David H. Ucko, Thomas A. Marks

Organized crime both preys upon and caters to human need. It is corrosive and exploitative, but also empowering, and therefore pervasive. Indeed, though often out of sight, organized crime is everywhere: wherever governments draw the line, criminal actors find profitable ways of crossing it; wherever governments fail to deliver on human need, criminal actors capitalize on unmet desire or despair. For those excluded from the political economy, from patronage systems or elite bargains, organized crime can offer opportunity, possibly also protection.

PRISM, Vol. 10, No. 3 (2023), pp. 92-117 (26 pages)

By David H. Ucko and Thomas A. Marks

Organised crime is not going well. According to the 2021 Global Organized Crime index, ‘the global illicit economy simply continue[s] along the upward trajectory it has followed over the past 20 years, posing an ever-increasing threat to security, development and justice – the pillars of democracy’ (Global Initiative, 2021, p. 8). Wherever governments seek to draw the line, criminal actors find profitable ways of crossing it; wherever governments fail to deliver on human need, criminal actors capitalise on citizens’ desire or despair. As of now, more than three-quarters of the world’s population ‘live in countries with high levels of criminality, and in countries with low resilience to organized crime’ (Global Initiative, 2021, p. 12). On aggregate, the associated activity amounts to an illicit form of governance, furnishing alternative services to a wide range of clients, be they the vulnerable and weak or a covetous elite. The breadth of organised crime, its clandestine nature, and its blending of creative and destructive effects make it difficult to counter. In past SOC ACE research, we argued that the response to organised crime often shares certain pitfalls with counterterrorism, at least since 9/11 (Ucko & Marks, 2022c). Both efforts have been stymied by 1) conceptual uncertainty of the problem at hand; 2) an urge to address the scourge head on (be it violence or crime), without acknowledging its socioeconomic-political context; and, therefore, 3) unquestioned pursuit of strategies that miss the point, whose progress is difficult to measure, and which may even be counterproductive. This convergence is based on the common features of the two phenomena, which are both concerned with i) collective actors, who ii) use violence and coercion among other methods; and who have iii) corrupting, or outright destructive effects on society. Though organised crime is not consciously political in its ideological motivation, it is – like terrorism – deeply political in its origins, activities, and effects. Given the conceptual overlap, and the common pathologies that undermine response, the lessons from countering terrorism are relevant also to the countering of organised crime. Focusing on the concept of ‘irregular warfare’, our past research identified six key lessons, touching upon 1) the socio-political embeddedness of the problem, 2) the tendency to militarise the response, 3) the mirror-imaging of state assistance programmes, 4) the invaluable role of community mobilisation, 5) the dearth of strategy, and 6) the need to engage more closely with questions of political will. As argued elsewhere, these challenges point to a need for greater strategic competence both in assessing the problem of organised crime and in designing a response (Ucko & Marks, 2022c).

To generate this strategic competence, this follow-on report sets out an analytical toolkit to assist planners and policymakers with the crafting of strategy. This ‘Framework of Analysis and Action’ builds upon lessons – negative and positive – learned via years of experience with irregular warfare, defined by the Department of Defense as ‘a violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant population(s)’ (U.S. Department of Defense, 2007, p. 1).1 It is a framework that finds its origins within the U.S. National Defense University’s College of International Security Affairs (CISA), where for two decades it has been used to teach strategic planning for complex and intensely political challenges (Ucko & Marks, 2022a). The framework consists of two parts: the Strategic Estimate of the Situation (which maps the problem, explores its drivers, frames, and methods, and critiques the current response) and the Course of Action (which uses the strategic estimate to design an appropriate strategy, guided by a theory of success). The framework is in this report adapted for organised crime, to enable the mapping of relevant actors and the crafting, thereby, of a viable response. By design, the framework responds to the six key lessons identified in our earlier work. This report goes through the framework and explains its adaptation to organised crime. Appendix A provides a summation of the toolkit, a ‘user’s guide’, that will facilitate application of the framework. Testing to date suggests great potential and we look forward to sustaining a dialogue with those engaged with countering organised crime to further evolve this toolkit. Indeed, since the beginning, this framework has been a living product, enriched by theoretical application in the classroom and practical use in the field.

