Edited by France Desmarais

Every day, cultural objects disappear. Stolen from their place of conservation – whether pilfered from a museum or, as is most often the case, ripped out of an archeological site – they embark on the road often travelled by illicit antiquities. A road we are still trying to map with more precision. The desire to better understand that journey, to figure out what the routes are, to know who the culprits could be, and of course to discover where these coveted objects end up, spurred the creation of the first – and only – International Observatory on Illicit Traffic in Cultural Goods by the International Council of Museums (ICOM) in December 2012, thanks to a grant from the European Commission. ICOM has, for long, been at the forefront of the fight against illegal trade. The protection of the world’s cultural heritage has featured in the organization’s mission statement since 1947, a year into its creation 70 years ago. Ever since, as the voice of the world museum community, ICOM has played a foremost part in advocating advancement in the protection of cultural heritage practice in general, and in countering illegal trade in particular (UNESCO 1972). From the Code of Ethics for Museums, now referred to as the international deontological standard for museum professionals, to the well-known Red Lists of Cultural Objects at Risk, directly associated with helping law enforcement recognize and seize important quantities of antiquities, the aim has always been to develop innovative practical tools designed to help protect cultural property. In need of figures In 2011, the idea of creating an observatory stemmed from the dire need to obtain more information on the whereabouts of stolen objects and more reliable facts and figures on illicit traffic in art and heritage. It is surprising, to say the least, that illicit traffic in cultural objects should have been officially recognized for decades – if not a century – but that no organization gathered official global statistics to illustrate the extent of the problem. Many numbers are brought forward by different expert organizations to quantify the trade, in mass or in financial value. Some of those numbers are astronomical. Yet, none can be confirmed by official empirical data. While the INTERPOL Expert Group on Stolen Cultural Property concluded, in June 2015, that data gathering and systematic research are of high relevance for combatting the illicit traffic in cultural items, it remains impossible, to this day, to precisely rank illicit traffic in cultural objects so as to measure it to other types of transnational crimes. Although some improvement has been observed in the collection and analysis of the numbers related to theft and seizures, it is unfortunately still impossible to answer questions regarding the number of objects that disappear or are sold illegally each year. In the big data era, and in a moment in time when massive looting has spread to large parts of the world, even as political leaders and the general public seem more than ever concerned about the fate of cultural heritage in danger, this impossibility to quantify seems paradoxical. The reality is that, despite the palpable increase in global awareness concerning the importance of protecting cultural objects, the actual means to support their protection are somewhat lagging behind. If, as a long-standing actor in he global fight against illicit traffic, ICOM wants to keep developing useful tools and proposing appropriate response mechanisms to effectively counter the illegal trade, it needs to know and understand the phenomenon as yet. Identifying the trade routes, the agents involved and the types of objects targeted is the only way to comprehend the significance of the illegal art and antiquities market. This can only be tackled through transdisciplinary research initiatives, such as that initiated with the Observatory project, as relevant organizations are encouraged to do under the 1970 UNESCO Convention. Indeed, Article 17 of the Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property mentions the possibility for relevant organizations to conduct studies on matters related to the illicit movement of cultural property. Looting and illicit traffic represent one of the global challenges yet to be faced, for which a research and data gathering body such as the International Observatory in Illicit Traffic in Cultural Goods is needed. What we do know for a fact is that museums are particularly concerned by theft in art and heritage, as primary places of conservation from which objects can be stolen, but also as collecting institutions that could, unwillingly, end up buying looted cultural property. Indeed, objects are not only stolen from museums, but they can also land, with the help of sometimes ill-informed accomplices, in the hands of private collectors. Later, through a donation for example, they might find themselves in museums. It is specifically because stolen art and antiquities risk falling into museum collections that it is the duty of the world museum community to come together and counter illicit traffic in art and heritage. The inaugural gesture is to apply strict ethical practice concerning provenance of acquisitions. But it does not suffice. It must be supported by strong national programmes

Paris: ICOM International Observatory on Illicit Traffic in Cultural Goods , 2015. 215p.

