By The: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime

Illicit financial flows (IFFs)- financial flows that are illicit in origin, transfer, or use, that reflect an exchange of value and cross country borders – are major impediments to sustainable development. They divert important resources away from state revenue and public investments, foster impunity, and ultimately erode criminal justice systems as a whole. The harmful effects of illicit Financial flows and the need to reduce them are demonstrated by their inclusion in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development as Target 16.4. It stipulates the goal to “significantly reduce illicit financial flows and arms flows, strengthen the recovery and return of stolen assets and combat all forms of organized crime”. Progress towards this target is measured by SDG Indicator 16.4.1 (the “total value of inward and outward IFFs in current US dollars”), for which UNODC is the custodian together with UNCTAD.

Organized crimes vary in their characteristics, objectives, and the extent to which they cross national borders. Consequently, the amount and nature of the IFFs they generate also varies. Given the transnational nature of smuggling of migrants (SOM) and cross-border trafficking in persons (TIP), monitoring and combatting IFFs is crucially important for disrupting, prosecuting, and dismantling the organized criminal networks committing these dangerous crimes.

This Study focuses on the trends, nuances, and complexities surrounding IFFs associated with smuggling of migrants and trafficking in persons into the European Union (EU), with specific attention paid to those relating to GLO.ACT partner countries.1 It is based on an analysis of available data, field research findings, and review of secondary literature.

Vienna: UNODC, 2023. 86p.

By The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)

Key Takeaways Significant gross income from illicit drug trafficking Between 2019 and 2022, the Balkan route – a major corridor for trafficking opiates and, more recently, methamphetamine – generated an estimated total annual illicit gross income ranging from US$13.9 to US$21.4 billion. Opiates accounted for about 90 per cent of this total, with methamphetamine representing a smaller but growing share. The aggregated value of these trafficking flows surpasses the gross domestic product (GDP) of several countries along the route, highlighting the significant economic impact of these illegal activities. The data and analysis do not cover the period following the drug ban in Afghanistan that was imposed in 2022 by the Taliban and its impact on drug consumption and trafficking patterns. Geographic distribution of trafficking routes The Balkan route remains a critical pathway for drug trafficking, stretching from Afghanistan through Iran (Islamic Republic of) and Türkiye, and splitting into three main branches, all leading into Europe. Alongside the opiate flow, methamphetamine trafficking is expanding, with manufacturing hotspots identified in Afghanistan, Eastern Europe (Bulgaria, Czechia and Slovakia), Southern Europe (Greece) and Western Europe (Germany and the Kingdom of the Netherlands). Opiates and methamphetamine trafficking is concentrated in key hubs Given their location at the start of the Balkan route, Iran (Islamic Republic of) and Türkiye are the main hotspots for trafficking both drugs. Trafficking through Iran (Islamic Republic of) plays a pivotal role in the opiate trade, accounting for over one-third of total gross income along the Balkan route related to opiates. Other key trafficking hotspots can be found in Belgium and the Netherlands (Kingdom of the). These countries are not only key stops for traffickers but also act as hotspots for distributing opiates and methamphetamine in smaller quantities. Illicit actors in some countries like the Netherlands (Kingdom of the) also contribute to methamphetamine manufacture the impact of proximity and trafficker adaptability on interception rates Interception rates of illegally traded opiates and methamphetamine along the Balkan route are highest in the proximity of production sources. Iran (Islamic Republic of) and Türkiye intercept the highest percentage of all opiates that cross their territories at 28.2 and 29.3 percent respectively. Traffickers' adaptability − through tactics such as breaking shipments into smaller quantities, altering routes and employing advanced concealment methods − continue to pose significant challenges to law enforcement, particularly further along the supply chain. High profit margins in the drug trade Trafficking of opiates and methamphetamine can yield substantial profits, with an estimated combined annual illicit net income ranging from US$10.9 to US$16.9 billion. These profits represent more than 70 per cent of the total illicit gross income acquired through the trafficking of these two substances after deducting intermediate expenditures, production and purchasing costs.The largest shares of illicit net income are generated at the retail level, where price markups are highest. However, individuals higher up in the supply chain may earn more per person, as fewer people share the profits at the international and wholesale levels. Illicit financial flows (IFFs) related to the management of drug trafficking profits are in the order of billions. IFFs are cross border flows of financial or nonfinancial assets that are illicit in origin, transfer or use. These flows represent the hidden movement of wealth that undermines economic stability and evades lawful oversight. Looking at IFFs generated through the trafficking of opiates and methamphetamine, it is estimated that between a quarter and half of the US$13.7 billion in illicit net income generated from drug trafficking along the Balkan route is illegally moved across borders, generating potential IFFs related to the management of drug trafficking profits of US$3.4 billion to US$6.9 billion annually. Link between money laundering and IFFs There is some evidence that income from drug trafficking is laundered both domestically and abroad through investments in real estate, luxury vehicles and other assets. Shell companies and informal systems like Hawala are frequently used to transfer and launder money, complicating efforts to trace the illicit proceeds. Key trafficking transit points not only facilitate drug movement but also serve as hubs for laundering and redistributing illicit financial resources. Contrary to common assumptions, traditional tax havens may play a minimal role in laundering drug trafficking proceeds. Instead, the limited available data suggests that countries like Luxembourg, the Netherlands (Kingdom of the) and Spain are potential hubs for drug-related IFFs generated along the Balkan route, alongside the United Arab Emirates.

. Vienna / ©United Nations, 2025 59p.

By The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Research and Trend Analysis Branch\

Opium production in Afghanistan remains low for the second consecutive year, with production at 433 tons in 2024, confirmed new estimates from the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). Although this figure represents a 30 per cent increase from 2023, production still remains 93 per cent below 2022 levels, when the de facto authorities began enforcing a country-wide drug ban.

UNODC released opium cultivation figures on 6 November, confirming that cultivation in 2024 had increased by an estimated 19 per cent year-on-year to cover 12,800 hectares, remaining far below pre-ban levels.

The value of the 2024 opium harvest is roughly US$260 million, an increase of 130 per cent over the previous year but still 80 per cent lower than the pre-ban value in 2022.

“A second year of low opium cultivation and production presents opportunities and complex challenges,” said Ghada Waly, Executive Director of UNODC. “International efforts must be coordinated to ensure that this decline is not replaced with production of dangerous synthetic drugs such as methamphetamine within Afghanistan or the wider region. We also need to help poppy-dependent rural communities transition to licit, economically viable alternatives, by investing in infrastructure, agricultural resources, and sustainable livelihoods.”

