By Jeff Shantz

Over the last few years there has been growing attention to and discussion of the so-called militarization of policing. Unfortunately, much of this discussion poses the militarization of policing as a recent phenomenon. This paper examines policing in Canada within the context of an ongoing military practice. It shows that policing was founded on a military basis and continues to be carried out on a military basis as exemplified in the more recent developments that have raised alarm about militarization. It raises the need for a retheorization of policing within the context of capitalist social struggles and highlights some instructive recent theoretical developments toward that end. Properly understanding the police in Canada can help to contextualize and challenge current responses that are limited to reforms for police (de-militarization, de-escalation, improved training, non-lethal weaponry, etc.) or which even allow for the expansion of policing (community policing, drones,

Theory in Action, Vol. 17, No. 3, July (©2024) DOI:10.3798/tia.1937-0237.2410

by Miriam Driessen '

Major new research on the way police in London use Stop and Search has highlighted significant levels of disproportionality in the way the power is used throughout the capital and presented solutions for how it can be addressed.

More than 150,000 Stop and Search interactions were analysed by the Mayor’s Office for Policing and Crime (MOPAC) and King’s College London who worked with community representatives and independent community voices to produce the largest-ever body of research on police use of Stop and Search.

Using new technology and innovative data science techniques, the research analysed every single stop and search conducted by the Met in 2023.

Our aim is to provide clear, practical insights to support evidence-based oversight and scrutiny in this important area.

Existing data and analytics from the report show:

The use of Stop and Search peaked in 2008/09 and has fallen significantly since then. The volume of stops conducted in March 2025 was 84.5% below the peak in year ending March 2009.

Disproportionality within Stop and Search is a long-standing concern in London and nationally. In England and Wales, Black individuals are four times more likely to be stopped and searched than White individuals - a comparable figure to London.

Public Voice data reveals 71% of Londoners believe the police should conduct Stop and Search - but that percentage has declined since 2020/21.

Black and disabled Londoners are more likely to report negative impacts of the encounter.

The overall quality of the Stop encounter is paramount, with wider links to trust and confidence.

London: The Mayor's Office for Policing and Crime (MOPAC), 2026.

By Michael R. Smith, Rob Tillyer, & John MacDonald

In January 2019, the City of Chicago entered into a policing Consent Decree in State ofIllinois v. City of Chicago, N.D. III. 17-cv-06260. The Consent Decree sets forth numerous requirements for the Chicago Police Department (CPD) to reform training, policies, and practices to ensure constitutional, effective, and transparent policing. The Consent Decree also requires data collection, analysis, and reporting to provide for ongoing, sustainable self-assessment and datadriven, evidence-based decision making by CPD leadership. In partial fulfillment of the requirements ofthe consent decree, researchers from the University of Texas at San Antonio and the University of Pennsylvania (Research Team) was engaged by the CPD and tasked with developing a best practice methodology for analyzing CPD Tactical Response Report (TRR) and related data for patterns and trends in force used against specific demographic groups in Chicago. The Proposed Methodology Report went through several drafts and was accepted by CPD and the Independent Monitoring Team (IMT) in its final form on August 15, 2024. The current report serves as the main analytic work product outlined in the Proposed Methodology Report and details the results from the Research Team's analysis of CPD use of force and related data spanning a four year period - January 2020 through December 2023. The analyses contained herein are designed to identify potential patterns of disparity in how force was used by CPD against identifiable racial, ethnic, and gender-based subpopulations in Chicago from 2020 - 2023. The report uses scientifically appropriate benchmarks and statistical modeling to investigate the nature and extent of those disparities, if any, and to examine relevant subject, officer, situational, and area-level factors that are associated with or predictive of observed disparities. This report is offered to CPD and the IMT to assist the parties in their ongoing efforts to monitor compliance with the terms of the Consent Decree.

San Antonio: The University of Texas at San Antonio UTSA Criminology & Criminal Justice, 2026. 84p.

