By Rumbi Matamba and Chwayita Thobela

Over the past decade, the GI-TOC has documented a staggering 108% increase in targeted killings in South Africa. While South Africa has long grappled with high levels of violence, as evidenced by a per capita murder rate of 45 per 100,000 in 2022/23, or approximately 70 murders a day, targeted killings have notably escalated, particularly political killings at local municipal level. Hitmen have become more daring, incidents more public and victims more high-profile. Coupled with the deficiencies in South Africa’s overburdened criminal justice system, where only about 15% of all murders are solved, the picture that emerges is one of a situation that is barely contained.

GI-TOC recorded 131 targeted killings in South Africa in 2023, just ten fewer than in 2022. The 131 cases were grouped into four categories: organized-crime related (46 cases or 35% of incidents), minibus taxi-industry related (45 incidents, or 34%), political assassinations (31 incidents, or nearly 24%) and personal assassinations (9 incidents, or nearly 7%). While every effort is made to ensure that the data is robust and accurate, this is almost certainly an undercount as the database draws on publicly available information such as press reports, media statements from affected families, court records, and media statements by the criminal justice sector.

This report is framed in the context of South Africa’s 2024 general elections. Previous analysis has shown that there are always spikes in political assassinations during election years, particularly in long-contested provinces such as KwaZulu-Natal. The 2024 elections, the sixth national election in the country’s 30 years of democracy, have been earmarked as a potential watershed moment.

Political violence and assassinations pose a very real threat to the country’s democracy. They are not an isolated phenomenon and they intersect with organized crime and criminal networks. The intertwining of criminal networks and political assassinations in South Africa underscores the urgent need for comprehensive strategies to tackle organized crime and stop targeted killings.

Geneva, SWIT: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2024. 32p.

By Hannah Miles and Samantha Bricknell

The National Homicide Monitoring Program is Australia’s only national data collection on homicide incidents, victims and offenders. This report describes 232 homicide incidents recorded by Australian state and territory police between 1 July 2022 and 30 June 2023. During this 12-month period there were 247 victims of homicide and 260 identified offenders

Statistical Report no. 46. Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology, 2024. 49p.

By Ernesto Lopez, Robert Boxerman and Keley CundiffEErnes

Since shortly after the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, the Council on Criminal Justice has tracked changing rates of violent and property crime in large cities across the United States. The pandemic, as well as the social justice protests during the summer of 2020 and other factors, have altered the motives, means, and opportunities to commit crimes.

Prepared for the Council on Criminal Justice’s Crime Trends Working Group, this report focuses on trends in shoplifting, a subset of retail theft which, in turn, is a subset of overall larceny-theft. The FBI defines larceny-theft as the unlawful taking of property without force, violence, or fraud.

The report looks at shoplifting patterns from before the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic through mid-year 2023. To date, attempts to measure changes in retail theft, including organized retail theft, have relied on retail industry data5 or have been limited to one state.

The city-specific data included in this report are drawn from open-data sources from 24 cities that, over the past five years, have consistently reported specific shoplifting data. Additional data come from the U.S. Justice Department’s National Incident-Based Reporting Program (NIBRS).7 The NIBRS data include a sample of 3,812 local law enforcement agencies. The analyses examine the changing frequency of reported shoplifting, trends in other property offenses, changes in the value of stolen goods, offenses that co-occur with shoplifting, and the number of people involved in each incident.

This report does not discuss in detail shoplifting data from the National Retail Federation’s Retail Security Survey.8 The 2021 survey (data ending in 2020) was the last year the survey reported figures on the number of incidents and the value of stolen goods. Because of this change, data from the survey could not be included.

Due to a lack of available data, this report does not examine factors that could be influencing the trends. Potential factors include changes in retailers’ anti-theft measures and changes in how retailers report shoplifting to law enforcement, which could be based on their perceptions of the extent to which local police or prosecutors will apprehend suspects and pursue criminal charges. Because these data rely on reported incidents, they almost certainly undercount total shoplifting. The findings presented here should be viewed with these considerations in mind.

