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A Primer in Private Security: Revived edition

By Mahesh Nalla and Graeme Newman

This book brings together for the first time the research on personnel management, corporate culture, and situational crime prevention to offer an exciting new perspective on private security. It is paradigm-breaking. Yet it manages to achieve a level of clarity and simplicity that would be the envy of any introductory text. As Ronald V. Clarke notes in his foreword, Law enforcement can no longer serve as the dominant paradigm for private security. This book identifies valuable legal and scientific concepts, such as situational prevention, risk management, and employee screening. These are explained with depth and clarity, which makes the book valuable not just for security professionals but also for students who require a brief but cogent introduction to the world of security. The book fills an important gap in the security literature. It will reach a broader audience than existing texts and will contribute to the greater professionalism for which the industry is striving.

Read-Me.Org Inc. New York-Philadelphia-Australia. 2025. 183p.

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Examining the Reasons Why Individuals Want and Do Not Want a Career in Policing

By Weston J. Morrow, Samuel G. Vickovic, and Emilie Whitehouse

Police departments across the country have and continue to experience staffing challenges in full-time sworn officers. In an effort to address this issue, previous research has examined the motivations for becoming police officers, or why people want to become officers. An equally important question that may help with recruitment and staffing efforts among police agencies is ‘Why do people not want to become police officers?’ The current study fills this void using Qualtrics Panel data from 2,000 respondents across the United States. In doing so, this study (1) contributes to the existing body of research on reasons people choose a career in policing, (2) adds insight to the limited body of research that examines why people do not want a career in policing, and (3) provides nuance to this discussion by examining racial, ethnic, and gender variations in these outcomes. The practical and policy implications of these findings are explored within the context of previous and ongoing research to help address police staffing challenges.

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Age, Criminal Thinking, and Disciplinary Infractions in Federal Prison Inmates: Testing a Mediation Hypothesis

By Glenn D. Walters

The intent of this study was to determine whether two features of antisocial thought process, proactive and reactive criminal thinking, mediate the age-disciplinary infractions relationship in prison inmates. Participants were 2,487 male inmates admitted to a medium security federal prison sometime between 2003 and 2010. Analyzing both total and aggressive disciplinary infraction data, it was discovered that whereas the proactive (planned, calculated, amoral) features of criminal thought process mediated the age-infractions relationship, the reactive (impulsive, irresponsible, emotional) features did not. Results from this study suggest that one way advancing age may contribute to declining disciplinary infractions in prison is that older inmates are less likely than younger inmates to employ the planned, calculated, and amoral aspects of antisocial cognition. Whether this stems from age-related decrements in antisocial cognition awaits further study using changes in criminal thinking over time.

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Incorporating Subjectively-Derived Behavioral Responses into Traditional Tests of Criminal Decision-Making: A Research Note

By Jeff A. Bouffard, Nicole Niebuhr, and M. Lyn Exum

In the study of criminal decision-making, researchers commonly present participants with a hypothetical offending scenario and ask how likely participants would be to engage in a list of behavioral responses predetermined by the researchers. Recently, scholars have questioned the use of predetermined response sets and argued instead that participants should be allowed to self-report their own behavioral responses. Using a hypothetical assault scenario presented to separate samples of incarcerated persons and university students, the current study invited participants to evaluate a traditional, predetermined (PD) list of behavioral response options and also to report any additional subjectively-derived (SD) behaviors in which they might engage. The study then explored the added value of including the SD responses. Results indicate that in a few cases, the use of the additional SD response revealed novel behaviors not captured in the list of PD behaviors (mostly alternative forms of prosocial behaviors). Furthermore, when novel SD behaviors were reported, they generally were not the behaviors that participants indicated they would be most likely to actually engage in. Mindful of these findings, the value of SD responses in the study of criminal decision-making is discussed.

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A People's Handbook of Surveillance New York

Summary

In this handbook, researchers from Morgan State University and the Surveillance Technology Oversight Project (S.T.O.P.) expose how New York City has become a pervasive surveillance state that tracks residents' every movement through public and private spaces without consent. Rather than enhancing public safety, this vast network of surveillance technologies threatens civil liberties, reinforces racial inequities, and undermines democratic freedoms while operating with minimal oversight or transparency.

