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CRIME

Violent-Non-Violent-Cyber-Global-Organized-Environmental-Policing-Crime Prevention-Victimization

Preventing the revolving door. Data and voices for change

By Revolving Doors and Newton

The hidden cost of England’s so-called “prolific offenders” the people repeatedly in the headlines for shoplifting and low-level crime – is laid bare in groundbreaking new research by Revolving Doors and
Newton.

The report is the first of its kind, bringing together the insights of people with lived experience of the ‘revolving door’ of reoffending with innovative analysis of real public sector data, including case notes. It reveals new findings about the toll that punishment without rehabilitation and key missed opportunities has on people, public finances and public services.

Revolving Doors is now calling for a joint-departmental Government response across health, justice and housing. They are also requesting a focus on interventions that are known to work to address the root
causes of offending and a joined-up approach that combines shared data, thinking and lived experience.

The joint analysis finds:

●      Between 30,000 and 50,000 individuals make up this group, trapped in cycles of repeat offending.

●      They are responsible for at least 130,000 crimes a year, from shoplifting and assault to drug offences and criminal damage.

●       True costs find that individuals cost more than £100,000 each year, with lifetime costs of over £1.4m.

●      They cost the criminal justice system at least £242m annually, with a total socio-economic bill of up to £5.2bn. This figure represents almost a quarter of all reoffending costs and is the first ever measurement of this group’s impact on public services including the NHS, councils and social services.

Those in this group are often referred to as “prolific offenders”. This report identifies them more clearly to show they are in fact the ‘revolving door cohort’: people in crisis who cycle in and out of the justice system because of unmet health and social needs – including mental ill health, addiction, homelessness and histories of trauma.

Crucially, this group is not captured by existing systems like Integrated Offender Management, which was set up to specifically target those identified as most persistently offending.

Changing Origins, Rising Numbers: Unauthorized Immigrants in the United States

By Julia Gelatt, Ariel G. Ruiz Soto and James D. Bachmeier

The 13.7 million unauthorized immigrants living in the United States as of mid-2023 reflect increasingly diverse origins, socioeconomic and labor market characteristics, family composition, and places of
settlement.

Explore the Data This fact sheet highlights top trends from MPI's detailed data profiles of unauthorized immigrant populations for the United States, 43 states and the District of Columbia, and the 135 counties with the largest unauthorized populations.

After a decade of stagnation, the unauthorized immigrant population now is up by 3 million since 2019, representing 26 percent of the overall foreign-born population in the United States.

This fact sheet sketches the changes in the unauthorized immigrant population, drawing on a unique MPI methodology that allows the assignment of legal status in data from the U.S. Census Bureau’s American Community Survey (ACS). It provides key information on countries/regions of birth, years of U.S. residence, top job sectors, workforce participation, educational attainment, family composition, U.S. destinations, and more.

Among the key findings, all as of mid-2023:

14 million U.S. citizens, lawful permanent residents (also known as green‑card holders), or temporary visa holders shared a household with an unauthorized immigrant. Nearly 4.2 million unauthorized immigrants were married to a U.S. citizen or green-card holder. 6.3 million children under age 18 lived with at least one unauthorized immigrant parent. All but 1 million of those children are U.S. citizens. Mexicans accounted for 40 percent of all unauthorized immigrants—down significantly from their 62 percent share in 2010. As the fact sheet and accompanying sociodemographic data profiles at state and top county levels show, the characteristics and experiences of unauthorized immigrants vary across U.S. states and localities. Understanding their workforce, economic, and sociodemographic characteristics is important for policymakers, service providers, and the public in an era of rapidly changing policy

Testing the Long-Term Impact of Bail Reform Across New York State: A Quasi-Experimental Evaluation

