By Peer Schouten and James Barnett

Contemporary banditry in northwest Nigeria is a multifaceted phenomenon that encompasses a wide spectrum of violence waged by heavily militarised yet loosely organised rural gangs. These groups engage in everything from cattle rustling to kidnapping for ransom and extortion of peasant communities, with bandits becoming important de facto authorities in swathes of rural northwest Nigeria. 

Underpinning the contemporary bandit conflict, we argue, is an ongoing ‘battle for the bush’ — a struggle over land, governance and rural livelihoods. Historically, the bush functioned as a shared space for farmers and pastoralists. However, land use data shows that the expansion of cropland farming has gradually overtaken grazing lands, reducing pastoral mobility and generating increasing conflicts. The state’s failure to mediate these tensions or provide equitable land policies, coupled with the breakdown of traditional conflict resolution mechanisms, has allowed grievances to fester. In response, bandits have violently reclaimed and reshaped the governance of the bush, not only as a refuge but as a domain of coercive rule, imposing levies on farming and controlling access to land and cattle.

We examine the historical drivers of this transformation and analyse how opportunistic criminals and social bandits have evolved into de facto rural rulers. Along the way, the trend of cropland expansion is being reversed. Yet instead of reestablishing a pastoral idyll, banditry is reproducing the very conditions that gave rise to it, further undermining rural livelihoods in the northwest. This has compounded rural poverty and food insecurity while depriving pastoralist youths’ access to government services and education that could provide for a better future. Our analysis implies that the crisis cannot be solved through military interventions alone but requires a rethinking of rural governance.

Schouten, P., & Barnett, J. (2025). Battle for the bush: banditry and violent agrarian change in northwest Nigeria. 

Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS). DIIS Working Paper Vol. 2025 No. 12

2025. 34p.

By JOHN KELLNER & ERIK GAMM

Colorado could spare itself a reputational headache and hefty fines if it were to invest in criminal incompetency restoration, but it would need to cut mental health operating costs to make the effort worthwhile. When criminal defendants are declared incompetent, they may also be declared “restorable,” meaning they could, with counseling and mental healthcare, restore a level of mental capacity that could carry culpability. The backlog of criminal defendants waiting for mental health services has risen in the last year, as has the length of time they need to wait for an available bed. In the meantime, high-visibility cases have highlighted a pervasive problem in Colorado relating to incompetency to stand trial. This situation has been created over the last five years. In March 2019, the Colorado Department of Human Services (CDHS) resolved an eight-year federal lawsuit regarding excessive wait times for courtordered competency services. The settlement, filed as a consent decree, required CDHS to expand community-based services, speed up inpatient admissions, and provide treatment for people in jail awaiting competency services. CDHS faces up to $12 million annually in fines if it fails to meet new service deadlines. The agreement comes after years of rising demand: since 2000, inpatient competency evaluation orders increased nearly 600%, and restoration service orders rose more than 1,200%. Disability Law Colorado reopened the lawsuit after CDHS failed to meet previous settlement deadlines. In subsequent years, the backlog has not only ceased to disappear but grown. The state of Colorado has not paid the fine threshold each year but has in some, an outlay that has added to the state’s deficit. In the meantime, judges have less discretion regarding when to release accused criminals who are mentally incompetent back into the public to await restoration.

