UNITED STATES. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE. CHIEF DIGITAL AND ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE OFFICE

From the document: "On December 11th, the Chief Digital and Artificial Intelligence Office (CDAO) launched the Artificial Intelligence Rapid Capabilities Cell (AI RCC), charged with accelerating the adoption and delivery of frontier and advanced AI capabilities for the Department of Defense (DoD). Through targeted initiatives aimed at putting advanced AI in the hands of warfighters, the AI RCC will allow the Department to move at speed to capitalize on emerging technologies, like Generative AI (GenAI), while building the foundational technical enablers to scale these technologies across DoD. The AI RCC will be managed by the CDAO and executed in partnership with the Defense Innovation Unit (DIU). The AI RCC is leveraging the findings from Task Force Lima (TFL) [hyperlink] to accelerate and scale the deployment of cutting-edge AI-enabled tools across 15 use cases for Generative AI covering warfighting and enterprise management."

UNITED STATES. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE.. 2024. 3p.

By Matthew Kriner, Erica Barbarossa, Isabela Bernardo and Michael Broschowitz

Militant accelerationism has recently emerged as one of the dominant terrorist movements in the Western world. Defined as a set of tactics and strategies designed to put pressure on and exacerbate latent social divisions, often through violence, the goal of its proponents is to hasten a societal collapse which they believe is already underway. The continued proliferation of these ideas on various online platforms, as well as their role in inspiring multiple far-right terrorist attacks, make this an increasingly urgent issue for analysts, policy makers, and technology companies alike. This report will serve as an introductory guide that will explain the key elements of militant accelerationism and its primary manifestations. It will begin with an overview and description of the phenomena of militant accelerationism, defining and discussing its main features, influences, and tactics. The following section will outline how practitioners can identify and categorize accelerationist content and activities adherents conduct to further their agenda. Finally, the report will conclude with an overview of observed accelerationist presence on digital platforms. The report additionally offers policy recommendations for technology companies to aid in their efforts at disrupting accelerationists activities on their platforms. These include the need to develop internal policies aimed at improving enforcement towards accommodating the multilingual and multicultural nature of transnational militant accelerationism. This is in addition to conducting network-based disruptions of militant accelerationist communities on their platforms, amongst others. The threat of militant accelerationism remains a top security concern, necessitating a comprehensive understanding of its core characteristics to address its associated threats. Key findings of the report include: • Militant accelerationism is predominantly neofascist and transnational, with three distinct yet overlapping activity types which include Active Resistance, Passive Resistance and “The Movement.” • Adherents of militant accelerationism intentionally join, infiltrate, or otherwise influence pre-radicalised extremist spaces so as to intensify the mobilisation of such ecosystems towards violence. • Accelerationist actors largely rely on digital forums as part of their efforts in brand creation, recruitment, and radicalisation, and maintain a consistent presence across a variety of online platforms.  • Accelerationist indicators are also present in video game ecosystems online, including on platforms such as Discord, Steam, Xbox Live, Roblox, and Minecraft. • Mainstream media platforms such as Facebook, Instagram, YouTube, and X (formerly Twitter) remain high-value targets for accelerationists.  

London: Global Network on Extremism and Technology (GNET), 2024. 36p.

By Center on Extremism, Terrorism and Counterterrorism, Accelerationism Research Consortium, United States of America

This report is the fourth in a series of short reports that look at the user journeys of individuals in extremist communities. This report focuses on the Active Club Network (ACN), which is a decentralised and transnational neofascist accelerationism sub‑community within the broader accelerationist movement. The accelerationist element is particularly noteworthy. This sub‑community consists of small, individually informed organisations that emphasise White fraternal brotherhood, Evolian traditionalism, and preparation for war against a perceived White genocide. The focus on the ACN is due to its presence across several social media platforms, maintaining accounts on both mainstream and alternative platforms. The focus is also partly because the user journey of its members and adherents is mostly characterised by a more robust multi‑platform experience. The study used focused groups which mainly comprised individuals who have accessed, observed and occasionally participated in the private communication channels of these accelerationist movements. The names of all communities mentioned during the focus group, including those that participants accessed, have been removed. The report highlights platform use, violence, attacks and gender dynamics. Key findings on accelerationism are: • For some of these groups such as ACN – the focus of this report – user journey is mostly characterised by a robust multi‑platform experience, in which affiliated accounts across various accounts link with each other in order to give their content maximum visibility. • Online platforms used by ACN include Instagram, Facebook, X (formerly Twitter) and YouTube. Telegram remains a central hub where Active Club members and its adherents can gather, share propaganda and coordinate among themselves. • Active Clubs intentionally eschew overtly violent tactics and activities mainly to avoid drawing the attention of law enforcement. • Within these Clubs, women are rarely spoken of, while men are expected to adhere to traditional roles as leaders and physical protectors of their families.

