By Barna Konkolÿ Thege|, Chaz Robitaille, Lujayn Mahmoud, Eden A. Kinzel, Rameen Qamar, Jamie Hartmann‐Boyce, Oliia Choy

Aggressive/antisocial behaviors in children and youth may result in impairments in family, social, or academic functioning and lead to long‐term negative consequences for both the individual and society as a whole. The potential of healthy dietand nutritional supplements to reduce aggression and antisocial behavior is an active area of study in nutritional mental health sciences. The goal of this systematic review is to (1) investigate the effectiveness/efficacy of nutritional interventions(dietary manipulation, fortification or supplementation) in reducing excessive aggression, antisocial behaviors, and criminal offending in children/youth (systematic review and meta‐analysis); and (2) provide an overview of implementation barriers and facilitators regarding nutritional interventions in children/youth (qualitative/narrative synthesis). After consulting theCampbell Collaboration's methodological guidelines, a comprehensive search for published and unpublished papers on controlled intervention studies was performed (up to February 26, 2024) using both electronic databases (MEDLINE,Embase, Cochrane Library, APA PsycInfo, Scopus, and the Allied and Complementary Medicine Database) and otherresources (e.g., Google Scholar, reference list of included studies and other reviews, websites of public health agencies). Thisstudy focuses on children and youth (up to the age of 24) presenting with an above‐average level of aggression/antisocial behavior. In terms of the intervention, we considered both dietary manipulation and nutritional supplementation with aduration long enough (minimum of 1 week) that a significant change in the individual's nutritional status could be expected.We included studies with a controlled design if, for outcomes, they reported on (1) behavioral‐level violence/aggression toward others in real‐life (non‐simulated) settings, (2) antisocial behaviors, or (3) criminal offending. Initial screening,checking for eligibility criteria, data extraction from, and risk of bias assessment for each eligible study were conducted independently by two reviewers. To perform the meta‐analysis, data from each original report were standardized(transformed into Hedges' g) so that results across studies could be meaningfully combined and interpreted. Data con-versions, computation of pooled effect sizes, and estimation of publication bias were conducted using the Comprehensive Meta‐analysis software (Version 4). Altogether, 51 reports (describing 50 individual studies) met our inclusion criteria, and72 effect sizes were extracted from these reports. Nutritional interventions with a broad target (e.g., broad‐spectrummicronutrient supplementation or general improvement in diet quality) had the most consistent and largest interventionThis is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits use, distribution and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.© 2025 The Author(s). Campbell Systematic Campbell Systematic Reviews, 2025; 21:e70059

Campbell Systematic Reviews, 2025; 21:e70059 1 of 42

By Luke Rodeheffer

Cybercrime is a growing global threat, causing trillions of dollars in economic damage annually. This report explores how Eastern Europe and Russia have become a significant hub for cybercriminal activity, fueled by historical legacies, economic disparities, and state connections.

The study outlines the key drivers of cybercrime in Russia and neighboring countries, including the rise of ransomware, the exploitation of geopolitical ‘grey zones’, and the blurred lines between hackers and state-sponsored cyber operations.

One of the most significant shifts analyzed in the report is the impact of the Russia-Ukraine war on cybercrime. As the war escalated, cybercriminal groups split along national lines, with some hackers supporting Russian intelligence while Ukrainian cybercriminals turned their efforts against Russia, engaging in financial fraud and targeted attacks.

Ransomware has emerged as the most profitable form of cybercrime in the region, overtaking other criminal activities like credit card fraud and botnet operations. Russian-speaking cybercriminals dominate the global ransomware industry, with an estimated 75% of ransomware revenue going to actors linked to the Russian-language underground. Despite international sanctions and takedown efforts, ransomware gangs have adapted, operating like structured organizations with management teams and even physical offices.

The report also highlights how cryptocurrencies are fueling cybercrime and helping Russia evade financial sanctions. Stolen funds from cyberattacks are laundered through unregulated crypto exchanges, allowing criminals to move money across borders undetected. At the same time, shell companies and illicit financial networks are being used to bypass restrictions imposed by Western governments, creating new challenges for global financial security.