Key Findings Include:

  • Pervasive surveillance without consent: New Yorkers are tracked from the moment they leave their homes through an extensive network of CCTV cameras, license plate readers, facial recognition systems, ShotSpotter gunshot detectors, and data collection from transit cards, bike shares, and WiFi kiosks; most without their knowledge or consent.

  • Systematic racial bias and overpolicing: Surveillance technologies are disproportionately deployed in communities of color, creating feedback loops that perpetuate overpolicing.

  • Vulnerable populations face heightened risks: Justice-involved individuals, undocumented immigrants, public housing residents, and those seeking reproductive or gender-affirming care face amplified surveillance threats that can result in re-incarceration, deportation, eviction, or prosecution for accessing legal healthcare.

  • Inaccurate and unaccountable technologies: ShotSpotter alerts result in evidence of actual gunshots only 20% of the time in NYC, yet the city renewed its $21.8 million contract. The NYPD has used facial recognition in 22,000 cases between 2017-2021 despite documented accuracy problems and racial bias.

  • Weak oversight and transparency: New York's POST Act provides limited oversight only over NYPD surveillance, with no enforcement power. Unlike other jurisdictions with comprehensive surveillance ordinances, New York lacks meaningful public input, independent oversight, or restrictions on surveillance technology procurement and use.

  • Threats to democracy and civil liberties: Surveillance of activists and protesters chills free speech and assembly. The technology enables tracking of individuals seeking abortion care, attending religious services, or engaging in political activities; fundamentally threatening democratic participation.

  • Public-private surveillance partnerships: Companies like Amazon (Ring), Cubic (OMNY), and others collect vast amounts of personal data that can be accessed by law enforcement, extending police surveillance capacity through private networks while avoiding public accountability.

In the handbook, we call for comprehensive surveillance oversight ordinances, community engagement in technology decisions, and a fundamental shift toward privacy-protective data collection practices that prioritize civil liberties over mass surveillance.

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Sudan: Overview of Corruption and Anti-Corruption: A Focus on Agriculture, Environment, and the Energy Sector

By Miloš Resimić

Omar al-Bashir’s thirty-year rule transformed Sudan into a kleptocratic state where public resources were systematically diverted to regime cronies, family members and armed actors. A transitional civilian-military government was formed after his ousting in 2019 but was disrupted by a military coup in 2021. The failure to agree on a new governance structure led to the outbreak of civil war in April 2023. Military and paramilitary actors now dominate key sectors of the economy through vast networks of affiliated companies with preferential access to public funds and resources. Agriculture, the energy sector and the environment are vulnerable to corruption, marked by land grabbing, secretive investment deals, diversion of state funds and institutional capture that enables environmental degradation.

Bergen: U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre, Chr. Michelsen Institute. , U4 Help Desk,2025. 35p.

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Corruption Risks in Land-Based Solutions to Climate Change: A Focus on Reforestation and Afforestation Projects

By Caitlin Maslen

“Nature-based” solutions to climate change require the acquisition of large swaths of land for reforestation, afforestation, conservation and renewable energy sources. However, corruption in the land sector is already widespread and this additional demand for land may aggravate pre-existing corruption risks, as well as causing new ones. National governments and project implementers of land-based solutions should therefore implement anti-corruption measures in projects and, most importantly, ensure that they take into account the communities (such as Indigenous Peoples) who may already live on the land.

Bergen: U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre, Chr. Michelsen Institute. , U4 Help Desk,, 2023. 24p.

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Corruption Risks in the Conservation and Restoration of Wetlands: A Focus on Peatlands and Mangroves

By Caitlin Maslen

Wetlands are vital ecosystems that play a crucial role in carbon sequestration while supporting the livelihoods of communities worldwide. However, they face growing threats from extractive industries, urban expansion, illegal logging and other destructive activities. Protecting these ecosystems requires countering corruption through transparency and accountability measures. In doing so, this can help wetlands continue to sustain local communities and wildlife, and contribute to nature-based solutions for curbing climate change.

Bergen: U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre, Chr. Michelsen Institute. , U4 Help Desk,2025. 31p.

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Cuba: Corruption and Anti-Corruption

By Maria Leonor Rodriguez Prat

In Cuba, the economic crisis and resource scarcity contribute to petty corruption, while opaque institutions and military control over key economic sectors enable forms of grand corruption. Cuba’s partial financial isolation both limits and obscures illicit inflows, but select recent cases indicate a growing vulnerability to transnational money laundering. While formal anti-corruption frameworks exist in Cuba, enforcement remains highly selective and politicised, particularly in cases involving state and military elites.

