By Laura Chiang, Stephanie Miedema, Janet Saul, James Mercy, Andrew Brooks, Alexander Butchart, Gretchen Bachman, Jennifer Hegle, Daniela Ligiero, Joseph Logan, Greta Massetti

Violence against children is a pervasive global public health and human rights issue, with 1 billion children experiencing at least one form of violence annually. Extensive scientific literature shows childhood adversity, including sexual violence, to be directly and indirectly associated with a host of health and social consequences with a dose–response effect, consequential intergenerational impacts, and sizeable economic ramifications. There is a dearth of population data on the prevalence of childhood sexual violence as well as its antecedents and health and social outcomes, which has hampered violence prevention and child protection efforts globally and locally. Population data are critical, alongside administrative data systems and statistical definitions and classification schemes, for governments to adequately begin addressing violence against children. The absence of national prevalence data has resulted in limited information to guide national policies and prevention strategies, monitor trends, and evaluate prevention efforts. Globally, lack of data on the epidemiological patterns of violence against children has resulted in deficient prioritisation for preventing and responding to this critical problem. Violence Against Children and Youth Surveys (VACS) collect comprehensive data on violence and have been implemented in over 23 countries in Africa, Asia, the Caribbean, Europe and Latin America since 2007. VACS have also been repeated in three countries: Zimbabwe (2011; 2017), Kenya (2010; 2019) and Eswatini (2007; 2022). VACS provide extensive data on the prevalence and contexts of all forms of violence, including sexual violence, therefore allowing for targeted prevention and response efforts. VACS further provide the global research community with data to examine the epidemiological patterns of childhood sexual violence across countries and regions. VACS data have raised awareness and improved understanding of childhood sexual violence in many countries worldwide, and thereby catalysed action. This article draws on VACS reports and empirical publications, to summarise and describe patterns in childhood sexual violence across countries that have completed VACS and shed light on the global prevalence of childhood sexual violence.

BMJ Paediatr Open, 2024. 3p.

By The Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime

   The illegal wildlife trade (henceforth IWT) is one of the world’s most lucrative criminal activitiesand much of the trade takes place online. The phenomenon has tremendously harmful effects on biodiversity and animal welfare, while it also exacerbates the risk of spreading zoonic diseases.2 Most online IWT occurs in the open online space – on e-commerce platforms, social media and messenger services such as WhatsApp – where sellers freely showcase wildlife or wildlife products to potential buyers. The ease with which illegal advertisements can be found online reflects the high level of impunity (and the low level of risk) enjoyed by those engaged in the trade.3 The online illegal wildlife trade is characterized by several key trends. First, traffickers exploit a diverse array of online platforms, spanning social media, marketplaces, messaging apps and encrypted channels to market and distribute illegal wildlife products. Second, online IWT is characterized by global reach, transcending geographical boundaries and regulatory jurisdictions, thereby making enforcement of wildlife protection laws a complex undertaking. Finally, the phenomenon has led to the fragmentation of traditional supply chains, with small-scale traders and individual sellers operating alongside larger criminal syndicates. Having a larger number of potential targets makes it difficult for law enforcement to efficiently prioritize and dismantle trafficking networks.5 Defining online illegal wildlife trade Recent publications have shed light on the alarming surge in IWT occurring on the internet.6 A significant hindrance in combating this crime is the dearth of data regarding the scale of the market, its dynamics, modus operandi and resultant consequences, especially on a global scale. To address this issue, ECO-SOLVE is developing a Global Monitoring System to monitor online IWT systematically and to gather global data to feed into law enforcement action and to inform policymaking. By identifying areas of high pressure on endangered species and ecosystems, surveillance activities can enable targeted interventions to prosecute traffickers and wider criminal networks

involved in this trade. Consistent monitoring may help to detect emerging trends and shifts in IWT, allowing for timely responses to new threats and challenges. This is the first in a series of Global Trend Reports, which will be published during the three year ECO-SOLVE project. Two or three of these reports will be published every year, to highlight important trends in online IWT and to contextualize these trends. Drawing on findings generated by the Global Monitoring System – a network of AI enabled ‘data hubs’ in key countries, which monitor online IWT – each Global Trend Report will showcase the latest trends in statistical data, specifically the number of adverts found, the numbers and types of species advertised and the number of platforms that host these adverts. Diving deeper into individual topics, these reports will offer regional breakdowns and include sections that contextualize and analyze findings, while also investigating changes in regulations and their effects on online IWT as well as trends in law enforcement. The reports will also discuss case studies of online IWT. This first report will set the stage for reports to come. It will review past trends in efforts to monitor the online IWT, trends in regulation and other government policies towards IWT, and the evolving role of civil society and law enforcement in responding to the phenomenon.   

