By Michele Burman | Ruth Friskney | Jane Mair | Richard Whitecross 

This Report presents the findings of the Domestic Abuse and Child Contact: The Interface Between Criminal and Civil Proceedings research project, funded by the Scottish Government. The study set out to examine the relationship between civil and criminal law in the context of child contact proceedings which raise issues of domestic abuse. The impetus behind the study is to better understand how, if at all, developments in domestic abuse proceedings and changing definitions in the context of criminal law in Scotland, inform the handling of child contact cases which are conducted within the scope of civil justice. Scotland has seen several major policy and legislative developments aimed at reforming responses to domestic abuse, most recently the introduction of the Domestic Abuse (Scotland) Act 2018. These developments have been primarily situated within the context of criminal law and the criminal justice process. There has been relatively less attention paid to civil law. The negative impact of domestic abuse on children is well-recognised in Scotland (see, e.g., Callaghan et al 2018). Growing awareness of the nature and impact of domestic abuse is reflected to some extent in the explicit statutory obligations, introduced by the Family Law (Scotland) Act 2006, on the civil courts to consider domestic abuse in the context of actions for child contact. In further recent debate and reform of child law and family justice, domestic abuse has been highlighted and children placed at the heart of the decision-making process. Decisions in respect of child contact generally, and in particular where there are allegations of domestic abuse, continue to present significant challenges. Relatively little is known of how these provisions of Scots family law work in practice; of the extent to which the treatment of domestic abuse in the civil courts reflects criminal practice, or of the ways in which individual child contact cases may (or may not) interact with criminal justice proceedings. How child contact, more generally, works in practice in Scotland, is an under-researched area with Wilson and Laing’s (2010) study a rare exception. The significance of the interaction of the criminal and the civil, in the context of domestic abuse and child contact, was clearly identified by the Scottish Government in the commissioning of a significant scoping project: Contact Applications Involving Allegations of Domestic Abuse: Feasibility Study (McGuckin & McGuckin 2004) but the planned Phase 2 did not follow. Much of the research evidence we have on this specific issue in Scots family law derives from two doctoral theses (Mackay 2012; Morrison 2014). Overall, there is limited research evidence on the operation of family law in child contact cases, and whether and how the interpretation and application of the civil law statutory provisions are informed by contemporary understandings of domestic abuse and changing definitions or practices in the criminal law. The research which has been published has consistently stressed the need for further, large scale (e.g., McGuckin & McGuckin 2004; Wilson & Laing 2010) and longitudinal study (e.g., Mays & Christie 2001). Through a focus on the interrelationship between the investigation and prosecution of domestic abuse in criminal justice and parallel child contact proceedings advancing through civil justice processes, this research study contributes to addressing the current knowledge gap. The key stated aims of the study are: a. to understand the ways in which domestic abuse proceedings may inform the handling of and decision-making in child contact cases; b. to explore family law practitioner understandings of the impact and relevance of a course of conduct of domestic abuse and its implication in contact cases under s.11 7A – C of the Children (Scotland) Act 1995; c. to identify and explain perceived impediments or obstacles to communication and information exchange in such cases; and d. to examine the links or lack thereof between domestic abuse criminal proceedings and Child Welfare Hearings (contact). 

Edinburgh: Scottish Civil Justice Hub, Scottish Centre for Crime & Justice Research, 2022. 78p.

By Thi Hoang and Livia Wagner

This report examines the prevalence of online child sexual exploitation and abuse (OCSEA) in West Africa, specifically in Ghana, Côte d’Ivoire and Cape Verde, highlighting key risk factors. Data on OCSEA is scarce due to under-reporting and weak reporting mechanisms, but preliminary data indicates an acceleration in uploads since 2019. Case studies in Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana and Cape Verde reveal gaps and shortcomings in victim identification, protection and prosecution. Urgent action is required to prevent devastating consequences for individuals in West Africa. Key points l Risk factors for OCSEA are prevalent and increasing across the ECOWAS region. l Limited evidence exists regarding the regional prevalence and trends of OCSEA, but preliminary findings suggest that it is more widespread than official data indicates. l Global trends indicate that regions with weak OCSEA identification processes and under-reporting tend to have higher prevalence of OCSEA. l Addressing the challenges of detection, investigation, prosecution and victim support requires sustained political will and greater prioritisation of OCSEA in the policy agenda. l This is an opportune moment for ECOWAS states to take action and implement practical measures to prevent the expansion of OCSEA and strengthen identification and follow-up processes 

OCWAR-T Research Report 7 | August 2023, ENACT Africa, 2023. 48p.