Bergen: U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre, Chr. Michelsen Institute. , U4 Help Desk,2025, 29p.

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Border Corruption Across the Western Balkans Region

By Nieves Zúñiga, Jamie Bergin

The Western Balkans is a transit region for smuggling of migrants, trafficking in persons and illicit trade. These illicit activities often perpetrated by organised criminal groups lead to heightened risks of corruption among border officers and customs officials. Dedicated policy responses to border corruption are generally underdeveloped, but there are some emerging positive developments at the national level as well as increasing regional cooperation efforts.

Bergen: U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre, Chr. Michelsen Institute. , U4 Help Desk, 2025. 33p

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Complexities in Defining and Investigating Financial Crime, Illicit Financial Flows and Devlopment in SOutheast Asia

By Jamie Bergin

Despite challenges in defining and measuring illicit financial flows (IFFs), academic and policy circles have increasingly recognised their negative effects on development, including by reducing domestic resource mobilisation and distorting markets, but also by facilitating predicate crimes that wreak wider harms. Evidence indicates that IFFs similarly undermine recent levels of economic growth and security in the region of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). 

Bergen: U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre, Chr. Michelsen Institute. , U4 Help Desk,2025. 58p

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The Impact of Financial Fraud in Colorado

By Thomas Young

Financial fraud is on the rise nationally. Across all 50 states and D.C., the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) Internet Crime report tracked 859,532 fraud claims in 2024. These claims resulted in $16.6 billion in financial loss, up 33% from 2023. A separate source, the Federal Trade Commission’s (FTC) Consumer Sentinel Network, reported 2.6 million fraud cases in 2024, of which 38% involved losing money. According to this source, citizens reported losing $12 billion to fraud, up $2 billion from 2023. This study seeks to answer the pressing question: What is the extent of financial fraud in Colorado and its impact on the lives of everyday Coloradans and the overall health of the state’s economy?

According to the Colorado Department of Public Safety, reported fraud cases summed to 75,119 from 2022 through 2024. Financial fraud is also costly, with the FTC reporting the total financial loss of financial fraud at $211 million statewide in 2024, up 314% since 2020. The FBI reported $244 million in losses from online (formally referred to as cyber-enabled) crime in Colorado, up 142% since 2020. These are just the reported figures. Unreported loss from financial fraud is higher.

The FBI reports that among all states Colorado ranks 34th best in total losses from online crime; 44th best in online crime per 100,000 citizens; 33rd best for complaints filed by individuals 60+; and 34th best for cryptocurrency losses by state. The FTC Consumer Sentinel Network figures on fraud, identity theft, and telemarketing suggests Colorado is doing slightly better than the FBI’s statistics. Colorado has the 32nd lowest rate of fraud and the 24th lowest rate of identity theft by their metrics.

In Colorado and across the nation, fraudulent financial activity is becoming increasingly sophisticated, encompassing a broad array of schemes such as identity theft, phishing, wire fraud, investment scams, and elder financial abuse. As the digital economy expands and cybercriminal tactics evolve, Coloradans face heightened risks from fraud schemes that attempt to exploit personal vulnerabilities, holes in financial systems, social media platforms, payment technologies, and personal data security. Fraudulent activities result not only in direct financial losses for individuals, businesses, and financial institutions, but they also have ripple effects throughout the state’s economy—affecting prices, consumer behavior, public safety expenditures, and overall economic productivity. 

This report presents evidence of the economic consequences of financial fraud, covering both the direct and indirect costs of fraudulent activity by examining incident data, economic modeling, and a fraud case study. By analyzing trends in fraud—including the types, methods, and demographic factors associated with its presence—it aims to provide policymakers, businesses, and consumers with actionable insights into the economic stakes of financial fraud.

Key Findings

  • For the state of Colorado, CSI estimates in 2025 the losses from financial fraud include—

  •  An estimated $375 million in direct, reported losses

  • An estimated $2.5 billion in unreported losses

  • The state’s General Fund will lose an estimated $88 million in tax revenue this year due to financial fraud.