Finally, the study explores the deepening relationship between cybercriminals and the Russian state. While organized cybercrime networks have traditionally operated independently, there is growing evidence that Russian intelligence agencies are leveraging these networks for espionage, cyberwarfare, and political influence operations. Hackers are increasingly targeting critical infrastructure, stealing data from adversaries, and assisting the state in strategic cyber campaigns.

This analysis provides detailed insights into how cybercrime has evolved, the future risks, and key policy recommendations. Understanding the ecosystem behind cyber threats is crucial for global security as cyber threats continue escalating.

Geneva, SWIT: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime. 2025. 44p.

was prepared by the Research and Trend Analysis Branch, Division for Policy Analysis and Public Affairs under the supervision of Angela Me, Chief, Research and Trend Analysis Branch.

Since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine by the Russian Federation in February 2022, the political economy of Ukraine has been profoundly transformed.1 The aggression affected both licit and illicit trade routes, disrupted criminal organizations, and spawned new forms of informal and illicit exchange at the frontline and in the rear of the country. It has also led to the emergence of new challenges, such as the development of new skills and technologies that could be exploited by transnational organized crime. This report aims to address the following overarching questions: how has the ongoing war against Ukraine affected organized crime and illicit markets in Ukraine, and what are the possible implications for the country, the region and the international community? These questions are addressed through research into the following six areas: • Organized crime structures and their evolution • Drug supply and demand, including production and trafficking • Online scams, and cyber and telephone fraud • Arms trafficking • Economic crime, including smuggling of cigarettes and custom fraud • Trafficking in persons • The facilitation of illegal exit and draft evasion To address the overarching research question about the effects of the war on organized crime and illicit markets, the chapters compare data for the pre-war and post-invasion periods. The report covers the period of January 2021 to June 2024, with background data for 2019-2020 and preceding periods where available and relevant, used for contextualization. It is based on desk research and in-country fieldwork, with analysis of publicly available official statistics and secondary literature, court decisions and key informant interviews. Field data collection and analysis were conducted from December 2023 to June 2024 (see Annex A for more details). The overall purpose of this research is to provide an evidence base to the government of Ukraine and national agencies involved in responding to organized crime, the United Nations (UN) and other international organizations, and other UN Member States, for countering crime-related challenges emerging out of the war against Ukraine. This research focuses on government-controlled parts of Ukraine. Consideration of alleged war crimes is outside the scope of this research.

Vienna: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2025. 81p.

By The Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime

Dnipro has long played a pivotal role in Ukraine’s political and economic development. Today, the city stands at another crossroads, as a key site for understanding how organized crime has evolved under the pressures of war. This report offers a detailed account of the city’s criminal landscape, drawing on field research, interviews, and open-source analysis.

The full-scale Russian invasion in 2022 has fuelled existing trends in Dnipro, a city already familiar with conflict since 2014. Dnipro’s proximity to the front line and its importance as a logistics and military hub have intensified its role in illicit markets, particularly in arms and drug trafficking. The city has also become one of the country’s most important bases for scam call centres, with around 30 000 people employed in operations that target victims across Russia, the EU and Ukraine itself. Many of these centres reportedly operate under the protection of law enforcement and are connected to organized crime groups. Meanwhile, corruption, which initially declined after the 2022 invasion, has made a strong comeback. Major procurement scandals, shrinking transparency and barriers to civil society participation in budget oversight suggest a renewed climate of impunity.

Dnipro’s drug economy remains resilient, with dealers reportedly targeting military personnel as clients. One trafficking group dismantled in 2024 had profits exceeding UAH10 million per month. Cases also show soldiers carrying drugs to the front or being recruited into distribution networks. While not unique to Dnipro, the city’s combination of trafficking infrastructure and military presence presents specific risks.

At the same time, the saturation of illicit weapons in the region has created a volatile environment. While organized crime groups generally avoid arms dealing, the volume of illegal stockpiles, trophy weapons and “contact-free” transactions makes Dnipro a critical node for monitoring arms flows returning from the front.

