By Kyra Hanemaaijer, Nadine Ketel, Olivier Marie 

When decision-makers overemphasize salient features under limited attention, biased decisions can result in settings in which decisions should be unbiased. We exploit a sudden shock in the salience of individuals of Moroccan descent in the Netherlands to test the vulnerability of decisions of various actors in the Dutch criminal justice system to biases. Using high-quality data on decisions made from arrest through appeal in the Dutch CJS, we find that the sentence length of individuals of Moroccan descent convicted of a crime increased by 79% after the shock. Heterogeneity analyses indicate that more-experienced judges mitigate this effect. Finally, we find suggestive evidence of longer-term costs for defendants of Moroccan descent in that their labor income drops by 40% over the four years following their judgment of conviction. 

Bonn:  IZA – Institute of Labor Economics, 2024, 54p.

By Peter Leasure

The current paper aimed to estimate the likelihood of an OVI (operating vehicle under the influence of alcohol or drugs) arrest across race/ethnicity and gender using data from the Ohio State Highway Patrol (OSHP). Black and Hispanic males and females had higher probabilities of an OVI arrest than White males and females. However, males and females in the other category had lower probabilities of an OVI arrest than White males and females. For gender differences, males in all race/ethnicity categories had higher probabilities of an OVI arrest than females. 

Ohio State Legal Studies Research Paper No. 886 Columbus: Ohio State University (OSU) - Michael E. Moritz College of Law, 2024. 11p.

By Johanna Lacoe, Brett Fischer & Steven Raphael 

Objectives

Low-income individuals facing criminal charges experience disproportionately high rates of pretrial detention and conviction. We study a pilot program in Santa Clara County, CA that aims to address this inequity by providing access to public defenders immediately following arrest.

Methods

The Santa Clara Public Defender agreed to provide pilot services one day per week, rotating the intervention day across weeks. Individuals booked on an intervention day were eligible for early legal representation, while individuals booked on control days received public defender services as usual. The study leverages the rotating treatment day to compare pretrial release and case outcomes between eligible individuals booked on treatment days and eligible individuals booked on control days.

Results

Pilot program participants were 28 percentage points more likely to secure pretrial release, and 36 percentage points more likely to see their cases dismissed, relative to comparable individuals who generally first meet with their public defender at arraignment.

Conclusions

Providing prompt access to legal representation could improve release and case outcomes for low-income individuals and the efficacy of public defense.

Journal of Quantitative Criminology, 2024.

By Christopher Uggen, Ryan Larson, Sarah Shannon, Robert Stewart and Molly Hauf

  Laws in 48 U.S. states ban people with felony convictions from voting. In 2024, an estimated 4 million Americans, representing 1.7% of the voting-age population, will be ineligible to vote due to these laws, many of which date back to the post-Reconstruction era. In this historic election year, questions persist about the stability of democratic institutions, election fairness, and voter suppression in marginalized communities. The systematic exclusion of millions with felony convictions should be front and center in these debates.

This report updates and expands upon a quarter century of work chronicling the scope and distribution of felony disenfranchisement in the United States.1 As in 2022, we present national and state estimates of the number and percentage of people disenfranchised due to felony convictions, as well as the number and percentage of the Black and Latino populations impacted. This year, we also present state-level data on the degree of disenfranchisement among men and women. Although these and other estimates must be interpreted with caution, the numbers presented here represent our best assessment of the state of U.S. felony disenfranchisement as of the November 2024 election. Among the report’s key findings: • An estimated 4 million people are disenfranchised due to a felony conviction, a figure that has declined by 31% since 2016, as more states enacted policies to curtail this practice and state prison, probation, and parole populations declined. Previous research finds there were an estimated 1.2 million people disenfranchised in 1976, 3.3 million in 1996, 4.6 million in 2000, 5.1 million in 2004, 5.7 million in 2010, 5.9 million in 2016, 4.9 million in 2020, and 4.4 million in 2022.2 • One out of 59 adult citizens – 1.7% of the total U.S. voting eligible population – is disenfranchised due to a current or previous felony conviction. • Seven out of 10 people disenfranchised are living in their communities, having fully completed their sentences or remaining supervised while on felony probation or parole. • In two states – Florida and Tennessee – more than 6% of the adult population, one of every 17 adults, is disenfranchised. • Florida remains the nation’s disenfranchisement leader in absolute numbers, with over 961,000 people currently banned from voting, often because they cannot afford to pay court-ordered monetary sanctions. An estimated 730,000 Floridians who have completed their sentences remain disenfranchised, despite a 2018 ballot referendum that promised to restore their voting rights. • One in 22 African Americans of voting age is disenfranchised, a rate more than triple that of non-African Americans. Among the adult African American population, 4.5% is disenfranchised compared to 1.3% of the adult non-African American population. In 15 states, 5% or more of the African American adult population is banned from voting due to a felony conviction. • More than one in 10 African American adults is disenfranchised in five states – Arizona, Florida, Kentucky, South Dakota, and Tennessee. • Although data on ethnicity in correctional populations are unevenly reported and undercounted in some states, a conservative estimate is that at least 495,000 Latino Americans or 1.5% of the voting eligible population are disenfranchised. • Based on available correctional data that records an individual’s sex, approximately 764,000 women are disenfranchised, comprising about 0.6% of the female voting eligible population and approximately one-fifth of the total disenfranchised population.3 We estimate that approximately 3.2 million men or 2.7% of the male voting eligible population is disenfranchised, consistent with the overrepresentation of men in the criminal legal system.   

