By Ian Mynot and Oksana Ihnatenko

This report summarises the main findings of the first meeting of the Taskforce on Public–Private Partnership in Fighting Financial Crime in Ukraine

Overview

On 15 November 2024, RUSI’s Centre for Finance and Security and the Center for Financial Integrity (CFI)1 launched a Taskforce on Public–Private Partnership in Fighting Financial Crime in Ukraine. An in-person meeting in Warsaw, held on a non-attributable basis, convened 40 representatives, including those from the public and private sectors in Ukraine, and international experts.

The discussion included two sessions focused on the current state of public–private partnerships (PPPs) in Ukraine and on international experience and recommendations. This report summarises the main findings of each of these sessions.

London: The Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies. (RUSI) 2025. 15p.

By Rusi - Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies

Economic crime poses a significant threat to the UK, undermining its financial stability and security. To address this threat, in March 2023, the UK government launched the Economic Crime Plan 2,1 outlining a series of coordinated actions that should be undertaken across multiple government departments. Among these measures, the National Economic Crime Centre (NECC) was tasked with developing a people strategy to strengthen expertise and cross-sector collaboration, considering partnerships with industry and other stakeholders such as academia.2 Although there is a growing body of research on economic crime in the UK, there is scope for academia to play a more important role as a valuable resource in combatting economic crime. In October 2024, the NECC and the Home Office convened the first Economic Crime Academic Forum, hosted by RUSI’s Centre for Finance and Security. The forum aimed to bridge the gap between academic research and policymaking by fostering dialogue and identifying actionable solutions to issues including money laundering, fraud, kleptocracy and corruption. Academic participants came from a range of related disciplines and included both more established and early career academics, bringing a range of perspectives. Government attendees came from multiple government departments and law enforcement. The discussions focused on three aspects of research on economic crime: economic crime threats; the response to economic crime in terms of policy, enforcement and evaluation; and research methods and associated challenges. Due to the breadth and fluidity of the discussion, this report does not provide a linear summary of the matters raised. Instead, it details ways in which academics conduct research on economic crime, identifies gaps and challenges in research and academic engagement with government initiatives, and explores potential solutions. The forum was conducted on a non-attributable basis.

London: Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies (RUSI), 2025. 11p

By European Union Drugs Agency (EUDA)

The European Drug Report 2025: Trends and Developments presents the EUDA’s latest analysis of the drug situation in Europe. Focusing on illicit drug use, related harms and drug supply, the report provides a comprehensive set of national data across these themes, as well as on specialist drug treatment and key harm reduction interventions

This report is based on information provided to the EUDA by the EU Member States, the candidate country Türkiye, and Norway, in an annual reporting process. The purpose of the current report is to provide an overview and summary of the European drug situation up to the end of 2024. All grouping, aggregates and labels therefore reflect the situation based on the available data in 2024 in respect to the composition of the European Union and the countries participating in the EUDA’s reporting exercises. However, not all data will cover the full period. Due to the time needed to compile and submit data, many of the annual national data sets included here are from the reference year January to December 2023. Analysis of trends is based only on those countries providing sufficient data to describe changes over the period specified. The reader should also be aware that monitoring patterns and trends in a hidden and stigmatised behaviour such as drug use is both practically and methodologically challenging. For this reason, multiple sources of data are used for the purposes of analysis in this report. Although considerable improvements can be noted, both nationally and in respect to what is possible to achieve in a European-level analysis, the methodological difficulties in this area must be acknowledged. Caution is therefore required in interpretation, in particular when countries are compared on any single measure. Caveats relating to the data are to be found in the online Statistical Bulletin 2025 , which contains detailed information on methodology, qualifications on analysis and comments on the limitations in the information set available. Information is also available there on the methods and data used for European-level estimates, where interpolation may be used :

PortugalEuropean Union Drugs Agency (EUDA); 2025 355p

By Erik Gamm and Mitch Morrissey

DNA evidence, where it’s available, is crucial to solving sexual assault cases—according to one study, it raises the likelihood of a guilty verdict from less than a third to nearly 75%. The trouble and expense of processing it, however, can create backlogs that put cases on hold for years. Dozens of state and local law-enforcement agencies have faced this problem over the decades since DNA technology emerged.

