By Rene Reyes

Free speech is under siege. This is not to say that all speakers and viewpoints are at equal risk—some voices receive support and protection, while others are subject to threats and suppression.  Pro-Palestinian speech falls into the latter category.  Critics argue that there has long been a “Palestine Exception” to free speech, but efforts to silence pro-Palestinian advocacy on university campuses and elsewhere have dramatically increased since Israel began its assault on Gaza in October of 2023 in response to incursions by Hamas militants.  Many supporters of Israel contend that such restrictions on pro-Palestinian advocacy are justified, and have suggested that there is a double standard between racism and antisemitism at play when universities fail to condemn at least some forms of pro-Palestinian speech. The implication seems to be that anti-Black and Brown speech would never be tolerated on campuses, and that racialized minorities have been a special favorite of legal and institutional protections against hateful expression. The problem with this argument is that it is demonstrably false.  Indeed, this Essay argues that free speech doctrines have consistently functioned to give white people the liberty to engage in hateful speech and to deny Black, Brown, and other racialized individuals the kinds of protections from fear and harm that supporters of Israel are now demanding.  In other words, the Palestine Exception to free speech is real—and it is part of a deeper legal tradition that has enshrined free speech as an element of white privilege.

Virginia Law Review ,Vol 111, June 2025.

By Ana Pottratz Acosta

A hallmark of the first Trump Administration was its pervasive attacks against immigrant communities. While President Trump often touts his efforts to ramp up immigration enforcement to secure the southern border, other policies aimed at limiting legal immigration to the U.S. through administrative action had a far greater impact on U.S. immigration policy during his first term. One such action, the promulgation of regulations setting forth more subjective standards to determine if an immigrant was subject to the public charge grounds of inadmissibility, led to the denial of many family-based permanent residence applications that were otherwise approvable under existing law.

In this Article, the Author will examine means tested benefit enrollment data for Minnesota immigrant households to see if this data supports existence of a chilling effect through decreased immigrant household enrollment in these programs following publication of the public charge regulations. Additionally, while several previous studies using survey data support existence of a public charge chilling effect, this Article will build on this previous work by analyzing primary enrollment data provided directly by the Minnesota Department of Human Services (MN-DHS), the agency administering these programs.

 (September 01, 2024).

Epistemic Oppression 

By Lark Mulligan

he police murdered Alton Sterling on camera.2 They also murdered Eric Garner, Laquan McDonald, and many others; the videos of their deaths garnered millions of views.3 Information about some horrors of the criminal legal system is spreading widely, yet White mainstream media outlets frequently dismiss, erase, or demonize Black, Indegenous, and People of Color (“BIPOC”) communities who protest and organize to demand justice through the abolition of or radical changes to the policing and prison systems.4 In response to these racist atrocities and within the broader context of criminal legal reform, activists and academics frequently craft ethical arguments such as: “Solitary confinement is immoral because it inflicts psychological and physical torture” or “Incarceration is unethical because prisons are inherently violent places.”5 Many ethical arguments centeron the racist injustices and harm that affronts human dignity and agency caused by prisons and police.6 Others critique the racist and retributive ethics of “law and order” rhetoric.7 Each argument is well-supported by accessible data that can be found in numerous studies, books, articles, and media.8 However, people often erroneously dismiss these data-driven, logical, ethical reasonings as factually inaccurate, or many respond with a deeply racist ethical-legal rationale, for example: “While there may be abuses in prisons, some people need to be put in solitary or prison and deserve it because [insert classical legal rationales for punishment: deterrence, retribution, rehabilitation, etc.].”9 Ethical and legal arguments are severely limited, however, when they lack an epistemological interrogation into the power structures that determine what qualifies as “knowledge” within the ethical-social conversation. This article demonstrates why anti-prison activists’ ethical arguments generally do not receive the due credibility and weight they deserve unless they pair critical liberatory epistemic practices with material, institutional, and social transformations. Abolitionists claiming to fight the confines of carceral epistemologies cannot merely sit back and point out the already-existing logical contradictions in the criminal legal system—it is not enough. ..continued 

St. Mary’s Law Review on Race & Social Justice , v. 27(2) 2025.