By Kourtnie Rodgers and Thomas Strauss

In 2024, the Twin Falls County Sheriff’s Office received funding from the Idaho State Police’s Pass-Through Grants and Research Department, through the Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant (Byrne JAG) Program, to purchase and install 38 in-car camera bundles for patrol vehicles. Installation was completed in January and February 2025. This report presents preliminary findings on the cameras’ impact, comparing data from January to August 2025 with the same period in 2024. After installation, the percentage of citizen complaints resolved increased from 75% to 90%, monthly traffic citations issued decreased by 10%, and overtime hours spent on traffic court cases fell by 27%. While these results indicate positive effects, significant limitations such as data quality and the short follow-up period limit the strength of the conclusions. The report recommends improving data collection and extending the study period to allow for more rigorous assessment and to support future research, with the potential to inform law enforcement practices statewide and nationally. daho

Meridian: Statistical Analysis Center Pass-Through Grants and Research, Idaho State Police, 2026. 15p.

By Kattie Hall

From June to August 2025, the South Dakota Division of Criminal Investigation’s Statistical Analysis Center (SAC) surveyed Sheriff’s Offices in the state. A survey, accompanied by instructions, was sent to all Sheriff’s Offices via email attachment. This was the twenty-first time the SAC compiled statewide management data pertaining to South Dakota Sheriff’s Offices.

The results of this survey are intended to provide sheriffs with a valid means of comparing expenditures and resources of offices across the state. In addition, the results can provide the sheriffs with a substantial basis from which to justify future management decisions.

Platte: South Dakota Office of Attorney General, Division of Criminal Investigation, Statistical Analysis Center. 2025. 43p.

By Jedidiah L. Knode, Travis M. Carter & Scott E. Wolfe

There is debate over the latitude of discretion police officers have when conducting stops and searches. While necessary due to resource limitations and the need for individualized justice, discretion involves subjective characteristics of suspicion formation, such as race and ethnicity, which could perpetuate disparities in traffic enforcement. Research has yet to explore other marginalizing characteristics of suspicion formation, such as the social class of drivers. This study draws on over 550,000 stops conducted by a large state police agency in 2022 and 2023 to explore how vehicle values serve as class signals influencing officers’ discretion. We found disparities, whereby lower-value vehicles were more likely to be searched than higher-value vehicles after matching based on when, where, and under what circumstances stops occurred. However, searches of lower-value vehicles were less likely to result in the recovery of contraband. Our findings highlight potential avenues for officer training and research analyzing inequalities in policing.

Justice Quarterly, 42:3, 396-425, DOI: 10.1080/07418825.2024.2398543

By Scott M. Mourtgos, Ian T. Adams, Kyle McLean, and Geoffrey P. Alpert

Police vehicle pursuits emphasize a central tension between law enforcement imperatives and public safety. While modern policies emphasize balancing apprehension needs against risks of continuation, little is known about whether public intuitions mirror this framework. We address this gap using a nationally representative conjoint experiment (N = 3,334) that varied eleven contextual factors across randomized pursuit scenarios. Respondents rated perceived risk, indicated whether pursuits should be terminated, and made forced-choice tradeoffs. Across all outcomes, high-risk situational factors (e.g., high speeds, adverse weather, heavy traffic, urban settings, etc.) increased perceived danger and termination support, while more serious underlying offenses, particularly violent felonies, reduced it. These patterns align with the proportional balancing logic embedded in contemporary policy and training. Findings suggest restrictive, risk-sensitive pursuit policies are broadly consistent with public expectations, though tolerance for risk in violent felony cases may limit support for outright prohibitions.

Police Quarterly 2026, Vol. 0(0) 1–25, 2026

By Richard A. Wise, Roger C. Mayer, and Scott M. Mourtguey Richard A. Wise, Roger C. Mayer, and Scott M.

Discussion of the police–public relationship focuses on the public’s lack of trust in police. Our research suggests that police trust in the public is another important factor in this relationship and that addressing trust concerns on both sides may improve it. We conducted two studies of police trust in the public. The results suggested that the more police trust the public, the more constructive risks they take in performing their jobs. Based on our results, we highlight the importance of reciprocity and attempting to simultaneously increase both police and public trust to improve their relationship. Measures developed for these studies may inform future research on police trust in the public and develop interventions to improve it.