By David Hammond, Daniel Hong, Samantha Rundle, Maryam Iraniparast, Beau Kilmer, Elle Wadsworth

Canada legalized ‘recreational’ or ‘non-medical’ cannabis in 2018 with a primary objective of displacing illicit cannabis and transitioning consumers to a ‘quality controlled’ legal retail market. To date, there is limited research on legal market capture in jurisdictions with non-medical cannabis markets. Methods: The current analysis used ‘demand-side’ methods to estimate the size of the Canadian cannabis market using data from two sources. First, data from the Canadian Community Health Survey were used to estimate the number of Canadians who use cannabis. Second, data on cannabis expenditures from legal versus illegal sources were analyzed from 5656 past 12-month consumers aged 16–100 who completed national surveys conducted in 2022 as part of the International Cannabis Policy Study. Results: Total estimated expenditures from legal sources were within two percentage points of the ‘actual’ retail sales data from Government of Canada’s tracking system. In the 12-month period ending in September 2022, total cannabis expenditures in Canada were estimated at $6.72 billion dollars, including $5.23 billion from legal sources and $1.49 billion from illegal sources for an estimated legal market capture of 78 %. In 2022, dried flower accounted for 55 % of total legal expenditures and an additional 2 % was spent on plants and seeds. Concentrates accounted for 12 % of legal expenditures, followed by oral liquids (11 %), vaping liquids (10 %), and edibles (8 %, excluding drinks). Conclusions: The findings provide evidence of substantial transition in expenditures from the illegal to the legal market in the five years since legalization of non-medical cannabis in Canada.

International Journal of Drug Policy, 2025. 10p.

By Jin A, Darzi AJ, Dargham A, Liddar N, Bozorgi S, Sohrevardi S, Zhang M, Torabiardakani K, Couban RJ, Khalili M, Busse JW, Sadeghirad B.

Background: Increasing legalization of recreational cannabis and availability of cannabinoid products has resulted in expanded use, which is associated with adverse effects including concerns over increased risk of motor vehicle collision (MVC). We aimed to explore the association between cannabis consumption and MVC.

Methods: We searched MEDLINE, EMBASE, CINAHL, Cochrane library, SCOPUS, PsycInfo, Web of Science, TRID from inception to November 2024. We included studies assessing the association between cannabis consumption on MVC fatalities, any injuries, and culpability/unsafe driving actions. Pairs of reviewers independently screened search results, extracted data, and assessed risk of bias. We used a DerSimonian and Laird random-effects model for all meta-analyses and the GRADE approach to assess the certainty of evidence.

Results: We included 31 studies with 328,388 individuals. Low certainty evidence suggests that cannabis consumption may be associated with an increased risk of MVC fatality (8 studies, OR 1.55, 95% CI: 1.20 to 1.98) with an absolute risk increase (ARI) of 14 more deaths per 100,000 MVC's. Low certainty evidence from 9 case-control studies suggests cannabis consumption may be associated with an increased risk of injury due to MVC (OR 2.00, [95% CI: 1.31-3.07]; absolute risk increase of 6.8%). We are uncertain about the association of cannabis consumption with MVC culpability/unsafe driving action as the evidence was only very low certainty.

Conclusions: Low certainty evidence suggests that cannabis consumption may increase risk of MVC fatality and risk of injury from MVC. The association between cannabis use and risk of unsafe driving is uncertain.

Int J Drug Policy. 2025 Aug;142:104832. doi: 10.1016/j.drugpo.2025.104832. Epub 2025 May 13. PMID: 40367728.

By The International Drug Policy Consortium

In March 2025, amidst geopolitical tensions, protracted negotiations, and a chaotic voting session at the 68th session of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs (CND), a ground-breaking document was adopted. A new resolution, submitted by Colombia and supported by a broad cross-regional coalition of Member States, agreed to create a “multidisciplinary panel of 19 independent experts” tasked with reviewing “the existing machinery for the international control of narcotic drugs” and providing recommendations to strengthen the system and its implementation.

This is a historical, once-in-a-generation opportunity to propose serious changes that further social inclusion, social justice, and “the health and welfare of humankind”. This opportunity must not be wasted.

In this advocacy note, IDPC lays out some key considerations and aspirations for the panel, as well as some of the potential pitfalls to avoid, in order to make this review count.

London: IDPC, 2o25. 11p

By Joanna R. Lampe

State marijuana laws have changed significantly in recent years, and federal law appears poised to change in the coming months. At the state level, many states have enacted laws authorizing the use of marijuana for medical purposes. A smaller but growing number of states have also amended their laws to legalize or decriminalize marijuana use. At the federal level, in April 2024, news outlets reported that the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) planned to change the status of marijuana under the Controlled Substances Act (CSA) by moving it from Schedule I to the less restrictive Schedule III. Under current law, many cannabis-related activities that comply with state law may nonetheless violate the federal CSA. Moving marijuana to Schedule III would not bring state-legal marijuana markets into compliance with federal law. In light of recent and proposed changes to state and federal marijuana regulation, this Sidebar provides an overview of the divergence between federal and state marijuana law. It then briefly discusses the legal consequences of the divergence and outlines certain related considerations for Congress.

Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2025. 5p.