Washington, DC: Council on Criminal Justice, 2023. 8p.

By Lucy Bryant

Figures from the UK Office for National Statistics (2021a) suggest that alcohol-related violence in England and Wales has been declining – both as a total figure (1,001,000 in 2009/10 to 525,000 in 2019/20) and as a proportion of all violent incidents (54% in 2009/10 to 42% in 2019/20). ■ This decline remains unexplained and generally unexamined – however, there are existing bodies of research that might offer insight into this trend. ■ This report examines possible explanations for the decline seen in alcohol-related violence – drawing on existing literature exploring: changing patterns in violence (e.g., Farrell et al. 2014), alcohol’s relationship with violence (e.g., Graham & Livingston 2011), and the measurement of violence (e.g., Reiner 2016). ■ Changing patterns in youth drinking might contribute to this violence decline. It is younger, rather than older age groups, who predominantly engage in violence in night-time economy settings (Finney 2004). Youth drinking in England has seen a recent downturn (e.g., Oldham et al. 2018), corresponding to some degree with declines in alcohol-related violence.

■ A steeper decline in alcohol-related violence relative to violence overall appears to be accounted for by shi s in alcohol-related stranger and acquaintance violence. Crime Survey for England and Wales (CSEW) data show that the proportion of stranger and acquaintance violence incidents that were alcohol related fell between 2009/10 and 2019/20, whilst the proportion of domestic violence incidents which were alcohol-related generally remained stable. ■ It is possible data artefacts such as counting errors contained in national statistics form some part of the trend investigated here. While the CSEW is a widely respected data source (Tilley & Tseloni 2016), limitations in its capturing of violent incidents have been previously identified (e.g., Walby et al. 2016). It is important to consider the impact any such data artefact might have on alcohol related violence trends – investigation of the production of these National Statistics should be undertaken to assess this.   

London: Institute of Alcohol Studies, 2023. 21p.

BY Lyn Mikel Brown

For some time, reality TV, talk shows, soap-operas, and sitcoms have turned their spotlights on women and girls who thrive on competition and nastiness. Few fairytales lack the evil stepmother, wicked witch, or jealous sister. Even cartoons feature mean and sassy girls who only become sweet and innocent when adults appear. And recently, popular books and magazines have turned their gaze away from ways of positively influencing girls' independence and self-esteem and towards the topic of girls' meanness to other girls. What does this say about the way our culture views girlhood? How much do these portrayals affect the way girls view themselves?

In Girlfighting, psychologist and educator Lyn Mikel Brown scrutinizes the way our culture nurtures and reinforces this sort of meanness in girls. She argues that the old adage “girls will be girls”—gossipy, competitive, cliquish, backstabbing— and the idea that fighting is part of a developmental stage or a rite-of-passage, are not acceptable explanations. Instead, she asserts, girls are discouraged from expressing strong feelings and are pressured to fulfill unrealistic expectations, to be popular, and struggle to find their way in a society that still reinforces gender stereotypes and places greater value on boys. Under such pressure, in their frustration and anger, girls (often unconsciously) find it less risky to take out their fears and anxieties on other girls instead of challenging the ways boys treat them, the way the media represents them, or the way the culture at large supports sexist practices.

Girlfighting traces the changes in girls' thoughts, actions and feelings from childhood into young adulthood, providing the developmental understanding and theoretical explanation often lacking in other conversations. Through interviews with over 400 girls of diverse racial, economic, and geographic backgrounds, Brown chronicles the labyrinthine journey girls take from direct and outspoken children who like and trust other girls, to distrusting and competitive young women. She argues that this familiar pathway can and should be interrupted and provides ways to move beyond girlfighting to build girl allies and to support coalitions among girls.

By allowing the voices of girls to be heard, Brown demonstrates the complex and often contradictory realities girls face, helping us to better understand and critique the socializing forces in their lives and challenging us to rethink the messages we send them.

New York; London: NYU Press, 2003. 259p.

