By Ayumi Takano, Kunihiko Takahashi, Tatsuhiko Anzai, Takashi Usami, Shiori Tsutsumi, Yuka Kanazawa, Yousuke Kumakura, Toshihiko Matsumoto

Background: Methamphetamine use is related to severe health, social, and criminal challenges. However, there is limited evidence regarding the factors associated with the recurrence of drug use among individuals who have used methamphetamine, particularly within populations involved in the criminal justice system. This study aimed to identify predictors of illicit drug use at a one-year follow-up among males in Japan who have used methamphetamine and are involved in the criminal justice system. Methods: The study participants were adult males on probation due to methamphetamine use or possession and were involved in a community-based program. The participants were recruited early in their probation period and participated in telephone-based surveys conducted by mental health center staff. We analyzed one-year follow-up data to investigate the recurrence rate of illicit drug use and associated risk factors using multiple logistic regression. Results: Out of 234 participants, 27 (11.5%) used illicit drugs during the one-year follow-up period. After adjusting for demographic characteristics, severity of drug use, type of probation, and use of treatment for substance use disorders, the use of social welfare services (OR = 2.78) and a lack of trustworthy relationships (OR = 3.17) were significantly associated with recurrence of illicit drug use. Conclusions: This study suggested that individuals facing challenges in maintaining stable living conditions and building trustworthy relationships were more likely to return to drug use early in their probation period. Comprehensive and tailored support focused on social stabilization and relationship-building is required to prompt recovery in males who have experienced methamphetamine use.

Drug and Alcohol Dependence Reports, (2024)

By William Downs

The Labour government has committed to halving knife crime in a decade.

This briefing provides an overview of legislation concerning knives and offensive weapons, and the approaches taken by the police and other agencies to prevent serious violence in England and Wales.

What are knife crime offences? It is a criminal offence to possess any knife or other bladed article in a public place, under section 139 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988. It is also a criminal offence to have an “offensive weapon” in any public place, under section 1 of the Prevention of Crime Act 1953. Both offences carry maximum penalties of up to four years’ imprisonment. It is a defence for someone to prove they have possessed a knife, bladed article or offensive weapon with “good reason or lawful authority”, though the legislation does not provide examples of what this means in practice. A court determines whether the explanation provided by a defendant amounts to lawful authority or reasonable excuse based on the specific circumstances of a case. It is also a criminal offence to possess any prohibited weapon under section 141 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 (as amended by the Offensive Weapons Act 2019). Prohibited weapons cannot be possessed anywhere, even in private, and are also illegal to hire, lend or manufacture. Like other possession offences, the maximum penalty is four years’ imprisonment. There are currently 20 prohibited weapons listed in secondary legislation under the Criminal Justice Act 1988 (Offensive Weapons) Order 1988, including a range of knives, bladed articles and other weapons. Under section 141(2) of the 1988 act, the government can introduce secondary legislation to add further weapons to this list. In 2024, the government added a new definition of “zombie-style” knives and machetes to the list, and launched a consultation on adding “ninja swords” to the list. Sentencing statistics from the Ministry of Justice shows that in the year ending March 2023, there were almost 18,500 cautions and convictions made for possession of a knife or offensive weapon. Juveniles (aged 10-17) were the offenders in around 17.3% of cases. Further data for England and Wales related to knife-related offences can be found in the Library briefing: Knife Crime Statistics: England and Wales.

London: House of Commons Library, 2025. 41p.

