By Mary E. Richmond

Mary E. Richmond's "Social Diagnosis," published in 1917, is a seminal work that laid the foundation for the scientific methodology of social casework. Richmond's pioneering approach emphasized the importance of understanding the interaction between individuals and their environments, providing a structured framework for diagnosing and addressing social issues. Despite its groundbreaking contributions, "Social Diagnosis" has faced criticisms over the years. Modern social workers have developed various strategies to address these criticisms, ensuring that the principles of social work continue to evolve and remain relevant.

Richmond's work emerged during a period when social work was transitioning from charitable activities to a more structured profession. Her book provided a scientific basis for social casework, which was essential for the professionalization of social work. Richmond introduced the concept of social diagnosis, involving a detailed analysis of an individual's situation and personality in relation to their social environment. She identified six sources of power available to clients and social workers: within the household, the person of the client, the neighborhood and wider social network, civil agencies, and private and public agencies.

While highly regarded, "Social Diagnosis" has faced several criticisms. Critics argue that Richmond's focus on individual diagnosis and personal responsibility can overshadow broader social and structural factors contributing to social issues. Given the time period in which Richmond wrote, her work has been critiqued for lacking cultural sensitivity and failing to adequately address the diverse cultural backgrounds of clients. Richmond's methodology primarily focuses on casework and individual interventions, which can be limiting as it does not fully address the need for broader community and policy-level interventions. Some aspects of "Social Diagnosis" are considered outdated by contemporary standards, as the field of social work has evolved significantly since Richmond's time. While groundbreaking, some critics have pointed out that Richmond's methods lacked the rigorous empirical validation expected in modern social science research.

Modern Adaptations in Social Work. Modern social workers have developed various strategies. They adopt holistic and ecological approaches, considering the complex interplay between individuals and their environments. This framework recognizes the impact of social, economic, and cultural factors on clients' lives. Social work education and practice now place a strong emphasis on cultural competence. Social workers are trained to understand and respect the diverse cultural backgrounds of their clients, ensuring that interventions are culturally sensitive and appropriate. In addition to individual casework, modern social workers engage in macro-level interventions, including community organizing, policy advocacy, and systemic change efforts aimed at addressing broader social issues and inequalities. To enhance scientific rigor, social workers increasingly rely on evidence-based practice. This approach involves using research and empirical data to inform interventions, ensuring that they are effective and grounded in scientific evidence. Examples of evidence-based practice include Cognitive Behavioral Therapy (CBT) for mental health issues, Motivational Interviewing for substance abuse treatment, and Trauma-Focused Cognitive Behavioral Therapy (TF-CBT) for children and adolescents[1][2][3]. Modern social work often involves interdisciplinary collaboration. Social workers work alongside professionals from other fields, such as healthcare, education, and law, to provide comprehensive support to clients. This collaborative approach helps address the multifaceted nature of social issues. Ongoing professional development is crucial in modern social work. Social workers are encouraged to engage in lifelong learning, staying updated with the latest research, theories, and best practices. This commitment to professional growth helps them address emerging challenges and improve their practice.

Conclusion: Mary E. Richmond's "Social Diagnosis" remains a cornerstone in the field of social work, continuing to influence practice, education, and research. While it has faced criticisms, modern social workers have developed strategies to address these limitations, ensuring that the principles of social work evolve and remain relevant. By incorporating holistic approaches, cultural competence, macro-level interventions, evidence-based practice, interdisciplinary collaboration, and continual professional development, social workers build on Richmond's foundational work while adapting to contemporary social challenges.

By The International Crisis Group

What’s new? A violent siege of Haiti’s capital in early 2024 triggered the creation of a transitional government and the eventual arrival of a Kenyan-led mission to help counter the gang threat. But infighting has paralysed the government, empowered the gangs and made it unlikely that planned elections can come off safely. Why does it matter? Haiti urgently needs a legitimate government able to lead the campaign to curb gang violence and respond to the country’s dire humanitarian emergency. But holding polls prematurely could backfire, allowing gangs to play a deciding role in the vote and entrenching their power. What should be done? Haiti’s transitional authorities should strive to overcome internal wrangling and chart a realistic path to safe elections and constitutional reform. With future U.S. funding in doubt, the UN Security Council must find a way to support either the existing international security force or a peacekeeping mission to weaken the gangs.