By Kylie Butler and Jasmine B. MacDonald

This policy and practice paper describes what we know about the relationship between intimate partner violence (IPV) and violence against family animals. It covers: (a) the forms of violence against family animals in an IPV context; (b) why perpetrators of IPV use violence against family animals; (c) how violence against family animals affects victim-survivors; and (d) implications for practice including tips for supporting clients who may be experiencing violence against family animals in an IPV context. Key messages ƒ Some evidence suggests that violence against family animals may be an indicator of frequent and severe IPV patterns. ƒ Perpetrators may threaten, harm or kill family animals with an intention to control victimsurvivors, cause emotional distress and/or control animals. ƒ Violence against family animals has negative effects on the physical and psychological wellbeing of victim-survivors, including children and family animals. ƒ Many victim-survivors report staying with, delaying leaving or returning to perpetrators due to fears for the safety of family animals left with the perpetrator. ƒ Actions at the practitioner, service and systemic levels to strengthen support for victimsurvivors of IPV who have experienced violence against family animals include: − screening for violence against family animals and providing support with animal-inclusive safety planning − increasing access to animal-inclusive crisis accommodation ƒ strengthening relationships between IPV support services, animal welfare services and law enforcement

Southbank VIC 3006 Australia Australian Institute of Family Studies, 2024. 16p

By Kristin Lees Haggerty; Olanike Ojelabi; Randi Campetti; Kathy Greelee

The authors of this paper report on a research project aimed at addressing unreported cases of elder abuse, and specifically exploring what guidance policy and decision-makers need in order to address barriers to reporting. Specifically, the authors’ research sought to improve understanding of elder abuse reporting pathways, facilitators, barriers, and outcomes. Over the course of their research, the authors report achieving three main objectives: conducting an environmental scan of policies and practices across states; conducting an in-depth case study of policy changes made in the state of Massachusetts; and developing recommendations for improving communication between Adult Protective Services (APS) and reporters based on findings from the first two objectives. The project was guided by two main research questions: what the legal, ethical, and practical barriers and facilitators are to establishing feedback loops about reported cases of potential elder abuse; and how regulations are interpreted and put into practice at the state and local levels in Massachusetts. The authors discuss their research design, methods, and analytical data analysis techniques, expected applicability of the research, limitations, outcomes, and recommendations.

Waltham, MA: Education Development Center, 2023. 67p.

By Claudio Mezzetti,  keshini muthukuda,  Haishan Yuan

We study whether data hacking of local organizations causes an increase in identity theft in the organization's local area. We use a difference in differences approach exploiting the timing of incidents of hacking and identity theft in the USA from 2015 to 2018, and estimate a fixed effects model that includes time and Core Based Statistical Area, or County, fixed effects. We find that a hacking incident in a local organization leads to 0.792 to 1.044 more identity thefts per 10,000 population in the local area the following year. The increase represents a 42% to 77% increase in the average prevalence of identity theft. We also show that among all our controls the unemployment rate is the most significant predictor of identity theft.

Mezzetti, Claudio and muthukuda, keshini and Yuan, Haishan, Crime in the Digital Age: Do Cyber Attacks Lead to Identity Theft? (April 24, 2024).

By Kim Thomas

  Targeted killings instil fear, silence activists and whistle-blowers, corrode democracies, and assist criminal actors in achieving their goals. The criminal economies of Kenya, Mozambique and South Africa are marked by these killings for social, political or economic gain. Yet, their nature and extent remain underexplored. We have chosen these three countries for analysis for several reasons. South Africa has a long history of targeted violence in various sectors of society, and our established database on the country provided a methodological framework for expanding the study. Kenya was chosen, as it has struggled not only with political violence, but also organized crime and gang culture, all of which, based on our South African research, provide a foundation for assassinations. Its fairly extensive media coverage also provided a good framework for the study. Although Mozambique’s media coverage is limited and less free, Mozambique was included in the study because our ongoing fieldwork there has revealed that targeted killings are prevalent in the country, particularly in manipulating political outcomes. The sociopolitical landscape of these three countries, although different from one another, all have commonalities that are conducive to targeted killings. South Africa has a long-standing history of violence deployed to achieve various political or economic outcomes, as was seen during the apartheid government’s administration and in the various post-democratic political party struggles. Violence in the mass-transit minibus-taxi industry as well as interpersonal violence are not new to the country. However, the use of targeted violence, by means of contracting a third party, to achieve political, economic or personal gain is something that has increased over the past two decades. Previous research on assassinations in South Africa by the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime (GI-TOC) has revealed that targeted violence increased from 2000 to 2017 and that there were particularly high rates of assassinations in the KwaZulu-Natal province, owing to both political motives and the taxi industry’s power struggles and conflict over routes. The research further revealed that, nationally, the taxi industry made up over 40% of the assassinations during that data period. Continued data collection and analysis up to 2020 seeks to determine if these trends are continuing or if there have been any significant changes in the targeted-killing landscape.  Kenya, although not as violent as South Africa, also has a history of political struggles and interconnectedness of the state and organized crime. This relationship is particularly evident in the deployment of gangs by politicians to intimidate the opposition and rally support for their campaigns. Kenya’s matatu industry, much like South Africa’s taxi industry, is also deeply criminalized. The industry experiences high levels of extortion, intimidation and corruption. Kenya has also experienced various land disputes over the years, which have led to violence and assassinations. It is in light of all these factors and their similarities with the South African landscape for assassinations, that the Kenyan database was compiled to determine the extent of these assassinations and their impact in Kenya. Mozambique has long been afflicted with political instability and violence. The current insurgency in the northern province of Cabo Delgado is one of many examples of the violence that has plagued the country. Although our research picked up some assassinations related to terrorism in the region, they were generally excluded from our database, as they were not linked to organized crime and did not fit within our methodological criteria. This is consistent with our field research in the country that has shown that the Islamic militants are in fact not profiteering from the illicit economy. The GI-TOC’s ongoing research in the country, as well our network of local journalists, has revealed that assassinations, particularly politically motivated ones, are having a profound impact on Mozambican society and democracy. This was first documented in a short GI-TOC data collection and article on the problem titled ‘Mozambique’s quiet assassination epidemic’. It is in light of this research that we decided to expand the database to better understand this phenomenon. As a result of the contexts in these countries, and their histories of violence, there are sources of violence available to those who have historically deployed it. This experience, coupled with dire social circumstances and limited economic opportunities, as seen in the context of Kenyan and South African gangs, creates reservoirs of violence that fuel targeted killings.8 Once involved in the business of targeted killings, the hired hitmen become vulnerable themselves. Interviews with hitmen in Cape Town gangs revealed that they were often as vulnerable as those whom they killed. In the gang context particularly, hitmen often exist outside of the formal gang structure and as a result do not have protection from gangs. However, they are still beholden to the gang bosses.  