  • CSI estimates reported fraud alone will have the following impact on Colorado’s economy in 2025:

    • A $954 million reduction in state GDP

    • A $932 million reduction in statewide personal income

    • A loss of approximately 6,628 jobs

  • Estimates on the reporting of financial fraud suggest formal reporting of financial fraud may be quite low, with one estimate putting the figure at 14%. This means that most financial fraud does not get reported to government authorities.

  • CSI estimates all financial fraud, reported and unreported, will have the following impact on Colorado’s economy in 2025:

  • A $5.1 billion reduction in state GDP ($856 per person)

  • A $3.9 billion reduction in statewide personal income ($655 per person)

  • A loss of approximately 16,374 jobs (0.5% of nonfarm jobs)

  • Financial fraud has wide-ranging economic implications. The impact is felt across consumer spending, interest rates, available loanable funds, capital investment, government spending and taxing, profit, and community trust.

  • Colorado’s incidence of financial fraud is around the middle of the states at 18th highest, at 1,260 reported incidents per 100,000 residents, lower than 17th ranked California at 1,291 and 19th ranked Mississippi at 1,221. The states with the highest incidence of financial fraud are Florida and Georgia with rates that are 72% and 67% higher than Colorado’s. 

Greenwood Village,  CO: Common Sense Institute 2025. 24p.

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Safer Opioid Supply, Subsequent Drug Decriminalization, and Opioid Overdoses

By Hai V. Nguyen, Shweta Mital, Shawn Bugden, Pharm; et al

Importance British Columbia, Canada, was the first and only jurisdiction globally to implement a province-wide safer supply policy, which offered pharmaceutical grade opioids to individuals at risk of opioid overdose, followed by the decriminalization of drug possession. Supporters of the safer supply policy argue that this policy could save lives by offering pharmaceutical-grade opioids to people who use toxic street drugs. Similarly, proponents of decriminalization suggest that decriminalizing drug possession could reduce drug overdoses by reducing stigma associated with drug use and enabling persons who use drugs to seek addictions treatment. However, critics of both policies believe that providing safer opioids and removing penalties for drug possession may worsen the crisis. Currently, there is limited evidence on the health impacts of these policies.

Objective To assess the association of British Columbia’s adoption of the safer supply policy and subsequent decriminalization of drug possession with opioid overdose hospitalizations and deaths.

Design, Setting, and Participants This observational cohort study used synthetic difference-in-differences analysis with quarterly province-level data to compare prepolicy and postpolicy changes in British Columbia with those in other Canadian provinces that did not implement these policies. The study period spanned from quarter 1 of 2016 to quarter 4 of 2023.

Exposure Safer opioid supply policy implemented in March 2020 and decriminalization of drug possession implemented in January 2023.

Main Outcomes and Measures Opioid-poisoning hospitalizations and apparent opioid-related toxicity deaths, measured as number per 100 000 population.

Results The safer supply policy alone was associated with an increase of 1.66 opioid hospitalizations per 100 000 population (95% CI, 0.41-2.92; P = .009) or 33%. The addition of drug possession decriminalization was associated with a further increase of 1.27 opioid hospitalizations per 100 000 population (95% CI, 0.05-2.50; P = .046) for an overall 58% increase compared with the period before the safer supply policy was in effect. There was insufficient evidence to conclusively attribute an increase in opioid overdose deaths to these policy changes.

Conclusions and Relevance This cohort study found that neither the safer supply policy nor the subsequent decriminalization of drug possession appeared to alleviate the opioid crisis. Instead, both were associated with an increase in opioid overdose hospitalizations. The observed increase in opioid hospitalizations, without a corresponding increase in opioid deaths, may reflect greater willingness to seek medical assistance because decriminalization could reduce the stigma associated with drug use. However, it is also possible that reduced stigma and removal of criminal penalties facilitated the diversion of safer opioids, contributing to increased hospitalizations.