By Cindy D. Ness

In low-income U.S. cities, street fights between teenage girls are common. These fights take place at school, on street corners, or in parks, when one girl provokes another to the point that she must either “step up” or be labeled a “punk.” Typically, when girls engage in violence that is not strictly self-defense, they are labeled “delinquent,” their actions taken as a sign of emotional pathology. However, in Why Girls Fight, Cindy D. Ness demonstrates that in poor urban areas this kind of street fighting is seen as a normal part of girlhood and a necessary way to earn respect among peers, as well as a way for girls to attain a sense of mastery and self-esteem in a social setting where legal opportunities for achievement are not otherwise easily available.
Ness spent almost two years in west and northeast Philadelphia to get a sense of how teenage girls experience inflicting physical harm and the meanings they assign to it. While most existing work on girls’ violence deals exclusively with gangs, Ness sheds new light on the everyday street fighting of urban girls, arguing that different cultural standards associated with race and class influence the relationship that girls have to physical aggression.

New York; London: NYU Press, 2010. 198p.

By Bruce A. Jacobs, and Michael Cherbonneau

Carjacking is a violent crime with a broad motivational landscape related to the unique opportunities that a motor vehicle, as the item targeted, makes available to offenders once it is stolen. Although carjacking is technically a form of robbery, carjacking is a hybrid offense because it draws from elements of both regular robbery and motor vehicle theft. Nuanced in its etiology and expression, carjacking boasts a structure and process that require offenders to navigate multiple challenges under considerable time pressure and uncertainty. The fact that carjacking is so often opportunistic yet simultaneously requires a fair amount of calculation makes the offense even more subtle in its complexity. The purpose of this review is to examine these nuances through the lens of official data and existing empirical research. Nascent but growing, this research provides insight into the scope of the problem, the method and manner of the crime's commission, and the challenges of curbing a clear urban menace.

Annual Review of Criminology, v. 6. 2023, 24pg

By Luca Giommoni, Ruth Ikwu

   This study identifies the presence of human trafficking indicators in a UK-based sample of sex workers who advertise their services online. To this end, we devel oped a crawling and scraping software that enabled the collection of information from 17, 362 advertisements for female sex workers posted on the largest dedicated platform for sex work services in the UK. We then established a set of 10 indicators of human trafficking and a transparent and replicable methodology through which to detect their presence in our sample. Most of the advertisements (58.3%) contained only one indicator, while 3,694 of the advertisements (21.3%) presented 2 indicators of human trafficking. Only 1.7% of the advertisements reported three or more indica tors, while there were no advertisements that featured more than four. 3, 255 adver tisements (19.0%) did not contain any indicators of human trafficking. Based on this analysis, we propose that this approach constitutes an effective screening process for quickly identifying suspicious cases, which can then be examined by more compre hensive and accurate tools to identify if human trafficking is occurring. We conclude by calling for more empirical research into human trafficking indicators

Trends in Organized Crime. 2024, 14pg

By U.S. Government Accountability Office

   The U.S. and its global partners are experiencing the effects of a massive cybercrime wave, which is growing in frequency and scale. In 2021, the Federal Bureau of Investigation received a record number of cybercrime complaints, over 840,000, with potential losses exceeding $6.9 billion. Further, in 2022, the intelligence community noted an increase in ransomware attacks by transnational criminals, which threaten to cause disruptions of critical services worldwide. GAO was asked to review federal efforts to build the capacity of allies and partner nations to combat cybercrime. This report’s specific objectives were to (1) describe challenges in building global capacity to combat cybercrime, and (2) determine actions selected federal agencies are taking to build foreign nations’ capacity to combat cybercrime and the extent to which they are evaluating the effectiveness of their efforts. GAO interviewed agency officials and convened a panel of experts representing entities focused on capacity building to combat global cybercrime. GAO also analyzed documentation from State, DOJ, and DHS, which provide the majority of U.S. capacity building assistance. What GAO Recommends GAO is making one recommendation to State to conduct a comprehensive evaluation of capacity building efforts to counter cybercrime. State concurred with the recommendation. 

 Washington, DC: GAO, 2023. 49p.