Efforts by Haitian politicians and their foreign partners to quell surging gang violence have yet to bear fruit. A transitional government drawn from the country’s main political forces took office in April 2024, promising to hold the first elections in nearly a decade. Soon thereafter, the first contingent of Kenyan police disembarked, part of an international security mission tasked with loosening the gangs’ stranglehold on the capital Port-au-Prince and its vicinity. But the hopes invested by Haitians in the transitional government and the foreign mission remain unfulfilled. Partisan infighting and corruption allegations have prolonged political dysfunction. Violence rages, with gangs perpetrating some of the worst massacres ever as the understaffed, underfunded foreign mission struggles to rein them in. With safe elections looking improbable in the near term, transitional authorities should get past their internal disputes to plot a realistic course to polls and constitutional reform. The UN Security Council, for its part, must decide how best to respond to Haiti’s request for support in fighting the gangs. February 2024 saw a grim milestone in the gangs’ growth but also the beginning of what seemed to be a concerted effort to stabilise Haiti. Instead of fighting one another, gangs banded together to mount a multi-pronged assault. Besieging Port-auPrince, they cemented control of more than 80 per cent of the city, emptied jails, ransacked police stations and forced the airport to close. With Prime Minister Ariel Henry stranded in Kenya, where he had been negotiating deployment of the security support mission, the time was ripe for a bold response. Caribbean countries, the U.S. and other foreign states gathered Haiti’s leading political forces for a summit in Jamaica on 11 March, prodding them to form a transitional government to take Henry’s place. The idea was that with a new cross-party government promising a route to fresh elections, the country’s leaders could arrest plummeting public trust in the state and the collapse of its institutions. In tandem, the foreign mission would arrive to join local police in beating back the gangs. Marrying the goals of rebuilding legitimate government and restoring security, the plan was geared around leadership by a new Transitional Presidential Council, alongside a prime minister whom it would appoint. This arrangement, however, proved to be a seed of fresh strife. Council members clashed repeatedly with the first prime minister, Garry Conille, a long-time UN official. Conille’s dismissal in November and replacement by businessman Alix Didier Fils-Aimé ended the impasse, while also sending a clear message that the council would run the show. But the wrangling did not stop. Council members are also at loggerheads with the political groups they are supposed to represent, known as the “sectors”, which see the councillors’ growing independence as a threat to their interests. Some parties are so affronted by their supposed loss of power that they have demanded a radical overhaul of government. Lastly, corruption charges against three councillors, who have refused to resign or cooperate with the authorities, have corroded the government’s public standing. To make matters worse, plans to push through constitutional reform, to be voted on at referendum in the first half of 2025, as well as hold elections before year’s end, have made scant progress. Members of provisional electoral bodies were appointed only in December, and Haiti lacks an up-to-date voter register. Moreover, polls held in current conditions would be unsafe for candidates and voters alike. Despite isolated achievements by police and the foreign mission in their campaign against the gangs, these groups control much of the capital and essential roads to the rest of the country, while fighting is expanding into other regions. In the past five months, gangs have carried out at least four massacres – carnage that has claimed around 400 lives. Staggering the voting schedule or placing polling stations outside gang-controlled territory could make balloting possible in some areas. But the result would likely be very low turnout, possibly under the 20 per cent witnessed in Haiti’s last polls in 2016. Gangs could also sow fear in places under their sway to ensure that their allies win positions of power. Instead of rushing toward elections, the transitional government should focus on the nuts and bolts of responsible governance. Drawing on the agreement that created the administration, it should establish an assembly where political groups represented in the Transitional Presidential Council can resolve their grievances without threatening to upend the state. The authorities should also act quickly to appoint a National Security Council and to provide the secretary of state for public security with the support required to map a strategy for reducing violence anchored in concrete, achievable steps. The government should also show it is serious about fighting corruption by ensuring that its members are held accountable. Transitional authorities should work alongside foreign partners to explore how security assistance from abroad can be made more sustainable and effective. It is all the more crucial that they do so at a time when funding from the U.S., Haiti’s main donor, has been partially frozen by the Trump administration, putting Washington’s commitment to underwrite future security operations in serious doubt. Donations for the multinational mission have fallen far short of what was expected, and not all the promised 2,500 officers and materiel have arrived. The UN could backstop the mission’s financial and logistical needs along the lines of its support for African Union forces in Somalia, but it is unclear whether this approach would address all the current gaps in its operations. The UN Security Council is also considering the possibility of turning the Kenyanled force into a blue-helmet peacekeeping operation, as the Haitian government has requested, which would help address the mission’s funding shortfall. Should the Council choose this option, the UN, in close coordination with Haitian authorities, should make the campaign to weaken gangs its priority and stand ready to follow up with support for state-building and development. For almost three years following President Jovenel Moïse’s assassination in July 2021, many Haitians cried out for a government that could build on broad public support to quell rising violence. The gang siege of Port-au-Prince appeared to mark a turning point. But Haiti’s transitional government has been drawn toward battles of self-interest rather than the pursuit of safe polls. The country’s new leaders should now rise to the occasion, working with foreign partners to stem the bloodshed that has tipped Haiti close to the breaking point.

Latin America & Caribbean Report N°107, Port-au-Prince/Mexico City/New York/Brussels : International Crisis Group, 2025. 40p.

By Mary E. Richmond

“The Long View” serves both as a historical document and as a critique of the limitations and challenges facing social work in the early 20th century. The title itself suggests her forward-thinking approach, urging practitioners to consider the long-term effects of their interventions rather than focusing solely on immediate relief. In this sense, the book represents a call for a more holistic and preventive approach to social work rather than a reactive or crisis-driven model. A key strength of her work is Richmond’s insistence on the importance of professionalization in social work. She argues for a rigorous, research-informed approach to casework, emphasizing the need for training, standardization, and ethical responsibility. This argument anticipates later debates in the field about the tension between bureaucratic efficiency and personalized, client-centered care. Richmond’s work in this book also highlights her concern with the social and structural determinants of poverty, distinguishing her from social workers who focus primarily on individual moral failings.

Originally published 1930 Russell Sage Fdn. Read-Me.Org Inc. 2025. 411p.