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Estimates of Illicit Opioid Use in the US

By David Powell; Mireille Jacobson

IMPORTANCE Illicit opioids, particularly illicitly manufactured fentanyl (IMF), are major contributors to overdose deaths in the US. Understanding the prevalence and characteristics of illicit opioid use is crucial for addressing the opioid crisis. OBJECTIVE To estimate the prevalence of illicit opioid use, including IMF, and initial opioid exposure among those reporting illicit opioid use. DESIGN, SETTING, AND PARTICIPANTS This cross-sectional study was conducted using an online survey with targeted demographic quotas from June 10, 2024, to June 17, 2024. A total of 1515 participants aged 18 years and older from the US completed the survey. The analysis was conducted between June 30, 2024, and February 13, 2025. MAIN OUTCOMES AND MEASURES The primary outcome was self-reported illicit opioid use within the past 12 months. Secondary outcomes included initial exposure to opioids and perceived likelihood of overdose. Logistic regression was used to analyze associations with demographic and geographic factors. RESULTS A total of 1515 respondents completed the survey, including 770 female individuals (50.8%), 20 American Indian or Alaska Native (1.3%), 101 Asian or Pacific Islander (6.7%), 215 Black (14.2%), 1087 White (81.7%), and 24 multiracial (1.6%); 186 (12.3%) were aged 18 to 24, 242 (16.0%) 25 to 34, 327 (21.6%) 35 to 44, 280 (18.5%) 45 to 54, 281 (18.5%) 55 to 64, 139 (9.2%) 65 to 74, and 60 (4.0%) 75 to 84 years. Among this sample, 166 (10.96%; 95% CI, 9.38%-12.52%) reported nonprescription opioid use within the past 12 months, including 114 (7.52%; 95% CI, 6.20%-8.85%) of the 1515 respondents reporting IMF use. Among those reporting nonprescription opioid use within the past 12 months, 65 (39.16%; 95% CI, 31.73%-46.58%) reported that their first opioid use involved opioids prescribed to them, whereas 60 (36.14%; 95% CI, 28.84%-43.45%) reported that their first use involved prescription opioids not prescribed to them. Only 41 (24.70%; 95% CI, 18.14%-31.26%) answered that their first exposure involved illicit opioids. Seventy-one (4.69%; 95% CI, 3.62%-5.75%) of all respondents reported that it was very likely they would have an overdose due to opioid use. This rate increased to 33.33% (95% CI, 24.68%-41.99%) among those who had used IMF within the past 12 months. Illicit opioid use was higher among men, Black respondents, and younger age groups. CONCLUSIONS AND RELEVANCE The findings of this cross-sectional study indicate a higher prevalence of illicit opioid use than previously reported, highlighting the need for more timely and accurate data to inform policy and intervention strategies.

JAMA Health Forum; 2025

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Fentanyl at the Gates: Comparing Large Seizures at the U.S.–Mexican and U.S.–Canadian Borders

By Jonathan P. Caulkins, Bishu Giri

Illegally manufactured fentanyl (IMF) kills enormous numbers of people in the U.S. and Canada. Since the emergence of modern heroin markets in the late 1960s, supply control has been associated with meaningful reductions in opioid use and harms in at least six cases worldwide. However, countering supply effectively depends on understanding what the dominant drug-trafficking routes are. New data on fentanyl seizures presented here largely reinforce previous understanding that most IMF enters the U.S. from the south. These data call into question tariffs and other policies and policy justifications that treat the threat from the northern border as comparably severe.

U.S. counties bordering Mexico and Canada show significantly higher rates of large fentanyl seizures, compared with counties that do not border our foreign neighbors—where “large” is defined as over a kilogram of powder or more than 1,000 pills, quantities indicative of wholesale trafficking. The 80 counties along the land borders recorded 2,461 large seizures between 2013 and 2024, averaging about 31 per county, while the other 3,064 counties documented 12,358 seizures, averaging only 4 per county. By weight, of all the fentanyl in those big land-border seizures in 2013–24, about 99% of the pills and 97% of the powder were found along the border with Mexico; by comparison, large seizures along the Canadian border are relatively rare. If we look at the recent years—2023 and 2024—distributions remain the same. San Diego County, California, leads in powder-form large fentanyl seizures; and Pima County, Arizona, records the highest volume of pill-form large fentanyl seizures.Drugs seized could be in transit to other places, or they might be intended for local consumption. Therefore, it is useful to contrast a county’s share of large seizures with its share of the population, which serves as a proxy for the size of the local market. Counties along the Mexican border account for only 2.35% of the U.S. population; but in 2023–24, they hosted about 40% of the nationwide quantity of fentanyl appearing in large seizures, for both powder and pills. By contrast, counties in the lower 48 states that border Canada account for 3.1% of the U.S. population but only 1.2% of the powder and just 0.5% of the pills obtained in large seizures.

