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This Job Post Will Get You Kidnapped: A Deadly Cycle of Crime, Cyberscams, and Civil War in Myanmar

By Emily Ferrguson and Emma Schroeder

Following decades of cyclical insecurity in Myanmar, conflict reached a new level following a coup d’etat in 2021 during which Myanmar’s military, the Tatmadaw, deposed the democratically elected National League for Democracy government. Meanwhile, criminal syndicates, entrenched primarily in Special Economic Zones (SEZs) like Shwe Kokko within Myanmar’s Karen state, have expanded and evolved their criminal operations throughout this evolving conflict. The Tatmadaw forces have intertwined themselves in complicated and carefully balanced alliances to support the ongoing conflict, including with the Karen State Border Guard Force (BGF) . As the Tatmadaw and BGF look to sustain themselves and outlast each other, they have found allies of convenience and alternative funding sources in the criminal groups operating in Karen state. In the last two years, organized criminal groups in Myanmar have expanded their activities to include forms of profitable cybercrime and increased their partnership with the BGF , which enables their operations in return for a cut of the illicit profits. Since roughly 2020, criminal syndicates across Cambodia, Myanmar, Laos, and Thailand have largely lured individuals with fake offers of employment at resorts or casinos operating as criminal fronts where they are detained, beaten, and forced to scam, steal from, and defraud people over the  internet The tactics—kidnap-to-scam operations—evolved in response to the pandemic and to the Myanmar civil war, allowing criminal groups to build on existing networks and capabilities. These operations do not require significant upfront investment or technical expertise, but what they do need is time—time that can be stolen from victims trapped in the region’s already developed human trafficking network. The profits that these syndicates reap from victims around the globe add fuel to the ongoing civil war in Myanmar and threaten the stability of Southeast Asia. These groups entrench themselves and their illicit activities into the local environment by bribing, partnering with, or otherwise paying off a key local faction within the Myanmar civil war, creating an interconnectedness between regional instability and profit-generating cybercrime. What is unfolding in Myanmar challenges conventional interpretations of cybercrime and the tacit separation of criminal activities in cyberspace from armed conflict. The criminal syndicates, and their BGF partners, adapted to the instability in Myanmar so effectively that each is financially and even existentially motivated to perpetuate this instability. This paper explores the connectivity between cybercriminal activities and violence, instability, and armed conflict in a vulnerable region, exploring how cybercrime has become an effective vehicle through which nonstate actors can fund and perpetuate conflict. The following section examines the key precipitating conditions of this case, traces the use of cyber scams to create significant financial losses for victims across the world, sow instability across Southeast Asia, exacerbate the violence in Myanmar, and, finally, considers the risks that this model could be adopted and evolved elsewhere. This paper concludes with implications for the policy and research communities, highlighting the ways in which conflict can move, unbounded, between the cyber and physical domains as combatants and opportunists alike follow clear incentives to marry strategic and financial gain.

Washington, DC: Digital Forensic Research Lab (DFRLab) at the Atlantic Council, 2023. 16p.

Lipstick on a Slaughtered Piggybank: Civil RICO Against “Pig Butchering” Cryptocurrency Investment Schemes

By Samantha B. Larkin

Niki Hutchinson, at twenty-four years of age, decided it was time to start dating. She thought she connected with a guy named Hao on Hinge, a dating website. The two started messaging and formed a bond after Hao told Niki he was born in the same town in China from which she was adopted. After learning she recently lost her mom, Hao offered to help Niki make money with her inheritance and told her he knew how to invest in cryptocurrency. While Niki was initially skeptical, Hao eventually instructed Niki on how to make wire transfers from her bank account to Crypto.com, an exchange platform. Through illustrated screenshots and text messaging, Hao described to Niki exactly how to use the platform. From there, Hao convinced Niki to transfer her crypto assets to another website. On the second platform, Niki saw profits in her account and decided to keep investing. She even convinced her father to invest in cryptocurrency too. But when Niki went to withdraw her virtual funds, she was informed that she needed to pay the tax bill with a new transfer of capital to release her earnings. The realization then set in that Niki and her dad lost over $390,000 to scammers. The scam Niki encountered is called “pig butchering.” Pig butchering is a billion-dollar industry of loss, draining American bank accounts, according to official government publications. Scammers abroad invented the term, referring to the concept of “fattening a pig before the slaughter,” where the goal is to nourish trust and confidence in a virtual relationship before conning the victim out of their money and slaughtering their savings. Cryptocurrency is the signature of the scheme. According to complaints received by the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3), the typical targets in crypto-investment scams are individuals between the ages of thirty and forty-nine. Aiming at young professionals with disposable income, these scammers vet their targets to ensure a level of sophistication with technology and susceptibility to emotional manipulation. Scammers then coach their targets into virtual exchanges on false websites, where the victims are manipulated into believing they are making a profit. Their investments increase over time, typically until the victim attempts to cash out their illusory gains, and then the scam reaches its final stage: the victim is informed they need to pay exorbitant taxes or fees with fresh crypto transfers in order to release their funds. In reality, their assets were already gone. (continued)

Roger Williams University Law Review, Volume 30, Issue 1 (2025) Winter 2025, 47p.

