By Emily Thompson and Galen Lamphere-Englund

Violent extremist, terrorist, and targeted hate actors have been actively exploiting video games to propagandise, recruit and fundraise for more than 30 years. This report presents an analysis of that history using a unique dataset, the Extremist and Terrorist Games Database (ETGD), developed by the authors. It contains 155 reviewed entries of standalone games, modifications for existing games (mods) and browser‑based games dating from 1982 to 2024. The titles analysed appear across the ideological spectrum: far right (101 titles), jihadist (24), far left (1) and other forms of extremism and targeted hate (29), including school‑massacre ideation (12). They span platforms ranging from simple standalone games for Atari in the 1980s to sophisticated mods for some of today’s most popular games. The number of titles has increased year on year – in line with global conflict and extremist ideological trends, and revealing a continued push by malicious actors to exploit gaming. Meanwhile, the means of distribution have shifted from violent extremist organisations and marketplaces – such as white supremacist, neo‑Nazi and jihadist organisations – to distributed repositories of extremist games hosted on internet archives, Ethereum‑hosted file‑sharing, Telegram and with subtly coded titles on mainstream platforms like Steam. While most of the titles in the ETGD are available for free, several that have been sold (often at symbolic prices like $14.88 or $17.76) appear to have generated revenue for groups ranging from Hezbollah to the National Alliance, an American neo‑Nazi group. Through new analysis of Steam data, we also show that a small number of extremist and targeted hate titles have generated almost an estimated $600,000 in revenue for small publishers on the platform. Far from being a comprehensive analysis of the ETGD, we intend this preliminary launch report to form a basis for future research of the dataset and a framework for continued contributions to the ETGD from Extremism and Gaming Research Network (EGRN) members. Above all, we seek to contribute to sensible policymaking to prevent violent extremism that situates games as part of a wider contested and exploited information space, which deserves far more attention from those working towards peaceful ends.

Complete recommendations are provided in the conclusion section of this report, but include the following: 1. Prohibit and prevent violent extremist exploitation: Gaming platforms should explicitly prohibit violent extremist and terrorist behaviours and content. Leadership exists here from Twitch, Discord, Microsoft/Xbox and the affiliated Activision‑Blizzard. a. Audio and video platforms, such as Spotify, Apple Music and YouTube should seek to identify extremist gaming content currently available under misleading titles and tags. b. Flag and remove extremist titles across platforms: Hashing and preventing outlinking to ETGD games and links should be a priority across platforms. 2. Improve reporting mechanisms: Platforms must improve reporting mechanisms to make it easier for players to report violative content found in games and in‑game conduct. 3. Understand and take down distributed repositories: Larger repositories of extremist gaming content readily available on the surface web accelerate user exposure. 4. Collaborate across sectors: Addressing the spread of extremist games requires a collaborative effort between tech companies, government agencies and civil society organisations. 5. Educate across sectors: Programmes supporting educators and frontline community moderators should be developed. 6. Support research and innovation: Including cross‑sector initiatives like the Global Network on Extremism and Technology (GNET) and EGRN, which produced this database. 7. Enhance regulatory frameworks: Governments should update regulatory frameworks applying to digital platforms, recognising the nuances of gaming platforms and complying with human rights. 8. Encourage positive community engagement: Thoughtful, well designed community guidelines, moderation policies and reporting mechanisms can support community‑building.

London: The Global Network on Extremism and Technology (GNET). 2024. 40p.

By Michael Jensen, Sheehan Kane, Sean Doody and Elena Akers

Recently, several studies have found that threats against state targets, including public officials, elections, and law enforcement, have been on the rise in the United States. In this brief, we take a closer look at terrorist plots and attacks in the United States that targeted government, police, and military entities over a thirty year period (1992-2022). This brief looks specifically at 460 premeditated plots and attacks against state targets in which the perpetrators either (1) successfully committed attacks, or (2) mobilized to violence but were interdicted by law enforcement before they could carry out attacks. For this brief, evidence of mobilization includes the acquisition of weapons or weapons-making materials, target surveillance, the recruitment of co-conspirators, raising funds for an attack, or engaging in military-style training. Using data from the Profiles of Individual Radicalization in the United States (PIRUS) project, this brief shows that anti-state terrorist plots and attacks have increased sharply, reaching all-time highs over the past five years.