To determine which counties look like import or transit centers, we developed a Disproportionality Index (DI), which compares a county’s proportion of large seizures against its proportion of the national population. On that scale, 1.0 means that seizures are proportionate to local population; below 1.0 indicates less than expected; and over 1.0 indicates more seizures than expected. Because of random fluctuations, a county can be a bit above or below 1.0, but we consider DIs above 2.5 noteworthy.

The counties with the highest DIs for 2023–24 were along the U.S.–Mexican border. For example, Imperial County, California, had a DI of 111 for fentanyl pills and 100 for powder. In contrast, in the county along the Canadian border with the greatest number of large seizures (Wayne County, Michigan, home of Detroit), the DIs were 0.5 for pills and 1.9 for powder, yielding an average DI of less than 2.0.

Only three other counties or collections of counties along the Canadian border had an average DI greater than 1. One (Okanagan County, Washington) stemmed from drugs seized from a Mexican-led organized-crime group that was supplying populations near the Canadian border. Another cluster (Juneau and Ketchikan) was suggestive of Alaska markets possibly being supplied from Canada. The third (Whatcom County, Washington) was locally significant (DI of 2.2 for powder) but small overall (Whatcom County accounted for just 0.15% of total powder seized).

Efforts to counter drug flows need to be grounded in data. The analysis here contradicts views—such as those used to justify certain tariffs—that treat the flows across the southern and northern borders as being comparably important.[1]

New York: Manhattan Institute, 2025. 15p.

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Recidivism and crash risk among California’s drug-involved DUI offenders

By Ainsley L. Mitchum, Sam Stevens, and Bayliss J. Camp

The present study builds upon prior work by Marowitz (1996) by examining the crash and recidivism risk of alcohol-focused versus drug-involved driving under the influence (DUI) offenders. Although drug-involved DUI offenders remain a relatively small proportion of all DUI offenders, this proportion is rising, as is the proportion of impaired-driving fatal crashes involving drugs. Using a cohort of offenders arrested during calendar years 2014 through 2017, comparisons were drawn for the one-year periods pre- and post-arrest. Drug-involved offenders tended to have more problematic driving histories in the year prior to their index offense, as compared to alcohol-focused offenders. Even taking account of these differences in pre-arrest behavior, drug-involved offenders continued to have more problematic driving in the year subsequent to their index offense: they were twice as likely to be involved in a crash, and approximately 30% more likely to recidivate. A particularly powerful predictor of recidivism was whether or not a pre-conviction administrative per se (APS) license suspension – only available in instances where an offender is above the per se blood alcohol concentration (BAC) limit, or refuses a chemical test – was imposed. Offenders convicted of a DUI offense, but against whom no APS license action was initiated, were more than three times as likely to recidivate compared to offenders against whom an APS action was taken.

Sacramento: California Office of Traffic Safety; 2025. 78p.

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China’s exploitation of scam centers in Southeast Asia

By U.S.-CHINA ECONOMIC AND SECURITY REVIEW COMMISSION

Summary:

This Commission Spotlight examines how China-linked scam centers are fueling corruption and violence in Southeast Asia, paving the way for greater Chinese influence in the region, and directly harming Americans in the process. Its findings are based on the Commission’s March 2025 hearing on “Crossroads of Competition: China in Southeast Asia and the Pacific Islands”; fact-finding trips to the Philippines, Indonesia, Vietnam, and Cambodia; and open source research.

Key Findings:

Chinese criminal networks operate industrial-scale scam centers across Southeast Asia that steal tens of billions of dollars annually from people around the world—a massive criminal enterprise that rivals the global drug trade in scale and sophistication.

The Chinese criminals behind scam centers have built ties—some overt, some deniable—to the Chinese government by embracing patriotic rhetoric, supporting China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and promoting pro-Beijing propaganda overseas. As a result, Chinese crime syndicates have expanded across Southeast Asia with, at a minimum, implicit backing from elements of the Chinese government.

The spread of China-linked scam compounds in Southeast Asia is fueling corruption and violence, promoting human trafficking, undermining the ability of governments in the region to control what happens in their territory, and promoting human trafficking.

China is exploiting the problem of scam compounds to increase its leverage over Southeast Asian governments, conduct intelligence and influence operations, and expand its security footprint in the region.

Beijing has selectively cracked down on scam centers that target Chinese victims, leading Chinese criminal organizations to conclude that they can make greater profits with lower risk by targeting citizens of wealthy countries such as the United States.