By Ernesto Lopez, Bobby Boxerman

Key Takeaways This study updates and supplements previous U.S. crime trends reports by the Council on Criminal Justice (CCJ) with data through December 2024. It examines yearly and monthly rates of reported crime for 13 violent, property, and drug offenses in 40 American cities that have consistently reported monthly data over the past six years. The 40 cities are not necessarily representative of all jurisdictions in the United States. Not all cities published data for each offense (see the Appendix for which cities reported which offenses); trends in offenses with fewer reporting cities should be viewed with caution. Not all crimes are reported to law enforcement. In addition, the data collected for this report are subject to revision by local jurisdictions. Reported levels of 12 of the 13 offenses covered in this report were lower in 2024 than in 2023; shoplifting was the only offense higher in 2024 compared to 2023. Looking at changes in violent offenses from 2023 to 2024, the number of homicides in the 29 study cities providing data for that crime was 16% lower, representing 631 fewer homicides. There were 4% fewer reported aggravated assaults, 15% fewer gun assaults, 6% fewer sexual assaults, and 4% fewer domestic violence incidents last year than in 2023. Robbery fell by 10% while carjackings (a type of robbery) decreased by 32%. Motor vehicle theft had been on the rise from the summer of 2020 through 2023, but that trend reversed last year; there were 24% fewer motor vehicle thefts in 2024 than in 2023. Reports of residential burglaries (-13%), nonresidential burglaries (-6%), larcenies (-5%), and drug offenses (-3%) all decreased in 2024 compared to 2023. But rates of reported shoplifting, a crime that has received extensive attention from the media and policymakers, increased by 14% over the same period. Examining trends over a longer timeframe, most violent crimes are at or below levels seen in 2019, the year prior to the onset of the COVID pandemic and racial justice protests of 2020. There were 6% fewer homicides in the study cities in 2024 than in 2019. Similarly, sexual assault (-26%), domestic violence (-11%), and robbery (-19%) were lower in 2024 than in 2019. In contrast, aggravated assaults (+4%), gun assaults (+5%), and carjackings (+25%) were higher in 2024 than in 2019. Homicide rates in some high-homicide cities, including Baltimore, Detroit, and St. Louis, have dropped even further, returning to the levels of 2014, when national homicide rates were at historic lows. Rates in other cities have largely returned to pre-pandemic levels. Property crime trends have been mixed over the last five years. There were fewer residential burglaries (-38%) and larcenies (-12%) in 2024 than in 2019, but more nonresidential burglaries (+12%) and shoplifting (+1%). Motor vehicle thefts were higher by half (+53%) during the timeframe. Drug offenses in 2024 were 28% below 2019 levels. While these crime reductions are promising, the United States still experiences high levels of homicide compared to other industrialized nations, and progress should not slow local, state, federal, and community efforts to adopt comprehensive, evidencebased strategies to reduce violence. Furthermore, researchers should redouble their efforts to identify how broad behavioral shifts and other societal dynamics may affect trends.

Washington, DC: Council on Criminal Justice, 2025. 39p.

By Danielle Stibbe, Stijn Ruiter, Wouter Steenbeek, Asier Moneva

Objectives: This study investigates the effect of advertised rewards in credential leaks on the likelihood and speed of account hijacking. Methods: In an online field experiment, we created 176 honey Gmail accounts and randomly assigned them to eight different posts containing account credential leaks. We used a 2 × 2 experimental design, manipulating two key variables within the post titles: the number of accounts (5 K or 1.5 M) and the promise of access to additional platforms (absent or present). We then monitored the accounts for any subsequent activity. Results: Our findings indicate that the promise of access to additional platforms increased the likelihood and speed of an attempted access. Only 12 accounts were fully accessed, however, because most hijackers did not complete the second-factor authentication (2FA) process required for gaining full access. It seems that the 2FA acted as a deterrent to complete Gmail account hijacking. Conclusions: The study aligns with the rational choice perspective of crime, showing that the prospect of greater rewards leads to more attempted account accesses

Computers in Human Behavior Reports, Volume 14, May 2024, 100410

By Asier Moneva, Stijn Ruiter, Daniël Meinsma

Criminal expertise plays a crucial role in the choices offenders make when committing a crime, including their modus operandi. However, our knowledge about criminal decision making online remains limited. Drawing on insights from cyber security, we conceptualize the cybercrime commission process as the sequence of phases of the cyber kill chain that offenders go through. We assume that offenders who follow the sequence consecutively use the most efficient hacking method. Building upon the expertise paradigm, we hypothesize that participants with greater hacking experience and IT skills undertake more efficient hacks. To test this hypothesis, we analyzed data from 69 computer security and software engineering students who were invited to hack a vulnerable website in a computer lab equipped with monitoring software, which allowed to collect objective behavioral measures. Additionally, we collected individual measures regarding hacking expertise through an online questionnaire. After quantitatively measuring efficiency using sequence analysis, a regression model showed that the expertise paradigm may also apply to hackers. We discuss the implications of our novel research for the study of offender decision-making processes more broadly.