Casinos, cyber fraud, and trafficking in persons for forced criminality in Southeast Asia

By Deanna Davy

The transnational organized crime (TOC) landscape in Southeast Asia has evolved dramatically in recent years. Trafficking in persons for the purpose of forced criminality to commit online scams and financial fraud, particularly occurring in Special Economic Zones (SEZs) and other areas of Cambodia, Lao People’s Democratic Republic (PDR), and Myanmar, as well as other destination countries (including Malaysia, and the Philippines), has emerged as a new and growing trend. Trafficking in persons for forced criminality has been driven by organized crime groups in the region, which operate in a remarkably open way. Their illicit activities are linked to various legal and illegal entertainment establishments, such as casinos, hotels, and registered companies (businesses), which operate from compound-like buildings where victims are harbored and forced to commit, or be complicit in, cyber-enabled crimes. This phenomenon of trafficking for forced criminality has recently become prominent in Southeast Asia, though it had already been identified in many parts of the world. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) 2022 Global Report on Trafficking in Persons1 has indicated a considerable increase in the identification of trafficking in persons for the purpose of committing criminal offences, currently reaching 10.2% of all reported trafficking cases globally. Trafficking for forced criminality (or for exploitation in criminal activities) can be understood as trafficking in persons for the purpose of exploitation of victims through forcing or otherwise compelling them to commit criminal acts for economic or other gains of traffickers or exploiters. While not included in the definition of the UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons (Trafficking in Persons Protocol) explicitly, exploitation in criminal activities has been incorporated into the trafficking definition of many countries around the world. In the Southeast Asia region, currently only Malaysia has incorporated this form of exploitation into domestic legislation. Nevertheless, the intent of traffickers, the methods.

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), 2023. 50p.

The virtual asset ecosystem in El Salvador: risks and challenges to counter financial crime

By Global Financial Integrity and the Cyrus R. Vance Center for International Justice

On September 7, 2021, El Salvador became the first country in the world to adopt Bitcoin as legal tender. Two years later, the country has undergone technological change and growth, faced operational and regulatory challenges, and learned a tremendous amount in the process. This joint publication by the Vance Center and Global Financial Integrity (GFI) analyzes virtual assets (VAs) in El Salvador, first from a legal and regulatory perspective, as well as from an anti-money laundering (AML) and counter-terrorism financing (CFT) perspective The first half of the report analyzes the current regulatory landscape in El Salvador regarding Bitcoin and VAs. El Salvador has taken a major leap in embracing technological innovation, specifically in the digitalization of the financial system, through adopting bitcoin, cryptocurrencies, and digital assets. The country has established a regulatory framework encompassing the Bitcoin Law, the Digital Assets Issuance Law, and the Innovation and Manufacture of Technologies Promotion Law. These laws aim to provide a supportive environment for individuals and businesses engaging in transactions involving digital currencies while fostering innovation and technology manufacturing within the nation.

As a result, El Salvador is poised to become a leading proponent of emerging technologies across various sectors of its economy. Due to the dynamic nature of the subject matter and the ongoing efforts to standardize these frameworks internationally, the report identifies additional areas that may still require regulation.

The second half of the report analyzes VAs in El Salvador from an AML/CFT perspective. The report approaches these issues from the perspective of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), which states that “the cornerstone (…) is the risk-based approach which emphasizes the need for countries to identify and understand the money laundering (ML) and terrorism financing (TF) risks they are exposed to.”

Understanding risks enables countries such as El Salvador to take mitigating measures and to deploy limited resources effectively. In this regard, the report analyzes financial crime risks for the most common predicate offenses for ML in El Salvador, considering drug trafficking, extortion, migrant smuggling, and misappropriation of public funds (peculado). The report also assesses financial crime risks related to specific operational features or developments within El Salvador’s VA ecosystem.

The report concludes with policy recommendations that can help El Salvador to maximize the benefits and minimize the risks associated with financial innovation. Key recommendations include:

Policymakers in El Salvador should urgently adopt reforms strengthening AML/CFT as well as ensuring robust oversight over VAs. These reforms are particularly important in light of El Salvador’s upcoming Mutual Evaluation.