Geneva:  Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime , 2021. 64p.

By Thorn and Burson Insights, Data & Intelligence

Since 2019, Thorn has focused on amplifying youth voices to better understand their digital lives, with particular attention to how they encounter and navigate technologyfacilitated forms of sexual abuse and exploitation. Previous youth-centered research has explored topics such as child sexual abuse material (CSAM)1 —including that which is self-generated (“SG-CSAM”)—nonconsensual resharing, online grooming, and the barriers young people face in disclosing or reporting negative experiences. Thorn’s Emerging Threats to Young People research series aims to examine emergent online risks to better understand how current technologies create and/or exacerbate child safety vulnerabilities and identify areas where solutions are needed. This report, the first in the series, sheds light specifically on young people’s perceptions of and experiences with deepfake nudes. Future reports in this initiative will address other pressing issues, including sextortion and online solicitations. Drawing on responses from a survey of 1,200 young people aged 13-20, this report explores their awareness of deepfake nudes, lived experiences with them, and their involvement in creating such content. Three key findings emerged from this research: CSAM Any visual depiction of sexually explicit conduct involving a person less than 18 years old 1. Young people overwhelmingly recognize deepfake nudes as a form of technology-facilitated abuse that harms the person depicted. Eighty-four percent of those surveyed believe that deepfake nudes cause harm, attributing this largely to the emotional and psychological impacts on victims, the potential for reputational damage, and the increasingly photorealistic quality of the imagery, which leads viewers to perceive—and consume—it as authentic. 2. Deepfake nudes already represent real experiences that young people have to navigate. Not only are many young people familiar with the concept, but a significant number report personal connections to this harm—either knowing someone targeted or experiencing it themselves. Forty-one percent of young people surveyed indicated they had heard the term “deepfake nudes,” including 1 in 3 (31%) teens. Additionally, among teens, 1 in 10 (10%) reported personally knowing someone who had deepfake nude imagery created of them, and 1 in 17 (6%) disclosed having been a direct victim of this form of abuse. 3. Among the limited sample of young people who admit to creating deepfake nudes of others, they describe easy access to deepfake technologies. Creators described access to the technologies through their devices’ app stores and accessibility via general search engines and social media

El Segundo, CA: Thorn, 2025. 32p.

By Louise Smith

Fly-tipping is the illegal disposal of household, industrial, commercial or other 'controlled' waste. The waste can be liquid or solid. ‘Controlled’ waste includes garden refuse and larger domestic items such as fridges and mattresses. Fly-tipping is not the same as littering. Littering is commonly assumed to include materials, often associated with smoking, eating and drinking. More information on litter can be found in the Commons Library briefing on litter. Fly-tipping is a devolved issue and this briefing focuses on England. Further information can also be provided to MPs and their staff on request.

The scale of fly-tipping

Government Fly-tipping statistics for England, April 2023 to March 2024 show that:

For the 2023/24 year, local authoritiesin England dealt with 15 million fly-tipping incidents, an increase of 6% from the 1.08 million reported in 2022/23.

In 2023/24,60% of fly-tips involved household waste. Total incidents involving household waste were 688,000 in 2023/24, an increase of 5% from 654,000 incidents in 2022/23.

Responsibility for fly tipping and powers to require clearance

Local authorities are responsible for investigating, clearing and taking appropriate enforcement action in relation to small scale fly-tipping on public land.

In England the Environment Agency is responsible for dealing with larger-scale fly-tipping (more than a lorry load), hazardous waste and fly-tipping by organised gangs.

On private land, it is normally the responsibility of the landowner to remove the waste.

Local authorities and the Environment Agency have legal powers to require landowners to clear fly-tipped waste from their land. They also have powers to enter the land and clear it and may seek reimbursement for costs related to it.