By René Ropac

New York’s bail reform, put into effect in January 2020 and amended in July 2020, eliminated money bail for most misdemeanors and nonviolent felonies. The law also reduced the use of bail even in cases remaining
legally eligible for it through such measures as providing judges with a universal option to order supervised release and an option to order electronic monitoring for certain charges. The mid-2020 amendments
reinstated bail eligibility for certain cases. Later amendments implemented in 2022 and 2023 were modest. As a result, the July 2020 framework essentially remains the basis of New York’s bail reform today. This study is the first to evaluate the recidivism impacts of the bail law as it currently operates. Using statewide court data and quasi-experimental methods, we tracked people for more than four years (50 months) after arraignment—far longer than prior evaluations—to test the impact of reform following the July 2020 amendments. Data Source, Key Measures, and Methods Drawing on non-public court data, we compared people who had bail set or were remanded at arraignment from July 2 to October 31, 2019 (pre-reform), with similar people released during the same dates in 2020 (post-reform). Each person was tracked for 50 months, encompassing both pretrial and post-disposition periods. This design allowed us to examine the long-term public safety consequences of pretrial release in lieu of bail or remand. To test the effects of bail reform on recidivism, we applied a quasi-experimental approach using propensity score weighting. Specifically, we first used logistic regression models to estimate propensity scores and applied inverse probability of treatment
weighting (IPTW) to create an analytic sample in which the distribution of observed baseline characteristics is comparable between treatment and comparison groups. The models included a large number of covariates, such as demographic factors, county and month of arraignment, charge variables, and criminal history measures. For the main analyses, we then employed a doubly robust approach that combined IPTW with covariate adjustment, reducing potential bias in our results. Analyses were conducted separately for: (1) cases seeing the elimination of bail under reform; and (2) cases remaining legally eligible for bail but seeing reduced use of it due to provisions such as the expansion of pretrial supervision. Overall results are reported separately for New York City and the rest of the State. We also examined whether impacts varied for people with or without recent criminal histories (within the past two and a half years) across all counties combined. Impact of Eliminating Bail and Pretrial Detention for Select Cases Effects in New York City: Bail reform's provisions eliminating the option to set bail or remand led to substantial recidivism reductions in New York City. Over the 50-month follow-up period, people released under reform had significantly lower rates of
overall re-arrest (57% vs. 66%), felony re-arrest (33% vs. 40%), and violent felony (VFO) re-arrest (20% vs. 25%), as well as averaged fewer numbers of overall, felony, and VFO re-arrests, compared to people who had bail set or were remanded pre-reform.

Effects in the Rest of the State: The prohibition of bail and detention had no effect in any direction on any of six recidivism outcomes in the suburban and upstate regions (encompassing rates and prevalence of overall, felony, and VFO re-arrest). Effects Among Different Subgroups: Among two "low-risk" subgroups—those with no recent criminal history and no recent prior violent felony arrests—bail elimination yielded statewide reductions in both re-arrest rates and average numbers of re-arrests. The largest benefits appeared among those with no recent criminal history at all. In other words, for those with no recent criminal history, prohibiting the use of bail substantially reduced re-arrest. Yet even people who may have had a prior record, so long as it did not involve a recent violent felony arrest, experienced meaningful recidivism reductions. In contrast, findings for "high-risk" subgroups were more mixed but generally indicated increases in recidivism. Among
those with any recent criminal history, re-arrest rates were unaffected, though the frequency of overall and felony re-arrests increased. For the smaller fraction of people (under 15% in all regions) with recent prior violent felony arrests, release without bail was consistently associated with elevated rearrest rates and more
re-arrest incidents across all six outcomes. Impact of Reducing the Use of Bail in Legally Eligible Cases Effects in New York City: The reduced use of money bail in eligible cases led to modest reductions in rates of overall re-arrest (53% vs. 56%) and felony re-arrest (30% vs. 33%), while violent felony re-arrest rates and the frequency of re-arrest incidents were unaffected. This suggests that reform reduced the likelihood of being re-arrested at least once without altering the overall frequency of re-arrests. Effects in the Rest of the State:
Results were essentially neutral in the suburban and upstate regions. Re-arrest rates and average numbers of re-arrests were nearly all the same for people released without bail and those in the comparison group.

Effects Among Different Subgroups: "Low-risk" individuals with no recent criminal history experienced notable statewide recidivism reductions, while those with no recent prior violent felony arrests showed no significant changes. For "high-risk" individuals with recent criminal history, on the other hand, the reduced use of bail was consistently associated with worse outcomes. Those with recent criminal histories or prior violent felony arrests had higher re-arrest rates and more rearrest incidents across all outcome measures. These increases were larger among people with recent prior violent felony arrests. Study Results in Context Bail reform aimed to reduce reliance on money bail and pretrial detention while maintaining public safety. By these measures, the current law can be considered a success. However, the recidivism increases among a relatively small subgroup of people with recent criminal histories should not be overlooked. The amendments to “initial” bail reform put into effect in July 2020 sought to allay public safety concerns primarily by reinstating bail for a range of cases. Yet, the present study shows that the detrimental impacts among subgroups of “high-risk” individuals defined by serious recent criminal history—previously observed in DCJ’s studies of initial bail reform—remain evident under the current law as well. Another key finding is the contrast between
New York City and the State’s suburban and upstate regions; in New York City, the prohibition of money bail (or "mandatory release") was associated with declines in both the likelihood and frequency of re-arrest, while rearrest outcomes in the rest of the State remained unchanged. Several factors may explain this divergence: possible baseline differences in pre-reform release rates (courts released fewer people prior to reform outside New York City); differences in the populations processed in each region; or potential gaps in the implementation and effectiveness of pretrial supervision and other support programs outside New York City