The Government of El Salvador, and specifically the Central Reserve Bank (BCR) and the National Commission of Digital Assets (NCDA), should engage with the legal and business community in developing regulations and technical standards according to need and practice for the Bitcoin Law and Digital Assets Issuance Law, following international best practices.

Lawyers and law firms advising companies wanting to operate in El Salvador should enhance compliance mechanisms to verify client backgrounds to prevent criminal actors from entering the national financial system.

All relevant government agencies should ensure transparency and access to public information, including contractual and operational processes, fraud and mismanagement investigations, and the use of public funds, per domestic laws and international standards.

The BCR should incorporate information on government Bitcoin purchases into the Balance of Payments and other similar documents.

The Superintendence of the Financial System (SSF) should require that Chivo Wallet collect information on legal persons opening Chivo Wallet accounts in line with the requirements for legal persons to open other types of financial accounts. In addition, Chivo Wallet should maintain beneficial ownership information for legal persons using Chivo Wallet, in line with FATF Recommendation 15’s interpretive guidance and similar to the requirements for financial institutions.

Considering that financial institutions and other obligated entities submit suspicious transaction reports (STRs) for crypto transactions, the Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) of El Salvador and other government authorities should provide education and training opportunities to the financial sector and other obligated entities regarding identification of red flag indicators in crypto transactions. This will help to ensure that STRs contain relevant information and reflect an informed understanding of the risks.

Washington, DC: Global Financial Integrity 2023. 63p,

Colorado Crime and Aurora’s Experience with Auto Theft

By Paul Pazen, Thomas Young, DJ Summers and Cooper Pollard

Colorado’s crime rate is not back to its pre-pandemic level. Both local and state authorities are currently attempting to find policy solutions.

Some localities have created policies and procedures that go beyond state guidelines in an effort to control crime. The City of Aurora implemented mandatory minimum sentencing guidelines for auto theft in 2022, for example, the year that Colorado’s and Aurora’s auto theft rates were highest. This policy led to a decrease in the auto theft rate in the city beyond what was seen statewide. In 2023, state lawmakers tried to address auto theft with passage of SB23-097. This bill did not implement mandatory minimum sentences, but instead made it a felony to commit auto theft regardless of the value of the vehicle. The law went into effect on July 1, 2023.

Using Aurora’s experience as a guide, CSI attempted to assess what the economic savings would be if the state were to experience the same decrease in auto theft, shoplifting, and overall crime that Aurora did after implementing its ordinance.

Key Findings

The share of auto theft in Aurora was 19% in July 2022. Since the passage of Aurora’s ordinance, known as “Mandatory Minimum Sentences for Motor Vehicle Theft,” the share averaged 16% from August 2022 through December 2024, representing a three percentage point decrease from the pre-August 2022 period.

A market model predicting auto theft in Aurora suggests there were 723 fewer auto thefts in Aurora from August 2022 to December 2024, a 6% decline relative to other large cities in the state.

For automobile crime, a 6% decline equates to $16.3 million in economic savings for Aurora from August 2022 through December 2024. For the largest city in the state, Denver, the economic savings would be $37.3 million over the same 29 months.

In contrast to Aurora’s experience, initial model results on the state impact from its 2023 effort was less pronounced at a 3% reduction in auto theft.

If Aurora’s experience is indicative of the potential savings of a similar statewide approach to crime, a 6% decline in crime statewide for all reported criminal offenses would have equated to $1.8 billion in economic savings in 2024, or roughly $774 per Colorado household.

Changes in local crime are not uniform across the state, however. The change in crime over the past five years varies widely by city and county.

Greenwood Village, CO : Common Sense Institute, 2025, 18p

School Shootings, Protests, and the Gun Culture in the U.S.

By  Susan Olzak

Scholars document that attitudes toward guns and gun policy reflect deeply entrenched cultures that overlap with ideological affiliations and party politics. Does exposure to dramatic events such as school shootings and protests regarding gun control affect these patterns? I first argue that school shootings are significant triggering events that will become associated with attitudes favoring gun restrictions. The second argument holds that rising protests by one’s opponent can be transformed into mobilizing opportunity by a focal group. To examine these ideas, I combine information from a national exit poll data on respondents’ attitudes on gun policy with state-level information on the counts of recent school shootings, gun-policy protest, existing laws restricting gun use, and membership in the National Rifle Association. To minimize bias, the analysis of public opinion applies Coarsened Exact Matching techniques followed by analysis using mixed-level logit. The second analysis uses data on gun control protests, school shootings, and NRA memberships in states over time. Results show that conservatives (but not liberals) exposed to more school shootings favor more restrictive gun policies. The second, longitudinal analysis found that there is a significant interaction effect between increases in school shootings and gun control protests that diminishes NRA memberships significantly.