Geneva, SWIT: The Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2024. 26p.

By  Council for Court Excellence and Office of the D.C. Auditor

While much attention is being paid to youth crime rates in D.C., little is known about the circumstances of justice-involved young people. This report finds that one characteristic many share is involvement in the child welfare system due to parental abuse and neglect. This report examines how effectively the District – and in particular the Child and Family Services Agency (CFSA) and the Department of Youth Rehabilitation Services (DYRS) -- serve young people who have had involvement in both child welfare and youth justice systems, that is, crossover youth. 

The fundamental finding of the audit is that the District lacks a unified approach to addressing the needs of these vulnerable young people. D.C. leaders are unable to accurately identify the number and traits of crossover youth in our community, to coordinate the services being offered or supervision being provided, to target specialized programming for these youth, or provide appropriate resources for their families and caregivers.

The new report includes the following key findings:  

• There is no single unified source of public data related to crossover youth in the District, making it difficult to understand the number and needs of this vulnerable population. 

• CFSA and DYRS undercount the number of crossover youth in their care because they only count dual-jacketed youth, rather than youth involved in both agencies at any point in their lives. CFSA and DYRS identified only 8 crossover youth in FY 2023, while CCE analysis of court records indicated 93 youth at the end of FY2022 were involved with the delinquency system and had current or past child welfare involvement. 

• Crossover youth are essentially invisible to CFSA and DYRS; neither clearly recognizes this population in their current operating documents, systems, policies, or practices, and their rights as justice-involved youth are not clearly identified in the Bill of Rights for Children in Foster Care. This impedes the agencies’ ability to address the special needs and manage cases of these young people, and can leave youth in New Beginnings and other facilities unaware of their rights.

• CFSA and DYRS do not sufficiently collaborate or communicate regarding crossover youth.   

Some of the report’s recommendations include:  

• D.C. Council should ensure the Office of the Ombudsperson for Children (OFC) has sufficient authority and funding to analyze and report on crossover youth annually. 

• CFSA and DYRS should reestablish the “Crossover Youth Steering Committee” to identify, manage and serve crossover youth in their care.

• CFSA and DYRS should identify and track crossover youth in their case management systems.

• CFSA and DRYS staff should be trained on the unique needs of crossover youth. Additionally, parents and foster parents should receive training and resources to help identify and meet the needs of youth who are, or are at risk of becoming, crossover youth. 

Washington, DC: Council for Court Excellence and Office of the D.C. Auditor, 2024. 125p.

By  United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC).

  The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) is proud to present this introductory analysis of darknet-enabled threats against Southeast Asian countries, which has been made possible through strong partnerships with global and regional law enforcement and justice authorities, together with private industry and academia. The report was produced thanks to kind voluntary funding from the Government of Japan. This report assesses the Darkweb from user, criminal and law enforcement perspectives with a particular focus on cybercriminality targeted at Southeast Asian countries. Darknets (i.e. networks on the Darkweb) provide the ideal environment for a wide range of criminal activities. Just as new threats appear on the Clearnet (i.e. the regular Internet), darknets can facilitate similar attacks that provide perpetrators with a greater degree of anonymity. This anonymity makes investigation and prevention more challenging, but still possible. There has been a consistent increase in darknet and Darkweb usage, both for legitimate and illegitimate reasons, whilst the COVID-19 pandemic also appears to have given rise to darknet cybercrime, including by criminals with no previous cyber experience. Despite this, there is an overall paucity of darknet criminality data specific to Southeast Asia. There is little prioritisation of darknet criminality in the region, either in policy or practice. This creates risk from the criminality itself, which is compounded by the limited political, policy and law enforcement response. There is an absolute need for a ministerial lead on cyber affairs, in each country, to ensure that law enforcers receive necessary political support to undertake the most challenging operations. Many criminal activities conducted over darknets are predictable and preventable. UNODC and its partners work hard to address these challenges by supporting and encouraging policy development, research, training and capacity building support in Southeast Asia. Awareness is fundamental for addressing cybercrime. Given, however, the challenges posed by darknets, stakeholders must increase their commitment and cooperation to developing policy, sharing intelligence and enhancing international cooperation to counter darknet crime nationally, regionally and internationally. This UNODC analysis will inform policymakers in Southeast Asia, including through the annual Senior Officials Meeting on Transnational Crime (SOMTC), as well as supporting law enforcement and judicial cooperation, and providing opportunities for darknet-focused crime prevention. 