By Jonathon J. Booth

This Article places the birth and growth of the Atlanta police in context by exploring the full scope of Atlanta’s criminal legal system during the four decades after the end of slavery. To do so, it analyzes the connections Atlantans made between race and crime, the adjudication and punishment of minor offenses, and the variety of Black protests against the criminal legal system. This Article is based, in part, on a variety of archival sources, including decades of arrest and prosecution data that, for the first time, allow for a quantitative assessment of the impact of the new system of policing on Atlanta’s residents.

This Article breaks new ground in four ways. First, it demonstrates that rather than simply maintaining the social relations of slavery, Atlanta’s police force responded to the challenges of freedom: it was designed to maintain White supremacy in an urban space in which residents, theoretically, had equal rights. Second, it shows that White citizens’ beliefs about the causes of crime and the connections between race and crime, which I call “lay criminology,” influenced policing strategies. Third, it adds a new layer to our understanding of the history of order-maintenance policing by showing that mass criminalization for minor offenses such as disorderly conduct began soon after emancipation. This type of policing caused a variety of harms to the city’s Black residents, forcing thousands each year to pay fines or labor for weeks on the chain gang. Fourth, it shows that the complaints of biased and brutal policing that animate contemporary police reform activism have been present for a century and a half. In the decades after emancipation, Atlanta’s Black residents, across class lines, protested the racist criminal legal system and police abuses, while envisioning a more equitable city where improved social conditions would reduce crime.

University of Colorado Law Review Volume 96 Issue 1 Article 1 2025

Delphine Brisson-Burns

Abstract

Eighth Amendment Jurisprudence proscribes criminalization based on “status.” Based on United States Supreme Court case law, for the purposes of this paper, “status” is understood to mean an “ongoing state of being.” This paper argues that race is “status” and thus criminalizing people of color based on race violates the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment. Further, in the United States, racial “status” is criminalized both directly and indirectly. Racial “status” is criminalized directly by police officers’ frequent use of racial profiling to build criminal cases against people of color. On the other hand, racial status is criminalized indirectly when police officers interpret conduct that is inextricably tied to racial “status” as inherently criminal. Finally, this paper argues that recriminalization of “felons” is an unconstitutional criminalization of “status,” disproportionately harming communities of color.

Recommended Citation

Delphine Brisson-Burns, Criminalizing Race: How Direct And Indirect Criminalization Of Racial “Status” Constitutes Cruel And Unusual Punishment, 21 UC Law SF Race & Econ. Just. L.J. 71 (2024).

By Leila N. Sadat

This Article presents a comprehensive overview of the development, challenges, and future prospects of creating and ultimately negotiating a global treaty for crimes against humanity. It honors pioneers in the field and acknowledges the contributions of various individuals and entities to the Crimes Against Humanity Initiative the author established in 2007. It traces the historical context of atrocities such as slavery and the slave trade, linking them to the modern concept of crimes against humanity. The Article reviews the evolution of international criminal law, particularly under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC), emphasizing the necessity of a new treaty to fill gaps left by existing frameworks. Highlighting contemporary examples like the Syrian Civil War, it underscores the preventive power of prosecuting crimes against humanity as a move towards preventing the commission of atrocity cascades, before the descent into armed conflict and genocide. The Article describes the multi-decade effort to draft and promote a new treaty, including significant milestones, such as the adoption of the International Law Commission’s (ILC) 2019 Draft Articles, and the protracted and ultimately successful advocacy within the UN General Assembly’s Sixth (Legal) Committee to achieve a consensus resolution in 2022 that allows the process to move forward. The 2024 adoption of GA Resolution 79/122, which authorizes convening a United Nations Diplomatic Conference for crafting a comprehensive legal instrument, was a critical achievement, setting the stage for negotiations over the next several years. The Article reflects upon the enduring struggle for justice and the imperative to adopt, ratify, and enforce a new treaty, drawing historical parallels with the abolition of the transatlantic slave trade. It concludes with a call for continued dedication to ending impunity for crimes against humanity globally.

