By The International Council of Shopping Centers

Organized retail crime (ORC) not only harms communities and retail centers but also threatens the safety of consumers and retail workers alike. ORC involves a criminal enterprise employing a group of individuals (2 or more) who steal substantial quantities of merchandise from a retailer. Stores lost $121.6 billion to retail theft in 2023; projections indicate shoplifting could cost retailers over $150 billion in 2026.

Reducing ORC was a major priority for state lawmakers and law enforcement in 2024. Lawmakers in nine states (Arizona, California, Florida, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, New York, Vermont and West Virginia) plus D.C., enacted 23 pieces of legislation that targeted different aspects of organized retail crime (ORC). Most of the measures considered by lawmakers addressed one of the following objectives: 1) provide more flexibility for prosecutors to charge offenders with the total value of stolen goods across multiple jurisdictions, 2) increase funding for law enforcement to investigate ORC cases, and 3) enforce tougher punishment for repeat offenders. To date, 17 states have created ORC Task Forces to coordinate activity among law enforcement, prosecutors, and businesses in stopping multi-jurisdictional retail crime rings.

New York: ICSC, 2023, 44p.

By New York City Office of the Mayor

On December 16, 2022, New York City Mayor Eric Adams convened more than 70 stakeholders to collaborate on policy and find creative solutions to address the prevalent increase in retail theft. The summit brought together law enforcement officials, government stakeholders, small business representatives, large retail groups, union leaders, Business Improvement Districts, Chambers of Commerce, and diversion providers with diverse perspectives to discuss a variety of topics, including physical security measures, new diversion programs, leveraging technology to protect businesses and improve citywide responses, and enhancing existing partnerships among private, government, and non-profit sectors. In developing this report, an evidence-based and stakeholder-informed methodology was followed. The Administration analyzed the information shared by the attendees at the summit, conducted independent research and data analysis, and consulted with law enforcement and retail business management. The Administration also conferred closely with New York State Attorney General Letitia James and with the Loss Prevention Research Council to receive additional input and advice on these matters. A draft of this report was then distributed to stakeholders to solicit feedback and, based on the input received, the report was further refined, and the recommendations developed as described herein. The plan outlined in this report identifies recurring problems that plague New York City businesses, which the subsequent list of solutions seeks to address in order to ensure public safety and promote economic growth.

New York: New York City Office of the Mayor, 2023. 33p.

By Michael Ahn Paarlberg

Policy responses to transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) within migrant receiving countries often conflate all organizations which conduct illegal activity in multiple countries based on the mafia or cartel model. This model imagines the TCO to be the most evolved form of organized crime: deeply institutionalized, well resourced, hierarchically structured, highly profitable, and diversified in their criminal activities. Such a model informs law enforcement and immigration policies which are often draconian and counterproductive to citizen security. In reality, transnational crime is highly varied in organization, activities, scope, and membership. A major TCO type that defies the mafia archetype is the transnational gang. This study seeks to nuance our understanding of TCOs, illustrated by case studies of two transnational gangs, MS-13 and Satudarah, by advancing the concept of criminal remittances to locate agency in transnationalization. As the case studies demonstrate, for transnational gangs, the remittance of criminal activity is not at the organization level but at the individual and state level. Thus the transnationalization of crime can itself be the product of state foreign and migration policies.

Comparative Migration Studies volume 10, Article number: 24, 2022, 20p.

By Moamen Gouda and Anouk S. Rigterink

This study investigates the long-term relationship between slavery and violent crime in the USA. Although qualitative evidence suggests that slavery perpetuated violence, there has been no largeN study supporting this claim. Using county-level data, we find that the percentage of slaves in the population in 1860 is linked with violent crime in 2000. This result is specific to violent crime, robust to instrumenting for slavery and varying the approach to missing crime data, and not driven by biased crime reporting. Investigating the theoretical mechanisms driving these results, we find that historical slavery affects inequality (like Bertocchi and Dimico, 2014), white Americans’ political attitudes towards race (like Acharya et al., 2016b) and black American’s political attitudes – in opposite directions. Results suggest that inequality and black American’s political attitudes mediate the observed effect on violence.