By National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine; Division on Engineering and Physical Sciences; etc

Facial recognition technology is increasingly used for identity verification and identification, from aiding law enforcement investigations to identifying potential security threats at large venues. However, advances in this technology have outpaced laws and regulations, raising significant concerns related to equity, privacy, and civil liberties.

This report explores the current capabilities, future possibilities, and necessary governance for facial recognition technology. Facial Recognition Technology discusses legal, societal, and ethical implications of the technology, and recommends ways that federal agencies and others developing and deploying the technology can mitigate potential harms and enact more comprehensive safeguards.

Washington, DC: National Academies Press, 2024.

By Vivien Miller 

This essay uses the 1950 “case of the clinking brassieres” to explore female theft in Miami at mid-century and the ways in which gender, race, class, respectability, and youth offered protections and shaped treatment within Florida’s criminal justice system. It focuses on the illegal activities of three female telephone employees, their criminal prosecution, and post-conviction relief. These seemingly respectable coin thieves challenged a familiar image of theft as a lower-class crime associated with poverty and economic need, while their blonde hair and white skin (and an idealization of the meanings of white beauty standards), complicated public attitudes in a period when “true” or serious criminals were racketeers and organised crime operatives.

European Social Science History Conference, 2013. 39p.

By The National Association of Manufacturers

Amid an unprecedented global health crisis, manufacturers have stepped up and taken the lead, working together and with national, state and local governments to fight the spread of COVID-19. Manufacturers deliver day-to-day necessities, lifesaving medical innovations and products that improve people’s lives in countless ways. While the pandemic has demonstrated anew the importance of American innovation and ingenuity, it has also revealed a serious threat: counterfeit products that put lives and livelihoods at risk. Counterfeiting is not a new problem; it has harmed manufacturers, American workers and consumers for years. But the problem is getting worse, and the COVID-19 pandemic has shown just how dangerous inaction can be. As part of the nation’s critical response effort, manufacturers have been supplying health care workers and other Americans on the front lines of this crisis with vital goods, including personal protective equipment, hospital beds, ventilators, hand sanitizers, cleaning supplies and other critical health care and safety products. But while manufacturing men and women work long hours to ramp up production of desperately needed products to fight the spread of this deadly illness, counterfeiters have exploited the crisis to peddle fake tests, dangerous vaccines and ineffective protective gear. These counterfeits are harming American citizens and hindering manufacturers’ efforts to protect their workers and communities. The prevalence of counterfeits in the COVID-19 response has brought new urgency to this long-simmering issue. So the National Association of Manufacturers is leading the charge against fake and counterfeit goods, bringing together diverse stakeholders and driving innovative policy solutions to address these issues once and for all and to ensure the long-term success of our sector and the safety and security of the people who rely on our products. 

Washington, DC: National Association of Manufacturers, 2020.  21p.