Washington University Global Studies Law Review, 2025, Vol 25, Issue 2, p302

By Ahilan Arulanantham

When can the government imprison people without trial?  That question lurks beneath many important civil rights issues of our time, from the federal government’s plans to jail and deport millions of non-citizens under the immigration laws, to the indefinite detention of people convicted of sex offenses, to the confinement of unhoused people in major American cities, and, most recently, the plan to summarily jail and deport “alien enemies” on national security grounds.  All of these involve forms of preventive detention—that is, imprisonment without trial to protect the public.

Under current doctrine, the legality of preventive detention schemes is governed by a substantive due process framework that requires courts to balance society’s interest in safety against the detained individual’s interest in liberty.  Although litigators, judges, and scholars often disagree about how to apply that framework, they have all generally assumed that it does apply.

But that framework is a modern invention.  Prior to World War II, the law took a very different approach to evaluating imprisonment without trial: the state could not preventively detain to stop conduct that could be punished under criminal law.  That framework reflected a basic normative constraint—that preventive detention should not be used to circumvent the criminal legal system.  If the conduct the state wanted to stop could be punished, the state was required to use the criminal law, rather than displacing it with a bespoke regime lacking the criminal law’s procedural and substantive protections.

That bedrock constraint began to erode during the Japanese American mass incarceration of World War II, and then disappeared over the next several decades as the Supreme Court upheld the preventive detention of non-citizen Communist Party members and then the pretrial preventive detention of people charged with federal crimes.  Since then, state power to imprison people outside the criminal legal system has grown rapidly in new ways, as the due process balancing framework has proven malleable enough to legitimate nearly every preventive detention scheme that governments have created.  As the federal government’s recent invocation of the “Alien Enemies” Act illustrates, more may soon be on the way.

In this Article, I uncover the origins of the common law doctrinal framework governing preventive detention, and then tell the story of its downfall, describing how today’s due process balancing framework took its place.  I then draw lessons from that doctrinal history for our present moment, as scholars, policymakers, litigators, and courts seek to chart the limits of preventive detention authority in the face of new demands for expanded state power.

73 UCLA L. Rev. ___ (forthcoming), UCLA School of Law, Public Law Research Paper No. 26-07

By Sharon Dolovich

This Article is the first scholarly work to identify and describe the experience of sleep deprivation in prison—an experience that, although an inherent feature of prison life, has gone almost entirely unnoticed even by those legal scholars, advocates, and policymakers committed to ensuring humane carceral conditions. Drawing on original data from interviews with people who served time in prisons all over the country, it maps the multiple overlapping conditions that routinely prevent the incarcerated from getting anything close to adequate sleep. Sleep is a basic human need, as fundamental to human survival and adequate human functioning as access to food, water, and shelter. Yet this Article’s findings are unambiguous: chronic sleep deprivation is an intrinsic part of prison life, as constitutive of the carceral penalty as are crowded conditions, grossly inadequate medical care, inedible food, and the ongoing risk of physical and sexual assault. After providing a brief overview of the sleep science, the findings of which make plain the physical and psychological damage caused by insufficient sleep, the Article provides a rich sociological account of the experience of trying to sleep in prison. Drawing on the accounts of interview subjects, it identifies ten distinct causes of sleep deprivation inside: five concrete conditions (fiercely uncomfortable beds, hunger, extremes of heat and cold, noise, and excessive light) and five “meta-conditions” (fear of violence, trauma, poverty, overly intrusive rules enforcement, and daily humiliation). This Article then considers some of the normative implications of the phenomenon explored here, including what the reality of sleep deprivation in prison means for our understanding of prisons and of carceral punishment, the prospects for Eighth Amendment conditions claims grounded in sleep deprivation, and the policy challenges likely to confront efforts to address this problem.

 96 S.Cal.L. Rev. 95, UCLA School of Law, Public Law Research Paper No. 26-06

By Raoul Sumo Tayo

This report explores current and emerging maritime piracy trends and the associated flow of criminal activities in Cameroon.

Maritime piracy has become one of the most urgent security issues in the Gulf of Guinea, which is currently the second-most affected region worldwide. Cameroon’s coastline is at the centre of these dynamics, with attacks, shifting routes and an expanding set of criminal activities that both accompany and sustain piracy. Understanding these trends is essential to analysing how violence is maintained at sea, in mangrove areas and on land.