CESifo Working Paper Series No. 11515, Dec 2024, 50 pages

By Amnesty International

Enforced disappearance is both a crime under international law and a serious human rights violation. When a person is deprived of their liberty and their fate or whereabouts concealed, the lives of their families, loved ones and communities are put on hold while they wait to learn of what has happened to them and where they are. In Colombia, as in other countries in the Americas, many of the people left waiting or searching for their loved ones after an enforced disappearance have turned uncertainty into a force for change. Firstly, to find the victims of enforced disappearance. Second, to demand truth, justice, reparation and guarantees of non-recurrence. Third, to continue the struggle to ascertain the fate and whereabouts of other people’s loved ones and to defend human rights. Women play a leading role in this story. They are the ones who have overwhelmingly taken on the task of searching for the victims of enforced disappearance in Colombia. In doing so, not only have they raised their voices against the injustice of the enforced disappearance imposed on them, but they have also acted as searchers and human rights defenders. In Colombia, taking on these roles means exposing themselves to unacceptable risks, threats and attacks. Whether they are searching for a loved one, helping someone else to search for a loved one, or defending the rights of victims of enforced disappearance and their families, women who search face arbitrariness, impunity and violence, sometimes from the state and sometimes from non-state actors, especially state security forces and armed opposition groups. In most cases, this violence is gendered. The nature of the risks, threats and attacks that women searchers face often intersect with their gender. Among other forms of violence against women, threats relate to their bodies or to their assigned or assumed gender roles, and perpetrators disproportionately use sexual violence against women. However, women searchers not only continue their work, but also put forward proposals for action to ensure that the state respects, guarantees and protects their rights. The most recent manifestation of this driving force is the approval of Law 2364 of 2024, a proposal that emerged from a group of organizations and communities of women searchers who spoke of their own life experiences, analysed them and used them to draft a bill designed to urge the state to take appropriate measures to end this scourge. With this report, Amnesty International begins a process of documenting the situation of risks, threats and attacks faced by women searchers in Colombia and, based on this, a process of monitoring the implementation of Law 2364 of 2024, which will continue over the next few years. This first part documents the story of Yanette Bautista, Andrea Torres and the Nydia Erika Bautista Foundation (FNEB), an organization of women searchers and victims of enforced disappearance that accompanies other organizations and communities in their own cases.

London: Amnesty International, 2024. 64p.

By Cassandra Popham, Ellie Taylor and William Teager., et al.

The Youth Endowment Fund surveyed over 10,000 teenage children (aged 13-17) in England and Wales about their experiences of violence. The findings are detailed across five reports, each focusing on a different aspect. In this report, we look at teenage children’s views and experiences of the police. Here’s what we found. Opinions of the police differ according to children’s experiences. Teenagers’ views of the police shift as they get older and gain more exposure to policing. Over half (54%) of 13-17-year-olds believe the police do a good job in their local areas. Similar proportions feel the police use force appropriately (50%) and are available when needed (47%). Only 45% think the police treat everyone fairly, regardless of race or religion.

Age plays a significant role in shaping perceptions. Thirteen-year-olds consistently express the most positive views, while 16-17-year-olds are more critical of police conduct. Interestingly, Black teenagers (63%) are the most likely to agree that the police do a good job locally, compared to 54% of White children, 52% of Asian children and 50% of mixed ethnicity children. However, Black (39%) and mixed ethnicity (36%) children are far less likely to believe the police treat everyone fairly than White children (47%). When it comes to the use of force, Asian (47%), Black (42%) and mixed ethnicity (39%) children are also less likely to agree that police use force only when necessary when compared to White children (52%).

Children with direct experiences of violence tend to have more positive views of the police. For instance, 62% of children who’ve been victims of serious violence think their local police do a good job, compared to 54% of children who haven’t been a victim. Direct experiences with the police also affect perceptions, but the effect differs depending on racial background. White teenagers who’ve had contact with the police are more likely to say the police do a good job than those with no direct experience. But this is not the case for teenagers from Black, Asian and mixed ethnic backgrounds.

Children are mostly supportive of stop and search but don’t all agree it’s used fairly. Most teenagers are supportive of the police’s power to stop and search, though not all believe it’s applied fairly. Overall, 68% of 13-17-year-olds support stop and search, and 72% believe it helps prevent knife crime. However, only 56% think that stop and search is used fairly. Younger teenagers (aged 13-15) are generally more supportive of stop and search than older teenagers (aged 16-17). Racial differences also emerge, with White children more likely to view stop and search as both effective and fair than their Black, Asian and mixed ethnicity peers.