SOC ACE Research Paper No. 19. Birmingham, UK: University of Birmingham, 2023. 45p.

By Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime’s Observatory of Illicit Economies in South Eastern Europe.

In this issue, we focus on three cases where criminal groups from the region have been active in recent years: the Netherlands, Ecuador and parts of Africa.

These examples illustrate the growing involvement of Balkan criminal groups in some of the world’s hotspots for illicit activity. Research for these articles is facilitated by the Global Initiative’s network of contacts with local investigative journalists, as well as close cooperation between regional observatories of illicit economies, namely South Eastern Europe, West Africa and Latin America.

As part of the GI-TOC’s analysis of the risks of firearms trafficking from Ukraine, in this issue we show that the Western Balkans remain the main source of illegal weapons in Europe. At present, weapons are still cheap and plentiful in the region, and stockpiles have been augmented by inflows from Turkey via Bulgaria, particularly of gas and alarm guns. More on this topic can be found in a forthcoming GI-TOC report on trends in arms trafficking from the Ukraine conflict.

In this issue, we also report on a major crackdown by Serbian authorities in late 2023 on increasingly violent smugglers operating along the border between Serbia and Hungary, and examine how this has displaced migration flows towards Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Risk Bulletin No. 18. Geneva, SWIT: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2024. 25p.

By Amir Rotami

In this policy brief, based on published and forthcoming studies, author Amir Rostami outlines the changing nature of crime in Sweden, with a focus on organised crime, specifically lethal violence and fraud. What are the lessons learned from the Swedish crime paradox, namely the rise in organised crime, but not an equivalent rise in general crime, and what needs to be implemented to counter organised crime? The reaction to the question can be divided into two components: local and global/

European Liberal Forum Policy Paper . Brussels: European Liberal Forum, 2021. 19p.

By Vlado Vivoda, Ghaleb Krame and Martin Spraggon

Oil theft refers to the exploitation of crude oil or refined petroleum products for criminal purposes. In Mexico, oil theft—referred to as huachicolero—is endemic and widespread. By framing it within the energy security and transition context, this paper offers a new perspective on the problem of oil theft in Mexico. Focusing on crude oil and refined petroleum, the paper demonstrates that Mexico’s energy security—as framed around the 4As (availability, accessibility, affordability, and acceptance)—has deteriorated over the past decade. Application of the 4As framework in the Mexican context shows that the increasing frequency of oil theft has contributed to this deterioration. The proposed solution to the energy security and oil theft problems is centred on Mexico moving from gasoline and diesel to electrification in the transportation sector. The paper demonstrates that, while transport electrification in Mexico has been lagging behind other countries, recent developments in the country point to growing momentum among the country’s political and business elites, in tandem with US partners, in support for the energy transition. Areas where further emphasis should be placed to accelerate Mexico’s energy transition in the transportation sector are identified. Finally, the feasibility of and potential limitations associated with implementing the transition are evaluated.

Resources 2023, 12(2), 30; https://doi.org/10.3390/resources12020030

By Wendy Grossman 

Who will rule cyberspace? And why should people care? Recently stories have appeared in a variety of news media, from the sensational to the staid, that portray the Internet as full of pornography, pedophilia, recipes for making bombs, lewd and lawless behavior, and copyright violators. And, for politicians eager for votes, or to people who have never strolled the electronic byways, regulating the Net seems as logical and sensible as making your kids wear seat belts. Forget freedom of speech: children can read this stuff.

From the point of view of those on the Net, mass-media's representation of pornography on the Internet grossly overestimates the amount that is actually available, and these stories are based on studies that are at best flawed and at worst fraudulent. To netizens, the panic over the electronic availability of bomb-making recipes and other potentially dangerous material is groundless: the same material is readily available in public libraries. Out on the Net, it seems outrageous that people who have never really experienced it are in a position to regulate it.

How then, should the lines be drawn in the grey area between cyberspace and the physical world? In net.wars, Wendy Grossman, a journalist who has covered the Net since 1992 for major publications such as Wired, The Guardian, and The Telegraph, assesses the battles that will define the future of this new venue. From the Church of Scientology's raids on Net users to netizens attempts to overthrow both the Communications Decency Act and the restrictions on the export of strong encryption, net.wars explains the issues and the background behind the headlines. Among the issues covered are net scams, class divisions on the net, privacy issues, the Communications Decency Act, women online, pornography, hackers and the computer underground, net criminals and sociopaths, and more.

