By Police Executive Research Forum

Jurisdictions across the United States have struggled with a dramatic rise in carjackings since 2020, leaving police leaders with questions about why this spike is occurring, why juveniles are committing this crime in unprecedented numbers, and why carjacking numbers remained elevated when the number of homicides and aggravated assaults started to decline. With those questions in mind, the Police Executive Research Forum (PERF) assembled a group of over 130 people from more than 50 different agencies for a National Summit on Carjacking in early 2024 in Washington, D.C. Throughout the day, police leaders, federal officials, local and federal prosecutors, researchers, executives, and business and community leaders discussed the situation in 7. D.C. Metropolitan Police Department. MPD Carjacking Dashboard. https://mpdc.dc.gov/page/carjacking. their communities and the challenges they have faced effectively addressing these incidents, particularly when juveniles are involved. Jurisdictions that have successfully brought their numbers down shared lessons learned and promising strategies for preventing carjackings. This report is drawn from the comments and observations of those who attended PERF’s summit and follow-up interviews. It looks at the carjacking problem in cities and counties across the country, offers insights into the factors causing the increase, and shares some of the innovative approaches jurisdictions are implementing — including the use of technology, data analysis, and cross-agency partnerships. The report includes 10 recommendations to help police and other stakeholders effectively respond to carjackings in their communities.

Washington, DC: Police Executive Research Forum, 2024. 62p.

By Allison Lind , Ryan P. Larson , Susan M. Mason , Christopher Uggen

There is abundant research showing the disproportionate impacts of violence on health in disadvantaged neighborhoods, making an understanding of recent violent crime trends essential for promoting health equity. Carjackings have been of particular interest in the media, although little research has been undertaken on this violent crime. We use interrupted time series models to examine the impact of the police killing of George Floyd on the spatiotemporal patterns of carjacking in Minneapolis in relation to neighborhood disadvantage. To provide grounding, we compare our results to the well-studied patterns of homicides. Results indicate that carjackings both increased and dispersed spatially after the murder of George Floyd and subsequent social unrest, more so than homicides. Socially disadvantaged neighborhoods experienced the greatest absolute increase while more advantaged neighborhoods saw a greater relative increase. The challenge ahead is to identify policy responses that will effectively curb such violence without resorting to harsh and inequitable policing and sentencing practices.

By Sophie Davies | Manon Roberts | Amber Evans | Freya Smith | Alex Murray,

Fraud is now the most commonly experienced crime in the UK, making up over 40 per cent of all recorded crime. Instances of fraud have risen substantially over the last decade, from 510,403 offences recorded in the year ending 2013 to 1.16 million offences recorded in the year ending 2023, with online fraud contributing significantly to the increase (the Crime Survey for England and Wales estimates that over 60 per cent of cyber incidents take place online). Yet our understanding of online fraud in particular — its typology, scale and impact — is limited. Crest Advisory, in partnership with the Police Foundation and Birkbeck, University of London (Institute for Crime and Justice Policy Research), and with funding from the Dawes Trust, is carrying out a large research project into tackling online fraud. The first part of our project focuses on developing a better understanding of the impact of online fraud on victims and the wider public. In September 2023, Crest published findings from large-scale online surveys of the public and small and medium enterprises (SMEs) which explored public perceptions and experiences of online fraud. This report presents the findings from interviews with 20 victims and 12 focus groups (with 96 members of the public) to build on the survey findings and deepen our insight and knowledge of online fraud victimisation and its impact. It addresses a key gap as most existing studies do not distinguish between online and offline fraud victimisation, in part because many fraudulent activities combine offline and online elements. Key findings from the interviews and focus groups are set out below.

London: Crest Advisory, 2024. 36p.