In 2024, farmers cultivated more alternative crops like cereals and cotton on previously fallow land. However, opium provides up to 60 times more revenue in comparison to wheat. Without profitable, licit alternatives, economic hardships could encourage some farmers to return to poppy cultivation.

The majority of opium cultivation and production has shifted from the southwest provinces to the northeast, where two thirds of opium production was concentrated.

UNODC, in partnership with the UN Development Programme (UNDP), further released a report on capacities and resources for the treatment of substance use disorders in Afghanistan.

The survey findings show that treatment services are available in 32 out of 34 provinces, but significant disparities exist in service distribution, accessibility, and gender representation, particularly affecting female patients.

Although opiates remain the most frequently reported class of substance used by patients seeking treatment, demand for services addressing stimulant-related disorders is rising, as synthetic drugs such as methamphetamine have become increasingly available in Afghanistan.

Kabul/Vienna: UNODC: 2024. 36p.

By The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Research and Trend Analysis Branch

The Afghanistan Drug Insights are a series of reports that provide latest data and in-depth analysis on aspects of the evolving drug situation in Afghanistan. This second volume provides the latest figures on national and regional opium poppy production in 2024 and the challenges farmers are facing as they adapt to new economic conditions. The remaining reports in the series will cover a range of topics related to the drug situation in Afghanistan, including the socioeconomic situation of farmers after the drugs ban; drug trafficking and supply; and treatment availability and drug use. Given the unprecedented nature of the ongoing drugs ban in Afghanistan, having continued for a second year, UNODC has sought to examine different aspects of the drug situation in that country. Taken together, reports in the series paint a comprehensive picture of the enforcement of the ban on production, trafficking and consumption of all drugs, and delve deep into the impacts of the ban on the Afghan population, as well as on neighbouring countries and the wider region. The insights are aimed at informing efforts to address demand and supply of drugs within and outside Afghanistan in an objective and timely manner, using latest data at highest quality standards. The present insight has been produced under the project “Monitoring of Opium Production in Afghanistan” (AFG/F98). Information and data contained in this report, unless otherwise stated, are based on data collected by UNODC through remote sensing techniques, rural village surveys; as well as through global data collections on drugs (UNODC Annual Report Questionnaires and UNODC Drugs Monitoring Platform). Data on opium cultivation and production are based on the Afghanistan Opium Surveys 1994-2020 jointly published by UNODC and the Government of Afghanistan, as well as the Afghanistan Opium Surveys conducted by UNODC in 2021, 2022, and 2023.

Opium production in Afghanistan remains low for the second consecutive year, with production at 433 tons in 2024, confirmed new estimates from the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). Although this figure represents a 30 per cent increase from 2023, production still remains 93 per cent below 2022 levels, when the de facto authorities began enforcing a country-wide drug ban.

UNODC released opium cultivation figures on 6 November, confirming that cultivation in 2024 had increased by an estimated 19 per cent year-on-year to cover 12,800 hectares, remaining far below pre-ban levels.

The value of the 2024 opium harvest is roughly US$260 million, an increase of 130 per cent over the previous year but still 80 per cent lower than the pre-ban value in 2022.

“A second year of low opium cultivation and production presents opportunities and complex challenges,” said Ghada Waly, Executive Director of UNODC. “International efforts must be coordinated to ensure that this decline is not replaced with production of dangerous synthetic drugs such as methamphetamine within Afghanistan or the wider region. We also need to help poppy-dependent rural communities transition to licit, economically viable alternatives, by investing in infrastructure, agricultural resources, and sustainable livelihoods.”

In 2024, farmers cultivated more alternative crops like cereals and cotton on previously fallow land. However, opium provides up to 60 times more revenue in comparison to wheat. Without profitable, licit alternatives, economic hardships could encourage some farmers to return to poppy cultivation.

The majority of opium cultivation and production has shifted from the southwest provinces to the northeast, where two thirds of opium production was concentrated.

Kabul/Vienna: UNODC, 2024. 36p.

By The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Research and Trend Analysis Branch

The Afghanistan Drug Insights are a series of reports that provide the latest data and in-depth analysis on aspects of the evolving drug situation in Afghanistan. This fourth volume provides an assessment of drug seizure trends near Afghanistan and estimates potential opium stocks within the country by the end of 2022, just before the start of the ban. The remaining reports in the series will cover a range of topics related to the drug situation in Afghanistan, including the socioeconomic situation of farmers after the drugs ban, and drug use. Given the unprecedented nature of the ongoing drugs ban in Afghanistan, which has continued for a second year, UNODC sought to examine different aspects of the drug situation in that country. Taken together, the reports in the series paint a comprehensive picture of the effects of the enforcement of the ban on production, trafficking and consumption of all drugs and delve deep into the impacts of the ban on the Afghan economy, as well as on Afghanistan’s neighbors and the wider region. The insights are aimed at informing international engagement in Afghanistan in an objective and timely manner, using the latest data of the highest quality standards, presenting it in an evidence-based, coherent, coordinated, and structured manner as foreseen in Security Council resolution 2721 (2023). The present Insight has been produced under the project “Monitoring of Opium Production in Afghanistan” (AFG/F98). Information and data contained in this report, unless otherwise stated, are based on data collected by UNODC by remote sensing, through rural village surveys and other tools; as well as through global data collections on drugs (UNODC Annual Report Questionnaires and the UNODC Drugs Monitoring Platform). Data on opium cultivation and production are based on the Afghanistan Opium Surveys 1994-2020 jointly published by UNODC and the Government of Afghanistan, as well as the Afghanistan Opium Surveys conducted by UNODC in 2021, 2022, and 2023. Other data used in this report to model stock estimates come from UNODC’s Afghan Opiate Trade Project published in 2020.

Kabul/Vienna: UNODC, 2025. 52p.

By David Blake Johnson and Jason Szkola

Existing research examining gun violence often faces criticism because of complications related to gun laws and gun culture. In this manuscript, we argue that these elements change the overall quality of gun owners and this quality has a significant effect on homicide. To demonstrate this, we introduce a measure of gun owner quality independent of local law enforcement and possibly indicative of illegal or dubious transfer of firearms: the time to crime of "exported" crime guns. We find that decreases in the time to crime of exported crime guns increase homicides and gun homicides while also having no effect on non-gun homicides and only a small effect on suicide. We then show how the time to crime of exported crime gun changes as a function of gun culture and gun laws.