Penalties for fly-tipping

There is currently no minimum fine set out in law for unlawfully depositing waste under Section 33 of the Environmental Protection Act 1990. Sentencing in individual cases is a matter for the independent courts. Other available penalties include the issue of a fixed penalty notices and having a vehicle seized. Householders can receive a fixed penalty notice of up to £600 if they pass their waste to an unlicensed waste carrier which is subsequently fly-tipped.

Concern about costs to private landowners

Concern has been raised about the costs involved to private landowners of clearing fly tipped waste from their land and several campaigns have been launched calling for change in this area.

UK Government plans for reform

Through the Crime and Policing Bill 2024-25 the government is seeking powers to issue statutory guidance on fly-tipping enforcement to local authorities. Local authorities would be required to have regard to the guidance.

The government has announced plans to introduce mandatory digital waste tracking from April 2026. A digital waste tracking system would require those who produce, handle, dispose of, or make products from, waste to enter information onto it. Among other things it aims to enable regulators to better detect illegal activity and tackle waste crime, including fly-tipping.

There are plans for the Environment Agency to introduce a waste crime levy on specified legitimate waste operations, to better fund regulatory work targeting waste crime.

The UK Government has also indicated that it will make changes to the waste carrier, broker and dealer registration system, to make it easier to identify rogue operators in the waste sector.

Research Briefing

London: House of Commons Library 2025. 33p.

By Childlight (Global Child Safety Institute)

The sexual exploitation and abuse of children is a global health crisis. This report – presenting a diverse set of studies into the nature of the crisis – underscores the need for urgent action, provides solutions and shines a light on the financial networks that fuel child sexual exploitation and abuse (CSEA). The theme – who benefits? – asks a critical question: who is making money from this vile trade? The answer is as disturbing as it is clear. Organised crime groups profit, of course, but so do mainstream technology companies. 

The report shows that advertising revenue increases when platforms attract high volumes of traffic, including traffic generated by offenders engaging in CSEA. The exploitation of children is not just an atrocity — it is an industry, generating billions of dollars in profits. This is a market, structured and profitable, designed to generate revenue off the backs of vulnerable children. But markets can be disrupted, and that is where change must begin. Governments, businesses and communities must shift to a prevention-focused approach that stops CSEA before it begins.

Key findings

• Offenders are evolving, adapting and exploiting gaps in legislation and regulations.

• Offenders groom single parents via dating apps to access their children.

• Offenders target displaced children in conflict zones like Ukraine.

• Images are traded using sophisticated payment methods, including cryptocurrencies, to evade detection.

Key solutions

• Law enforcement and financial institutions can use tell-tale digital breadcrumbs to track and dismantle CSEA networks.

• Tech companies must be held accountable, pro-actively detect and remove child sexual abuse material (CSAM), and make more effective use of tried and tested tools, like blocklists, to shut down access to CSAM.

• Policymakers must act decisively, as the United Kingdom has begun to do, by criminalising AI-generated CSAM and banning so-called ‘how-to’ manuals for paedophiles. 

Edinburgh: University of Edinburgh, Childlight, 2025. 15p.

By Flore Berger and Mouhamadou Kane 

West Africa has become a hotspot for the trafficking of medical products, with estimations that the illicit market makes up to 80% of medical products in Burkina Faso and Guinea, the two case studies of this brief. Despite its enormous scale, there are gaps in knowledge that this report seeks to address by providing a qualitative analysis of the market’s key characteristics and enablers (corruption and insecurity), and an assessment of national and regional responses. Recommendations l The complex supply chains feeding the illicit market for medical products dictate that responses must be international, and at the very least regional, to be effective. ECOWAS hence has a key role to play at the regional level to enhance cross-border intelligence gathering and cooperation. l National authorities are best placed to tackle the structural drivers (affordability and accessibility) behind the demand for illicit medical products, and should work simultaneously on awareness campaigns, as well as on wider distribution of and access to key high-demand products such as antimalarials. l Civil society has a key role to play. In addition to supporting the awareness-raising effort, civil society is also central in holding people accountable (including customs officials and politicians, for example) by denouncing cases of corruption and malfeasance.  

  OCWAR-T Policy Brief 5 | August 2023, Institute for Security Studies, 2023. 10p.

By Hannah Miles Samantha Bricknell

The National Homicide Monitoring Program is Australia’s only national data collection on homicide incidents, victims and offenders. This report describes 262 homicide incidents recorded by Australian state and territory police between 1 July 2023 and 30 June 2024. During this 12-month period there were 277 victims of homicide and 278 identified offenders

Statistical Report no. 52.

Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology. 2025. 77p.