By The Better Business Bureau

CRIMINALS ARE FINDING NEW METHODS WITH THE CRYPTOCURRENCY MARKET, LIKE BITCOIN AND ETHEREUM, TO STEAL FROM UNSUSPECTING INVESTORS OR VICTIMS OF COMMON SCAMS. | Cryptocurrency Scams As Bitcoin and other types of cryptocurrencies gain attention in the news for their volatility, novelty and celebrity investors, scammers are quickly discovering how to use people’s lack of knowledge about the system to rip off investors and dress up old scams. Early entrants into the market made enormous amounts of money, and later others rushed in with hopes of similar gains. The total value of all bitcoins in the world is estimated at $1.03 trillion. A single bitcoin, worth $2,000 in 2017, reached an all-time high of $67,549 in 2021. But Bitcoin is volatile, and the value can swing wildly. After hitting a high in 2021, it declined to $35,484 in early 2022. Purchasing power of a bitcoin can vary day-to-day. Nonetheless, cryptocurrency — a digital payment system that does not rely on banks to verify transactions — has now grown into a major worldwide industry. New York, Arkansas, Brazil, and Puerto Rico expressed interest in becoming attractive locations for the cryptocurrency industry. However, in the spring of 2021 China banned cryptocurrency. It was the second largest country using cryptocurrency. A virtual tug of war exists between the legitimate and fraudulent use of cryptocurrency. This study examines digital currencies and the scams that use them. It provides background on key terms and concepts, examines cryptocurrency’s susceptibility for large-scale scams, and notes the risks and provides tips for common investors and others using cryptocurrency as a payment method.

Washington, DC: BBB, 2022. 18p.

By EUROPOL and Basel Institute on Governance,

These recommendations follow the 6th Global Conference on Criminal Finances and Cryptocurrencies on 1–2 September 2022. The conference was hosted by Europol at its headquarters in The Hague, the Netherlands, together with the Basel Institute on Governance through the Joint Working Group on Criminal Finances and Cryptocurrencies.

The Recommendations are intended to highlight broad approaches and best practices. They are designed to help public and private actors stay one step ahead of those seeking to abuse crypto assets (also known as virtual assets) and services to make, hide and launder illicit money.

The main message is that as the use of crypto assets expands into practically every country and sector, so does its abuse to commit new forms of crime and launder criminal proceeds. Yet with the right tools, capacity and cooperation, the unique characteristics of blockchain-based technologies offer an unprecedented opportunity to investigate organised crime and money laundering networks and to recover stolen funds.

The five recommendations cover:

1. Breaking down silos between “traditional” and “crypto”

2. Regulating broadly and make full use of existing laws 

3. Taking advantage of the blockchain to disrupt organised crime 

4. Raising crypto literacy through capacity building and clear communication 

5. Increasing public-private cooperation

EUROPOL and Basel Institute on Governance, 2022. 6p.

By Angus K Ryan

Crime can evade detection and prosecution by criminal justice systems. This can include safety crime, briefly defined here as violations of law that either do, or have the potential to cause sudden death or injury as a result of work-related activities. Research estimates that 2.3 million people across the globe succumb to work-related incidents and diseases every year, and that safety crime causes nearly 900 annual deaths in Britain. Despite this largescale harm, safety crime fails to attract major political, public, or academic attention. One consequence of the lack of attention to safety crime in policy discussions is a significant gap in the body of knowledge on how to effectively punish safety criminals. This thesis aims to address how the effectiveness of penalties for safety criminals can be improved to reduce safety crime. To fulfil this aim, this study answers: which theories are currently informing the punishment of safety criminals in England and Wales? Which theories are effective at punishing safety criminals and why are they effective? How can penalties be used to effectively punish safety criminals? This qualitative study explores 21 stakeholders’ views on the relationship between the punishment of safety criminals and the prevalence of the theories of deterrence, retributive justice, rehabilitation, and incapacitation in England and Wales. The findings of this study indicate that there is a lack of punishment for safety criminals in England and Wales, and that the theories of deterrence, retributive justice, rehabilitation, and incapacitation can be used in varying degrees of effectiveness against these persons, typically dependent on how penalties are used to achieve these theories. The interview data suggests numerous methods of improving current penalties and effectively punishing safety criminals. This study concludes that a mixture of sanctions in a pyramid of penalties should be used to punish safety criminals more effectively.