Understanding Federal Law Enforcement in the United States Part 6—Drug Enforcement Administration

By Jillian Snider

This is the sixth and final installment in a six-part series examining major federal law enforcement agencies through a research-grounded lens, assessing each agency across the same core categories.

When federal agents dismantle a covert fentanyl lab, when pharmaceutical personnel are charged with unlawful distribution, when investigators trace a methamphetamine pipeline from a Mexican cartel into networks across the U.S., or when the federal government loosens restrictions on the most widely used illegal drug in the country, one agency is at the center of each: the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA). Yet of the agencies in this series, the DEA is among the least understood as it is often conflated with the broader “war on drugs” rather than recognized for the specific statutory machinery it
operates.

The DEA is the federal government’s lead agency for enforcing the nation’s drug laws, and the youngest of the three Department of Justice (DOJ) agencies examined in this series. But its defining feature is that it does not merely enforce the drug laws, it also helps determine which substances are controlled, and how tightly,
through its authority over the federal drug-scheduling system. Those scheduling decisions, in turn, help define what counts as a federal drug crime in the first place. It is that combination of powers, enforcing the drug laws while also helping to write them, that has drawn the DEA into one of the most consequential drug-policy debates in a generation: the rescheduling of marijuana, an issue that has reached a turning point in 2026.

CAUSES AND CURES OF CRIME

By Thomas Mosby (Author), Graeme Newman (Introduction)

n 1913, Thomas Speed Mosby, who had served as Pardon Attorney to Missouri Governor Joseph W. Folk, set out to explain to the general reader why people commit crimes and what society should do about it. Drawing on years of reviewing convicts’ petitions for clemency, and on the leading criminologists of his day, he organized his answer like a medical textbook. Crime was a disease of the social body, to be understood through its causes, its prevention, and its cure.

Part I, Etiology, examines the “cosmic,” social, and individual factors of crime. These range from climate and season to corrupt prosecutors, sensational newspapers, poverty, alcoholism, and Lombroso’s theory of the born criminal. Part II, Prophylaxis, turns to prevention through eugenics, the sterilization laws then spreading across the states, trade education, and social reform. Part III, Therapeutics, traces the history of punishment and argues forcefully against the death penalty. It includes a remarkable state-by-state survey of American parole laws in 1912 and 1913, and closes with a program for “the new penology.”

Causes and Cures of Crime is a vivid record of American criminal justice reform before the First World War. It shows both the movement’s humane ambitions and its dangerous enthusiasms. Its photographic plates of “criminal types,” supplied by the St. Louis and Kansas City police departments, and its illustrations of anthropometric instruments show how early criminologists hoped to read criminality in the human face and body.

This Read-Me.Org Modernized-Classic edition corrects and modernizes the original text while retaining Mosby’s arguments, statistical tables, all fourteen photographic plates, and the text figures. A new introduction by Colin Heston places the book in historical context, including the later discrediting of eugenics and compulsory sterilization. Review and Discussion Questions for each chapter make the edition well suited to courses in criminology, criminal justice history, and the history of social science.

Read-Me.Org Inc. New York-Philadelphia-Australia. 2026. p.207.

Understanding Federal Law Enforcement in the United States Part 5—Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives

By Jillian Snider

This is the fifth in a six-part series examining major federal law enforcement agencies through a research-grounded lens, assessing each against a consistent set of criteria.

In Kansas City, federal agents traced handguns recovered from the mass shooting at the 2024 Super Bowl victory rally back through unlawful transfers to straw purchasers. In College Station, Texas, federal agents and fire investigators examined a burned-out Krispy Kreme for accelerant traces and graffiti, analyzing evidence of arson. And of the 9,696 federal firearms licensees inspected in 2024, industry operations investigators combed through acquisition and disposition records line by line. All three encounters involve the same federal agency; one many Americans associate with controversies decades old rather than the day-to-day work that defines its current mission.