College Park, MD: The National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) , 2024. 6p.

By Flore Berger, Lyes Tagziria and Aziz Mossi

As the infiltration of communities in northern Benin by violent extremist organisations (VEOs) has intensified since 2021, the number of kidnapping incidents has surged. This research identifies four main types of kidnapping by VEOs – forced recruitment, intelligence gathering, punishment and intimidation – all of which are closely linked to conflict dynamics and group expansion. Kidnapping is used as a strategic tool for infiltration into new territories. Key findings l An effective protection programme for defectors, key targets for abductions, should be developed. This would preserve an important source of intelligence while also incentivising further defections. l Explore amnesty programmes for individuals who have joined the ranks of the VEOs. Dialogue should be made an important feature in counterterrorism strategy. l Reinforce local infrastructure to bolster community resilience towards kidnapping and other forms of violence. This should include telephone network coverage and road infrastructure, among others. l Kidnapping incidents should be incorporated into ECOWAS and national early warning mechanisms. The pervasiveness of kidnapping can be used as a barometer of VEO entrenchment in a given area. l Rebuilding international cooperation structures with neighbouring countries is crucial. The Benin government should immediately seek a resolution to current diplomatic stand-offs.

Pretoria: South Africa: OCWAR-T: Organised Crime: West African Response to Trafficking , 2024. 34p.

By Noor Huda Ismail

The fall of Damascus to Syrian rebels has sparked a ripple effect in Southeast Asia, with figures like Indonesia’s Mas'ud Izzul Mujahid using apocalyptic prophecies to fuel extremism. However, the region's diverse Islamic practices, shaped by unique historical and socio-political contexts, show that a universal eschatological (end of the world) narrative does not resonate everywhere. Religious scholars can counter extremist ideologies and reclaim prophetic teachings for peace in Southeast Asia’s pluralistic society by offering inclusive interpretations of prophecy and addressing local grievances.

Singapore: S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), 2024. 4p.

By Timothy Cubitt and Anthony Morgan

Using a large, national survey of online Australians, we measured unintentional and intentional exposure to fringe or radical content and groups online.

Two in five respondents (40.6%) reported being exposed to material they described as fringe, unorthodox or radical. One-quarter of these respondents (23.2%) accessed the content intentionally. One-third (29.9%) said the content they had seen depicted violence.

Fringe or radical content was often accessed through messages, discussions and posts online. Mainstream social media and messaging platforms were the platforms most frequently used to share fringe or radical content. Being a member of a group promoting fringe or radical content was associated with increased sharing of that content with other internet users.

Efforts to restrict access to radical content and groups online, especially on mainstream platforms, may help reduce intentional and unintentional exposure to and sharing of that content.

Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology. 2024. 17p.

By Camden Carmichael, Brooke Buxton, Seamus Hughes, and Clara Braun

Despite a rapid increase in domestic terrorism investigations in the United States, the threat that domestic terrorism poses to the homeland remains unclear. This is due to a lack of a comprehensive domestic terrorism legal framework that fully encompasses the variety of ideological groups present in the US. Using a sample of twenty-six QAnon and eighteen incel cases that have been federally prosecuted, our team examined how the US prosecutorial system utilises non-terrorism-related charges in addressing domestic violent extremism (DVE) cases. We propose a more inclusive DVE legal framework that expands the categorisation of VE ideologies, identifies specific DVE charges, and requires the engagement of the prosecutorial and probationary offices. By recognising Misogyny Motivated Violent Extremists (MMVEs) and Conspiracy Theory Motivated Violent Extremists (CTMVEs) as their own threat categories, it would allow researchers and practitioners to gain a deeper understanding of how pervasive the threat posed by these ideologies is.

The Hague: The International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT) , 2024. 21p.