The city’s control over illicit flows —from drugs and weapons to extortion and fraud— is currently in flux. Historically shaped by figures who straddled the worlds of politics, business and crime, Dnipro has seen many of its key power brokers either exiled, imprisoned or under investigation. This has created a vacuum in which no single actor dominates, leaving the city open to new contests for control. At the same time, groups from Dnipro have spread across Ukraine, looking for safer places to work, including Odesa and Kyiv, raising the risk of increasing crime in those cities and beyond.

The report concludes that the city’s trajectory will depend on shifting political allegiances, the outcome of the war, and the extent to which Kyiv can reassert control. With national-level implications, Dnipro should be a key focus for any efforts to understand or disrupt Ukraine’s evolving organized crime landscape.

Geneva, SWIT: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime. 2025. 31p.

By The Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime

As Ukraine continues to resist Russia’s full-scale invasion, the port city of Odesa presents a paradox: while under frequent aerial assault, many aspects of life appear remarkably normal. This report explores how organized crime has not only survived but thrived in one of the country’s most strategically significant cities.

Odesa’s relative stability, growing economy, and reopened ports have created an oasis for criminal economies, guided by one rule: anyone can do business, as long as they do not interfere with others. This ‘free city’ model has allowed Odesa to emerge as a hub for scam call centres, synthetic drug production and tax evasion surrounding lucrative grain exports.

The study delves into a troubling overlap between legitimate business and criminal enterprise. For instance, the booming grain trade – critical for Ukraine’s economy – is plagued by fraud, shell companies and collusion with sanctioned actors. At the heart of this is the use of cash to conduct large transactions, depriving the Ukrainian state of an estimated $3 billion between May 2022 and May 2024.

Meanwhile, Odesa’s role in conscript smuggling has grown as draft evasion surges, driving prices higher. Call centres have become one of the city’s most profitable illicit ventures, targeting victims across Europe and beyond. Some rogue actors from the city’s volunteer units have also helped facilitate the resurgence of the night-time vice economy, moving drugs and sex workers to clients during curfew.

As Ukraine looks to reconstruction, the report warns that Odesa is at risk of becoming a template for criminal capture of public funds. Billions of hryvnias in aid are earmarked for rebuilding infrastructure and cultural landmarks in the city, but without effective safeguards, these funds may fall into the hands of corrupt networks.

This report offers insights into how illicit economies evolve during conflict and why stronger responses are needed now to prevent long-term damage.

Geneva: the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime 2025. 31p.

By the Little Hoover Commission

The state should prioritize data collection and collaboration with research institutions as it seeks to understand and combat retail theft in the long term, the Little Hoover Commission concluded in a new report, Retail Theft: A Data-Driven Response for California.

The report was prompted by a request from 66 members of the legislature to study issues surrounding retail theft. The report notes that since the Legislature and the voters are now considering changes to the penal code sections addressing retail theft, the Commission’s recommendations focus on long-term improvements in the way the state reports and assesses retail theft and law enforcement’s response.

In recent years, alarming videos showing brazen thefts of commercial property have circulated on social media, increasing public concern. Some businesses have cited theft as a reason for closing stores. These crimes also burden the criminal justice system, using limited resources that could be redirected toward more severe crimes.

Looking at available data, the Commission found that, despite a recent uptick, reported retail theft remains at roughly the same level as during the 2010s and lower than it was in earlier decades. Like many crimes, retail theft is undoubtedly underreported, but the report notes that by its nature, the level of underreporting is difficult to measure.

The Commission concluded that more detailed crime data is needed for policymakers to craft an evidence-based response. The Commission commended the Department of Justice for its existing data initiatives, and recommend they be expanded in consultation with experts. At a minimum, data should include information on crime statistics, demographics, law enforcement response times, prosecution and adjudication data, and rehabilitation, reentry, and recidivism data. In addition to data collection, the Commission recommended that the state partner with California universities and other nonpartisan research institutions to study preventative measures, rates of underreporting, economic impact, and drivers of public perception.

“Never was the aphorism, ‘You can’t manage what you don’t measure,’ more true than when discussing retail theft. We can’t fully comprehend the effects of retail theft, or address its causes, without detailed data. As it now stands, necessary data is missing,” said Commission Chair Pedro Nava. “There are many potential partners who can collaborate to remedy the information gap. Working with stakeholders, California can fund coordinated studies and data collection efforts to better understand the complexities of these crimes.”