Unpublished paper. 2022. 49p.

Organised Crime Groups in Cyberspace: A Typology

By Kim-Kwang Raymond Choo

Three categories of organised groups that exploit advances in information and communications technologies (ICT) to infringe legal and regulatory controls: (1) traditional organised criminal groups which make use of ICT to enhance their terrestrial criminal activities; (2) organised cybercriminal groups which operate exclusively online; and (3) organised groups of ideologically and politically motivated individuals who make use of ICT to facilitate their criminal conduct are described in this article. The need for law enforcement to have in-depth knowledge of computer forensic principles, guidelines, procedures, tools, and techniques, as well as anti-forensic tools and techniques will become more pronounced with the increased likelihood of digital content being a source of disputes or forming part of underlying evidence to support or refute a dispute in judicial proceedings. There is also a need for new strategies of response and further research on analysing organised criminal activities in cyberspace.

Springer Science + Business Media, LLC, 2008, 26p.

Global Cybersecurity Outlook 2025

By The World Economic Forum

In a complex cyberspace characterized by geopolitical uncertainties, widening cyber inequity and sophisticated cyberthreats, leaders must adopt a security-first mindset. While the 2024 edition of the Global Cybersecurity Outlook highlighted the growing inequity in cyberspace, this year’s report shines a light on the increasing complexity of the cyber landscape, which has profound and far-reaching implications for organizations and nations. This complexity is driven by a series of compounding factors: – Escalating geopolitical tensions are contributing to a more uncertain environment. – Increased integration of and dependence on more complex supply chains is leading to a more opaque and unpredictable risk landscape. – The rapid adoption of emerging technologies is contributing to new vulnerabilities as cybercriminals harness them effectively to achieve greater sophistication and scale. – Simultaneously, the proliferation of regulatory requirements around the world is adding a significant compliance burden for organizations. All of these challenges are exacerbated by a widening skills gap, making it extremely challenging to manage cyber risks effectively.

Geneva, SWIT: World Economic Forum , 2025. 49p.

Retail theft in Vermont Using Court Data

By Monica Weeber and Robin Joy

Summary • The 2023 retail theft charge filings are consistent with pre-COVID years. There is an increase in the number of felony retail theft charges filed. • Most felony retail theft charges are disposed as a felony. • Case backlogs can occur at all stages of the process, including apprehension, scheduling, and disposition. • 57.6% of repeat retail theft offenders re-offend with a new retail theft offense within 30 days of their first offense. • Restitution is ordered in approximately 8% of all retail theft cases.
 

• Straight sentences were the most common sentence for both misdemeanor and felony retail theft. The average minimum time for misdemeanor retail theft was .03 years (11 days) and for felony was .64 years (7.6 months).

Montpelier VT: Crime Research Group, 2024.   12p.

Vermont Crime Analysis Using National Incident Based Reporting System (NIBRS) Data on Human Trafficking, 2015-2019

By Megan Novak

Vermont’s victim service providers, law enforcement, and legislature have been interested in understanding state trends related to sex and labor trafficking. In this regard, Crime Research Group reviewed Vermont human trafficking data recorded in the National Incident Based Reporting System (NIBRS). NIBRS was created to capture details on specific crime incidents including information about victims, known offenders, victim-offender relationships, arrestees, and property involved. Since the 1990s, Vermont law enforcement have been NIBRS compliant meaning that information concerning certain crimes known to Vermont law enforcement are logged in NIBRS. This report reviews available NIBRS data reported between 2015-2019. A preliminary review indicated that there were no labor or sex trafficking cases recorded in 2015. Furthermore, between 2016-2019, there were no recorded incidents involving labor trafficking offenses. Therefore, this report focuses on sex trafficking offenses that occurred between 2016-2019 in Vermont. Annual review of NIBRS sex trafficking data will help identify trends and monitor data quality. Trends to be monitored include, but are not limited to, total number of incidents and offenses, offense circumstances (e.g., substances involved, weapons used), as well as victim and offender demographics.

Montpelier, VT: Crime Research Group, 2021. 7p.