Bristol, UK: University of Bristol, 2022. 300p.

By Jack Nicholls; Aditya Kuppa; Nhien-An Le-Khac

Machine Learning and Deep Learning methods are widely adopted across financial domains to support trading activities, mobile banking, payments, and making customer credit decisions. These methods also play a vital role in combating financial crime, fraud, and cyberattacks. Financial crime is increasingly being committed over cyberspace, and cybercriminals are using a combination of hacking and social engineering techniques which are bypassing current financial and corporate institution security. With this comes a new umbrella term to capture the evolving landscape which is financial cybercrime. It is a combination of financial crime, hacking, and social engineering committed over cyberspace for the sole purpose of illegal economic gain. Identifying financial cybercrime-related activities is a hard problem, for example, a highly restrictive algorithm may block all suspicious activity obstructing genuine customer business. Navigating and identifying legitimate illicit transactions is not the only issue faced by financial institutions, there is a growing demand of transparency, fairness, and privacy from customers and regulators, which imposes unique constraints on the application of artificial intelligence methods to detect fraud-related activities. Traditionally, rule based systems and shallow anomaly detection methods have been applied to detect financial crime and fraud, but recent developments have seen graph based techniques and neural network models being used to tackle financial cybercrime. There is still a lack of a holistic understanding of the financial cybercrime ecosystem, relevant methods, and their drawbacks and new emerging open problems in this domain in spite of their popularity. In this survey, we aim to bridge the gap by studying the financial cybercrime ecosystem based on four axes: (a) different fraud methods adopted by criminals; (b) relevant systems, algorithms, drawbacks, constraints, and metrics used to combat each fraud type; (c) the relevant personas and stakeholders involved; (d) open and emerging problems in the financial cybercrime domain.

IEEE Access ( Volume: 9), 2021, 22p.

By David B. Hinchman,

Ransomware is a malicious software that encrypts files and leaves data and systems unusable. With ransomware attacks, hackers gain entry into a system, lock out users, and demand payment to regain access.

Homeland Security, FBI, and Secret Service help state, local, and other governments prevent or respond to ransomware attacks on systems like emergency services. Most government entities said they're satisfied with the agencies' prevention and response efforts. But many cited inconsistent communication during attacks as a problem. We recommended that the federal agencies address cited issues and follow key practices for better collaboration.

Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2022. 70p.

By Mark Button · David Shepherd · Jeyong Jung

This paper explores the use of fake social media accounts for economic espionage. It focuses solely on the first step of the recruitment process, the link requests. There has been very little research on economic espionage and none on the use of fake social media profiles as a means of recruitment. The methodology is built upon an inductive approach based on a survey of 2,000 UK professionals who use social media for professional purposes to provide practical and theoretical insights into the problem drawn from a Qualtrics panel. The results illustrate that a quarter of professionals are ill-prepared for the threat of fake social media profiles for the purposes of espionage because they either do not check link requests or accept them even with risky attributes. It further finds a substantial minority are carelessly indifferent to information security and computer network security, and are so indifferent to the identities behind link requests that they auto-link with everyone. The paper also explores the homophily-heterophily orientation of professionals. It argues that homophily-orientated professionals tend to reject profiles with espionage characteristics, whilst heterophily-orientated professionals are susceptible because they embrace social difference. The practical implications are that employers need to strengthen their information security training programmes, the security services need to be more explicit in characterising the threats, and regulation is required to force the social media companies to focus on tackling the fake profle problem.

Security Journal (2025) 38:30

By George Herbert

This rapid research review provides an overview of the current state of knowledge on the scale and dynamics of trade-based money laundering (TBML) and key challenges and opportunities in relation to TBML, both globally and in relation to the United Kingdom (UK) specifically. The study took place over ten days in August and September 2022, and involved a review of existing literature, as well as two interviews with experts. Much of the literature reviewed originated from international organisations and publications by national governments, supplemented by news reports and publications by private sector firms.

K4D Emerging Issues Report 55.

Brighton, UK: Institute of Development Studies. .2022.165p.