Unpublished paper, 2024, 25p.

By Nicole Kravitz-Wirtz,  Angela Bruns , Amanda J Aubel , Xiaoya Zhang , Shani A Buggs

Understanding the burden of gun violence among youth is a public health imperative. While most estimates are based on direct and witnessed victimization, living nearby gun violence incidents may be consequential too. Yet detailed information about these broader experiences of violence is lacking. We use data on a population-based cohort of youth merged with incident-level data on deadly gun violence to assess the prevalence and intensity of community exposure to gun homicides across cross-classified categories of exposure distance and recency, overall and by race/ethnicity, household poverty, and neighborhood disadvantage. In total, 2–18% of youth resided within 600 m of a gun homicide occurring in the past 14–365 days. These percentages were 3–25% for incidents within 800 m and 5–37% for those within a 1300-m radius. Black and Latinx youth were 3–7 times more likely, depending on the exposure radius, to experience a past-year gun homicide than white youth and on average experienced incidents more recently and closer to home. Household poverty contributed to exposure inequities, but disproportionate residence in disadvantaged neighborhoods was especially consequential: for all racial/ethnic groups, the difference in the probability of exposure between youth in low vs high poverty households was approximately 5–10 percentage points, while the difference between youth residing in low vs high disadvantage neighborhoods was approximately 50 percentage points. Given well-documented consequences of gun violence exposure on health, these more comprehensive estimates underscore the importance of supportive strategies not only for individual victims but entire communities in the aftermath of gun violence.

J Urban Health, 2022 Jun 7, 16p.

By CSE Aware

  The United Nations and other experts have highlighted that women with learning disabilities (LDs) are at higher risk of experiencing gender-based violence (GBV) because of the lifelong isolation, dependency and oppression they often they experience. These inequalities also put them at risk of commercial sexual exploitation (CSE). Despite global recognition of these impacts, in Scotland to date there is very limited evidence and information on how commercial sexual exploitation affects women with learning disabilities. In the recent report Unequal, Unheard, Unjust: But not Hidden Anymore,the Scottish Commission forPeoplewithLearningDisabilities (SCLD) highlighted SEason of the types of GBV women with learning disabilities experienced. What’s more, this groundbreaking report specifically recommended that the Scottish Government “commission national research examining the commercial sexual exploitation of women with learning disabilities in Scotland,” noting the lack of documented information. While some information does exist about learning disabled women’s experiences of selling or exchanging sex, it is mostly anecdotal and has not been documented nor analysed to truly understand the effects on this population and the effectiveness of, andgaps in, service responses.The present report was born from therecognition that there is a significant knowledge gap on the issue of CSE and its intersection with this particularly vulnerable group of women. Whilst the present report is not the much needed full-scale research which SCLD and ourselves are calling for (see recommendations), it does provide initial findings and recommendations from the exploratory researchweconductedoverthecourseofthreemonths. The Aims Of This research were to: Collect and document evidence of learningisabledwomen’sexperiencesof sellingorexchangingsex. Understandthedynamicsofwomen’s involvement and their specific needs. Explore service responses and challenges and opportunities when addressing women's experiences and needs. Produce Initial Recommendations thattheScottishGovernment and organisations canuseas abasis to design service and policy responses that meet theneeds women with LDs impacted byCSE.

Glasgow: CSE, 3035. 32p.

By Vanda Felbab-Brown 

Over the past several decades, the U.S. opioid epidemic has spanned four phases:  Oversupply of prescription opioids in the 1990s.. A significant increase in heroin supply and use in the 2000s.  A supply-driven explosion of fentanyl use after 2012.  Most recently, polydrug use, with fentanyl mixed into/with all kinds of drugs. Since fentanyl entered the U.S. illegal drug market, more than a million people in the United States have died of opioid overdose. The costs of fentanyl use go beyond the tragic deaths and drug-use-related morbidity, however. In addition to having significant implications for public health and the economy, the fentanyl crisis intersects in many ways with U.S. foreign policy. U.S. overdose deaths began declining in 2023. But there is little certainty as to which domestic or foreign-policy interventions have been crucial drivers. The wider availability of overdose-reversal medication is fundamental, as is expanded access to evidence-based treatment. It is also possible that the Biden administration’s actions toward international supply from Mexico and China are contributing to this reduction in overdose deaths: since the start of 2024, China has become more active in suppressing the flow of precursor chemicals, and Mexican cartels, perhaps purposefully, are now trafficking a less lethal version of fentanyl. A wide array of policy measures as well as structural factors outside of policy control could be cumulatively and interactively reducing mortality. The fact that the declines in mortality are not uniform across U.S. ethnic, racial, and social groups or geographic areas suggests the importance of access to medication for overdose reversal and the treatment of opioid use disorder, as well as the influence of structural factors. There is strong bipartisan support for preserving access to medication-based treatments. But crucially, access depends on medical insurance coverage, such as that provided through Medicaid and the Affordable Care Act. There are strong ideological divides about the financing and structure of the U.S. insurance industry as well as other aspects of drug policy. On February 1, President Donald Trump imposed a 25% tariff on imports from Mexico and Canada and a 10% tariff on imports from China until each country stops the flow of fentanyl (as well as migrants, in the cases of Mexico and Canada).1 He gave all three countries a month-long reprieve before implementing the tariffs in March to see if they satisfied his counternarcotics demands. Canada adopted a robust package of anti-fentanyl measures. Mexico too tried to appease the United States through a set of law enforcement actions, though it held out on perhaps the most important form of cooperation—expanding the presence and mandates of U.S. law enforcement agents in Mexico to levels at least approaching those enjoyed during the Felipe Calderón administration. Unlike Mexico or Canada, China did not take any further counternarcotics actions and instead responded with counter-tariffs of its own, even as Trump threatened to add additional tariffs on imports from China of up to 60%.2 On March 4, 2025, Trump dismissed Canada’s and Mexico’s law enforcement actions as inadequate, implementing the 25% tariffs. He also added an additional 10% tariff on China, meaning the second Trump administration has now placed a 20% tariff on Chinese goods.3 Apart from increasing the cost of goods for U.S. customers and driving up inflation, these tariffs will have complex effects on anti-fentanyl cooperation. Any large U.S. tariffs on China will likely eviscerate Beijing’s cooperation with the United States, resetting the diplomatic clock  back to the bargaining of 2018 and noncooperation of 2021-2023. As crucial as it is to induce the government of Mexico to start robustly and systematically acting against Mexican criminal groups, whose power has grown enormously and threatens the Mexican state, Mexican society, and U.S. interests, Mexico has no capacity to halt the flow of fentanyl. Mixing the issues of migration and fentanyl risks Mexico appeasing the United States principally on migration while placating it with inadequate anti-fentanyl actions. Further, U.S. military action in Mexico, which has been threatened by Republican politicians close to Trump, would yield no sustained weakening of Mexican criminal groups or fentanyl flows. It would, however, poison the political atmosphere in Mexico and hinder its meaningful cooperation with the United States. Strong law enforcement cooperation with Canada is crucial. Canada has been facing law enforcement challenges, such as the expansion of Mexican and Asian organized crime groups and money laundering operations in Canada. But disregarding the domestic and collaborative law enforcement efforts Canada has put on the table is capricious. At home, Trump’s favored approach, which renews focus on imprisoning users and drug dealers, and dramatically toughening penalties for the latter, would be ineffective and counterproductive. And while providing treatment is very important, the dramatic effect of treatment modality on effectiveness cannot be overlooked. Approaches to treatment should be designed based on evidence, not ideology.

