By  Avril Sharp

   Kalayaan works on the assumption that no amount of abuse should be tolerated, permitted to persist or go unchallenged. Key to this is addressing the systemic drivers of exploitation, including the legal structures that make people vulnerable to abuse. Whilst acknowledging that exploitation is multifaceted and abusive employers must be held accountable, our focus in this report is demonstrating the role and legal duty the state has to ensure that our legal systems are compatible with our positive obligations to protect and safeguard all workers. The UK Government has repeatedly acknowledged the vulnerabilities faced by migrant domestic workers over the years, but their concern has been restricted to after-the-event responses that focus measures to rescue workers who have experienced extreme abuse, rather than address the ways in which the legislative and policy framework facilitates their abuse and excludes them from certain fundamental protections as workers in their own right. Since 2012 and against the backdrop of the UK’s hostile environment for migrants, Government policy has seen domestic workers stripped of their labour law rights, immigration enforcement prioritised, and the protections of this workforce placed within a trafficking framework. This has meant workers have had to demonstrate their treatment has deteriorated to the point of slavery before they are able to seek redress. This reactive approach does nothing to prevent abuse escalating, places an evidential burden on workers and obfuscates the role the state plays in handing more control to employers. The visa changes introduced in 2012 under David Cameron formed part of that Government’s objective to reduce net immigration to the UK to under 100,000 people. It sought to achieve this by reducing the rights of migrants on various visa pathways, including domestic workers. Ultimately, this objective failed. The demand for domestic workers has remained consistent and the number of visas being issued remains equally significant. By reducing the rights of domestic workers, the Government did not remove the demand for domestic workers’ labour, and so did not achieve the aim of reducing their number. However, by using a reduction in rights as the method, the move did produce a significant increase in rates of worker exploitation. Evidence from workers, from Kalayaan and other front-line organisations has continuously demonstrated that restrictions on the ability of workers to challenge abusive employers only results in levels of abuse increasing. This evidence has been consistently disregarded for the last 12 years. This must be considered alongside the fact successive Conservative administrations have at the same time refused or rejected measures which would have provided the state with evidence and knowledge of the working conditions faced by this workforce. This report provides evidence compiled by Kalayaan of the abuse experienced by migrant domestic workers in the UK over the last 12 years. It also scrutinises and dismantles the 8 key myths that have been relied on when rejecting calls to reinstate labour law rights for workers, and demonstrates why concessions that have been introduced since 2012 have always fallen short of the unconditional protections that all workers are entitled to and were provided for under the visa regime prior to 2012. Ultimately, the report finds that the myths relied upon by Government are a smokescreen for the state’s failure to ensure our legal system does not facilitate the abuse and exploitation of this workforce. Kalayaan urges the incoming Government to consider the available evidence and reinstate the pre-2012 visa regime so that all migrant domestic workers are protected at work and able to challenge abuse when it arises. We hope this report will assist in discussions with parliamentarians and policy makers as the campaign to restore rights continues  

London: Kalayaan, 2024. 48p.

By European Monitoring Centre on Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA)

The purpose of the current report is to provide an overview and summary of the European drug situation up to the end of 2023. All grouping, aggregates and labels therefore reflect the situation based on the available data in 2023 in respect to the composition of the European Union and the countries participating in EMCDDA reporting exercises. However, not all data will cover the full period. Due to the time needed to compile and submit data, many of the annual national data sets included here are from the reference year January to December 2022. Analysis of trends is based only on those countries providing sufficient data to describe changes over the period specified. The reader should also be aware that monitoring patterns and trends in a hidden and stigmatised behaviour such as drug use is both practically and methodologically challenging. For this reason, multiple sources of data are used for the purposes of analysis in this report. Although considerable improvements can be noted, both nationally and in respect to what is possible to achieve in a European-level analysis, the methodological difficulties in this area must be acknowledged. Caution is therefore required in interpretation, in particular when countries are compared on any single measure. Caveats relating to the data are to be found in the online Statistical Bulletin 2024, which contains detailed information on methodology, qualifications on analysis and comments on the limitations in the information set available. Information is also available there on the methods and data used for European-level estimates, where interpolation may be used.

Lisbon: European Monitoring Centre on Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA), 2024. 