“California has the opportunity to join efforts with some of the best researchers in the nation as it navigates the issue of retail theft,” said Vice Chair Anthony Cannella. “With a more complete picture of how retail theft is impacting the state, the Governor and Legislature can make evidence-based decisions on how to respond effectively.”

Sacramento: Little Hoover Commission, 2024. 35p.

By Cecilia Farfán-Méndez, Karen Bozicovich and Pier Angelli De Luca

This article presents the results of a pilot test conducted with a group of experts on existing challenges and emerging and future threats that the region faces regarding illicit trade in firearms and ammunition. The pilot test was carried out within the framework of designing a methodology for the Hemispheric Study on Illicit Trafficking of Firearms and Ammunition, mandated by paragraph 66 of Resolution 2945 (XLIX-O/19) on Advancing Hemispheric Security: A Multidimensional Approach, passed on the 49th Regular Session of the General Assembly of the Organization of American States (OAS). This mandate falls under the responsibility of the Secretariat for Multidimensional Security, specifically the Department against Transnational Organized Crime and the Department of Public Security. The pilot test was conducted by the latter. The findings from the pilot test reveal a possible road to follow. Out of the 95 challenges identified, 39 were classified as “high priority.” Among these, challenges requiring low resource investment and capable of being implemented in the short to medium term—while producing effective and tangible results—were identified. On the other hand, preventing and mitigating the identified threats will require, mainly, efforts in the public sphere, including coordination among state institutions and branches of government, intersectoral coordination (especially with manufacturing, importing/ exporting, intermediary, transport, and technology companies), and international cooperation with multilateral organizations and between countries. The lack of secure and protected information generation, analysis, and exchange was identified in at least four of the seven dimensions into which the threats were grouped. This finding is also positive for states, as anticipating such information related threats could be achieved in the short and medium term, and in some cases without the need for signification budget modifications.

Washington, DC: Organization of American States - OAS, 2025. 18p.

Compiled by Julia Stanyard, Michael McLaggan, Aron Hyman, Julian Rademeyer, Jenni Irish-Qhobosheane, Matt Herbert, Jason Eligh, Marcena Hunter and Livia Wagner

East and Southern Africa (ESA) is a pivotal node for organized crime, connecting regional criminal markets to global networks. From the shores of Somalia to border crossings and international air and seaports in Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, South Africa and Namibia, the region serves as a thriving source, hub and conduit for a wide variety of illegal commodities.

For example, heroin trafficked from Afghanistan via Pakistan and Iran is shipped across the Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean by dhow before it is deposited in northern Mozambique and Tanzania. There, it splits into two primary supply lines: one of higher purity bound for international markets in Europe and Australia, and another that is significantly adulterated and consumed in towns and villages across ESA.

Rhino horn is smuggled by air from Johannesburg and Addis Ababa, routed through Dubai and Doha and sometimes Paris and London to throw off law enforcement. Ivory departs in shipping containers from ports in Dar es Salaam, Nampula and Durban, ending up in Singapore, Sihanoukville, Huangpu and Haiphong. Gold mined illegally in Zimbabwe’s mineral-rich Kwekwe gold fields and deep shaft mines in the towns of Krugersdorp, Carletonville, Klerksdorp and Welkom on South Africa’s Vaal Reef is processed and eventually laundered through Dubai. Gold is smuggled by the tonne into countries along the strife-torn Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)’s eastern border and laundered through Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda, Tanzania and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). In northern Mozambique and South Africa’s KwaZulu-Natal province, Islamic State-aligned insurgents and supporters have been implicated in criminal economies, gold smuggling, and kidnapping and extortion schemes to raise funds.

In addition to local criminal actors, the region has attracted a coterie of international criminal players. For instance, networks from China, Pakistan and Iran are known to interface with African intermediaries for drug trafficking (drug precursor chemicals, methamphetamine and heroin) and wildlife smuggling (notably of abalone and ivory). In Southern Africa, Nigerian and Congolese syndicates, often operating from hubs such as Johannesburg, coordinate regional drug distribution and financial fraud schemes while also connecting to global diaspora networks.