Behavioral Science & Policy, Volume 11, Issue 2, October 2025, Pages 31-37

By Kaylyn Jackson Schiff,  Daniel S. Schiff, Bryant J. Moy , Joshua McCrainc, Scott M. Mourtgos and Ian T. Adams

Does the implementation of external oversight in policing improve public perceptions of police legitimacy? Civilian review boards (CRBs) are frequently promoted as mechanisms to enhance the legitimacy of police agencies by providing independent oversight. Despite public support for CRBs, their adoption and effectiveness remain limited, raising concerns about their actual impact on procedural fairness and police legitimacy. This study assesses the role of CRBs in shaping public perceptions by examining various decision-making scenarios involving police chiefs and CRBs. Using a survey experiment fielded to 2,503 respondents, we investigate whether CRBs enhance legitimacy when they either coincide with or conflict with police chiefs’ determinations in cases of officer misconduct. Our findings suggest that while CRBs may enhance perceptions of procedural fairness for some, particularly those with negative views of police, their involvement does not generally increase legitimacy. In fact, when CRBs conflict with police chiefs, they may diminish public trust in both policing and civilian oversight and further entrench politically polarized attitudes towards policing. These results provide empirical evidence to support concerns that CRBs might not fulfill their intended role in enhancing police legitimacy, especially in cases of institutional disagreement.

PNAS Nexus, 2025, 4, pgaf267 

By David Bruce and Gareth Newham

With good leadership and clear strategy, corruption can be tackled, with many benefits for policing in South Africa.

There is abundant evidence of high levels of corruption in the South African Police Service (SAPS), metro and traffic police. Police corruption affects all ranks and many police activities. It is a key contributor to low levels of public trust in police, as well as poor policing outcomes. With proper leadership and clear strategic interventions, corruption can be tackled, with many benefits for the SAPS and policing in South Africa.

Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2025. 16p.

By Philip J. Cook

Approximately 75,000 people in the United States were shot by a criminal assailant in 2024, yet most of those shootings did not result in an arrest.

In this HFG Research and Policy in Brief, Philip J. Cook, professor emeritus at Duke University, explores the gap between the minority of shootings that are solved and those that go unsolved.

“There is a strong argument for improving police performance in investigating serious crimes of violence,” Cook writes in Unsolved Shootings: Why and How to Boost Clearance Rates. “What is at stake is public safety and the basic duty of the police to serve the public.”

Cook examines the importance of arresting and prosecuting perpetrators of serious violence, the validity of “clearance rates” as a performance indicator for police departments, and what can b, e done by police to increase the success rate for criminal investigations—citing examples from Chicago, Denver, and other cities.

New York: The Harry Frank Guggenheim Foundation, 2026. 25p.

A Forgotten Classic of Criminological Thought—Reintroduced for the Twenty-First Century

Originally published in 1918 and now carefully edited and introduced by Graeme R. Newman, The Criminology of Crime and Criminals: Medical, Biological and Psychological restores Charles Mercier’s groundbreaking exploration of crime, punishment, criminal behavior, and social order.

Long before modern criminology embraced concepts such as situational crime prevention, environmental opportunity, offender decision-making, and restorative justice, Mercier argued that crime cannot be explained by biology, psychology, or environment alone. Instead, criminal behavior emerges from the interaction between human nature and circumstance, between personal disposition and criminal opportunity.

Rejecting the popular theories of his day, Mercier challenges the notion of the “born criminal” and dismisses simplistic environmental explanations of lawbreaking. His provocative and highly original analysis examines:

• The psychological foundations of criminal conduct

• The roles of instinct, reason, desire, self-control, and will

• How opportunity and temptation shape criminal action

• The classification of crimes and criminals

• The relationship between crime, morality, and society

• The purposes of punishment: deterrence, retaliation, reform, and reparation

• The prevention, detection, and punishment of crime

Mercier’s central insight—that criminals are not a separate species but ordinary human beings responding differently to circumstances—remains strikingly relevant more than a century later.

Graeme R. Newman’s contemporary introduction places Mercier within the broader history of criminological thought and connects his ideas to modern developments in crime prevention and criminal justice. Together, Mercier and Newman illuminate enduring questions that continue to shape public policy and scholarly debate:

Why do people commit crimes? How should society respond? Is prevention more effective than punishment?

Part intellectual history, part criminological theory, and part social philosophy, this edition offers a fascinating window into the origins of modern criminology and the continuing struggle to understand crime and criminals.

Essential reading for students and scholars of criminology, criminal justice, sociology, psychology, legal history, and anyone interested in the causes of crime and the future of punishment.

Read-Me.Org Inc. New York-Philadelphia-Australia. 2026. 195p.

by Graeme Newman (Editor), Charles Mercier (Author)

Why do people commit crime? When does mental illness diminish responsibility? Should punishment always follow wrongdoing?