By Danny Klinenberg

Why do people join domestic violent extremist organizations? This paper from Danny Klinenberg, an IGCC nonresident fellow, examines an understudied reason: organizational outreach. Klinenberg studies how the inflow of new members to the Oath Keepers, America’s largest paramilitary organization, is affected when the group’s leadership employs three tactics: showcasing their ideological zeal through armed standoffs with the government, membership discounts, and sports sponsorships. Using a variant of the synthetic control method, he finds that standoffs increase new memberships by 150 percent, discounts increase new memberships by over 60 percent, and sports sponsorships decrease new memberships. Membership is less responsive in counties with higher income inequality, but is more responsive in politically conservative counties. The findings provide new insights into ways extremist groups attract potential recruits.

La Jolla, CA: UC Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation, WORKING PAPER NO. 10, 2024. 42p.

By The National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine

For nearly eight decades, the world has been navigating the dangers of the nuclear age. Despite Cold War tensions and the rise of global terrorism, nuclear weapons have not been used in conflict since Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945. Efforts such as strategic deterrence, arms control and non-proliferation agreements, and the U.S.-led global counterterrorism have helped to keep nuclear incidents at bay. However, the nation's success to date in countering nuclear terrorism does not come with a guarantee, success often carries the risk that other challenges will siphon away attention and resources and can lead to the perception that the threat no longer exists.

This report found that U.S. efforts to counter nuclear or radiological terrorism are not keeping pace with the evolving threat landscape. The U.S. government should maintain a strategic focus and effort on combatting terrorism across the national security community in coordination with international partners, State, Local, Tribal and Territorial authorities, the National Laboratories, universities and colleges, and civil society. Developing and sustaining adequate nuclear incident response and recovery capabilities at the local and state levels will likely require significant new investments in resources and empowerment of local response from Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), working with the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Environmental Protection Agency, Department of Energy, and National Institutes of Health

Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. 2024. 158p.

Metropolitan Police Department, Washington D.C.

On the morning of Monday, September 16, 2013, Aaron Alexis entered Building 197 at the Washington Navy Yard, where he served as an independent contractor, and carried out the most deadly workplace mass shooting in the Nation’s Capital in recent memory.

Over the course of 69 minutes, Alexis terrorized thousands of employees of Naval Sea Systems Command, firing indiscriminately from a shotgun he had legally purchased two days earlier and a handgun he had taken from a security guard after mortally wounding the guard. He would also get into multiple shooting engagements with responding law enforcement officers, seriously injuring a Metropolitan Police Department (MPD) officer. In his final confrontation with police, Alexis ambushed and fired upon another MPD officer. Fortunately, the officer was saved by his protective vest and was able to return fire, killing Alexis and ending his rampage. When it was over, Alexis had shot and killed twelve people and injured several others.

*****

In the aftermath of the incident, the members of MPD first and foremost want to remember and honor the twelve people who lost their lives. Twelve people went to work that Monday, but did not return home to their loved ones. It is truly a senseless tragedy beyond comprehension, and there are no words adequate enough to express our condolences. Our thoughts remain with the victims’ families and friends.

Metropolitan Police Department, Washington D.C. 2014.. 84p.

Mark S. Hamm and Ramon Spaaij

This research offers the largest and most comprehensive database ever created on lone wolf terrorism, along with a theory-informed case study component based on direct contact with imprisoned lone wolf terrorists, and a comparative analysis distinguishing lone wolves from those who undergo radicalization in a group setting. Strictly in terms of lethality, the data indicate that lone wolf terrorism in America is not on the rise. Although lone wolf terrorism may not be increasing, it is undergoing two important changes in modus operandi. First, uniformed police and military personnel have become the primary target of lone wolf terrorists. Second, consistent with the relaxation of U.S. gun laws since the 1990s and the recent trend in mass shootings, the lone wolf’s preferred weaponry is now a staggering range of high-velocity firearms. While there is no standard profile of the lone wolf terrorist, most of them are unemployed, single white males with a criminal record. Compared to members of terrorist groups, lone wolves are older, less educated and more prone to mental illness.