By Michael Skidmore and Beth Aikenhead

This study aims to improve our understanding of the most serious fraud offences perpetrated in the UK, specifically the diversity of methods for committing these crimes, the characteristics and pathways of offenders involved and where applicable, how the groups or networks of offenders operate. This is an exploratory study which used qualitative data taken from the documents compiled by police practitioners in 25 separate criminal investigations. The cases included in this analysis do not constitute a representative sample of frauds in England and Wales during this period. The selection of cases reflects the choices made by the research team to incorporate a diversity of methods, offenders and settings to capture the breadth of fraud. Furthermore, the sampling frame is the product of practitioner choices over which crimes to assign investigation by specialist teams; these are a limited resource and due to the challenges of international investigation, will likely prioritise offending that has a footprint in the UK. Furthermore, in focusing on frauds that were perpetrated (at least in part) from within England and Wales it does not represent fraud offending that emanates from other countries. The specific fraud cases were serious for different reasons; high financial losses (£100,000 or more), high volume offending (50 or more known victims) and high victim impact (assessed by the victim and/or police practitioner). These dimensions of harm reflect those used in practitioner assessments for deciding which frauds are high harm and a priority for intervention. Only three cases satisfied all three harm criteria, all of which involved the mis-selling of investments. Twelve cases satisfied only one criterion and those linked to each dimension of harm were associated with different methods and victims; all cases that fulfilled the high financial loss criterion had defrauded businesses, and two out of three that fulfilled the high-volume criterion involved taking advance payment from consumers In five cases the scale of victimisation and impact was hidden, but they were included because they involved high-risk offenders suspected of being engaged in serious and complex offending. There was considerable diversity in the methods for perpetrating serious fraud and this study borrows from a typology of acquisitive crime developed in a previous study (Naylor, 2002). This model provided a good fit for distinguishing serious frauds on the basis of two overarching models of offending, and this delineation simultaneously revealed distinctions in the situational context, victim and offender profiles: • Commercial frauds: perpetrated from within a legitimate or pseudo-legitimate business setting and included the sale of investments or the mis-selling of products or services online or face-to-face, and nearly all had victimised individual members of the public. • Predatory frauds: involved theft by impersonating legitimate individuals or organisations, mostly by offenders operating from outside of a business setting and without the pretence of a legitimate commercial exchange. The victim profile was more varied, and over half had victimised businesses (for example, payment diversion fraud). There was divergence in the types of fraud offence encompassed by each category of fraud.

London: Police Foundation 2023. 39p.

By The Youth Justice Board (UK)