More than a century before modern debates about criminal responsibility, forensic psychiatry, and the treatment of mentally ill offenders, the distinguished British physician Charles Mercier confronted these enduring questions with remarkable clarity and originality.

In Crime, Insanity and Affliction, Mercier explores the complex relationship between criminal behaviour, mental disorder, and human suffering. Rejecting simplistic explanations, he argues that crime cannot be understood apart from the biological, psychological, and social forces that shape human conduct. His examination ranges from drunkenness, epilepsy, intellectual disability, and mental illness to questions of moral responsibility, punishment, and the proper role of the criminal law.

Although written in the early twentieth century, many of Mercier's observations anticipate debates that continue today. His discussion of diminished responsibility, the treatment of mentally ill offenders, addiction, and the limits of punishment remains surprisingly relevant in an era still struggling to balance justice, compassion, and public safety.

This new Read-Me edition presents Mercier's influential work with a new editorial introduction that places his ideas within the development of modern criminology, forensic psychiatry, and criminal justice. It also examines where Mercier's conclusions have been confirmed, where later research has challenged them, and why his work continues to deserve the attention of students, scholars, and general readers alike.

More than a historical curiosity, Crime, Insanity and Affliction is a thoughtful exploration of one of society's oldest and most difficult questions: how should we judge those whose minds, circumstances, or afflictions place them beyond the ordinary boundaries of responsibility?

Read-Me.Org Inc. New York-Philadelphia-Australia. 2026. 182p.

A Forgotten Classic of Criminological Thought—Reintroduced for the Twenty-First Century

Originally published in 1918 and now carefully edited and introduced by Graeme R. Newman, The Criminology of Crime and Criminals: Medical, Biological and Psychological restores Charles Mercier’s groundbreaking exploration of crime, punishment, criminal behavior, and social order.

Long before modern criminology embraced concepts such as situational crime prevention, environmental opportunity, offender decision-making, and restorative justice, Mercier argued that crime cannot be explained by biology, psychology, or environment alone. Instead, criminal behavior emerges from the interaction between human nature and circumstance, between personal disposition and criminal opportunity.

Rejecting the popular theories of his day, Mercier challenges the notion of the “born criminal” and dismisses simplistic environmental explanations of lawbreaking. His provocative and highly original analysis examines:

• The psychological foundations of criminal conduct

• The roles of instinct, reason, desire, self-control, and will

• How opportunity and temptation shape criminal action

• The classification of crimes and criminals

• The relationship between crime, morality, and society

• The purposes of punishment: deterrence, retaliation, reform, and reparation

• The prevention, detection, and punishment of crime

Mercier’s central insight—that criminals are not a separate species but ordinary human beings responding differently to circumstances—remains strikingly relevant more than a century later.

Graeme R. Newman’s contemporary introduction places Mercier within the broader history of criminological thought and connects his ideas to modern developments in crime prevention and criminal justice. Together, Mercier and Newman illuminate enduring questions that continue to shape public policy and scholarly debate:

Why do people commit crimes? How should society respond? Is prevention more effective than punishment?

Part intellectual history, part criminological theory, and part social philosophy, this edition offers a fascinating window into the origins of modern criminology and the continuing struggle to understand crime and criminals.

Essential reading for students and scholars of criminology, criminal justice, sociology, psychology, legal history, and anyone interested in the causes of crime and the future of punishment.

Read-Me.Org Inc. New York-Philadelphia-Australia. 2026. 195p.

The book that criminology forgot — and urgently needs to remember.
Arthur M<ercier (Author). Graeme Newman (Editor and Introduction).

First published in 1918 by the University of London Press, Charles Arthur Mercier's Conduct and Its Disorders, Biologically Considered, published by Macmillan in 1911 is one of the most rigorous, most readable, and most unjustly neglected works in the history of criminological thought. Now reissued as The Biology of Conduct Disorders, with a major critical introduction by Graeme R. Newman, it arrives at a moment when the questions it raises — about criminal intent, biological disposition, the limits of punishment, and the poverty of criminological theory — are more pressing than ever.
Mercier was no armchair theorist. As medical officer of lunatic asylums, consulting physician at criminal trials, and the only systematic student of conduct as a science, he brought to the study of crime a combination of clinical experience and biological rigour that the field had not seen before and has rarely matched since. His target was the prevailing chaos of criminological thought — above all the Continental school of Lombroso, which he dismantled with surgical precision — and his method was the application of praxiology, his own science of conduct, to the specific problem of criminal action.