This year, due in part to years of alleged misconduct by one of its forensic scientists, the Colorado Bureau of Investigation (CBI) found itself with a queue of more than 1,400 untested sexual assault kits and without the means to process new ones promptly. The unsolved cases stuck in this backlog represent substantial further crime risks from repeat offenders, delayed justice for victims, and tangible costs to Colorado’s economy.

Key Findings

By processing all of the 1,369 DNA kits in the state’s backlog, Colorado could prosecute up to 200 rape cases.

This would also prevent up to 1,030 sexual assaults, 108 other violent crimes, 230 property offenses, and 113 drug/alcohol, public disorder, and other crimes.

At a testing cost of $2,000 per kit and adjudication, public-services, and work-loss costs totaling $82,000 per case, clearing the backlog and prosecuting cases associated with it will cost the state $21 million. In return, Colorado’s economy will eventually save $234.7 million due to prevention of future crimes.

The longer authorities take to clear the backlog, the larger the costs and smaller the savings will become.

CSI estimates that, by training 15 more DNA scientists over the next year, CBI will clear its DNA backlog of excess kits by July 2027. Delayed processing of kits currently in the backlog, which are expected to be tested by September 2026, will have allowed $51.8 million worth of additional criminal activity.

Even kits that don't lead to convictions are worth testing for the qualitative benefits they offer, like identifying deceased and incarcerated perpetrators, adding to the national DNA database, and providing closure to victims.

Greenwood Village, CO: Common Sense Institute, 2025. 12p.

By Brown, K., Crawford, A., Lloyd, C, Birks, D., Capstick, N., Wood, M., et al. (2024).

Children who are victims of crime and those drawn into offending behaviours are amongst the most vulnerable in society. The evidence is clear: life chances of young people are significantly affected by childhood experiences of crime, harm, abuse, and victimisation, as well as engagement with the criminal justice system. This is not deterministic and many children find ways to cope with the adversities they face. However, adverse childhood experiences greatly elevate the probability of a young person becoming involved with the police and we must act to support these children before they become trapped within the criminal justice system. It is therefore of the utmost importance that we promote a whole-child approach to childhood vulnerability that focuses on needs – one that is informed by the evidence base on best practice throughout the UK and internationally. We make three evidence-based recommendations that align with the new government’s Opportunity Mission to improve outcomes for CYP and reduce crime.

Child of the North and the Centre for Young Lives. , 2024. 50p.

By Megan Kang

This study draws on 95 interviews and observations with gang-affiliated individuals in Chicago to examine how gang structures shape disengagement and desistance from crime. Over the last two decades, the city’s gangs have experienced a decline in group closure, or their capacity to regulate membership and member behavior, and a blurring of boundaries between those active in a gang from all others. In the past, Chicago’s gangs maintained closure and bright boundaries that made gang affiliations, norms, and territories clearly defined. Leaving these gangs required costly exit rituals that signaled an unambiguous departure while facilitating desistance. Today, with weaker gang structures and blurry boundaries, leaving a gang is no longer a distinct event. However, the ease of gang disengagement makes desistance harder, as inactive members struggle to knife off past ties and access turning points. In this uncertain landscape, desistance tactics can backfire, sending blurred signals—behaviors intended to create distance from former affiliates and rivals but appear as wavering commitment to supporters—that trap individuals in a liminal space between social worlds. Contrary to leading desistance theories that emphasize individual readiness, opportunity, and pro-social bonds, this study underscores how group structures critically shape pathways out of crime

Unpublished paper 2025, 55p.