By Barbara Andraka-Christou , Olivia Randall-Kosich , Matthew Golan , Rachel Totaram , Brendan Saloner , Adam J Gordon , Bradley D Stein

Background: Problem-solving courts have the potential to help reduce harms associated with the opioid crisis. However, problem-solving courts vary in their policies toward medications for opioid use disorder (MOUD), with some courts discouraging or even prohibiting MOUD use. State laws may influence court policies regarding MOUD; thus, we aimed to identify and describe state laws related to MOUD in problem-solving courts across the US from 2005 to 2019.

Methods: We searched Westlaw legal software for regulations and statutes (collectively referred to as "state laws") in all US states and D.C. from 2005 to 2019 and included laws related to both MOUD and problem-solving courts in our analytic sample. We conducted a modified iterative categorization process to identify and analyze categories of laws related to MOUD access in problem-solving courts.

Results: Since 2005, nine states had laws regarding MOUD in problem-solving courts. We identified two overarching categories of state laws: 1) laws that prohibit MOUD bans, and 2) laws potentially facilitating access to MOUD. Seven states had laws that prohibit MOUD bans, such as laws prohibiting exclusion of participants from programs due to MOUD use or limiting the type of MOUD, dose or treatment duration. Four states had laws that could facilitate access to MOUD, such as requiring courts to make MOUD available to participants.

Discussion: Relatively few states have laws facilitating MOUD access and/or preventing MOUD bans in problem-solving courts. To help facilitate MOUD access for court participants across the US, model state legislation should be created. Additionally, future research should explore potential effects of state laws on MOUD access and health outcomes for court participants.

Health Justice. 2022 Mar 31;10(1):14. doi: 10.1186/s40352-022-00178-6. PMID: 35357599; PMCID: PMC8969254.

By Inshik Sim, Shawn Kelley, Kavinvadee Suppapongtevasakul, Seong Jae Shin

This report shows that the production and trafficking of methamphetamine in Shan State, Myanmar, have significantly increased since 2021. Thailand remained the main transit and destination point for methamphetamine trafficked from Myanmar and recorded the largest quantity of methamphetamine seizures in the region. The report highlights the evolving nature of transnational drug trafficking groups operating in East and Southeast Asia. These groups have demonstrated remarkable agility in reacting to law enforcement pressure, as shown by the spread of production sites for ketamine and related precursor chemicals.

Vienna: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime; 2025. 150p.

By Katrien Luyten

The EU is an important market for illicit drugs (hereinafter referred to as drugs), both in terms of consumption and production. An estimated 29% of European adults aged 15-65 have used drugs at least once in their lifetime, the majority of them being men. Cannabis remains by far the most used drug, followed by cocaine, MDMA (ecstasy or molly) and amphetamines. Drugs have been claiming an increasing number of lives in the EU since 2012, but their impact goes far beyond the harm caused by their use. The drugs market is the largest criminal market in the EU, with an estimated minimum retail value of €30 billion per year in the EU alone. Over a third of the organised crime groups active in the EU are involved in the trade in drugs, which, besides generating massive criminal profits and inflicting substantial harm, incites associated violence. Drug markets furthermore have links with wider criminal activity, including terrorism; they have a negative impact on the legal economy and communities, cause environmental damage and can fuel corruption and undermine governance. Drugs have been trafficked into and through the EU for decades, but they are also increasingly produced in the EU, for both local and global markets, asis the case for cannabis and synthetic drugs such as amphetamines. In fact, the trade in synthetic drugs in the EU is unique compared to other substances,as the production of these drugs and new psychoactive substances in most cases takes place in the EU. In 2021, around 1million seizures of drugs were reported in the EU-27 plus Norway and Türkiye. Although the EU Member States carry the primary responsibility for developing their drug policy and legislation, cross-border cooperation is paramount in the fight against drugs. With the problem constantly expanding in scale and complexity, the EU has been increasingly active since the early 1990s, particularly with respect to law enforcement, health-related issues and the detection and risk assessment of new psychoactive substances. This is an update of a briefing published in September 2021.

Brussels: EPRS | European Parliamentary Research Service , 2023.. 12p.