The study validates a series of commonalities associated with pathways to radicalization for lone wolf terrorists. The radicalization model indicates that lone wolf terrorism begins with a combination of personal and political grievances which form the basis for an affinity with online sympathizers. This is followed by the identification of an enabler, followed by the broadcasting of terrorist intent. The final commonality is a triggering event, or the catalyst for terrorism. The ability of law enforcement and intelligence communities to detect and prevent lone wolf terrorism demands a clear understanding of these radicalization processes. Such insight may provide investigators with a sort of detection system, or “signatures”—as minimal as they may appear—that an individual with a terrorist intent will demonstrate in preparing for an attack. Crucial to this understanding is the broadcasting of intent. While lone wolves physically isolate from society, at the same time they seek recognition for their causes through spoken statements and threats, manifestos, e-mail messages, texting and videotaped proclamations. Focusing on this kind of immediate objective of radicalization among lone wolves, rather than on their underlying grievances, may sharpen our focus on the dangers posed by lone wolf terrorism.

U.S. Department of Justice.. February 2015. 28p.

By Committee On Homeland Security House Of Representatives

The hearing focuses on improving information sharing across intelligence and law enforcement agencies following the Fort Hood attack.

• Major Nidal Hasan, the suspect, communicated with terrorist Anwar al-Awlaki, raising red flags that were missed by authorities.

• The FBI and the Department of Defense had pieces of information that, if combined, might have prevented the attack.

• The Webster Commission investigated the FBI’s handling of the case and found shortcomings in policy guidance and technology.

• Recommendations included enhancing data management, training, and policies for counterterrorism leads.

• The Commission emphasized the need for better information sharing and technology to prevent future attacks.

• The ISE works to improve information sharing while protecting privacy and civil liberties.

• The hearing highlighted the importance of addressing information-sharing gaps to enhance national security.

One Hundred Twelfth Congress Second Session, September 14, 2012. 54p.

By The Committee on Assessing and Improving Strategies for Preventing, Countering, and Responding to Weapons of Mass Destruction Terrorism: Chemical Threats; Board on Chemical Sciences and Technology; Division on Earth and Life Studies; National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine

Domestic and foreign violent extremist organizations, or terrorist groups, have caused a greater amount of harm with chemical agents than with biological or radiological weapons. The United States capacity and capability to identify, prevent, counter, and respond adequately to chemical threats is established by the strategies, policies, and laws enacted across multiple levels of government. While the number of chemical terrorism incidents has risen and fallen over time, there is no empirical or analytical indication that the threat is disappearing. This report comes at a time when the nation's highest-level strategies have shifted from focusing primarily on violent extremist organizations to focusing more on Great Power Competition. This shift in relative perceived threat and consequent prioritization will impact efforts against chemical terrorism, and in turn, affect funding priorities. Revised risk assessments are needed to reprioritize risks guided by new strategies, so that strategy-aligned budgets can be created. The report recommends weapons of mass destruction budgets be aligned with evolving priorities and incentivize activities that transition promising research to operations.

National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2024, 209 pages

By Gabriele Bernardini, Elena Cantatore, Fabio Fatiguso, and Enrico Quagliarini

This open access book outlines the latest results in analysing, assessing, and managing terrorist risk in the urban outdoor built environment. In detail, contents refer to the outdoor Open Areas (such as streets, squares, urban parks and other public spaces in our cities) exposed to such violent events considering the physical elements and properties of the built environment and users. PThe built environment features, including layout, use and management, are combined with terrorist threats issues and user behaviours in emergency conditions, to determine a set of complementary tools for the reduction of risk and increase of urban resilience. The contents hence provide different levels of tool analysis, for risk scenario definition, risk assessment, mitigation strategies design and effectiveness evaluation, considering traditional approaches about the issue along with simulation-based approaches relying on understanding and representing user behaviors. This “behavioural design” approach offers the opportunity to manage the level of risk for specific real urban cases overcoming the normative limitations in Europe that are only referred to a few countries and sometimes deal with the prevention of violent acts by intelligence activities as the exclusive way to face this issue. In addition, the focus on the characters of cultural and historic places and their resilience is increasing by means of introduction of mitigation and compatible solutions providing a complementary chapter for the design of resilient cities in all of their peculiarities (peripheries, consolidated, and historical). In this sense, it is one of the first organized attempts to analyse the main limitations of current solutions in these outdoor Open Areas and, at the same time, to clearly introduce the importance of human behaviours and the various choices in emergency evacuation conditions, thanks to the proposed behavioural-based simulation approach. The attention is focused on a critical aspect for historic spaces, where morphological conditions are fixed values. Thus, this book represents a sort of guidelines about these user-related issues during such violent events and is useful to both professionals and researchers in the areas of security and urban administration.