London: Youth Endowment Fund, Children, violence and vulnerability 2024 Report 4. 33p.

By Ionel Zamfir and Colin Murphy

The rise of digital technologies represents a double-edged sword for women's rights. On the one hand, the digital environment has enabled women to build networks and spread awareness about the abuse they suffer, such as through the #Metoo movement. On the other, it has provided abusers and misogynists with new tools with which they can spread their harmful content on an unprecedented scale. With the development of artificial intelligence, these trends, both positive and negative, are expected to continue. Against this backdrop, it has become clear that digital violence is as harmful as offline violence and needs to be tackled with the full force of the law, as well as through other non-legislative measures. Moreover, the digital content causing the harm – images, messages, etc. – needs to be erased. This is particularly important, as the impact on victims is profound and long-lasting. The European Union has adopted several pieces of legislation that aim to make a difference in this respect. The directive on combating violence against women, to be implemented at the latest by June 2027, sets minimum EU standards for criminalising several serious forms of cyberviolence and enhances the protection of and access to justice for victims. EU legislation on the protection of privacy is also having an impact on cyberviolence. For example, the new Digital Services Act imposes an obligation on big digital platforms in the EU to remove harmful content from their websites. This is instrumental in removing intimate or manipulated images that are disseminated on the internet without the person's consent; almost all such images portray women, according to existing data. Member States use a multiplicity of legal approaches to tackle this issue, combining criminalisation of specific cyber offences with the use of general criminal law. In some Member States, an explicit gender dimension is also included.

Brussels: EPRS | European Parliamentary Research Service, 2024. 11p

By Indra de Soysa

Democracy and the level of economic development correlate tightly. While some argue that egalitarian conditions inherent in democracies reduce homicide, others suggest that it is economic development that matters. This study evaluates competing theory and tests the democracy—homicide link using homicide data defined as death due to interpersonal violence and novel data on a variety of democracies. The results show that democracies associate positively with homicide, and egalitarian democracy shows the strongest effect. The level of economic development is negative on homicide and substantively large. The basic results are robust to alternative data, estimating method, and to omitted variables bias.

The British Journal of Criminology, 2024, 22 p.

By Matthew Mitchell, Tully O’Neill, & Curtis Redd

While criminology has studied news media reporting for decades, it has largely overlooked reporting on anti-queer violence and depictions of crime outside mainstream outlets. This article addresses this gap by analysing how anti-queer violence is represented in LGBTQ community media. By analysing 1,295 articles from 11 LGBTQ publications across five Anglophone countries between 2019 and 2021, we examine which forms of anti-queer violence are deemed newsworthy in these outlets. Our analysis reveals that LGBTQ community media emphasize particular types of violence, relationships between victims and perpetrators and contexts of victimization while downplaying or disregarding others. We argue that this selective representation both mirrors and ‘queers’ prevailing norms in mainstream crime news reporting in culturally and criminologically significant ways. In grappling with this tension, we identify and critique several cisheteronormative assumptions embedded in the existing literature on news media representations of crime. Ultimately, our analysis calls for a re-evaluation and revision of the existing discourse within media criminology, urging scholars to engage with a broader range of experiences, communities and narrative practices to understand better how violence is culturally mediated.

British Journal of Criminology, Dec. 2024. 19p.

By Sarah Treves-Kagan, Yanet Ruvalcaba, Daniel T. Corry, et al.

Problem/Condition: In 2022, homicide was the second leading cause of death for Hispanic and Latino persons aged 15–24 years in the United States, the third leading cause of death for those aged 25–34 years, and the fourth leading cause of death for those aged 1–14 years. The majority of homicides of females, including among Hispanic and Latino persons, occur in the context of intimate partner violence (IPV). This report summarizes data from CDC’s National Violent Death Reporting System (NVDRS) on IPV-related homicides of Hispanic and Latino persons in the United States.

Period Covered: 2003–2021.