This report provides an overview of current and emerging patterns of maritime piracy and the cohabitant flows that reinforce it. It tracks the evolution of incidents on and off the Cameroonian coast, describing the methods used by individuals commonly referred to as pirates, including timing of attacks, routes, targets and operational tactics. While vessel boardings, attempted attacks, hijackings and kidnappings have generally decreased, illegal activities that generate alternative income have increased, particularly hostage-taking, extortion and illegal taxation. These criminal flows sustain pirate economies and strengthen their resilience when groups are not directly involved in kidnapping-for-ransom operations.

PretoriaL  Institute for Security Studies, 2025. 42p.

New South Wales. Legislative Assembly Committee on Law and Safety

An interim report for the inquiry into measures to combat right-wing extremism in New South Wales. The report considers the Crimes and Summary Offences Amendment Bill 2025 and puts forward some considerations for Parliament when debating the Bill. The Bill was introduced on 19 November 2025, following a neo-Nazi protest outside Parliament House on 8 November 2025. The event was widely condemned.

The protest shows the current laws have been failing to prevent right-wing extremists from mobilising and recruiting. Legislative change is required to address the worrying rise of right-wing extremism.

The Crimes and Summary Offences Amendment Bill 2025 is an important step in combatting right-wing extremism. The Committee has considered the Bill in the context of a broader inquiry into measures to combat right-wing extremism in New South Wales. 

The Committee strongly supports the Bill as a key measure to combat right-wing extremism in New South Wales. At the same time, the Committee acknowledges the risk of constitutional challenge to any law that may restrict the implied freedom of political communication.

Parliament of New South Wales, 2026. 21p.

By New South Wales. Legislative Assembly Committee on Law and Safety

Following the December 2025 Bondi terror attack, the NSW government is strengthening laws against hate speech, specifically targeting slogans like "globalize the intifada" and prohibited terrorist symbols in public. A January 2026 Parliamentary inquiry recommended legislation to ban this specific slogan and similar hate speech to combat violence, with proposals including amending the Crimes Act 1900.

NSW ParliamentNSW Parliament +3

Key Measures and Developments:

Targeted Slogans: The chant "globalize the intifada" is explicitly identified as inciting violence, with moves to prohibit it and similar hateful statements.

Legislative Action: The inquiry recommends amending the Crimes Act 1900 (specifically section 93ZAA) to further prohibit public acts that incite hatred on grounds including religion, race, and sexual orientation.

School Crackdown: Immediate, stricter conduct rules are in place across NSW schools (government, independent, and Catholic), with potential for dismissal for staff engaging in hate speech.

Symbol Prohibition: Legislation is being developed to outlaw the public display of symbols associated with proscribed terrorist organizations.

Inquiry Recommendations: The Parliamentary committee advised monitoring UK hate speech laws, ensuring new legislation is robust against constitutional challenges, and reviewing any new laws within 12 months.

Context: These actions follow the 2025 Bondi incident and focus on balancing anti-racism with existing legal frameworks.

Justice and Equity CentreJustice and Equity Centre +7

Parliament of NSW. 2026. 56p.

By Philip Mendes

The paper describes the emergence of antisemitism as a defining characteristic of significant sectors of Australia’s self-described ‘progressive’ institutions. It argues that antisemitism is rife in institutions such as universities, schools, the arts, trade unions, human rights and civil liberties bodies and the media – and predominant among younger Australians.

The paper documents a systematic pattern of hostility toward Jews going far beyond legitimate criticism of Israeli government policy. It presents case studies of pro-racist groups and activities, and of a bystander approach. The paper outlines three steps towards a best practice anti-racist response of zero tolerance.

A combination of universal and targeted education among other strategies are needed to prevent antisemitism becoming embedded longer-term within key sections of Australian society. The paper identifies mandatory education is badly needed both within all secondary schools – public, private and faith-based – and universities to directly counter antisemitic arguments that are prevalent and currently uncontested.