Key findings The Serious Incident Annual Report provides a comprehensive overview of 438 serious incidents notified to the Youth Justice Board (YJB) in 2023-24 and the 546 children involved, highlighting key themes and recommendations. Whilst serious incident reporting has been mandatory for youth justice services (YJSs) since April 2022, this is the first year of published findings. A summary of the key findings is below. Whilst there are limitations to this data (please see section 2.1 Data Limitations), this report underscores the importance of addressing exploitation, knife crime, and the vulnerabilities of children with special educational needs or who are neurodivergent. It also highlights the need for timely, effective interventions which address underlying causes, and support to prevent children from being involved in serious incidents. To learn more about the notification process itself, please see the Serious incidents notification: standard operating procedures for YJSs - GOV.UK Criminal exploitation • 41% of all children notified were said to be gang affiliated, criminally exploited, or involved with the National Referral Mechanism (NRM) process1; 42% of all boys and 29% of all girls. • 20% of all children notified had exploitation concerns identified relating to the charge, of these; 58% an NRM referral was due to be made and 42% had a previous NRM referral but were awaiting a decision. Offence types • 55% of all notifications were for Grievous Bodily Harm (GBH), 16% for Rape, 13% for Murder/Manslaughter, 9% Attempted Murder and 3% Terrorism offences. • 56% of incidents notified were knife/blade enabled. • 92% of Attempted Murder notifications indicated there was knife or blade involvement, 84% of Murder/Manslaughter, and 62% of Grievous Bodily Harm incidents. • Rape charges increased from 8-13% of overall notifications when compared to the previous year. Contact with services • 36% of all children charged were under the supervision of a youth justice service at the time of the incident. • 24% were not known to YJSs, nor were they engaged in support from any other local authority service at the time of the incident. • 49% of children notified had no previous cautions and convictions, increasing to 92% for children charged with terrorism offences. • 71% of children notified for murder were not supervised by a youth justice service at the time of the incident, but were known to other agencies, social care, education, health. • 63% had some kind of previous contact with a local authority or Children and Adolescent Mental Health Service (CAMHS), of these 24% were engaged with both the youth justice service and one or more other services at the time of the incident. Safeguarding and vulnerabilities • Of the 63% who had some kind of previous contact with a local authority or CAMHS service; o 29% were identified as Children in Need or in Wales, Children with care and support needs o 19% were subject of a Child Protection Plan o 27% were in the care of the local authority as a looked after child, with 48% of these reported to have gang involvement and/or exploitation concerns. • 23% of children reported had identified Special Educational Needs, in Wales Additional Learning Needs/Neurodiversity. Of these; • 19% had an Education Health Care Plan (EHCP) or in Wales Individual Development Plans • 48% were diagnosed with Attention Deficit Disorder (ADD) or Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) or Autistic Spectrum Disorder (ASD) • 53% reported risks associated with exploitation. • 43% of children notified due to their death whilst under the supervision of the youth justice service were victims of murder and 19% died by suicide. Demographics and over-representation • 96% of the children notified were boys • 68% of the children notified were 16-17 years old; 99% of these were boys. • 48% of all children notified were from ethnic minority backgrounds and significantly overrepresented compared to the general 10-17 population (27%) • 17% of children reported were from Black backgrounds and significantly overrepresented compared to the general 10-17 population (6%) • 17% of children reported were from Mixed backgrounds and significantly overrepresented compared to the general 10-17 population (6%) Timeliness of investigations and decision making • Rape offences took the longest from offence to charge, averaging 380 days, followed by terrorism offences at 230 days. • 32% of all incidents took longer than 180 days from offence to charge. • 17% of children notified were reported as being on bail for another matter at the time of the incident.

London: YJB, 2025. 38p.

By Sara T. Thompson

Banditry is a current problem in Nigeria. Historically, banditry has been a problem around the world. A review of the trends of banditry can help to identify and understand patterns that are present related to such criminal activity. To further understand and analyze this problem, this paper outlines the methodology for the systematic collection and creation of one major dataset that provides detailed information about bandit attacks in Nigeria. A review of around 1200 publications from peer-reviewed journals, news articles, and other relevant publications containing information about bandit attacks in Nigeria resulted in a dataset containing a sample of almost 1000 bandit attacks over the course of a decade in Nigeria. Upon analysis of this dataset, there are spatial concentrations related to where bandit attacks occurred as well as the identifcation of common types of bandit attacks. This paper concludes with recommendations for future research.

Security Journal, 2025, 17p.

By Anna Stenkamp, Joanna Weill, and Michael Rempel

This report examines how New York’s 2020 discovery reform law has been implemented across New York City, the four downstate suburban counties (Nassau, Suffolk, Westchester, and Rockland), and the 53 remaining “upstate” counties. The law was designed to increase fairness in the criminal legal process by requiring prosecutors to exercise early sharing of evidence to the defense. Prosecutors must file a Certificate of Compliance (COC) within 20 or 35 days of arraignment (depending on whether a person is held pretrial or released), with a possible 30-day extension. This report evaluates whether the law has contributed to more case dismissals and whether case processing times have changed. In a first-ever analysis, this report also examines prosecutors’ compliance with the reform’s legal timelines for sharing evidence.

New York: Data Collaborative for Justice at John Jay College, 2025. 37p.

By The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe

The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) is proud to release a practical resource designed to empower law enforcement officers, prosecutors, and stakeholders in tackling cryptocurrency-related crimes. The guide "Decoding Crypto Crime: A Guide for Law Enforcement" simplifies complex concepts like blockchain technology and virtual assets, offering best practices for investigating common crypto crimes such as investment scams, extortion, and phishing.