By Mark Shaw, Tuesday Reitano, Simone Haysom, Peter Tinti

  I llicit trade is an umbrella term that covers multiple crimes and commodities, including the theft, diversion, adulteration, counterfeiting, and production of substandard goods, all acts which can occur at multiple points along a supply chain. It is initiated, enabled, and protected by a wide range of actors, from unethical corporations and corrupt officials at all levels of government to armed violent groups in conflict zones and organized crime networks operating locally and transnationally. As global trade routes increasingly encompass developing economies—as a source, transit, and market for consumer goods—they present unique challenges to creating effective national and, by implication, regional and global regimes against illicit trade. For many states around the world, and especially in the Global South, these challenges threaten to destabilize social, economic, and political structures. These states are the world’s “states on the cusp.” The term illicit trade, for the purpose of this report, refers to illegal production, movement, or sale of normally legal goods. Such illegal movement is often carried out to derive profit by avoiding costs such as those imposed by taxes or customs duties. There is a particularly strong incentive for illicit trade in cases where goods are subject to high duties, or where goods are subsidized to be cheaper in one jurisdiction (food, sugar, and flour are examples) but not in another, providing incentives for illegal cross-border trade. The phrase “licit goods traded illicitly” captures this phenomenon neatly. Importantly, however, this definition also includes some goods that are counterfeited to pass off as being licit, and then traded either illicitly (avoiding scrutiny) or, on occasion, in legal markets. The trade in counterfeit goods alone has been estimated to be worth between 3 and 7 percent of global GDP. Many forms of illicit trade, including counterfeit medicines, substandard goods, and the falsification or adulteration of food and agricultural commodities, medical equipment, and consumer and industrial goods have serious public health and safety implications. Other forms of illicit trade have huge environmental, social, and economic impacts, not least of which is reduced revenue collection which weakens state institutions, creating a downward spiral of higher illicit trade intertwined with weaker state capacity. Reversing this trend, therefore, must be a global public good. This complex mix of products and commodities being traded illegally raises the important question of whether advances in technology can assist in more effective regulation. At the core of these efforts is ensuring that commodities are both produced and traded legally to protect consumers from harm. Here, “harm” refers to harms to the public (arising from poor quality or counterfeit products) and to the state (such products harms the state’s ability to collect essential revenues and to control markets in accordance with democratic processes). Global economic trends in international trade and ever more complex supply chains are, however, reducing the role that governments can play in monitoring and regulating trade, creating both greater vulnerabilities and increasing the importance of the private sector as a critical actor. This poses significant new challenges. With an estimated 80 percent of global trade travelling by sea, the trend toward the privatization of ports and other critical infrastructure and the proliferation of free trade zones have created a growing blind spot for governments seeking to understand and regulate supply chains and illicit trade. For some forms of illicit trade, the role of small air shipments through private carriers has had a similar effect, eroding law enforcement’s ability to monitor, predict, and interdict where and how illicitly traded goods will reach the hands of their consumers. Online marketplaces and small package shipping are replacing the physical spaces where illicit transactions used to take place; their market size and reach are expanding while at the same time reducing the stigma of illegality. In short, the scope for illegality is growing, just as the capacity for states to respond is weakening. Can advances in technology fill the gap? Sophisticated and rapidly evolving technologies are bringing new ways to track, trace, monitor, and maintain records with integrity. They are steadily reinforcing law enforcement’s capacity to identify criminality in the vastness of the surface and dark web. Despite the promise that technology has to offer, some longstanding stumbling blocks need to be overcome. Some of these are particularly acute in developing economies. At the most basic level, for example, no system can provide quality control over data entry when those responsible for entering the primary data are either willfully or through lack of capacity corrupting that content. More generally, the lack of global standards and effective and consistent legal frameworks, and, increasingly, questions about jurisdiction caused by cyber-enabled trade and global supply chains, may limit the impact of purely national regimes of oversight and enforcement regimes. Lack of capacity, insecurity, and multiple forms and levels of corruption are pertinent features of developing economies that  compound the inherent challenges of responding to illicit trade. Evidence from case studies around the world, as well as two commissioned for this report—examining the political economy of illicit tobacco in Southern Africa and of counterfeit medicines in Central America—reveal that political actors and state institutions are complicit in enabling, promoting, and protecting illicit trade at the very highest levels of the state. They also show that it is often the most vulnerable and underserved in society who rely on illicit markets to meet basic needs. While there are clear distinctions by commodity and context, the perpetuation of illicit markets and trade within developing economies often can be exacerbated by systematic and serious failures in governance and political will, rather than technical shortcomings that can easily be overcome. Technical solutions also may have unintended consequences for governance and the poor. That does not mean that they should not be used, rather that a better understanding of the economic, political, and social context in which they are implemented is desirable. Implemented effectively, they hold great promise in taking forward steps to undercut illicit markets and improve citizens’ well-being. However, the changing landscape for infrastructure, investment, and development assistance also has reduced the leverage of more traditional multilateral institutions to insist upon the governance and policy reforms that would address these issues. These changes have had contradictory outcomes: increasing trade on the one hand but weakening regulatory systems and conditionalities (that had been a growing part of traditional multilateral development bank practices) on the other. Requirements for transparency, broad-based development benefits for the citizenry, or democratic governance have been weakened, although not removed, in the new financing landscape. Against this backdrop, private sector innovation for providing technology-based tools to enhance regulatory capacity combined with citizen empowerment is key. Such innovations, however, should be grounded in an understanding of the context into which they are introduced and be governed by effective oversight systems, including effective and transparent public-private partnerships. How to address illicit trade in developing economies, therefore, remains unsurprisingly complex. Wins often will be incremental and setbacks frequent. The overall goal simply may be to constrain the enabling environment for illicit trade rather than allowing it to endlessly expand, to target efforts where they have the greatest chance of sustained success, and to prioritize those commodities where the harmful implications are the greatest. This is a volatile time in global history, marked by rapid technological and political changes plus a global COVID-19 pandemic. We must develop a better understanding of the political economy of illicit trade and craft an active monitoring capacity for intervenening. In this report, we put forward a commodity- and context-specific political economy approach to achieve this and conclude with some guidance for policy makers from any sector, public or private, to assess when and how to respond to i o illicit trade, and to work in and with developing economies.  