Washington, DC: Brookings Institute, 2025. 49p.

 By The United States Sentencing Commission

  More than 780,000 Americans died from a drug overdose in the last ten years. Overdose deaths have increased more than 300 percent from the level two decades ago. The number of such deaths has continued to increase in recent years, with the Centers for Disease Control reporting that 91,799 people died of drug overdoses in 2020, 106,699 in 2021, 107,941 in 2022, and 105,007 in 2023. Provisional data shows a recent decline in overdose deaths beginning in late 2023 and continuing into 2024. Overdoses remain one of the leading causes of deaths in adults in the United States. While fentanyl and fentanyl analogues, methamphetamine, cocaine, and heroin are the drugs most often involved in these deaths, synthetic opioids like fentanyl— which is up to 50 times more potent than heroin—contribute to nearly 70 percent of overdose deaths. In this report, the Commission examines all overdoses identified in drug trafficking cases reported to the Commission for fiscal years 2019 to 2023. One or more deaths occurred in more than three-quarters of these cases, while no deaths occurred in the remaining cases. The Commission is able to collect information about the overdoses reported in these cases through the sentencing documents the courts provide to the Commission in every case.8 Using that information, this report provides an analysis of the 1,340 individuals sentenced for a federal drug trafficking offense involving an overdose in fiscal years 2019 to 2023. In it, the Commission analyzes the demographic characteristics of these individuals, the offense conduct that occurred in the case, and how the courts sentenced these individuals—including the application of sentencing guideline provisions that provide for heightened base offense levels when the offense of conviction established that death or serious bodily injury resulting from an overdose occurred, or departures from the guideline range for death or physical injury, or how often courts varied from the guideline range for a similar reason. Additionally, in this report, the Commission provides the results of a special data collection project to explore the outcome of each overdose, the type of drug involved in the overdose, the victim’s knowledge of the drug they were taking, and the sentenced individual’s conduct during the offense.  

Washington, DC, USSC, 2025.   52p.