Computers in Human Behavior, Volume 155, June 2024, 108180

Edited by Peter Starke, Laust Lund Elbek and Georg Wenzelburger

We live in an age of insecurity. The Global Financial Crisis, the Covid-19 pandemic, the wars in Ukraine and Gaza and the climate crisis are just the most evident examples of shocks that have increased the level of insecurity among elites and citizens in recent years. And yet there is ample evidence that insecurity is not equally distributed across populations. Bringing together disciplines such as political science, criminology, sociology, and anthropology and combining quantitative and qualitative studies from a wide range of rich and middle-income countries, this collection presents a new framework for exploring the two key social challenges of our times – insecurity and inequality – together. The volume analyses the nature, causes and distribution of subjective insecurities and how various actors use or respond to unequal security. The essays cover a host of themes including the unequal spatial distribution of (in)security, unequal access to security provision in relation to crime and welfare, the impact of insecurity on political attitudes as well as policy responses and the political exploitation of insecurity. An important contribution to debates across several social scientific disciplines as well as current public debate on insecurity and politics, the volume will be of great interest to scholars and researchers of criminology, social policy, peace and conflict studies, politics and international relations, sociology, development studies and economics. It will also be of interest to policymakers and government think tanks.

London; New York: Routledge, 2025. 248p.

By Bendik Brunvoll and Bjørn Øvstedal

Europe has seen an increase in cocaine seizures in recent years. As the criminal landscape in South America has seen noticeable changes, there has been a shift in how cocaine enters Europe. Belgium has become the primary gateway for cocaine trafficking to Europe. With increased cocaine imports, organized criminal gangs have more money to be laundered. This thesis analyzes Belgium's trade data to investigate whether increased cocaine trafficking impacts a country's international trade flow. We propose

a method of detecting money laundering by analyzing trade flows of goods related to money laundering. This is done by introducing the synthetic difference-in-differences method in a case study. We analyze trade flows from 2000 to 2019 between Belgium, tax havens, and cocaine trafficking countries. The thesis finds that as Belgium experiences an increase in cocaine seizures, there is a significant increase in the import of diamonds, arts, and antiquities from cocainetrafficking countries. However, there is no conclusive evidence of increased money laundering activities between Belgium and tax havens. The method cannot conclude the causes of increased imports. However, it can be a tool to narrow down different countries and products to identify trade flows that raise suspicion regarding money laundering activities. Further work should analyze the trade flows identified by the proposed method to detect money laundering.

Norwegian School of Economics Bergen, Spring 2022 48p.

By Jake M. Drew and Tyler Moore

To be successful, cybercriminals must figure out how to scale their scams. They duplicate content on new websites, often staying one step ahead of defenders that shut down past schemes. For some scams, such as phishing and counterfeit goods shops, the duplicated content remains nearly identical. In others, such as advanced-fee fraud and online Ponzi schemes, the criminal must alter content so that it appears different in order to evade detection by victims and law enforcement. Nevertheless, similarities often remain, in terms of the website structure or content, since making truly unique copies does not scale well. In this paper, we present a novel optimized combined clustering method that links together replicated scam websites, even when the criminal has taken steps to hide connections. We present automated methods to extract key website features, including rendered text, HTML structure, file structure, and screenshots. We describe a process to automatically identify the best combination of such attributes to most accurately cluster similar websites together. To demonstrate the method’s applicability to cybercrime, we evaluate its performance against two collected datasets of scam websites: fake escrow services and high-yield investment programs (HYIPs). We show that our method more accurately groups similar websites together than those existing general-purpose consensus clustering methods.

• Smugglers were the top source of information for those who obtained information prior to starting their journey (50%), even more so for women (60%).This high percentage likely stems from the unique sampling criteria, in which all respondents used a smuggler. • However, 28% of migrants overall considered smugglers to be the most reliable source of information, and less so among women (21%).