  2020. 64p.

By Priyanka Goonetilleke, Alex Knorre, Artem Kuriksha

We present a comprehensive description of Hydra, the largest darknet marketplace in the world until its shutdown in April 2022. We document the main features of Hydra such as dead-drop delivery, feedback and reputation system, escrow, and dispute resolution. Using data scraped from the platform, we quantitatively examine the scale and the structure of the marketplace. We find that it has been highly competitive, geographically covering at least 69% of the Russian population and trading a wide variety of drugs, while also allowing the wholesale trade of drugs and precursors. The dead-drop delivery system used on Hydra was expensive, as the courier costs comprised a substantial proportion of the sale price of drugs on Hydra. We contribute to the research on drug cryptomarkets by studying an unprecedentedly large non-Western marketplace that existed substantially longer than any other known darknet market.

Policy Implications

The phenomenon of Hydra shows that shut-down policies applied to darknet marketplaces have a large effect and implicitly shape the whole drug market. Without these policies, a pervasive digitalization of the drug trade can occur. The major cost of allowing marketplaces to grow is the probable increase in the consumption of illegal drugs due to convenience for consumers and facilitated cooperation between suppliers. This cost must be weighed against the potential benefits, including a higher quality of drugs, a decrease in potential violence, and the incentives for a large marketplace to self-regulate. The case of Hydra also suggests the relevance of financial regulation to limit the growth of darknet marketplaces.

Criminology and Public Policy, Volume22, Issue4

Special Issue: Cybercrime and Cybersecurity

November 2023

Pages 735-777

By Adam Clark

Cybersecurity is the practice of protecting IT systems, devices, and the data they hold from unauthorised access and interference (known as cyber attacks). This briefing focuses on policy and legislative efforts to improve the UK’s cybersecurity. It does not discuss cyber in the context of military operations. Cybersecurity policy is a reserved matter, as are many related policy areas such as national security, product safety and consumer protection. In devolved matters, such as education, the devolved administrations have their own strategies for implementing the UK Government’s overarching cyber policy. Who carries out cyber attacks? The cyber threat to the UK comes from a range of actors, including state and state-sponsored groups, financially motivated criminal organisations, and ‘hacktivists’ with political aims. The boundaries between these groups can be unclear. For examples, cyber criminal groups can operate with the implicit backing of states, choose targets for political reasons, or sell their cyber attack services to others (known as ‘as-a-service’ business models). How are cyber attacks carried out? Cyber attacks typically involve malicious software (known as ‘malware’) being executed on the target’s system. Malware is an umbrella term for various types of software designed to damage, disable, and extract data from computer systems. Cyber attackers deliver malware to the target’s IT system by exploiting technical vulnerabilities and human error, then run the malware to achieve their aim (such as stealing or encrypting data). An estimated 95% of cyber attacks succeed because of human error. This includes ‘active’ errors such as opening malicious email attachments and ‘passive’ errors such as using weak passwords. 

Research Briefing.

London: House of Commons Library, 2024. 68p.