New York; London: NYU Press, 1998. 256p.

By  James B. Jacobs and Kerry T. Cooperman

In 1988, Manhattan U.S. Attorney Rudy Giuliani brought a massive civil racketeering suit against the leadership of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters (IBT), at the time possibly the most corrupt union in the world. The lawsuit charged that the mafia had operated the IBT as a racketeering enterprise for decades, systematically violating the rights of members and furthering the interests of organized crime. On the eve of trial, the parties settled the case, and twenty years later, the trustees are still on the job.

Breaking the Devil’s Pact is an in-depth study of the U.S. v. IBT, beginning with Giuliani’s lawsuit and the politics surrounding it, and continuing with an incisive analysis of the controversial nature of the ongoing trusteeship. James B. Jacobs and Kerry T. Cooperman address the larger question of the limits of legal reform in the American labor movement and the appropriate level of government involvement.

New York; London: NYU Press, 2011. 320p.

By Daniel Borbely, Markus Gehrsitz, Stuart McIntyre, Gennaro Rossi

In this article we study the effects of permanent school closures on crime. We leverage the closure of over 300 schools in Scotland between the school years 2006/07 and 2018/19, and employ a staggered difference-in-differences design on a matched sample. We find that neighbourhoods affected by school closures experience a reduction in crime of about 9% of a standard deviation, relative to areas where schools remained open. This effect is mainly driven by a reduction in violent and property crimes. We provide evidence on several mechanisms explaining the negative crime effect, such as changes in neighbourhood composition and reductions in school-level segregation.

IZA DP No. 16523  
Bonn: IZA – Institute of Labor Economics, 2024. 48p.

By Global Financial Integrity, FACT Coalition, and the Anti-Corruption Data Collective

Today Global Financial Integrity, in conjunction with the FACT Coalition and the Anti-Corruption Data Collective, is releasing a report with identifies 25 cases in which illegal, allegedly illicit or suspicious funds were funneled into commercial property in the United States over approximately the last 20 years. With a total value of property exceeding $2.6 billion, California, Florida and New York are some of the most favored locations for these illegal investments, but criminals stashed money across some 20 different states. This money originated from around the globe and includes suspicious funds from 14 countries, including Iran, North Korea, Kazakhstan, Russia and Mexico. As varied as the sources of funds were, so too were the types of properties involved. Hotels, shopping malls, supermarkets, a music studio and an equestrian facility in addition to more pedestrian office high-rise

It should be noted that our research represents only known cases involving U.S. commercial real estate: the actual number is likely much higher. Our data definitively shows, however, that commercial property in the U.S. offers criminal syndicates, cartels, kleptocrats and fraudsters an easy path to hide and launder their ill-gotten gains. Russian oligarchs facing international sanctions have also invested in U.S. commercial real estate. Shockingly, eight of the 25 cases involve foreign government officials or their relatives, yet the links to these Politically Exposed Persons were only uncovered long after the purchases.In recent years it has become increasingly clear that the combination of complex financing schemes and a lack of transparency mean commercial real estate provides a unique opportunity for laundering huge amounts of cash with a relatively low risk of detection. Identifying who is behind the purchase of commercial property often presents a significant challenge given large financial flows from real estate investment trusts and private investment groups, in addition to funds from shell companies formed and operated by registered agents, proxies and/or attorneys. Key Findings – More than $2.6 billion in suspicious funds were invested in commercial real estate in 22 U.S. states over approximately the last 20 years. The actual figure is likely much higher.– Funds used to buy commercial real estate in the United States originated in 14 different countries including Russia (4 cases), Mexico (4 cases), China, Malaysia, Iran and Kazakhstan (see Map 2). – Of the 25 cases reviewed for this study, 14 involved either politically exposed persons or oligarchs who typically have especially close relationships with foreign government officials. – The types of properties appearing in cases fall into four broad categories: land/buildings, business facilities (e.g. music studios, health facilities), retail spaces (e.g. supermarkets, hotels) and industrial sites (e.g. steel plants). – Weak or non-existent reporting requirements by professions involved in the purchase of commercial real estate contributed to the ease with which illicit funds were laundered.Recommendations 1.FinCEN should adopt a reporting obligation for multiple real estate professionals in a cascading order to ensure the requirement falls on at least one U.S.-based entity involved in the transaction, from both the buyer and the seller. As attorneys are legally required to be part of the closing process in almost 20 states, attorneys should be included with specific reference to the function they perform in the transaction.The rule should cover transfers of ownership that do not constitute a sale. Current rules only refer to purchases of real property by a legal entity. However, numerous cases of real estate money laundering simply involve the transfer of ownership or creation of equitable interest in the property without an actual sale. FinCEN should expand the types of transactions covered to include direct/indirect transfers of ownership or creation of equitable interest in the property.The rule should cover transactions by trusts: An increasing proportion of housing is now owned by legal entities and arrangements, including trusts. In Los Angeles, for example, 23% of rental units are owned by trusts. Both foreign and some domestic trusts are excluded from the purview of the Corporate Transparency Act. We recommend that transactions by all different classes of legal entities and legal arrangements be included in any prospective rule.