London: Mixed Migration Centre, 2025. 12p.

By Federico Varese  & Fanqi Zeng

Studies of organized crime in cities have traditionally concentrated on the global south or ethnic enclaves and traditional mafa territories within the global north. Here this study turns its attention to governance-type organized crime in the English city of Nottingham, where the main protagonists are white and British born. It investigates whether such a gang can govern communities by reducing ordinary crimes. We conduct in-depth interviews with local ofcials and analyze a novel dataset of the public’s phone calls to the Nottingham police from 2012 to 2019, encompassing spatio-temporal information and police-labeled crime types. We identify Nottingham’s ward of Bestwood as the site of an entrenched, governance-type organized crime group, whereas its most similar ward, Bulwell, is not. Further comparative analyses indicate that certain ordinary crime rates are significantly lower in Bestwood than in Bulwell. We conclude that governance-type organized crime can emerge in a country with a high capacity to police and in a nonimmigrant, less affluent community. Our findings suggest that traditional explanations of the emergence of criminal governance in cities need to be revisited.

Nature Cities | Volume 1 | December 2024 | 821–829

By Haolei Zheng, Daqian Liu, YangWang & XiaoliYue

Current academic research on fitting the volume of urban theft crimes at a macro size is limited, especially from the urban functionality perspective. Given this gap, this study utilizes a Bayesian model to conduct a fitting analysis of theft crime data from 674 cities in China from 2018 to 2020. This research aims to explore novel pathways for theft crime fitting. Results indicate that the size of urban functionality, particularly points of interest (POIs), exhibits excellent performance in fitting theft crimes, with POIs related to public services and commercial activities demonstrating the most significant fitting effects. This research successfully identifies effective indicators for crime fitting, thereby offering a new perspective and supplement to theft crime research. This study holds significant value for gaining a profound understanding of criminal phenomena and explaining the causes and mechanisms underlying the differences in theft crimes among various cities in China.

Scientific Reports,

Volume 14, article number 26447, (2024)

By Jerzy Sarnecki · Amber L. Beckley · Sofa Wikman · Lars Westfelt · My Lilja6 · Hernan Mondani · Emy Bäcklin · Amir Rostami

Global evidence indicates minimal connection between immigration and crime. Nordic research, however, has been generally carried out on individuals and shows that immigrants are over-represented in crime. This has led to claims that high crime rates are due to immigration. We directed our study towards these claims by analyzing immigrant population prevalence, defined as the percent of foreign-born individuals, and violent crime in Swedish municipalities between 2000 and 2020. Nearly all municipalities had higher violent crime rates in 2020 relative to 2000. To discern whether drastic increases in municipality-level crime rates could be connected to municipality-level immigrant population prevalence, a retrospective case–control design was used to select 20 municipalities with the highest increase in reported violent crime rates and 20 municipalities with the lowest increase in reported violent crime rates. Immigrant population prevalence had little association with high rates of reported violent crime. The

average association between immigrant population prevalence and violent crime rates calculated from all municipalities was also weak and non-significant (p>0.05). Municipalities with a high increase in crime tended to have more crime correlates than municipalities with a low increase in crime. However, more research is needed on the impact of migration in small towns, especially those that have experienced economic and social stagnation.

Int. Migration & Integration (2025).