By John Dunham & Associates

The Retail Industry Leaders Association (RILA) is the US trade association for retailers that have earned leadership status by virtue of their sales volume, innovation, or aspiration. The Buy Safe America Coalition (BSA) represents a diverse group of responsible retailers, consumer groups, manufacturers, intellectual property advocates and law enforcement officials who support efforts at all levels of government to protect consumers and communities from the sale of counterfeit and stolen goods. One important issue facing US retailers is the growth in the availability and sales of illicit products, both from counterfeit imports and from products stolen from legitimate retailers. These products are increasingly sold online through third-party marketplaces. RILA and BSA asked John Dunham & Associates (JDA) to examine the data around these illicit sales to determine how they impact the US economy, federal tax revenues, and criminal activity. This is the second in a series of papers examining the issue of organized retail crime (ORC), and its effect on the United States economy. This analysis will focus on product theft from brick-and- mortar retailers and the rise of organized theft operations that fence illegally obtained goods to consumers, increasingly online. While this paper focuses solely on those goods stolen from retail locations, there is a growing problem with consumer goods being stolen from containers and trucks as the supply chain has backed up in recent months. For the purpose of this analysis, cargo theft was not included. According to the analysis: • As much as $68.9 billion worth of products were stolen from retailers in 2019. This represents about 1.5 percent of total retail sales. • Law enforcement and retail asset protection officials have found that the availability of anonymous online marketplaces has provided an easy way to sell stolen goods, and that the growth of these marketplaces coincides with a recent surge in organized retail crime that puts both employees and customers in harm’s way. • Academic research has suggested that most retail theft represent crimes of opportunity. In other words, people steal when it is easy to do so. Other causes include poor economic conditions, and dissatisfaction among workers. However, professionals in the field identify the availability of anonymous on-line marketplaces as ways to easily fence goods, and prosecutorial changes as being major factors contributing to the growth in ORC. • The growth in on-line marketplaces is highly correlated (61 percent) to the number of shoplifting events reported each year. • In addition, those retail categories most subject to shoplifting activities are also the ones most sought after through on-line marketplaces. • Nearly 67 percent of asset protection managers at leading retailers surveyed report a moderate to considerable increase in organized retail crime, while 80 percent believe it will only get worse in the future.  The economic impact of retail crime is profound. Retailers face increased costs for lost product, security, and labor, which lead to higher prices for consumers and ultimately, lower sales. Lower sales translate to fewer jobs throughout the economy. The result is $125.7 billion in lost economic activity and 658,375 fewer jobs, paying almost $39.3 billion in wages and benefits to workers. • Retail theft is not a problem just in major metropolitan areas, it is pervasive across America. In fact, one factor that is associated with lower levels of retail theft is the density of retail locations. • The impact of theft is felt through higher prices, and this impact is more acutely felt by low- and middle-income families. • It is estimated that retail theft costs federal and state governments nearly $15 billion in personal and business tax revenues, not including the lost sales taxes.

Washington DC: Retail Industry Leaders Association (RILA) ;  Washington, DC:  Buy Safe American Coalition, 75p.

By John Dunham & Associate

  The Buy Safe America Coalition represents a diverse group of responsible retailers, consumer groups, manufacturers, intellectual property advocates and law enforcement officials who support efforts at all levels of government to protect consumers and communities from the sale of counterfeit and stolen goods. One important issue facing US businesses is the massive growth in the availability and sales of illicit products, both from counterfeit imports — increasingly from China — and from products stolen from legitimate retailers and sold through online marketplaces, where the anonymity of a screenname has made it easier and more profitable to fence counterfeit and stolen goods. The Coalition asked John Dunham & Associates (JDA) to examine the data around these illicit sales to determine how they impact the US economy, federal tax revenues, and criminal activity. This is the first of a series of papers examining the issue of counterfeit and stolen goods and its effect on the United States economy. This analysis will focus on the importation of illicit products, notably counterfeits that violate producers’ intellectual property rights. Future analysis will examine the effects of domestic smuggling, the resale of stolen goods, and the effects of contraband on overall criminal activity. According to the analysis: • A large share of contraband items are delivered to US consumers by mail or by express consignment. These transactions account for over 60.8 percent of all seizures by the US customs service and over 90 percent of intellectual property rights (IPR) seizures. The growth in these types of shipments has increased along with the use of online marketplaces. Amazon, for instance, now derives more than 75 percent of their ecommerce revenue from marketplace sales. • In effect, as companies like the Chinese ecommerce marketplace Alibaba and the Amazon marketplace, have linked more consumers to more shippers, many companies producing illegitimate products have gained access to unwitting consumers in America. • The bulk of counterfeit products to the US come from China and its dependent territories, accounting for over 90.6 percent of all cargo with IPR violations. Of the $1.23 billion in total IPR violations intercepted, $1.12 billion was from China. • Examining just those data where CBP can provide an HS code, in some cases, the amount of contraband cargo is nearly equal to the entire import base. For example, imports of certain sweaters, jumpsuits and toys from China are almost 100 percent contraband, as are large amounts of handbags, jewelry and belts. • While there is substantial academic literature on the smuggling of narcotics, people and tobacco, there is very little written on counterfeit products. Using a very conservative model it is estimated that $44.3 billion in additional illicit cargo is escaping detection. • These lost sales alone mean that over 39,860 jobs in wholesaling and nearly 283,400 retail jobs are lost due to the impact of counterfeit goods skirting normal trade channels. All told, the sale of counterfeit items is expected to cost the wholesale and retail sectors of the US economy nearly 653,450 full-time equivalent jobs that pay over $33.6 billion in wages and benefits to US workers. • It is estimated that the smuggling of counterfeit goods costs the US government nearly $7.2 billion in personal and business tax revenues alone. • This analysis is based on the current level of CBP intercepts of illicit cargo. It is likely that the number of illegal imports is much larger than even estimated here.  