London: Global Network on Extremism and Technology (GNET), 2024, 20p.

By The Australian Federal Police, Australian Security Intelligence Organisation

A jointly authored analysis of youth radicalisation by the Five Eyes security and law enforcement agencies – the first time they have collaborated on a public paper. The analysis identifies common issues and trends contributing to youth radicalisation and includes case studies from all of the Five Eyes countries: Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States. The paper calls for a whole-of-society response across the nations to help identify and deal with the radicalisation of minors – especially online.

The case studies highlight the challenges of minors in counter-terrorism. Minors can pose the same credible terrorist threat as adults, with some minors attracted to violent extremist content and ideologies – especially online. Law enforcement and security agencies intervene when there is a potential threat to public safety, but these disruptions are not the only response to this issue. Several of the case studies demonstrate that diversion and countering violent extremism programs can make a difference.

There is a role to play for law enforcement, security and government agencies, the education sector, mental health and social well-being services, communities and technology companies. The analysis informs the Australian Government’s upcoming counter-terrorism and violent extremism strategy.

Key issues

Minors are ‘digital natives’ – they have grown up online and are technologically savvy. Minors often use multiple platforms and applications for different purposes.

The online environment allows minors to interact with adults and other minors, allowing them to view and distribute violent extremist content which further radicalises themselves and others. Online environments, particularly encrypted ones, provide a large degree of anonymity.

Engaging with minors is more complex than engaging with adults. The unique characteristics of adolescent development require agencies to factor in additional considerations when dealing with minors. Determining intent can be harder for minors than adults, especially for minors who spend a lot of time online.

A renewed whole-of-society approach is required to address the issue of minors radicalising to violent extremism. This is not something governments or communities can address in isolation. Mental health, community initiatives, social services, and education interventions can help to counter radicalisation before security and policing responses are required.

The ways in which vulnerability factors (not limited to mental health or neurodiversity characteristics) impact minors’ radicalisation to violent extremism is challenging.

Five Eyes Insights, 2024. 8p

By The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime

Guidelines for the Dismantling of Clandestine Laboratories (ST/NAR/56) is one in a series of similar UNODC publications dealing with clandestine manufacture of substances under international control, and the safe handling and disposal of chemicals used in the illicit manufacture of drugs. These manuals form part of a programme pursued by UNODC since the early 1980s to enhance the operational capacity of law enforcement personnel and drug testing laboratories, to improve the quality of their performance, and to promote standardization of working practices. This is to ensure that both scientific and non-scientific personnel have comprehensive information on risks of exposure and appropriate controls, precautions for evidence searching and handling as well as emergency medical and overdose responses. The target audience for this manual are law enforcement personnel that may encounter clandestine laboratories in their duties, crime scene and forensic experts that may have to collect evidence, process and dismantle these facilities, and also, the judiciary and policymakers and other stakeholders who may benefit from a greater understanding of the risks involved in dismantling clandestine laboratories. Furthermore, the manual underlines the importance of the development of national capacity, inter-agency cooperation and national legal frameworks in order to effectively respond to challenges encountered in laboratories where substances under international control are clandestinely manufactured.

Vienna: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2024. 81p.

By Sora Park, Tanya Notley, T. J. Thomson, Aimee Hourigan, Michael Dezuanni

The rapid uptake of social media, which Australians now use more than any other type of media, presents many opportunities for accessing information, but also presents the highly significant challenge of misinformation. The sheer volume of information online can be overwhelming and very difficult to navigate. As a result, bad actors seek to undermine democratic processes and target individuals. This has been widely recognised as a global problem. However, Australians lack the confidence and ability to verify misinformation.

