By  Kingsley L Madueke, et al

  This report explores the dynamics of armed banditry in North West Nigeria, aiming to unravel their evolution, structure and the illicit economies that bandit groups engage in for financing and resourcing, as well as their interactions with local communities and other non-state armed groups. Focusing on Nigeria’s North West region, this report explores the internal dynamics of armed bandit groups,1 as well as the ecosystem and landscapes within which they operate, identifying potential entry points for interventions. As concerns grow regarding potential alliances between some bandit groups and violent extremist organizations – namely Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP), Ansaru and Jama’atu AhlusSunnah Lidda’Awati Wal Jihad (JAS) – operating in North West, this report explores not only to what extent these alliances exist but what shapes their formation. Nigeria’s North West region, encompassing Katsina, Kaduna, Kano, Sokoto, Jigawa and Zamfara states, has since 2011 witnessed a surge in armed bandit activities.2 Reported civilian fatalities resulting from violence by armed bandits in North West between 2018 and 2023 surpassed those inflicted by JAS and ISWAP in Nigeria’s North East region within the same period.3 Responses have largely consisted of military operations and local vigilante efforts. However, military operations’ impact has been temporary and banditry persists. This necessitates a better understanding of why banditry is resilient: bandit group structure and engagement with illicit economies are key elements of this resilience. The existing body of media and expert analyses pertaining to armed bandits in North West Nigeria has predominantly concentrated on the violence they inflict and its repercussions, with less focus on their structure, resourcing and financing mechanisms, and the physical and social environment within which they operate. This report aims to fill this gap, focusing on Zamfara and Kaduna – two major flashpoints of armed banditry in Nigeria’s North West. This report engages with the ongoing debate around categorizing non-state armed groups and explores whether the bandits can be said to exercise any governance functions or operate as political, as well as criminal, actors. This report explores the dynamics of armed banditry in North West Nigeria, aiming to unravel their evolution, structure and the illicit economies that bandit groups engage in for financing and resourcing, as well as their interactions with local communities and other non-state armed groups. Focusing on Nigeria’s North West region, this report explores the internal dynamics of armed bandit groups,1 as well as the ecosystem and landscapes within which they operate, identifying potential entry points for interventions. As concerns grow regarding potential alliances between some bandit groups and violent extremist organizations – namely Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP), Ansaru and Jama’atu AhlusSunnah Lidda’Awati Wal Jihad (JAS) – operating in North West, this report explores not only to what extent these alliances exist but what shapes their formation. Nigeria’s North West region, encompassing Katsina, Kaduna, Kano, Sokoto, Jigawa and Zamfara states, has since 2011 witnessed a surge in armed bandit activities.2 Reported civilian fatalities resulting from violence by armed bandits in North West between 2018 and 2023 surpassed those inflicted by JAS and ISWAP in Nigeria’s North East region within the same period.3 Responses have largely consisted of military operations and local vigilante efforts. However, military operations’ impact has been temporary and banditry persists. This necessitates a better understanding of why banditry is resilient: bandit group structure and engagement with illicit economies are key elements of this resilience. The existing body of media and expert analyses pertaining to armed bandits in North West Nigeria has predominantly concentrated on the violence they inflict and its repercussions, with less focus on their structure, resourcing and financing mechanisms, and the physical and social environment within which they operate. This report aims to fill this gap, focusing on Zamfara and Kaduna – two major flashpoints of armed banditry in Nigeria’s North West. This report engages with the ongoing debate around categorizing non-state armed groups and explores whether the bandits can be said to exercise any governance functions or operate as political, as well as criminal, actors. ■ Depending on the type of illicit economy and the level of influence they exert over it, armed bandits vary their engagements with illicit economies, shifting between attacks and robberies targeting actors in licit and illicit supply chains; imposition of levies; and assumption of control of part (or more rarely the entirety) of the supply chain. This variability in engagements with illicit economies renders a unidimensional response strategy inadequate. ■ A bandit group’s degree of influence over an area and the type of economy bandits are using for resource extraction contribute to shaping the level of violence against communities. Violence by bandits is higher when their influence is lower, and kidnapping and cattle rustling are characterized by greater violence than engagement in other revenue-generating activities. ■ Armed bandits exhibit some behaviours that fall within definitions of ‘governance’, though profit and predation appear to be the primary motivations for their actions. The concept of governance is important for understanding bandits in the political/criminal spectrum    

Geneva: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2024. 53p.