Washington, DC: Global Financial Integrity, 2024. 21p.

By Ian Tennant and Prem Mahadevan

Summary This briefing note summarises the GI-TOC’s research and experiences in engaging with and supporting civil society responses to organised crime. This is provided in the context of the ongoing threats and shrinking space for civil society, and a need for policymakers and officials to understand civil society’s role, value and potential. It is hoped that this briefing note can provide researchers and officials with a background briefing that could enable improved policy responses aimed at supporting civil society as part of whole-of-society efforts to prevent and counter organised crime.

Briefing Note 27

The Hague: Serious Organised Crime & Anti-Corruption Evidence (SOC ACE) 2024. 10p.

By The Center for Justice Innovation

The Center for Justice Innovation and RxStat convened together stakeholders in the criminal justice, court, and public health systems to discuss the treatment of drug use and prevention of fatal overdoses in the context of the criminal justice system, as well as the integration of harm reduction principles. This document, which maps many of the court-based problem substance use interventions currently utilized across New York City, came out of this forum of experts.

On September 19, 2023, the Center for Justice Innovation and RxStat convened together stakeholders in the criminal justice and court systems, clinicians, and public health experts to discuss the treatment of drug use and prevention of fatal overdoses in the context of the criminal justice system, as well as the integration of harm reduction principles into these and related programs. Among the pre-conference materials distributed were this document, which maps many of the court-based problem substance use interventions currently utilized across New York City. We divided these initiatives into four stages within the timeline of a criminal case: pre-arraignment, arraignment, pre-plea, and post-plea. This categorization is intended to highlight the distinct role that each stage plays within the larger system of treatment and prevention.

New York: The Center for Justice Innovation. 2023, 16pg

By Ana Paula Oliveira

Summary As a global challenge, organised crime is increasingly threatening the safety and security of citizens. Despite the real-world impact, there is an apparent disconnection between international human rights laws and policies, and responses to transnational organized crime. Even though the regulatory frameworks may have different objectives and scopes, human rights and responses to organised crime are not concepts at odds. Without aiming to provide an exhaustive or comprehensive account of all human rights issues deriving from the workings of organised crime, this briefing note identifies four areas that justify greater attention to the fundamental rights of natural persons, and convergence in the human rights and crime agendas. It draws on a review of Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime (GI-TOC)’s research and programming, and the author’s own experience as a lawyer working on organised crime issues for the past five years.

Briefing Note 29

The Hague: Serious Organised Crime & Anti-Corruption Evidence (SOC ACE) , 2024. 10[p.

By Reynell Badill and Víctor M. Mijares

Why do criminal groups decide to adopt political discourses? We argue that an armed group's discursive politicisation (the public declaration of political motivations) is more likely when the state declares the organisation to be an existential threat, militarises the fight against it (securitisation), and when the leaders of the armed group have had political training. This discourse aims to reduce the state's military actions against them and gain civilian support. This argument is demonstrated through a qualitative comparative analysis of six Latin American cases: Autodefensas Gaitanistas de Colombia and Los Rastrojos (Colombia), Militarizado Partido Comunista del Perú (Peru), Primeiro Comando da Capital (Brazil), Tren de Aragua (Venezuela), and Cartel de Sinaloa (Mexico). Three of them adopted a political discourse, and the others did not. We provide an analytical framework for criminal actors who do not necessarily fit into insurgent, paramilitary or simple criminal group typology.