The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) is the smallest of the three Department of Justice (DOJ) agencies in this series. ATF employs roughly 5,300 personnel, including approximately 2,373 special agents as of 2025, and operates on a budget of roughly $1.6 billion. ATF’s dual role as both criminal enforcer and industry regulator has placed it at the center of repeated political fights over its very existence.

Understanding Federal Law Enforcement in the United States Part 4—Federal Bureau of Investigation

By Jillian Snider

This is the fourth in a six-part series examining major federal law enforcement agencies through a research-grounded lens, assessing each agency across the same core categories.

When a cyberattack cripples a hospital’s computer network, when a public corruption investigation topples a sitting mayor, when a terrorist plot is disrupted before it reaches execution, or when a fugitive on the Ten Most Wanted Fugitives list is tracked across international borders, the same three letters appear in the headlines:
FBI. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) occupies a unique position in American law enforcement—it is simultaneously the country’s principal federal criminal investigative agency, a domestic intelligence service, and an international law enforcement partner. With its jurisdiction spanning more than 200 categories of federal crime, no other agency in the federal system operates as broadly.

Yet the FBI’s breadth of authority has always made it a lightning rod. The same agency that disrupted the MS-13 gang network and dismantled ransomware operations also carries the historical weight of COINTELPRO—the counterintelligence program that surveilled civil rights leaders—and the more recent controversies surrounding the Bureau’s Crossfire Hurricane investigation. Since early 2025, the FBI has undergone significant organizational restructuring under Director Kash Patel, including the removal of senior career officials; large-scale personnel transfers out of the Washington, D.C. region; and the redeployment of agents toward immigration enforcement and violent crime. These changes have placed the Bureau at the center of debate over whether its mission is sharpening or being redirected.

Understanding Federal Law Enforcement in the United States Part 3—U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement

By Jillian Snider

This is the third in a six-part series examining major policing strategies through a research-grounded lens, assessing each strategy against multiple criteria.

When federal agents in plain clothes and tactical gear appeared at car washes, worksites, and bus stops across American cities in recent months, many residents had the same question: Who are these people, and what authority do they have to be here? In most cases, the answer was U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)—an agency that most Americans have heard of but few could describe with precision.

ICE is the federal agency responsible for immigration enforcement in the interior of the United States and for criminal investigations involving cross-border violations. With more than 20,000 law enforcement and support personnel—a figure that grew significantly following a 2025 hiring surge—operating out of more than 400 offices domestically and in approximately 50 countries, ICE enforces more than 400 federal statutes. It shares a parent department and legislative origin with U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP); however, where CBP’s jurisdiction is anchored at and near the border, ICE’s operational footprint is centered in the nation’s interior.

Understanding Federal Law Enforcement in the United States Part 2—U.S. Customs and Border Protection

By Jillian Snider

This is the second in a six-part series examining major policing strategies through a research-grounded lens, assessing each strategy against multiple criteria.

A traveler arriving at John F. Kennedy International Airport (JFK) hands over their passport. A rancher in southern Arizona sees agents patrolling the mesquite beyond his fence line. A shipping container at
the Port of Los Angeles undergoes imaging scans before its contents reach American consumers. All three encounters involve the same federal agency, but most Americans would be hard-pressed to explain how or why.

U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) is the largest federal law enforcement agency in the United States, with more than 60,000 employees and a budget exceeding $19 billion. It is simultaneously a law enforcement agency, a trade facilitation body, and the federal government’s primary screening operation for people and goods entering the country. Understanding how one agency came to hold all of these responsibilities—and what authorities it exercises in each role—is essential context for the policy debates that surround it.

Understanding Federal Law Enforcement in the United States Part 1—Introduction

By Jillian Snider

This is the first in a six-part series examining major policing strategies through a research-grounded lens, assessing each strategy against multiple criteria.

When most Americans think of law enforcement, they picture the local police officer on patrol, the county sheriff, or perhaps a state trooper on the highway—and with good reason. According to the Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS), the 17,500-plus state and local law enforcement agencies operating across the country employ over 1.2 million full-time sworn and civilian personnel who represent about 90 percent of U.S. law enforcement. Most citizens encounter these officers in their daily lives; however, operating alongside them is a vast network of federal law enforcement that many Americans know primarily from television or news headlines.