Vermont Crime Analysis Using National Incident Based Reporting System (NIBRS) Data on Domestic Violence, 2015-2019

By Megan Novak

Domestic violence (DV) refers to a particular subset of offenses committed by household members, spouses (including ex- and common law spouses), children/stepchildren, or family members. While some domestic incidents involve non-violent offenses (e.g., identity theft, forgery, motor vehicle theft), this report focuses on violent offenses (e.g., murder, rape, assault) that occur during domestic incidents. Rather than report crimes as DV, NIBRS requires law enforcement to record the relationship of the victim to the offender. Incidents included in this report can be categorized as intimate partner violence (IPV) (i.e., violent offenses committed against a boyfriend/girlfriend, homosexual partner, spouse, ex-spouse, or common law spouse) and DV against children aged 18 and younger (i.e., violent offenses against a biological child, child of a boyfriend/girlfriend, or a stepchild). Annual reports will monitor trends related to the number of incidents each year, types and number of offenses committed, victim and offender demographics, victim-offender relationships, and arrestee information. 

Montpelier, VT: Crime Research Group, 2021. 9p.

Vermont Crime Analysis Using National Incident Based Reporting System (NIBRS) Data on Property Crime, 2015-2019 

By Megan Novak

Property offenses refer to crimes in which the object is “to obtain money, property, or some other benefit” (NIBRS User Manual, p. 9).1 Between 2015 and 2019, property offenses accounted for 70.88% of all crimes committed in Vermont. Given the prevalence of property offenses, criminal justice stakeholders and legislatures have a vested interest in monitoring trends related to these types of crime. The National Incident Based Reporting System (NIBRS) is a data source in which law enforcement record information about 26 property offenses. Annual reports will monitor Vermont’s NIBRS data for trends related to the number of incidents each year, types and number of offenses committed, victim and offender demographics, and arrestee information. 

Montpelier, VT: Crime Research Group, 2021. 13p.

Vermont Crime Analysis Using National Incident Based Reporting System (NIBRS) Data Top Five Crimes by County 

By Christopher C. Louras 

As part of Crime Research Group’s (CRG) stakeholder engagement process associated with the National Incident Based Reporting System (NIBRS) data-driven Vermont Crime Analysis project, CRG’s law enforcement partners asked: “How do our agencies spend our time? And to what offenses do we respond?” This report seeks to use NIBRS data to help Vermont’s state, county, and municipal policing agencies answer those questions. This report will delve into the most common reported offenses within the state and the individual counties, which law enforcement agencies respond to the reported crimes, and the distribution of the offenses in individual counties. Given that most of Vermont is comprised of rural areas, an aggregate view of the data on offenses committed in the state might be skewed by more urbanized areas like Burlington. As such, this report will examine the top five offenses reported in each county and will include a list of the top ten crimes. A county-level examination can help inform how law enforcement agencies and policymakers develop strategies to address each jurisdiction’s particular needs. This report by no means describes all the incidents to which law enforcement responds. NIBRS data captures crimes while quality of life incidents such as noise complaints, issues with animals, and suspicious activity, etc., are not captured in NIBRS data. Once Vermont law enforcement are all using the new computer aided dispatch/records management system (CAD/RMS), the quality-of-life incidents will be available for a more comprehensive review as to how law enforcement spends their time.

Montpelier, VT: Crime Research Group, 2021. 33p.

Vermont Crime Analysis Using National Incident-Based Reporting System (NIBRS) Data Review of Day of Week and Time of Day

By Christopher Louras

A series of interviews with criminal justice stakeholders conducted by Crime Research Group (CRG) in 2020 concluded that policymakers at both the state and local levels rely on access to accurate data to fully understand the scope of criminal incidents that occur within Vermont generally and within communities specifically. Without timely and accurate information, those policymakers recognize the inherent challenge in developing both short- and long-term effective strategies to address the needs of the constituencies they serve. To that end, this report analyzes five years of National Incident Based Reporting System (NIBRS) data for incident trends related to law enforcement agencies’ recording day(s) of the week and time of day for criminal events. While this study by no means provides a comprehensive summary of how law enforcement agencies spend their time in response to calls for service, it provides a glimpse into one critical component, when crimes occur and/or are recorded within Vermont’s data systems, that is needed to effectively and efficiently serve the public. 

Montpelier, VT: Crime Research Group, 2021. 11p.

