By Cathy Haenlein, Sasha Erskine, Elijah Glantz and Tom Keatinge

Sanctions are increasingly being used to tackle a range of specific issues. These include sanctions that respond to human rights abuses, combat corruption and address malicious cyber activity. As sanctions use has broadened, the question of their application to organised criminal activity is increasingly raised; yet the use of sanctions for this reason has remained limited to a specific set of issuers, notably the US, and more recently, the UN. In the UK, the government has advanced its vision of an ambitious post-Brexit independent sanctions regime, with the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018 allowing sanctions use ‘in the interests of national security’ (HMG, 2018). New regimes addressing human rights and corruption have emerged. With serious and organised crime deemed a national security threat by the UK government, there is a case to add a sanctions regime to address this particular threat (HMG, 2018). The National Crime Agency itself has called for a legislative amendment to reference serious and organised crime as grounds for sanctions use (HMG, 2021). However, little research or evaluation has been undertaken to assess the impact of sanctions on organised crime. With US sanctions used over almost three decades to disrupt cross-border trafficking, the lack of a body of rigorous relevant research is a key shortcoming. Similarly, few past initiatives have sought to assess the lessons these experiences hold for future sanctions issuers in this space. With interest mounting in the potential use of organised crime-related sanctions, this represents a critical limitation. In seeking to address the gap, this paper reviews existing evidence on the use and impact of sanctions to disrupt organised criminal activity. It focuses on two case studies, Colombia and Libya, in differing regions of the world and with different exposure to organised crime-focused sanctions. While Colombia tops the list of states globally for organised crime-focused sanctions on individuals and entities in its territory (with the third-highest number of relevant listings since 2016), Libya’s exposure is more recent and limited. Libya nonetheless has experience of listings under UN and US country regimes relating to fuel smuggling, people smuggling and human trafficking. Here, it differs markedly from Colombia, which is the epitome of the historic US approach to narcotics-related sanctions. This paper analyses organised crime-related sanctions data, examines the current state of knowledge relating to the implementation and impact of these sanctions, and draws on the tw wo case studies. It identifies a number of factors that influence the effectiveness of organised crime-focused sanctions, including:

• The extent to which the host government of the sanction’s target is willing to cooperate with the sanction’s issuer.

• The extent to which the issuance of sanctions is embedded within a coherent broader strategic approach.

• The overarching focus of the regime within which relevant designations are made.

• The need for clear objectives when applying sanctions.

• Resourcing and engagement of key agencies in both the country of issuance and the target’s host country.

• Divergent levels of vulnerability of key actors across the related illicit trade chain. With these factors and the broader findings of the research in mind, this paper concludes with a set of ten considerations for those countries that may, in the future, consider introducing organized crime-focused sanctions.

SOC ACE Research Paper No. 1. Birmingham, UK: University of Birmingham. . 2022. 51p.

Edited by Adam Lynes, Craig Kelly, and Kevin Hoffin

In recent decades the video games industry has grown astronomically, quickly becoming a substantial part of our everyday lives. Alongside the rise of this technology, the media, academia and, in some cases, governments, have drawn correlations between video games and serious instances of violence, focusing most notably on mass shootings. This narrow debate has distracted from our understanding of many of the harms which video games can, in some cases, cause, perpetuate or hide. Drawing upon the emerging deviant leisure perspective, this book seeks to re-orientate the debate on video games and their associated potential harms. Through the examination of culturally embedded harms such as gambling, sexual violence and addiction, together with the rise in swatting and other activities, the authors explore the notion that video games are inexplicably intertwined with aspects of deviancy.

Bingley, UK: Emerald Publishing, 2020. 208p.

By Prem Mahadevan, Maria Khoruk, Alla Mohammad Mohmandzai and Ruggero Scaturro

How will the new Taliban regime change Afghanistan’s illicit drug landscape in the coming years? Are the Taliban genuinely committed to combating the flow of narcotics within and outside Afghanistan, as signalled by the ban on opium cultivation issued by the Taliban leadership in April 2022?

Based on field research coordinated by the Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime (GI-TOC) in the Afghan provinces of Helmand and Nangarhar, this paper analyses the changes to the Afghan drug economy since the Taliban’s return to power on 15 August 2021, documenting the adaptation of local actors engaged in the opium economy to the events that had a profound impact on their lives. Historical analysis supplements the field research findings and aids our understanding of the shifting conditions of the illicit drug economy in Afghanistan. Given the institutional weakness of Afghan statehood after nearly five decades of civil war, the GI-TOC’s approach represents a collation of provincial and district-level assessments rather than a comprehensive country-wide assessment.