By Sasha Murray,  Sarah Welland, Madeleine Storry

For victims who have experienced a serious criminal offence in England and Wales, the Crown Court is a vital part of their journey to receive justice. This is where jury trials are conducted to reach a verdict on whether the defendant is guilty of the crime or not. This report comes following a record number of outstanding cases at the Crown Courts in England and Wales. 2 At the end of September 2024, 73,105 cases were outstanding and almost a quarter (23%) of these had been outstanding at the Crown Court for over a year and 8% had been outstanding for over two years. This is a considerable increase since the end of March 2020, when just 7% of cases were outstanding for over a year and 2% of cases were outstanding for over two years. 3 This means an increasing number of victims are waiting extended lengths of time for justice. This report explores how these unprecedented delays in the Crown Court system impact on victims of crime, victims’ services, and the wider criminal justice system. The findings are based on primary research conducted by the Office of the Victims’ Commissioner in 2024, including a survey and interviews with victims and a survey with victim services staff. Based on these findings, the Victims’ Commissioner makes key, actionable recommendations for justice agencies and policy makers to consider. About the research This report aims to: • Understand the experiences of victims of all crime types who are navigating the Crown Court system in England and Wales amidst a record backlog. • Identify the impact of the Crown Court backlog on victims, the criminal justice system and victim services. • Understand victims’ experiences of support and communication whilst navigating the Crown Court backlog. Findings from the research The Crown Court system is experiencing an unprecedented backlog meaning victims commonly face delays and adjournments. • In the latest official statistics, a quarter of trials listed at the Crown Court had to be rearranged on the day of trial. • Further data, provided by HMCTS, showed that the number of completed Crown Court cases that had been rearranged more than three times on the day of trial, was four times higher in 2023/24 than it was in 2019/20. 4 • In our research, we found that of those victims who had been given a trial date, nearly half (48%) had this date changed at some point in their criminal justice journey and 26% of these victims had the date changed four or more times. For  victims often navigating the criminal justice system for the first time, this worsened an already stressful and traumatic process. The delays in the Crown Court cause debilitating stress and trauma for victims. • Our research highlighted how the Crown Court backlog caused immense stress for victims, prompting a deterioration in physical and mental health. Some victims resorted to drug and alcohol use or self-harm to cope, while other victims reported attempting suicide as it was too difficult to continue. • We found that while victims were still involved in the criminal justice process, they were unable to move on and prevented from recovering from the crime. • Additionally, when victims experienced repeated adjournments, the emotional distress and the necessity to re-live the trauma for each additional listing further exacerbated their trauma. The Crown Court backlog damages victims’ lives and futures. • We found that whilst enduring the prolonged waits for Crown Court trials, many victims were unable to maintain their daily functioning. Their lives were subsequently further disrupted by repeated adjournments. • Our findings also highlighted the impact of the Crown Court delays on victims’ employment. Victims often had to take periods of time off work for each trial listing, and some were unable to work or were signed off sick due to the stress of the delays. This had significant financial implications for some victims, particularly those who were self-employed. • The delays also adversely affected younger victims, as it disrupted their education and put their lives on hold during significant periods of their development. Our findings also highlighted the impact on victims’ interpersonal relationships. The turmoil of the Crown Court delays sometimes led to relationship breakdowns, at a time when a victim’s support network was vital. • We also heard how the delays in the Crown Court system impacted on other legal processes. For example, delays to trials concluding caused issues with Family Court proceedings, applications to the Criminal Injuries Compensation Authority (CICA) and eviction orders. The effectiveness of the criminal justice system and victims’ confidence in its ability to deliver justice is at risk due to the delays in the Crown Court system. • Our findings highlighted how increased waiting time for trials heightened the risk of victims’ memories fading and therefore, the quality of their evidence diminishing. • The increased waits also meant supportive prosecution witnesses became more likely to withdraw. • In addition, victims’ faith and trust in the criminal justice system was damaged, leading to disengagement from with the criminal justice process and in many cases, an entire withdrawal. • Where victims persevered with the criminal justice process, they often felt justice did not prevail. We were informed of cases where the time taken for the trial to take place meant the defendants’ sentence had already been served, either on remand or through bail conditions. We were also told of instances where the Crown Prosecution Service had dropped charges due to cases no longer being in the public interest and where defendants had died before the trial could take place. • For many victims, their experiences of the Crown Court backlog left them unwilling to engage with the criminal justice system in the future. High-quality support helps victims to stay engaged with the criminal justice process amidst the Crown Court delays, however the delays impede support organisations’ ability to provide this support. • Despite support being vital for their engagement, we found that for some victims, the delays prevented them accessing support. Some rape and sexual offence victims were advised not to seek therapy until after trial. However, the delays in cases coming to court resulted in long periods without support, further delaying their recovery. • We also found that the delays led to an increased demand for support services. This was due to an increased number of victims waiting for court and increased victim support needs due to the impact of the Crown Court delays. Many staff reported unsustainable caseloads and many support services had to implement waiting lists. Many services also raised concerns about the quality and consistency of support provision being compromised as a result of the overwhelming demand. • Our research highlighted the negative impact of the Crown Court backlogs on the wellbeing and job satisfaction of support staff, with some at risk of burnout and leaving their roles. This further exacerbated issues with support accessibility, quality, and consistency. Poor communication compounds the impact of the Crown Court backlog on victims. • Our research highlighted that poor initial expectation management of how long a case can take to get to trial and a lack of communication whilst victims waited for trial worsened victims’ experiences. • We also found that many victims experienced trials being adjourned at very short notice and with minimal or no explanation. This added to the emotional distress they experienced navigating an already challenging process. Key recommendations This report contains 19 recommendations that are grouped into three overarching aims. We have identified a key recommendation for change to help achieve each of these aims: 1. Improve the victim experience of the criminal justice system. o The government to explore how victims whose case is going to trial might be given a single point of contact to improve communication and ensure their Victims’ Code entitlements are delivered. 2. Make court processes more transparent and efficient. o The restoration of an Independent Courts’ Inspectorate so that the operation of the Court Service is subject to rigorous independent scrutiny. 3. Ensure victim services can provide support to victims as they wait for the case to get to trial. o Providing emergency funding to victim support services to help them cope with increased caseloads arising from the court backlog crisis.  

London: Victims Commissioner, 2025. 73p.

By Jamie MacColl, James Sullivan, Jason R C Nurse, Sarah Turner, Gareth Mott, Edward Cartwright and Anna Cartwright  

The cyber insurance industry has been heavily criticised for providing coverage for ransom payments. A frequent accusation, which has become close to perceived wisdom in policymaking and cyber security discussions on ransomware, is that cyber insurance has incentivised victims to pay a ransom following a cyber incident, rather than seek alternative remediation options. Over a 12-month research project, researchers from RUSI, the University of Kent, De Montfort University and Oxford Brookes University conducted a series of expert interviews and workshops to explore the relationship between cyber insurance and ransomware in depth. This paper argues that there is, in fact, no compelling evidence that victims with cyber insurance are much more likely to pay ransoms than those without. Ransomware remains one of the most persistent cyber threats facing the UK. Despite a range of government, law enforcement and even military cyber unit initiatives, ransomware remains lucrative for criminals. During this research, we identified three main drivers that ensure its continued success: 1. A profitable business model that continues to find innovative ways to extort victims. 2. Challenges around securing organisations of all sizes. 3. The low costs and risks for cybercriminals involved in the ransomware ecosystem, both in terms of the barriers to entry and the prospect of punishment. Despite this perfect storm of factors, the cyber insurance industry has been singled out for criticism with the claim that it is funding organised cybercrime by covering ransom payments. In reality, cyber insurance’s influence on victim decision-making is considerably more nuanced than the public debate has captured so far. While there is evidence that cyber insurance policies exfiltrated during attacks are used as leverage in negotiations and to set higher ransom demands, the conclusion that ransomware operators are deliberately targeting organisations with insurance has been overstated. However, the insurance industry could do much more to instil discipline in both insureds and the ransomware response ecosystem in relation to ransom payments to reduce cybercriminals’ profits. Insurers’ role as convenors of incident response services gives them considerable power to reward firms that drive best practices and only guide victims towards payment as a last resort. But the lack of clearly defined negotiation protocols and the challenges around learning from incidents make it difficult to develop a sense of collective responsibility and shared best  practices around ransomware response. This has not been helped by the UK government’s black-and-white position on ransom payments, which has created a vacuum of assurance and advice on best practices for ransom negotiations and payments. This paper does not advocate for an outright ban on ransom payments or for stopping insurers from providing coverage for them. Instead, it makes the case for interventions that would improve market-wide ransom discipline so that fewer victims pay ransoms, or pay lower demands. Ultimately, this involves creating more pathways for victims that do not result in ransom payments. Beyond ransom payments, cyber insurance has a growing role in raising cyber security standards, which could make it more difficult to successfully compromise victims and increase costs for ransomware operators. Successive years of losses from ransomware have led to more stringent security requirements and risk selection by underwriters. Although the overall effect of this on the frequency and severity of ransomware attacks remains to be seen, by linking improvements in security practices to coverage, cyber insurance is currently one of the few market-based levers for incentivising organisations to implement security controls and resilience measures. However, continued challenges around collecting and assessing reliable cyber risk and forensic claims data continue to place limits on the market’s effectiveness as a mechanism for reducing ransomware risk. This, along with cyber insurance’s low market penetration, makes clear that cyber insurance should not be treated as a substitute for the legislation and regulation required to improve minimum cyber security standards and resilience. Insurers are also commercial entities that primarily exist to help organisations transfer risk, rather than to improve national security and societal cyber resilience. The cyber insurance industry could be a valuable partner for the UK government through increased ransomware attack and payment reporting, sharing aggregated claims data, and distributing National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) guidance and intelligence to organisations. However, the government has not made a compelling enough case to insurers and insureds about the benefits of doing so. Instead, it has relied on appealing to their general sense of altruism. While insurers will benefit if governments are able to generate more accurate and actionable data on ransomware, albeit indirectly, this needs to be sold to the industry in a more convincing way. Some principles and recommendations for both the insurance industry and the UK government are listed below. These are not designed to solve all the challenges of the cyber insurance market, nor do they present wide-ranging solutions to the ransomware challenge. Instead, they focus on where the cyber insurance industry can have the most impact on key ransomware drivers. This reflects the fact that disrupting the ransomware economy involves applying pressure from different angles in a whole-of-society approach. The recommendations also start from the position that the UK government’s light-touch approach is unsustainable and requires more intervention in private markets that are involved in ransomware prevention and response. While they are specifically aimed at UK policymakers, regulators and insurers, they may be applicable to other national contexts     

