By Michelle Minton and Geoffrey Lawrence

Hawaii may be poised to become the 25th state to legalize the recreational use of cannabis for adults aged 21 and over. Nearly 90 percent of Hawaii residents supported full legalization of cannabis for adult use in a January 2023 poll conducted by the Hawaii Cannabis Industry Association. Gov. Josh Green has said he would sign a legalization bill if one is delivered to his desk—marking a significant departure from former Gov. Dave Ige, who left office in 2023. During the 2023 legislative session, lawmakers considered proposals to legalize adult-use cannabis. One of these bills was passed by the state Senate but was not heard in the state House of Representatives. Between the conclusion of the 2023 legislative session and the convening of the 2024 session, Attorney General Anne Lopez met with key lawmakers to develop proposed language for a legalization bill that could gain the support of the administration and the legislature. This working group produced a 315-page draft bill, introduced in each chamber of the legislature as House Bill 2600 and Senate Bill 3335, respectively. Despite having played a key role in drafting the legislation, however, the attorney general’s office testified in early hearings that it “does not support the legalization of adult-use cannabis,” although the current legislation is a “good faith effort toward protecting the public welfare and is an improvement on previous bills that have been heard by the legislature.” Reason Foundation has offered recommendations for improvement to successive cannabis legalization proposals in Hawaii. Several of these recommendations were adopted by Senate committees during the 2023 legislative session. Reason Foundation has also reviewed the provisions of Senate Bill 3335, as amended, and submitted recommendations for improvement. This brief goes beyond those recommendations and provides key background on the Hawaiian marijuana market and considerations for market structure and tax policy. Cannabis consumers are price-sensitive and have many options for purchasing cannabis. Prices and availability within the licensed cannabis industry can strongly influence the decisions of both producers and consumers to either participate in this industry or engage in illicit cannabis activity. In California, high taxes and a lack of legal sellers resulted in roughly two-thirds of cannabis demand being satisfied by the illicit market six years after legalization. The prevalence of illicit sales also negatively affects state tax collections, as only a minority of cannabis transactions are legal and subject to taxation. California has recently begun to take corrective action to lower the tax-induced price disparity between licensed and illicit goods, but Hawaiian lawmakers can circumvent the rise of large illicit markets with an appropriate market design. 

Los Angeles: The Reason Foundation, 2024. 18p.