By National Counterterrorism Center (U.S.), United States. Federal Bureau of Investigation, United States. Department of Homeland Security

 "This resource is provided to inform law enforcement, terrorism prevention practitioners, other first responders, community leaders, as well as the general public about both threats of violence and contextual behaviors that suggest an individual is mobilizing to violence. While some violent extremists may make direct, indirect, or vague threats of violence, others may plot violent action while avoiding such overt threats to maintain operational security--underscoring the need to consider both threats of violence and contextual behaviors. We have incorporated 'unusual' into many of the indicators because we are looking for behavior that is different enough from the individual's normal behavior to cause concern. The indicators included in this booklet are intended to aid law enforcement and first responder investigative and detection efforts, not to be a substitute for their expertise and experience. In addition, we continue to see that members of the community--such as family members and peers--are often best positioned to witness signs of mobilization to violence. Such community members almost always are the first to detect hints that an individual may be considering violent action in the United States or overseas. This booklet is provided to aid interpretation of their observations. This booklet was first published in 2015 and updated in 2017 and 2019."

Washington, DC: The Authors, 2021. 

By Smriti Sharma and Naveen Sunder

 
It has been demonstrated that violent crime has profound effects on a number of socioeconomic outcomes. But, does day-to-day crime also shape human capital accumulation? We answer this question in the Indian context by combining multiple years of district-level data on the incidence of various types of crime with a nationally representative survey on learning achievement of school-aged children. Our empirical strategy leverages the within-district across-year variation in crime to estimate the crime-learning gradient. We show that an increase in violent crime is associated with lower achievement in reading and math, while non-violent crimes have no discernible correlation with learning outcomes. The effects are short-lived, driven by contemporaneous crime, and are similar for boys and girls. Additionally, we find that violent crimes impose greater costs on learning of children from socioeconomically disadvantaged households. We find evidence that both household-level factors (reduced child mobility and poorer mental health) and school-level factors (lower availability of teachers) are possible mechanisms underpinning these findings.

   IZA DP No. 17037

Bonn:  IZA – Institute of Labor Economics , 2024. 51p.

By Sean Hill

Nonwhite communities experience higher rates of arrest, prosecution, and incarceration than white communities for drug offenses, and these disparities have persisted even in the wake of decriminalization and legalization. Although a diverse array of political stakeholders increasingly agree that drug policies should be reformed, they are nearly unanimous in their opposition to abolition. While select drug crimes may be worthy of reduced punishment or conversion into civil offenses, these stakeholders contend that the abolition of criminal institutions will inevitably jeopardize public safety. This Article challenges the widespread presumption that drug law and policy correlates with the protection of the public. Drug crimes are, instead, an essential vehicle for the subordination of nonwhite people and for the misallocation of resources across racial groups. Part I of the article contests the presumed correlation between illicit drugs and violence and illuminates how drug criminalization erodes individual and collective safety. Part II addresses how drug policy sustains white and American hegemony, respectively, by legitimating racist ideologies and by justifying force against marginalized people both in and outside of the country's borders. Finally, Part III explains how abolition represents a viable path away from the harms of prohibitionist policies.

Ohio State Journal of Criminal Law, Forthcoming

Ohio State Legal Studies Research Paper No. 852

By  Kars de Bruijne Clara Gehrling 

t is generally accepted that violent extremism is a problem in northern Benin. Currently, attention is overwhelmingly devoted to northern Alibori and western Atacora and this problem is viewed as a ‘spillover’ from the Sahel.
But this is only part of the story.

This report points to a number of disturbing signals which, in combination, point to a problem of violent extremism along Benin’s border with Nigeria.

1.

Suffocating canaries in coal mines indicate dangerous levels of carbon monoxide. A variety of strange signals in Northern Benin along the border with Nigeria are like these canaries: they point at dangerous liaisons between violent extremist groups. Closer relationships with bandit groups seem to facilitate this. This report makes the following observations:

−

Banditry is re-emerging in JNIM’s zones of operation in Benin. Those bandits seem to have Nigerian connections.