Description of System: NVDRS collects data regarding violent deaths in the United States and links three sources: death certificates, coroner or medical examiner reports, and law enforcement reports. IPV-related homicides include both intimate partner homicides (IPHs) by current or former partners and homicides of corollary victims (e.g., children, family members, and new partners). Findings describe victim and suspect sex, age group, and race and ethnicity; method of injury; type of location where the homicide occurred; precipitating circumstances (i.e., events that contributed to the homicide); and other selected characteristics. Deaths related to each other (e.g., an ex-partner kills the former partner and their new partner) are linked into a single incident. State participation in NVDRS has expanded over time, and the number of states participating has varied by year; data from all available years (2003–2021) and U.S. jurisdictions (49 states, Puerto Rico, and the District of Columbia) were used for this report. Of the 49 states that collect data, all except California and Texas collect data statewide; Puerto Rico and District of Columbia data are jurisdiction wide. Florida was excluded because the data did not meet the completeness threshold for circumstances.

Results: NVDRS collected data on 24,581 homicides of Hispanic and Latino persons, and data from all available years (2003–2021) and U.S. jurisdictions (49 states, Puerto Rico, and the District of Columbia) were examined. Among homicides with known circumstances (n = 17,737), a total of 2,444 were classified as IPV-related (13.8%). Nearly half of female homicides (n = 1,453; 48.2%) and 6.7% (n = 991) of male homicides were IPV-related; however, among all Hispanic and Latino homicides, most victims were male (n = 20,627; 83.9%). Among the 2,319 IPV-related homicides with known suspects, 85% (n = 1,205) of suspects were current or former partners for female victims, compared with 26.2% (n = 236) for male Hispanic and Latino victims. Approximately one fifth (71 of 359 [19.8%]) of female IPV-related homicide victims of childbearing age with known pregnancy status were pregnant or ≤1 year postpartum. Approximately 5% of IPV-related homicide victims were identified as Black Hispanic or Latino persons (males: n = 67; 6.8%; females: n = 64; 4.4%). A firearm was used in the majority of Hispanic and Latino IPV-related homicides (males: n = 676; 68.2%; females: n = 766; 52.7%).

MMWR Surveill Summ, 2024, 20p.

By United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and UN Women

The latest report on femicides reveals that 60 per cent of all female homicides are committed by an intimate partner or other family member.

New York/Vienna 25 November 2024 — On the International Day for the Elimination of Violence against Women, November 25, the report Femicides in 2023: Global Estimates of Intimate Partner/Family Member Femicides by UN Women and UNODC reveals that femicide—the most extreme form of violence against women and girls—remains pervasive in the world.

Globally, 85,000 women and girls were killed intentionally in 2023. 60 per cent of these homicides—51,000—were committed by an intimate partner or other family member. 140 women and girls die every day at the hands of their partner or a close relative, which means one woman or girl is killed every 10 minutes.

In 2023, Africa recorded the highest rates of intimate partner and family-related femicide, followed by the Americas and then by Oceania. In Europe and the Americas, most women killed in the domestic sphere (64 per cent and 58 per cent, respectively) were victims of intimate partners, while elsewhere, family members were the primary perpetrators.

“Violence against women and girls is not inevitable—it is preventable. We need robust legislation, improved data collection, greater government accountability, a zero-tolerance culture, and increased funding for women’s rights organizations and institutional bodies. As we approach the 30th anniversary of the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action in 2025, it is time for world leaders to UNiTE and act with urgency, recommit, and channel the resources needed to end this crisis once and for all," highlighted UN Women Executive Director, Sima Bahous.

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime; 2024

By Stephen Machin, Matteo Sandi:

Research studying connections between crime and education is a prominent aspect of the big increase of publication and research interest in the economics of crime field. This work demonstrates a crime reducing impact of education, which can be interpreted as causal through leveraging research designs (e.g., based on education policy changes) that ensure the direction of causality flows from education to crime. A significant body of research also explores in detail, and in various directions, the means by which education has a crime reducing impact. This includes evidence on incapacitation versus productivity raising aspects of education, and on the quality of schooling at different stages of education, ranging from early age interventions, through primary and secondary schooling and policy changes that alter school dropout age. From this evidence base, there are education policies that have been effective crime prevention tools in many settings around the world.

Bonn, Germany: IZA – Institute of Labor Economics, 2024 59p.

