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Bargaining with the Devil to Avoid Hell? A Discussion Paper on Negotiations with Criminal Groups in Latin America and the Caribbean

By Vanda Felbab-Brown

Since 2007, negotiations with violent organised crime groups (hereafter, “criminal groups”) have been increasingly featured in government, church and NGO responses to violent criminality in Latin America and the Caribbean. They are enormously controversial, both politically and ethically. Many consider them unacceptable and counterproductive, as they may involve risks such as legitimising the criminal group or emboldening others to engage in criminal activities. The relative rarity with which such negotiations produce a deal and the great uncertainty as to their long-term outcomes are further sources of controversy. The sensitivity and risks are so large that some who have participated in the situations examined in this paper are wary of calling them “negotiations.” They may avoid the term even when they have bargained from a position of superiority or succeeded in striking a deal. In attempting to address the challenges criminal groups present, most countries understandably employ a tough-on-crime stance. Any other would be hard to justify to the public. Yet, where the activities of these groups have become especially pervasive and violent, there is often a lack of deterrence capacity, leading to public anger and desperation. Negotiation can thus sometimes become an option and may be pursued in conjunction with coercive tactics, institutional strengthening, legalisation measures and more. As a diplomat involved in the talks with criminal gangs in El Salvador and Honduras put it, by negotiating “we were not trying to get to heaven; we were just trying to avoid hell.” But if negotiation with criminal groups sometimes becomes necessary, which group characteristics and contextual factors must be taken into account? What end-goals are appropriate and realistic? What inducements, concessions and redlines must be contemplated? And how do such processes compare and contrast with negotiations conducted with politically-motivated insurgents? These are just some of the questions examined in this paper.   

Barcelona, Spain: The Institute for Integrated Transitions, 2021. 47p,