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Violent extremists are present in Kainji Lake National Park (Nigeria) just across the border from the Borgou Department. Evidence suggests this involves Sahelian extremists (likely JNIM). Another group would be Darul Salam – a group linked to Boko Haram, if not fully affiliated – with an open attitude towards bandits.

−

There has been a strong increase in the movement of unidentified armed actors along the Borgou border with Niger State and in banditry-related incidents since March 2023. The evidence suggests that there is a direct link with those operating in Kainji Lake National Park.

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Since March 2023, unidentified armed groups have had a concealed presence in the Forêt de Trois Rivières between southern Alibori and the Borgou Department.

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Bandits and unidentified armed groups are known to move towards Kebbi State from Sokoto. It is alleged that these include various Darul Salam fighters with links to the Sahel.

2.

There are deep connections between North West Nigeria and North East Benin due to longstanding social, ethnic and religious connections, particularly in the former ‘cross-border’ Borgu Empire:

−

The northern-most border area (North East Alibori and Kebbi State) sees intra-ethnic cross-border connections between the Hausa and the Nigerian Zamfara Fulbe respectively. A risk in this area are ethnic tensions between the Hausa and the Fulbe.

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The area of the former Borgu Empire (Borgou Department and Niger State) has a distinct cross-border political entity. On both sides of the border, people tend to identify as one Bariba/Boo community with shared customary institutions. There are high farmer-herder tensions involving autochthonous Fulbe. There is also a fear of kidnapping by Zamfara Fulbe.

−

Another risk in the former Borgu Empire concerns the Dambanga hunting groups. These groups operate cross-border in defiance of a Benin government ban but are pitched against extremists in Kainji and have been used by the Nigerian military. This discrepancy can generate tensions between the two countries.

−

Two non-violent reformist movements – the Yan Izala movement and the Jama'at Tabligh – are present along the border. Their reach has grown strongly in the border area of Northern Benin during the last ten years.

3.

A well-developed cross-border trade system operates between the Nigerian and Beninese border. This system generates livelihoods for many people in the area. Livelihoods are at risk:

−

There is a variety of markets and crossings connecting North West Nigeria and Northern Benin. Unidentified armed groups and Darul Salam operate in these hubs.

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People’s livelihoods are highly dependent on cross-border trade. Interviews revealed frustration and a strong sense of grievance towards both Nigerian and Beninese government policies that are perceived to put livelihoods under stress.

−

On the one hand, consistent problems reported are a ban on cereal exports and soybeans, and accompanying border restrictions. Both have a negative impact on livelihoods.

−

On the other hand, the end of fuel subsidies in Nigeria at the time of research for this report had a severe impact on people’s livelihoods (and on communities in general).

4.

The above three main observations suggest that a very problematic situation is emerging along the Nigerian-Benin border. Not only are there numerous indications of extremist activities and a link between bandits and extremists along the border but also there are clear social links that facilitate cross-border exchange and real livelihood needs that create vulnerabilities to recruitment. The governments of Benin and Nigeria urgently need to move into action. Three things could be done:

−

Coordinate and step up the military response by: revamping regional security cooperation within ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States); bilateral security cooperation for hot-pursuit, intelligence sharing and coordination; and a joint strategy for cross-border hunting groups.

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Prioritise people’s livelihoods. This should involve cushioning livelihood effects of the ban on cereals (and cutting of fuel subsidies) to reduce vulnerability to recruitment.

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Be more flexible and agile to respond to rapidly changing context by closely monitoring border markets for sudden vulnerabilities, and demanding more flexible donor programming and funding so that programming can be really flexible.

The Hague: Clingendael, 2024. 80p.

 By Juan Del Toro and John Roman     

  Youths’ interaction with law enforcement can have implications for their opportunities for upward social mobility. Indeed, prior studies indicate that police contact (i.e., stops and arrests) predicts lower persistence in education and higher unemployment. However, most researchers used between-individual designs to examine youth and police interactions, which limit claims of causality, as differences in life-course outcomes related to police encounters are likely biased by individual differences in genes and/or environments. Using standard within- and between-sibling analyses, we found that siblings with police contact have poorer life-course outcomes (i.e., years in school and income) across adolescence and adulthood than their sibling without police contact. The links between police contact and life-course outcomes are worse for police arrests (vs. police stops) and within Black siblings (than within Hispanic and White siblings). We believe that these results signal the need for alternative and more developmentally appropriate forms of punishment among America’s youth.