Vermont's National Criminal Justice Reform Project Data Integration Report (2022) 

Within the state of Vermont, there is a history of following a traditional approach of relying on transaction- based information systems for data capture and reporting. This model relies on disparate silos of data and functionality, resulting in numerous problems ranging from the inability to access the right data to lengthy delays in obtaining much needed data for analysis and decision making. This perpetuates inefficiencies and compromises the effectiveness of criminal justice practitioners as they try to navigate these systems. Obtaining relevant data in Vermont can also be challenging due to a lack of information-sharing or the inability to share data. Not only are there challenges in identifying data but there are also nuances in data fields that make it difficult and, in some cases, harmful to draw conclusions from the data. For example, it is harmful to assume that a defendant intended to avoid justice in the case of failure to appear, when in actuality the defendant incarcerated at the time of the hearing. The Data Integration Planning Process The National Criminal Justice Reform Project (NCJRP) helped focus the process on strategic planning that furthered the integration of data systems and the use of measurable, high fidelity evidence-based programs. The long-term vision of this effort has been to develop a data system that allows data sharing and the integration of disparate information technology systems between and among all partners across the criminal justice system in the state. Such a system would provide practitioners at all levels with a comprehensive set of query and analytics tools for improved decision making. Foundational to this work is the need for access to integrated data from criminal justice and human services. Access to integrated data is critical for the decision-making processes and for measuring the results being achieved. Currently the data systems are siloed with some data flowing through one system to the next. (See AttachmentA) Technology is needed that is scalable to all systems within the Vermont criminal justice system, allowing for the comprehensive collection and assessment of data across the criminal justice processes. Through the NCJRP, the Advisory Committee recognized the importance of including data from other agencies beyond that of law enforcement, including courts and corrections. They identified the need to engage stakeholders, conduct a thorough technology and systems assessment, develop a comprehensive strategic plan, and establish a governance structure and staffing to oversee this work. The long-term vision is to have a single point of reference for the integration of all criminal justice data in Vermont. A system is needed that provides query capabilities, as well as system integration services, allowing for the use of a single, open-source standards-based data portal to facilitate state-wide justice information sharing. The next steps called for bringing the criminal justice community together to develop a strategy that looked beyond the NCJRP. To do this, the NCJRP technical assistance team engaged SEARCH, the premiere justice sharing organization, to help with operationalizing the vision. To help convey the complexity and number of software systems involved in the various functions and roles of the stakeholders expecting to be integrated, Attachment B exists as a flowchart representation overlayed with the software engaged at each phase of the process. Three objectives were identified: 1. To develop and deliver a data infrastructure implementation plan and framework for strengthening governance and multi-agency information sharing among criminal justice and other stakeholders with an initial focus on racial disparities. 2. To establish a process to routinely communicate stakeholder technology plans, changes to information sharing needs, policies and practices, and capabilities and gaps. These activities will promote coordination and integration solutions that collectively enhance strategic policy and operational decision making among justice partners within the state. 3. To establish a consensus among partners to define the relevance, need, purpose, participating agencies, objectives, and responsibilities of the governance structure. Identify leadership, support, and resources to effectively manage progress toward the defined objectives. In 2019, the Vermont Department of Public Safety (DPS), as outlined in their Modernization Plan, was in the process of implementing a new computer-aided dispatch and records management system (CAD/RMS) for all law enforcement agencies within the state. This would allow more data to be collected and stored at DPS and help ensure the data is collected effectively and integrated with other systems within the criminal justice system. To further the data integration work, the Vermont NCJRP team proposed utilizing the funds initially allocated for personnel to support a position within the Agency of Digital Services (ADS). Scheduling meetings, agenda/minutes preparation and distribution, managing deliverables, and participating in committee meetings all takes time and effort – resources which most stakeholders had very little to spare. The support and management function of this initiative was a key component to maintain the project’s initial momentum and continue making progress toward the objectives. 

Montpelier, VT: Crime Research Group, 2022. 27p.

Multimedia Forensics

Edited by Husrev Taha Sencar, Luisa Verdoliva, Nasir Memon

Media forensics has never been more relevant to societal life. Not only media content represents an ever-increasing share of the data traveling on the net and the preferred communications means for most users, it has also become integral part of most innovative applications in the digital information ecosystem that serves various sectors of society, from the entertainment, to journalism, to politics. Undoubtedly, the advances in deep learning and computational imaging contributed significantly to this outcome. The underlying technologies that drive this trend, however, also pose a profound challenge in establishing trust in what we see, hear, and read, and make media content the preferred target of malicious attacks. In this new threat landscape powered by innovative imaging technologies and sophisticated tools, based on autoencoders and generative adversarial networks, this book fills an important gap. It presents a comprehensive review of state-of-the-art forensics capabilities that relate to media attribution, integrity and authenticity verification, and counter forensics. Its content is developed to provide practitioners, researchers, photo and video enthusiasts, and students a holistic view of the field.

Singapore: Springer Nature 2022, 490p.