Australian policymakers attempting to combat manifestations of antisemitic intolerance will need to take a long-term approach given the ingrained nature of the racist and illiberal views within sections of academia and the wider community.

Key findings

The levels of antisemitic incidents in Australia are unprecedented, reaching a high in 2024 rising sharply after the October 7 massacre of innocent Jews in southern Israel in 2023.

Incidents range from systemic vilification in universities and trade unions, to extreme acts of violence.

There is a major generational divide between older Australians who are less likely to hold antisemitic views, and younger Australians aged 18 to 24 years who are more likely to hold negative views concerning Zionism, Israel and Jews generally.

Key recommendations

Exclude antisemites from Australia's immigration admission processes.

Prevent hate speech.

Interventions within educational institutions to stop young Australians absorbing racist ideas.

Centre for Independent Studies, 2026. 30p.

By Michael Rempel, Olive Lu, & Sarah Monaghan

In January 2020, New York’s landmark bail reform law went into effect. This report provides a definitive examination of how bail reform reshaped the pretrial landscape after five full years of implementation. Covering all regions of the state, and drawing on court data from 2018 to 2024 (spanning pre- and post-reform timeframes), the report examines bail reform’s impact on:

• Pretrial Decision-Making at Arraignment: Rates of release on recognizance, supervised release, bail, and pretrial detention; and estimated numbers of cases not resulting in pretrial detention due to changing practices under bail reform.

• Affordability of Bail: For cases that continue to be assigned bail, median bail amounts, bail posting rates, and judges’ use of “alternative” payment methods (partially secured bonds and unsecured bonds) that legislators intended to ease people’s ability to pay.

• Racial and Ethnic Disparities: Disparities among Black, Hispanic, and white people in judges’ rates of continuing to set bail or remand people directly to jail.

• Three Rounds of Bail Amendments: Effects of amendments respectively put into effect in July 2020, May 2022, and June 2023 (entailing a first-ever analysis of the 2022 and 2023 amendments).

New York: Data Collaborative for Justice, 2026. 47p.

By C.J. McKinney

In 2025, the government announced that it intends to make changes to asylum appeals.1 These would include a new appeals body staffed by adjudicators, replacing the current First-tier Tribunal staffed by immigration judges.2 This briefing examines previous changes to the structure of asylum appeals over the years. A September 2025 briefing by Amnesty International captures the main shifts: In May 1969, Parliament created a two-tier system to deal with appeals against various Home Office decisions. Appeals were generally made to and decided by people called adjudicators. If permission was granted, an adjudicator’s decision could be appealed, including by the Home Office, to the Immigration Appeal Tribunal. This two-tier appeals system was later formally constituted as the Immigration Appellate Authority (IAA). The rules governing appeals procedures were made by the Home Secretary, a power which was later transferred to the Lord Chancellor. On 4 April 2005, the IAA was replaced by the Asylum and Immigration Tribunal (AIT). The change involved changing the title of the people who decided appeals from adjudicators to judges. The change gave the appearance of merging a two-tier system into one. However, the system remained two-tier. If permission was granted, a more senior judge could review a decision of the first tier of that system. This process was called reconsideration rather than appeal but was essentially the same. On 15 February 2010, the AIT was abolished, and its functions passed to the current appeals body. The change involved moving the judges from the AIT to the current body. The second tier of this body (the Upper Tribunal) has a higher status making it more difficult to seek judicial review of its decision to refuse permission to appeal against a decision of the first tier (the First-tier Tribunal). This appeals body also has more independence from government, including over the rules that govern the appeals for which it is responsible. 3 This briefing goes into more detail on all these developments. It does not cover changes to the substance of appeal rights over time; these are For general context: claims for asylum are usually based on the United Nations Refugee Convention, which the UK has ratified.summarised in a 2019 report of the Joint Committee on Human Rights. 

London: UK Parliament, House of Commons Library 2026. 16p.