KEY FINDINGS • Since 2000, inpatient competency evaluation orders increased nearly 600%, and restoration service orders rose more than 1,200%. • As of June 2025, there are 368 Colorado inmates on the wait list to receive court-mandated competency restoration. • There are 673 total beds reserved for incompetency restoration treatment. They are always occupied, creating a wait list referred to as the state’s “backlog.” • Over the last year, 930 inmates have been referred for restoration and have spent, or will spend, an average near 110 days each on the wait list. • The Colorado Department of Human Services (CDHS) pays a fine between $100 and $500 per day for keeping an inmate ordered to undergo competency restoration waitlisted for longer than 28 days. In Fiscal Year 24, CDHS paid $12 million, which is the cap under the consent decree. • If the consent decree had not included a cap, the fines would have cost $65.2 million. • To bring wait times below 28 days, the state would need to add 209 new beds. These resources would save the state $12 million (plus annual adjustments to the cap) per year by eliminating the fines and $11.9 million per year by reducing the amount of time that inmates spend in public facilities while on the wait list. • HB22-1303 budgeted $6.2 million per year to staff and operate 16 new beds at the Colorado Mental Health Hospital in Fort Logan. At $388,279 per bed, 209 new beds would require $81.2 million of additional state spending per year. • State accreditation standards require that mental institutions dedicate about 3.7 FTE of staff to each restoration bed; this requirement alone generates 74% of the total cost per unit. • Inpatient restoration is almost seven times more expensive than incarceration, which costs just $58,000 per inmate annually. • In total, the state would face an annual cost of $57.2 million to comply with the 2019 consent decree.

Greenwood Village, CO: Common Sense Institute, 2025. 13p.

By Robert Vargas, Lauren Hagani, and Gabriel Rojas∗

This article synthesizes emerging research on the political economy of policing, conceptualized through a Gramscian framework that examines policing as an inter-institutional structure shaped by economic, political, and ideological forces. We review research on relations between police and (a) social services, (b) private firms, (c) philanthropy, and (d) academia, highlighting how each sector plays a role in legitimating or sustaining police power. By situating policing within a Gramscian political economy, we provide a framework for understanding how police functions extend beyond law enforcement into the management of social order, wealth extraction, and ideological control.We conclude by discussing future directions for research and strategies for intervening in these power relations.

Annu. Rev. Law Soc. Sci. 2025. 21:489–507

By Dan Simon

Adversarial legal procedure is one of the defining features of the American legal system. Adversarialism has long been criticized for breeding a combative style of lawyering that precipitates a host of injurious effects that outweigh its virtues. Seeking to explore the psychological foundations of this combat model, this article suggests that playing an adversarial role skews legal actors’ views of their case toward greater congruence with that role. This expansive bias encompasses distortions of interpretations of evidence, beliefs, and judgments, and it results in corresponding motivations, emotions, and more. The article discusses three facets of the legal process that illustrate the harms wrought by the combat model and its underlying adversarial bias. The persistence of the combat model is a testament to adversarialism's iron grip on the American legal imagination.

Annual Review of Law and Social Science

Volume 21, 2025

By Dan Simon,David E. Melnikoff

The adversarial legal procedure is one of the defining characteristics of Anglo-American law. Adversarialism is lauded for its capacity to discover the factual truth, which is said to be revealed by the clash between zealous advocates. This study further explores the proposition that adversarial contests trigger a bias that pervades adversarial actors’ judgments, beliefs, motivations, and emotions, and thus skews how they perceive and approach their cases. Specifically, we set out to extend prior research by testing whether the adversarial bias could spill over to skew simulated pre-trail prosecutorial tasks: the decision to seek an indictment and forming judgments in advance of the plea negotiation. In a simulation with lay people, we find that the adversarial bias does indeed skew pre-trial decisions. This result is troubling because the epistemic justification of adversarialism has little to contribute to these decisions, as indictment decisions are made unilaterally by prosecutors, and plea negotiations take place under heavily lopsided power and access to information. It follows that while adversarial zeal has little to contribute to pre-trial decisions, it can readily infest them with zeal. While ecological validity considerations abound, this study demonstrates the psychological plausibility that the adversarial bias results in heightened levels of indictment and stiffer punishments, thus highlighting prosecutors’ potential contribution to the exceptionally high rate of people sent to prison in the US.