It provides actionable steps for collecting critical evidence, interacting with Virtual Asset Service Providers (VASPs), and utilizing blockchain analytics tools. Recognizing the challenges victims face, the guide also offers support strategies and emphasizes the importance of cross-jurisdictional collaboration. While not exhaustive, this guide serves as a foundational tool to bridge the knowledge gap and enhance law enforcement’s ability to navigate the rapidly evolving world of crypto crime. Download the guide today to strengthen your capacity to combat digital financial crime and ensure a safer digital landscape.

Prague: OSCE, 2025. 64p.

By Claudio Mezzetti,  keshini muthukuda,  Haishan Yuan

We study whether data hacking of local organizations causes an increase in identity theft in the organization's local area. We use a difference in differences approach exploiting the timing of incidents of hacking and identity theft in the USA from 2015 to 2018, and estimate a fixed effects model that includes time and Core Based Statistical Area, or County, fixed effects. We find that a hacking incident in a local organization leads to 0.792 to 1.044 more identity thefts per 10,000 population in the local area the following year. The increase represents a 42% to 77% increase in the average prevalence of identity theft. We also show that among all our controls the unemployment rate is the most significant predictor of identity theft.

Mezzetti, Claudio and muthukuda, keshini and Yuan, Haishan, Crime in the Digital Age: Do Cyber Attacks Lead to Identity Theft? (April 24, 2024).

By Kim Thomas

  Targeted killings instil fear, silence activists and whistle-blowers, corrode democracies, and assist criminal actors in achieving their goals. The criminal economies of Kenya, Mozambique and South Africa are marked by these killings for social, political or economic gain. Yet, their nature and extent remain underexplored. We have chosen these three countries for analysis for several reasons. South Africa has a long history of targeted violence in various sectors of society, and our established database on the country provided a methodological framework for expanding the study. Kenya was chosen, as it has struggled not only with political violence, but also organized crime and gang culture, all of which, based on our South African research, provide a foundation for assassinations. Its fairly extensive media coverage also provided a good framework for the study. Although Mozambique’s media coverage is limited and less free, Mozambique was included in the study because our ongoing fieldwork there has revealed that targeted killings are prevalent in the country, particularly in manipulating political outcomes. The sociopolitical landscape of these three countries, although different from one another, all have commonalities that are conducive to targeted killings. South Africa has a long-standing history of violence deployed to achieve various political or economic outcomes, as was seen during the apartheid government’s administration and in the various post-democratic political party struggles. Violence in the mass-transit minibus-taxi industry as well as interpersonal violence are not new to the country. However, the use of targeted violence, by means of contracting a third party, to achieve political, economic or personal gain is something that has increased over the past two decades. Previous research on assassinations in South Africa by the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime (GI-TOC) has revealed that targeted violence increased from 2000 to 2017 and that there were particularly high rates of assassinations in the KwaZulu-Natal province, owing to both political motives and the taxi industry’s power struggles and conflict over routes. The research further revealed that, nationally, the taxi industry made up over 40% of the assassinations during that data period. Continued data collection and analysis up to 2020 seeks to determine if these trends are continuing or if there have been any significant changes in the targeted-killing landscape.  Kenya, although not as violent as South Africa, also has a history of political struggles and interconnectedness of the state and organized crime. This relationship is particularly evident in the deployment of gangs by politicians to intimidate the opposition and rally support for their campaigns. Kenya’s matatu industry, much like South Africa’s taxi industry, is also deeply criminalized. The industry experiences high levels of extortion, intimidation and corruption. Kenya has also experienced various land disputes over the years, which have led to violence and assassinations. It is in light of all these factors and their similarities with the South African landscape for assassinations, that the Kenyan database was compiled to determine the extent of these assassinations and their impact in Kenya. Mozambique has long been afflicted with political instability and violence. The current insurgency in the northern province of Cabo Delgado is one of many examples of the violence that has plagued the country. Although our research picked up some assassinations related to terrorism in the region, they were generally excluded from our database, as they were not linked to organized crime and did not fit within our methodological criteria. This is consistent with our field research in the country that has shown that the Islamic militants are in fact not profiteering from the illicit economy. The GI-TOC’s ongoing research in the country, as well our network of local journalists, has revealed that assassinations, particularly politically motivated ones, are having a profound impact on Mozambican society and democracy. This was first documented in a short GI-TOC data collection and article on the problem titled ‘Mozambique’s quiet assassination epidemic’. It is in light of this research that we decided to expand the database to better understand this phenomenon. As a result of the contexts in these countries, and their histories of violence, there are sources of violence available to those who have historically deployed it. This experience, coupled with dire social circumstances and limited economic opportunities, as seen in the context of Kenyan and South African gangs, creates reservoirs of violence that fuel targeted killings.8 Once involved in the business of targeted killings, the hired hitmen become vulnerable themselves. Interviews with hitmen in Cape Town gangs revealed that they were often as vulnerable as those whom they killed. In the gang context particularly, hitmen often exist outside of the formal gang structure and as a result do not have protection from gangs. However, they are still beholden to the gang bosses.  