Washington, DC: Buy Safe America Coalition, 2021. 25p.

By Galen Englund and Jessica White

This report provides a review of the research on the exploitation of gaming and gaming‑adjacent platforms by violent extremists and the policies seeking to mitigate the impact of that exploitation. There is increasing interest in the nexus of online gaming and (violent) extremism. This report builds on the work of the Extremism and Gaming Research Network (EGRN) to provide a primer for those new to this space and an updated state of play of the cutting‑edge research taking place among members of the network and beyond. The report is divided into three sections. First, it lays out the online gaming ecosystem. The report identifies gamers, the unique individual and community identity formations that can happen in these spaces and the multifaceted environment in which this takes place, including games, gaming‑adjacent spaces and beyond. Second, it builds upon and enhances a typology of potential harms in the online gaming ecosystem. This typology allows clarification of the different ways in which extremism can both spread through these spaces and how extremists can specifically exploit these spaces and communities. Third, it provides an overview of some of the efforts that are currently ongoing to mitigate these potential harms. This includes efforts in the tech industry to reinforce policies and moderation efforts, by game designers to address potential challenges at an early stage and by practitioners who use online gaming engagement or gamification to prevent and counter violent extremism effectively. Finally, the report concludes by looking to the future of this exponentially expanding space. It offers some recommendations for research, policy and practice to better understand and address the threat of extremism within online gaming to protect and enhance online gaming as a positive engagement space.

London: Global Network on Extremism & Technology, 2023. 36p.

By Suzanne Newcombe, Sarah Harvey, Jane Cooper, Ruby Forrester, Jo Banks and Shanon Shah

The word ‘cultic’ is applied to a diverse range of online activity. This label is not always intended to convey a negative judgement; for example, individual influencers, music groups and brands aspire to a ‘cult following’. However, the use of the words ‘cult’ or ‘cultic’ is usually intended by the speaker as a judgement to draw attention to something that may have some elements typically associated with religion (for example, idealisation of a particular individual, a specific worldview and/or ritual practices) as well as the potential to cause harm and violence. This report proposes three ideal-typical groupings of online cultic activity that can glorify and inspire violent extremisms: ‘Cultic’ Religious Groups, ‘Online Cultic Milieus’ and ‘Cultic Fandoms’. This is not an exhaustive description of online activity that has been termed ‘cultic’ in popular culture, but it provides a good starting point for further analysis. This report argues that the understanding of ‘cults’ and online activity needs to be carefully nuanced; the complexities of online and offline activities that might result in violent extremism need to be analysed and risk assessed at the level of both group/social movement and individual. It is important to understand that there are a range of ways individuals interact with these cultic online environments that may or may not represent warning signs or pathways into violent extremism. A holistic understanding of both the nature of the cultic online milieu and an individual’s engagement with that environment is warranted before making assumptions about the nature of any individual’s engagement.

London: Global Network on Extremism and Technology (GNET), July 2023.