Edited by Kurt J. Engemann, Cathryn F. Lavery and Jeanne M. Sheehan

This volume explores the understanding, analysis and applications of mitigating social and political risks and the devastating consequences of mishandling of incidences. Contributors use evidence based practices, theories and real-life scenarios to explore how social and political risk mitigation is essential for the survival of an organization and how positive restructuring can take place after negative consequences occur.

Berlin/Boston, De Gruyter 2023, 277p.

By Nilay Saiya, Stuti Manchanda

This study examines the relationship between Christian nationalism—a political theology and cultural framework that seeks to amalgamate the Christian faith and a country's political life and privilege Christianity in the public square over other faith traditions—and attacks against religious minorities in the United States. Some Christian nationalists believe that it is justifiable to undertake violent actions in order to realize the goals of Christian nationalism. We theorize that the political empowerment of Christian nationalist ideology in the form of politicians expressing Christian nationalist sentiments corresponds to physical attacks on religious minorities carried out by self-professing Christians. We test this theory using a cross-sectional, time-series analysis of antiminority violence in the United States. The results provide robust support for our theory.

Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion: Volume 64, Issue 1, 2025, 16p.

By The Center for Countering Digital Hate

Amidst the worst period of public disorder and violence targeting minority communities in recent history, social media platforms failed the British public. Worse still, they played a significant role in fomenting the lies, hate, extremist beliefs, and antipathy towards institutions that erupted over a series of warm summer nights into extraordinary spasms of violence across the United Kingdom. False claims about the Southport attacker’s identity – lies identifying him as a Muslim asylum-seeker – spread widely and quickly. Far-right agitators received millions of views on X, formerly Twitter. Towns and cities across the UK saw attacks on mosques and hotels housing asylum seekers, inspired by these online posts. My family was among those affected; my mother, sisters and nieces were among those to experience hate on British streets. While affected communities and authorities struggled to cope with violent attacks on- and offline, social media platforms did little to quell its spread and, worse still, profited from it. We have seen this before. In the immediate aftermath of tragic incidents, bad actors weaponise online spaces to spread disinformation and sow informational chaos. Before the facts are known, extremists capitalise on the opportunity to spread hate, mobilise new followers, and inject conspiracy into the public discourse at the moment of maximum vulnerability. Underpinning this cynical behaviour are powerful financial incentives: hate actors turn the grief that follows a tragic incident into online engagement for financial reward from social media platforms. One platform stood out. The owner of X, Elon Musk, shared false information about the situation to his 195 million followers and made a show of attacking the UK Government’s response to the outbreak of violence.i Rather than ensuring risk and illegal content were mitigated on his platform, Musk recklessly promoted the notion of an impending “civil war” in the UK.ii CCDH found far-right figures, previously banned from Twitter but reinstated under Musk’s leadership, receiving millions of views per day on X. The platform ran ads against posts inciting hate, encouraging the mobs to “permanently remove Islam from Great Britain.” iii Musk has transformed Twitter, once the go-to  source for journalists, politicians, and the public for real time news, into X, a platform with imperceptible moderation and the morality of Telegram. On the 16th of August, CCDH convened stakeholders from government departments, law enforcement, the online safety regulator, British advertisers, and frontline civil society groups to chart a path forward. The insights and policy proposals which emerged from that discussion are detailed in this paper. While recognising that there was undue criticism levied at the regulator for powers it cannot yet use under the Online Safety Act (OSA), there is also a case for action to ensure the OSA is fit for purpose. Future amendments will be needed to tackle its most glaring omissions 

London; Washington, DC: Center for Countering Digital hate, 2024. 19p.

By Stéphane Carcillo, Marie-Anne Valfort, Pedro Vergara Merino

This paper presents the first rigorous evaluation of school-based interventions aimed at reducing LGBTphobia. We focus on a classroom intervention that addresses the issue of LGBT harassment through perspective-taking and narrative exchange. Using a field experiment in France with more than 10,000 middle and high school students, we find robust evidence of strong positive effects, with variations across gender, age, and socio-economic status. We argue that changing perceptions of group norms is a key channel driving these heterogeneous effects.

IZA DP No. 17683, Bonn: IZA – Institute of Labor Economics , 2025. 65p

By The Center for Countering Digital Hate

Meta announced six key policy changes on January 7th . Halting “proactive” enforcement of some policies on harmful content . Demoting less content “that might violate our standards” . Dropping policies on “immigration, gender identity and gender” . Replacing independent fact-checking with Community Notes . Demoting less content about “elections, politics or social issues” . Moving trust and safety teams from California to Texas Meta intends for these policy changes to be “expanded beyond the US” • Meta’s Chief Global Affairs Officer, Joel Kaplan, has said that changes to fact-checking and enforcement will be “expanded beyond the US” in time. • Kaplan also said that changes to Meta’s hate speech policies announced on January 7th “have been implemented worldwide immediately.” 1) Meta will halt “proactive” enforcement of some policies on harmful content • Meta will halt proactive enforcement (including automatic detection) for some policies on harmful content, instead acting only in response to user reports. • Meta’s announcement explicitly states proactive enforcement will continue for terrorism, child sexual exploitation, drugs, fraud and scams. • Meta has not stated if proactive enforcement will continue for these policy areas used in Meta’s transparency reports, which we call “at risk” policy areas: o Bullying & Harassment o Dangerous Orgs: Organized Hate o Hate Speech o Suicide and Self-Injury o Violence And Incitement o Violence & Graphic Content • Meta previously credited its “proactive detection technology” as a key factor in reducing the prevalence of hate speech and harmful content on its platforms. Meta could halt 97% of its enforcement in key policy areas such as hate speech • We analyzed Meta’s transparency reports to examine the potential impact of Meta halting proactive enforcement in policy areas such as hate speech. • Last year, over 97% of Meta’s enforcement actions in “at risk” policy areas were “proactive”, with less than 3% made in response to user reports. • Even accounting for Meta’s claims about mistakes in proactive enforcement, Meta correctly acted on 277 million pieces of content in “at risk” policy areas. Meta must tell users which policies it will no longer proactively enforce, and how it will keep them safe if it stops acting on millions of pieces of harmful content.  