By Cruz, J. M., Coombes, A., Mizrahi, Y., Vorobyeva, Y., Tanyu, M., Campie, P., Sánchez, J., & Hill, C

Can a gang member in Honduras leave the gang, abandon criminal activities, and rehabilitate? What factors facilitate the process of disengagement from gangs in Honduras? To answer these questions, the American Institutes for Research (AIR), the Kimberly Green Latin American and Caribbean Center at Florida International University (LACC-FIU), and Democracy International (DI) conducted a study with Honduran gang members and former gang members across the country. The study is based on a survey with a sample of 1,021 respondents with a record of gang membership and 38 indepth interviews with former gang members and other community members. Active gang members do disengage from the gang and its activities, but this disengagement depends on a myriad of factors, including the types of social relationships which the individual establishes outside the gang, the type of gang organization, and the availability of faith-based programs willing to reach out to the individual. This study, funded through the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) Latin America and Caribbean Youth Violence Prevention project, builds on previous academic scholarship on gangs in Honduras and Central America. We conducted the survey interviews in three adult penitentiaries, three juvenile detention centers, two juvenile parole programs, and several faith-based centers which work with former gang members in Tegucigalpa and San Pedro Sula. We complemented the information with semistructured interviews with 14 former gang members in the metropolitan areas of San Pedro and La Ceiba. We also interviewed 24 subject-matter experts and community members in Tegucigalpa, San Pedro Sula, and La Ceiba. We contracted a local firm, ANED, to conduct the survey interviews and trained a local team of interviewers, who collected the information under our direct supervision. For the in-depth interviews, we contracted and trained two local specialists. Data collection was conducted between October and December 2019. PRIMARY RESULTS The results indicate that gangs remain a predominantly male phenomenon, and the average age at which males join a gang is 15. Interviewed females joined the gang at an average age of 13.2. Nearly 46 percent of the subjects interviewed for this study are active members of a gang, while the rest are in different stages of gang membership. Approximately 54 percent of the subjects interviewed in the survey belong—or have belonged—to Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13), while 35 percent expressed their loyalty to the 18th Street Gang, also known as Pandilla 18 (or 18th Street Gang). The rest of the interviewees indicated membership in smaller gang groups: Los Chirizos, El Combo que no se deja, Los Olanchanos, Los Vatos Locos, etc. Education The average number of years that individuals with a record of gang membership spent in school was 9.6 years, and 90 percent of our respondents never finished high school. Half of the respondents have a household income of less than 250 USD, and 84 percent did not have a regular job, either in the formal or informal sector, even before going to prison. One in every four gang members lived with their parents or step-parents, while 31 percent lived with other relatives or alone. Furthermore, 56 percent of gang members had children of their own, and 45 percent were married or in a stable relationship. Gang Activities Violence and criminal activities are essential components of gang life. Extortion, murder, and drug trafficking are the most common crimes of which gang members are accused. Nearly 69 percent of the respondents were accused of committing these types of crimes in addition to assaults, robberies, and illicit association. In Honduras, both gangs control territories through the use of extortion, drug trafficking, and violence. Such activities, in combination with seniority as an active gang member, are critical components for ascending the gang structure ranks. Contrary to the common assumption that gang members had to complete a “mission” to join the gang, evidence collected by the study suggests that most of them did not have to go through rites of initiation or perform a mission. Rather, “missions” become an important mechanism by which to ascend the gang ranks once the individual has joined the gang. Gang Structure Over the past two decades, the structures of MS-13 and Barrio 18 seem to have evolved and “mutated.” Gangs appear to be more structured and mandated by a system of unwritten norms and rules common to each organization and shared by the diverse subgroups who share the same gang affiliation. Gangs preserve a regionally fragmented structure (sectors and cliques) which enables them to operate with certain autonomy while adhering to the rules established by membership. The structure of both MS-13 and Barrio 18 include different levels of management, which typically start with the clique as its lowest operational level (i.e., at the neighborhood level). Cliques are the basic gang unit and are composed of several members. On average, cliques are composed of 36 male members, but they vary by size. However, cliques from other gangs (Los Chirizos, El Combo que no se deja, etc.) tend to be larger on average, with 45.8 male members per clique. Cliques are clustered in regional groups called sectores (sectors). Both cliques and sectores are run by a senior member of the gang. Senior members of the MS-13 gang are known as Compas and Palabreros, and Barrio 18 leaders are known as Toros and Homies. Half of the survey respondents (49 percent) held what can be considered a soldier position within the structure of the gang, 17 percent held some position of leadership, and 25 percent were aspiring members of