The scale of this federal apparatus is significant: The most recent BJS Census of Federal Law Enforcement Officers found that 90 agencies employed 136,815 full-time federal law enforcement officers authorized to make arrests, carry firearms, or both. As the largest of these agencies, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) employs approximately 80,000 officers across nine agencies and offices. But despite this substantial presence, public understanding of jurisdictional boundaries, statutory authorities, and the distinctions between agencies remains limited.

This need for clarity has never been more pressing. In recent years—particularly since early 2025—federal law enforcement agencies have moved to the center of national debate. Expanded enforcement operations by U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) in American cities have raised questions about use-of-force standards, the relationship between federal and local agencies, and public trust. Fatal shootings involving federal agents during enforcement operations have prompted scrutiny of whether agents receive adequate training for volatile urban environments. The unprecedented assertion of federal control over some major U.S. cities has sparked questions about the boundaries of federal authority over local policing.

Additionally, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF), and the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) have conducted large-scale violent crime and drug enforcement operations in cities across the country, often alongside local police departments. This surge of federal agents has left residents struggling to distinguish between the agencies operating in their neighborhoods and questioning each agency’s authority and limitations.

Artificial Intelligence and Procedural Due Process

By Brandon L. Garrett

Artificial intelligence (AI) violates procedural due process rights if the government uses it to deprive people of life, liberty, and property without adequate notice or an opportunity to be heard. A wide range of government agencies deploy AI systems, including in courts, law enforcement, public benefits administration, and national security. If the government refused to disclose the reasons why it denied a person bail, public benefits, or immigration status, there would be substantial due process concerns. If the government delegates such tasks to an AI system, due process analysis does not change. As in any other setting, we still need to ask whether a person received adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard. And further, where applicable, we need to ask whether the risk of error and costs to rights justify not using interpretable and adequately tested AI.

Nor is it necessary for AI or other automated systems to operate in a “black box” manner without providing people with notice or a way to meaningfully contest decisions. There is a ready alternative: a “glass box” or interpretable AI systems present results so that users know what factors it relied on, what weight it gave to each, and the strengths and limitations of the association or prediction made. Whether it is a criminal investigation or a public benefits eligibility determination, interpretable AI can ensure that people have notice and can challenge any error, using the procedures available. And such a system can be more readily checked for errors. Due process demands a greater opportunity to contest government decisions that raise greater reliability concerns. We need to know how reliable an AI system performs, under realistic conditions, to assess the risk of error.

Longstanding due process protections and well-developed interpretable AI approaches can ensure that AI systems safeguard due process rights. Conversely, due process rights have little meaning if the government uses “black box” systems that are not fully interpretable or fully tested for reliability, and as a result, cannot comply with procedural due process requirements. So far, there has been little government self-regulation of AI. In response, judges have begun to enforce existing due process rights in AI and other automated decision-making settings. As judges consider due process challenges to AI, they should consider the interpretability and the reliability of AI systems. Similarly, as lawmakers and regulators examine government use of AI systems, they should ensure safeguards, including interpretability and reliability, to protect our due process rights in an increasingly AI-dominated world.

Due Processing: Cutting Through AI Hype and Doomerism in American Courtrooms

By Logan Seacrest

Three years after an artificial intelligence (AI) system first passed the bar exam, the American legal system is being pulled in two directions. In one direction is overconfidence, which has resulted in well-publicized courtroom mistakes. In the other is risk aversion, which has provoked sanctions, restrictions, and even outright bans. Both reactions are understandable, but neither will ultimately serve the public good. Threading the needle between utopian promises and AI doomerism requires open-minded judges to test AI deliberately, learn its limits, and proceed with caution.

Two Families and a Laboratory: Heredity, Crime, and the Study of Man

A. E. Winship and Arthur MacDonald. Introduction nad Review Questions, Graeme Newman.

Are people born to crime and poverty, or made by their surroundings? This volume brings together two influential American works from the turn of the twentieth century that tried to answer that question.

In Jukes–Edwards: A Study in Education and Heredity (1900), educator A. E. Winship sets the infamous “Jukes” family against the descendants of the great colonial theologian Jonathan Edwards. The Jukes were the subject of Richard Dugdale’s famous study of crime and pauperism. Edwards’s descendants included college presidents, judges, physicians, senators, and a vice-president of the United States. Winship’s vivid portraits, from Sarah Edwards’s household to the troubled brilliance of Aaron Burr, make a case for the combined power of inheritance, training, and education.