By Ilya Klauzner, Amy Pisani

  AIM To examine the trends in, major characteristics of, and the police response to cybercrime in NSW. METHOD We extracted data from the ReportCyber Application Platform (RCAP), a national cybercrime reporting system operated by the Australian Cyber Security Centre. Data was analysed over a three-year period from 1 July 2019 to 30 June 2022 and was restricted to incidents where the victim resided in NSW. We separate cybercrime into five offence categories: cyber-enabled fraud, identity theft, cyber-enabled abuse, online image abuse (OIA), and device. We conducted a descriptive analysis on the victim, suspected perpetrator, and report characteristics to report on trends and characteristics of reported cybercrime. We estimated an ordinary least squares regression model to identify factors correlated with a referral to police of reported cybercrime. RESULTS Over the three years to June 2022, there were 39,494 reports of cybercrime where the victim resided in NSW, and more than $404 million reported lost. Cybercrime reports increased by 42%, with all cyber offence categories increasing except cyber abuse. Increases in cyber enabled fraud and identity crime, spurred a corresponding increase in reported cyber crime related financial losses by individuals. Most victims were individuals (89%), male (53%) and over 25 years of age (87%); however, differences in victim type were observed within offence categories. While a high proportion of victims have evidence about the incident (94%), the majority did not know their perpetrator and therefore few reports included suspect details (28%). The majority (71%) of reports were closed by police in RCAP with no further investigation undertaken. Reports were however more likely to be referred to police when the incident involved a victim aged 17 years or younger, the suspect was known to the victim, money was lost, or an OIA offence was indicated. CONCLUSION Our results show that cybercrime in NSW largely follows the same increasing trend that has been observed in national cybercrime studies. However, the statistics we report here only offer a partial view of reported cybercrime in NSW as we do not capture data reported directly to police or other national reporting systems. There are clear benefits in ongoing public reporting of cybercrime trends both at the national level and separately for individual states and territories, which could be enabled by integrating reporting systems and enhancing police data

Bureau Brief no. 165. 

Sydney:  NSW Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research. , 2023. 18p.

By The International Council of Shopping Centers

Organized retail crime (ORC) not only harms communities and retail centers but also threatens the safety of consumers and retail workers alike. ORC involves a criminal enterprise employing a group of individuals (2 or more) who steal substantial quantities of merchandise from a retailer. Stores lost $121.6 billion to retail theft in 2023; projections indicate shoplifting could cost retailers over $150 billion in 2026.

Reducing ORC was a major priority for state lawmakers and law enforcement in 2024. Lawmakers in nine states (Arizona, California, Florida, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, New York, Vermont and West Virginia) plus D.C., enacted 23 pieces of legislation that targeted different aspects of organized retail crime (ORC). Most of the measures considered by lawmakers addressed one of the following objectives: 1) provide more flexibility for prosecutors to charge offenders with the total value of stolen goods across multiple jurisdictions, 2) increase funding for law enforcement to investigate ORC cases, and 3) enforce tougher punishment for repeat offenders. To date, 17 states have created ORC Task Forces to coordinate activity among law enforcement, prosecutors, and businesses in stopping multi-jurisdictional retail crime rings.

New York: ICSC, 2023, 44p.

By New York City Office of the Mayor

On December 16, 2022, New York City Mayor Eric Adams convened more than 70 stakeholders to collaborate on policy and find creative solutions to address the prevalent increase in retail theft. The summit brought together law enforcement officials, government stakeholders, small business representatives, large retail groups, union leaders, Business Improvement Districts, Chambers of Commerce, and diversion providers with diverse perspectives to discuss a variety of topics, including physical security measures, new diversion programs, leveraging technology to protect businesses and improve citywide responses, and enhancing existing partnerships among private, government, and non-profit sectors. In developing this report, an evidence-based and stakeholder-informed methodology was followed. The Administration analyzed the information shared by the attendees at the summit, conducted independent research and data analysis, and consulted with law enforcement and retail business management. The Administration also conferred closely with New York State Attorney General Letitia James and with the Loss Prevention Research Council to receive additional input and advice on these matters. A draft of this report was then distributed to stakeholders to solicit feedback and, based on the input received, the report was further refined, and the recommendations developed as described herein. The plan outlined in this report identifies recurring problems that plague New York City businesses, which the subsequent list of solutions seeks to address in order to ensure public safety and promote economic growth.

New York: New York City Office of the Mayor, 2023. 33p.