Yet this chaotic mixture of different criminal commodities and networks is, in many ways, shaped by geography and coalesces around a spider’s web of regional hubs and economic centres. Environmental, social and regional dynamics in hinterlands allow warlords and smugglers to thrive, while bustling trade hubs provide cover for clandestine flows and access to key transport links. In urban slums, neglected towns and remote rural communities, criminal actors and parallel illicit economies rapidly fill the void left by an often absent state. Ancient trade and migratory routes over mountains and along rivers and coastlines that long pre-date colonial borders allow for the largely untrammelled movement of people and goods, both licit and illicit. This means many of these trafficking networks and criminal groups are found concentrated in certain illicit hubs.

The challenges in countering this are enormous. For example, Bole International Airport in Ethiopia, a key smuggling hub for extractives, wildlife products, people and drugs, handles more than 24 million passengers, 100,000 flights, 50 million pieces of luggage and around 226,000 tonnes of cargo every year. Yet it lacks sufficient screening equipment, staff and sniffer dogs. The South African port of Durban, notorious for its inefficiency, corruption and drug trafficking, handles around 60% of South Africa’s container traffic: 2.9 million 20-foot-equivalent units per year. Only a fraction can feasibly be scanned or searched.

This report aims to define where the illicit hubs of the region are and explain which factors shape the geography of organized crime in ESA across four main markets: drugs, wildlife, extractives, and human trafficking and smuggling. These illicit markets are often looked at in isolation by enforcement bodies, policymakers and analysts. While this is often justified, as it means action can be taken against a particular form of illicit trade, looking at a range of illicit markets together can better demonstrate where convergence occurs and illuminate the common factors that shape the geographical concentrations of these criminal markets.

Geneva, SWIT: Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime, 2025. 86p.

By Antonio Mazzitelli

According to the US Government, over 60 percent of the cocaine intended for the US market transit through Central American. Since the early 1990’s, Colombian and Mexican drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) established logistics bases both on the Atlantic and Pacific coasts of Central America, facilitating the movements of large shipments of cocaine. In establishing these routes, the DTOs took advantage of a number of local enabling factors. Among them, the preexistence of well-established smuggling networks, the weakness of law enforcement and judicial structures in most countries in the region, and the overall culture of lawless and impunity resulting from the civil conflicts that marked the paths to democracy of some of these nations. The tough campaigns launched against DTOs by the governments of Colombia and Mexico during the past eight years, coupled with the gradual evolution of both local and foreign criminal organizations (COs) involved in (but not exclusively) cocaine trafficking, seem to have further worsened the situation in Central America. Old styled DTOs and local “transportistas” are increasingly challenged by new criminal groups, usually emerging from the military and claiming specific territories. These new groups are exerting a capillary control over all types of criminal activity taking place in the territories under their control. The confrontation between two different criminal “cultures”-- the first, business oriented; the second one, territorial oriented-- constitutes a serious threat not only to the security of citizens, but also to the very consolidation of balanced democratic rule in the region. Mexican DTOs and COs poses a serious threat to Central American, if left unchecked. Responses by national institutions, assisted by their main international partners, will have to be carefully tailored according to the specific feature of the predominant foreign criminal organization operating in its territory. In the case of DTOs, interventions will have to privilege investments in the areas of financial investigations, specialized prosecution and international cooperation, as well as anti-corruption initiatives. In combating COs (Zetas type), intervention will have to privilege restructuring, professionalization and deployment of local police corps that would then be capable of controlling the territory and preventing the infiltration of external criminal actors. In both cases, governments need to strengthen the intelligence capacity of law enforcement agencies allowing the early identification of the likely threat, its analysis and its subsequent removal. National law enforcement and judicial efforts should also be geared toward the creation of a sincere and mutual beneficial international cooperation (both investigative and judicial) that is built not only on common objectives, but also on the use of common investigative instruments and harmonized procedures.