This report is based on analysis of four linked datasets and finds that the vast majority of adult Australians want to be able to identify misinformation and are trying to do so. It also finds that many adult Australians overestimate their ability to verify information online.

The research findings illustrate the need for media literacy initiatives. These might include videos that show people how to fact check online or how to identify high-quality news sources, quizzes or games that help people develop their digital media knowledge and skills, explainers that show how platform business models operate and how this relates to the spread of misinformation, or in-person media production training that can help people think critically, and accurately represent people, places and ideas.

Penrith, AUS: News and Media Research Centre, Western Sydney University, 2024, 82p.

By Dr Ben Collier, Dr Morgan Currie, & Dr Benedetta Catanzariti

We are a team of researchers at the University of Edinburgh’s department of Science, Technology, and Innovation Studies, with a broad range of expertise and experience relating to digital technologies. The Scottish Parliament has commissioned us to conduct this research study evaluating the potential threats, risks, and mitigations to parliamentary business associated with novel generative AI technologies. We have been asked to consider particularly the threat of deepfaked video to the integrity of the Parliament video livestream and archived recordings of parliamentary business - a phenomenon which one of our participants dubbed ‘chamberfakes’. Scottish Parliament makes its live streamed and archived video of chamber and committee business widely accessible to major broadcasters and to the public directly through its website and on major social media platforms. Parliamentary video is produced as a neutral record of parliamentary business, and its accessibility serves a core democratic function of making the Scottish Parliament visible to the public. At the same time, this broad accessibility could lead to security vulnerabilities, including deepfake attacks. The report identifies three main deepfake-related risks: 1. Hacking the video livestream, either through a cybersecurity breach or by compromising a live participant dialing in through Zoom 2. Disseminating deepfakes on social media platforms 3. Creating deepfakes using parliamentary video material as a training resource for online harassment and abuse of MSPs While deepfake technologies are part of concerning broader trends in the proliferation of misinformation, abuse, and organised political interference, they do not generally represent a step change in capabilities for most hostile actors in the context of Parliamentary video. Instead, they generally offer small-to-medium scale reductions in barriers to entry for some existing forms of harm. Scottish Parliament has no formal processes in place to respond to these deepfake threats. However, Parliament’s strong institutional resilience - particularly the deep knowledge and experience of its staff - can play a current role in preventing or mitigating threats. The broadcasting team has multiple people who monitor both the live transmitted video and online video stream, ensuring the video transmission chain proceeds correctly. Parliament’s strategic risk register is already set up to respond to cybersecurity and personal online security threats to MSPs. The Official Report of Parliament, the transcript of all the Parliament's public proceedings, offers a record to check video suspected of tampering. Beyond current practices of risk management there are several technical, educational and legal solutions that could be adopted as future mitigations to deepfake risks. Considering deepfakes in relation to a broader constellation of risks and finding an optimistic picture of the resilience of Parliament to these threats, this report focuses its recommendations on several key institutional solutions that Scottish Parliament could adopt. Recommendations: 1. Develop formal intervention plan and reporting procedures for a deepfake or misinformation attack, involving the assignment of responsibility for this process to a specific individual via the risk register and establishing reporting procedures to UK Parliament and ministers and to MSPs 2. Institute further material and human-in-the-loop checks, including having cameras dump a live feed to file locally straight from the recording apparatus itself, authentication checks for participants dialling in to give evidence, and retaining an in-house staff to monitor the feed in comparison with live proceedings 3. Establish a communications team (or hire a small number of dedicated communications staff) within the broadcasting unit to support to MSPs who encounter or are victims of misinformation, track how parliamentary content is being circulated and used, and promote the use of parliamentary video through communications campaigns and direct engagement with broadcasters and platforms

Edinburgh: The Scottish Centre for Crime and Justice Research (SCCJR), 2024. 29p.

By Primitivo III Cabanes Ragandang

This report examines online youth‐led initiatives involved in challenging violent extremism (CVE).