London: Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies, 2023.  84p.

By Jamie MacColl, Jason R C Nurse and James Sullivan 

  GOVERNMENTS AND BUSINESSES are struggling to cope with the scale and complexity of managing cyber risk. Over the last year, remote working, rapid digitalisation and the need for increased connectivity have emphasised the cyber security challenge. As the pursuit of approaches to prevent, mitigate and recover from malicious cyber activity has progressed, one tool that has gained traction is cyber insurance. If it can follow the path of other insurance classes, it could play a significant role in managing digital risk. This paper explores whether cyber insurance can incentivise better cyber security practices among policyholders. It finds that the shortcomings of cyber insurance mean that its contribution to improving cyber security practices is more limited than policymakers and businesses might hope. Although several means by which cyber insurance can incentivise better cyber security practices are identified, they have significant limitations. Interviewees from across government, industry and business consistently stated that the positive effects of cyber insurance on cyber security have yet to fully materialise. While some mature insurers are moving in the right direction, cyber insurance as a whole is still struggling to move from theory into practice when it comes to incentivising cyber security. If this is to change, the insurance industry must overcome significant challenges. One is the competitiveness of the nascent cyber insurance market over the last two decades. Most of the market has used neither carrots (financial incentives) nor sticks (security obligations) to improve the cyber security practices of policyholders. The industry is also struggling to collect and share reliable cyber risk data that can inform underwriting and risk modelling. The difficulties inherent in understanding cyber risk, which is anthropogenic and systemic, mean insurers and reinsurers are unable to accurately quantify its causes and effects. This limits insurers’ ability to accurately assess an organisation’s risk profile or security practices and price policy premiums accordingly. The spectre of systemic incidents such as NotPetya1 and SolarWinds2 has also limited the availability of capital for cyber insurance markets. However, the most pressing challenge currently facing the industry is ransomware. Although it is a societal problem, cyber insurers have received considerable criticism for facilitating ransom payments to cybercriminals. These add fuel to the fire by incentivising cybercriminals’ engagement in ransomware operations and enabling existing operators to invest in and expand their capabilities. Growing losses from ransomware attacks have also emphasised that the current reality is not sustainable for insurers either.

To overcome these challenges and champion the positive effects of cyber insurance, this paper calls for a series of interventions from government and industry. Some in the industry favour allowing the market to mature on its own, but it will not be possible to rely on changing market forces alone. To date, the UK government has taken a light-touch approach to the cyber insurance industry. With the market undergoing changes amid growing losses, more coordinated action by government and regulators is necessary to help the industry reach its full potential. The interventions recommended here are still relatively light, and reflect the fact that cyber insurance is only a potential incentive for managing societal cyber risk. They include: developing guidance for minimum security standards for underwriting; expanding data collection and data sharing; mandating cyber insurance for government suppliers; and creating a new collaborative approach between insurers and intelligence and law enforcement agencies around ransomware. Finally, although a well-functioning cyber insurance industry could improve cyber security practices on a societal scale, it is not a silver bullet for the cyber security challenge. It is important to remember that the primary purpose of cyber insurance is not to improve cyber security, but to transfer residual risk. As such, it should be one of many tools that governments and businesses can draw on to manage cyber risk more effectively.   

RUSI Occasional Paper, June 2021, London: Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies , 2021. 68p.

By Greg Hannah, Caroline Harper, Heather James and Grace Whitehead, under the direction of Oliver Lodge.