Miami: Florida International University, Western Hemisphere security Analysis Center, 2011. 49p

By the European Union Drugs Agency (EUDA)

A large variety of individuals, many of them designated as high-value targets, groups and networks shape the complex supply of cocaine to the EU. Criminal networks involved in cocaine trafficking are highly resilient, with some operating across several continents. For example, some locations in the Middle East, such as the United Arab Emirates, have emerged as a safe haven for top-level organisers of cocaine trafficking to the EU. Further, criminal networks originating from the EU or the EU’s neighbourhood have also become established in key locations in South America, or maintain direct contacts with suppliers. Trusted members of the criminal networks are sent to arrange and supervise these shipments.

Wholesalers are involved in the acquisition, storage and distribution of cocaine to regional and local markets. Local criminal networks then usually take care of mid-level or retail distribution or both. However, some Albanian-speaking criminal networks have made successful attempts to apply an end-to-end business model from producing or transit countries in South America to retail distribution within the EU and beyond (see Box Cocaine trafficking by criminal networks from Western Balkans). This includes financing, access to suppliers in the producing or transit countries, transportation, extraction, storage, distribution and money collection.

The substantial profits associated with the cocaine trade have attracted numerous EU-based criminal networks to become involved. Several of these operate in the main EU distribution hubs and also organise shipments from countries of origin and transit to the EU. The majority of the criminal networks reported to Europol have been active for more than 10 years, with some actors having played a key role for decades, such as Italian networks, while new players are on the lookout for a bigger share of the cocaine market, such as Albanian, Belgian, British, Dutch, French, Irish, Moroccan, Serbian, Spanish and Turkish networks (UNODC and Europol, 2021).

Lisbon: EUDA, 2023. 11p.

By Anthea McCarthy-Jones and Mark Turner

The growth of transnational organised crime has been widely perceived as a major national and international security threat. The growth has been facilitated by globalisation, in which people, money, information and goods flow more easily and rapidly across international borders. To take advantage of the illicit transnational business opportunities, crime groups have restructured from hierarchical organisations to more loosely structured configurations known as ‘dark networks.’ Crucial to the success of these networks are brokers, who enable exchanges between previously disconnected actors. In this paper, we present a new way in which to understand the role of the broker in illicit networks by distinguishing how brokers adopt different strategies that ultimately have a transactional or transformational impact on the networks they serve.

Journal of Illicit Economies and Development, 5(1): pp. 58–69.

By Raúl Zepeda Gil

Violence rising in Latin America since the early 1990s has puzzled media, policymakers and academia. Characterising high scales of violence in non-political confrontations has been one of the main challenges. The main argument of this essay is that the hybrid criminal nature of violence in Latin America by non-state organisations has pushed the discussion to several misinterpretations and conceptual stretching that produces fog rather than clarity. Instead, this essay proposes a conceptof criminal war that can capture the complex nature of violence in Latin America by drawing convergences and divergences from diverse fields of literature and confronting usual mischaracterisations in current Latin American research.

Third World QuarTerly2023, Vol. 44, No. 4, 776–794

By Nynke M. D. Niezink · Paolo Campana

This study examines the mechanisms underpinning the emergence of violence among individuals in the organized crime milieu. Methods : Relying on criminal event data recorded by a UK Police Force, we apply a longitudinal network approach to study violent interactions among offenders. The data span the period from 2000 to 2016 and include 6,234 offenders and 23,513 organized crime related events. Instead of aggregating these data over time, we use a relational event-based approach to take into consideration the order of events. We employ an actor-oriented framework to model offenders' victim choices in 156 violent events in the OC milieu. Results - We fnd that the choice of offenders to target a particular victim is strongly affected by their mutual history. A violent act is often preceded by a previous act of violence, both in the form of repeated violence and reciprocated violence. We show that violence is strongly associated with prior co-offending turning sour. We uncover a strong efect for previous harassment as a retaliation cum escalation mechanism. Finally, we fnd evidence of conflicts within organized crime groups and of violence being directed to offenders with the same ethnic background. Conclusions - Relational effects on victimization are consistently stronger than the effects of individual characteristics. Therefore, from a policy perspective, we believe that relational red fags (or risk factors) should play a more central role. A focus on harassment could be valuable in the development of an early intervention strategy.