the gang who served as collaborators or informants. Gang leaders do not consider collaborators or informants to be official members of the gang, yet they participate in core activities and play a significant role in the dynamics of gang survival and operation. Joining the Gang From the standpoint of former and active gang members, most (63 percent) joined the gang because of the “pull forces” which peers in the gang exert over them in their teenage years. Gang involvement revolves around the opportunity of disenfranchised teens to join a group which provides them with affection and care, which many do not find at home. Thus, gang members value the “solidarity,” “social respect,” and resources the gang provides, which otherwise would be absent if they were not part of the organization. Evidence suggests that several gang members grew up in environments in which problematic families, lack of opportunities, and lack of respect and affection from their communities were common. Gang recruiters appeal to youth by promising to supply such needs to grow and exert stronger control inside their territories. Thus, findings suggest that most people end up joining gangs in Honduras for “innocent” reasons rather than because of criminal intent. Gang Disengagement The findings of this study suggest that many members do in fact disengage from gangs, but they go through a process in which the interaction of several conditions determines how soon or how complicated the separation could be. More than half of active gang members want to leave the gang. There are four significant predictors of active gang members’ intentions to leave a gang: the type of organization to which the person belongs, the number of years that the person has been active in the gang, the individual’s religious affiliation, and the person’s immediate social circle. Members of the two major gangs expressed less intention of leaving the gang compared to members of the smaller gangs. Active members of MS-13 demonstrated fewer intentions of leaving the gang compared to their rivals in Barrio 18. Additionally, there is a U-shaped curve relationship between the number of years in the gang and intentions to leave. During the first years of gang membership, intentions to leave are stronger; then they subside for a while and start growing again after six years of being in the gang. This pattern suggests that the early months and years of gang life are probably full of doubts about membership. These doubts are later quenched by gratifying experiences as a gang member and then re-emerge as the individual matures. This finding is significantly different from that in Cruz and colleagues’ 2018 study in El Salvador, in which researchers found that intentions to leave the gang are low during the first years of gang membership and then grow as time passes. Religion plays an important role in the process of leaving the gang, although comparatively, this role seems less prevalent than in El Salvador. Belonging to an evangelical church not only contributes to one’s intention to disengage from the gang but also is approved by leaders of the gang (more specifically, MS-13). Further, evangelical churches seem to be more successful than other denominations in connecting with the spiritual needs of the gang population. In the in-depth interviews, half of the respondents referred to a connection to God as the most powerful change mechanism which enabled gang members to disengage from the gang. Survey data also reveal that one of the most important factors in an individual’s intention to leave a gang is social interaction. Gang members who spent the most time with non-gang individuals (their family, non-gang friends, or even alone) before they were detained in prison were more prone to thoughts about leaving the gang. Thus, one’s social circle has a significant influence on the intent to disengage. Gang members who are exposed to social groups different from the gang appear to be more willing to abandon gang life. Reintegration The process of leaving a gang doesn’t end there. Rather, being a defector is the beginning of a series of challenges and obstacles which a former gang member has to face. The most common reintegration challenges by a former gang member include lack of opportunities, insecurity, police abuse, social discrimination, poverty, and lack of family support. Most study participants (69.2 percent) said that church or faith-based organizations are the appropriate institutions to lead rehabilitation and reintegration programs. Otherwise, 14.6 percent of respondents said that nongovernmental organizations should lead rehabilitation programs. Few people interviewed saw government agencies leading rehabilitation efforts, and experts interviewed thought there was little to no political will to approach the gang phenomenon from a rehabilitation standpoint. RECOMMENDATIONS Our research indicates that violence prevention efforts should target the root causes of joining a gang, which are mostly related to absence of positive youth development opportunities in their communities, including lack of employment, insufficient access to education, weak family structures, and negative peer influences. We recommend that programming focus on providing relational, educational, community, and economic supports to young people from an early age to both prevent youth from joining gangs, as well as to support those who have disengaged. Prevention strategies should include efforts to support disengagement from the gangs during the first years of gang membership, when many youth are considering disengagement. Finally, once gang members disengage from gangs, we recommend supporting rehabilitation and reintegration of former gang members to help them become productive members of society and prevent their reinsertion into gang activity.