Washington, DC; London: Center for Countering Digital Hate, 2025. 31p.

Edited by Mónika Contreras Saiz and Stefan Rinke  

This interdisciplinary volume analyzes the historical culture of Latin American society embodied in telenovelas and series from the 1960s to the present. Bringing together regional case studies on the representation of 20th-century dictatorships in Argentina, Chile and Brazil, as well as the war against drug trafficking and the armed conflict in Colombia, it highlights the political and social relevance of ficcional television narratives.

Berlin/Boston, De Gruyter, 2024. 405p.

By Jordyn D. Laird & Philip G. Laird

One hundred and twenty-one White participants made judgments about a hypothetical rape and murder scenario with race of perpetrator and victim systematically varied and completed the Defining Issues Test Version 2-Short Form (DIT2-SF) Independent variables were race of the accused and victim, dependent variables consisted of judgment about accused’s and victim’s behaviors, relative blameworthiness, and moral reasoning. White accused were judged more harshly than Black and Indigenous accused. Perpetrators of crimes against White victims were judged more harshly than perpetrators of crimes against Black and Indigenous victims. Participants who used more principled reasoning blamed victims less than those who employed less principled reasoning. Explicit and implicit racism and the role of principled moral reasoning are discussed.

Washington, DC: CAIR, 2025. 22p.

By Rebecca Meiksin, Ruth Ponsford, Nambusi Kyegombe, Chris Bonell

Dating and relationship violence (DRV) among young people is widespread. DRV is associated with subsequent mental ill health, substance use and sexual risk among girls and boys and is a leading cause of morbidity and mortality among girls globally. Harmful social norms are widely recognised for their role in sustaining DRV, and interventions often seek to change these. However, little evidence is available to suggest which specific norms are most salient and where protective norms might be strengthened. We conducted, audio-recorded and transcribed consultations and semi-structured interviews with students (years 9 and 10), school staff and parents/carers from ten secondary schools in England. We also audio-recorded discussions in staff DRV trainings in four of these schools. Data collection took place between April 2017 and July 2018. This research explored participant accounts of social norms relating to gender and to DRV in schools and their influence on DRV behaviours. Drawing on Giddens’ structuration theory, our thematic analysis found that sexist social norms subjugating girls to boys facilitated gendered practices of harassment and abuse, including DRV; and that these practices, in turn, reproduced this gendered power structure. Our data suggest that while physical DRV is socially proscribed, norms supporting controlling behaviours and inhibiting disclosure of victimisation directly underpin DRV. They further suggest that indirectly, gender norms concerning cross-gender friendships; sexual harassment; the policing of girls’ sexuality; homophobic abuse; and dominance, control and sexual activity as masculine ideals indirectly sustain DRV. Accounts demonstrated that students and staff challenge harmful norms, but that these efforts can be ineffective and socially punished. Our findings can inform DRV interventions, which should draw on evidence to foster protective norms and shift those that sustain DRV.