 Definitions of the term ‘violence against women and girls’ (VAWG) vary, but the government defines it as “acts of violence or abuse that we know disproportionately affect women and girls”. It covers crimes including rape and other sexual offences, stalking, domestic abuse, ‘honour’-based abuse (including female genital mutilation, forced marriage and ‘honour’ killings), ‘revenge porn’ and ‘upskirting’.  Over one in four women are estimated to be victims of sexual assault or attempted assault in their lifetime, and one in 12 women are victims of VAWG each year, although the actual number is likely to be much higher. The National Police Chiefs’ Council reported that, in 2022-23, 20% of all police-recorded crime was related to violence against women and girls. The victim was female in 86% of all police-recorded sexual offences in the year to March 2022. In the year ending December 2023, over 97% (23,723) of people convicted of sexual offences were male, and crimes are often committed by someone known to the victim. 3 Violence against women and girls can have long-term impacts on victims, affecting them physically, mentally, socially and financially. It is estimated that the economic and social cost of domestic abuse could be as high as £84 billion. The Home Office last estimated the societal cost of rape cases in 2018, based on 2015-16 data, when it estimated that the 122,000 rape cases reported that year could have a societal cost of around £4.8 billion.  In 2021, the then government introduced its strategy, “Tackling Violence Against Women and Girls” (the VAWG Strategy), which outlined a series of commitments focused on: • prevention – to deliver long-term cultural and societal change; • supporting victims – to increase support for victims and survivors including providing support services that are run by and for the communities they serve; • pursuing perpetrators – to transform the criminal justice response to ensure all perpetrators of offences against women are brought to justice; and • building a stronger system – working with multiple government departments to develop a joined-up system across health, justice, law enforcement, housing, social care and education. In 2021, the Domestic Abuse Act received Royal Assent, and in 2022 the Home Office published a separate “Tackling Domestic Abuse” Plan (the Domestic Abuse Plan)   The Home Office leads on the government’s response to tackling VAWG, including domestic abuse. However, achieving progress requires the commitment of multiple government departments. There are important roles for the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government, the Ministry of Justice and other parts of the criminal justice system, the Department for Education and NHS England in, for example, identifying victims and supporting them to feel safe, educating young people in safe relationships and ensuring justice through the courts and prison systems.  The new government has committed to halve the prevalence of VAWG within a decade as part of its ‘mission’ to make streets safer. The Home Office will lead this mission and is developing a new VAWG strategy. In this report, we have examined the Home Office’s leadership of the 2021 “Tackling Violence Against Women and Girls” Strategy (the VAWG Strategy) and the 2022 “Tackling Domestic Abuse Plan” (the Domestic Abuse Plan), to identify lessons to support the delivery of the government’s ambition to halve violence against women and girls. Key Findings Progress against the 2021 strategy  Violence against women and girls is a serious and growing problem. In 2023-24 the prevalence of sexual assault against women aged 16 to 59 in England and Wales (the percentage of the population estimated to have suffered a sexual assault each year) was higher than in 2009-10 (4.3% and 3.4% respectively). Conversely, the prevalence of domestic abuse against women was lower (9.2% and 7.4% respectively). Over the same period incidents of rape and sexual assault against women and girls recorded by police have increased almost fourfold, from 34,000 to 123,000, although this can in part be explained by improved recording of these crimes. The societal landscape against which these crimes are committed has also become increasingly complex and in recent years online harms (such as revenge porn) have been recognised as crimes in themselves (paragraphs 1.2, 1.4, 1.7 to 1.9 and Figures 1 and 2). 8 To date, the Home Office has not led an effective whole-system response. Successfully addressing the harms caused by VAWG requires the coordinated effort and commitment of many government departments. But the cross-departmental governance in place did not ensure all departments were prioritising the VAWG Strategy’s aims and were pulling in the same direction. The Home Office created a dedicated team to lead the VAWG Strategy, but it has found it challenging to get buy-in from other government departments. The Home Office’s Officials’ oversight group, established to progress the Strategy, did not meet until a year after the VAWG Strategy’s launch. The Home Office has since revised its governance, which has been welcomed by some departments. While strong ministerial support can encourage cross-government working, the Ministerial oversight group for the VAWG Strategy only met four times in three years (paragraphs 1.10, 3.4 to 3.8). 9 The Home Office has not had a full understanding of the scale of resources committed to tackling VAWG across government, limiting its ability to prioritise efforts. As the lead department for tackling VAWG, the Home Office needs to understand the capacity and resources other bodies are committing to the VAWG Strategy so it can effectively coordinate and oversee their work. The Home Office has not centrally coordinated funding for VAWG across government and, in contrast with the 2021 illegal drugs strategy, the relevant departments did not prepare a joint spending review bid during the period of implementing the VAWG Strategy. Our analysis suggests other government departments spent at least £979 million between 2021-22 and 2023-24. The Home Office has historically underspent its own budget allocated to the VAWG Strategy, by an average of 15% between 2021-22 and 2023-24 (paragraphs 2.5 to 2.9 and Figure 7).  The lack of a consistent definition for VAWG across public bodies and their approaches to measuring the scale of VAWG crimes has made it difficult to measure progress in a consistent way. The Home Office’s definition of VAWG includes all victims, across all ages and genders, whereas police forces only include women and girls. The Home Office told us it uses estimates from the Crime Survey for England and Wales to measure prevalence, which does not include children under the age of 16, even though they are included in the Strategy. The Home Office does not consider police-recorded crime an accurate indicator of the prevalence of VAWG, since it is likely to under-report crimes: the police only record one crime per victim/perpetrator relationship, even where multiple VAWG crimes are committed. This, in addition to gaps in data for some VAWG crime types such as ‘honour’-based abuse, limits the data available to measure progress. A consistent definition and approach to measuring the scale of VAWG crimes across all of government and policing would help to create a better shared understanding of the scale of the challenge the government is trying to address (paragraphs 3.16 to 3.21 and Figure 12).  

London: National Audit Office, 2025. 69p.

By Rima Ah Toong, Shelby Grauer, Katherine Tallan

  The Criminal Justice Commission (CJC) has administered the Illegal Marijuana Market Enforcement Grant since 2018 and is required to issue an annual report concerning the status and effectiveness of the program and to provide future funding recommendations to the Oregon Legislature (legislature). The Legislature funds this grant program with $6 million on a biennial basis. In response to a sharp increase in reports of unaddressed illegal grow sites and associated worker abuse in 2021 and 2022, the Legislature infused the grant program with an additional $26 million in emergency one-time funding, which the CJC awarded to grantees in 2022. In 2023, the legislature supplemented the $6 million in base funding with an additional $5 million, for a total of $11 million in biennial funds that will be awarded through a competitive grant solicitation process in 2024. This report examines the status of the grant program and grantee expenditures from 2021 to 2023. The CJC, with input from grantees, other agencies, and interested parties, also changed its program data reporting structure, in 2022, to better gauge the problems being addressed with these grant funds. Described in this report, among other things, are the following findings: • Since April 1, 2022, grant-funded law enforcement operations reported 424 illegal cannabis incidents, occurring in 96 unique zip codes. • Eleven zip codes saw 10 or more incidents involving grant-funded law enforcement activities during the reporting period. The zip codes experiencing the highest number of incidents were 97523 (the greater Cave Junction area, with 35 incidents) and 97526 (Grants Pass and areas north, with 17 incidents). • The number of incidents in which law enforcement observed or suspected labor trafficking and/or worker abuse decreased from 39 (20 percent) in 2022 to eight (3.5 percent) in 2023. However, the number of survivors of human trafficking served by grant funded community-based organizations (CBOs) increased from 100 to 344 during the same time period. • Survivors served by CBO grantees were primarily male (41.4 percent), Hispanic (48.9 percent), and ages 18-35 (28.8 percent). The majority received legal assistance (63.5 percent) and/or referrals to other needed crisis or long-term support services (56.8 percent). • Grantees reported that the 424 incidents resulted in 184 felony case filings in Oregon circuit courts. • Of the 424 reported incidents, 54.2 percent involved a land, natural resource, or civil code violation. • Law enforcement grantees seized approximately 1.8 million illegal cannabis plants and 351,781 pounds of illegal processed cannabis, as well as other illegal narcotics and substances, firearms, and equipment used to operate illegal grows off-grid. Based on the best available information, the projected cost for e  

Salem, OR: Oregon Criminal Justice Commission. 2024. 31p.