By Michelle Minton and Geoffrey Lawrence

In the wake of the 2018 Farm Bill, which legalized hemp and its derivatives across the country, an unexpected flood of hemp-derived cannabinoid products hit the market and has sparked a whirlwind of interest—and concern—among state lawmakers. Unlike marijuana, which for now remains a Schedule I controlled substance under federal law, hemp-derived cannabinoids, such as cannabidiol (CBD) and delta-8 THC, occupy a murkier legal and regulatory landscape. This ambiguity, along with a lack of guidance from federal authorities, has left states grappling with how to ensure consumer safety, prevent underage access, facilitate interstate commerce, and support existing marijuana markets. The growing popularity of hemp-derived products has stimulated significant legislative attention in recent years, with over 90 regulatory proposals introduced in state legislatures in 2024 alone and 14 states adopting restrictions or prohibitions to some degree. A small but growing number of states have sought to legalize and regulate intoxicating hemp derivatives as general consumer goods, similar to alcoholic beverages or tobacco, or by incorporating them into their existing regulations governing medical or recreational marijuana. Yet, the continued proliferation and evolution of hemp-derived cannabinoid products has exposed significant gaps in existing regulatory paradigms. State regulations governing hemp products vary widely and are unevenly enforced, creating a patchwork of rules that can change dramatically from one state to the next. Unlike the market for marijuana, which has remained largely intrastate due to federal prohibition, federally-legal hemp products can cross state lines more freely. This has resulted in a marketplace where consumers face an increasingly confusing array of products of uncertain quality while businesses must navigate a shifting and uncertain regulatory environment. Additionally, lawmakers and regulators must continually update or amend rules in response to the emergence of new products, consumer behaviors, and industry dynamics. This piecemeal approach leaves consumers at risk, strains state resources, and hampers the ability for even willing actors to comply with state rules. This paper advocates for a cohesive approach to regulating hemp cannabinoid products that includes action by both federal and state policymakers. Our paper presents a series of recommendations for both federal and state authorities aimed at harmonizing standards across testing, labeling, packaging, and taxation for all cannabis products. By implementing these measures, states can enhance compliance and market competitiveness, reduce costs, and ensure consumer safety as both marijuana and hemp markets evolve. Ensuring consumer safety and minimizing youth access to potentially intoxicating products can also be achieved through state regulations that differentiate between high-THC and low-THC hemp products. We recommend states adopt labeling standards by which high THC product labels must provide detailed potency disclosures and risk warnings, while low THC products may adhere to general consumer goods standards. Consistent advertising restrictions across all cannabis products will also avoid bias based on the source of cannabinoids. The disparity in tax and regulatory burdens between marijuana and hemp products also fosters an uncompetitive landscape between the two product categories. High costs in state-regulated marijuana markets, such as those in California, push consumers toward cheaper alternatives, including both illicit marijuana or less-regulated hemp. To level the playing field, states should reduce the tax and compliance costs imposed on legal marijuana businesses, aligning them more closely with those for hemp producers. Imposing a single, uniform excise tax on all intoxicating cannabis products would simplify the tax system and reduce incentives for consumers to seek cheaper, illicit options. Restrictive licensing frameworks for marijuana businesses also contribute to its competitive disadvantage compared to hemp, limiting market entry, innovation, and consumer access, with the artificial scarcity raising prices and pushing consumers toward alternatives. In contrast, intoxicating hemp products can be produced in any state, shipped to a variety of retailers, and sold directly to consumers even in states without legal marijuana sales. This dynamic distorts the market in favor of hemp products, sometimes sold under transient branding and lacking clear originating information for the producer, which consumers might not choose if legal marijuana were more affordable or available. Regulators ought to be aware of who is selling intoxicating cannabis products, but regulatory schemes should not push market participants toward the hemp market merely because marijuana licensing is too costly or unavailable. We recommend states adopt a middle ground approach between overly-restrictive marijuana licensing regimes and the lack of any such framework for hemp. In particular, we suggest state law at least require hemp producers to register with state regulatory authorities while also drastically reducing both financial and non-financial barriers to entry into the marijuana market. This may include allowing any retailer who can demonstrate competence over inventory management for age-gated products to become eligible to retail both hemp cannabinoid and marijuana products. Finally, to fully realize the potential of a national cannabis market, particularly in light of the emerging hemp derivatives sector, states must also permit the interstate sale of marijuana products. As these authors argued in a prior paper, existing bans on out-of-state marijuana products are unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause and exacerbate the competitive advantage hemp currently enjoys. State lawmakers should agree to remove bans on the import of marijuana and allow state-licensed producers to export to purchasers in other states. In addition, lawmakers should take steps to align packaging, labeling, and testing protocols to facilitate a robust and legal interstate market. The rapidly evolving cannabis industry presents both opportunities and challenges for state regulators. By adopting a more unified and flexible approach to both hemp and marijuana regulation, states can enhance market competitiveness, reduce costs, and protect consumers. Embracing these recommendations will position states to lead in the burgeoning cannabis sector while ensuring consumer safety and market integrity

Los Angeles: The Reason Foundation, 2024. 85p.