Journal of Law & Empirical AnalysisVolume 1, Issue 2, December 2024, Pages 326-342

By Richard Ashby Wilson

In the years that followed the 2020 Black Lives Matter protests, the US federal government, cities, and states enacted sweeping reforms of the police and criminal justice system. To counter the narrative of racialized police violence and promote community policing, these included new hate crime statutes and dedicated bias-crime task forces. This article reviews the literature on the enforcement of hate crime, evaluates post-2020 antibias initiatives, and advises realistic expectations about the long-term impact of reform efforts. For starters, hate crimes are massively underreported. Even when reported, police often fail to accurately identify and charge a hate crime. Police officers exercise wide discretion, often accord hate crimes low priority, struggle to prove the bias motive of the offender, and come under political pressure to drop bias-motivated charges. Even when charged, few defendants are convicted of a hate crime because prosecutors frequently dismiss the hate crime charge. Prosecutors are expected to resolve cases quickly and may use a hate crime charge as leverage in plea bargaining. Media coverage, political pressure, and the involvement of victims and civil rights groups predict prosecutorial pursuit of a hate crime conviction. Hate crime policing and prosecutions may be enhanced by specialized hate crime units in police departments and prosecutors’ offices; clear policies that define terms and investigatory procedures; and enhanced communication between police, prosecutors, and target communities.

Annu. Rev. Law Soc. Sci. 2025. 21:449–67

By Oliver Rollins, Julien Larregue, and Hannah Pullen-Blasnik

Technologies play a central role in decision-making processes within criminal legal systems, creating what we call technologies of criminalization. These tools are based on the idea of calculated truths about future riskiness, but they often reinforce structural biases that underlie the concept of criminality. Their development and use demonstrate efforts to define the abstract criminal: a notion that embodies the presumed natural realities and discoverable aspects of criminality believed to be objectively discoverable and statistically predictable. This perspective neglects the socially constructed nature of criminality and the impact of human biases in the design and implementation of these technologies. Three interlinked processes drive their adoption: quantification, prediction, and pathologization. By examining neuroscientific, genomic, and algorithmic technologies, we critically assess their social impacts and the risks of exacerbating social inequalities under the facade of technical neutrality. Finally, we emphasize the increasing involvement of private industries in criminalization processes.

Annu. Rev. Law Soc. Sci. 2025. 21:469–87

 By Benjamin van Rooij, Malouke E. Kuiper, and Alex R. Piquero

Punishment plays a major function in preventing crime. Punishment can potentially shape criminal conduct through at least 13 different mechanisms: 5 have a positive effect, reducing crime, and 8 have a negative effect, stimulating offending. This article explains what these 13 potential effects of punishment are and how they have been theorized. It further reviews the body of available empirical evidence for each of these mechanisms. It finds that for many mechanisms there is mixed and inconclusive evidence with major methodological challenges. The article further analyzes the conditions under which punishment affects crime, including the type of crime, offender, and underlying causes and correlates of crime. It also explores the time frames through which punishment affects crime, as well as the ways in which different behavioral effects of punishment interact. The conclusion develops ideas about how this body of empirical work can come to shape criminal justice practice.

Annu. Rev. Law Soc. Sci. 2025. 21:509–26

By The  European Crime Prevention Network

This paper summarises the findings from an expert meeting on youth recruitment into organised crime held in Brussels on 26 and 27 March 2024. In this meeting, co-organised by EMPACT Cocaine, Cannabis, and Heroin (OA 7.1) and the EUCPN, twenty-one experts, representing 15 EU Member States, the European Commission, and the European Crime Prevention Network, shared the latest insights on the growing problem of youth recruitment into organised crime, the multifaceted risk factors contributing to youth involvement in organised crime, and opportunities for prevention. This report highlights key insights relevant for intervention frameworks and actionable recommendations. 

Cf. European Crime Prevention Network,2025. 16p.