Washington, DC: American Institutes for Research & Florida International University. 2020. 91p.

By Bruce Wallace, Irene Shkolnikov, Collin Kielty, Derek Robinson, et al.

Background Illicit opioids, including fentanyl, are linked to unprecedented levels of overdose in Canada and elsewhere. The risks associated with illicit opioids can include high potency, unpredictable concentration and the unexpected presence in other drugs. Within this context, we examine drug checking data to better understand the presence of illicit opioids such as fentanyl in other drugs and possible ways to interpret these results. Methods Three years (2021–2023) of data (18,474 samples) from Substance Drug Checking in British Columbia, Canada were examined to investigate the risks associated with the detection of opioids in other drugs such as cocaine and methamphetamine, as well as in other drug categories. Samples were tested by paper spray mass spectrometry (PS-MS), fentanyl test strips and Fourier-Transform infrared spectroscopy (FTIR). We examine the 8889 samples not expected to include fentanyl to confirm; if the expected drug was detected, if unexpected opioids were detected, and when the unexpected opioids are in trace concentration. Results Unexpected opioids were rarely detected (2%) in other drugs (189 of 8889 samples) with most (61.4%) detected at trace concentration levels. Unexpected opioids are far more likely to be found in samples that did not contain the expected drug than in samples that were confirmed to contain the expected drug. The least common scenario (below 1%) were substances that included the expected drug plus unexpected opioid above trace concentration. These findings raise questions on how to interpret and communicate the detection of fentanyl and related opioids in other drugs. We present three potential interpretations: (1) mistaken and misrepresented samples where the expected drug was never detected, (2) cross contamination when opioids were at trace concentration levels, or (3) adulteration as the least frequent scenario where opioids were detected above trace concentrations in combination with the expected drug. Conclusions In a region where fentanyl is associated with extreme rates of overdose, it remains rare to find such opioids in other drugs. However, the risk of fentanyl in other drugs remains an ongoing threat that warrants responses by individuals and public health. We provide possible interpretations to inform such responses. Our data raises questions on how to interpret and communicate the detection of fentanyl and other opioids in other drugs.

Harm Reduction Journal, (2025) 22:28, 8p.

By De Souza Oliveira, Elenice De Souza; Natarajan, Mangai; and da Silva, Bráulio

Abstract This study examines the spatial patterns and other situational determinants leading to the high number of bus robberies in Belo Horizonte. Main research questions include patterns of robberies, spatial concentration, locations prone to robberies, and environmental characteristics therein. This study also provides a variety of safety measures based on the Situational Crime Prevention approach. The Rapid Assessment Methodology (RAM) was employed using both quantitative and qualitative data. It involves spatial analysis, direct observation of hot spots using a safety audit protocol, and focus group discussions with key participants. Bus robberies involve minimum risk and low detection and arrest. The “hottest products” to be stolen include electronic devices and cash. The robberies occur at specific times and locations depending on opportunity. As many crimes go unreported, police data have inaccuracies. Therefore, it is impossible to verify the exact location of the robberies. This study concludes that for safe travel preventive measure should focus on reducing crime opportunities. A collaborative effort is needed from agencies and individuals alike. Further research should focus on examining why the majority of bus robberies are concentrated in only two main bus routes. Are these hot spots just recent spikes or are they chronic?

Crime & Delinquency 1–25 © The Author(s) 2019, 26p.

By Elenice De Souza Oliveira , Braulio Figueiredo Alves da Silva , Flavio Luiz Sapori & Gabriela Gomes Cardoso

Many studies demonstrate that homicides are heavily concentrated in impoverished neighborhoods, but not all socially disadvantaged neighborhoods are hotbeds of violence. Conducted in Belo Horizonte, Brazil, this study hypothesizes that the association between high rates of homicide and impoverished areas is influenced by the emergence of a specific type of street drug-dealing common to favelas (slums). The study applies econometric techniques to police data on homicides and drug arrests from 2008 to 2011, as well as 2010 Census data, to test its hypothesis. The findings provide insight into the development of crime prevention policies in areas of high social vulnerability.

International Journal of Law and Public Administration Vol. 3, No. 2; December 2020

By Gabriel Brollo Fortes, Patricia Faraldo Cabana

The collateral consequences of the non-payment of fines have merited much attention in jurisdictions such as the USA or Australia, yet they are relatively unexplored in countries of the Global South. In this article, we analyse Brazil as a case study. Although Brazil has the third largest prison population in the world, its criminal justice system has received little attention. We intend to fill this gap by addressing the legal framework and practices surrounding the non-payment of fines in a country whose draconian policies cause social exclusion and impede rehabilitation.

The Howard Journal of Crime and Justice, 64, 129–144, 2025.

By Ernesto Schargrodsky and Lucía Freira

The purpose of this paper is to study the relationship between inequality and crime, with a focus on the Latin America and Caribbean region. We find a significant, positive, and robust association between these variables.

The results persist if one instruments for inequality with historical variables in crime regressions, suggesting that a causal interpretation of the estimated effect is reasonable. Moreover, inequality is the only variable showing this robust regularity. Education levels, economic activity, income per capita, and poverty show weaker and unstable relationships with crime. The analysis of the distribution of crime victimization indicates that men and youth suffer more crime than women and the elderly. By socio-economic strata, high-income groups suffer more victimization relative to poorer groups in LAC countries, but the poor suffer more homicides.

UNDP LAC Working Paper 13.

Panama City, Panama: United Nations Development Programme, Latin America and the Caribbean , 2021. 48p.