By Yanwen Wang, Jacquelyn Gilbreath , Lynne Mock

While drug crime-related criminal legal system and victim costs reached $113 billion across the United States in 2007, just $14.6 billion was spent on treating substance use disorder (National Institute on Drug Abuse, 2014). Due, in part, to drug crimes, many U.S. citizens are under correctional supervision, with 1 in 66 adults being on probation or parole in 2020 (Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2021). In Illinois, 67,587 individuals were on probation in 2020 (Administrative Offices of the Illinois Courts, 2021) and 26,426 were on parole (Illinois Department of Corrections, 2020). The supervision population rate of substance use is estimated to be two to three times higher than that of the general population, with nearly half of the people under community supervision having a substance use disorder (PEW Charitable Trusts, 2018). The Illinois Criminal Justice Information Authority’s Adult Redeploy Illinois (ARI) program was established by the Crime Reduction Act of 2009 to provide financial incentives to local jurisdictions for programs that divert justice-involved individuals from state prisons by providing community-based supervision and individualized services. While researchers have evaluated ARI, models used in some jurisdictions (DeLong & Reichert, 2016; Kroner, et al., 2021; Mock et al., 2017; Reichert et al., 2016), research on ARI client outcomes related to the impact of drug testing is limited. The research goals for this study included: • Quantitatively examining all local ARI program drug test data, including tested drugs, drug test frequencies, and drug test results. • Systematically examining how ARI drug testing contributes to the possibility of revocation including other factors such as age, sex, and race. • Proposing recommendations for better program practice to reduce the rate of revocation. This study sought to answer the following research questions: 1. How is drug testing being practiced and observed in ARI in terms of its frequency, pass rates, and tested drugs? 2. Does drug testing have a significant impact on ARI participant outcomes when controlling for demographic variables? The study included 53,159 records of 1,055 individuals collected from October 3, 2011, to June 20, 2019. The median number of drug tests per individual was 19, and the median of the average days between drug tests was 10 days. The most frequently tested drugs also had the highest positive results: heroin (32%), marijuana/THC (30%), cocaine/crack (14%), alcohol (10%), and other opiates (8%). Logistic regression analyses were used to determine what demographic, drug testing, and criminal justice variables predicted program outcomes of completion or revocation. Among the demographic variables, only age predicted program outcomes. Neither sex nor race emerged as significant program outcome predictors. Drug test positivity rates predicted revocation, as well as drug test frequency (number of times an individual was tested) and average number of days between the drug tests. i Overall, the average drug positivity rate was 29% and most tests were passed with no drug found. Most successful clients who were older women at medium to medium-high recidivism risk and whom tested monthly with lower test positivity rates. Those most likely to experience program revocation were younger men who tested several times per month with higher test positivity rates during their program tenure. Graphing the programs by test positivity, number of tests, and frequency of tests suggests that individuals enrolled in some programs had higher test positivity rates (>50%) and were subject to less frequent drug tests than other programs. This study focuses on drug test outcomes, however, it also would be worth exploring data on drug testing rewards, sanctions, and requirements for program completion and their impacts on program outcomes.   

Chicago:  Illinois Criminal Justice Information Authority., 2022. 33p 

By Mark McMullen

Although it is particularly pronounced in Oregon, there is no question that the fentanyl epidemic is imposing severe economic costs across the nation. The current report quantifies some of these costs and describes the state policy environment. Public policy regarding drug use is evolving rapidly in Oregon as we speak. As with all CSI does, the primary goal of this report is to educate and inform Oregonians on policy issues such as this that impact their lives. Key Findings • The economic cost of Oregon’s fentanyl crisis is more than $31 billion annually, up from $5.88 billion in 2017. • Enough fentanyl was seized last year to kill every Oregonian more than 20 times over. • Most western states have seen above-average growth in fentanyl use during recent years. Even so, Oregon’s experience stands out relative to its neighbors. Since the pandemic began, fentanyl-related overdose deaths in Oregon have increased by over 1,000%, more than in any other state. Alaska’s experience is the only one that even comes close. • Although Oregon’s decriminalization experiment cannot be blamed for all the disproportionate local impact of the fentanyl epidemic, it is clearly playing a role. When decriminalization went into effect in February 2021, Oregon ranked 38th out of 48 states with available data in the rate of fentanyl related overdose deaths. By January 2024, Oregon’s rank rose to 13th. • Many voters and policymakers quickly experienced regrets associated with the decriminalization effort and are making some efforts to improve the law. During the 2023 legislative session, legislators enacted House Bill 4002, which created a new misdemeanor for simple drug possession. The new law gives leeway to counties on how to implement it locally, and we are likely to learn much as the different programs evolve.

Greenwood Village, CO: Common  Sense Institute 2024. 

By Kasey Stricklin and Megan K McBride

Social media bots—simply, automated programs on social media platforms—affect US national security, public discourse, and democracy. As the country continues to grapple with both foreign and domestic disinformation, the laws and platform policies governing the use of social media bots are incredibly important. As part of CNA’s study, Social Media Bots: Implications for Special Operations Forces, our literature review found that the landscape of such regulations is difficult to piece together, and applicable provisions and policies are disparately catalogued. This CNA primer helps to fill this gap by helping policy-makers and national security practitioners understand the laws and social media platform policies as they currently exist. We also consider the challenges and dilemmas faced by legislators, and social media platforms, as they attempt to craft relevant provisions to address social media bots and malign influence, and we conclude with a brief look at the consequences for breaking platform policies.

The Legal Framework: US policy-makers are constrained in their passage of bot-related laws by a number of factors. First, legislators must consider free speech rights granted by the First Amendment of the Constitution. Additionally, Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act (CDA 230) hinders the ability of policy-makers to hold social media platforms legally responsible for any material posted on their site. Further, the slow speed of congressional action compared to technological advancement, and the barriers to obtaining reliable information on the social media bot threat, have proved difficult to overcome. There are no US federal laws governing social media automation, although members of Congress have introduced several relevant pieces of legislation over the last few years. While there is some congressional interest in crafting botrelated legislation, the political will to pass such provisions has yet to materialize.