By R. Evan Ellis

The security environment in Mexico is characterized by a dangerous fragmentation of and competition among criminal groups that pushed the nation’s homicide rate to a record high of 22.5 per 100,000 in 2017, a 27.5 percent increase over the prior year.1 The nation, whose security and prosperity strongly impacts the United States through geographic proximity and associated flows of people, money, and goods (both licit and illicit), is at a critical juncture in its fight against transnational organized crime. Since Mexican President Felipe Calderón launched the “war against the cartels” in December 2006 with the deployment of the Mexican army into the state of Michoacán, the nation’s security forces have taken down the leaders of multiple powerful criminal groups and debilitated their organizations.2 In the process, the Mexican military, police, and other security institutions have evolved their institutional structures, modified both their strategy and their doctrine, and strengthened their ability to combat transnational organized crime. Yet as with the experience of the United States in combatting terrorist groups in Iraq and Afghanistan, Mexico’s fight against the cartels, both despite and because of its successes, has created a more chaotic criminal landscape, with both a higher level of violence and a broader range of criminality. Complicating Mexico’s security challenge is the disposition of the Trump administration to act aggressively against illegal immigration from Mexico (among other countries) into the United States, along with U.S. renegotiation and possible abandonment of the North American Free Trade Agreement. These actions increase stressors on Mexico, including the prospect of expanded deportations of immigrants to Mexico, the loss of remittance income, and impeded access by Mexican producers to the U.S. market. The Trump administration’s actions, magnified by rhetoric that many Mexicans perceive as an insult to their country and people, have combined with Mexican frustration over the persistence of violence and corruption to create the real prospect that leftist populist candidate Andrés Manuel López Obrador could win the July 2018 presidential election, potentially taking Mexico on a course of more distant political relations and decreased security cooperation with the United States and expanded engagement with extra-hemispheric rivals of the United States such as Russia and China.

Army University Press, 2019. 12p.

By IGARAPÉ INSTITUTE | THOMSON REUTERS FOUNDATION | TRUSTLAW |

Environmental and natural resource-related crimes represent the third-largest illicit economy in the world in terms of the volume of money involved, ranking behind only drug trafficking and human trafficking. These are offenses that affect nature and threaten the planet’s sustainability, such as illegal logging, illicit crops, unauthorized agricultural expansion, illegal gold mining, and wildlife trafficking. These crimes are characterized by the insertion of illegally obtained natural resources into the formal economy — a process known as environmental asset laundering — which is estimated to move between US$110 and US$281 billion per year. Given the diversity and complexity of the strategies used to conceal the illicit origin of these resources, anti-money laundering systems often face challenges in identifying the dynamics of environmental crime. This report analyzes how the legislation of six Amazon Basin countries — Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela — defines environmental crimes and whether the entities required to report suspicious transactions to their national Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs) are adequately structured to address these crimes. It is through the action of these reporting entities that the asset laundering enforcement system — including law enforcement agencies and public prosecutors — is activated. In general, legal frameworks follow two models: one that links asset laundering to a predefined set of criminal offenses (the so-called “predicate offenses”) and another that recognizes laundering of resources from any offense (“all-crimes model”). The study is divided into two parts. The first examines whether the activities and professions most closely associated with the supply chains vulnerable to environmental and natural resource-related crimes in the Amazon are subject to mandatory suspicious transactions reporting. The second part assesses the application of anti-money laundering laws and asset recovery mechanisms. It also investigates whether national legal frameworks recognize money laundering as a crime associated with these offenses and whether they provide effective instruments for asset recovery in the context of such illicit activities. IGARAPÉ INSTITUTE | THOMSON REUTERS FOUNDATION | TRUSTLAW | 2025. 39p.

By Sarah J. Foster, Syd J. Ascione, Francesca Santaniello, Teale N. Phelps Bondaroff