October 2021Global Crime 22(4):312-335

By The United Nations Office on Drug and Crime (UNODC)

Cocaine, cannabis resin and pharmaceutical opioids are the internationally trafficked drugs most seized in the Sahel. In terms of quantity, cannabis herb is actually the most commonly seized drug in the Sahel countries, but it seems to be produced locally and trafficked mostly for local consumption. Cannabis is also the principal substance for which people seek treatment in the region. The geographical location of West Africa renders it a natural stopover point for cocaine produced in South America en route to Europe, one of the largest consumer markets for cocaine after North America. In a context of increasing cocaine production in South America and increasing demand for the drug in Europe, flows of cocaine trafficked through West Africa have intensified. The re-emergence of large cocaine seizures since 2019 suggests a surge in large shipments of the drug to the coastal countries of West Africa, with 9.5 tons being seized in Cabo Verde. Although the majority of the cocaine reaching West Africa typically continues northwards towards North Africa and Europe via maritime routes along the African coast, an increasing number of significant cocaine seizures involving Sahel countries has provided evidence of large-scale cocaine trafficking through the region. From an average of 13 kg per year in the period 2015–2020, the quantity of cocaine seized in the Sahel countries increased to 41 kg in 2021 and 1,466 kg in 2022, with the bulk reported by Burkina Faso, Mali and the Niger. Annual estimates were not available for 2023, but at the time of writing over 2.3 tons of cocaine had already been seized in Mauritania in 2023.

Cannabis resin is the second most seized drug in the Sahel countries after cannabis herb, with 24.8 tons seized in the period 2021–2022. Representing over 52.6 per cent of the total quantity of cannabis resin seized in West and Central Africa in the same period, this illustrates the importance of the Sahel route for cannabis resin trafficking. According to data from the Sahel countries, the cannabis resin trafficked in the region generally originates in Morocco, where an increase in cannabis resin production has been reported, reaching an estimated 901 tons in 2022. It is typically destined for countries in Western Europe and North Africa. Aside from the direct trafficking route between Spain and Morocco, cannabis resin is typically trafficked overland from Morocco to Mauritania, Mali, Burkina Faso, the Niger and Chad, then onwards to Algeria, Libya and Egypt. Since 2020, the Sahel countries have reported that cannabis resin is being transported by sea via an alternative maritime route, mostly from Morocco down the coast of West Africa to ports on the Gulf of Guinea, in Benin and Togo in particular, before being transported north to the Niger and then on to North Africa. The reconfiguration of the cannabis resin trafficking routes in West Africa is likely to have an effect on the drug distribution networks operating between North Africa, the Gulf of Guinea and the Sahel. For example, Moroccan drug traffickers are likely to become less reliant on Malian organized crime groups, while traffickers in the Gulf of Guinea are likely to be increasingly exposed to cannabis resin, enabling them to diversify their trade and the markets to which they have access. Between 2011 and 2021, the annual prevalence of opioid use (including opiates) increased from 0.33 to 1.24 per cent in Africa. The non-medical use of pharmaceutical opioids appears to have grown considerably, from just two countries (the Niger and Togo) citing tramadol as the principal drug of concern by people entering drug treatment in 2017, to five countries (Burkina Faso, Liberia, Mali, the Niger and Sierra Leone) in 2019. Indeed, the non-medical use of tramadol remains a threat in North, West and Central Africa in particular. Tramadol is the most used opioid for non-medical purposes in Burkina Faso, Mauritania, the Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo. Moreover, in 2022, Tramadol was the second most common drug for which female patients sought treatment in Mali and Mauritania etc.

Vienna: UNODC, 2023. 40p.

The European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA)

A wastewater analysis has indicated that in Europe, cocaine from South America is now being consumed in smaller towns, as well as major urban areas.

The report, published on March 20 by the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA), is the institution’s latest annual overview of drug residues used to estimate cocaine consumption across participant cities in Europe. This year, the report analyzed results from approximately 90 cities and towns, though several major cities, including London, Madrid, and Berlin, did not participate.