By Miranda Bruce, Jonathan Lusthaus, Ridhi Kashyap, Nigel Phair, Federico Varese

Cybercrime is a major challenge facing the world, with estimated costs ranging from the hundreds of millions to the trillions. Despite the threat it poses, cybercrime is somewhat an invisible phenomenon. In carrying out their virtual attacks, offenders often mask their physical locations by hiding behind online nicknames and technical protections. This means technical data are not well suited to establishing the true location of offenders and scholarly knowledge of cybercrime geography is limited. This paper proposes a solution: an expert survey. From March to October 2021 we invited leading experts in cybercrime intelligence/investigations from across the world to participate in an anonymized online survey on the geographical location of cybercrime offenders. The survey asked participants to consider five major categories of cybercrime, nominate the countries that they consider to be the most significant sources of each of these types of cybercrimes, and then rank each nominated country according to the impact, professionalism, and technical skill of its offenders. The outcome of the survey is the World Cybercrime Index, a global metric of cyber-criminality organised around five types of cybercrime. The results indicate that a relatively small number of countries house the greatest cybercriminal threats. These findings partially remove the veil of anonymity around cybercriminal offenders, may aid law enforcement and policymakers in fighting this threat, and contribute to the study of cybercrime as a local phenomenon.

PLOS ONE,  April 10, 2024

https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0297312

By The Australian National Audit Office

Australian Government entities are attractive, high-value targets for a range of malicious cybercriminals because they hold the personal and financial information of Australians. In 2022–23, approximately 31 per cent of cyber security incidents reported to the Australian Signals Directorate (ASD) were from non-corporate Commonwealth entities. Over 40 per cent of these cyber security incidents were coordinated, low-level malicious cyberattacks directed specifically at the Australian government, government shared services, or regulated critical infrastructure. Ransomware was the most destructive cybercrime threat in 2022–23, and continues to pose considerable risk to Australian government entities, businesses and individuals.

Previous audits conducted by the ANAO identified low levels of cyber resilience in entities. Low levels of cyber resilience continue to make entities susceptible to cyberattack and reduce business continuity and recovery prospects following a cyber security incident. An entity’s preparedness to respond to and recover from a cyberattack is a key part of cyber resilience. This audit was conducted to provide assurance to Parliament about the effectiveness of the selected entities’ implementation of arrangements for managing cyber security incidents.

In preparing audit reports to the Parliament on cyber security in Australian Government entities, the interests of accountability and transparency must be balanced with the need to manage cyber security risks. The ASD has advised the ANAO that adversaries use publicly available information about cyber vulnerabilities to more effectively target their malicious activities.

The extent to which this report details the cyber security vulnerabilities of individual entities was a matter of careful consideration during the course of this audit. To assist in appropriately balancing the interests of accountability and potential risk exposure through transparent audit reporting, the ANAO engaged with ASD to better understand the evolving nature and extent of risk exposure that may arise through the disclosure of technical information in the audit report. This report therefore focusses on matters material to the audit findings against the objective and criteria and contains less detailed technical information than previous audits.

Key findings:

• The implementation of arrangements by AUSTRAC and Services Australia to manage cyber security incidents has been partly effective. Neither entity is well placed to ensure business continuity or disaster recovery in the event of a significant or reportable cyber security incident.

• AUSTRAC has partly effective cyber security incident management procedures for investigating, monitoring and responding to cyber security incidents. It has established management structures and a framework of procedures to support these processes. It has not detailed the responsibilities for its Chief Information Security Officer (CISO), its approach to continuous monitoring and improvement reporting, or defined timeframes for reporting to stakeholders.

• Services Australia is partly effective in its design of cyber security incident management procedures. It has established a framework of procedures and an incident response plan. It has not documented an approach to threat and vulnerability assessments. Services Australia does

•  not have a policy covering the management of cyber security incidents.

  Auditor-General Report No. 38 2023–24

Canberra: Australian National Audit Office, 2024. 103p.