Washington, DC: Atlantic Council,  Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security , 2020. 57p.

By United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)

  As defined in the Conceptual Framework for the Statistical Measurement of Illicit Financial Flows,  Illicit Financial Flows (IFFs) are “financial flows that are illicit in origin, transfer or use,that reflect an exchange of value and that cross country borders.”IFFs may arise from criminal activities, but also from some behaviours related to tax and commercial practices. Such flows are either directly generated by illicit income, including cross-border transactions performed in the context of illicit trade of goods such as drugs, or the management of illicit income through investment in financial and non-financial assets. National data on IFFs remain limited worldwide, but significant progress has been made since 2017, when the UN Assembly adopted indicator 16.4.1. ("Total value of inward and outward illicit financial flows") for the monitoring of progress towards Sustainable Development Target 16.4, which aims to significantly reduce illicit financial and arms flows by 2030.  The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) was entrusted, alongside the United Nations Commission on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), with the custodianship of SDG indicator 16.4.1. The International Classification of Crime for Statistical Purposes (ICCS)  provides definitions of illegal activities generating IFFs. Moreover, since 2017, UNODC and UNCTAD have taken a series of coordinated actions leading to a conceptual framework for the statistical measurement of IFFs, the implementation of pilot measurement exercises and the development of methodological guidelines to measure IFFs from selected illegal market activities. Additionally, in October 2019, the 10th session of the Inter-agency and Expert Group on Sustainable Development Goals Indicators,  held in Addis Ababa, reviewed the methodology and reclassified the indicator from Tier III to Tier II, meaning that the indicator is conceptually clear and has set out internationally established standards, although data are not yet regularly produced by countries. This document details the crime-related IFF estimates resulting from the engagement of UNODC with countries to implement the methodology outlined in the UNODC-UNCTAD conceptual framework.

Vienna: UNODC, 2023. 23p.

By Giorgia Cascone, Caterina Paternoster, Michele Riccardi , Viktoriia Poltoratskaya, Bence Tóth: Claudia Baez-Camargo, Jacopo Costa

• Corruption is a complex and multifaced phenomenon, often defined broadly as “the misuse of public office for private gain” [1]. Despite the absence of consensus on its definition [2,3], scholars, practitioners, and policymakers acknowledge corruption as a longstanding issue heavily affecting nations around the world [3]. Its negative impacts are extensive, undermining civil, political, economic, social, and cultural rights [4]. • The FALCON Project is a three-year Horizon Europe research project which will develop new data-driven indicators and tools to strengthen the global fight against corruption by following an evidence-based, multiactor and interdisciplinary approach. • Specifically, FALCON covers four corruption domains: Corruption and fraud in public procurement; Circumvention of sanctions by "kleptocrats" and oligarchs; Border corruption; Other high-level corruption cases • This Policy Brief summarizes the main results of the analysis carried out on these four corruption domains under Work Package 2 of the FALCON Project. The document is structured as follows

Policy Brief of Project FALCON.

Milan: Transcrime – Joint Research Centre on Innovation and Crime, 2025. 22p.

By The Financial Action Task Force (FATF)

The market of art, antiquities and other cultural objects has attracted criminals, organised crime groups and terrorists to launder proceeds of crime and fund their activities. Criminals seek to exploit the sector’s history of privacy and the use of third-party intermediaries while terrorist groups can use cultural objects from areas where they are active to finance their operations.

The vast majority of market participants do not have a connection to illicit activities, but there are risks associated with these markets and many jurisdictions do not have sufficient awareness and understanding of them. This results in a lack of investigative resources and expertise, and difficulties with pursuing cross-border investigations.

The report includes a list of risk indicators that can help public and private sector entities identify suspicious activities in the art and antiquities markets, and also highlights the importance of rapidly identifying and tracing cultural objects involved in money laundering or terrorist financing.

The report includes some good practices that countries have taken to address the challenges they face, including the establishment of specialised units and access to relevant databases and cooperation with experts and archaeologists to help identify, trace, investigate and repatriate cultural objects.

Paris: The Financial Action Task Force (FATF), 2023. 60p.

By The Financial Action Task Force (FATF)

Ransomware attacks target individuals, businesses and government agencies, across the world. The impact of these attacks can be devastating for individuals, government agencies and business activity and even disrupt essential infrastructure and services.

This FATF report analyses the methods that criminals use to carry out their ransomware attacks and how payments are made and laundered. Criminals are almost exclusively using crypto, or virtual assets and have easy access to virtual asset service providers around the world. Jurisdictions with weak or non-existent AML/CFT controls are therefore of concern.