Social Science & Medicine

Volume 366, February 2025, 117621

By Ashmini Kerodal, Kelly Officer, Emma Dunn

During the 2019 legislative session, the legislature passed, and the Governor signed Senate Bill 577. Section 5 of the bill created a collection process for data on the prosecution of bias crimes, and requires the Criminal Justice Commission (CJC) to analyze these data to identify gaps or weaknesses in the investigation, presentation, prosecution and sanctioning of crimes motivated by bias. This study pools the county District Attorney (DA) data submitted per SB 577 and ORS 137.676, with data from the Oregon State Police (OSP) and Oregon Judicial Department (OJD) to conduct a pre-post evaluation of SB 577 on bias crime prosecutions. The pre-SB 577 group covers all defendants with a bias crime court case or arrest between January 1, 2012 and July 14, 2019, while the post-SB 577 group covers all defendants with a bias crime court case or arrest between July 15, 2019 and December 31, 2022.1 Key Findings One thousand and nine bias crime cases were identified for the 11-year study period. This number excludes cases deemed unfounded by law enforcement (LE)2 and thus not referred to the deputy district attorney (DDA) for review for criminal charges, but includes fingerprintable arrests that were no filed, i.e., bias crime arrests for which no charges were filed by the prosecutor. A case with at least one conviction charge – guilty plea, jury or bench conviction, or no contest plea – was classified as a conviction, which was further divided into bias and non-bias convictions. Sentences and probation conditions were compared for bias conviction and non-bias conviction in the pre- and post-SB 577 periods to determine if conviction charge influenced sentence lengths and probation conditions, and thereafter compared for the pre-post periods to determine the effect of SB 577 on bias crime prosecution. • Eighty percent of filed cases in the pre- and 78.5% in the post-SB 577 group were disposed with a conviction on either a bias or non-bias charge; convictions in the post-SB 577 group are expected to increase as open cases (14.8%) are disposed (see Figure 4). • Slightly over half of defendants sentenced to probation on any conviction charge pre-SB 577 had at least one complex need – identified via post-conviction court mandated substance abuse, mental health or anger management treatment, or houseless status – which increased to 6 in 10 post-SB 577 (see Table 14). • There were no differences in sentencing for bias vs non-bias convictions, aside from the higher use of jail for bias convictions: 67.4% of defendants convicted on a bias vs 44.8% convicted on a non-bias charge in the pre-SB 577 group were sentenced to any jail time, while 54.8% of defendants convicted on a bias vs 41.1% convicted on a non-bias charge in the post-SB 577 group were sentenced to any jail time (see Table 9). • In the absence of formal bias crime treatment and restorative justice (RJ) programs, Clackamas, Multnomah, Wasco and Washington counties are assigning online courses and books/essays to improve defendants’ cultural awareness; community service in culturally appropriate community based organizations (CBOs); and RJ dialogue at the community level. Due to the lack of data on deferred sentences in the OJD Odyssey database, it is possible that these strategies are more prevalent than found in this study, and some creative RJ and sensitivity trainings were not identified. • Insufficient evidence, victim issue, 3 and defendant (in)ability to aid and assist were the most frequently cited reasons bias charges were no filed/no complaint, removed from the charging instrument, or dismissed – in the rare instance when details are provided in Odyssey (see Table 7). The county DA data is crucial to close this knowledge gap and identify challenges faced by DDAs when prosecuting bias crimes. Supplemental data from the Multnomah County District Attorney’s Office (MCDA) indicate that aid and assist concerns were confirmed (22.5%) or suspected (29.8%) in over half of bias crime referrals between 2020 and 2022 (see Table A8 in the Appendix). • Some DDAs communicate justifications for no filing, filing/issuing a case as non-bias, plea bargaining, and deferred sentences to the referring officer, but this is not a consistent practice. Community members who share identity with the victim and who research shows are similarly psychologically harmed when a community member is targeted, have no right to be informed of these decisions and occurrences.4 Recommendations This report focuses on the prosecution and sanctioning of bias crimes, which is a necessary first step to formulate research design(s) 5 to identify gaps in the investigation and presentation of bias crimes. When bias convictions, global plea agreements, and non-bias convictions’ probation conditions are considered, it shows that the criminal justice system contains more accountability than is apparent when one queries a single criminal justice system data point. While accountability is a good start, CJC recommends: • Continuation of the current probation practice of utilizing a 4th generation risk assessment instrument with integrated case management (e.g., LS/CMI), mandating programming recommended by the assessment, and treating housing insecurity to reduce reoffending. • The DA, victim advocates at the DA office, or victim advocates at LEAs typically attempt to inform victims of case outcomes, but communication may be stymied due to justice system capacity, language barriers, time constraints, and other barriers. To improve future bias crime reporting and procedural justice, victims should be informed of which charges were filed, justifications for no filed decisions, their rights to participate in plea bargaining negotiations, case outcomes including probation conditions, and other efforts to hold the defendant accountable. • Additional, rigorous research that utilizes administrative criminal justice, victim services, prosecutors, law enforcement, and community perspectives is required to determine the extent of bias crime and non-criminal bias incidents, barriers to reporting, and resources service providers and the justice system require to ensure defendant accountability and meet the needs of victims and affected communities. Academics, policy researchers and graduate students can help fill these knowledge gaps with qualitative and mixed-methods studies. Interested researchers should contact the CJC.

Salem, OR: Oregon Criminal Justice Commission, 2024. 54p.

By Robin Joy

The purpose of this study was to test the effectiveness of the Arnold Ventures’ Public Safety Risk Assessment (PSA) in Vermont. This report presents the findings of the study. The Arnold PSA measures the risk of a person failing to appear for a court date (FTA) and engaging in new criminal activity (NCA) or committing a new violent crime (NCV) while out on bail. The PSA relies on criminal histories, the current charged offenses, and the age of the defendant to score the likelihood of a person engaging in the measured behavior. This research was conducted at the request of the Vermont stakeholder group of the National Criminal Justice Reform Project (NCJRP). The NCJRP was supported by the National Governors Association, Arnold Ventures, and the National Criminal Justice Association. This report was funded by the Bureau of Justice Statistics. Key Findings Overall, the PSA did not perform well in Vermont, and we do not recommend its adoption. It was unable to accurately predict who would not appear while on bail, commit a new crime, or commit a new crime of violence. Additionally, there are racial equity concerns about using criminal histories in criminal justice decision making. The PSA may have performed poorly for a variety of reasons. First, the overall rate of failure to appear (FTA) for the cohort (people arraigned on felony charge in 2016-2017) was 11%. This is low; however, the real number of FTAs are likely higher, but they are not appearing in the official data. Because the PSA relies on criminal histories, the completeness and accuracy affect the score. Not all states report the same level of detail and completeness of records, therefore, the scores are likely off. New crimes of violence while out on bail were also low, with 14% of the cohort being arrested or arraigned with a new crime of violence. About 25% of the cohort committed a new criminal offense (excluding Violations of Conditions of Release), but the PSA did not accurately predict who would commit a new crime.   