By Gunes A. Aşık, Naci Mocan:

We analyze the expressive content of government action, focusing on Istanbul Convention, an international treaty aimed at protecting women against violence, signed and ratified by 39 countries. In 2021, ten years after signing the Convention, the Turkish government withdrew from it, on the grounds that it "was hijacked by a group of people attempting to normalize homosexuality, which is incompatible with Turkey's social and family values." Although this withdrawal did not alter existing laws or law enforcement practices, women's rights advocates viewed it as a signal of tolerance for violence against women. We use two separate datasets on female murders from independent sources. Analyses, including a difference-in-difference model with male homicide data, show that the withdrawal led to an additional 70 female murders per year, primarily committed by intimate partners. The effect is more pronounced in provinces where the long-governing religious-conservative coalition parties have stronger voter support and in provinces with lower education levels. We also show that Turkey's entry into the Convention in 2011 had the opposite impact, leading to a decrease in female murders. The signing of the Convention, which acted as a normative signal against violence, and the subsequent enactment of comprehensive legislation strengthening deterrence, had distinct effects. The signaling effect of the Entry was more significant in the same provinces that reacted more strongly to the Exit: those with lower education levels, stronger support for the governing party, and the Eastern region of the country. These findings indicate that government actions are interpreted as normative signals by society.

Bonn, Germany: IZA – Institute of Labor Economics, 2024. 56p

By Nina Hudson, Rachel Moody, Heather McKay, Rae Kaspiew

The guide presents research-based insights that challenge common stereotypes, highlighting the diverse experiences of victims and survivors and offering practical examples and approaches for professionals to implement in their practice. It is intended for use by professionals within the Australian justice sector, specifically police, lawyers, and judicial officers.

This resource aims to support a more trauma-informed, victim-centred approach within the Australian justice system, ultimately fostering a greater understanding of the complexities of sexual assault. It was developed in response to calls for improvements in the justice system's handling of sexual assault cases and draws on research from over 100 Australian and international sources.

Australian Institute of Family Studies, 2024. 83p.

By Isabel Meciar, Cheneal Puljević, Alice Holland, Coral Gartner

Australian survey and seizure data suggest a growing illicit tobacco market. As an illicit product, accurately tracking trends in illicit tobacco growing, manufacture, and sales is challenging. We examined trends in Australian illicit tobacco-related crimes using a content analysis of news articles.

Aims and Methods

We analyzed Australian news articles identified in the Factiva database and government press releases describing Australian illicit tobacco-related crimes reported between January 2000 and December 2023. Sources were coded for crime type, location, product type, dollar value of seized products, methods of distribution or storage, agencies involved, and other crimes involved.

Results

We identified 447 crimes reported in 389 sources. The number of illicit tobacco-related crimes reported increased between 2000 and 2023. The most common crimes were possession of illicit tobacco (n = 196/43.7%) and smuggling (n = 187/41.8%), and the most common product type was “illicit cigarettes” (n = 197/44.1%). The most common distribution/storage method reported was via residential premises (n = 98/21.9%). One-hundred and twenty incidents involved other crimes such as financial crimes involving money laundering (n = 59/13.2%). Across all included news articles, the quantity of seized products totaled 827 529 307 cigarette sticks, 76 185 cartons, 668 687 packs, 239 hectares (of land growing tobacco plants), and 2 149 000 plants of illicit tobacco between 2000 and 2023. The median value (worth; AUD) of each seizure was $1 500 000 (range $43 to $67 000 000).

Conclusions

Australian media reporting on illicit tobacco-related crimes increased over the past two decades, particularly since 2018. These findings highlight a need for improved border detection measures, investment in enforcement, and other deterrent activities.

Implications

This media analysis complements trends identified in national survey data that indicate a growing illicit tobacco market in Australia since 2013 with a marked increase since 2018. While survey data suggests that the Australian tobacco tax policy, which has included regular large tax increases since 2010, has decreased consumer demand for tobacco overall, it may have also incentivized criminal networks to supply illicit tobacco products due to it being a “low risk” and “high reward” activity. Controlling the Australian illicit tobacco market should be a policy priority.