By Kristina Amerhauser and Audrey Thill with support from Martin Thorley, Louise Taylor and Matt Herbert

Cyber scam operations have surged across Southeast Asia since the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, evolving into a transnational organized crime crisis of staggering proportions. In this report, we expose the inner workings of scam compounds and the sophisticated criminal ecosystem sustaining them.

Repurposed hotels, casinos, and private compounds across Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and the Philippines have become centres of global fraud. These compounds are operated by organized criminal networks that exploit hundreds of thousands of people, many of whom are trafficked and forced to perpetrate online scams. Victims include not only those defrauded online but also the scam workers themselves, subjected to threats, violence, sexual exploitation and extreme working conditions.

The report details how cyber scams —including ‘pig-butchering’ romance-investment scams, crypto fraud, impersonation and sextortion— now generate tens of billions of dollars annually.

These illicit operations thrive due to weak rule of law, widespread corruption, and complicity from powerful figures who operate as ‘role shifters’ —individuals who blur the lines between government, business and crime. Scam compounds often enjoy protection from local elites and security forces, and rely on global money laundering networks, including cryptocurrencies and high-risk financial services providers.

This in-depth analysis, based on extensive fieldwork and case studies, highlights the devastating economic, human rights and security implications of cyber scam operations.

The report calls for urgent, coordinated responses, including better victim identification systems, crackdowns on enablers, and reforms to protect vulnerable communities.

Geneva, SWIT: 5 Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2025. 68p.

By James C. Wo, Ethan M. Rogers

Urban greenspace (UGS) has been recently linked to public safety. Criminologists, however, have been largely absent from the discussion about this association, despite having important theoretical tools and empirical findings to contribute. In the current study, we review the prominent criminological perspectives that may be used to explain the association between UGS and crime. Furthermore, we draw from prior work to extend beyond the question of whether UGS affects crime to the more crucial question of when it does. Using a sample of block groups in Washington, D.C., we examine the association between two measures of UGS—tree canopy coverage and noncanopy vegetation coverage—and violent and property crime. We also assess the moderating effects of antecedents to social disorganization (poverty and homeownership) on the association between UGS and crime. Our results suggest that both types of UGS are associated with fewer crimes, even while controlling for a range of criminogenic factors. The effects of tree canopy coverage appear to be crime general, while the effects of noncanopy vegetation coverage only apply to violent crime. The effects of tree canopy, however, are weaker in communities characterized by high levels of poverty and low levels of homeownership.

Criminology, Volume62, Issue 2, May 2024, Pages 236-275

By Carly Lightowlers, Lucy Bryant

COVID-19 restrictions significantly altered alcohol availability across England, at times with on-trade premises closed, presenting a novel opportunity to examine the efects of of-trade alcohol availability on violence. Police recorded violent crime data were used to examine changes in the level and proportion of (i) violence as well as (ii) domestic violence, which was alcohol-related during this period. On-trade closures saw the proportion of violent incidents recorded as alcohol-related fall only subtly (by 3 percentage points in months of closure) and did not lead to a significant difference in the proportion of domestic violence, which was recorded as alcohol-related. Tis suggests of- and on-trade alcohol availability may be comparable contributory factors to levels of violence and domestic violence

Te British Journal of Criminology, 2025, XX, 1–18

By David Jinkins, Elira Kuka, Claudio Labanca

Research on the social safety net examines its effects on recipients and their families. We show that these effects extend beyond recipients’ families. Using a regression discontinuity design and administrative data, we study a Danish policy that cut welfare benefits for refugees, increasing crime among affected individuals. Linking refugees to neighbors, we find increased crime among non-Danish neighbors, with spillovers persisting even after direct effects stabilize. Accounting for these spillovers raises the marginal value of public funds by 20%. We explore several mechanisms and find evidence consistent with peer effects among young individuals from the same country of origin.

IZA DP No. 17958

Bonn: IZA – Institute of Labor Economics , 2025. 85p.