Montpelier, VT: Crime Research Group, 2022. 16p.

By Susan McNeeley, Grant Duwe and Valerie Clark

A growing body of literature shows people released from prison have higher risk of mortality. However, few studies have identified characteristics that increase or decrease mortality among this population. Some studies suggest formerly incarcerated women may have especially high risk of death, despite their relatively lower mortality in the general population compared to men. We seek to contribute to the understanding of risk of mortality among people released from prison by testing whether demographic, social, and custodial factors differentially effect risk of mortality for men and women. We analyze a sample of 31,587 men and 5,129 women released from Minnesota state prisons between 2010 and 2019. We matched administrative data from the Minnesota Department of Corrections with death records from the Minnesota Department of Health. Separate Cox regression analyses were conducted for men and women to determine whether they exhibit different risk factors for all-cause, natural, and unnatural deaths. Our analyses found that release type and frequency of healthcare access were more strongly related to mortality among women, while educational achievement was more strongly related to mortality among men. The findings suggest there are sex-based differences in how programming, post-release community supervision, correctional health care, and education shape health outcomes during reintegration to the community. Examining how these aspects of correctional operations operate for men versus women may shed light on ways to improve releasees’ risk of mortality after release from prison.

St. Paul: Minnesota Department of Corrections, 2023. 32p.

Edited by Avis Whyte, Patricia Tuitt & Judith Bourne

In 1965 the UK enacted the Race Relations Act while the International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD) opened for signature and ratification. In the US, the changes that brought down the walls of segregation, conveying some equality to black people essentially began with the Civil Rights Act of 1964. These ground-breaking instruments marked a commitment—domestically and internationally by the state parties to the ICERD—to address racial injustice and inequality through legal means. Yet, the intervening years reveal the challenges of pursuing racial justice and equality through the medium of law. In recent years, allegations of institutional racism have been levelled against numerous public institutions in the UK, while the rise of populism globally has challenged the ability of law to effect change. This edited collection draws attention to the need to reflect on the persistence of racial inequalities and injustices despite law’s intervention and arguably because of its ‘unconscious’ role in their promotion. It does so from a multiplicity of perspectives ranging from the doctrinal, socio-legal, critical and theoretical, thereby generating different kinds of knowledge about race and law. By exploring contemporary issues in racial justice and equality, contributors examine the role of law—whether domestic or international, hard or soft—in advancing racial equality and justice and consider whether it can effect substantive change.

London: University of Westminster Press, 2024. 222p.

By The Office of the eSafety Commissioner (Australia)

Online hate is one of the most prevalent forms of digital violence. It affects many internet users in Australia and globally, especially individuals from targeted groups, including sexually diverse individuals, Aboriginal and/or Torres Strait Islanders, individuals with disability, and those from other culturally and racially marginalised backgrounds. It can take the form of hateful posts or comments about a person based on discrimination or bias related to characteristics such as their sexual orientation, gender, race, disability, religion or ethnicity.

This report is the first in a series of two reports exploring encounters with online hate among adults in Australia. It explores the prevalence, nature and impact of online hate among adults who belong to one or more of the targeted groups, drawing on data from eSafety’s Australian Adults Online survey, conducted in November 2022.

Key findings

Adults who identify as sexually diverse, Aboriginal and/or Torres Strait Islander, with disability, and/or linguistically diverse are more likely to be targeted with online hate.

Adults from these targeted groups are more likely to experience online hate based on discrimination or bias related to at least one aspect of their identity.

Most targeted adults experience online hate on social media, with the hate most often perpetrated by a stranger.

Online hate has harmful effects on the wellbeing of adults from targeted groups.

A minority of targeted adults act after encountering online hate, but many refrain from acting because they don’t think anything will change.

Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia 2025

By The University of Massachusetts Amherst. Campus Demonstration Policy Taskforce