Illegal wildlife trade (IWT) is a persistent and extensive threat to global biodiversity. Hundreds of marine fish species are subject to regulation under the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES), but it is unclear how much protection species gain from CITES because information on marine fish IWT is limited. We used online reports of seized shipments of seahorses (Hippocampus spp.) to investigate their illegal trade. Seahorses were the first genus of marine fishes to be listed under CITES. We compiled 297 unique seizure records from 192 online outlets posted from January 2010 to April 2021 and analyzed the number of seahorses seized, the value of the seized items, trade routes, and other seizure details. Dried seahorses accounted for nearly all seizures, which totaled around 5 million individuals valued at over US$21 million. The reported number of seizures and the number of seahorses seized increased over time. Reported illegal trade involved 62 countries and other jurisdictions. Seized seahorses predominantly originated in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. China was the primary destination. Seahorses were mostly intercepted in transit and in destination countries rather than source countries. Airports were the most common location for seizures, and passenger baggage represented the primary transportation method by number of seizures, but sea cargo facilitated the largest seizures. Seahorses were most commonly seized by customs, often in conjunction with other regulated wildlife products. Although seizures led to detention of actors, information on subsequent legal actions was limited. Addressing the illegal trade in seahorses requires greater enforcement in source countries and increasing the realized risks associated with smuggling. Our findings can inform intelligence-led enforcement efforts to curb seahorse trafficking and highlight data biases and gaps that should be addressed to facilitate enhanced deterrence measures.

Conservation Biology, volume39, Issue5

October 2025

e70047

By Ailie Rennie In partnership with the Building Futures programme

This report forms part of the Prison Reform Trust’s Building Futures programme, funded by the National Lottery Community Fund, that since 2020 has been exploring the experiences of people serving longterm prison sentences. The programme has defined its long-term cohort to include men who spend 10 or more years in prison and women who spent eight years or more. This report is based on in-depth interviews with 20 people who have been released from prison and returned to the community after serving long-term prison sentences. This report aims to: • Understand more about the experience of release, re-entry, and resettlement for those who serve the longest periods in custody, including the challenges they face and their experiences of being on licence or under supervision. • Explore the availability of pre- and post-release support and assistance offered to people released from long prison sentences, highlighting both evidence of good practice and identifying areas for improvement. • Develop insights and ideas that will inform policy and practice through-the-gate in line with the Prison Reform Trust’s vision of a just, humane, and effective penal system. The report and its context Despite the common understanding that most prisoners – even those who are serving long-term and indeterminate periods of imprisonment – will eventually be released back into the community, there is currently very little known about the experiences of release for such individuals. We know strikingly little about the process of release itself as it exists in England and Wales, the challenges it presents, and the ways in which people begin to create a life for themselves after having spent many years separated from the outside world. Similarly, we know very little about what support might be available to assist people on their re-entry journeys or how the challenges they face might change over time. Given the increasing number of people subject to long-term sentences, the likely subsequent rise in people being released from them, and the staggeringly high current rate of recall, this is problematic as we may be failing to understand the unique re-entry needs of this population and providing insufficient support, setting them up to fail. The need to understand individuals’ experiences of release from long sentences is also particularly relevant given policy changes that have occurred in recent years wherein release and progression to open conditions have been severely curtailed. In 2022, for example, the then justice secretary Dominic Raab introduced controversial changes that limited the transfer of indeterminate prisoners from closed to open conditions and introduced new ministerial powers to refuse the release of the ‘highestrisk prisoners’. In effect, these procedural changes sought to keep a greater number of individuals imprisoned for longer by making it harder for specific types of prisoners to be released. Despite the reversal of Dominic Raab’s policy changes by Alex Chalk in 2023, many long-term and indeterminately sentenced prisoners are still denied the opportunity to access open prisons and progress towards release. For example, in 2024, more than 100 indeterminate prisoners were blocked from moving to open conditions by justice secretary Shabana Mahmood, despite their transfers being approved by the Parole Board.1 Without the opportunity to access the benefits of open conditions, including release on temporary licence, and to demonstrate how they have lowered their risk, more people serving long-term and indeterminate sentences are likely to stay in prison for longer beyond the expiry of their tariff, further increasing pressures on the prison population. The importance of these changes, for the purposes of this report, is to highlight the achievements of those who were granted release within this context, including participants in this study. Whilst most of the participants were released before these policy changes came into effect, just under half were released – or rereleased – in accordance with these frameworks. Those who were released prior to this, however, also experienced a series of policy changes both prior to and post-release which impacted their progress, including the declining use of release on temporary licence, Transforming Rehabilitation, and the increased length of supervision from four to 10 years. As the entire Building Futures programme has sought to demonstrate, being sentenced to and progressing through long-term imprisonment is a tumultuous process of navigating complex – and often contradictory – policy changes without knowing when they could change again. The intention of this report is to detail how the ‘rollercoaster’ of policy changes also impact the release and resettlement processes, continuing long after an individual exits the prison gates

London: Prison Reform Trust, 2025. 84p.