It found that the Belgian city of Antwerp, a vital port for the arrival of drugs from Latin America to Europe, remains the continent’s cocaine consumption capital, while eastern European states — particularly the Czech Republic and Slovakia — continue to dominate in methamphetamine consumption, though that is changing slowly.

The report also looked beyond the European Union for the first time to compare residues at a global level, including cities in the United States and Brazil in its analysis.

Researchers tested the cities’ sewage systems for indications of how much cocaine the population is consuming, which they estimate in milligrams per 1,000 inhabitants per day (mg/1000p/day).

Wastewater studies measure only drugs that have been consumed, not those that were dumped, João Matias, a scientific analyst at the EMCDDA and one of the authors of the study, told InSight Crime.

“Once inside our bodies, the drug is metabolized. Once excreted to the sewage system, researchers can take samples before the water is treated. We look for the metabolites produced after the use of a specific substance,” said Matias.

Here, InSight Crime analyzes the report’s findings on the increasing prevalence of cocaine and methamphetamine outside of major cities in Europe, as well as new data from non-EU cities.

Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg 2024. 16p.

By Stacey Mckenna

Overdose deaths have skyrocketed across the United States in recent years, increasing by 622 percent between 2000 and 2020, with more than 112,000 lives lost in 2023. This crisis has been largely driven by the proliferation of potent synthetic opioids such as illicitly manufactured fentanyl, which is up to 50 times stronger than heroin.

The opioid antagonist, naloxone, is an especially important harm reduction tool in this landscape. Naloxone binds to opioid receptors in the brain, preventing other opioids, such as fentanyl or heroin, from binding to and activating them. The U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) first approved the medication for the reversal of opioid overdoses in 1971. When administered in a timely manner, naloxone can restore breathing within minutes and successfully reverse 75 to 100 percent of overdoses.

Consequently, lawmakers and government agencies across the country have taken steps to improve access to naloxone. State legislatures have passed laws providing immunity to laypeople who administer the medication, authorized statewide standing orders to facilitate prescription-free pharmacy access, and purchased naloxone in bulk for direct distribution and to pass along to community-based organizations and first responders. Last year, the FDA approved intranasal naloxone products for over-the-counter sale for the first time.

However, with novel, increasingly potent synthetic opioids dominating the illicit supply, some medical experts worry that naloxone as we know it is simply not good enough anymore. In fact, in 2021, the FDA approved both higher-dose naloxone products and new, longer-lasting opioid antidotes, and some government agencies have begun purchasing these products for distribution in their communities.

This policy study aims to inform legislators and public health decision-makers about how high-dose naloxone fits into federal, state, and local efforts to combat the opioid overdose crisis. We examine the research on naloxone efficacy—in laboratory and medical settings and in the real world—and assess potential drawbacks associated with alternatives to standard-dose naloxone.

R Street Shorts No. 135 Washington, DC: R Street, 2024. 10p.

By Claudia Wiehler and Medinat Malefakis

Nigeria has functioned as an anchor of stability in West Africa, a region that has been shaken by seven coups in three years. Yet, Nigeria is also grappling with several internal security crises including a violent-extremist insurgency and large-scale banditry, putting into question Nige ria’s ability to maintain this role. Reports about collaborations between bandit groups and Boko Haram extremists create fear about an unholy alliance across the country’s Northern region, potentially linking violent extremist groups in Mali and Niger with those in the Lake Chad region. It is against this backdrop of severe civilian suffering and potential transnational ripple effects that we argue for a pragmatic and rapid intervention in the banditry crisis. At this point, it is time to make ‘peace’ with the bandits.  

  Policy Perspectives Vol. 12/1. April 2024, 4pg

By The Transnational Alliance to Combat Illicit Trade 

The escalating global demand for food highlights the critical role of increasing agricultural productivity and securing long-term food security. Agro-chemicals, especially pesticides, are essential for modern agriculture, protecting crops from pests and diseases and supporting the growth in agricultural productivity.

However, the increase in demand for crop protection has also paved the way for criminals to exploit agricultural supply chains to introduce unauthorized pesticides. This issue is further exacerbated by online sales on e-commerce platforms, which, while offering new avenues for the sale of pesticides, have also become conduits for trading illicit pesticides.
 