In A Plan for the Study of Man (1902), Arthur MacDonald of the U.S. Bureau of Education urges Congress to establish a national laboratory for the scientific study of “the criminal, pauper, and defective classes.” He wanted it to study ordinary people as well. His wide-ranging survey covers anthropometry, measurements of schoolchildren, instruments for gauging sensitivity to heat, touch, and pain, and hypnotism and suggestion. It also takes in the Mafia and the Camorra, alcoholism, moral education, prison reform, and a detailed case history of a young murderer. His original illustrations of laboratory instruments are reproduced.

The new introduction places both works in historical context. It traces their influence on the eugenics movement, the later criticism of their methods, and their surprising anticipation of modern child development and criminological research. Spelling and wording have been modernized throughout, tables have been summarized in prose, and review and discussion questions are included. The book will interest students and general readers in criminology, sociology, education, and the history of science.

Read-Me.Org Inc. New York-Philadelphia-Australia. 2026. p.196.

LESSON FROM SOMALIA: A SPECIAL MODEL OF HANDLING PIRACY JURE GENTIUM AND ARMED ROBBERY AT SEA

Gerald Aldytia Bunga

In this article, the author discusses the issues pertaining to piracy jure gentium and armed robbery at sea. Focus shall be given on the incidence of both crimes occurring offshore Somalia during a certain time period. It is noted that Somalia is unable or unwilling to enforce its law to protect international (commercial) shipping passing through its waters. This inability to enforce the law has been the primary reason, Somalia was forced to seek legal assistance from the international community. By taking lessons from Somalia and comparing these two crimes, the author seeks to propose a model of how to tackle the problem at hand. To be discussed and analysed is a number of United Nations Security Council Resolutions which provide the international community with a guideline how to handle both crimes.

VeJ Volume 5 • Nomor 2 • 302

piracy, robbery, SecurityRead-Me.Org
LEGAL TECHNOLOGIES OF PRIMITIVE ACCUMULATION: Judicial Robbery and Dispossession-by-Restitution in Warsaw

Joanna Kusiak

Among the ‘extra-economic means’ that facilitate primitive accumulation, or accumulation by dispossession, the law plays a prominent role. But works on neoliberal urban restructuring rarely engage with concrete legal technologies. Analysing judicial property restitution (‘reprivatization’) in Warsaw, this article grasps the machine of accumulation by dispossession at a moment of faltering and exposes the distinctive legal technologies behind its troubleshooting. It makes three contributions to critical urban studies. First, it demonstrates how judicial systems can steal political conflicts that obstruct the cycle of accumulation by dispossession. It thus introduces the notion of ‘judicial robbery’, a non-legislated expropriation of common property through judicial engineering that simultaneously deprives the public of political agency. Second, it shows that seemingly neutral legal technicalities, usually sheltered from political debate, can become a key locus of urban politics. Third, it examines the agency, scope and spatial patterns of ‘dispossession by restitution’, the term I use for a locally specific form of accumulation by dispossession in Warsaw. Lastly, I raise the question of political struggle against primitive accumulation. Is the judicial robbery reversible? If we can reclaim property, can we also reclaim political conflicts that have been stolen by the law?

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF URBAN AND REGIONAL RESEARCH DOI:10.1111/1468-2427.12827

Leadership and hierarchies in criminal groups: Scaling degrees of leader behaviour in group robbery

Louise E. Porter* and Laurence J. Alison

Purpose. The purpose of this paper was, firstly, to replicate Porter and Alison’s (2001) leadership behaviour scale and, secondly, to extend this research through the use of a new sample of group robbery offenders. This will provide further support for the use of such a scale to identify potential criminal leaders and also offer insight into the dynamics and hierarchical structures among group robbery offenders.

Methods. One hundred and five cases of group robbery, yielding 290 offender behaviour profiles, were coded according to each offender’s level of involvement at each chronological offence stage in terms of decisions, actions and orders. A multidimensional scaling procedure examined the combinations of these, and produced a partially ordered scale of leadership behaviour with the defining aspects being initial decision making and involvement in the offence outcome.

Results. The scale identified potential leaders in 103 of the 105 robbery groups, where these leaders scored higher than non-leaders on the leadership behaviour scale. Two-thirds of groups comprised a dichotomous leader/follower distinction, whilst the remaining third comprised more dispersed, linear and lieutenant hierarchies.