Knife Crime Statistics: England and Wales

By Grahame Allen, Helen Wong

Knife-related crime (knife crime) is a crime involving an object with a blade or sharp instrument. Knife crime data is published by the Office for National Statistics (ONS), government departments, police forces and the NHS. This briefing focuses on knife crime statistics for England and Wales. Some of the statistics go up to March 2024, whereas others only go up to March 2023. Further information on knife crime in England and Wales: possession offences, rules for retailers and efforts to prevent serious violence can be found in the Library briefing: Knives, offensive weapons and serious violence

Offences involving a knife The ONS publishes data on crimes recorded by police involving a knife or sharp instrument for a selection of serious violent offences. In the year ending March 2024, there were around 50,500 offences involving a sharp instrument in England and Wales (excluding Greater Manchester). This was 4.4% higher than in 2022/23 and 2.8% lower than in 2019/20.

Homicide offences In the year ending March 2023, Home Office data shows there were 244 homicides (the killing of one person by another) using a sharp instrument, including knives and broken bottles. This meant sharp instruments were used in 41% of the 594 homicides that occurred in England and Wales in 2022/23. Knife crime by police force area ONS data shows that in 2023/24, West Midlands Police recorded the highest rate of 178 offences per 100,000 population. In contrast, Dyfed-Powys Police recorded the lowest rate of 29 offences per 100,000 population. Proven offences and offenders Sentencing statistics from the Ministry of Justice show that in the year ending March 2023, there were almost 18,500 cautions and convictions made for possession of a knife or offensive weapon. Juveniles (aged 10 to 17) were the offenders in around 17.3% of cases. Hospital admissions Police and courts crime data depends on offences being reported to the authorities; this won’t capture all instances of knife crime because some offences may not be reported. It is therefore useful to supplement this information with alternative sources such as NHS hospital data. Data from NHS Digital shows there were 3,900 “hospital episodes” recorded in English hospitals in 2023/24 due to assault by a sharp object. This was a 3.3% increase compared 2022/23, and a 7% increase compared to 2014/15. Scotland and Northern Ireland The data above are for England and Wales. Data for Scotland on the number of crimes involving the possession of an article with a blade or point can be found in table A8 of the Recorded Crime in Scotland 2023-24 publication. Table 7 of Homicide in Scotland 2023-24 shows the victims of homicide by main method of killing, including those where a sharp instrument was used.

Statistics on knife crime in Northern Ireland can be found in the latest Police Recorded Crime Statistics Monthly update from the Police Service of Northern Ireland.

London: House of Commons Library, 2025. 30p.

Predictors for Recurrence of Drug Use Among Males on Probation for Methamphetamine Use in Japan: A One-Year Follow-Up Study

By Ayumi Takano, Kunihiko Takahashi, Tatsuhiko Anzai, Takashi Usami, Shiori Tsutsumi, Yuka Kanazawa, Yousuke Kumakura, Toshihiko Matsumoto

Background: Methamphetamine use is related to severe health, social, and criminal challenges. However, there is limited evidence regarding the factors associated with the recurrence of drug use among individuals who have used methamphetamine, particularly within populations involved in the criminal justice system. This study aimed to identify predictors of illicit drug use at a one-year follow-up among males in Japan who have used methamphetamine and are involved in the criminal justice system. Methods: The study participants were adult males on probation due to methamphetamine use or possession and were involved in a community-based program. The participants were recruited early in their probation period and participated in telephone-based surveys conducted by mental health center staff. We analyzed one-year follow-up data to investigate the recurrence rate of illicit drug use and associated risk factors using multiple logistic regression. Results: Out of 234 participants, 27 (11.5%) used illicit drugs during the one-year follow-up period. After adjusting for demographic characteristics, severity of drug use, type of probation, and use of treatment for substance use disorders, the use of social welfare services (OR = 2.78) and a lack of trustworthy relationships (OR = 3.17) were significantly associated with recurrence of illicit drug use. Conclusions: This study suggested that individuals facing challenges in maintaining stable living conditions and building trustworthy relationships were more likely to return to drug use early in their probation period. Comprehensive and tailored support focused on social stabilization and relationship-building is required to prompt recovery in males who have experienced methamphetamine use.

Drug and Alcohol Dependence Reports, (2024)

Knives, Offensive Weapons and Serious Violence

By William Downs

The Labour government has committed to halving knife crime in a decade.

This briefing provides an overview of legislation concerning knives and offensive weapons, and the approaches taken by the police and other agencies to prevent serious violence in England and Wales.