TRACIT’s report, Tackling the sale of illicit pesticides on e-commerce platforms: Risks, challenges and solutions, identifies the scale of trade of illicit pesticides on e-commerce platforms and the vulnerabilities that expose platforms to illicit traders. The primary objective of the report is to examine the structural vulnerabilities in the operations of e-commerce platforms that can be exploited by criminals to sell illicit pesticides online. It goes on to present examples of listings of illicit pesticides found on major ecommerce platforms worldwide. 
 
Key findings

• Major e-commerce platforms worldwide sell illicit pesticides, in circumvention of national regulatory controls. 

• Ongoing trade in illicit pesticides necessitates stricter, government-mandated due diligence controls on e-commerce platforms.

• Platforms must ensure greater compliance with existing law and improve enforcement of their own policies to prevent the sale of illicit pesticides.

In an effort to advance progress in these areas, this report delineates recommendations for intergovernmental organizations, national government and e-commerce platforms.
 
Critical recommendations

1. Ensure that sellers have a license. National regulations should require e-commerce platforms to check pesticide sellers’ credentials and verify that pesticide sellers have a license to trade pesticides. 

2. Store such licenses for verification by regulatory authorities.: National regulations should mandate e-commerce platforms to verify and store seller information including dealer licenses for greater transparency and for recourse in the case of illicit pesticides. 

3. Verify that pesticides sold on platforms are registered in the country of use: National regulations should mandate e-commerce platforms to verify that sellers put up for sale only those pesticides that are registered in the country of use. In the case of cross-border transactions, regulations should require e-commerce platforms to verify registrations or authorization certificates in the country of import and the country of export ahead of permitting such transactions.

New York: TRACIT, 2024. 65p

By Matt Hopkins, Rachel Keighley, Teela Sanders

  Thinking about organised crime as an ecosystem is not only novel but also offers much potential to add to the theoretical and policy-based literature in this area. While organised crime is often analysed as relationships between criminal groups and consumers of illicit goods/services, little work has analysed specific forms of organised crime activities as ecosystems where different constituent parts are dependent upon each other for the crime activity to occur. This paper analyses the organisation of sexual exploitation by entrepreneurial organised crime groups sell ing sex in the United Kingdom. Based upon 30 interviews with 23 law enforcement forces in England and Wales and five interviews with Adult Service Website Opera tors; it identifies how an ecosystem is built that ensures (a) profit generation and (b) avoidance of legal prosecution. Our analysis not only illustrates how a market ‘sup ply’ and ‘demand’ ecosystem is generated through mutually convenient ‘organiser’, ‘marketer’ and ‘buyer’ relationships, but also how the roles of these actors ensure sexual exploitation continues. Keywords Organised crime · 

Trends in Organized Crime, trends in Organized Crime. 2024, 20pg

By 
Richard C Harruff, Robert Johnston, and U L M S Perera 

Asphyxia due to strangulation is an uncommon but important modality of homicide that tends to disproportionately involve female victims. The present study was designed to investigate the circumstances, motivations, and injuries associated with strangulation homicides of females and to measure trends in incidence over time. Electronic records of the King County Medical Examiner's Office in Seattle, Washington, were used to compile a data set of all homicides in King County from 1995 through 2022. A second data set of female homicides due to strangulation was constructed with additional records prior to 1995, supplemented with data abstracted from autopsy reports, and linked to the Washington Attorney General's Office Homicide Investigation Tracking System database. This comprehensive data set was used to analyze demographics, circumstances, motives, and injuries of female strangulation homicides from 1978 through 2016. The results found that, from 1995 through 2022, females accounted for 22.8% of 2394 homicides but 80.3% of strangulation homicides. The average annual rate of all strangulation homicides decreased until 2020. Mean ages of female decedents were 27.7 years in homicides associated with sexual assault, 36.8 years with domestic violence, and 63.9 years with robbery. Lethal assaults most often occurred in private homes, and perpetrators were usually well known to the victim. Injuries included petechiae in 83%; ligature marks in 20%; fingernail marks in 1.4%; hyoid fractures in 23%; and thyroid cartilage fractures in 31%. Fractures were more common in manual strangulation and in decedents of ages over 40 years.

Journal of Forensic Sciences. January 2024, 6pg