What Mercier argued — and why it still matters:

• Every criminal act is the product of two factors: an internal factor (the biological constitution of the offender) and an external factor (circumstance and opportunity). Ignoring either produces not criminology but ideology.

• The turpitude of the criminal and the gravity of the crime are entirely separate questions — and confusing them has produced centuries of unjust punishment.

• Punishment should be calibrated to intention, not outcome: the man who intends murder and fails is more culpable than the man who kills by accident, whatever the body count.

• Statistical criminology — mass data gathered from convicted prisoners — cannot produce a science of crime. Only the study of individual criminal action, grounded in biology, psychology, and jurisprudence together, can do that.

• Certain acts currently outside the law (stealing the use of a thing; deliberate breach of contract) deserve criminal status; certain acts currently criminalised do not.

This new edition includes a critical introduction by Graeme R. Newman, Distinguished Professor Emeritus at the School of Criminal Justice, University at Albany, and one of the most provocative and original voices in the study of crime, deviance, and punishment. Author of Comparative Deviance: Perception and Law in Six Cultures, The Punishment Response, Just and Painful: A Case for the Corporal Punishment of Criminals, and Civilization and Barbarism: Punishing Criminals in the Twenty-First Century — and, as Colin Heston, of darkly satirical fiction including The Tommie Felon Show, Miscarriages, and Holy Water — Newman brings a unique authority to this text. Writing with the unflinching directness that earned him national television appearances and a reputation as the most uncomfortable conscience in American criminology, he traces the connections between Mercier's 1918 arguments and the debates that have defined — and divided — the field ever since.
"With the exception of logic, there is no subject on which so much nonsense has been written as this of criminality and the criminal." — Charles Arthur Mercier, 1918
Essential reading for students and scholars of criminology, criminal justice, the history of psychiatry, legal theory, and the philosophy of punishment — and for anyone who has ever wondered why, after two centuries of criminal science, we understand so little about why people commit crimes and what we should do about it.

Read-Me.Org Inc. New York-Philadelphia-Australia. 2026. 208p.

By R. Evan Ellis

The security environment in Mexico is characterized by a dangerous fragmentation of and competition among criminal groups that pushed the nation’s homicide rate to a record high of 22.5 per 100,000 in 2017, a 27.5 percent increase over the prior year.1 The nation, whose security and prosperity strongly impacts the United States through geographic proximity and associated flows of people, money, and goods (both licit and illicit), is at a critical juncture in its fight against transnational organized crime. Since Mexican President Felipe Calderón launched the “war against the cartels” in December 2006 with the deployment of the Mexican army into the state of Michoacán, the nation’s security forces have taken down the leaders of multiple powerful criminal groups and debilitated their organizations.2 In the process, the Mexican military, police, and other security institutions have evolved their institutional structures, modified both their strategy and their doctrine, and strengthened their ability to combat transnational organized crime. Yet as with the experience of the United States in combatting terrorist groups in Iraq and Afghanistan, Mexico’s fight against the cartels, both despite and because of its successes, has created a more chaotic criminal landscape, with both a higher level of violence and a broader range of criminality.

Complicating Mexico’s security challenge is the disposition of the Trump administration to act aggressively against illegal immigration from Mexico (among other countries) into the United States, along with U.S. renegotiation and possible abandonment of the North American Free Trade Agreement. These actions increase stressors on Mexico, including the prospect of expanded deportations of immigrants to Mexico, the loss of remittance income, and impeded access by Mexican producers to the U.S. market. The Trump administration’s actions, magnified by rhetoric that many Mexicans perceive as an insult to their country and people, have combined with Mexican frustration over the persistence of violence and corruption to create the real prospect that leftist populist candidate Andrés Manuel López Obrador could win the July 2018 presidential election, potentially taking Mexico on a course of more distant political relations and decreased security cooperation with the United States and expanded engagement with extra-hemispheric rivals of the United States such as Russia and China.

This article examines Mexico’s serious and evolving security challenges, and the key initiatives and critical issues confronting the nation’s security forces. It argues that the Mexican government has made important progress against a range of criminal groups and in innovating and strengthening its own capabilities to combat such entities and associated flows of illegal goods—capabilities that deserve to be recognized, further refined, and exploited in partnership with the United States and Mexico’s other neighbors. It concludes with recommendations for U.S. policy makers regarding the importance of strong and respectful support for Mexico at the present critical juncture.