Washington, DC: The Sentencing Project, 2024. 40p.

By Robin M. Maher, Leah Roemer

While all eyes are on the race for U.S. President, it is local races for prosecutor, state judge, legislator, and governor that will decide whether and how the death penalty is used. The President only has jurisdiction over federal death penalty cases, which currently represent about 2% of all death row prisoners and 1% of all executions carried out in the U.S. since 1976. He or she selects the Attorney General, who determines whether to seek death sentences in eligible federal cases and how to defend existing federal death sentences. The President also has clemency power for people convicted of federal crimes, including those on federal death row. 

Washington, DC: Death Penalty Information Center, 2024. 32p.

By Jane Arnold Lincove, Catherine Mata & Kalena Cortes

This research analyzes the implementation of a school suspension ban in Maryland to investigate whether a top-down state-initiated ban on suspensions in early primary grades can influence school behavior regarding school discipline. Beginning in the fall of 2017, the State of Maryland banned the use of out-of-school suspensions for grades PK-2, unless a student posed an "imminent threat" to staff or students. This research investigates (1) what was the effect of the ban on discipline outcomes for students in both treated grades and upper elementary grades not subject to the ban. (2) did schools bypass the ban by coding more events as threatening or increasing the use of in-school suspensions? and (3) Were there differential effects for students in groups that are historically suspended more often? Using a comparative interrupted time series strategy, we find that the ban is associated with a substantial reduction in, but not a total elimination of, out-of-school suspensions for targeted grades without substitution of in-school suspensions. Disproportionalities by race and other characteristics remain after the ban. Grades not subject to the ban experienced few effects, suggesting the ban did not trigger a schoolwide response that reduced exclusionary discipline.

Bonn:  IZA – Institute of Labor Economics, 2024. 65p.

By the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights (USCCR)

Meaningful federal guidelines and oversight for responsible FRT use have lagged behind the application of this technology in real-world scenarios. With the advent of biometric technology and its widespread use by both private and government entities, the Commission studied how the Department of Justice (DOJ), Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) are utilizing this technology, in compliance with existing civil rights laws. Currently, there are no laws that expressly regulate the use of FRT or other AI by the federal government, and no constitutional provisions governing its use.

Washington DC: USCCR,, 2024. 194p.

By The U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, Arkansas Advisory Committee

On January 19, 2024, the Arkansas Advisory Committee to the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights adopted a proposal to study the right to counsel for indigent defendants in Arkansas. The focus of the Committee’s inquiry was to examine the role public defenders play in ensuring equal protection of the laws in the administration of justice. The Committee considered a public investment and funding available to support the right to counsel for those who cannot afford it and the impact such counsel (or the lack thereof) may have on persistent disparities throughout the criminal justice system based on race, color, sex, disability, and national origin.

Washington, DC: USCCR, 2024. 27p.