By Mostafa Soliman

The purpose of this research is to explore the domestic and international markets for small arms. Firstly, the research begins by summarizing the factors contributing to the illicit market of small arms and light weapons, including their ammunition, since their inception after World War II. Secondly, it explains the social, economic, and political aspects that impact weapons trafficking. Finally, it analyzes the attitudes of countries' policies towards the international regime for regulating small arms transfers, by comparing their national laws for acquiring and dealing with small weapons, as well as the various initiatives undertaken by either countries or non-governmental organizations to curb the illicit market of small arms.

Unpublished paper, 2023. 46p.

By Lyla Latif

Illicit financial flows (IFFs) cost Africa around US$88.6 billion per year. They have hamstrung progress and created poverty, insecurity and financial challenges which today impede implementing the 2030 UN Agenda for Sustainable Development and the AU Agenda 2063: The Africa We Want. IFFs have also driven the African continent towards indebtedness, in addition to eroding funds that could be used for services such as education, health care and infrastructure.

This study focuses on one form of IFF, namely corruption and the resultant money laundering. It describes and analyzes the symbiotic relationship between corruption and money laundering and how they mutually reinforce an IFF ecosystem inclined towards draining resources needed for development. It further proposes measures to enhance the effectiveness of the fight against corruption and money laundering.

This study is produced by the Office of the Special Adviser on Africa (OSAA) within its mandate to support analytical work in improving coherence and coordination of the UN System support to Africa and to facilitate intergovernmental deliberations on Africa\

United Nations, 2022. 46p.

By Dan Ngabirano

illicit financial flows pose a critical challenge to African countries, as IFFs deny countries the opportunity to generate the revenues required for them to meet their expenditure needs and to fund long-term development plans. UNCTAD has put the magnitude of IFFs in Africa at an average of $88.6 billion per year, which represents about 3.7% of the continent’s total Gross Domestic Product. Curbing IFFs can reduce the region’s financing gap by 33%. IFFs drain foreign exchange reserves, affect asset prices, distort competition, and undermine the capacity of countries to maintain economic and financial stability. Consequently, African countries are constrained in meeting commitments made under various regional and international frameworks, including the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and Agenda 2063.

This report is focused on IFFs linked to aggressive tax planning and other illegal commercial practices in the context of Africa. Commercial practices constitute the largest source of IFFs from Africa (65%), followed by crime (30%) and corruption (5%). The report provides a broad overview of the scale and distribution of IFFs in Africa; discusses different forms of IFFs that arise from tax and illegal commercial practices; and reviews current initiatives for combating tax and commercial-related IFFs in Africa. The report provides the conclusion and policy recommendations for combating tax and commercial IFFs in Africa.

United Nations, Office of the Special Adviser on Africa, 2022. 42p.

By Amazon Watch

This report, developed by Amazon Watch in collaboration with various Indigenous and human rights organizations, addresses the recent security crisis in Ecuador and the impacts of the repressive policies implemented by the government of Daniel Noboa. It highlights the increasing influence of organized crime and illegal mining in the Ecuadorian Amazon. This research exposes how criminal economies not only pose a threat to the livelihoods of Indigenous peoples, Afro-descendant communities, and traditional rural communities by endangering their territorial governance projects and the sustainability of their ways of life, but also severely compromises the ecological integrity of the Amazon. The conclusion contains a series of recommendations aimed at ensuring the rights of the civilian population in the context of the non-international armed conflict recently declared by the national government to address this crisis. It particularly emphasizes the need to provide protection guarantees and establish coordination mechanisms with the organizational structures of Indigenous peoples and nationalities, whose territorial governance projects are at risk. Additionally, it underscores the urgency of strengthening the government’s institutional capacity by developing coordinated actions to halt the advance of illegal economies, declaring the Amazon in a state of emergency, and taking immediate measures to prevent its destruction

Oakland, CA: Amazon Watch, 2024. 24p.

By Mercedes De Freitas , et al.