It focuses on the 2013–2023 online presence of 13 youth organisations, namely: KRIS (Philippines), Youth for Peace Movement Davao de Oro (Philippines), United Voice for Peace Network Inc. (Philippines), Global Peace Youth (Philippines), Students Against Violence Everywhere, Paiman Alumni Trust, Sri Lanka Unites, Youth for Peace (Cambodia), Sambisig, Team Pakigsandurot, MasterPeace, Youth for Peace Philippines Cordillera Youth Brigade and College of Youth Activism and Development.

Based on data scraped from more than 130 social media posts, the report highlights the dynamics of youth‐led CVE efforts online, and discusses strategic planning, content creation and organisational challenges.

The study identifies the dual approach of young people in CVE work across both online and offline spaces. The predominant use of digital platforms to document offline activities suggests that for many, the online platform is secondary, pointing to the challenges of internet access in certain regions of Asia.

Limited internet access in marginalised communities emerges as a significant barrier, underlining the need for more inclusive online participation. Organisational hurdles include communication issues, resource constraints, team dynamics and visibility challenges, particularly where messaging is too localised.

This report recommends that CVE youth organisations be given more training in online content creation and social media literacy. It suggests prioritising and supporting offline activities to improve sustainability, and proposes collaborative online spaces to boost engagement. The report also recommends that tech companies broaden their existing community systems to amplify and lend credibility to CVE‐related content on social media platforms.

The report shows that online youth‐led CVE initiatives in Asia are not explicitly labelled as CVE. They have a variety of names but allare geared towards challenging ideas and acts that are violent and extreme in nature.

In some initiatives, young people directly condemn violent forms and acts of extremism. Other initiatives advocate social change in a preventive sense, with young people addressing factors that contribute to violence and extremist ideas.

Another type of initiative involves Asian youths promoting positive values and behaviours as a means of CVE, advocating positive messaging, active participation and good citizenship. This approach encourages positive behaviour as a counter to extremist ideologies.

The report concludes with a recommendation that tech companies should support existing youth CVE initiatives, rather than creating new ones. This support might include establishing a support network for these initiatives and organising conferences to gather and connect young CVE advocates across the region. Strengthening communication channels with youth groups and fostering collaborative online spaces would improve coordination and content dissemination.

Modifying search engine functions would make it easier to identify relevant groups. Using community systems to endorse CVE‐related content would boost credibility, while supporting regulatory duties with AI (artificial intelligence) capabilities would make content moderation easier. Strengthening proactive measures to safeguard online spaces and reduce harmful influences requires addressing emerging threats such as domestic terrorism and extremist ideologies.

London: The Global Network on Extremism and Technology (GNET) , 2024. 44p.

By Helen Young and Geoff M. Boucher

Digital publishing, sale and distribution of books have contributed significantly to the dissemination and mainstreaming of far‐right extremist (FRE) material in the 21st century. Historical and contemporary books that espouse politically and ideologically motivated violence circulate widely and easily online, in both FRE and mainstream spaces. Such books include, but are not limited to: the speeches of Adolf Hitler, William L. Pierce’s The Turner Diaries, Theodore Kaczynski’s Industrial Society and its Future (The Unabomber Manifesto), James Mason’s Siege, and anthologies produced by the Iron March forum and Terrorgram Collective.

Commercial book publication, sales, distribution and sharing platforms play a significant role in enabling the circulation of FRE material, as this report details through analysis of Amazon, Google Play, Rakuten Kobo, Goodreads, and Scribd and its e‐book‐platform, Everand. An autoethnographic ‘snowball’ methodology was used, exploiting the features of commercial book platforms, such as search functions and algorithmically driven recommendations. FRE books were quickly and easily located on all platforms analysed.

There are two principal ways that major e‐book sites enable the circulation of FRE material:

Distribution: of self‐publications by FRE authors (through Amazon Kindle, for example), access for ideologically motivated small presses to large marketplaces, and users’ sharing of FRE material including manifestos (on Scribd, for example)

Recommendation algorithms on all platforms directing users from one FRE title to another, or from Far‐Right material that does not meet the threshold of extremism to that which does.