This research paper outlines the complexities of local conditions and reveals a regime fragmented among varied interests and power structures, seeking to reconcile the profitability of the drugs trade with the strive for legitimacy.

University of Birmingham, Research Paper No. 27. 2023, 31pg

By Atanas Rusev, et al.

Organized property crime is considered to be a significant criminal market affecting virtually all members states of the European Union. Organized property crime is reportedly being committed by highly mobile organized crime groups (MOCG). These groups have been engaging in various forms of property crime, such as motor vehicle theft throughout Europe. At European level, ongoing initiatives are supporting member states in the fight against organized property crime. Nonetheless, to date still little is known on the logistical processes of motor vehicle theft across EU member states and in Europe as a whole. Within this context, this project aims at enhancing the knowledge of organized property crime in the form of motor vehicle crime, which includes motor vehicle theft and the sale of stolen vehicle parts.

Vehicle Crime Barrier, 2023, 46p.

By: Atanas Rusev, Tihomir Bezlov, Flamma Terenghi

Organized property crime is a pervasive issue across all EU Member States, demanding immediate and collective action. V-BAR specifically targets one aspect of organized property crime: motor vehicle crime, encompassing theft and the illicit trade of stolen vehicle parts. Despite a decline in vehicle theft, the overall prevalence of motor vehicle crime remains alarmingly high. This comprehensive report outlines V-BAR’s objectives in enhancing operational cooperation between EU law enforcement authorities and private partners to combat the menace posed by mobile organized crime groups involved in vehicle theft. Additionally, the report delves into an extensive investigation of motor vehicle theft trends within six EU countries, namely Belgium, Bulgaria, Germany, France, and The Netherlands, providing valuable insights for combating this form of criminal activity.

CrimRxiv. https://doi.org/10.21428/cb6ab371.af77f1d4 2023.

By Organization of American States , Department against Transnational Organized Crime

The illegal gold trade is a growing and significant challenge in Ecuador. The spread of illegal gold mining activity has brought surges of violence and instability to remote areas while attracting organized crime, at the local and international level, and triggering an increase in money laundering and contraband. Concern regarding the disruptive and harmful impact of illegal gold mining, as well as the government’s desire to develop and expand Ecuador’s mining sector away from its reliance on small-scale and artisanal operations, have also led to a renewed focus on the challenges posed by illegal mining. There is reason to believe that the illegal gold trade and its associated criminal networks are less entrenched and developed in Ecuador than in neighboring Peru and Colombia. However, there are significant challenges facing the government as it works to combat illegal mining activity, which is increasingly accelerated by illicit cross-border contraband flows and unique vulnerabilities to money laundering activity.

Washington, DC: OAS, 2021. 46p.

By Transnational Alliance to Combat Illicit Trade (TRACIT)

The Philippines, with its strategic location in the heart of Southeast Asia and its dynamic economy, is one of the fastest-growing economies in Southeast Asia, and a leader in the Association of Southeast Asia Nations (ASEAN). However, the country’s position as a vital maritime gateway in the region, coupled with its robust economic activities, has rendered it susceptible to a spectrum of illicit practices. From counterfeit goods flooding local markets to the underground movement of smuggled products, the illegal wildlife trade, and the intricate networks of money laundering, the Philippines faces significant challenges in its ongoing battle against these illicit activities

New York: The Transnational Alliance to Combat Illicit Trade (TRACIT), 2023. 48p.

By Tena Prelec

Information manipulation has been a growing concern in recent years, particularly in relation to the disinformation tactics employed by authoritarian regimes. However, the role of non-state actors, such as organized crime (OC) groups, in information manipulation has been largely overlooked. This research aims to fill this gap by examining the various ways in which OC groups manipulate information to achieve their objectives and those of actors connected to them. Drawing on Nicholas Barnes’ concept of ‘political criminality’ (2017), this study examines the varying degrees of proximity between criminal actors and the state, which is essential in exploring the complex interplay between OC and information manipulation. Empirical data was collected from several geographies, with a particular focus on Eastern Europe and the post-Soviet space, including Ukraine, Russia, Moldova (Transnistria), and Albania. The research highlights several dimensions of interest, including: the changing opportunities that technology gives to OC groups to shape facts and narratives; media ownership by organised crime groups and criminal actors; and the ways in which this interplay is situated within the global political economy of offshore finance – including the wider networks of enablers these actors rely on. By shedding light on these aspects, the research seeks to contribute to a more comprehensive understanding of the threat posed by the misuse of information, situates it within the literatures on non-state actors and transnational kleptocracy, and puts forward a framework for analysis that can be tested in future work.