By Laura Carlson  

American criminal jurisprudence relies on confidential informants: those individuals who agree to assist police in exchange for leniency. Facing little regulation by legislatures, law enforcement has raised an informant system premised on the exploitation of vulnerabilities and free from basic safeguards that would help to mitigate the moral, mental, and physical harm informants face in the field. While this is generally problematic, the issue becomes more pronounced when considering law enforcement’s use of juveniles to combat crimes perpetrated against and among children. A juvenile’s brain is developmentally distinct from an adult’s. During late adolescence, the brain goes through major maturation processes that significantly affect a juvenile’s ability to assess risk, make forward-thinking decisions, override emotions with logic, and resist social pressures. In other words, the juvenile brain is predisposed to act adverse to self-interests. Within the context of the modern informant system, juveniles engage with police on seriously disadvantaged ground; and because agreeing to assist police has proven to be a death sentence for some, the urgency with which this must be addressed cannot be overstated. America’s tolerance of police discretion with respect to the use of juvenile informants must end. Legislatures can facilitate change by implementing safeguards aimed at mitigating the risks posed by a juvenile’s physiological predispositions. Namely, legislatures should consider implementing mandatory cooling-off periods, a statutory right to counsel, mandatory parental and judicial consent, prescribed documentation and recordkeeping requirements, and enforced training regimens. Absent empirical data that youth at large are better protected by the abolition of the use of juvenile informants, legislatures looking to implement these suggestions or otherwise restrict the practice should be careful to balance proposed legislation with the needs of law enforcement. 

Arizona Law Review, 2023. 26p.

By Christina Billhartz

In 1987, the U.S. Sentencing Commission created its first federal sentencing guideline for child pornography offenses. As Congress grappled with dynamic technological advances that changed the child pornography landscape, the Commission continually revised and amended these guidelines, creating the last significant amendment in 2009. For the past 12 years, these guidelines have been considered by federal court judges tasked with sentencing child pornography offenders, yet little has been done to determine whether or not these guidelines actually diminish the amount of children victimized by child pornography. While acknowledging that child pornography victimizes and harms children in countless ways and must be criminalized to account for these egregious harms, this Note argues that the sentencing guidelines fail to deter the production, distribution, and consumption of child pornography, and fail to fulfill congressional goals of protecting children from victimization. Rather, the guidelines have resulted in the mass incarceration of child pornography offenders and a system that punishes viewers of child pornography more severely than it does child rapists. If the government truly wants to protect children from being victimized through child pornography, then the sentencing guidelines, as written, cannot stand, and they must be replaced by a system that allows child pornography offenders to access rehabilitative resources both inside and outside of the federal prison system.

Arizona Law Review, 2021. 32p.

By Jennifer M. Reingle Gonzalez,  Rebecca Molsberry, Jonathan Maskaly, and Katelyn K. Jetelina

COVID-19 has caused a wave of research publications in academic and pre-print outlets which have resulted in several high-profile retractions. While the breadth of emerging research has been instrumental in understanding and curbing the global pandemic in near real-time, unfortunately manuscripts with major methodological challenges have fallen through the cracks. In this perspective, we illustrate this issue in light of a recent manuscript by Piquero et al. (2020). In the study, a statistically significant association between stay-at-home orders and family violence was not detected; however, the authors widely disseminated a “12.5% increase in family violence” offenses to a variety of media outlets. This negligent dissemination of inaccurate research findings has important implications for policy and the virus mitigation efforts, which might urge policymakers to terminate stay-at-home orders in an effort to reduce family violence and other social risk factors. Changes may ultimately result in more COVID-related deaths as stay-at-home orders are prematurely and inappropriately lifted to prevent purported injuries in the home. Therefore, the widespread propagation of these claims in the absence of scientific evidence of an increase has great potential to cause harm.

American Journal of Criminal Justice, 2022. 11p.

By John H. Boman IV & Owen Gallupe 

In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, state-level governments across the United States issued mandatory stay-at-home orders around the end of March 2020. Though intended to stop the spread of the COVID-19 virus, the lockdowns have had sweeping impacts on life in ways which were not originally planned. This study’s purpose is to investigate the extent to which governmental responses to COVID-19 have impacted crime rates in the U.S. Compared to the pre-pandemic year of 2019, crime – as measured by calls for service to law enforcement – has decreased markedly. However, there are multiple indications that the crime drop is being driven by decreases in minor offenses which are typically committed in peer groups. At the same time, serious crimes which are generally not committed with co-offenders (namely homicide and intimate partner violence) have either remained constant or increased. As such, the crime drop appears to be hiding a very disturbing trend where homicides remain unchanged and intimate partner batteries are increasing. Since many offenders would presumably be committing less serious crimes in a non-pandemic world, we raise attention to the possibility that mandatory lockdown orders may have taken minor offenders and placed them into situations where there is rampant opportunity for intimate partner violence, serious batteries, and homicides. While crime in the U.S. appears to be down overall, this good news should not blind us to a troubling co-occurring reality – a reality that paints a dim picture of unintended consequences to public health and criminal justice finances as a result of COVID-19 lockdowns.