By Daniel M. Gerstein

his report is one in a series of analyses on the effects of emerging technologies on U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) missions and capabilities. As part of this work, the research team was charged with developing a technology and risk assessment methodology for evaluating emerging technologies and understanding their implications in a homeland security context. The methodology and analyses provide a basis for DHS to better understand the emerging technologies and the risks presented.

This report describes the implications that the metaverse could have on digital crimes that involve the targeting and exploitation of children. These digital crimes are already occurring and have affected and endangered many victims and families. In an immersive online environment, such as the metaverse, opportunities for criminal activity and exploitation aimed at children could expand further.

Key Findings

Metaverse technologies — which encompass artificial intelligence systems, immersive technologies, and enabling digital technologies — will likely continue to become more available, have greater capabilities, and cost less to obtain and use. As has been the case with other digital technologies, metaverse technologies likely will have few policy, legal, ethical, or regulatory impediments constraining their development or use.

The metaverse concept is at an inflection point. How it will expand, how large it will become, and whether will it become an expansive virtual world that directly competes with the physical world remain unanswered questions. The timelines for expansion of the metaverse also remain speculative and will largely depend on use case, demand, and market forces.

Both non-metaverse and metaverse platforms have been and will continue to be used effectively to target children. Furthermore, an overlap exists between non-metaverse and metaverse platform use in luring and victimizing children, which makes it impossible to delineate the share of these abhorrent behaviors ascribable to each.

The lack of legal frameworks for crimes involving the targeting and exploitation of children in online applications will likely continue to be an issue. Clear definitions for what constitute attacks in the metaverse are not available as they are in the physical world, which hinders investigations and prosecutions. Despite the known vulnerabilities and consequences, these platforms continue to be aggressively marketed to children.

As the metaverse grows, the potential of these platforms for targeting, luring, exploiting, and victimizing children through targeted criminal activity or child exploitation will likely also grow.

Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2025. 24p.

By Vaclav Prusa

Liberia’s mining sector accounts for a significant amount of its GDP, but its economic potential is undermined by bribery and political interference in licensing and the granting of concession agreements. While data on illicit financial flows (IFFs) derived from or enabled by corruption is limited, bribery cases involving foreign companies, the prevalence of trade mispricing and existence of a professional enabler industry, suggest vulnerabilities. Corruption and IFFs in the sector create fiscal losses, lead to environmental degradation and foster instability. Best practices for mitigation include robust legal frameworks, enhanced transparency and accountancy mechanisms, greater regional collaboration and community engagement.

Bergen: U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre, Chr. Michelsen InstituteU4 HELPDESK ANSWER 10 2025. 30p.

By Mathias Bak and Matthew Jenkins

Illicit financial flows (IFFs) undermine economic growth by weakening institutional quality, state legitimacy, facilitating corruption and discouraging foreign and domestic investment. Empirical studies that have explicitly assessed the links between IFFs and economic growth, either on a regional scale or at the national level, generally find that illicit financial outflows have a negative and significant impact on core determinants of economic growth, notably domestic investment. Evidence suggests that IFFs not only hinder growth in source countries but also distort investment patterns in destination countries, particularly in real estate markets.

Bergen: U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre, Chr. Michelsen Institute (U4 Helpdesk Answer 2025: 2. 44p.

By Human Rights Watch

Pakistan’s blasphemy laws are inherently discriminatory, denying equality before the law to non-Muslims and facilitating violence against anyone accused of the crime. Blasphemy is an offense officially punishable by death in Pakistan, and while no one has been executed for blasphemy, the laws have long been used to carry out personal vendettas and prosecute members of minority religious communities with grave consequences. A mere accusation of blasphemy can be a death sentence: in the past decade, vigilantes have killed dozens of people in mob violence following blasphemy accusations.