2028. 13p.

Women and Illicit Finance in Russia’s Occupation of Ukraine Orly Stern Olivia Allison

Addressing police and military involvement in serious organised crime (Research Paper 39)

By Michael Miklaucic and Jacqueline Brewer

I llicit networks affect everyone in our modern, globalized world. From human trafficking in Eastern Europe to drug smuggling in East Asia, to the illicit arms trade in Africa, to terrorist cells in East Asia and insurgents in the Caucasus, transnational illicit networks have tentacles that reach everywhere. The trade in illegal narcotics is perhaps most worrisome, but of growing concern is the illicit trafficking of counterfeit items, weapons, natural resources, money, cultural property, and even people by shrewd, well-resourced, and nefarious adversaries. I have experience combating these threats personally at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels. As a young naval officer on a variety of ships, I spent a fair amount of time patrolling the global commons where transnational criminals in the guise of pirates and drug smugglers proliferate. I was in the Pentagon on 9/11 and personally experienced the global reach of modern terrorism. Later on, when I commanded U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM), one of my subordinate commands was Joint Interagency Task Force–South in Key West, Florida, a multinational and interagency/interministerial command that counters drug trafficking in the Western Hemisphere. I also experienced the pernicious effects that transnational crime has on our friends as it ranges throughout the entire Western Hemisphere. After leaving USSOUTHCOM to become commander at U.S. European Command (USEUCOM), I saw that Europe was also challenged by the same types of transnational crime. In response, I stood up the Joint/Interagency Counter Trafficking Center in Stuttgart, Germany, designed to counter transnational criminal networks in cooperation with our international partners. When I took command of USEUCOM, I also became the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR). As SACEUR, I command Operation Active Endeavor, which counters trafficking in the Mediterranean, and Operation Ocean Shield, which is part of the international counterpiracy efforts off the Somali coast. In addition, we have pioneered responses to cyber threats. At the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, we have the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Computer Incident Response Center, and at USEUCOM, we are taking steps to create a subunified cyber command that will have links to both U.S. Cyber Command in the United States and USEUCOM in Germany. All of these organizations were designed to facilitate a whole-of-government approach, where all elements of national power work together in order to address emerging threats. Eventually, once societies understand the nature of the threats facing them, they will hope- fully mobilize nongovernmental assets, adopting a “whole of society” approach. When all of these elements work together, governmental and nongovernmental groups can join international regional and global groups to form a “whole of international society” approach, allowing us to close the seams that exist between nations and regions. Only then will we be able to close these illicit transnational networks. These networks have taken advantage of modern advances in communications and transportation to globalize. Narcotraffickers in the Andean Ridge, for instance, have expanded operations as far as their markets in the United States and Europe. Illegal arms merchants have expanded their operations around the world. Human smugglers have moved their slaves from underdeveloped countries to sex operations throughout the developed world. And, of course, we have all seen the global reach of modern transnational terrorism. No one is immune from this insidious threat. 

Center for Complex Operations Institute for National Strategic Studies By National Defense University Press Washington, D.C., 2013. 304p.

By The International Crisis Group

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What’s new? Once one of South America’s safest countries, Ecuador has in under a decade become its most violent, transforming into a hub of the drug trade to Europe. President Daniel Noboa’s iron-fist approach brought murder rates down at first, but violence has since soared again and crime continues unabated.

Why does it matter? Ecuador’s authorities have declared the country to be in the grip of internal armed conflict, deploying soldiers to prisons and crime-hit communities. With no sign of violence falling, the government is set to double down on its tough approach, expanding cooperation with the U.S. military and private security contractors.

What should be done? Crackdowns send a strong message to communities and criminals alike, but alone they tend not to overwhelm drug markets. Ecuador should do more to bring state services and licit economic opportunities to crime-hit neighbourhoods while quelling the corruption in ports, prisons and the state that helps generate the crime wave.

Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2025. 52p.