The report proposes a number of actions that countries can take to more effectively disrupt ransomware-related money laundering. This includes building on and leveraging existing international cooperation mechanisms, given the transnational nature of ransomware attacks and related laundering. Authorities also need to develop the necessary skills and tools to quickly collect key information, trace the nearly instantaneous financial transactions and recover virtual assets before they dissipate. The multi-disciplinary nature of ransomware also means that authorities must extend their collaboration beyond their traditional counterparts to include cyber-security and data protection agencies.

The FATF also finalized a list of potential risk indicators that can help public and private sector entities identify suspicious activities related to ransomware.

Paris: The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) 2023. 54p.

By Transparency International

Despite international standards and collective commitments, the world’s biggest economies and some key financial hubs remain far too open to corrupt people and other criminals laundering and enjoying their ill-gotten gains through real estate.

To help policymakers address these ongoing challenges, Transparency International and the Anti-Corruption Data Collective (ACDC) developed the Opacity in Real Estate Ownership (OREO) Index. The Index evaluates the ideal framework to protect real estate markets from dirty money, using two pillars. The first pillar assesses the availability and adequacy of real estate data. The second measures the coverage and scope of the anti-money laundering legal framework as it applies to the real estate sector.

The first edition of the index reveals gaps that make global property markets vulnerable to corrupt money flows through assessing and ranking 24 jurisdictions, including 18 G20 member nations plus guest countries Spain and Norway, as well as Hong Kong, Panama, Singapore and the United Arab Emirates (UAE).

No country achieves a perfect mark, with 10 jurisdictions scoring below five out of possible 10 points.

By exposing weaknesses, the OREO Index aims to drive reforms that enhance transparency and accountability in the real estate sector. Both an effective data system and comprehensive anti-money laundering safeguards are essential for effectively preventing, detecting and investigating money laundering, and identifying policy gaps that allow it to go undiscovered.

Berlin: Transparency International, 2025. 49p.

By Fatjona Mejdini

Organized crime groups from the Western Balkans have over the last 20 years established a remarkably strong foothold in South America in their pursuit of cocaine that they ship to and distribute in Europe and beyond. They have evolved from minor European players into prominent international criminal enterprises in this illicit global commodity trade, building durable relationships at both ends of the highly lucrative supply chain. Their rise has been spurred, in part, by luck. Two key factors have favoured them: an unprecedented surge in cocaine production in South America and insatiable demand for the drug in Europe. The Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime (GI-TOC)’s European Drug Trends Monitor suggests that after reaching record high levels in 2023, and despite a drop in seizures in the beginning of 2024, cocaine availability remains stable, if not on the rise, in Europe.1 Indeed, record seizures are being documented at key EU ports and the bloc’s drugs monitoring agency, the European Union Drugs Agency, announced in March 2023 another annual increase in the levels of cocaine detected in wastewater, continuing an upward trend that began in 2016.2 But guile has played an equally important role in the success of these groups, which have leveraged the smuggling expertise and paramilitary training established during the Balkan ethnic conflicts and civil unrests of the 1990s. Playing the long game, they have learned from and won the respect of the Italian mafia, among others, while retaining an agility that has allowed them to seize market opportunities. This has largely been achieved – so far, at least – without provoking debilitating blowback from rival players. The research for this report focused on Western Balkan organized crime groups and was conducted within this framework. Consequently, the dynamics observed in South American countries are explored solely in relation to these criminal groups. The report aims to provide a detailed understanding of their presence in South America and the broader implications that this has for their future in the context of the Western Balkans. Balkan brokers have been crucial to their success in establishing symbiotic local relationships. They have forged strong and enduring connections in the cocaine-producing countries of Colombia, Peru and Bolivia, from cartels to coca farmers. They have also been able to establish strong bases and key relationships in dispatching countries such as Brazil, Ecuador and, more recently, the neighbouring Caribbean region. Not only have they managed to navigate the South America’s criminal environment with relative ease, but in some cases they have also proved able to forge relationships within high-level business and political circles in the countries where they operate.3 To avoid disruptions to their operations at the wholesale source, they have intentionally maintained a professional working distance from other foreign criminal organizations operating in South America, especially the infamous Mexican cartels. However, they have managed to expand their footprint in global cocaine markets, partly through arrangements with some of Europe’s most prominent criminal organizations, such as the Dutch–Moroccan networks, the Kinahan cartel and Italian mafia groups like the ’Ndrangheta and the Camorra. They have also displayed creativity by employing various forms of trafficking methods. These extend beyond the use of container ships, to also encompass cargo and leisure vessels and planes. Their presence in South America and the international cocaine supply chain has left a conspicuous footprint that has been tracked by law enforcement activity. Over the past three years, half of the targets of Europol-coordinated cocaine operations have been linked to individuals and networks from this region, thanks in part to the crackdown on communication platforms such as EncroChat and SKY ECC, which were widely used by criminal organizations from the Western Balkans.4 Western Balkan criminals have been accused of transporting tens of tonnes of cocaine from South America to major ports in Belgium, the Netherlands, Spain and elsewhere. Although these major European entry hubs appear to be the primary channels for criminal organizations from the Western Balkans, these actors also utilize ports in the Balkans region as transit points for trafficking cocaine elsewhere in Europe. Their involvement in the global illicit cocaine trade is not confined to the European consumer market, however. Western Balkan groups have been linked to significant seizures on other continents as well, including one of the largest cocaine seizures in US history (more than 20 tonnes, worth more than US$1 billion).5 Western Balkans groups have also, in recent years, been using their strong presence in South America to target even wealthier markets, such as Australia, using Africa and Southern Europe as transit regions.6 These criminal entities have also left a trail of blood. Since 2010, at least 19 people from the Western Balkans believed to be linked with cocaine trafficking have been killed in South America, according to GI-TOC records. Their activities have exacerbated instability in certain South American countries such as Ecuador, as they relentlessly secure supplies of cocaine and its safe shipment – at any cost. This research report identifies the links between criminal actors from the Western Balkans and the South American cocaine trafficking market. It provides an overview of the factors that have impelled the region’s organized crime groups towards South America and addresses the implications arising from their presence in that region. The study sheds light on their origins and operations, revealing common patterns despite the diverse backgrounds from which they have emerged. The study finds that links between the Western Balkans and South America have existed for around three decades but have significantly intensified in the last two. It predominantly focuses on organized crime groups from Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Montenegro, North Macedonia and Serbia, but also makes reference to those from other countries in South Eastern Europe where relevant, in relation to their collaboration in the cocaine trade. It is important to note that international law enforcement organizations, in their reporting, often refer to criminal groups from the Western Balkans as ‘Albanian-speaking networks’7 or the ‘Balkan Cartel’.8 The former is used to denote criminal groups of Albanian nationality that speak Albanian, while the latter refers to criminal groups of Slavic origin that speak the Bosnian-Croatian-Montenegrin-Serbian language.9 These terms indicate ethnicity and linguistic variations among actors rather than their organizational characteristics. Inter-ethnic cooperation between organized crime groups in the Western Balkans has a long history, particularly in the trafficking of weaponry and ammunition, cigarettes, fuel and drugs, and human smuggling. In some cases, integrated organized crime groups have emerged bringing together members from different countries within the region. But these groups prefer to retain their independence, and there is no evidence of the creation of cartels in the Western Balkan region.10 Organized crime groups in the region generally have a clear leadership structure, but Balkan organized crime groups operating in South America appear to prefer a horizontal organizational structure that allows flexibility. Due to the transnational nature of cocaine trafficking, these groups have become adaptable. Often, their trafficking operations in South America are seen as ‘joint ventures’ or ‘projects’ that bring together organizations or groups of criminals from different countries and ethnic backgrounds who happen to be in the right place and have the necessary resources and skills to achieve the desired outcome. The extensive supply chain coordination needed to procure, transport, process and distribute the drug has prompted enhanced flexibility within these groups. Therefore, in this report, the terms ‘organized crime groups’ and ‘criminal networks’ will be used interchangeably.