In the international arena, the European Union has been a leader in efforts to counter disinformation; it introduced a nonbinding Code of Practice in October 2018, to which many of the most prominent social media companies signed on. As a result, the platforms committed themselves to self-regulation aimed at stamping out disinformation on their sites, which includes closing fake accounts and labeling bot communications. In May 2020, the European Commission reported that, though there were positive developments toward countering disinformation, there is still much room for improvement in labeling and removing bots. It is important to keep in mind, though, that the EU has a permanent bureaucracy to study problems and propose legally and non-legally binding legislation. In the US, legislation works differently, as a legislative champion with significant clout needs to emerge in order to push forward a proposal.

Platform Policies: The social media companies face their own dilemmas when thinking about the creation of effective bot regulations. Unlike policy-makers, platforms are beholden to shareholders; and higher platform engagement generally leads to higher share values. Because bots make up a large portion of monthly active users on some platforms, the companies may be reluctant to kick off these automated accounts. However, public pressure since the 2016 US election has created a greater financial incentive to ensure engagement is authentic. The companies also worry about regulating too extensively out of fear they will then be admitting they have an affirmative duty to moderate and thus lead to the revocation of their limited immunities under CDA 230. This tension is evident in the run-up to the US presidential elections, as the social media companies seek to ensure the truthfulness of candidates on their sites, they also risk one side of the political spectrum regarding them as politically biased and seeking to regulate them in response.

Instead of specifically focusing on bot activity, the platforms tend to address bot behavior through other policies on banned behavior. We broke out the policies relevant to bots into four categories: automation, fake accounts and misrepresentation, spam, and artificial amplification. Figure 1 depicts the way these policies often overlap in detailing prohibited bot behaviors. 

The consequences for breaking platform policies vary, with the sites often looking at the specific violation, the severity of the infraction, and the user’s history on the platform. While they may simply hand out a warning or restrict the post’s viewership, the sites also reserve the right to ban users or accounts, and can even go so far as to sue for violation of their terms.

The ever-evolving threats from disinformation and malicious bots will likely continue to cause consternation in the US government. However, experts are skeptical that Congress will find a legislative solution in the near future, despite enhanced attention to the problem. Therefore, the social media platforms are likely to shoulder much of the burden going forward, and it is an open question how and to what extent the platforms should police themselves. As they grapple with the prevalence of automated accounts operating on their sites, the platforms’ policies and enforcement provisions will continue to evolve to meet the threats of the day. However, it may ultimately be the attention of the press and American public, or the initiative of a regulatory agency like the Federal Trade Commission, that provides the needed impetus for change on these issues.

Arlington, VA: CNA, 2000. 40p.

By Michael J. Zoorob, ; Ju Nyeong Park, ; Alex H. Kral,  et alBarrot H. Lambdin, PhD3; Brandon del Pozo, PhD, MPA, MA1,2

IMPORTANCE-  With the implementation of Measure 110 (M110) in 2021, Oregon became the first US state to decriminalize small amounts of any drug for personal use. To date, no analysis of the association of this law with overdose mortality has fully accounted for the introduction of fentanyl—a substance that is known to drive fatal overdose—to Oregon’s unregulated drug market. OBJECTIVE -  To evaluate whether the decriminalization of drug possession in Oregon was associated with changes in fatal drug overdose rates after accounting for the rapid spread of fentanyl in Oregon’s unregulated drug market. DESIGN, SETTING, AND PARTICIPANTS In this cohort study, the association between fatal overdose and enactment of M110 was analyzed using a matrix completion synthetic control method. The control group consisted of the 48 US states and Washington, DC, all of which did not decriminalize drugs. The rapid spread of fentanyl in unregulated drug markets was determined using the state-level percentage of all samples reported to the National Forensic Laboratory Information System that were identified as fentanyl or its analogues. Mortality data were obtained from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention for January 1, 2008, to December 31, 2022. Data analysis was performed from fall 2023 through spring 2024. EXPOSURES Measure 110 took effect in Oregon on February 1, 2021. MAIN OUTCOMES AND MEASURES The primary outcome assessed was fatal drug overdose rates per half-year. A changepoint analysis also determined when each state experienced a rapid escalation of fentanyl in its unregulated drug market. RESULTS In this analysis, rapid spread of fentanyl in Oregon’s unregulated drug supply occurred in the first half of 2021, contemporaneous with enactment of M110. A positive crude association was found between drug decriminalization and fatal overdose rate per 100 000 per half year (estimate [SE], 1.83 [0.47]; P < .001). After adjusting for the spread of fentanyl as a confounder, the effect size changed signs (estimate [SE], −0.51 [0.61]; P = .41) and there was no longer an association between decriminalization and overdose mortality in Oregon. Sensitivity analyses were consistent with this result. CONCLUSIONS AND RELEVANCE In this cohort study of fatal drug overdose and the spread of fentanyl through Oregon’s unregulated drug market, no association between M110 and fatal overdose rates was observed. Future evaluations of the health effects of drug policies should account for changes in the composition of unregulated drug markets.