Chicago: NORC at the University of Chicago, 2023. 5p.

By Marie-Celine Schulte, et al.

  Gender-based Violence (GBV) persists as an entrenched, yet preventable, pattern of systemic human rights violations and a global public health pandemic. GBV includes not only sexual violence but also physical, psychological, and economic violence. GBV can be technology enabled and politically motivated. Multiple forms often co-occur on a continuum up to lethal violence. GBV thrives in contexts of social, economic, legal, and political gender inequality. In Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), the COVID 19 pandemic, economic crisis, democratic backsliding, labor and sex trafficking, corruption, gangs, armed groups, organized crime networks, armed conflict, and environmental disasters exacerbate these conditions. Using a political economy analytical approach, the GBV Impunity Regional Study (2021–2023) investigates the social, economic, legal, and political barriers to, and survivor-centered1 recommendations for, increasing GBV accountability in LAC. Examining eight countries, the study investigates a main research question

  This report focuses on case studies in El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Mexico that investigate factors driving GBV impunity and solutions to address it. The report synthesizes findings and recommendations across these four case studies based on qualitative, in-depth individual interviews with 106 GBV survivors,2 as well as government institutional and civil society organization (CSO) staff who provide direct services to survivors. Country case studies explore multiple forms of GBV. They pay special attention to GBV perpetrated against underserved groups, such as indigenous women, Afro-descendent women, transgender women, and gay men. In line with the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) definition, this study defines GBV as encompassing any harmful act or threat against an individual or group based on biological sex, gender, gender orientation or expression, sex characteristics, sexual orientation, and/or lack of adherence to socially accepted conceptualizations of femininity and masculinity.

New York: USAID, 2023. 50p.

By: Altagracia E. Balcacer Molina, et al.

  Gender-based violence (GBV) impunity violates human rights, harms public health, and destabilizes homes and communities. GBV impunity often threatens diverse survivors’ basic security, including food, safe shelter, livelihood, and freedom from further violence.1 Impunity perpetuates GBV and denies survivors their rights not only to justice but to vital protection and recovery support services and prevention programs. It entrenches widespread lack of government transparency and accountability to uphold survivors’ legal and human rights. It further undermines broader development objectives of social inclusion, governance, and democracy. The Dominican Republic (DR) GBV Impunity case study is one of eight country case studies included in the GBV Impunity Regional Study under the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) Latin America and the Caribbean Learning and Rapid Response (LACLEARN) Task Order. Each case study investigates country-specific responses to the main research question:   

Chicago: NORC at the University of Chicagom 2024. 52p.

By  Veronica Martinez-Solares, et al.

  The Mexico country case study is one of eight case studies that form the Latin America and Caribbean Learning and Rapid Response (LACLEARN) Gender-based Violence (GBV) Impunity Regional Study. Through an intersectional gender, power, and political economy approach, the Mexico case study explores: 1) the prevalence and social acceptance of femicide and transfemicide (FTF) based on literature review and secondary statistics to provide background and context for the study; and, 2) views shared in in-depth individual interviews (IDIs) with 30 respondents including institutional actors and civil society staff who work directly with GBV victims and survivors, and GBV and FTF survivors1. The case study diagnoses the state of FTF impunity in Mexico, identifies solutions to address impunity, and provides operational recommendations to USAID on changes needed to promote pathways to GBV and FTF accountability that center on survivors’ recommendations. DIAGNOSIS OF GBV AND FTF IMPUNITY IN MEXICO. Despite important progress in the past decade to address GBV and FTF in Mexico, and to develop necessary mechanisms for prevention, protection, and access to justice, the country still faces persistently high levels of GBV and impunity, particularly for cases of FTF. Widespread societal normalization of GBV, patriarchal, male-dominated social, economic, and political structures, corruption, and underlying impunity, persist as key factors that influence GBV prevalence generally, and FTF specifically. GBV prevention and protection programs are not equally available or accessible across the country. There is very little justice for cisgender and even less for transgender FTF survivors owing to inadequate or discriminatory response, or non-response by law enforcement and an absence of a gender perspective and survivor-centered, trauma-informed protocols and practices that do not re-victimize survivors.  