Recommendation algorithms are particularly problematic because they have the capacity to direct users who have not yet encountered extremist material towards FRE books and to actively reinforce extremist perspectives.

Technology companies have already taken steps to remove some of the most notorious FRE books from sale, distribution and discussion. In the case of extremist novels, such as The Turner Diaries, searches typically meet a dead end and return purchasing recommendations of books on anti‐racism and de‐radicalisation rather than hate fiction.

This report recommends that the companies surveyed extend this practice to other FRE materials documented below, using available techniques to understand and interrupt the formation of a network of recommendations which leads individuals towards publications advocating political violence. The report also recommends the use of available techniques (such as machine learning) to scrutinise the nature of self‐published materials, with the aim of preventing reproductions of materials that are refused classification from being published spuriously under misleading titles or pseudonyms.

The report is agnostic on whether such companies should stock the speeches of Adolf Hitler, for instance, focusing instead on potential problems in the way the affordances of search technologies provide ready‐made FRE libraries.

London: Global Network on Extremism and Technology, 2023. 36p.

By Patrick Meehan and Jonathan Goodhand

This research paper advances a conceptual framework for analysing the nexus between paramilitaries, illicit economies and organised crime in borderland and frontier regions. We challenge two dominant policy narratives around paramilitaries: first, the idea that these organisations are symptomatic of state breakdown and flourish in marginal spaces suffering from ‘governance deficits’. Second, the idea that paramilitaries can primarily be understood as apolitical, predatory and self-enriching actors, driven by economic motives, and operating outside formal political systems. In critiquing these narratives, we develop an alternative approach that studies how paramilitaries become embedded in enduring systems of rule in borderlands shaped by protracted conflict and illicit economies. At the centre of our approach is the concept of ‘coercive brokerage’ which provides a lens for exploring how paramilitaries play a crucial role in shaping power relations by mediating between different scales, jurisdictions and policy domains. Brokerage can be defined as the capacity to mediate the transmission of power across divides – or synapses – between different networks or power structures, and facilitates connections outside formal institutions. In conflict-affected frontier spaces, the use of violence – actual or threatened – enables brokers to fulfil their connective function and creates a privileged space for distinct forms of ‘coercive brokerage’. Coercive brokers have an ambiguous relationship with the state; they derive power from mediating the state’s influence, rather than acting as state proxies. By fulfilling these roles as intermediaries, coercive brokers become embedded in political and market systems in frontier regions and beyond. As we argue below, over time, coercive brokers become important political actors who deal with collective action problems by cementing alliances and political coalitions that connect political centres with frontier regions, and who pursue political interests and agendas. Not all paramilitaries become coercive brokers who end up assuming significant political roles. We aim to explore why some paramilitary figures and groups become powerful coercive brokers and others do not. We also examine why coercive brokerage seems to be a particular feature of frontier and borderland contexts. And finally, we aim to better understand variation in the dynamics of coercive brokerage – at the national and subnational levels. This paper is the first of a three-part series exploring the nexus between paramilitaries, illicit economies and organised crime. This first paper conceptualises coercive brokerage and outlines how this concept advances the growing body of recent literature on militias and paramilitaries. The second paper then works with the concept of coercive brokerage to present comparative analysis of the paramilitary-organised crime nexus in three contexts: Afghanistan, Colombia and Myanmar. These case studies draw upon data and analysis generated by a four-year Global Challenges Research Fund (GCRF) project, Drugs & (Dis)order (https://drugs-and-disorder.org/). The third paper outlines a set of policy implications based on the key findings from across the case studies.

SOC ACE Research Paper No 26. University of Birmingham. 2023. 35p.

By Marcela Neves Bezerra and Mitja Kovac

Modern Brazil is plagued by social and economic inequalities, endemic violence, crime, and weak rule of law. Once these narratives become dependent on each other, all aspects must be worked on to change the scenario experienced in the country, of insecurity, fear and lack of opportunities. This paper argues that unprecedented increase in social injustice in Brazil is not the result of short-term measures, but the materialization of a history marked by economic and social inequalities that extend from the colonial period to the present moment and faulty criminal policies that intensified in the mid-1990's. Moreover, current massive incarceration, overcrowding of prisons combined with the lack of human living conditions is turning Brazil into a gigantic, perpetual school of crime. Investment in education that has a direct effect on the decrease of crime rate, must be aligned with the structuring of a new, less repressive and more inclusive punitive policy, to induce criminals not to recur to crime. Paper suggests that essential development in Brazil is possible only if the efficient legal institutions, rule of law, and criminal sanctioning based on principles of social justice are available to all citizens.