By Michael Ahn Paarlberg

Policy responses to transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) within migrant receiving countries often conflate all organizations which conduct illegal activity in multiple countries based on the mafia or cartel model. This model imagines the TCO to be the most evolved form of organized crime: deeply institutionalized, well resourced, hierarchically structured, highly profitable, and diversified in their criminal activities. Such a model informs law enforcement and immigration policies which are often draconian and counterproductive to citizen security. In reality, transnational crime is highly varied in organization, activities, scope, and membership. A major TCO type that defies the mafia archetype is the transnational gang. This study seeks to nuance our understanding of TCOs, illustrated by case studies of two transnational gangs, MS-13 and Satudarah, by advancing the concept of criminal remittances to locate agency in transnationalization. As the case studies demonstrate, for transnational gangs, the remittance of criminal activity is not at the organization level but at the individual and state level. Thus the transnationalization of crime can itself be the product of state foreign and migration policies.

Comparative Migration Studies volume 10, Article number: 24, 2022, 20p.

By Moamen Gouda and Anouk S. Rigterink

This study investigates the long-term relationship between slavery and violent crime in the USA. Although qualitative evidence suggests that slavery perpetuated violence, there has been no largeN study supporting this claim. Using county-level data, we find that the percentage of slaves in the population in 1860 is linked with violent crime in 2000. This result is specific to violent crime, robust to instrumenting for slavery and varying the approach to missing crime data, and not driven by biased crime reporting. Investigating the theoretical mechanisms driving these results, we find that historical slavery affects inequality (like Bertocchi and Dimico, 2014), white Americans’ political attitudes towards race (like Acharya et al., 2016b) and black American’s political attitudes – in opposite directions. Results suggest that inequality and black American’s political attitudes mediate the observed effect on violence.

CESifo Working Paper Series No. 11515, Dec 2024, 50 pages

By Amnesty International

Enforced disappearance is both a crime under international law and a serious human rights violation. When a person is deprived of their liberty and their fate or whereabouts concealed, the lives of their families, loved ones and communities are put on hold while they wait to learn of what has happened to them and where they are. In Colombia, as in other countries in the Americas, many of the people left waiting or searching for their loved ones after an enforced disappearance have turned uncertainty into a force for change. Firstly, to find the victims of enforced disappearance. Second, to demand truth, justice, reparation and guarantees of non-recurrence. Third, to continue the struggle to ascertain the fate and whereabouts of other people’s loved ones and to defend human rights. Women play a leading role in this story. They are the ones who have overwhelmingly taken on the task of searching for the victims of enforced disappearance in Colombia. In doing so, not only have they raised their voices against the injustice of the enforced disappearance imposed on them, but they have also acted as searchers and human rights defenders. In Colombia, taking on these roles means exposing themselves to unacceptable risks, threats and attacks. Whether they are searching for a loved one, helping someone else to search for a loved one, or defending the rights of victims of enforced disappearance and their families, women who search face arbitrariness, impunity and violence, sometimes from the state and sometimes from non-state actors, especially state security forces and armed opposition groups. In most cases, this violence is gendered. The nature of the risks, threats and attacks that women searchers face often intersect with their gender. Among other forms of violence against women, threats relate to their bodies or to their assigned or assumed gender roles, and perpetrators disproportionately use sexual violence against women. However, women searchers not only continue their work, but also put forward proposals for action to ensure that the state respects, guarantees and protects their rights. The most recent manifestation of this driving force is the approval of Law 2364 of 2024, a proposal that emerged from a group of organizations and communities of women searchers who spoke of their own life experiences, analysed them and used them to draft a bill designed to urge the state to take appropriate measures to end this scourge. With this report, Amnesty International begins a process of documenting the situation of risks, threats and attacks faced by women searchers in Colombia and, based on this, a process of monitoring the implementation of Law 2364 of 2024, which will continue over the next few years. This first part documents the story of Yanette Bautista, Andrea Torres and the Nydia Erika Bautista Foundation (FNEB), an organization of women searchers and victims of enforced disappearance that accompanies other organizations and communities in their own cases.

London: Amnesty International, 2024. 64p.

By Cassandra Popham, Ellie Taylor and William Teager., et al.