This report focuses on an additional widespread abuse: people making blasphemy accusations often do so for economic motivations, including forced evictions to acquire land that belongs to another. While the targets of blasphemy accusations and the violence fostered by the law belong to all socio-economic and religious groups in Pakistan, most of the victims have been from marginalized groups.

Blasphemy accusations against Christians and Ahmadis in particular have often forced entire communities to flee their homes and neighborhoods. Because many minority communities in Pakistan live in informal, low-income settlements without titles to the land, their forced exodus leaves their property up for easy seizure. Those alleging blasphemy have also benefitted financially by targeting business rivals and businesses owned and run by religious minorities. This exploitation of the blasphemy law, in particular the ease with which anyone can make an accusation as part of a personal dispute or for economic gain, has instilled fear among those at risk.

An entrenched bias in the criminal justice system results in miscarriages of justice against people accused of blasphemy. The authorities almost never hold those who commit violence in the name of blasphemy to account, while those accused under discriminatory and vague laws—generally without evidence—suffer long pretrial detention, lack of due process, and unfair trials that may result in years of imprisonment. In cases of vigilante attacks, police seldom take action to protect those targeted, and those who do may themselves face threats of violence. As a result, perpetrators of mob violence who enjoy the patronage and protection of politicians or religious leaders avoid arrest or are acquitted.

Human Rights Watch calls on the government of Pakistan to repeal the blasphemy law and safely release all those held or imprisoned on blasphemy charges. The authorities should investigate all attacks and threats based on blasphemy accusations, with particular concern for those targeting religious minorities and other marginalized groups and those that result in forced evictions and large-scale forced displacement. The authorities should also institute safeguards to prevent the coerced transfer and sale of properties of those accused following such incidents.

New York: Human Rights Watch, 2025. 34p.

By John Jenkins, Andrew Gilligan and Paul Stott

A new report from Policy Exchange calls for the Government to suspend the working group chaired by Rt Hon Dominic Grieve — that is developing a definition of Islamophobia — with immediate effect.

Former top UK diplomat Sir John Jenkins, the ex-Ambassador to Saudi Arabia and co-author of the report, has refused to engage with Grieve’s group. In a letter to Grieve — published for the first time today — he warns that any official definition of Islamophobia “will almost certainly turbocharge ‘cancel culture’” and would “be an undeniable act of two-tier policy, creating special status and protection for members of one faith alone."

London: Policy Exchange, 2025. 39p.

By Jeselyn and Danielle Lynn Goh

Transnational crime networks in Cambodia and Indonesia have been responsible for heinous cybercrime, including illegal online gambling and scams. These networks target vulnerable populations and undermine human security. Addressing these challenges requires stronger law enforcement cooperation, regulatory reforms, and coordinated regional and national strategies to dismantle the criminal networks. COMMENTARY In Southeast Asia, transnational crime has long posed a significant challenge. These include illicit drugs, human trafficking, cyber scams, and illegal gambling. Cybercrime has surged in recent decades with technological advancements and increasing global connectivity. In particular, operators of illicit gambling networks have expanded their operations into countries such as Cambodia, Lao PDR, the Philippines, and the border regions of Myanmar. Many of these centres are not limited to illegal gambling alone – they also function as cyber scam hubs. These scam centres engage in a wide range of online fraudulent activities, including investment scams, romance scams, and phishing operations. The current landscape of organised crime in Southeast Asia thus reflects a convergence of illicit gambling and sophisticated cyber scamming operations, often managed by the same transnational criminal networks. 

S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, NTU Singapore , 2025. 6p.