Conclusions. These results further support the leader behaviour scale originally proposed by Porter and Alison (2001). The results also offer insight into the processes by which robberies evolve; namely, through a series of decisions of one individual who then either participates first or gives orders to his fellow group members to participate, although the former seems far more frequent.

Legal and Criminological Psychology (2006), 11, 245–265.

Intercountry adoption after the Haiti earthquake Rescue or robbery?

Peter Selman

n the first two months of 2010, the plight of orphaned children in earthquake-hit Haiti led to calls for intercountry adoption processes to be expedited, but it also raised the question of whether taking children away from their homeland, even in extreme or impoverished conditions, is the right solution, especially at times of crisis. Peter Selman examines, in the context of other examples of the use (or non-use) of adoption as a response to natural disaster, the varied responses of countries in Europe and North America in the aftermath of the earthquake and how this affected the number of children adopted from Haiti.

ADOPTION & FOSTERING VOLUME 35 NUMBER 4 2011

Understanding Trends in Law Enforcement Staffing

By Brandon Martin, Deepak Premkumar, and Mandi Acevedo

Law enforcement agencies have experienced hiring and retention challenges amid the pandemic, economic uncertainty, and changing views of the police. This report provides key trends and context for understanding officer staffing in California and highlights several obstacles for agencies moving forward.

Key Takeaways
Law enforcement agencies at the state, county, and local levels employ more than 77,000 individuals with arrest powers across California spending about $28 billion on policing. Research shows that hiring additional law enforcement officers reduces crime, especially violent crime. Yet agencies have experienced several challenges around officer recruitment and retention in recent years amid the COVID-19 pandemic, economic uncertainty, and societal changes.

In this report, we bring together several new and underused data sources to provide key trends and context for understanding officer staffing in California, highlighting several possible challenges for agencies moving forward

The number of officers has decreased since the pandemic. Despite small growth over the last two years, the statewide officer count (77,200) in 2024 is 3 percent less than it was in 2019 (79,600). California has 196 officers per 100,000 residents, down from a peak of 221 in 2008. → Officer demographics have shifted. Although officers are predominantly male, the share of female officers has risen over time, from 12.8 percent in 2005 to 15.3 percent in 2024. Looking at race/ethnicity, representation of white and Black officers has declined over the last two decades, while representation of Latino officers has increased significantly and representation of Asian officers has remained largely unchanged. Average officer age and tenure have stayed relatively stable. Recent research shows benefits to having more female, Latino, Black, older, and experienced officers. → Staffing trends differ based on agency size and type. While agencies of all sizes saw declines in staffing after the Great Recession, the post-pandemic drop was concentrated in large agencies with over 100 officers. In recent years, rural agencies have experienced more volatile changes in staffing than non-rural agencies. And over the last two decades, staffing levels have risen at sheriff’s departments while decreasing slightly at police departments. → Officer retention has declined. From 2016 to 2020, total separations—including resignations, retirements, and terminations—rose steadily at California law enforcement agencies, by about 11 percent.

Separations then went up more than 30 percent between 2020 and 2022, potentially influenced by factors like the pandemic and protests following the murder of George Floyd. → Average salaries have decreased slightly; agencies are increasing overtime pay. After adjusting for inflation, the average base salary for officers declined between 2011 and 2023, from $116,000 to $110,000, possibly due to more experienced officers leaving. Over this time, average overtime pay grew from $10,000 to over $25,000. Though rural and non-rural agencies had similar overtime pay in 2011, there was a large difference by 2023 ($16,000 rural, $28,000 non-rural). → Agency competition and pay are key challenges to recruitment and retention. Respondents in our survey say that location issues, like remoteness of agency as well as housing costs and availability, also play a role. When it comes to hiring, agencies report that unqualified applicants are an issue. About 30 percent of respondents indicate that limited staff capacity has led to shifts in services or response priorities, such as deprioritizing non-criminal medical calls.