American Journal of Criminal Justice, 2020. 9p.

By Steven James Lee and  Daniel Augusto

  In the latter half of 2020, Los Angeles was dubbed by the media and academicians as the latest epicenter of COVID-19 in the United States. Using time-series analysis on Los Angeles Police Department crime data from 2017 through 2020, this paper tests the economic theory of crime, routine activities theory, social isolation theory, and structural vulnerability theory to determine whether they accurately predicted specifc crime rate movements in the wake of COVID-19 in the city of Los Angeles. Economic theory of crime was supported by the data, and social isolation theory and structural vulnerability theory were partially supported. Routine activities theory was not supported. Implications for policymakers and academics are also discussed.  

Crime Prevention and Community Safety, 2022. 21p.

By J. Andrew Hansen, Gabrielle L Lory 

Rural criminal justice organizations have been overlooked by researchers and underfunded in the United States, exacerbating problems caused by the coronavirus pandemic. Access to victims' services has been a longstanding issue in rural communities, but has become more difficult due to stay-at-home orders and changes in daily activities. Requirements such as social distancing, necessitated by COVID-19, have increased the risk of domestic violence and rural service providers are less prepared than those in more populated areas. Rural law enforcement agencies, on the other hand, have traditionally operated with smaller budgets and staffs-conditions that have complicated the response to the unprecedented event. Many of the recommended practices for policing during a pandemic have been more applicable to larger urban and suburban departments with more resources and officers extended across many units. The strain on rural victims' services and law enforcement has been felt only a few months into the coronavirus pandemic, while the long-term effects are not yet known.

Southern Criminal Justice Association, 2020. 12p.

 By David Yerger, Brandon Vick, Robert Orth, and Charles Gartside, 

The project’s primary goal was to investigate whether shocks stemming from the COVID-19 pandemic either triggered or heightened human suffering in two crimerelated areas: murder and abuse. A secondary goal was to identify rural-urban differences in these outcomes both before and during the pandemic. An analysis of homicides and protection from abuse orders over time provided valuable insights regarding crime trends and rural-urban differences, but it did not suggest large, long-term effects due to the COVID-19 pandemic throughout the state. The statewide homicide rate rose 21 percent from 2019 to 2020, but the increase was specific to a certain group and location: Black, male victims in Philadelphia County, murdered with a firearm, with most of these incidents being homicides, with no known relationship between the victim and offender (Philadelphia County’s murder rate increased 36 percent in 2020). In rural counties, the 2020 murder rate rose 24 percent, and in non-Philadelphia urban counties, there was a 3 percent increase. It should be noted that these upward trends came after homicides steadily rose from 2014 to 2018, before falling significantly in 2019, and then rising in 2020. The exploratory analysis on county-levels of COVID case and death rates found no statistical evidence that high COVID-rate counties were more likely to experience high levels of protection from abuse orders or homicides. However, the analysis found that counties with higher unemployment rates and Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) participation also experienced higher murder rates and protection from abuse order prevalence in 2020 (a relationship that holds when tested across other years). 

Harrisburg, PA: Center for Rural Pennsylvania, 2022.  42p.