By Nafees Hamid and Cristina Ariza

Question: Are those radicalised offline or online more of a threat? Which group is harder to detect, more successful in completing attacks, and more lethal when they do so? Is the pattern different for youth versus older perpetrators and for men versus women? This report investigates these questions. Database: We created a database containing 439 perpetrators involved in 245 attacks between 1 January 2014 and 1 January 2021. It includes every publicly known completed attack and an extensive sampling of thwarted attacks. Attacks were all jihadist‑linked in eight Western countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Spain, the United Kingdom and the United States. Type of radicalisation: In our database, radicalisation primarily happens offline; over half the individuals in our database had been radicalised via offline networks. Success and lethality: Individuals who were radicalised offline were three times more likely than individuals radicalised online to complete an attack successfully. Those radicalised offline are 18 times more lethal than individuals in the online category. Those radicalised online are almost eight times more likely to fail than to succeed. Group attacks: Individuals who were radicalised offline are almost three times more likely to attack or plot in groups than individuals radicalised online. Success of group attacks: While groups were more likely to be thwarted by the police than to succeed (regardless of how individuals had been radicalised), successful groups of people radicalised offline were more lethal than their lone actor counterparts (15%). Family and friends: Some 87% of those with radicalised friends and 74% with radicalised relatives plotted or attacked together. Foreign fighters: Foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs), who were mostly radicalised offline, have the same success rate as non‑FTFs. But success rate increases if they have spent more than a year in a terrorist training location. Age: Online radicalisation is on the rise for young people (born from the 2000s onwards), although most individuals, including young people, are still radicalised offline. Gender: Women appear to be more likely to have been radicalised online. Bottom line: Those radicalised offline are greater in number, more successful in completing attacks and more deadly than those radicalised online.  

London: International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation, King’s College London. 2022. 40p.

By: Felix Soldner, Bennett Kleinberg, and Shane D Johnson

Counterfeits harm consumers, governments, and intellectual property holders. They accounted for 3.3% of worldwide trades in 2016, having an estimated value of $509 billion in the same year. While estimations are mostly based on border seizures, we examined openly labeled counterfeits on darknet markets, which allowed us to gather and analyze information from a different perspective. Here, we analyzed data from 11 darknet markets for the period Jan-2014 and Sep-2015. The findings suggest that darknet markets harbor similar counterfeit product types as found in seizures but that the share of watches is higher and lower for electronics, clothes, shoes, and Tobacco on darknet markets. Also, darknet market counterfeits seem to have similar shipping origins as seized goods, with some exceptions, such as a relatively high share (5%) of dark market counterfeits originating from the US. Lastly, counterfeits on dark markets tend to have a relatively low price and sales volume. However, based on preliminary estimations, the original products on the surface web seem to be worth a multiple of the prices of the counterfeit counterparts on darknet markets. Gathering insights about counterfeits from darknet markets can be valuable for businesses and authorities and be cost-effective compared to border seizures. Thus, monitoring darknet markets can help us understand the counterfeit landscape better.

Crime Science (2023) 12:18

By Coen Teunissen and Sarah Napier

We analysed the chat logs of seven Australia-based men who had committed 145 child sexual abuse (CSA) live streaming offences, to examine the overlap between this offending, contact sexual offending and engagement with child sexual abuse material (CSAM).

Four CSA live streaming offenders attempted to travel to offend against victims in person, in that they discussed travelling or actually booked flights in order to meet these children. Offenders also requested or received images and videos of victims they had viewed over live stream, and recorded live streams to produce CSAM.

Travelling to offend against children, use of CSAM and CSA live streaming appear to be interrelated and should be considered by law enforcement as potential risk factors for one another. Further, detection and removal of new CSAM, and scanning of live streams for abusive content, should be a priority for all electronic service providers.

Trends & issues in crime and criminal justice no. 671. Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology. 2023. 16p.

By Danni Zhang, Regina Frei, P.K. Senyo, Steffen Bayer, Enrico Gerding, Gary Wills and Adrian Beck

The growth of online retailing has exceeded expectations over the last few years. This has resulted in high product return rates, which retailers are struggling with due to complex and costly returns processing, logistics, and financial implications. Additionally, online returns come with increased opportunities for returns fraud. During the pandemic, new types of returns fraud have emerged and returns fraud rates have increased across all channels. Based on a series of semi-structured interviews with retailers and retail experts, we investigate factors that enable fraudulent returns from consumers' and retailers’ perspectives and outline strategies for retailers to combat product returns fraud in a multichannel environment, leading to a framework for retail fraud. We contribute critical insights to research and practices on understanding and addressing a growing problem that has economic, social and environmental implications.

Journal of retailing and consumer services, Vol.70, 2023. 103145