New York: USAID, 2023. 47p. 

By Ximena Canal Laiton

This paper explores the use of smugglers by Latin American and Caribbean migrants on their journeys to North America. It is based on responses to more than 3,000 4Mi surveys conducted in Costa Rica, Honduras and Mexico in 2022 and 2023 and includes findings on profiles of migrants who hired smugglers as well as information on the services they sought and their general perceptions of smugglers. As such, this paper provides a wealth of solid empirical evidence with a view to informing the work of policymakers and humanitarian actors.

  Key findings • Smuggler use is far from the norm: two out of every five survey respondents hired smugglers during their migration journey. • The demand for smuggling services in Latin America andtheCaribbeanisdrivenbygeographicandpolitical barriers to mobility between countries, including the lack of safe and regular pathways to migrate and the absence of formal services and infrastructure (such as transportation and accommodation) along the migratory routes. • Respondents surveyed in 2022 and 2023 reported using smugglers at rates of 49% and 34% respectively. This decline could be the consequence of an increase in the overall number of people on the move in the region, the greater use and sharing of maps by people on the move, and the reopening of the border between Colombia and Venezuela. • A fifth of respondents (20%) who used smugglers identified them as potential perpetrators of abuse that may occur in the most dangerous locations on their migration journey. • Just 6% of respondents said they saw smugglers as a potential source of protection during their migration journey. • Respondents who reported using smugglers mostly identified them as service providers who helped them to cross borders irregularly and to travel within transit countries. More than half said smugglers had helped them achieve their migration goals. • Despite marketing their services widely on social networks, smugglers  

Geneva, SWIT: Mixed Migration Centre, 2024. 14p.

By Jennifer Avila, et al.

  The Honduras country case study is one of eight case studies that comprise the Latin America and Caribbean Learning and Rapid Response (LACLEARN) Gender-based Violence (GBV) Impunity Regional Study. Applying an intersectional gender and political economy approach, this case study explores impunity for femicide and transfemicide among transgender women and Garifuna women in Honduras. Transgender and Garifuna women (both cisgender and transgender1) are disproportionately affected by GBV impunity, and face catastrophic consequences of impunity in the near and long term. These women have the least resources to access justice, protection, or recovery support services, are socioeconomically marginalized, and are politically targeted for their gender and ethnic identities and as human rights defenders. Garifuna women as environmental and land rights defenders, and transgender women as members of a minority gender identity and transgender rights defenders face extraordinary discrimination, intimidation, and violence as documented by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR), the Global Protection Cluster, investigative journalists, and in data that civil society organizations collect. The Honduras case study involved collection and analysis of data from: 1) a review of available scholarly and grey literature and secondary statistics on structural gender inequalities, such as poverty, unemployment, and social and political disparities, that create the conditions within which high levels of GBV and impunity persist, especially towards transgender women and Garifuna women (cisgender and transgender); and 2) views shared in 30 in-depth individual interviews (IDIs) with GBV survivors and their representatives among transgender women and Garifuna women, relevant institutional actors, and civil society organization service providers that interact with GBV survivors or victims’ representatives in their work in Honduras. The team used an adapted qualitative data analysis Framework Method with integrated thematic analysis to identify, analyze, and interpret key themes emerging from the interview transcripts. The case study first diagnoses the state of GBV impunity in Honduras, then identifies solutions to address impunity, and finally provides practical recommendations to USAID on strategies for operationalizing changes needed to promote pathways to GBV accountability that survivors recommend.   

New York: USAID, 2022. 54p. 

By Michel Misse

The article comments on a new generation of researchers studying the illegal markets in Brazil. In doing so, I summarize the interpretative model of ‘social accumulation of violence’. Initially applied to Rio de Janeiro, several researchers have now expanded it to other Brazilian states as well as to countries with high violence rates, such as Colombia and Mexico. The model is both historical and social. It combines three main factors that have been feeding one another throughout times and expanded across several places: (1) social accumulation of disadvantages; (2) criminal subjection; and (3) expansion of acquisition strategies across networks of informality and illicit markets, for which the offer of political merchandise is decisive. As proposed in previous works, political merchandise means political assets originated from the privatization of segments of the State’s pretension to sovereignty over the monopoly of violence by different agents, who negotiate these assets in exchange for economic assets or other political goods.