By Brandon Vick, Robert Orth, Charles Gartside

Information on the prevalence and cost of firearm injury is difficult to find and typically lacks important details. Using a rich dataset from the Pennsylvania Health Care Cost Containment Council (PHC4), researchers from PCCD/IUP performed a statistical analysis of non-fatal firearm injuries from 2016 to 2021, finding the following: • Initial injury totals and costs: Over the five-year timeframe, an estimated 10,640 new, non-fatal firearm injuries occurred in Pennsylvania for which patients received treatment. The medical cost of initial treatment for these injuries was $308.4 million, or over $51 million per year. The average cost of treatment was $34,837 in 2020. • Rising medical costs and injuries: The number of total injuries increased by 20 percent and the medical cost for these injuries increased by 107 percent from 2016 to 2020. The number of accidental injuries increased by 46 percent (to over 1,000 per year in 2020), with a cost increase of 195%. Assault injuries increased by 5%, with the medical costs of these injuries increasing by 81%. • Rises with COVID: The number of firearm injuries rose dramatically immediately after the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic and resulting shutdowns. Both accidental and assault injuries rose to their highest levels over the timeframe studied. • Economic and Racial Disparities: The poorest one-fifth of zip codes incurred nearly 60 percent of the total medical costs of firearm injuries. Two-thirds of all patients of firearm injuries were Black, although Black people make up only 11 percent of the Pennsylvania population. • Long-term costs: 16 percent of new injuries require additional hospital visits and incur nearly four times the medical costs, averaging over $70,000 per patient. Over 3 percent of new firearm injuries result in paralysis, increasing costs over the first year to over $100,000. • Full Economic Losses: If values are placed on lost work and lower quality of life, the total economic losses of firearm injury increase by six-fold to an estimated $300 million per year and $1.5 billion. Estimates here should be considered conservative, as they do not consider full costs to society (i.e. disability and unemployment payments) and are limited to costs only incurred during the time of visits for treatment (i.e. not counting long-term rehabilitation). Additionally, they do not include fatal injuries or shootings – for instance, over 600 people are victims of homicide by firearm and at least double that number die by firearm suicide per year. The nonfatal injury findings here are in line with estimates for U.S. injuries made separately by the Government Accountability Office and the Center for Disease Control. 

Harrisburg:  Pennsylvania Commission on Crime and Delinquency , 2022.  48p.

By The Joint State Government Commission (PA) and the Pennsylvania  the Pennsylvania Commission on Crime and Delinquency (PCCD) 

The specific statute under review by the TFCP is the section relating to “Sexual Abuse of Children” and is codified at 18 Pa.C.S. § 6312. 9 There are three subsections within that offense and each address a different type of behavior perpetrated by the offender: Subsection (b) of § 6312 relates to “Photographing, videotaping, depicting on computer or filming sexual act” and may be described as manufacturing or creating child pornography. This subsection criminalizes individuals who cause or knowingly permit a child under 18 to engage in a prohibited sexual act10 or simulation of said act, knowing or intending the act to be photographed or filmed. Manufacturing child pornography under subsection (b) is generally a felony of the second degree11 but is graded as a felony of the first degree12 if indecent contact13 with a child is depicted or the child is under the age of 10 or prepubescent. Subsection (c) of § 6312 relates to “Dissemination of photographs, videotapes, computer depictions and films” and may be described as distributing or selling child pornography. This subsection criminalizes individuals who knowingly sell, distribute, deliver, disseminate, transfer, display or exhibit to others images depicting a child under 18 engaged in or simulating a prohibited sexual act. Distributing child pornography under subsection (c) is generally a felony of the third degree; 14 however, it is graded a felony of the second degree if it is a second or subsequent offense, or if the images depict indecent contact with a child or the child is under the age of 10 or prepubescent. Subsection (d) of § 6312 relates to “Child Pornography” and may also be described as possession of child pornography. Subsection (d) criminalizes individuals who intentionally view, knowingly possess or control images depicting a child under 18 engaged in a prohibited sexual act or simulation of such act. Possessing child pornography is generally a felony of the third degree however, it is graded a felony of the second degree if it is a second or subsequent offense, or if the images depict indecent contact with a child or the child is under the age of 10 or prepubescent. 

Harrisburg: Pennsylvania Commission on Crime and Delinquency, 2022. 284p.

By  DeFacto Consultancy

 This analysis reveals that the media predominantly reported on cases of physical (76.9%) and sexual (68.3%) violence. On the other hand, cases of structural/systemic violence were reported in 10.9% of the analysed media reports, while cases of economic violence in 10.3% of cases. The media have the least frequently covered online or digital violence (9.8%) and selective abortion cases (7%). z In more than half of the analysed cases (58.1%) the media reported cases of gender-based violence (GBV) as a private matter. Furthermore, media have the most commonly reported physical (63.8%) and sexual (61.8%) violence as private matters, and reports on these two types of violence were least often categorized as educational in nature. In slightly more than half of the cases (50.7%), the media reported domestic violence as a private matter.