By Eurojust and Europol

This report is a collaborative effort between Eurojust and Europol that addresses persistent and emerging challenges in cybercrime and investigations involving digital evidence. Key challenges include management of massive volumes of data, legal uncertainties following the invalidation of the Data Retention Directive, and technologies that create barriers to accessing data.

Just like in the previous edition, this 2024 review identifies and categorises challenges from both the law enforcement and judicial perspectives. However, this report includes a second part focusing on legislative tools that could alleviate those challenges and their practical application.

Europol, 2025. 18p

By Thorn in partnership with Burson Insights, Data & Intelligence 

Since 2019, Thorn has focused on amplifying youth voices to better understand their digital lives, with particular attention to how they encounter and navigate technologyfacilitated forms of sexual abuse and exploitation. Previous youth-centered research has explored topics such as child sexual abuse material (CSAM)1 —including that which is self-generated (“SG-CSAM”)—nonconsensual resharing, online grooming, and the barriers young people face in disclosing or reporting negative experiences. Thorn’s Emerging Threats to Young People research series aims to examine emergent online risks to better understand how current technologies create and/or exacerbate child safety vulnerabilities and identify areas where solutions are needed. This report, the first in the series, sheds light specifically on young people’s perceptions of and experiences with deepfake nudes. Future reports in this initiative will address other pressing issues, including sextortion and online solicitations. Drawing on responses from a survey of 1,200 young people aged 13-20, this report explores their awareness of deepfake nudes, lived experiences with them, and their involvement in creating such content. Three key findings emerged from this researc.  1. Young people overwhelmingly recognize deepfake nudes as a form of technology-facilitated abuse that harms the person depicted. Eighty-four percent of those surveyed believe that deepfake nudes cause harm, attributing this largely to the emotional and psychological impacts on victims, the potential for reputational damage, and the increasingly photorealistic quality of the imagery, which leads viewers to perceive—and consume—it as authentic. 2. Deepfake nudes already represent real experiences that young people have to navigate. Not only are many young people familiar with the concept, but a significant number report personal connections to this harm—either knowing someone targeted or experiencing it themselves. Forty-one percent of young people surveyed indicated they had heard the term “deepfake nudes,” including 1 in 3 (31%) teens. Additionally, among teens, 1 in 10 (10%) reported personally knowing someone who had deepfake nude imagery created of them, and 1 in 17 (6%) disclosed having been a direct victim of this form of abuse. 3. Among the limited sample of young people who admit to creating deepfake nudes of others, they describe easy access to deepfake technologies. Creators described access to the technologies through their devices’ app stores and accessibility via general search engines and social media 

El Segundo, CA  Thorn, 2025. 32p.

By Anne Summers, Thomas Shortridge, Kristen Sobeck

Whichever way you look at it, many women are paying a huge economic price in addition to the physical, emotional and psychological damage done to them by domestic violence. It is no accident that employment and education – the pathway to better employment – are targeted by perpetrators as a prime means of depleting or even destroying women’s ability to be financially self-sufficient.

The data used in this report enables the authors, for the first time, to quantify the economic impact of domestic violence on Australian women. The report sets out in detail how large numbers of women have not attained a degree, have left the labour force, have reduced their working hours, or have taken time off work– all because of domestic violence.

The authors identify changes that need to be made across the following areas: paid domestic violence leave policie tthe operation of paid domestic violence leave multiple avenues of support are needed support to (re-)enter employment the Leaving Violence Program.

Sydney: University of Technology Sydney 2025. 52p.

By Gustavo J. Bobonis and Anke Kessler

To what extent can anti-corruption measures serve to limit patronage and corrupt networks effectively and sustainably in clientelist societies with a prevailing norm of corruption? We develop a political agency model in which office holders are motivated to reduce rent seeking behavior through re-election incentives operating via elections and audits (formal institutions), but also through reputational or self-image concerns that are influenced by the prevailing norm on corruption in their peer group (informal institutions). We show that, while the formal institutions of audits and elections have the desired direct effect of reducing corruption, they also affect informal rules of conduct, which can have unintended effects. In particular, in clientelist societies with high levels of corruption, the social concerns work in opposition to formal incentives provided by anti-corruption efforts. Applying the theory to data from Puerto Rico’s anti-corruption municipal audits program, we find evidence consistent with the idea that anticorruption measures are less effective due to social spillovers.

CESifo Working Paper No. 11715, Munich: Munich Society for the Promotion of Economic Research - CESifo GmbH, 2025.

By Dan Werb, dwerb@health.u HaeSeung Sung ∙ Yingbo Naa ∙ Indhu Rammohana ∙ Jolene Eeuwesa ∙ Ashly Smoke∙  Akwasi Owusu-Bempah, Thomas Kerr,g, and Mohammad Karamouzian

  Background Supervised consumption services (SCS) are effective at preventing overdose mortality. However, their effect on public safety remains contested. We investigated homicide rates in areas near SCS in Toronto. Methods We classified coroner-reported fatal shootings and stabbings (January 1st, 2010 to September 30th 2023) by geographic zone: within 500 m (‘near’), between 500 m and 3 km (‘far’), and beyond 3 km of an SCS (‘out’). We then used Poisson regression to calculate the rate ratio (RR) across zones 18, 36, 48, and 60 months pre vs. post SCS implementation. Finally, we compared spatial homicide incidence prior to and after the date of the implementation of each SCS using interrupted time series (ITS). Findings Overall, 956 homicides occurred, and 590 (62%) were fatal shootings and stabbings. There was no meaningful change in the rate of fatal shootings and stabbings within 3 kms of SCS (near and far zones) after their implementation. However, between 48 and 60 months pos-implementation, we detected an increase in out zones. In an ITS analysis, we observed a reduction in the monthly incidence in near zones and an increase in out zones. Interpretation SCS implementation was not associated with increased homicide rates; instead, we observed a reduction in monthly incidence near SCS. These results may inform drug market activity responses that optimize community health and safety.

The Lancet Regional Health – Americas, Volume 43, 2025. 101022