By  Rosamund SHREEVES 

The International Day of Zero Tolerance for Female Genital Mutilation (FGM) on 6 February is an occasion to raise awareness and call for further action to end this practice that puts an estimated four million girls at risk of severe harm every year. The available data shows that there are also survivors of FGM or potential victims in at least 16 EU Member States. The EU supports international efforts to end FGM and has made preventing and combating it a key part of its strategies on women's and children's rights. The European Parliament, which has been raising awareness and pushing for firm action on FGM since 2001, spearheaded provisions on criminalising FGM as a standalone offence and providing specialist support for victims in new EU legislation on combating violence against women, which Member States must transpose into national law by June 2027. Looking ahead, while the number of countries with legislation prohibiting FGM has increased and there has been some success in changing social norms, progress is not a given. The United Nations and civil society organisations are flagging an urgent need to step up collective action and sustain investment if the internationally agreed target of eliminating FGM by 2030 is to be reached. At EU level, the preparation of the next long-term EU budget, action plan for gender equality, and implementation of the EU gender equality strategy for 2026-2030 will provide openings to build and expand on the action taken to date.

EPRS | European Parliamentary Research Service, 2026. 4p.

By FATF/OECD - GAFILAT 

This report summarises the AML/CFT measures in place in Brazil as at the date of the on-site visit, 13-31 March 2023. It analyses the level of compliance with the FATF 40 Recommendations and the level of effectiveness of Brazil’s AML/CFT system, and provides recommendations on how the system could be strengthened. Key Findings a) Brazil has a strong domestic coordination mechanism to address risks from money laundering, ENCCLA. Brazil has built a legal and structural framework largely enabling competent authorities to prevent and combat ML. More recently, Brazil has also improved its framework to fight terrorist financing (TF) by passing legislation criminalising the offence and enabling implementation of targeted financial sanctions (TFS). Informed by the longstanding coordination within ENCCLA and a National Risk Assessment conducted in 2021, authorities have shared and robust understanding of national ML threats, namely, corruption, drug trafficking and organised crime, environmental crimes, and tax crimes. There is a precise understanding of the ML risks and vulnerabilities linked to most threats— including informal and illicit value transfers, misuse of cash, and front companies—however, there is a lack of depth in the understanding of financial flows linked to environmental crimes. b) Through ENCCLA, since 2003, Brazil has developed and refined policies to tackle many of its higher ML risks, particularly those stemming from corruption. Brazil has taken many steps to address other higher risk areas, however, these actions are taken without longer-term, comprehensive strategies, which results in occasional disjointed efforts and misalignment of objectives and priorities (such as ML from environmental crimes where interagency cooperation is growing but limited, and where some keyauthorities lack sufficient resources). At times, structural issues inhibit effective coordination in combatting ML/TF, including cooperation between police and prosecution offices and resources to handle the complex criminal justice system. In addition, the tax authority (RFB) has a central role in the AML/CFT system given that it controls access to many pieces of relevant information, but legal obstacles frustrate its full ability to assist other authorities in tackling ML/TF and its own AML/CFT activities are not adequately prioritised. c) Brazil has successfully prosecuted high-end cases of ML, including from corruption, reflecting the capacity to conduct financial investigations and the development of supportive institutional structures. Despite important successes, there is a mismatch between the investigative input and the results seen in terms of prosecutions and convictions. Structural issues have a major impact. Among other things, ML proceedings take too long due to appeals and when convictions are obtained, sometimes a decade or more after charges, and the sanctioning regime needs major improvements. Criminal assets are generally identified and temporarily seized, and in some major cases Brazil was able to recuperate large sums of criminal money; however, there was not sufficient evidence of final confiscation and asset recovery is mainly accomplished through agreements. While there is highlevel commitment to fighting ML/TF, the resources available to competent authorities are largely insufficient, particularly those of COAF and prosecutors. Lack of resources hinders the production of deeper financial intelligence to identify a larger number of complex ML schemes and frustrate efforts to trace criminal financial networks. d) Brazil is committed to fighting terrorism and terrorist financing and has an improving understanding