Nicotine & Tobacco Research, 26 October 2024, 8 pages

By The Texas Organized Retail Theft Task Force

Organized Retail Theft (ORT), the large-scale theft and reselling of merchandise, is a growing problem, according to Texas retailers. In 2023, the Texas Legislature created a special task force led by Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts Glenn Hegar to analyze and develop strategies for combatting ORT. The ORT Task Force, which includes law enforcement, retailers and policy experts, conducted research, listened to expert testimony and conducted site visits as part of its study. The following report represents the findings of the Task Force and offers recommendations for further action. Summary of Findings and Recommendations As the Task Force listened to expert testimony and Comptroller staff visited retailer sites, ORT Task Force members noted three recurrent themes: a lack of ORT data, a need for coordination among ORT stakeholders and a need for consistency in the application of ORT laws. Finding 1 Statewide data relating specifically to ORT are not collected in Texas, which makes it difficult to quantify the extent and cost of ORT, pinpoint where crimes are happening and dedicate sufficient resources to combat ORT. Retailers are reluctant to share certain proprietary data with their competitors. Recommendations • Develop a statewide repository to collect ORT data that can be aggregated and analyzed. • Work with retailers to categorize and mask their confidential data in a manner that doesn’t expose proprietary information while still allowing analysts to estimate the cost of ORT and detect trends. • If ORT trends indicate a need, consider creating an organization to combat ORT modeled after or housed under the Texas Financial Crimes Intelligence Center. Finding 2 Thefts conducted by perpetrators who target multiple types of merchandise or who operate in more than one law enforcement jurisdiction may be difficult to identify as ORT. Improved transparency, interaction and communication among all stakeholders—retailers, law enforcement and prosecutors—have yielded positive results in some cities. Recommendations • Continue support for the Texas Department of Public Safety’s Organized Retail Theft Prevention Unit and consider increasing the total number of FTEs for the unit. • Identify an existing state agency to serve as both an information clearinghouse and a facilitator to help local law enforcement departments develop and improve ORT coordination, cooperation and knowledge sharing with other jurisdictions so that potential links to related cases may be identified and shared. • San Antonio’s Businesses Against Theft Network (BAT-NET) program could serve as a model for other cities to improve communication, transparency and collaboration among stakeholders. • Establish a store walk-through program. Retailers can launch a store walk-through program inviting law enforcement agencies and prosecutors’ offices to get a better understanding of the ORT issue. This can also help foster a stronger relationship between retailers and law enforcement. • Incorporate training on ORT in new officer training classes and as part of a continuing education class for law enforcement. • One-hour presentation to new academy classes. • Quarterly and annual meeting/certification by Texas Organized Retail Crime Association (TXORCA) or similar association. Finding 3 Prosecuting ORT can be time and resource intensive, and prosecutors sometimes apply ORT charges inconsistently (e.g., charging an ORT crime as simple theft, which may take less time and be easier to prove). Prosecutors find the requirement to prove intentionality in ORT cases to be an obstacle in the pursuit of charges under the ORT statute. Other state laws may inadvertently make it difficult for ORT crimes to be prosecuted. Retailers, for example, are required by law to wait 10 days before reporting the theft of certain rental items. Although normally this provision likely would be in a consumer’s best interest, it is a barrier when the retailer becomes aware that the items are being resold before the retailer is allowed to report the theft. Recommendation • Form a committee of prosecutors to review the ORT statute’s requirements, including proof of intentionality, and other statutes that are barriers to ORT prosecution, such as the waiting period on reporting stolen rental items. The committee should seek input from retailers and law enforcement during its review. The committee will present its suggestions to the ORT Task Force before the next legislative session. • Develop training on ORT as a continuing education course, such as a one-hour presentation on the key steps for prosecuting an ORT case.

Austin: Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts 2024. 24p.