School of Economics and Business University of Ljubljana, 2020,

By Anina Schwarzenbach and Michael Jensen

Prior research suggests that members of terrorist groups prioritize forming network ties based on trust to improve their organizational and operational security. The homophily principle, which postulates that individuals tend to form relationships based on shared characteristics, can be a key mechanism through which people identify trustworthy associates. Next to homophily, the mechanism of establishing interconnected relationships through transitivity is also well-known to serve this purpose and shape community structures in social networks. We analyze the community structures of the Islamist co-offending network in the United States, which is highly violent, to assess whether homophily and transitivity determine which extremists form co-offending ties. We rely on a new database on the individual attributes and the co-offending relationships of 494 Islamist offenders radicalized in the United States between 1993 and 2020. Using community detection algorithms, we show that the US Islamist co-offending network is highly clustered, modular, and includes many small but only a few large communities. Furthermore, results from exponential random graph modeling show that transitive relationships as well as spatial proximity, ideological affiliation, and shared socio-cultural characteristics drive co-offending among US Islamist extremists. Overall, these findings demonstrate that the processes of homophily and transitivity shape violent social networks.

PLoS ONE 19(6): 2024, 31p.

By The International Centre for the Study of Radicalization (ISCR), King’s College London, United Kingdom

This report is the sixth in a series of short reports that look at the user journeys of individuals in extremist communities. This report focuses on the extremist chan culture, which refers to a collection of online platforms. The existence of chans is in stark opposition to mainstream social media, where users are usually encouraged to share their personal content and use their real identities. Strong group identity within chans is mostly established by the use of in‑jokes and subcultural slang, despite the anonymous online setting. The decision to focus on extremist chan culture in this report is informed by the continued threat posed to broader society by chan sites, which foster a climate in which extremism is the norm and in which violence is often openly encouraged. These chan sites continue to represent a particular kind of extreme online hate which requires moderation in order to curtail the rise and spread of extreme far‑right communities. On the report’s methodology, the study used focus groups, involving individuals who have accessed, observed and occasionally participated in the private communication channels of these extremist communities. The names of all communities mentioned during the focus groups, including those that participants accessed, have been removed. Key findings on extremist chan culture are: • While there are non‑English language chan sites which attract large audiences in many countries, the most popular is 4chan, with more than 22,000,000 users. Since its inception, 4chan has been a haven for violence. • Newcomers are generally only able to find new chan sites through word of mouth, with more informed users periodically posting lists of links to more obscure chans on popular forums like 4chan. • The existence of smaller chan sites further implies their links to other such sites based on shared ideology and in some instances a sense of camaraderie. • Misogyny and queerphobia remain rife on extremist chan sites, with different chan sites varying slightly in their attitudes towards women.

London: Global Network on Extremism and Technology (GNET), 2024. 20p.

By Joshua J. Reynolds, Victoria Estrada-Reynolds , Scott Freng, Sean M. McCrea,

Police officers must rely on the available information when investigating crimes. One cue police sometimes rely on is suspect movement (e.g., furtive movements and headlong flight). The courts have explicitly allowed officers to use this information to support warrantless searches. Yet, there is scant empirical evidence examining whether suspect movement is associated with guilt. Using 141 participants in an experimental design, we examined whether individuals who were made guilty (experimentally) would be more likely to avoid a police representation in a social distance paradigm. We also examined a second legal perspective, that racial minorities or individuals who have low police legitimacy would be more likely to avoid the police. Using Bayesian statistics and information criteria we found that neither guilt nor race was associated with avoidance, but feeling guilty was positively associated with avoidance

Applied Psychology in Criminal Justice, 2021, 16p.