  JAMA Netw Open. 2024;7(9):e2431612. doi:10.1001/jamanetworkopen.2024.3161

By Asian Racing Federation

This Handbook highlights the risks to the integrity of horse racing and other sports from illegal betting-related sports corruption and provides practical guidance to administrators and other key stakeholders for mitigating against and combatting such corruption. Practical guidance in the Handbook includes an overview of major issues around illegal betting, how to conduct bet monitoring and betting analysis, intelligence gathering and analysis, how to conduct illegal betting investigations, and how to engage stakeholders to combat illegal betting and related corruption.

Hong Kong: Asian Racing Federation, 2020. 130p.

By Clara Martiny, Terra Rolfe, Bilen Zerie, Aoife Gallagher and Helena Schwertheim

ISD sought to understand how Online Gender-Based Violence (OGBV) affects South African women, focusing on the experience of women politicians, candidates, and political figures during one of South Africa’s most historic general elections in May 2024. ISD analysts used a combination of qualitative and quantitative analytical methods, interviews with experts, and knowledge drawn from online and in-person workshops. Specifically, three online case studies looked at abusive content, gendered disinformation, and harassment targeting women politicians on TikTok, X (formerly Twitter), and Facebook. ISD’s analysis found that South African women in politics often face abuse online in the form of replies or comments to their posts or content about them. Misogynistic actors tend to target their physical attributes, intelligence, and ability to lead. They also often engage with gendered disinformation narratives that sexualize or objectify women. While the legislative frameworks in South Africa are progressive and comprehensive, enforcement is difficult and many women are unaware of the resources available to them. Social media platforms also have policies that address OGBV and gendered disinformation but their enforcement is weak, especially outside of English language content.

Amman Berlin London Paris Washington D C: Institute for Strategic Dialogue , 2024. 37p.

By Delvon T. Mattingly a b, Maggie K. Richardson c, Joy L. Hart 

Cannabis use is increasing due to several factors including the adoption of laws legalizing its use across the United States (US). We examined changes in current cannabis use among US youth and adults and by key sociodemographic groups. Methods: Using data from the 2013-2022 National Survey on Drug Use and Health (n=543,195), we estimated the prevalence of (2013-2019, 2020, 2021-2022) and trends in (2013 2019, 2021-2022) current (i.e., past 30-day) cannabis use among US youth (aged 12-17) and adults (aged 18+) overall and by age, gender, race and ethnicity, educational attainment, and total annual family income. We also examined sociodemographic factors associated with use from 2013-2019, in 2020, and from 2021-2022. Results: Cannabis use increased from 7.59% to 11.48% in 2013-2019, was 11.54% in 2020, and increased again from 13.13% to 15.11% in 2021-2022. Among youth, cannabis use remained constant from 2013-2019 and 2021-2022. In 2022, use was highest among aged adults 18-34, male, non-Hispanic multiracial, and generally lower SES adults. From 2021-2022, cannabis use increased among several groups such as adults who were aged 35-49 (14.25% to 17.23%), female (11.21% to 13.00%), and Hispanic (10.42% to 13.50%). Adults who were aged 18-25, male, non-Hispanic multiracial, some college educated, and of lower annual family income had consistently higher odds of current cannabis use from 2013-2019, in 2020, and from 2021-2022. Conclusions: Cannabis use is increasing overall and among certain sociodemographic groups. Our findings inform prevention and harm reduction efforts aimed at mitigating the burden of cannabis use in the US. 

Drug and Alcohol Dependence Reports