What are knife crime offences? It is a criminal offence to possess any knife or other bladed article in a public place, under section 139 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988. It is also a criminal offence to have an “offensive weapon” in any public place, under section 1 of the Prevention of Crime Act 1953. Both offences carry maximum penalties of up to four years’ imprisonment. It is a defence for someone to prove they have possessed a knife, bladed article or offensive weapon with “good reason or lawful authority”, though the legislation does not provide examples of what this means in practice. A court determines whether the explanation provided by a defendant amounts to lawful authority or reasonable excuse based on the specific circumstances of a case. It is also a criminal offence to possess any prohibited weapon under section 141 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 (as amended by the Offensive Weapons Act 2019). Prohibited weapons cannot be possessed anywhere, even in private, and are also illegal to hire, lend or manufacture. Like other possession offences, the maximum penalty is four years’ imprisonment. There are currently 20 prohibited weapons listed in secondary legislation under the Criminal Justice Act 1988 (Offensive Weapons) Order 1988, including a range of knives, bladed articles and other weapons. Under section 141(2) of the 1988 act, the government can introduce secondary legislation to add further weapons to this list. In 2024, the government added a new definition of “zombie-style” knives and machetes to the list, and launched a consultation on adding “ninja swords” to the list. Sentencing statistics from the Ministry of Justice shows that in the year ending March 2023, there were almost 18,500 cautions and convictions made for possession of a knife or offensive weapon. Juveniles (aged 10-17) were the offenders in around 17.3% of cases. Further data for England and Wales related to knife-related offences can be found in the Library briefing: Knife Crime Statistics: England and Wales.

London: House of Commons Library, 2025. 41p.

Crime Trends in U.S. Cities:Year-End 2024, Update January 2025

By Ernesto Lopez, Bobby Boxerman

Key Takeaways This study updates and supplements previous U.S. crime trends reports by the Council on Criminal Justice (CCJ) with data through December 2024. It examines yearly and monthly rates of reported crime for 13 violent, property, and drug offenses in 40 American cities that have consistently reported monthly data over the past six years. The 40 cities are not necessarily representative of all jurisdictions in the United States. Not all cities published data for each offense (see the Appendix for which cities reported which offenses); trends in offenses with fewer reporting cities should be viewed with caution. Not all crimes are reported to law enforcement. In addition, the data collected for this report are subject to revision by local jurisdictions. Reported levels of 12 of the 13 offenses covered in this report were lower in 2024 than in 2023; shoplifting was the only offense higher in 2024 compared to 2023. Looking at changes in violent offenses from 2023 to 2024, the number of homicides in the 29 study cities providing data for that crime was 16% lower, representing 631 fewer homicides. There were 4% fewer reported aggravated assaults, 15% fewer gun assaults, 6% fewer sexual assaults, and 4% fewer domestic violence incidents last year than in 2023. Robbery fell by 10% while carjackings (a type of robbery) decreased by 32%. Motor vehicle theft had been on the rise from the summer of 2020 through 2023, but that trend reversed last year; there were 24% fewer motor vehicle thefts in 2024 than in 2023. Reports of residential burglaries (-13%), nonresidential burglaries (-6%), larcenies (-5%), and drug offenses (-3%) all decreased in 2024 compared to 2023. But rates of reported shoplifting, a crime that has received extensive attention from the media and policymakers, increased by 14% over the same period. Examining trends over a longer timeframe, most violent crimes are at or below levels seen in 2019, the year prior to the onset of the COVID pandemic and racial justice protests of 2020. There were 6% fewer homicides in the study cities in 2024 than in 2019. Similarly, sexual assault (-26%), domestic violence (-11%), and robbery (-19%) were lower in 2024 than in 2019. In contrast, aggravated assaults (+4%), gun assaults (+5%), and carjackings (+25%) were higher in 2024 than in 2019. Homicide rates in some high-homicide cities, including Baltimore, Detroit, and St. Louis, have dropped even further, returning to the levels of 2014, when national homicide rates were at historic lows. Rates in other cities have largely returned to pre-pandemic levels. Property crime trends have been mixed over the last five years. There were fewer residential burglaries (-38%) and larcenies (-12%) in 2024 than in 2019, but more nonresidential burglaries (+12%) and shoplifting (+1%). Motor vehicle thefts were higher by half (+53%) during the timeframe. Drug offenses in 2024 were 28% below 2019 levels. While these crime reductions are promising, the United States still experiences high levels of homicide compared to other industrialized nations, and progress should not slow local, state, federal, and community efforts to adopt comprehensive, evidencebased strategies to reduce violence. Furthermore, researchers should redouble their efforts to identify how broad behavioral shifts and other societal dynamics may affect trends.

Washington, DC: Council on Criminal Justice, 2025. 39p.