By STEVEN BYERS, MITCH MORRISSEY & JOHN KELLNER

The last year has brought some relief to Colorado’s fentanyl overdose problem, but some measures may still be needed to erase the drug’s explosive fatality growth in the last decade. Colorado state legislators implemented stricter penalties for fentanyl possession and distribution in 2022, though those reforms have been criticized by law enforcement as not going far enough. Since the legislation’s passage, fentanyl deaths have been declining. There is evidence that similar measures in other U.S. states are producing similar results. In the Common Sense Institute’s drug overdose competitiveness index, Colorado’s ranking decreased through the early 2020s and remained at 2023 levels in 2024. This suggests Colorado’s declining drug overdose rates are falling less than in other states. Local drug seizure figures have declined since 2022. At the federal level, policy changes correlate to declining overdose rates as well. The southwestern border has seen fentanyl seizures fall since the fall of 2024. Officials should take note that fentanyl overdose rates have moved in the right direction following policy implementation. As fentanyl overdoses remain highly elevated, leaders should consider whether additional policies could press the overdose rate down even further.

Greenwood Village, CO:Common Sense Institute, 2025. 22p.

By The International Crisis Group

What’s new? Ten years of crisis in the Central African Republic (CAR) have fostered new dynamics in the livestock sector, exacerbating conflict between nomadic herders and sedentary farmers. The government, which has treated transhumance primarily as a security problem, has been unable to curb the violence. So have NGO and UN initiatives. Why does it matter? Reducing herder-farmer violence is essential for long-term stability in CAR. Bangui now has an unprecedented opportunity to scale it back, as the state gets re-established in rural areas, non-state armed groups weaken there and CAR’s relations warm with neighbouring Chad. What should be done? To contain herder-farmer violence, Bangui should reassume the regulatory role it abandoned in the 1990s. With the support of international partners, CAR’s authorities should rehabilitate pastoral services they once provided, combat army predation upon herders and revive cross-border cooperation with Chad.

Bangui/Nairobi/Brussels: International Crisis Group, ICG, 2025. 39p.

By Meghan Benton, Susan Fratzke and Nurbanu Hayır

When it left the European Union, the United Kingdom lost its participation in the EU system for managing which country is responsible for which asylum seekers. This change has been a major, though not the sole, factor in burgeoning numbers of people attempting to reach UK shores in small boats, some dying in the process. The UK government and its European counterparts recently announced progress on cooperation in trade, security, and youth mobility, but addressing the politically corrosive Channel crossings will depend on whether the United Kingdom and its EU partners sign a readmissions deal— an issue that has proved much more thorny. Under the contemplated deal, the United Kingdom would accept transfers of certain asylum seekers from the European Union in return for an agreement by France and/or other Calais Group countries (Belgium, Germany, and the Netherlands) to readmit asylum seekers who have reached the United Kingdom by sea. Such an agreement could be a bilateral readmission agreement, which would be easiest to stand up but holds political risks for the French if it lacks the European Union’s blessing. Alternately, an agreement could be reached with the European Union itself to facilitate the readmission of small boat arrivals directly to the EU country responsible for them, in line with rules set out by the EU Pacton Migration and Asylum—an option that could take longer to negotiate but also reduce the risk of simply shifting irregular migration routes to a neighboring country. The architects of the deal will need to balance the need to quickly deliver an agreement and proof of concept with the longer-term goal of creating a system that will significantly bring down dangerous Channel crossings and improve how countries share responsibility for the asylum seekers involved. This deal is an opportunity to test a more managed approach to asylum and migration.

Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute, 2025. 16p.

By Michelle Kendler-Kretsch

The US Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) appears to have a renewed interest in a sanctions tool first used in 2001: blocking individuals and entities pending investigation. Used in two recent sets of listings, the tool offers the agility and speed necessary to quickly and efficiently dismantle financing networks and sanctions evasion tactics. Its strategic application warrants closer attention from financial institutions, who must be responsive to their compliance obligations. Non-government organizations (NGOs) may be aware of opportunities where they can advocate for OFAC to take greater advantage of this option, particularly in cases related to sanctions evasion and conflict financing. In parallel, NGOs can also play a vital role by sharing information that supports implementation and, where applicable, reinforces the credibility of these provisional designations.

Washington, DC: The Sentry, 2025. 22p.