z The principle of presumption of innocence of the perpetrator was observed in 99.4% of the analysed cases. z The media have rarely use stereotypes to describe victims of GBV and infrequently provide justification for the perpetrators. z Sensationalistic elements are present in reporting on GBV, with 10.8% of the cases in headlines and 3.9% of the cases within the actual media reports. In slightly over one-fifth of the cases (21%), analysed media reports featured some form of sensationalistic audio-visual material. z The analysis shows that when reporting on GBV, the media used the statement of the victim in 14.4% and the statement of the (potential) perpetrator in 7.4% of the cases. These media reports did not record whether the statements were used with or without the consent of those quoted. z Media reporting on GBV was educational in nature in only 15.2% of cases. Additionally, statistical data were used in only 14.7% of the analysed media reports, and expert opinions were featured in only 20.9% of them. z Media reporting on GBV lacked more comprehensive contextualization of the issue; journalists rarely use comparative examples, statistical data, or legislative analysis. Effects of media reporting z Unprofessional media reporting on gender-based violence contributes to the reinforcement of societal stereotypes. z Traditional respondents (30%) tend to form negative views regarding the attribution of blame to women, the victims of violence when exposed to unprofessional media reporting. 

z 22% of citizens believe that a man is always to blame for violence committed by a man against a woman/partner. Additionally, 30.1% believe that a man is mostly to blame but that some blame falls on the woman. Furthermore, 3.4% believe that a woman is mostly to blame and that she provoked the incident. The largest group, comprising 44.5% of respondents, states that it is difficult to ascertain blame until both sides are heard. z Among respondents with authoritarian tendencies, one-third (34%) endorse sanctions if a partner does not fulfil household or marital obligations. When these respondents are exposed to unprofessional media reporting on GBV, every second person (51%) believes that sanctions should exist. z One in four respondents, i.e. 27.4 % of citizens, believe that women and girls falsely claim to be victims of violence just to attract attention to themselves. z Among respondents who say there is more violence against women today than before, there are significantly more of those who have read a professionally written article (56.3%) on GBV as part of an experimental treatment, while 25.4% have been exposed to an unprofessionally written article. 

Vienna: OSCE, 2023. 68p.

By Clara Martiny, Cécile Simmons, Francesca Visser, Rhea Bhatnagar, Isabel Jones, Allison Castillo Small

In 2022, the United States witnessed both dramatic breakthroughs and calamitous setbacks on women’s rights, from Ketanji Brown becoming the first Black woman to sit on Supreme Court of the United States to the overturning of Roe v. Wade, a legal precedent that protected a woman’s right to bodily autonomy for over 50 years. These events, among many others, had an undeniable impact on the US information environment, with 2022 seeing the rapid growth in popularity of misogynistic and male supremacist influencers who openly advocate for violence against women and campaigns of hate and disinformation targeted against women celebrities speaking out against the abuse they have faced.

This report looks back at 2022 to examine online conversations around nine different real-world events impacting women in the US and explores the potential correlation between these offline events and the targeting of women with misogynistic and abusive content on social media. This study also attempts to identify how misogyny, abusive content, and gendered disinformation may be amplified and deployed in the lead-up to the 2024 US presidential election.

Berlin: IDS - Institute for Security Dialogue, 2023. 31p.

By Michael T. Light, Jingying Hea, and Jason P. Robey

We make use of uniquely comprehensive arrest data from the Texas Department of Public Safety to compare the criminality of undocumented immigrants to legal immigrants and native-born US citizens between 2012 and 2018. We find that undocumented immigrants have substantially lower crime rates than native-born citizens and legal immigrants across a range of felony offenses. Relative to undocumented immigrants, US-born citizens are over 2 times more likely to be arrested for violent crimes, 2.5 times more likely to be arrested for drug crimes, and over 4 times more likely to be arrested for property crimes. In addition, the proportion of arrests involving undocumented immigrants in Texas was relatively stable or decreasing over this period. The differences between US-born citizens and undocumented immigrants are robust to using alternative estimates of the broader undocumented population, alternate classifications of those counted as “undocumented” at arrest and substituting misdemeanors or convictions as measures of crime.

 Madison, Wisconsin: 2020. 8p.