Journal of Quantitative Criminology (2023) 39:655–678

Edited by Armon J. Tamatea, Andrew J. Day and & David J. Cooke

Preventing Prison Violence introduces the idea of ‘prison ecologies’ – a multi-layered perspective to understanding prison violence as a ‘product’ of human, environment (social and physical), systemic, and societal influences – and how an ecological approach is helpful to prevention efforts.

Interpersonal violence is a global concern and a significant cause of death around the world. In prisons, the human, financial, and health burden of violence presents a significant social issue – as well as a ‘wicked problem’ that does not permit of simplistic solutions. Recent innovations in data capture means that questions about violence, gang-affiliations, and prisons that could not be answered previously can now be explored. The central theme of this book is that prisons are ‘ecologies’ – spaces where people, resources, and the built environment are interrelated – and that violence is a product of a complex of interpersonal and environmental factors that increase the likelihood of assault – but also provide opportunities for solutions. Drawing on psychology, geography, indigenous knowledge, gang culture, and predictive modelling, this book expands beyond the conventional individual-focused ‘assessment-intervention-prevention’ approach to research in this field, towards a holistic and ecological way of thinking that recognises individual, organisational, and cultural factors, as well as the role of the physical environment itself in the facilitation and prohibition of aggression.

Providing a comprehensive resource for those who are interested in making prisons safer; firmly based in contemporary research and theory, Preventing Prison Violence will be of great interest to students and scholars of Penology, Violence and Forensic Psychology, as well as to professionals working in criminal justice settings.

London; New York: Routledge, 2023.

By Shadd Maruna

Early desistance research identified a key role for redemption scripts in the process of desisting from crime. This research emerged in an incredibly punitive environment at the turn of the century, when core beliefs about human redeemability were being challenged by popular and academic theories about incorrigible predators incapable of change. Desistance research made a profound impact, inspiring academic scholarship and changes to the policy and practice of reintegration. However, desistance research can also be accused of numerous crimes, as well, ranging from the adoption of an overly individualistic framing to the usurpation of the voices of research contributors. Fortunately, redemption is possible. A new generation of desistance theory and research now explicitly addresses the political and cultural factors impacting the desistance process and proposes that these hardened prejudices will only be changed by supporting a social movement led by and for system-impacted people. With their proven ability to inspire hope and promote action, redemption scripts may, again, be a key tool in such a movement.

Criminology, Volume63, Issue1

February 2025

Pages 5-25

By Lisa Blaydes, James D. Fearon, and Mae MacDonald

Violence against women occurs at high rates in societies across the world. The most common form is intimate partner violence, abuse perpetrated against a spouse or intimate relationship partner. We present a household bargaining model that seeks to clarify causal mechanisms and to identify key pathways by which economic, political, legal, and cultural factors external to households influence domestic abuse rates, gender equity within relationships, and rates of relationship dissolution. We relate key parameters to factors that differ across societies and over time, including economic opportunities for women, laws that criminalize domestic abuse, and social norms associated with gender equality. We review research associated with these topics to establish what we know and do not know about violence against women in households. While much of this literature is outside of the field of political science, we highlight opportunities for political scientists to contribute to our understanding of how and why domestic violence persists in the world today.

Annu. Rev. Political Sci. 2025. 28:351–74

By Edelyn Verona and Bryanna Fox

The United States has one of the highest rates of correctional supervision among all nations in the world, reflecting the disproportionate incarceration of racial minorities and economically disadvantaged groups. Scholars have emphasized the role of structural factors and governmental policies in longterm shifts in crime and incarceration. However, much of the psychological research on crime and antisocial behaviors has not deeply considered this broader context, focusing mostly on individual and proximal environmental risk factors. This article presents a novel synthesis of large cross-disciplinary literatures that have not been previously integrated. After a brief summary of dominant themes in psychological research on the topic, we review the strong evidence, primarily from fields outside of psychology, for structural forces that explain pathways into criminal justice involvement, independent of individual-level explanations. A broader ecological framework is outlined to help unconfound individual and structural influences, with the hope of motivating policy change that is evidence-based and equitable.