Organised crime and corruption in Venezuela have become a state problem that not only keeps Venezuelans in constant danger, but their effects are already impacting a number of Latin American countries, while the United States and several European nations have witnessed how illegal operations of power groups have infiltrated their financial and real estate systems with dirty money stolen from Venezuela’s coffers. A simple explanation for the complex humanitarian emergency facing Venezuela is that the country was subjected for several years to misguided public policies and decisions by authorities, which in most cases right out aimed to steal large amounts of money from the nation’s Treasury. It was a Grand Corruption scheme,1 with systematic measures that impinged on the entire population. This context was a breeding ground for organised crime, which became stronger with substantial firepower and economic resources, to the point of collaborating—in many cases—with agencies at all levels of authority, including senior officials in the administration. In view of this situation, at the end of this investigation we propose a set of initiatives to combat this evil, which will require forceful and unprecedented actions in Venezuela, such as resorting to the support of international organisations in the search for solutions that have been effective in other countries of the hemisphere, to punish the culprits. This work encompassed a nationwide vision—as opposed to the 2019 Organised Crime and Corruption study2 focused on border issues—which shows the map of criminal organisations, the types of crimes, the regional situation in various states, the role of the Bolivarian National Armed Forces (FANB), as well as an analysis of the situation of women regarding organised crime and corruption. The most important findings of this new study can be summarised as follows: 1. The existence of at least 9 major organised crime rings in Venezuela, involving more than 13,000 criminal organisations, some of which have ties to policy makers and public officials. 2. Crimes and acts of corruption boast total impunity. 3. The lack of robust public institutions, the dismantling of some of them, as well as the existence of incentives derived from some public policies such as price controls and fuel subsidies, are a breeding ground for misdeeds, crimes, human rights violations and the theft of public funds. 4. Venezuelan migrants are victims of illegal groups. 5. The implementation of a model called garrison state, “banana republic” style, whose main characteristics include institutionalised violence, colonisation of public administration and the incorporation of members of the Armed Forces into the economic leadership of the country. 6. The differentiating aspect of organised crime and corruption among Venezuelan women In this investigation, the effort was focused on determining the institutional, social and economic aspects of criminal activity in Venezuela and is developed in 6 chapters: 1. Anatomy of crime: the 9 major crime rings controlling Venezuela 2. Corruption and crime in the regions: lawless states. 3. Military power, crime and corruption. 4. Differential impact of corruption and organised crime on women in Venezuela. 5. Crime, security agencies and human rights. 6. A proposal to desmantled organized crime in Venezuela. The general objective has been to gather and organize relevant information, with the purpose of providing sufficient data and empirical analysis for political leadership, with power to lead the country, can design the strategies and public policies that will defeat and overcome corrupt practices, incentives to corruption and the action of organized crime that, to the detriment of governance and institutional integrity, have had devastating consequences for the lives of Venezuelans with violations to the human rights, destruction of the productive apparatus, of the public services, opportunities to overcome poverty, and that have generated a process of unprecedented degradation that led to the complex humanitarian emergency that they are suffering and still waiting for solutions. The statements, opinions, and ratings present in all chapters correspond experts, witnesses, victims and affected persons, some of whom have chosen not to disclose their identity

Caracas: Transparency Venezuela, 2020.....135p.

By Avalere Health

In 2022, over six million people in the United States reported having an opioid use disorder (OUD). Past research has not yielded comprehensive estimates of the full societal burden of OUD or the impact of OUD treatments in limiting associated costs. To evaluate the costs of OUD and the benefits and cost savings associated with OUD treatment, Avalere Health conducted secondary research and modeled the costs as well as the savings associated with treatment of OUD, nationally and by state. This research (1) characterized the prevalence of OUD, (2) modeled the costs of OUD, and (3) modeled the net cost impact of four ambulatory OUD treatments: (a) behavioral therapy alone, (b) behavioral therapy plus methadone, (c) behavioral therapy plus transmucosal buprenorphine, and (d) behavioral therapy plus longacting injectable (LAI) buprenorphine. Key findings: 1. OUD prevalence: OUD cases per capita (the percentage of individuals per state with OUD) ranged among states from 0.75% to 2.99%. New Hampshire, Nevada, Massachusetts, and Kentucky had the highest rates of OUD (greater than 2.5%), while Wyoming, Hawaii, Washington DC, and Minnesota had the lowest (less than 1.0%). 2. Cost burden of OUD: The average annual total cost per OUD case OUD is approximately $695,000 across all stakeholders analyzed. The annual cost per OUD case, excluding the patient burden to the individual with OUD, is approximately $163,000, spread across public and private stakeholders. Including lost quality and length of life, the patient burden of OUD is approximately $532,000 per year. 3. Costs to external stakeholders: The costs to the federal government, state/local government, private businesses, and society are driven by lost productivity for employers ($438 billion), employees ($248 billion), and households ($73 billion). Health insurance and uninsured costs were $111 billion, criminal justice costs are $52 billion, and other substance use treatment costs are: $12 billion. 4. Treatment benefits of OUD: Medications and behavioral therapy to treat OUD are associated with significant average cost savings per case. Estimated annual per-case savings net of treatment cost from ambulatory treatments are estimated to be: • $144,000 for behavioral therapy alone • $271,000 for behavioral therapy plus methadone • $271,000 for behavioral therapy plus sublingual buprenorphine • $295,000 for behavioral therapy plus LAI buprenorphine

Washington, DC: Avalere Health, 2025. 21p.