By Kristin Finklea

Retailers and retail industry advocacy groups have expressed concern about what they see as a general increase in retail crime, and more specifically an increase in organized retail crime (ORC). Reports of incidents where individuals, occasionally acting in flash mobs, storm stores to steal large amounts of items, and at times assault employees, have underscored these concerns. Some law enforcement agencies have increased resources and information sharing to counter these crimes. Additionally, some retail organizations have urged policymakers and law enforcement to take steps to educate the public and crack down on this apparent increase in retail crime, and more specifically ORC. A primary barrier to measuring ORC accurately is a lack of a consistent, widely accepted definition that can be used in a systematic and comprehensive effort to collect and report these data. Nonetheless, there is general consensus that ORC involves coordinated theft with the intent to resell for financial gain. ORC typically refers to large-scale retail theft and fraud by organized groups of professional shoplifters (or boosters). Organized crime rings resell illegally acquired merchandise via a variety of fencing operations such as flea markets, swap meets, pawn shops, and online marketplaces. ORC differs from shoplifting in that traditional shoplifters tend to steal merchandise for personal use. A number of factors contribute to the lack of comprehensive criminal justice data on ORC. At the federal level, there is currently no law prohibiting organized retail crime that could be used to help document the number of ORC incidents known to federal law enforcement, specifically. Combating retail theft has primarily been handled by state and local law enforcement under state criminal laws. While state laws prohibiting theft are the statutes that state and local law enforcement and prosecutors have often relied on to investigate and prosecute ORC, over 30 states have enacted ORC-specific laws. However, these laws differ by state and there is no centralized reporting system for ORC-related crimes. The Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Uniform Crime Reporting Program, National Incident-Based Reporting System collects data on thefts reported to state and local law enforcement, including shoplifting; however, it does not capture ORC specifically. In the absence of comprehensive data on ORC, snapshots of data from various sources may offer insight into its extent and nature. For instance, 78.1% of respondents to the National Retail Federation’s 2023 National Retail Security Survey indicated that the threat of ORC was more of a priority than it had been in the prior year. While some observers believe that ORC is a national problem, others disagree, citing anecdotal and high-profile flash mob thefts and smash-and-grabs as driving this concern. Nonetheless, there is debate over the federal government’s role in deterring ORC and sanctioning various actors that may be involved in committing or aiding these crimes. A principal underlying issue is the lack of data on the scope of ORC to inform this debate. Without these data, Congress may not be able to accurately assess the proper role of the federal government. As such, policymakers may debate various options regarding data on ORC, including how new or existing mechanisms for collecting national crime data could be used to capture these data and help inform policymakers on the prevalence and nature of this type of crime.

Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2024. 11p.

By Ellen Jacobs, Ella Meyer, Helena Schwertheim, Melanie Döring and Terra Rolfe

The global gaming industry is now worth more than both the film and music industries combined, with an estimated 3.2 billion gamers worldwide. As such, greater attention has paid in recent years to the online safety risks associated with gaming. This includes both gaming-specific companies and the wider ecosystem of gaming-adjacent social media platforms, particularly in the context of online hate and misogyny, extremism and radicalisation, and child safety issues (such as grooming and cyberbullying). Significant progress has been made in understanding how online harms are perpetrated in online gaming spaces. Recognising these risks, policymakers have crafted new digital and online safety regulations such as the EU’s Digital Services Act (DSA) and the UK’s Online Safety Act (UK OSA) to increasingly apply to gaming or gaming-adjacent companies. However, such regulations are still in the early stages of implementation and enforcement, and the extent to which gaming companies or services are within scope can be unclear. This policy brief provides a summary of the current evidence on the nature and extent of these risks and highlights remaining gaps and challenges to building out this evidence base. It also provides an overview of existing government approaches to enhancing online safety in gaming, including both regulatory and non-regulatory efforts, as well as industry and civil society initiatives. Special attention is given to existing regulatory frameworks in the EU (DSA, Terrorist Content Online Regulation), the UK (UK OSA) and Australia (Online Safety Act), to understand how and how far they may provide higher standards of online safety to gamers. Finally, the brief explores both existing and proposed mitigation strategies to enhance online safety in gaming. Throughout, the brief provides recommendations for governments, regulators, researchers and industry. The DPL supports collaboration through a multi-stakeholder approach to develop a better understanding of the risks posed in online gaming spaces and how best to mitigate them

Amman Berlin London Paris Washington DC: Institute for Strategic Dialogue (2024) 47p