By Seema Choksy Pessar, Rosanna Smart, Tim Naimi, Marlene Lira, Jason Blanchette, Anne Boustead, and Rosalie Liccardo Pacula

Aims: To measure the association between state cannabis policies and use among adults and youth in the United States from 2002 to 2019, given rapid policy liberalization and complex state cannabis policy environments.

Design: Repeated cross-sectional time series analysis. Three sets of models assessed the linear association between the Cannabis Policy Scale (CPS), an aggregate measure of 17 state cannabis policy areas that weights each policy by its efficacy and implementation rating, and prevalence of cannabis use. The first included year and state fixed effects; the second added state-level controls; the third replaced state fixed effects with state random effects. Standard errors were clustered at the state level in all models.

Setting and participants - United States.

Measurements: Past-month prevalence of cannabis use is from the National Survey on Drug Use and Health Small Area Estimates, a nationally and state-representative cross-sectional survey of household population ages 12 and older for years 2002–2003 to 2018–2019. Exposure data include the CPS.

Findings: A 10 percentage-point increase in the CPS (i.e. greater cannabis policy restrictiveness) was associated with lower past-month use prevalence by 0.81 (95% confidence interval [CI] = -1.05 to −0.56) to 0.97 (95% CI = -1.19 to −0.75) percentage-points for the population ages 12 years and older. When models were stratified by age, a 10 percentage-point increase in the CPS was associated with a 0.87 (95% CI = -1.13 to −0.61) to 1.04 percentage-point (95% CI = -1.03 to −0.84) reduction in past-month use prevalence for adults ages 18 years and older, and a 0.17 (95% CI = -0.24 to −0.09) to 0.21 percentage-point (95% CI = -0.35 to −0.07) reduction for youth ages 12–17 years.

Conclusions: More restrictive US cannabis policies appear to be associated with reduced cannabis use for both adults and youth.

Addiction; Early View, 2024, 7p.

By JEN HOLLIS AND STUART MATHEWS

To most Australians, fire danger forecasting is embedded within our cultural identity and history. It’s as Australian as kangaroos, the Holden Ute and the Sydney Opera House.

For the last six decades Australians have relied heavily on the pioneering work of Alan McArthur who developed the Forest Fire Danger Index and Grassland Fire Danger Index. The system has served Australians well and with only minor adaptations to meet local needs, it remains largely unchanged. The most significant adjustment came after the 2009 Black Saturday fires in the state of Victoria which, in one afternoon, burned through more than 450,000 hectares and resulted in the devastating loss of 173 lives.

Following a Royal Commission investigation into the fires, it was recognised that McArthur’s system was being applied well beyond the original design. As a result, categories were added, including one at the top end of the fire danger scale reflecting conditions beyond the existing maximum of 100. Importantly, it was also recognised that there was a need to incorporate new science and technological developments (for example, remote sensing, landscape mapping, higher computational capability) into calculating and interpreting fire danger.

International Association of Wildfire. 2022.

By N. Bénichou, M. Adelzadeh, J. Singh, I. Gomaa, N. Elsagan, M. Kinateder, C. Ma, A. Gaur, A. Bwalya, and M. Sultan

Fires in the wildland-urban interface (WUI) have become a global issue, with disasters taking place all over the world recently. The drivers of increasing WUI fire risk—increasing population and expansion of urban areas into wildlands, and climate change—are global-scale phenomena. In the coming decades, WUI fire risk is expected to increase both in regions with a long history of fires and in regions that have had been less affected over past decades. WUI fires can cause the ignition of many structures through the spread of flames and radiant heat and the deposition of burning embers over a short period of time. This can overwhelm protection capabilities, lead to large evacuations, and cause disasters with the potential for the total loss of hundreds of structures in a few hours.