  Journal of Illicit Economies and Development, 1(2), pp. 177–182. 

By David Bruce

The South African per-capita murder rate has steadily escalated since 2011/12, when it was at its lowest since 1994. The 2022/23 rate of 45 per 100 000 is the highest in 20 years. But focusing on national murder trends is misleading as trends vary greatly across the nine provinces. The current high per-capita murder rate is driven by high rates in the Eastern Cape, KwaZulu-Natal, the Western Cape and Gauteng. Key findings: South African murder trends vary considerably across provinces. The Eastern Cape, KwaZulu-Natal, the Western Cape and Gauteng have the highest per-capita murder rates. In 2022/23, the Eastern Cape had the highest murder rate (71 per 100 000), followed by KwaZulu-Natal and the Western Cape, both with annual murder rates of 56. The four provinces with the most murders have also recorded the highest per-capita murder rate increases in the last 10 years. Since 2011/12, rates have increased most dramatically in KwaZulu-Natal and the Eastern Cape. The increase has been greatest from 2017/18 to 2022/23. The per-capita murder rate in the Western Cape decreased over the last five years. Recommendations The government and society must prioritise reducing murder rates, which are high and increasing. The collection of data about murder, and the analysis thereof, must be improved. ‘One-size-fits-all’ approaches to addressing murder are unlikely to be effective. Responses should be adapted to respond to the drivers of murder focusing on high-murder localities. Priority should be given to understanding and addressing murder in the four provinces with the highest per-capita murder rates. KwaZulu-Natal and, to a lesser degree, Gauteng experienced major surges in murder in 2021/22, with increases continuing in 2022/23. These have taken them well above their rates in the year before the COVID-19 pandemic and national lockdown. Deaths during the July 2021 unrest were not a major contributor to the increases in murder in KwaZulu-Natal and Gauteng in 2021/22. Many experts believe that the entrenchment and growth of organised crime has played a major role in the increasing number of murders. More in-depth provincially focused research and analysis is required to better understand the factors and circumstances driving murder trends. 

Pretoria, South Africa: Institute for Security Studies, 2023. 12p.

By Laura Cayreyre , Théo Korchia , Anderson Loundou , Maeva Jego, Didier Théry , Julie Berbis , Gaëtan Gentile  Pascal Auquier  Jérémy Khouani 

Screening and care for victims of sexual violence (SV) among asylum seekers and refugees (ASRs) living in High-income host countries were prioritized by the WHO in 2020. The lack of stabilized prevalence findings on lifetime SV among ASRs in High-income countries hinders the development of adequate health management. The objective of this study was to determine the lifetime prevalence of SV experienced by ASRs living in High-income countries. We conducted a systematic review and meta-analysis according to the Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analyses (PRISMA) guidelines. Studies were included in the meta-analysis if the sample consisted exclusively of asylum seekers or refugees over the age of 16 living in High-income countries and if they reported a lifetime prevalence of experienced SV. The results of the meta-analysis were expressed with 95 % confidence intervals (CIs) as estimates of lifetime SV prevalence using a random-effects model. The estimated lifetime prevalence of SV among women ASRs was 44 % (95 % CI, 0.24–0.67) and 27 % (95 % CI, 0.18–0.38) for both sexes. This meta-analysis revealed a high prevalence of SV among ASRs hosted in High-income countries and suggest the importance of developing specific screening and care programs in these host countries.

Journal of Forensic and Legal Medicine

Volume 101, January 2024, 102622 Volume 101, January 2024, 102622

By Göran Adamson

In 2005, the Swedish Crime Prevention Agency published a report about the link between immigration and crime. Since then, no comprehensive study has been conducted even though Sweden has experienced a large influx of migrants in combination with a rising crime rate. This study conducted by Göran Adamson and Tino Sanandaji is the first purely descriptive scientific investigation on the matter in fifteen years. The investigation (from 2002 to 2017) covers seven distinct categories of crime, and distinguishes between seven regions of origin. Based on 33 percent of the population (2017), 58 percent of those suspect for total crime on reasonable grounds are migrants. Regarding murder, manslaughter and attempted murder, the figures are 73 per cent, while the proportion of robbery is 70 percent. Non-registered migrants are linked to about 13 percent of total crime. Given the fact that this group is small, crime propensity among non-registered migrants is significant.