Geneva, SWIT: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime , 2025. 48p.

By Jacki Tapley, David Shepherd, Veronika Carruthers, Jennifer Grant, Chloe Hawkins, Michelle McDermott, Megan Thomas 

  The Victim Contact Scheme (VCS) requires the Probation Service to offer contact to victims of specified sexual and/or violent offences to provide information about the offender’s sentence and release. The VCS applies to cases where the sentence is 12 months or more, or where the offender is made subject to a hospital order. The 2021 Target Operating Model for the unified Probation Service highlighted the desire to provide a similar service to victims of stalking, harassment and coercive and controlling behaviour, where the length of sentence is less than 12 months. The Victim Notification Scheme (VNS) differs from the VCS; it is a non-statutory scheme and due to the nature of the shorter sentences there is a need to contact victims more quickly. The VNS was initially trialled from April 2022 in three Probation regions: Hampshire and Thames Valley, Northumbria, and the whole of Kent, Surrey and Sussex. This report provides findings from a process evaluation of the VNS. The aim of the research was to explore the process by which the VNS has been rolled out in the pilot areas, and its perceived impact on those criminal justice professionals responsible for its delivery, as well as the perceived impact on victims’ experiences and the specialist support services assisting them. It also aimed to identify parts of the new process that are working well and areas where further improvements are required, particularly in relation to the shorter timescales required for VNS cases.   

 Ministry of Justice Analytical Series, London: UK Ministry of Justice, 2025. 71p.

By Andy Aydın-Aitchison

The paper reflects on the value of linking criminological research on atrocity with that on serious economic crime. The two areas of criminological research are outlined briefly, before common challenges around complexity and interdependence are set out. An example of a criminal career encompassing both atrocity and serious economic criminality is put forward to support claims that atrocity and economic crime can usefully be studied together. Three further examples of research are discussed to show the possible merits of bringing together two criminological strands. Ultimately, studying the two forms of criminality together would respect the lived experience of victims, who see firsthand how atrocity and serious economic crime go hand in hand.

International Criminal Law Review (2023) 1–17