By The Youth Endowment Fund

In this year’s survey, 20% of teenage children told us they’ve been a victim of violence in the past 12 months. Over half (61%) of these incidents led to physical injury, equating to 440,000 children in England and Wales. For some, these experiences are not one-off. Of all teenagers who were victims of violence, 65% had it happen multiple times within the year, with nearly a third (31%) — or 5% of all 13-17-year-olds — reporting it occurred more than five times. Children commit violence in reaction to others. 16% of children have been a perpetrator of violence. Many of the 16% of children who committed violence cited reactive motivations. For instance, 36% acted out of annoyance, humiliation or feeling threatened, while 29% retaliated for previous violence. Bullying is a significant factor for 25% of respondents, and 17% report engaging in violence for self-defence or due to rivalries related to gangs, neighbourhoods or schools. Half (49%) of all children who perpetrated violence in the past year have also been a victim themselves. Experiences of violence are concentrated among the most vulnerable. This year’s report sheds new light on children at risk of exploitation, revealing even more concerning links between vulnerability and violence. Children who went missing from home were five times more likely to engage in violence, while those approached to transport or store drugs and weapons were six times more likely. Gang involvement and carrying weapons further escalated these risks, with children in gangs or those carrying weapons being seven times more likely to commit acts of violence than their peers. Children struggling in education are also particularly vulnerable. Those who are persistently absent, suspended, excluded or attending alternative education settings are far more likely to be victims of and to engage in violent behaviour than their peers. A relatively small number are driven to carry weapons. 5% of children aged 13-17 say they have carried a weapon in the past year. Although the possession, sale and supply of zombie-style knives and machetes are now illegal in the UK, only a small proportion of those who’ve carried weapons (17%) admit to carrying such knives before the ban. Kitchen and other types of knives are much more likely to be carried. Other items carried include screwdrivers or stabbing implements (25%) and sticks, clubs or hitting implements (24%). Younger teenagers aged 13-15 are more likely to carry weapons compared to those aged 16-17. Nearly half (47%) of those who carry a weapon do so for self-protection. Others cited being asked by someone else (37%), scaring others (31%) or following the behaviour of their peers (18%).

London: Youth Endowment Fund, 2024. 

By Cassandra Popham, Ellie Taylor and William Teager

The Youth Endowment Fund surveyed over 10,000 teenage children (aged 13-17) in England and Wales about their experiences of violence. The findings are detailed across five reports, each focusing on a different aspect. In this second report, we examine teenage children’s experiences of violence on social media. We aim to understand its prevalence, the nature of the content the children encounter and its impact on their lives. Here’s what we found. Violence is widespread on social media. Exposure to real-life violence on social media has become the norm rather than the exception for teenage children. Our findings reveal that 70% of respondents have encountered some form of real-world violence online in the past 12 months. The most frequently observed content is footage of fights involving young people, with 56% of respondents reporting that they’ve seen such videos. Other common types of violence witnessed online include threats of physical harm (43%) and content related to gang activity (33%) and weapons (35%). Notably, one in nine children who say they’ve encountered weapon-related content have seen footage involving zombie knives or machetes — a figure significantly higher than the 1% of 13–17-year-olds who’ve reported that they carry such weapons, as highlighted in our first report. This suggests that social media may amplify fear by making certain behaviours appear more widespread than they are. Sexually violent content or threats have been reported by more than a quarter of teenage children (27%). For the second year in a row, TikTok is the platform where children are most likely to witness violent content.  While the majority of teenage children encounter violent content online, few actively seek it out. In fact, only 6% of those who’ve come across such content do so intentionally. Most are exposed to it inadvertently: half (50%) have seen it via someone else’s profile or feed, and just over a third (35%) have had it shared directly with them. Alarmingly, 25% of children have reported that the social media platforms themselves promote this violent content through features like ‘Newsfeed’, ‘Stories’ and the ‘For You Page’. This underscores the significant role social media companies play in amplifying exposure to violent content beyond what users might encounter by chance. Seeing violence online has real-world impacts. Viewing violent content online has impacts that extend far beyond the screen. The vast majority (80%) of teenage children who encounter weapons-related content on social media say it makes them feel less safe in their local communities. This perceived threat has tangible consequences: two-thirds (68%) of teenagers who’ve seen weapons on social media say it makes them less likely to venture outside, and 39% admit that it makes them more likely to carry a weapon themselves. The influence of social media doesn’t stop there. Nearly two-thirds (64%) of teenagers who report perpetrating violence in the past year say that social media has played a role in their behavior. Factors like online arguments and the escalation of existing conflicts are commonly cited as catalysts for real-world violence  Children support limiting access to phones and social media. The widespread exposure to real-world violence online may partly explain why many teenagers believe that access to social media should come later than access to smartphones. Our findings highlight the responsibility of social media companies to remove or restrict harmful content. They also point to the need for effective support and education to help children navigate these dangers while still benefiting from the positive aspects that social media can offer.  

London: Youth Endowment Fund, 2024. 28p.