Birmingham, UK: SOC ACE Research Paper 22. University of Birmingham 2023. 44p,

By Alex Papadovassilakis, et al

El Salvador’s gangs are in disarray.

For decades, the Mara Salvatrucha (MS13) and two factions of the 18th Street (Barrio 18) dominated the small Central American nation’s criminal landscape. The gangs embedded themselves in poor communities, terrorizing urban dwellers with extortion and murders. Successive governments tried and failed to dismantle the gangs with aggressive security policies, known as mano dura (iron fist).

In March 2022, the government of El Salvador President Nayib Bukele enacted a state of emergency (régimen de excepción) in response to a brutal gang massacre that left 87 dead. Buoyed by emergency powers, security forces tore through the gangs, arresting tens of thousands of suspected gang members and collaborators. Those who escaped arrest went underground or into exile. In a flash, the MS13 and Barrio 18 all but vanished from the streets of El Salvador.

But though battered and bruised, a surprising number of gang members remain at large. The country’s prisons, once incubators for the gangs, have never been so full.

This six-part investigation looks at how the Bukele government’s crackdown succeeded in overpowering the MS13 and Barrio 18. We assess what remains of the gangs in El Salvador, and contemplate whether these structures could one day return or mutate.

Washington, DC; Medellin, Columbia: InSight Crime, 2023.56p.

By: Bryan Avelar, Juan José Martínez

Moskitia is dying. And it is organized crime that is killing it.

First came the drugs, as traffickers turned the region’s coasts and forests into a cocaine corridor. Then came the traffickers themselves, financing invaders that are clear-cutting thousands of hectares of forest and fencing off vast tracts of land with barbed wire and armed guards.

The region’s Indigenous Miskito people have been left trapped in desperate poverty, and are caught between the traffickers and an indifferent state. But some are now preparing to fight back.

Washington, DC, Columbia: InSight Crime, 2023. 64p..

By Jenni Irish-Qhobosheane

Our new report focuses on the pervasive issue of copper theft in South Africa. This socio-economic challenge has severe consequences on the country's already strained infrastructure, affecting the capacity and operations of state-owned entities and municipalities.

Our 2022 South Africa Strategic Organized Crime Risk Assessment revealed that the nation's critical infrastructure is 'at a tipping point after years of chronic mismanagement and rampant theft,' noting the role of copper theft as an exacerbating factor. In light of this alarming situation, our latest report delves into the repercussions of copper theft on South Africa's infrastructure and its links to organized crime networks.

This comprehensive study examines the value chain and market dynamics for stolen copper, a familiar yet often overlooked area where criminal enterprises have become deeply entrenched. With a focus on solutions, the report outlines measures taken to combat copper theft and explores possible future strategies for addressing this growing concern.

Geneva, SWIT: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2023. 60p.

By Lyes Tagziria and Lucia Bird Ruiz Benitez de Lugo

West Africa is one of the world’s most vibrant and diverse regions; home to over 400 million people, around 1 200 languages and many different religious and ethnic identities. The region’s economic growth since the turn of the century has been impressive, resulting in a significant reduction in absolute levels of poverty. Nevertheless, with rampant insecurity at the hands of violent extremists, armed groups and criminal bandits, political instability, limited economic opportunities for the region’s burgeoning youth population and the worsening impact of climate change, West Africa faces many complex challenges.

With over 20 000 conflict fatalities across the region in 2022 alone, violence in West Africa, especially in the Sahel region, is at unprecedented levels. According to the ACLED Conflict Severity Index, three countries in West Africa – Mali, Burkina Faso and Nigeria – have extreme or high levels of conflict. Illicit economies play an important role in sustaining instability across the region.