Singapore: Springer Nature, 2025. 135p.

By Piotr Bąkowski  

In 2021, the European Commission presented a package of legislative proposals in the area of anti-money-laundering efforts and countering the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT). One of them, a proposal on the prevention of the use of the financial system for money laundering or terrorist financing, became Regulation (EU) 2024/1624, adopted on 31 May 2024. Its detailed, directly applicable provisions will replace the minimum rules of the existing EU AML directives. Most provisions will apply from 10 July 2029. The package was adopted in response to repeated calls by the European Parliament and the Council of the EU to enhance the EU's AML/CFT regulatory framework. The aim is for the framework to become more coherent, keeping in step with technological innovations and related new forms of crime, as well as remaining in line with international standards in the area. In Parliament, the Committees on Economic and Monetary Affairs and on Civil Liberties, Justice, and Home Affairs were jointly responsible for the file. Second edition. The 'EU Legislation in Progress' briefings are updated at key stages throughout the legislative procedure.

Brussels: EPRS | European Parliamentary Research Service, 2024, 10p.  

By JASON BLAZAKIS & MEGAN RENNEBAUM

This paper seeks to examine the array of terrorist designations undertaken by “Five-Eye” (FVEY) countries (i.e. Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States) against violent far-right terrorists, often also referred as racially and ethnically motivated violent extremist (REMVE) actors. While not a focus of the papers, non-FVEY countries, most notably Germany, have also implemented measures to restrict the activities of violent far-right actors. Thus, this paper will evaluate whether non-FVEY measures can help inform broader policy determinations related to violent far-right terrorism designations. What lessons learned, if any, can the FVEY countries draw from other national experiences? Furthermore, are there multilateral regimes, such as the United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1267 counterterrorism sanctions regime (henceforth, 1267 regime), that can inform FVEY policies within the field of terrorist designations?

Issue Brief, New York: Soufan Center, 2022. 22p.

By National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine.

Domestic and foreign violent extremist organizations, or terrorist groups, have caused a greater amount of harm with chemical agents than with biological or radiological weapons. The United States capacity and capability to identify, prevent, counter, and respond adequately to chemical threats is established by the strategies, policies, and laws enacted across multiple levels of government. While the number of chemical terrorism incidents has risen and fallen over time, there is no empirical or analytical indication that the threat is disappearing. This report comes at a time when the nation's highest-level strategies have shifted from focusing primarily on violent extremist organizations to focusing more on Great Power Competition. This shift in relative perceived threat and consequent prioritization will impact efforts against chemical terrorism, and in turn, affect funding priorities. Revised risk assessments are needed to reprioritize risks guided by new strategies, so that strategy-aligned budgets can be created. The report recommends weapons of mass destruction budgets be aligned with evolving priorities and incentivize activities that transition promising research to operations.

Washington, DC: The National Academies Press.2024, 186p. https://doi.org/10.17226/27159.

By Michael A. Jensen, Elizabeth Yates , Sheehan Kane

This project expands the Profiles of Individual Radicalization in the United States (PIRUS) database with information on the nexus of criminal extremism and U.S. military service. The expanded database includes 461 individuals with U.S. military backgrounds who committed criminal acts in the United States from 1990 through 2021 that were motivated by their political, economic, social, or religious goals. Findings from these data are detailed in three results sections of a report that can be accessed here.

The first section explores the scope and nature of criminal extremism in the ranks, detailing the rates of military service among criminal extremists and analyzing their military branch, ideological, and extremist group affiliations. This section also provides a closer look at the individuals with military backgrounds who have been charged with criminal offenses related to the Capitol breach of January 6, 2021.

Section two provides a closer look at risk factors for radicalization, comparing subjects with military backgrounds to those without records of military service. This section explores the rates of substance use disorders, anti-social relationships, and social mobility challenges among past U.S. service members who committed extremist crimes and situates these radicalization risk factors within the larger extremist context in the United States.