By The Sentry

The first Wagner Group fighters arrived in Bamako in January 2022 to assist the Malian military junta in its counterterrorism campaign.1 Three and a half years later, the group has announced its withdrawal from Mali to make space for Africa Corps with the statement “Mission accomplished.”2 But as the number of Wagner fighters in Mali will stay roughly the same, since many had already signed contracts with the Russian state prior to the announcement,3, 4 the group’s claim to success—and their overall strategy in Mali—merits scrutiny. Despite the Wagner Group possessing a reputation for being battle-ready and claiming occasional public triumphs in Mali, its strategy has been plagued by a series of failures.5 Wagner forces have been unable to take control of areas in the north and center of the country where armed terrorist and separatist groups are challenging the authority of the Malian state. There has been a significant increase in attacks on civilians and in civilian casualties since Wagner’s arrival in Mali, and this, in turn, has severely undermined relations between the Malian military and the Malian public. Faced with challenges such as insufficient air support, a lack of trust, and a lack of reliable information from informants, the Wagner Group has become more reactive and violent—allowing the very terrorist groups they were hired to neutralize to gain more control and increase recruitment in Mali. Wagner’s playbook in Mali has not only affected the civilian population; it has also helped perpetuate insecurity and has paved the way for the fragmentation of the Malian state. Wagner fighters have created chaos and fear within the Malian military hierarchy, forcing the Forces Armées Maliennes (Malian Armed Forces, or FAMA) to remain silent in cases of civilian abuse. In addition, the lack of order and communication within the chain of command has led to the progressive deterioration of the FAMA’s ranks. Abuses against the Malian armed forces by Wagner troops have increased, as have complaints from Malian soldiers. Within the Malian military junta itself, the varying degrees of partnership with Russian actors are contributing to a shift in power relations in Bamako, as Malian leaders regard one another with suspicion. Despite official discourse suggesting that Wagner and Russia are reliable partners in the Malian conflict, the Wagner command in Mali has demonstrated a reluctance to intervene militarily—even in cases where the capital is directly threatened—without first having assurances of financial compensation. At the outset of its Malian venture, Wagner was seeking to secure mining concessions that would likely replicate the group’s self-funding arrangements in other countries. However, the Malian junta appears unwilling to allow Wagner to control the mining sector, and Wagner’s forays into that sector have thus far been limited. Ultimately, the Wagner Group has failed in its task of eliminating terrorist groups in Mali. The Russian presence is instead creating upheaval amid the Malian military and causing rifts within the Malian junta. And as Wagner has seemingly gone unpaid for months and failed to obtain access to lucrative natural resources, its deployment in Mali has not been a worthwhile investment for any party involved. Wagner is not an infallible actor. If anything, the Malian example illustrates that the group can fail, and this should be a warning to other African clients who are considering hiring Wagner—or its more officialoffshoot, Africa Corps. At the same time, policymakers in the Global North should see Wagner’s failures as an opportunity for alternative policy approaches in the Sahel region. Key recommendations • The Office of the Prosecutor at the International Criminal Court (ICC) should open an investigation into war crimes perpetrated by Wagner troops in Mali and prosecute those responsible for human rights abuses. Alternatively, the United Nations Security Council should refer Wagner abuses in Mali to the Office of the Prosecutor at the ICC. • The government of Mali should take steps toward criminal accountability and reparations for the victims of massacres such as Moura, as well as for the abuses against and displacement of civilian populations following attacks by the Wagner Group in the north and west of the country. • The EU, the US, the UK, Canada, and Australia should investigate and, if appropriate, designate for sanctions the network of individuals and entities in Sadio Camara’s inner circle who enable, support, or benefit from Wagner’s presence in the country, as well as those involved in corruption and human rights abuses. They should coordinate sanctions to increase their impact. • International mining companies operating in Mali and foreign refineries processing Malian gold should conduct comprehensive audits of their operations to ensure that they are not conducting business with sanctioned Wagner Group entities or individuals, such as Ivan Maslov. • The Algerian government should facilitate renewed negotiations on a peace agreement between Bamako and the northern rebel groups. As the political and security landscape has changed since the 2015 agreement, which was facilitated by Algeria, including as a result of the withdrawal of the UN peacekeeping operation MINUSMA, new terms will need to be agreed.

The Sentry, 2025. 55p.

By Europol

All EU Member States and 17 of Europol’s partner countries contributed data to identify the most threatening criminal networks in Europe. This resulted in a unique dataset of 821 most threatening criminal networks, with extensive information on all aspects that describe them and help assess their threat.

This mapping report is one of the key deliverables of the Belgian presidency of the Council of the European Union, which strongly encouraged the efforts of Europol in this respect. It will be an essential tool to fight organised crime going forward, which is a top EU priority, as outlined in the recent roadmap presented by the European Commission.

Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg, 2024. 60p.