The security and well-being of citizens across the ECOWAS region is affected not only by violent conflict, but by myriad, interwoven factors from economic prosperity to political representation, justice and security, social cohesion, freedom and much more. In this context the concept of human security, as opposed to the narrower concept of state security, has increasingly become the focus of policymakers across West Africa.

As set out in the ECOWAS Country Risk and Vulnerability Assessments (CRVAs), ‘the human security framework provides a holistic approach to understanding different threats that affect individuals’ lives, whether this is through conflict, health, food, environment, or other social, political or economic factors’.

A key component of this human-centric approach to security, focused on reducing harm to the people of West Africa, is prevention. This requires comprehensive, accurate and timely data on existing and future threats and is therefore one of the main rationales behind the work of the ECOWAS Commission, through both the Early Warning Directorate and the ENACT Organized Crime Index. While the objectives of the index are manifold, its principal aim is to build an evidence base to underpin responses to organized crime.

The 2021 ENACT Organized Crime Index identified the West Africa region as having the second-highest level of criminality on the African continent, with human trafficking, drugs and the illicit trade in non-renewable resources forming the most prevalent criminal markets. The region placed in second once again in the latest iteration of the index, the 2023 Global Organized Crime Index.

In 2023, West Africa overtook Southern Africa as the region with the highest resilience score on the continent, pointing to comparatively high levels of resilience even in areas affected by significant criminal markets. The index highlighted legislative frameworks, civil society actors and the region’s international collaboration in the fight against organized crime as relative regional strengths. Overall levels of resilience, however, both objectively and within the global context, are weak.

The index’s findings provides a statistical underpinning for the relationship between illicit markets, security and stability, demonstrating a strong negative correlation between criminality and peacefulness. In other words, the less peaceful a country, the more likely it is to be afflicted by high levels of organized crime. In other words, the less peaceful a country, the more likely it is to be afflicted by high levels of organized crime. Responding to illicit economies which pose a threat to these goals must be a central element of programming. In line with this, the Organized Crime Resilience Framework (OCRF) examines the major organized-crime threats facing the West African region, as identified by the index and the CRVAs published by the ECOWAS Early Warning Directorate.

While the index is devoted to organized crime, the CRVAs focus on conflict and human security more broadly. Drawing on both these datasets engenders a conflict-sensitive and human-security-focused assessment of organized crime in West Africa, encompassing threats and vulnerabilities, as well as potential sources of resilience.

Geneva, SWIT: Global Initiative Against International Organized Crime, Ecowas Commission, 2023.

By Marina Caparini

This SIPRI Report examines how organized crime is intertwined with armed conflict and hybrid governance systems in three states that currently host United Nations stabilization missions. It surveys the conflict/crime/governance nexus in the Central African Republic (CAR), the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), and Mali, and how UN stabilization missions, in particular the UN Police, have engaged with the challenge of organized crime.

The report argues that improving how UN stabilization interventions engage with organized crime will require a frank assessment of the significance of organized crime in systems of governance and patronage, of the role of organized crime as a driver and enabler of armed conflict by non-state armed groups, and of the involvement of state-embedded actors in illicit markets. The complex links between conflict and governance actors and organized crime in the settings examined raise fundamental questions about the assumptions underlying peace operations. The report concludes with a set of recommendations on how to move to more realistic analyses and bases for peace operations.

Solna: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2022. 57p.

By Mark Freeman and Barney Afako

Co-authored by Mark Freeman and Barney Afako, the publication offers simplified technical guidance directed to any good-faith promoter of formal negotiation with one or more violent criminal groups when the proposed endgame of the negotiation is to reduce or end the criminal violence in question. In doing so, the paper draws on key ideas developed in IFIT’s ground-breaking report, Negotiating with Violent Criminal Groups: Lessons and Guidelines from Global Practice (Freeman & Velbab-Brown, 2021), which covers the most diverse set of negotiations with criminal groups ever examined in one place.

The first part of Freeman and Afako's practice note examines threshold questions a good-faith promoter would be wise to consider before outwardly exploring or proposing any negotiation involving a criminal group; the second part discusses internal and external actions a good-faith promoter ought to contemplate as part of any initial phase of formal engagement or negotiation with members of a criminal group.

Barcelona: Institute for Integrated Transitions (IFIT) , 2024. 3p.