Geneva:  Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime , 2021. 64p.

By Hannah Miles Samantha Bricknell

The National Homicide Monitoring Program is Australia’s only national data collection on homicide incidents, victims and offenders. This report describes 262 homicide incidents recorded by Australian state and territory police between 1 July 2023 and 30 June 2024. During this 12-month period there were 277 victims of homicide and 278 identified offenders

Statistical Report no. 52.

Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology. 2025. 77p.

By The Financial Action Task Force (FATF)

Ransomware attacks target individuals, businesses and government agencies, across the world. The impact of these attacks can be devastating for individuals, government agencies and business activity and even disrupt essential infrastructure and services.

This FATF report analyses the methods that criminals use to carry out their ransomware attacks and how payments are made and laundered. Criminals are almost exclusively using crypto, or virtual assets and have easy access to virtual asset service providers around the world. Jurisdictions with weak or non-existent AML/CFT controls are therefore of concern.

The report proposes a number of actions that countries can take to more effectively disrupt ransomware-related money laundering. This includes building on and leveraging existing international cooperation mechanisms, given the transnational nature of ransomware attacks and related laundering. Authorities also need to develop the necessary skills and tools to quickly collect key information, trace the nearly instantaneous financial transactions and recover virtual assets before they dissipate. The multi-disciplinary nature of ransomware also means that authorities must extend their collaboration beyond their traditional counterparts to include cyber-security and data protection agencies.

The FATF also finalized a list of potential risk indicators that can help public and private sector entities identify suspicious activities related to ransomware.

Paris: The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) 2023. 54p.

By Stacy Calhoun

This randomized controlled trial to assess the effectiveness of a curriculum-based gang prevention program in addressing gang risk factors within a school setting encountered delays and challenges in implementing the program and completing the study. Despite challenges, progress was made as the clinic adapted to the evolving circumstances. Although the clinic lost its dedicated space, it successfully established Memorandums of Understanding (MOUs) with two new school districts where they implemented their universal screening program and services at one middle school and two high schools. Despite efforts by the clinic team, school staff, and SSGP facilitator to enhance student engagement during the project performance period through special events, motivating students to submit signed enrollment forms and to attend clinic and group appointments remained challenging. Participation in this study allowed the clinic to significantly expand its focus, addressing gang risk factors on a much broader scale than before. Despite facing substantial challenges, including adapting to COVID-19 disruptions, forming relationships in new school districts with differing policies, and coping with the loss of dedicated clinical space and staff, the clinic has remained committed to refining their processes to better support these students. Moreover, the clinic has taken a proactive role in educating stakeholders about the potential of integrating gang prevention services within school-based systems of care.

Los Angeles: Department of Psychiatry and Biobehavioral Sciences University of California, Los Angeles, 2024. 29p.