of its TF risks including those stemming from farright extremism. While it has expertise to investigate TF activity, the legal framework in place and the corresponding view of the authorities hinder successful prosecutions. The authorities are not always well coordinated to identify, prosecute, or prevent TF. The framework to implement targeted financial sanctions without delay for TF and proliferation financing is in place, although it remains largely untested at the time of the onsite visit as no designations had been made by Brazil and no funds or assets were frozen. Sanctions implementation by the private sector is improving particularly in the financial sector, thanks to the supervisory activity of the Central Bank of Brazil (BCB), and more slowly in other sectors. There is a lack of interagency coordination on issues related to the financing of proliferation and guidance is needed for the private sector. NPOs are not yet subject to risk-based measures specifically to prevent TF. e) As a major regional and global economy, Brazil has a large and diverse universe of financial and non-financial sectors with increasing sophistication. BCB is the key supervisor for the most material financial institutions and its long-standing risk-based activities have contributed to significantly improve the ability of financial institutions to detect and prevent ML and TF, particularly the largest ones. With few exceptions, other supervisors have not been able yet to take sufficient measures to ensure sufficient implementation of the AML/CFT framework. At the time of the on-site visit, some activities remained unregulated, notably those of lawyers and virtual asset service providers, leaving serious vulnerabilities. f) The misuse of companies is a feature in many ML schemes and Brazil has been able to detect abusers in many cases by using the information available through REDESIM to map out the company structure. Brazil has also created a requirement for companies to provide beneficial ownership (BO) information to RFB, however, this database is largely unpopulated. Moreover, declaratory BO information is considered by law to be “tax secret,” which means that LEAs need to request a court order to obtain it and that COAF and other administrative authorities (including those involved in the fight against corruption) cannot access it for their analysis. g) Brazil generally cooperates well in ML/TF areas with its international partners. As many ML schemes include the sending of money abroad, LEAs and COAF are very proactive in seeking assistance to obtain information and restrain criminal assets. As a major financial centre, Brazil also receives requests for cooperation from abroad, and competent authorities provide high quality assistance, with soon-site visit, some activities remained unregulated, notably those of lawyers and virtual asset service providers, leaving serious vulnerabilities. f) The misuse of companies is a feature in many ML schemes and Brazil has been able to detect abusers in many cases by using the information available through REDESIM to map out the company structure. Brazil has also created a requirement for companies to provide beneficial ownership (BO) information to RFB, however, this database is largely unpopulated. Moreover, declaratory BO information is considered by law to be “tax secret,” which means that LEAs need to request a court order to obtain it and that COAF and other administrative authorities (including those involved in the fight against corruption) cannot access it for their analysis. g) Brazil generally cooperates well in ML/TF areas with its international partners. As many ML schemes include the sending of money abroad, LEAs and COAF are very proactive in seeking assistance to obtain information and restrain criminal assets. As a major financial centre, Brazil also receives requests for cooperation from abroad, and competent authorities provide high quality assistance, with so on-site visit, some activities remained unregulated, notably those of lawyers and virtual asset service providers, leaving serious vulnerabilities. f) The misuse of companies is a feature in many ML schemes and Brazil has been able to detect abusers in many cases by using the information available through REDESIM to map out the company structure. Brazil has also created a requirement for companies to provide beneficial ownership (BO) information to RFB, however, this database is largely unpopulated. Moreover, declaratory BO information is considered by law to be “tax secret,” which means that LEAs need to request a court order to obtain it and that COAF and other administrative authorities (including those involved in the fight against corruption) cannot access it for their analysis. g) Brazil generally cooperates well in ML/TF areas with its international partners. As many ML schemes include the sending of money abroad, LEAs and COAF are very proactive in seeking assistance to obtain information and restrain criminal assets. As a major financial centre, Brazil also receives requests for cooperation from abroad, and competent authorities provide high quality assistance, with some improvements needed in extradition and the speed of responses.

Paris, FATF, 2023. 354p.