By The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe

This report offers empirical evidence and case studies from across the OSCE area on how women are recruited into organized crime groups, their roles within them, and how and why they exit these groups. It demonstrates that the role of women in organized crime is nuanced. Evidence shows that while women are often exploited and victimized by organized crime groups, they can also be important actors. Yet persistent gender stereotypes mean that women’s agency in organized crime is often not recognized by criminal justice practitioners. Failing to recognize women’s agency in organized crime impedes the understanding in participating States of the complexity of the organized crime landscape, and hampers their ability to combat transnational organized crime or support women to leave organized crime groups.

Vienna: OSCE, 2023. 72p.

By Alaina De Biasi Edmund F. McGarrell Scott E. Wolfe

Historically, crime in the United States has been measured by the Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) system administered by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). In this system, local, county, state, Tribal and federal law enforcement agencies submit summary crime data on incidents and arrests to the UCR system. Crime patterns and trends can then be analyzed and tracked at local, state, and national levels. 

United States, Michigan Justice Statistics Center, School of Criminal Justice, Michigan State University. 2023. 33pg

By John Gramlich

More Americans died of gun-related injuries in 2020 than in any other year on record, according to recently published statistics from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). That included a record number of gun murders, as well as a nearrecord number of gun suicides. Despite the increase in such fatalities, the rate of gun deaths – a statistic that accounts for the nation’s growing population – remains below the levels of earlier years.

United States, Pew Research Center. 2022. 7pg.

By Michael Heise

Two broad trends inform public K-12 education’s current trajectory. One involves persisting (and recently increasing) school racial isolation which helps account for an array of costs borne by students, schools, and communities. A second trend, involving a dramatically increasing police presence in schools, is evidenced by a rising school resource officer (“SRO/police”) presence in schools. Increases in the magnitude of a school’s SRO/police presence correspond with increases in the school’s propensity to engage law enforcement agencies in student disciplinary matters which, in turn, help fuel a growing school-to-prison pipeline problem. While these two broad trends propel two distinct research literatures, these research literatures do not meaningfully engage with one another. Empirical research is largely silent on the degree to which, if at all, variation in a school’s racial isolation level influences how its SRO/police presence interacts with the school’s propensity to report student discipline issues to law enforcement agencies. This Article examines whether variation in school racial isolation levels informs whether a school’s SRO/police presence influences the school’s law enforcement reporting rates. Results from this study imply that any such influence is confined to schools where non-white student enrollment ranges from 11% to 50%. The research literature on tipping points provides one helpful interpretative lens to better understand why this specific school racial isolation band systematically differs from others when it comes to SRO/police presence’s influence on a school’s propensity to report student discipline matters to law enforcement agencies.

Buffalo Law Review Vol. 71, No. 2 (2023)

By International Crisis Group

What’s new? Mexico’s criminal groups use social media to garner popular support, denigrate rivals, glorify narco-culture and coordinate violence. Social media is also crucial for providing timely information about flare-ups of violence, particularly since journalists face major threats to their safety, which heavily circumscribes their ability to report from many crime-affected municipalities.

Why does it matter? These criminal groups are recruiting and spreading disinformation online, making them stronger and creating a glut of unverified information that puts civilians at greater risk. Platforms have struggled to respond appropriately.

What should be done? Platforms should boost resources for online monitoring, especially when violence is spiking. Given social media’s importance in disseminating information, platforms should modify their algorithms to demote posts supporting criminal groups and work with civil society to identify trusted accounts, including anonymous ones. Mexico’s government should also invest in protecting journalists.

Brussels: Crisis Group, 2024

By Abigail Weitzman, Mónica Caudillo, and Eldad J. Levy

In this review, we argue that to understand patterns and causes of violence in contemporary Latin America, we must explicitly consider when violence takes on interpersonal qualities. We begin by reviewing prominent definitions and measurements of interpersonal violence. We then detail the proliferation of interlocking sources of regional insecurity, including gender-based violence, gangs, narcotrafficking, vigilantism, and political corruption. Throughout this description, we highlight when and how each source of insecurity can become interpersonal. Next, we outline mutually reinforcing macro and micro conditions underlying interpersonal violence in its many hybrid forms. To conclude, we call for more multifaceted conceptualizations of interpersonal violence that embrace the complexities of Latin American security situations and discuss the opportunities and challenges that lie ahead in this area.

Annual Review of Criminology, Volume 7, Page 163 - 186