Annu. Rev. Clin. Psychol. 2025. 21:439–64

By Omar García-Ponce

The study of criminal violence has received increasing attention in political science over the past 15 years, as organized criminal groups have grown and diversified worldwide, unleashing unprecedented waves of violence. This article presents a critical assessment of the current state of political science scholarship on criminal violence. It discusses the sources and dynamics of organized criminal violence, emphasizing the reconceptualization of state–criminal group relationships in the literature, shifts in illegal markets, and the political incentives fueling criminal wars. It also examines how states and societies respond to criminal violence. State responses include punitive approaches, institutional reform, and community-based interventions, while societal responses can be examined through the lenses of exit (e.g., migration, disengagement), voice (e.g., political participation, collective resistance), and loyalty (i.e., compliance with state authorities or criminal groups). The article also addresses conceptual and methodological challenges, policy implications, and ethical considerations inherent in this field of study and identifies promising pathways for future research. 

Annu. Rev. Political Sci. 2025. 28:435–56 

By Katalin Parti

In an attempt to understand how differently fraud works depending on a victim’s age, we have examined the effects of situational (lifestyle-routine activities), self-control, and sociodemographic variables on scam victimization across age groups. The analysis was carried out on a national sample of 2,558 Americans, representative by age, sex, and race, and includes additional factors such as their education, living arrangement, employment, and propensity for reporting a crime or asking for help. The results substantiate research findings of the contribution of self-control and LRAT in predicting victimization in general but could not identify major situational and individual differences between older and younger Americans’ scam victimization. However, employment can function as a protective factor for older individuals in some online fraud scenarios. Furthermore, older adults show significantly more reluctance in asking for help or reporting than do younger ones. Future research must address these differences. The author also suggests developing specific variables for measuring how lifestyle-routine activity theory works in scam victimization.

International Journal of Cybersecurity Intelligence & Cybercrime: 5(3), 20-40

By Matthew La Lime

Black Axe’s violent organized criminal network undermines economic development and political reform within Nigeria while scamming victims abroad out of billions via cybercrime.

A 21-country INTERPOL initiative known as Operation Jackal III targeting Black Axe, the Nigerian organized crime group, led to the arrest of 300 suspects and the seizure of $3 million in assets in a sting operation culminating in July 2024. While a victory for law enforcement, the action is unlikely to make a dent in the operations of Black Axe, which has an estimated 30,000 members in dozens of countries and yearly proceeds estimated to exceed $5 billion.

First founded in 1977 at the University of Benin in Edo State as a pan-African Black Power student confraternity, Black Axe has since morphed into a sophisticated multinational criminal enterprise with cells in the United States, Canada, Italy, Brazil, Argentina, Ireland, the United Arab Emirates, South Africa, France, the United Kingdom, Spain, Portugal, and the Netherlands, among others. The organization also maintains a foothold in neighboring West African countries, such as Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire, and can be found operating as far afield as China, Japan, Malaysia, and Singapore.

The proceeds gained from cybercrime have spawned a complex web of money laundering networks spanning the globe.

Known for its violence and brutality in Nigeria, Black Axe members (referred to as Axemen) routinely engage in drug dealing, smuggling, kidnapping, and extortion. Axemen also compete over territory with rival criminal groups—like the Maphites, the Supreme Eiye Confraternity, and the Vikings—and are accused of perpetuating a culture of urban violence, political corruption, and juridical impunity. Nigeria recorded almost 6,000 gang-related deaths across 31 states from 2006 to 2021.

In its operations abroad, Black Axe members engage in crimes such as drug-trafficking, extortion, and sex worker management. The organization’s most profitable criminal enterprise, cybercrime, transcends geographic boundaries and is thought to have netted the organization tens of billions of dollars. Starting out as simple “Yahoo Boys” pulling advance-fee scams via email, many Black Axe members have grown into shrewd cybercriminals who specialize in defrauding businesses out of thousands if not millions of dollars. The proceeds gained from cybercrime have, in turn, spawned a complex web of money laundering networks spanning the globe.

Washington, DC: Africa Center for Strategic Studies, 2024. 8p.