Formed by Chancellor Reyes on June 17, 2024, the Campus Demonstration Policy Taskforce was charged with: • Reviewing demonstration-related policies/guidelines including, but not limited to, the land-use policy, picketing code, and demonstration guidelines and make recommendations to the appropriate university governing bodies. • Making recommendations, based on best practices in higher education, regarding methods of demonstration-related intervention, including, but not limited to, the deployment of and composition of the Demonstration Response and Safety Team (DRST). • Making recommendations, based on best practices in higher education, regarding how to increase awareness of university policies and First Amendment protections as they apply to on-campus demonstrations. Between its formation on June 17, 2024, and the delivery of this report on August 30, 2024, the taskforce met six times. The subcommittees met ten times. Significant asynchronous discussion and document review was also completed via a shared Teams channel. The Campus Demonstration Policy Taskforce (CDPT) was guided by and fully endorses the text and spirit of the UMass Amherst Picketing Code, excerpted above, which is itself informed and backed by the First Amendment of the United States Constitution. The importance of clear policies – and the consistent application of them without regard to the subject matter of demonstrations (content neutrality) or the viewpoints expressed in them (viewpoint neutrality) - was a near-universal theme in a national workshop co-hosted by UMass Amherst during the CDPT’s work. This underscored the criticality of the CDPT’s charge. Throughout its work, the CDPT set out to ensure that the university’s policies reflect a commitment to the free and open exchange of ideas while equally protecting the rights of all to live, work, teach, and learn in a community of inquiry. The CDPT makes several recommendations in three areas: • clarify policy where reasonable interpretations could lead to divergent understandings; • strengthen the ability of the Demonstration Response and Safety Team (DRST) to serve the campus through its role providing demonstration-related safety, education, and deescalation; and • delineate the e distinct roles of university administrators and UMPD in terms of handling violations of policy and illegal acts, respectively. Specifically, we make the following substantive recommendations regarding the Land Use Policy: 1) adopt a definition of “Structure” informed by Massachusetts law; and 2) clarify the role of the University of Massachusetts Police Department (UMPD) in relation to policy enforcement and law enforcement Regarding the DRST, the CPDT recommends the following: 1) create an advisory council to the DRST that includes representatives from outside the university administration; 2) actively seek out post-action reports from other universities for review by the DSRT and advisory board; 3) develop off-ramps oriented towards de-escalating the potential for conflict, including building up a mediation infrastructure; 4) specify procedures for the identification of demonstrators that are UMass community members; and 5) clarify the use of law enforcement in relation to illegal acts, including violent acts, threats of public safety, substantial disorder, trespass, and the invasion of the rights of others, as opposed to policy violations. This also applies to a recommended edit in the Land Use Policy. The CDPT was also asked to provide guidance around “increasing awareness” of demonstration related policies. To that end, the task force 1) created a Free Expression FAQ, attached to this report, that we recommend sharing with the university community; 2) updated DRST handouts that can be shared with demonstrators; and 3) recommends a central website that shares all demonstration-related policies and guidance. e distinct roles of university administrators and UMPD in terms of handling violations of policy and illegal acts, respectively. Specifically, we make the following substantive recommendations regarding the Land Use Policy: 1) adopt a definition of “Structure” informed by Massachusetts law; and 2) clarify the role of the University of Massachusetts Police Department (UMPD) in relation to policy enforcement and law enforcement Regarding the DRST, the CPDT recommends the following: 1) create an advisory council to the DRST that includes representatives from outside the university administration; 2) actively seek out post-action reports from other universities for review by the DSRT and advisory board; 3) develop off-ramps oriented towards de-escalating the potential for conflict, including building up a mediation infrastructure; 4) specify procedures for the identification of demonstrators that are UMass community members; and 5) clarify the use of law enforcement in relation to illegal acts, including violent acts, threats of public safety, substantial disorder, trespass, and the invasion of the rights of others, as opposed to policy violations. This also applies to a recommended edit in the Land Use Policy. The CDPT was also asked to provide guidance around “increasing awareness” of demonstrationrelated policies. To that end, the task force 1) created a Free Expression FAQ, attached to this report, that we recommend sharing with the university community; 2) updated DRST handouts that can be shared with demonstrators; and 3) recommends a central website that shares all demonstration-related policies and guidance.

Amherst: University of Massachusetts Amherst, 2024. 11p.

By The Australian Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights

This parliamentary inquiry report addresses the prevalence, nature, and experiences of antisemitism at universities, finding current frameworks for prevention and response leave Jewish students and staff feeling unsafe. The report makes recommendations for regulatory changes to better address and prevent antisemitism on campuses, noting the need to balance between protection with upholding academic freedom and freedom of speech.

The report contains additional comments from Senator Lidia Thorpe, who argues for the inquiry to take into account the full historical and current context, and suggests the Committee should have broadened its approach and recommendations to reflect a comprehensive anti-racism framework to oppose the escalating threat of white supremacy.

Kylea Tink MP also provides comment, in favour of adopting a formal definition of antisemitism that distinguishes between antisemitism and criticism of the Israeli Government and/or Zionism. She emphasises the need to address racism more broadly, noting that the rise in antisemitism has been accompanied by a rise in other forms of racism, particularly Islamophobia.

Recommendations

University leaders should meet with Jewish students and staff to discuss antisemitism on campus, and then publicly comment on actions taken.

Universities should make their complaints processes simpler, have a central place to handle them, use a clear definition of antisemitism and offer ways to resolve issues without formal processes.

Universities should be more open about the outcomes of complaints.

Government should consider changing employment laws to allow universities to take action against staff who engage in antisemitic behaviour.

Universities should publish regular, anonymous reports on the number, type and resolution of complaints they receive.

Universities should put more resources into researching antisemitism.

Universities should provide ongoing training for students, staff and leaders on how to recognise and deal with antisemitism.

The government should consider further empowering the Tertiary Education Quality and Standards Agency to make sure universities are keeping students safe.

The National Student Ombudsman should review what universities are doing to reduce antisemitism.

If universities do not take sufficient action, the government should consider a formal judicial inquiry.

Canberra: Parliament of Australia, 2025. 135p.

By Onesmus Mugyenyi, Paul Twebaze. et al. Global Financial Integrity (GFI) and Advocates Coalition for Development and Environment (ACODE)

The Advocates Coalition for Development and Environment (ACODE) and Global Financial Integrity (GFI) have published a new research report titled "Uganda's Mining Legal Regime: Addressing Illicit Financial Flows (IFFs) Risks and Revenue Loss in the Mineral Supply Chain." This research looks at the pervasive enablers of IFFs within Uganda's mineral supply chain, highlighting gaps and challenges undermining Uganda's efforts to curb these practices.