POLICING PARTNERSHIPS IN THE PACIFIC: CHINA’S LAW-ENFORCEMENT COOPERATION WITH PACIFIC ISLAND COUNTRIES

By Virginia Comolli | Martin Thorley

Over the past two decades, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has significantly expanded its role as a provider of foreign law enforcement assistance and policing cooperation. What began primarily as targeted support linked to diplomatic competition and counterterrorism has evolved into a more systematic and geographically dispersed portfolio of activities. Today, the PRC supplies equipment, infrastructure, training and, in some cases, operational support to police forces across Asia, Africa, Latin America and, increasingly,
the Pacific Islands. In the Pacific, this engagement has grown markedly in the last ten years in both scope and political sensitivity. Initial efforts centred on infrastructure development and training exchanges, but in several countries these have developed into more sustained and, at times, operationally embedded relationships. As
a result, policing cooperation – traditionally viewed as a largely technical area – has become more closely intertwined with broader questions of influence, security and geopolitics in the region. This trajectory reflects broader global patterns in China’s law enforcement engagement, which is shaped by a combination of external and domestic objectives. Internationally, assistance serves to cultivate diplomatic partnerships, expand political influence, secure support in multilateral forums, and reinforce state authority abroad. At the same time, it advances domestic priorities: protecting Chinese nationals and investments overseas, engaging and monitoring diaspora communities, countering transnational threats and projecting the image of a state capable of safeguarding its citizens globally.

Under Xi Jinping’s Comprehensive National Security Concept and the Global Security Initiative (GSI), the boundary between internal and external security has increasingly blurred, positioning foreign law enforcement cooperation as an instrument through which Beijing seeks to shape its external environment in ways that reinforce domestic stability. Against this backdrop, this report finds that Chinese policing assistance and cooperation in the South Pacific is: Politically differentiated, ranging from infrastructure grants to formal security frameworks. Institutionally layered, combining central direction with provincial actors and diaspora-linked networks. Strategically consequential, reshaping regional security dynamics without necessarily displacing traditional partners. Operationally assertive in some contexts.

Keeping Us Safe: Rethinking policing, harm and justice,

By Runnymede Trust

Keeping Us Safe: Rethinking policing, harm and justice, is a major new report calling for a fundamental shift in how the UK approaches safety, harm prevention and justice.

Drawing on nationally representative polling of 5,405 people in England and Wales, alongside in-depth community-based qualitative research, the report finds strong public support for social investment over punitive enforcement when given nuanced choices.

Key findings from the national polling include:

More than half (52%) think investing in public and social services would do more to prevent crime than increasing police powers (18% disagree, the rest are unsure). Half (50%) of the public believe investing in public and social services would do more to prevent crime than increasing the number of police officers (22% disagree, the rest are unsure). Keeping Us Safe critiques the dominant political and media framing that more police and more policing powers are common-sense solutions to social issues. It argues that binary polling questions obscure these nuances and reinforce a narrow public narrative that equates safety with police presence.

In the report, we trace modern British policing to its colonial origins, finding that contemporary policing continues to reproduce racial injustices through stop and search, punitive practices in educational settings, policing the border, mental health detentions and the overrepresentation of Black and racialised communities in the criminal legal system.

We argue that despite decades of inquiries and reform efforts, including high-profile reviews into institutional racism - from the 1999 Macpherson Report which found ‘institutional racism’ in the Metropolitan Police, to the 2023 Casey Review which identified a culture of racism, misogyny, and homophobia - attempts to reform policing have failed to address systemic issues. Instead, it argues, reform has often individualised racism as a matter of ‘bad apples’, leaving structures which produce inequality intact.

Police spending reached £19.9 billion last year, while youth services, mental health provision, housing support and community infrastructure face chronic underfunding.

Across six key areas (‘serious youth violence’, education, housing and homelessness, border enforcement, gender-based violence and mental health), the research finds that policing often deepens harm and fails to address root causes such as poverty, social exclusion, trauma and racism. It highlights community-led models already in practice, including: transformative justice practices that address harm without reproducing
violence, grounded in care, consent and collective accountability; reparative justice approaches that acknowledge and seek redress for historic and ongoing harms caused by racism, colonialism and slavery
and the inequalities they produced; restorative justice initiatives that empower survivors and create genuine opportunities for people who’ve caused harm to take responsibility and repair relationships; healing justice models that recognise harm as both systemic and interpersonal and treat healing as part of a collective political project.

The report sets out a series of ‘non-reformist reforms’ designed to build safer, more resilient communities. These include investing in teachers and pastoral support; ending school exclusions and the Prevent Duty; overhauling the Mental Health Act to end the use of police in responding to people in crisis; and an end to the No Recourse to Public Funds policy.

Keeping Us Safe concludes that safety does not begin with enforcement but with meeting people’s basic needs. It calls for a redistribution of public resources away from punitive systems and towards harm prevention, collective care and accountability.