As discussed in Chapter 1 of this Guide, over the last decade, an average of 5 533 wildfires have occurred each year in Canada, involving 2.9 million hectares of wildland area. The number of evacuations caused by wildfires increased by about 1.5 evacuations per year between 1980 and 2014, with more than 20 evacuations per year after 2010. The substantial negative impacts of WUI fires were illustrated by the Okanagan Mountain Park Fire, which affected Kelowna in 2003; the Flat Top Complex Wildfire, which destroyed significant parts of Slave Lake in 2011; and the Horse River Fire, which immensely affected Fort McMurray in 2016 and was the most costly insured loss event in Canadian history. These disasters resulted in a loss of over 2 400 structures and roughly 3 400 dwelling units. Total insured losses from these wildland fire disasters and the 2017 wildland fire catastrophic events in British Columbia are currently estimated to be $4.8 billion. Despite all efforts, wildfires pose a significant challenge to the residential population, to mitigation efforts, and to existing infrastructure when located in a WUI setting. Wildfires are likely to become more severe and frequent as a result of climate change.

National Research Council Canada: Ottawa, ON. 2021. 192 pp.

Heather Kreidler, Rapporteur; Board on Environmental Change and Society; Board on Agriculture and Natural Resources; Division of Behavioral and Social Sciences and Education; Division on Earth and Life Studies; National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine

Over the past two decades, wildfires in western North America have significantly increased in frequency, magnitude, and severity. Scientists have documented three leading causes: a century of suppression and inadequate forest management that has led to overly dense, fuel-rich forests; climate change, which has turned woodlands and grasslands into hot, dry tinderboxes; and the spread of urbanization, which has increased the probability of man-made ignitions. Less well known are the environmental and social implications associated with the acceleration of these trends.

To explore these concerns and to identify possible policy responses, the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine's Board on Environmental Change and Society, in partnership with the Royal Society of Canada, convened a workshop in June 2024, "The Social and Ecological Consequences of Future Wildfire in the West". Over two days, two dozen wildfire experts and a hybrid audience of over 200 participants explored the history, current state, and anticipated future of wildfire science and policy across the western United States and Canada. This publication summarizes the presentations and discussions of the workshop.

National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2024. Social-Ecological Consequences of Future Wildfires and Smoke in the West: Proceedings of a Workshop. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. https://doi.org/10.17226/27972.

Contributor(s): National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine; Division on Earth and Life Studies; Board on Chemical Sciences and Technology; Committee on the Chemistry of Urban Wildfires

Wildfires in America are becoming larger, more frequent, and more destructive, driven by climate change and existing land management practices. Many of these fires occur at the wildland-urban interface (WUI), areas where development and wildland areas overlap and which are increasingly at risk of devastating fires as communities continue to expand into previously undeveloped areas. Unlike conventional wildfires, WUI fires are driven in part by the burning of homes, cars, and other human-made structures and in part by burning vegetation. The interaction of these two types of fires can lead to public health effects that are unique to WUI fires.

This report evaluates existing and needed chemistry information that decision-makers can use to mitigate WUI fires and their potential health impacts. It describes key fuels of concern in WUI fires, especially household components like siding, insulation, and plastic. It examines key pathways for exposure, including inhalation and ingestion, and identifies communities vulnerable to exposure. The report recommends a research agenda to inform response to and prevention of WUI fires, outlining needs in characterizing fuels and predicting emissions and toxicants.

National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2022. The Chemistry of Fires at the Wildland-Urban Interface. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. https://doi.org/10.17226/26460. .2022. 215p.

U.S. Forest Service

Under this strategy, the Forest Service will work with partners to engineer a paradigm shift by focusing fuels and forest health treatments more strategically and at the scale of the problem, using the best available science as the guide. At the Forest Service, we now have the science and tools we need to size and place treatments in a way that will truly make a difference. We will focus on key “firesheds”—large forested landscapes and rangelands with a high likelihood that an ignition could expose homes, communities, and infrastructure to wildfire. Firesheds, typically about 250,000 acres in size, are mapped to match the scale of community exposure to wildfire.

Our new management paradigm builds on the National Cohesive Wildland Fire Management Strategy, Our new management paradigm builds on the National Cohesive Wildland Fire Management Strategy, including efforts to create fire-adapted communities and other collaborative strategies for cross-boundary treatments, including Cohesive Strategy projects and Shared Stewardship agreements. We will build on our long-standing work and relationships with U.S. Department of the Interior agencies. We will work collaboratively with States, Tribes, local communities, private landowners, and other stakeholders to adapt lessons learned into a coordinated and effective program of work.

U.S. Forest Service. 2022. 35p.