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The Hard Return: Mitigating organized crime risks among veterans in Ukraine

By Observatory of Illicit Markets and the Conflict in Ukraine.

This report assesses the organized crime risks associated with veterans in Ukraine. It is a complicated, sensitive subject: while the hot state of the conflict means that very few military personnel are being demobilized at present, there is also concern that discussing veterans in such a context may stigmatize them. But, as this report highlights, such risks cannot be ignored and preparations for demobilization now may help prevent negative outcomes in future. Our research identifies the following as key organized crime risks: the incidence of drug use among service personnel, the profusion of weapons in the country and the possibility of veterans being recruited into or forming organized crime groups or joining private security firms as muscle. More tangentially, a sense of disaffection among veterans – rooted in a perception that the state is not keeping its promises to provide individual support or reform society as a whole – may also drive a wedge between veterans and society, generating friction and increasing the risk of confrontation, perhaps with violence. Veterans policy in Ukraine is a fast-moving field. The Ministry for Veteran Affairs is spearheading the new veterans law – a crucial development to ensure that Ukraine’s legislation is fit for the new realities of a post-conflict period that will see a million or more veterans in society. Work is also underway on draft laws governing the legal ownership of weapons, which will bring much-needed clarity and control to the millions of trophy weapons in the country.1 With a new demobilization law yet to be submitted to parliament (at the time of writing) and relatively few veterans in Ukraine today, 2024 is a critical window of opportunity. Ukraine should use this time to determine and implement a comprehensive veterans policy before the wave of demobilizing veterans arrives. Although there was no upsurge in veteran-related organized crime in the 2014–2022 period, the size of the veteran population will be much larger. Even a fraction of these veterans falling into crime will have a significant impact on Ukrainian society. At present, there is little sign of institutional readiness. Implementation of the initiatives announced to date has been patchy and slow, and the Ministry for Veterans Affairs has lacked a permanent head for much of the first half of 2024. Demobilization, for those who are eligible, is a frustrating and even humiliating process. Our interviews with veterans revealed scarce access to information about benefits, with many unaware of what was available to them. In terms of rehabilitation, there is a lack of effective psychological, physiological, legal and social support for veterans. Some of this is explainable by the very real strictures the war has imposed on Ukraine: training that usually takes years must be completed in a matter of weeks.

But the need remains. Since the full-scale invasion, civil society organizations, many of which have worked in veterans affairs since 2014, have been making strenuous and effective efforts to cover the gaps in care and provision for veterans, from physiological and psychological support to forming business collectives and designing a ‘whole-life’ veterans policy. Yet many feel they are working in isolation, with the state resisting their attempts to work collaboratively and introduce strategic and innovative thinking to veterans affairs.2 Only the state can deliver a veterans policy with the scope and resources needed, but NGOs have much to offer, not least their agility and ability to deliver help where it is most needed. Both the state and civil society will be needed if Ukraine is to deliver a programme of ‘deep prevention’ – a strategy that addresses veterans’ needs at the level of contributing social factors rather than the individual level – which will reap the most dividends in reducing exposure to organized crime risks. The hard reality is that, as Ukraine dedicates as many resources as it can to the day-to-day conflict, it must also begin planning for the decades-long aftermath.

Geneva: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime , 2024 48p.