The report identifies various enablers of IFFs in Uganda’s mineral supply chain, including informal mining, corruption, insufficient funding for regulatory bodies, misuse of trade-free zones, double taxation agreements, and limitations in mineral database management. These systemic challenges create an environment conducive to various types of illicit financial activities occurring along Uganda's mineral supply chain, such as tax evasion and avoidance, illegal mineral exploitation, money laundering, smuggling, informal trade, and other forms of financial misconduct. Such activities deprive the country of essential revenue for development.

Additionally, the report also examines the challenges associated with the implementation of Uganda's mineral legal framework in addressing these issues. Key obstacles include limited inter-agency cooperation, resource limitations within regulatory bodies, and an insufficient alignment between Uganda’s mining legislation and international best practices. The challenges have hindered Uganda's ability to maximize revenue collection while ensuring sustainable governance of its mineral resources. “operationalization of the Mining and Minerals Act, 2022 by putting in place and enforcing the regulations is critical in mitigating illicit activities and revenue loss” Onesmus Mugyenyi, Research Fellow, ACODE.

The report presents actionable recommendations to address these challenges by enhancing transparency, strengthening enforcement mechanisms, and promoting regional and international cooperation. Proposed measures encompass the implementation of enhanced regulations regarding mineral traceability, the augmentation of investment in capacity-building for oversight institutions, and the establishment of effective mechanisms for data sharing and coordination among the relevant agencies. “It is imperative to enhance Uganda's mining legal framework in order to maximize the sector's revenue potential while curbing illicit financial flows. Actionable recommendations are provided in our report to ensure that mineral wealth benefits all Ugandans. It is time to implement reforms to protect Uganda's resources and future prosperity,” Philip Nyakundi, Policy Director, Global Financial Integrity.

This report is a call to action for policymakers, Civil Society Organizations, and industry stakeholders to prioritize reforms that can reduce IFFs risks and improve revenue collection from Uganda's mineral wealth.

Washington, DC: Global Financial Integrity, 2025. 35p.

By Asylum Aid, et al.

 Stateless people are not considered as a national by any State under the operation of its laws, and many have no right to live in any other country. The protection of stateless people living in the UK is an obligation under two post Second World War UN Conventions which the UK has agreed to implement1 and in 2013 the UK government introduced a statelessness determination procedure through which stateless people can gain recognition and regularise their status. However, protection continues to fall short both because stateless people face barriers to recognition, and because protections for those recognised are insufficient. Some recent changes have further reduced protection. Many people in British communities right across the UK are stateless or at risk of statelessness. Most are migrants, who are often forcibly displaced and some are children born in the UK to non-British parents. They are left in legal limbo, vulnerable to discrimination, poverty, and exploitation.2 They cannot work and are often denied access to essential services, including healthcare. While many of these issues overlap with those faced by others without immigration status, stateless people without a right to reside in any country face distinctive problems in resolving their status. Neither the 1954 nor 1961 Statelessness Conventions have been fully incorporated into domestic law which feeds into key policy and legal problems that create barriers to stateless people accessing protection and rights. These include: ● Problems with the statelessness determination procedure: Statelessness is inherently difficult to prove, and wrongly refusing someone recognition and the status that entails has grave consequences. Nonetheless, the current determination procedure contains excessive barriers to recognition, and has too few safeguards on decision-making. There is no right of appeal, and applicants are refused without interview and can be refused permission to stay on grounds which apply to non-stateless migration routes. All of this contributes to years of delays in decision-making for stateless people. ● Poor access to legal advice: Stateless people face huge barriers to accessing legal advice. In England and Wales, statelessness is not in scope for legal aid. However, even across jurisdictions where it is in scope, as it is in Scotland, there exists a UK  wide crisis in legal aid provision, including poor rates of remuneration, complex bureaucracy and large advice deserts. ● Detention: Because they exist in legal limbo and are often unidentified, stateless people are at disproportionate risk of long and arbitrary detention, which compounds the limbo and uncertainty central to their lives. Immigration detention in the UK has no time limit, and relatively few procedural safeguards, and statelessness is often not considered in detention decisions, despite the obvious impact which having no nationality has on the likelihood of a stateless person being admitted to another country. ● Limited access to family reunification: Changes made to the Immigration Rules in January 2024 have made it significantly more onerous for stateless people to be joined by their family members. ● Barriers to Citizenship: Some children born in the UK to non-British parents are left at risk of statelessness because Home Office decision-makers have wide discretion to deny them citizenship.3 Further, citizenship fees are too expensive, sometimes prohibitively so, but there is no fee waiver for adults. The 1961 Convention does not permit any fees to be charged for children’s citizenship applications, yet although fee waivers are available for children in principle, the process for obtaining a fee waiver for children is excessively onerous. This both places people at risk of statelessness, and prevents those recognised as stateless from finally accessing citizenship.     

Jesuit Refugee Service UK, Asylum Aid, the University of Liverpool Law Clinic, the European Network on Statelessness, and JustRight Scotland : 2025. 11p.