Sweden; Society, 2020. 13p.

By Ashley N. Muchow

Amid punitive shifts in crime and immigration control during the 1980s and 1990s, Hispanic individuals com-prised a growing share of the population confined in U.S.prisons and jails. Although it is widely acknowledged that the nation’s wars on crime and drugs contribute to higher rates of minority arrest, limited empirical research has examined whether the merging of immi-gration control with criminal justice practice during this period intensified these disparities. This article uses county-level arrest data from California between 1980and 2004 to investigate whether intergovernmental ser-vice agreements (IGSAs) leasing jail space for immigrant detention increased rates of Hispanic arrest. Employing A quasi-experimental design that leverages the staggered adoption of IGSAs across counties, this study finds that these agreements increased rates of Hispanic arrest but had no discernible impact on arrest rates for White Or Black residents. Supplemental analyses reveal that these increases were driven by misdemeanor arrests and were particularly pronounced in counties where the His-panic population comprised between 11 and 22 percent.These findings suggest that IGSAs may trigger minority threat concerns that increase arrests, shedding additional light on Hispanic representation in the criminal justice system.

Criminology, early view, May 2024.

By Charles Fain Lehman

Drug policing faces two simultaneous crises. One is the drug crisis itself, which the public and policymakers expect police to play a role in suppressing. The other is a crisis of public confidence, in policing in general but especially in the efficacy of the enforcement-driven “War on Drugs.” This report frames an approach to policing drugs meant to address both crises—a 21st-century approach to drug policing.

Routine drug policing is widely perceived to be an ineffective approach to controlling drug problems. This is because it is relatively hard for policing to cut off the supply of drugs altogether. Routine enforcement can increase the price of drugs, making the drugs scarcer, but these effects are likely small, and the effects of price on demand are, in turn, quite small in addicted subpopulations. These concerns are particularly relevant in the current crisis, in which novel methods of drug production have driven prices to rock bottom.

Faced with this evidence, some argue that policing and drug problems should be totally disconnected, through a policy of decriminalization. This, advocates argue, would reduce both the health harms of drug use and the harms of the criminal-justice system. However, the evidence indicates that the former claim is probably wrong—the expected average effect of decriminalization on figures like the overdose death rate is probably close to zero. Moreover, policymakers are capable of addressing the fact that the criminal-justice system can harm drug users, and it would be foolhardy to drop the good aspects of drug enforcement as a method to avoid these “bads.”

What are the “goods” of drug policing, and how can they be bolstered? This report culminates in three strategies for a modern, evidence-based approach to drug policing:

• Drug-Market Crackdowns: Rather than do routine, haphazard enforcement, police can focus all their resources on particular drug markets or drug problems and enforce against them simultaneously. This has the effect of crippling the market, circumventing the limited effects that policing has on price by substantially reducing supply altogether.

• Responding to Emerging Threats: Emerging drug markets—especially novel synthetic substances—represent a particular opportunity for police effectiveness. By differentially targeting small markets, police can keep them small, having an outsize impact relative to targeting large but hard-to-control markets.

• Policing as Public Health: Police officers are not just enforcers; they are also first responders, and they should see themselves as frontline actors in getting people the treatment they need. Equipping police with naloxone is a widely taken first step. But treatment referral following overdose, or diversion to treatment in lieu of arrest or prosecution, is a promising way for police to take the lead on controlling drug problems.

These strategies collectively imply a more strategic approach to drug policing than the historical norm. Routine buy-busts are likely no longer effective strategies for fighting the drug crisis—if they ever were. But police can still play a substantial role in combating the drug crisis. And if they do so intelligently, they can regain the public’s trust.

New York: Manhattan Institute, 2024. 26p.