The Youth Endowment Fund surveyed over 10,000 teenage children (aged 13-17) in England and Wales about their experiences of violence. The findings are detailed across five reports, each focusing on a different aspect. In this report, we look at teenage children’s views and experiences of the police. Here’s what we found. Opinions of the police differ according to children’s experiences. Teenagers’ views of the police shift as they get older and gain more exposure to policing. Over half (54%) of 13-17-year-olds believe the police do a good job in their local areas. Similar proportions feel the police use force appropriately (50%) and are available when needed (47%). Only 45% think the police treat everyone fairly, regardless of race or religion.

Age plays a significant role in shaping perceptions. Thirteen-year-olds consistently express the most positive views, while 16-17-year-olds are more critical of police conduct. Interestingly, Black teenagers (63%) are the most likely to agree that the police do a good job locally, compared to 54% of White children, 52% of Asian children and 50% of mixed ethnicity children. However, Black (39%) and mixed ethnicity (36%) children are far less likely to believe the police treat everyone fairly than White children (47%). When it comes to the use of force, Asian (47%), Black (42%) and mixed ethnicity (39%) children are also less likely to agree that police use force only when necessary when compared to White children (52%).

Children with direct experiences of violence tend to have more positive views of the police. For instance, 62% of children who’ve been victims of serious violence think their local police do a good job, compared to 54% of children who haven’t been a victim. Direct experiences with the police also affect perceptions, but the effect differs depending on racial background. White teenagers who’ve had contact with the police are more likely to say the police do a good job than those with no direct experience. But this is not the case for teenagers from Black, Asian and mixed ethnic backgrounds.

Children are mostly supportive of stop and search but don’t all agree it’s used fairly. Most teenagers are supportive of the police’s power to stop and search, though not all believe it’s applied fairly. Overall, 68% of 13-17-year-olds support stop and search, and 72% believe it helps prevent knife crime. However, only 56% think that stop and search is used fairly. Younger teenagers (aged 13-15) are generally more supportive of stop and search than older teenagers (aged 16-17). Racial differences also emerge, with White children more likely to view stop and search as both effective and fair than their Black, Asian and mixed ethnicity peers.

London: Youth Endowment Fund, Children, violence and vulnerability 2024 Report 4. 33p.

By Ionel Zamfir and Colin Murphy

The rise of digital technologies represents a double-edged sword for women's rights. On the one hand, the digital environment has enabled women to build networks and spread awareness about the abuse they suffer, such as through the #Metoo movement. On the other, it has provided abusers and misogynists with new tools with which they can spread their harmful content on an unprecedented scale. With the development of artificial intelligence, these trends, both positive and negative, are expected to continue. Against this backdrop, it has become clear that digital violence is as harmful as offline violence and needs to be tackled with the full force of the law, as well as through other non-legislative measures. Moreover, the digital content causing the harm – images, messages, etc. – needs to be erased. This is particularly important, as the impact on victims is profound and long-lasting. The European Union has adopted several pieces of legislation that aim to make a difference in this respect. The directive on combating violence against women, to be implemented at the latest by June 2027, sets minimum EU standards for criminalising several serious forms of cyberviolence and enhances the protection of and access to justice for victims. EU legislation on the protection of privacy is also having an impact on cyberviolence. For example, the new Digital Services Act imposes an obligation on big digital platforms in the EU to remove harmful content from their websites. This is instrumental in removing intimate or manipulated images that are disseminated on the internet without the person's consent; almost all such images portray women, according to existing data. Member States use a multiplicity of legal approaches to tackle this issue, combining criminalisation of specific cyber offences with the use of general criminal law. In some Member States, an explicit gender dimension is also included.

Brussels: EPRS | European Parliamentary Research Service, 2024. 11p

By Indra de Soysa

Democracy and the level of economic development correlate tightly. While some argue that egalitarian conditions inherent in democracies reduce homicide, others suggest that it is economic development that matters. This study evaluates competing theory and tests the democracy—homicide link using homicide data defined as death due to interpersonal violence and novel data on a variety of democracies. The results show that democracies associate positively with homicide, and egalitarian democracy shows the strongest effect. The level of economic development is negative on homicide and substantively large. The basic results are robust to alternative data, estimating method, and to omitted variables bias.

The British Journal of Criminology, 2024, 22 p.