By Kiril Sharapov, Heather Komenda

This article examines the vulnerability of Ukrainian refugees to trafficking, abuse and exploitation in Poland and Romania following the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Drawing on survey data from the International Organization for Migration's Displacement Tracking Matrix and qualitative interviews with key informants, the study applies a multi-level, intersectional framework to assess personal, situational and contextual dimensions of vulnerability. It introduces a ‘continuum of vulnerability’ model, recognising that risks are dynamic, relational and shaped by structural inequalities. Quantitative analysis identifies financial insecurity, age and discrimination as key predictors of harm, whereas qualitative findings highlight the impact of conditional protection regimes, housing insecurity and healthcare barriers. Although few trafficking cases were officially identified, the findings suggest that a well-funded and coordinated rights-based response helped mitigate risks. The article argues that such protection frameworks must remain in place for as long as necessary and that vulnerability should be continuously monitored across all three dimensions.

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International Migration
Volume 63, Issue 5

September 2025

By Audrey Macklin

Enlisting states of origin or transit to prevent exit from their own territory has become a tool of extraterritorial migration control for industrialised liberal democratic states. This article first explores the practical erosion of the right to leave any country since the demise of communism, focusing on arrangements between EU member states and select African states of origin or transit. I then document the legitimating function performed by the anti-smuggling and search and rescue regimes in effacing the human right to leave. I conclude by situating exit restrictions in a wider European project of promoting, building and supporting border infrastructure in the name of development and capacity building in select African countries. This permits reflection on what the contemporary use of exit restrictions signifies for the equation of border control and sovereignty.

International Migration, June 2025

By Angeli Romero and Oliver Fisher

This report provides a Blueprint for how to build better visa structures and migration systems. This approach was developed by drawing on the struggles and needs of migrant workers themselves, to build a framework that can work concretely in a variety of contexts.

Vulnerability is not intrinsic to migration; vulnerability is constructed. This can be through factors such as governmental agenda, bureaucratic processes, legislation or reform.

Immigration policies and systems create risks and vulnerabilities to exploitation through complex processes, ineffective safeguards, and restrictive visa conditions imposed on migrant workers. We need to deconstruct the policies that create these risks, and redesign them to enable migrant workers to access rights and enjoy decent standards of work and living conditions.

Policy-makers, employers, sponsors, unions and others can take this framework and apply it, to help bring about a safer, fairer visa structure and migration system into practice.

  London: Focus on Labour Exploitation (FLEX). 2025. 32p.

By Ruth Vollmer, Clara Schmitz-Pranghe

This article analyses the interactions between inequalities and reintegration assistance, looking at the examples of Serbia and Kosovo. It proposes an approach for examining the reintegration assistance practices of frontline providers by (a) viewing them through the lens of street-level bureaucracy acting mainly on behalf of the returning state and (b) as locally situated agents within the networks of their own distributive relations and embodying their own social positioning. Street-level implementers play an active role in shaping outreach, effectiveness, and sustainability of reintegration assistance, not always in the intended ways. This article traces their navigation of institutional, organisational, and relational contexts, internalised social norms, and perceptions of social divisions, as well as the micro-dynamics of asymmetrical interactions during service delivery. It finds that strategies applied by street-level assistance providers have ambivalent but rather minor effects on pre-existing inequalities. Even though they often naturalise prevalent social divisions, the interactions and allocation of assistance are determined more by their practical experiences, availability and type of support, as well as general programme design and working conditions. The inability to bridge the mismatch between available support and needs can even endorse inequality-normalising perceptions.