By Jeffry A. Collins

Cryptocurrencies and Financial Crimes: The Role of Decentralized Cryptocurrency in Facilitating Money Laundering and the Challenges Posed on Anti–Money Laundering Regulations, 

By Jeffry A. Collins

This research examines the role of decentralized cryptocurrencies in facilitating money laundering and the challenges they pose to Anti–Money Laundering (AML) regulations through literature review and regulatory analysis. The study reveals that the decentralized, anonymous, and borderless nature of cryptocurrency enables illicit activities via cryptocurrency ATMs, mixing services, and decentralized exchanges (DEXs). For over a decade, the same regulatory problems persist today as were present at the inception of cryptocurrencies. Current AML frameworks, such as the Bank Secrecy Act and the Money Laundering Control Act, are inadequate for this decentralized ecosystem. The analysis critiques the fragmented efforts of U.S. regulatory agencies, identifying enforcement gaps and inconsistencies. To address these vulnerabilities, the paper proposes three solutions: mandating privacy–preserving technologies like zero–knowledge proofs for mixing services, requiring decentralized identity solutions for cryptocurrency ATMs and DEXs, and enhancing public education oncryptocurrency risks and safe practices. The study concludes with an urgent call for comprehensive regulatory reforms and educational initiatives to balance innovation, privacy, and security while combating money laundering in the cryptocurrency sector.

34 U. MIA Bus. L. Rev. 71 (2025).

By The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO)

The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) have worked together to provide an overview of the common food fraud cases in the aquatic sector and the associated health risks. The report resulting from this collaboration provides information on tools that can be used to fight food fraud for aquatic products, and international case studies illustrate the scope and impact of fraud. The report reviews regulatory frameworks as well as standards such as those set by Codex Alimentarius, FAO guidelines, and GFSI‑benchmarked schemes, advocating for harmonized labelling, mandatory scientific names, and improved traceability. It emphasizes the role of consumer awareness and industry transparency in combating fraud.

Fisheries and Aquaculture Technical Paper, No. 742. Rome.

The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO)2026. 179p.

By Nazgol Ghandnoosh, Bobby Boxerman and Celeste Barry
Prior criminal records account for a large share of already lengthy prison sentences, often adding years or even decades to sentences, without evidence of community safety benefits.



What’s new? Recruitment of children to fight in armed and criminal groups has boomed across Colombia over the last decade, with hundreds of minors lured into joining violent groups on false promises of wealth, status and protection. This war crime disproportionately affects Colombia’s ethnic communities and those who live in conflict zones.

Why does it matter? Armed groups rely on minors to maintain territorial control. Children carry out high-risk tasks, suffer abuse, and are punished with death if caught escaping. Recruitment shatters communities’ ability to resist armed groups because locals fear their own family members will be the targets of reprisals if they speak out.

What should be done? Colombia should act promptly to identify children at risk, boost protection at schools (where recruitment often happens) and strengthen its criminal investigations into the perpetrators. Foreign donors should support police efforts to track recruiters and help strengthen communities’ ability to prevent the crime from taking place.

International Crisis Group, 2026, 28p.

By Mark Galeotti

Weaponized migration, which is sometimes called instrumentalized migration or coercive engineered migration, is by no means a new challenge, but it is one that is arguably easier to apply in the modern age of cheap and easy international travel and growing awareness of the wealth and security disparities across the globe. It is also more likely to have local and widespread political impacts within democratic governments with free media.

This report considers particular case studies from the Russian–Finnish border in 2015 and, especially, the Belarusian borders with Poland and Lithuania in 2021, and Russia’s with Finland and Norway in 2023/24. In subtly different ways, these were all examples of attempts to use weaponized migration to bring pressure to bear on the target countries, in the hope of influencing their leaderships by generating division, disruption and costs, both practical and political. They certainly all proved problematic and, although there is scope for serious debate as to whether they were ultimately effective or counter-productive, the consensus appears to be that both Minsk and Moscow were left with the sense that, in the short term at least, weaponized migration remained a viable tool within their ‘hybrid war’ toolbox.

Given the scope for the renewed use of this tool by Belarus and, especially, the Russian Federation, as well as its potential use by other nations such as Türkiye, which has already employed it, European societies in particular must consider the contexts in which it can be used against them in the future and potential responses. This report, therefore, concludes with future scenarios for the weaponization of migration, ranging from facilitating flows from North Africa to the online encouragement of would-be asylum seekers, as well as a range of recommendations for both the EU and individual states, ideally that do not simply depend on a dangerous ‘Fortress Europe’ approach.

Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime (GI-TOC) , 2026.