By David Blake Johnson and Joshua J. Robinson

We explore the relationship between gun prevalence and homicides in the United States from 2003–2019. Unlike previous research, which typically uses an indirect, state-level measure of gun prevalence, we use a direct measure of guns in a narrow geographic area: gun dealers. We find an increase in gun dealer density is significantly and positively associated with increased homicides in subsequent years. We compare estimates from our preferred measure, the number of dealers per 100 square miles in a local area, to those found using other gun prevalence measures. We find our preferred measure to be more consistent in magnitude across three different estimation methods and two different data sources. We additionally show the effect of gun dealer density is limited mostly to counties that have a high percent of Black residents. We propose that the so-called “Ferguson Effect”—a sharp increase in violent crime in urban and Black communities after 2014—might be partially explained by an influx of gun dealers in and near Black communities, rather than just a change in the propensity of Black residents to call the police or changes in police behavior.

Unpublished paper 2021. 48p.

Johnson, David Blake and Robinson, Joshua J., Gun Dealer Density and its Effect on Homicide (November 17, 2021).

By Georgina Sturge 

  Asylum is protection given by a country to someone fleeing from persecution in their own country. An asylum seeker is someone who has applied for asylum and is awaiting a decision on whether they will be granted refugee status. An asylum applicant who does not qualify for refugee status may still be granted leave to remain in the UK for humanitarian or other reasons. An asylum seeker whose application is refused at initial decision may appeal the decision through an appeal process and, if successful, may be granted leave to remain. • In 2023, 67,337 applications for asylum were made in the UK, which related to 84,425 individuals (more than one applicant can be included in a single application). • The annual number of asylum applications to the UK peaked in 2002 at 84,132. After that the number fell sharply to reach a twenty-year low point of 17,916 in 2010. It rose steadily throughout the 2010s, then rapidly from 2021 onwards to reach 81,130 applications in 2022, the highest annual number since 2002. • Not all asylum applications are successful. In 2023, 33% were refused at initial decision (not counting withdrawals). The annual refusal rate was highest in 2004 (88%) and lowest in recent times in 2022 (24%). • When an application is refused at initial decision, it may be appealed. Between 2004 to 2021, around three-quarters of applicants refused asylum at initial decision lodged an appeal and almost one third of those appeals were allowed. • In 2023, the most common origin region of asylum seekers was Asia and the most common single nationality was Afghan. In previous recent years, the Middle East was the most common origin region, with Syrian and Iranian the most common nationalities. • As of June 2023, the total ‘work in progress’ asylum caseload consisted of 215,500 cases. Of these, 138,000 cases were awaiting an initial decision, 5,100 were awaiting the outcome of an appeal, and approximately 41,200 cases were subject to removal action. • The total asylum caseload has more than doubled in size since 2014, driven both by applicants waiting longer for an initial decision and a  growth in the number of people subject to removal action following a negative decision. • The Covid-19 pandemic reduced the number of asylum seekers arriving by air routes in 2020 and 2021. However, during this time the number of people arriving in small boats across the Channel (most of whom applied for asylum) rose substantially. The number of small boat arrivals rose again in 2022 despite the re-opening of other travel routes. • In 2022, there were around 13 asylum applications for every 10,000 people living in the UK. Across the EU27 there were 22 asylum applications for every 10,000 people. The UK was therefore below the average among EU countries for asylum applications per head of population, ranking 19th among EU27 countries plus the UK on this measure. In addition to the asylum process, the UK operates various routes for people seeking humanitarian protection to be granted status outside of the UK and then, in some cases, assisted in travelling to the UK. • Between 2014 and March 2024, 57,000 people were resettled or relocated to the UK through various schemes. Around 20,000 of these were Syrians resettled between 2014 and 2020. Since 2021, 25,000 people from Afghanistan have been resettled or relocated to the UK through various schemes. • In 2022, two new routes were introduced for Ukrainians. As of May 2024, around 207,000 people have arrived under these routes. This flow was much larger in scale than any other single forced migration flow to the UK in recent history. The number of Ukrainian refugees who arrived in the UK in 2022 was equivalent to the number of people granted refuge in the UK from all origins, in total, between 2014 and 2021. • In 2023, asylum seekers and refugees made up around 11% of immigrants to the UK. If including the British National (Overseas) scheme in the category of humanitarian routes, up to 14% of immigration in that year would fall into that category.    

London: UK House of Commons Library, 2024. 36p.