International MigrationVolume 63, Issue 4

August 2025

By Anita Ramsak and  Eyueil Abate  

Ethiopia is a country of origin and transit, with migration primarily occurring around three main routes: (a) Eastern route through Djibouti towards Saudi Arabia; (b) Southern route through Kenya towards South Africa; and (c) Northern route through Libya towards Europe. In 2022, the number of unaccompanied children who migrated via the Eastern route doubled in comparison to 2021, and unaccompanied children made up 38 per cent of all children on the move from Ethiopia in 2022. En route, children may face protection risks including arbitrary arrest and detention, human trafficking for the purposes of labour or sexual exploitation, gender-based violence, extortion and denial of access to basic needs. Broad structural factors, such as conflict, drought and poverty are driving children and adults to migrate despite the protection risks. To understand the current knowledge gaps in the nexus between migration and child protection, as well as propose improvements, this study relies on primary and secondary data analysis. With a particular focus on exploring linkages between child migration and trafficking in children in Ethiopia, the report concludes with the institutional and legal landscape for children on the move and highlights key policy gaps in protecting children on the move across Ethiopia.Geneva, SWIT:  International Organization for Migration. 2023, 94p.

By Sara Giunti, Andrea Guariso, Mariapia Mendola, Irene Solmone 

In advanced economies, increasing population diversity often fuels hostile attitudes toward immigrants and political polarization. We study a short educational program for highschool students aimed at promoting cultural diversity and improving attitudes toward immigration through active learning. To identify the impact of the program, we designed a randomized controlled trial involving 4,500 students from 252 classes across 40 schools in northern Italy. The program led to more positive attitudes and behaviors toward immigrants, especially in more mixed classes. In terms of mechanisms, the intervention reduced students’ misperception and changed their perceived norms toward immigration, while it had no impact on implicit bias, empathy, or social contacts. Our findings suggest that anti-immigrant attitudes are primarily driven by sociotropic concerns rather than individual intergroup experience, and that educational programs combining critical thinking with cross-group discussion can correct them. 

  IZA DP No. 17978

Bonn:  IZA – Institute of Labor Economics , 2025. 71p.

By Cole Anderson and Caitlin McKennie

Relative to 2015, statewide net migration (i.e., in-migration subtracted by out-migration) has declined by 52.5% as of 2025. This reflects 36,146 fewer individuals arriving in Colorado in 2025 – roughly four times the capacity of Red Rocks Amphitheatre.i Low net migration presents a growing challenge to Colorado’s economic stability and labor force sustainability. Historically, net migration – particularly among working-age individuals – has been a critical driver of the state’s labor force growth and overall economic vitality. A sustained decline in net migration reduces the inflow of skilled workers, limiting the ability of businesses to recruit talent and expand operations. This dynamic places upward pressure on wages, contributes to labor shortages, and constrains economic productivity across key sectors. Declining migration trends compound the challenges posed by Colorado’s rapidly growing 65+ population. By 2030, Colorado expects roughly 40,000 retirees per year.ii As outlined in a CSI report released in July, while this demographic is expanding, its participation in the labor force is not expected to increase meaningfully in the coming decades. Without a stronger inflow of working-age residents, Colorado’s labor market may face a growing talent shortfall, making it increasingly difficult to meet future workforce demands.  According to a recent study by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), Colorado ranks 14th (not including the District of Columbia) in terms of regional price parities relative to all other states (a measurement that evaluates the differences in price levels across states for a given year).iii If these issues remain unaddressed, they could have long-term consequences for the state’s economic competitiveness and growth prospects. Evidence suggests this scenario is already emerging: Colorado’s economic growth is slowing, with job growth projected to increase by only 1.2% in 2025. During the first quarter of 2025, Colorado’s job growth ranked 26th in the nation. This deceleration is suggested to be linked to decreased net migration and an aging population, both of which pose risks to the state’s labor force capacity and overall economic dynamism.

Greenwood Village, CO: Common Sense Institute, 2025. 10p.