Americans are now among the top global targets of China-linked scam centers, with an estimated $5 billion lost to online scams in 2024 alone—a 42 percent increase over the previous year.

Washington, DC:

U.S.-CHINA ECONOMIC AND SECURITY REVIEW COMMISSION

2025. 12p.

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Organized Crime and National Security in Spain: Challenges and Responses

Organized Crime and National Security in Spain:

Challenges and Responses

Edited by Andrés de Castro

This book offers an analysis of how organized crime operates in Spain and the security apparatus designed to contain it. Organized crime is currently one of the most serious security threats facing democratic societies. Despite its intense presence and the responses that states have articulated in recent decades, little attention has been paid to the measurement of the effectiveness of the means adopted to combat it. Thus, this volume delves into this issue and performs an analysis of the police dimension of the response to organized crime in Spain. Firstly, this volume describes the international phenomenon of organized crime and its evolution in Spain, and continues by analyzing the profile and the characteristics of the different police forces and their resources and capabilities. This book then discusses the consequences of the measures at international level, European Union level, and local level, in relation to other police forces. Finally, the volume addresses the legal and public policy efforts that Spanish Law Enforcement Agencies have made in supervising or regulating their own police forces, which is necessary to carry out a detailed analysis of the consequences on the presence and strength of organized crime in the structures, strategies and decisions that Spain adopted over the last decades. As a result, this book builds on and updates the previous work by international scholars and proposes an interesting methodology that can contribute to the advancement of security studies.

London; New York: Routledge, 2025. 265p.

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Visions of Global Environmental Justice: Comunidades Negras and the War on Drugs in Colombia

Visions of Global Environmental Justice:

Comunidades Negras and the War on Drugs in Colombia

By Alexander Huezo

Focusing on the lived experiences of Afro-Colombians processing and resisting violence against their ecological communities, Visions of Global Environmental Justice employs accounts of the supernatural narratively and analytically to frame a contemporary struggle for environmental justice. The book applies Achille Mbembe’s theorization of necropolitics to the environmental racism of the US War on Drugs in Colombia, specifically the aerial eradication of coca in the comunidades negras of the Pacific Coast. Through critical examination and deconstruction of transnational mythmaking and local oral tradition, Visions of Global Environmental Justice illustrates that non/humans rendered expendable by US-driven drug (necro)politics are indispensable to both the conceptualization and the realization of environmental justice globally. Far from being a study singularly focused on the symptoms of environmental issues, this book creatively guides us toward a broader understanding of environmental racism and justice across geographic scales and non/human agencies.

Oakland, CA; University of California Press, 2025

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Digital Surveillance in Africa: Power, Agency, and Rights

Edited by Tony Roberts and Admire Mare

Media coverage and scholarly research on digital surveillance has focused primarily on the USA and Europe. Everyone knows about Cambridge Analytica’s social media surveillance; Edward Snowden’s revelations of the West’s mass internet and phone surveillance; and Pegasus Spyware’s mobile phone surveillance of activists, journalists, judges, and presidents across the world. Comparatively little is known about the millions of dollars now being spent on digital technologies for use in the illegal and illegitimate surveillance of citizens in Africa. In this open-access third volume of Bloomsbury’s Digital Africa series, a broad range of African and European scholars and practitioners map the development, procurement and (mis)use of the ever-expanding suite of digital surveillance and policing technologies across the continent. Drawing on the empirically rich, theoretically sophisticated research of the African Digital Rights Network, this book examines how public and private actors in Africa use spyware, mobile phone extraction, biometric and face recognition systems, and other technologies for smart-city and other social, and social-control, applications. Eight chapters examine eight African countries, and each of these begins with a thorough political history of the nature of surveillance there under colonial and post-liberation political settlements. This enables new analyses of the socio-cultural, political, and economic drivers and characteristics of contemporary digital surveillance in each country, all of which ultimately leads to concrete policy recommendations at local, national, and international levels. For its empirical richness and breadth, as well as its theoretical sophistication, Digital Surveillance in Africa is essential reading for anyone interested in contemporary African studies, and it is of keen interest to anyone concerned with how digital surveillance affects everyday lives across the world. The ebook editions of this book are available open access under a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 licence on bloomsburycollections.com.

London: Zed Books, 2025. 240p.

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