The final section of results examines the risk factors and vulnerabilities for radicalization that are unique to subgroups of criminal extremists with U.S. military backgrounds. Using hierarchical clustering methods, the results in this section show how the radicalization pathways of extremists with military backgrounds are likely to differ depending on whether individuals are active in the military at the time of their involvement in extremism or if they have military-specific risk factors for radicalization, such as previous deployments to combat zones or diagnoses of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). This report concludes with recommendations for policy and future research, paying particular attention to the potential benefits of applying a public health model to countering the spread of extremism in the U.S. military.

College Park, MD: National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), 2022. 45p.

By Joana Cook, Eva Herschinger, Seran de Leede, and Anna-Maria Andreeva

The literature focusing on gender and radicalisation has steadily increased over the last ten years. This has reflected the rise of extremism across the globe, and has been particularly triggered by researchers seeking to better understand the experiences of individuals throughout all stages of the radicalisation process. However, research on the topic has also largely focused on the experiences of women, especially those associated with Islamist forms of extremism. Such narrow focus has resulted in several gaps in the literature, which in turn has translated into gaps in practice. This report seeks to identify the key trends in research between 2014 and 2024 concerning literature on gender and radicalisation, as well as make explicit the areas that remain underexplored. Focusing on tangible recommendations, which align with the needs of practitioners, the report seeks to bring forward the state of the art of research on gender and radicalisation.

The Hague: The International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT) 2024. 21p.

By Anna-Maria Andreeva, Annika von Berg, Bibi van Ginkel, Elisabeth Hell, Shams Jouve, Alexandra Korn, Bàrbara Molas, Maximilian Ruf, and Sophie Scheuble

Despite the fact that research indicates that it is important to integrate a gender-based approach for effective risk assessment and implementation of counter-terrorism (CT) and preventing and countering violent extremism (P/CVE) practices, such as rehabilitation and reintegration, our assessment of academic and grey literature on gender perspectives in CT and P/CVE practices shows that most of these practices remain gender-blind and tend to reproduce gender norms and stereotypes, while ignoring the complexity of women’s and men’s involvement in extremism. In this report, the authors did a thorough literature review of academic and grey literature published between 2014 and 2024, and conducted ten interviews to reflect on gender perspectives in CT and P/CVE practices. After a reflection on persisting gender construction, biases, and other problematic perspectives, the report focuses on the gender perspectives in analytical frameworks and toolkits used, for instance, for risk assessments. Next, the report elaborates on the gender perspectives in the implementation of the intervention phases, namely from law enforcement interventions, to exit processes. In the general conclusion, the authors argue that gender constructs, roles, and norms, and the way these are taken into consideration in the various P/CVE interventions, heavily impact the effectiveness of these efforts. They also conclude that there is a potential of an aggravating sequence of gender (mis)conceptions, since the gender constructs used in the risk assessments inform following interventions, such as disengagement, deradicalisation, and rehabilitation processes. The report ends with a set of recommendations tailored to different target groups.

The Hague: The International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT), 2024. 25p.

By Rin Ushiyama,

Aum Shinrikyō’s sarin attack on the Tokyo subway in March 1995 left an indelible mark on Japanese society. This book is the first comprehensive study of the competing memories of Aum Shinrikyō’s religious terrorism. Developing a sociological framework for how uneven distributions of power and resources shape commemorative processes, this book explores how the Aum Affair developed as a ‘cultural trauma’ in Japanese collective memory following the Tokyo attack. The book shows how numerous stakeholders, including the state, the mass media, public intellectuals, victims, and perpetrators offered competing narratives about the causes and consequences of Aum’s violence. Combining multiple methods including media content analysis, participant observation, and original interviews with victims and ex-members, this book reveals various flashpoints of contention such as the state regulation of religion, ‘brainwashing’ and ‘mind control’ controversies, and the morality of capital punishment. It shows that although cultural trauma construction requires the use of moral binaries such as ‘good vs.. evil’ and ‘sacred vs.. profane’, the entrenchment of such binary codes in commemorative processes can ultimately hinder social repair and reconciliation.

Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2022. 231p.