By Johanna Lacoe, Alissa Skog, Mia Bird

Pretrial reform is driving criminal justice policy debates across the nation. The In re Humphrey decision required the San Francisco County criminal court to set bail levels based on defendant ability to pay rather than the county bail schedule. Under this new policy, the rate of pretrial detention fell by 11%. We find defendants released pretrial were less likely to be convicted (a decline of 3 percentage points) in the post-Humphrey period. This decline in conviction rates was driven primarily by a reduction in the likelihood of plea bargaining. These case outcome results are robust to an alternative strategy using propensity score matching and a difference-in-difference estimator to estimate effects for those most likely to be affected by the policy change. There was no consistent, statistically significant change in subsequent arrests or convictions post-Humphrey across the estimation strategies.

Policy Implications

Although the Humphrey decision originally applied only to San Francisco, a state supreme court decision in March 2021 extended the ruling to courts throughout California. The results also have implications for other states engaged in bail reform. These findings suggest that requiring bail to be set at affordable levels increases pretrial releases overall, specifically releases to pretrial supervision programs, with improvements in case outcomes and no apparent increase in subsequent criminal justice system contact. Counties or states without robust pretrial service options may not experience the same change in releases or other outcomes. Further, jurisdictions that detain people booked on lower-level offenses at higher rates than San Francisco may experience a greater response to a policy change like Humphrey.

Criminology & Public Policy, 1–Nov. 2024.  https://doi.org/10.1111/1745-9133.12688

By Christoph Feldhaus, Lukas Reinhardt, Matthias Sutter:

In a democracy, it is essential that citizens accept rules and laws, regardless of which party is in power. We study why citizens in polarized societies resist rules implemented by political opponents. This may be due to the rules' specific content, but also because of a general preference against being restricted by political opponents. We develop a method to measure the latter channel. In our experiment with almost 1,300 supporters and opponents of Donald Trump, we show that polarization undermines rule-following behavior significantly, independent of the rules' content. Subjects perceive the intentions behind (identical) rules as much more malevolent if they were imposed by a political opponent rather than a political ally.

Bonn:  IZA – Institute of Labor Economics, 2024. 36p.

By Diogo G. C. Britto, Gianmarco Daniele, Marco Le Moglie, Paolo Pinotti, Breno Sampaio  

We study the prevalence and effects of individuals with past criminal charges among candidates and elected politicians in Brazil. Individuals with past criminal charges are twice as likely to both run for office and be elected compared to other individuals. This pattern persists across political parties and government levels, even when controlling for a broad set of observable characteristics. Randomized anti-corruption audits reduce the share of mayors with criminal records, but only when conducted in election years. Using a regression discontinuity design focusing on close elections, we demonstrate that the election of mayors with criminal backgrounds leads to higher rates of underweight births and infant mortality. Additionally, there is an increase in political patronage, particularly in the health sector, which is consistent with the negative impacts on local public health outcomes.  

Bonn:  IZA – Institute of Labor Economics, 2024. 60p.

By Colin P. Clarke

Because terrorist groups like al-Qaeda and Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) have been successful in adapting and innovating in response to counterterrorism measures, it is important to develop a flexible, responsive sanctions regime similar to the 1267 regime, but that can include new organizations and bodies designed to keep it relevant and applicable— and any new regime considered for violent far-right groups should be similarly flexible—both in terms of the various measures employed, but also concerning the individuals and assets to be targeted. • Due to ISIS’ relatively unique ability to capture and administer large swaths of territory as it built a proto-state and diversified its funding portfolio, it is somewhat difficult to assess how effective sanctions were against the group. • If certain terrorist threats concern only a limited number of states—for example, the rightwing threat is likely to be more prominent in North America, Europe, and Oceania, though it certainly exists elsewhere—there may be less of an impetus, or little sense of urgency, for states outside of those immediately impacted to act. In that sense, the threats posed by al-Qaeda and ISIS) were more transnational, and as a result, generated global consensus more easily. Therefore, it will be crucial to work toward creating consensus, as well as to explore other applications of sanctions to counter the violent far-right threat. • One of the primary challenges to evaluating the impact of sanctions against terrorist groups is the lack of an effective assessment framework, in addition to data gaps. The sensitive nature of data related to terrorism and counterterrorism is one of the primary reasons why it has been difficult to provide a comprehensive assessment of the United Nations’ overall impact in this area. • Recommendations include: focus on tailor-made sanctions regimes that can adapt to the terrorist threat, considering both multilateral and national options; establish metrics to assess implementation and impact of sanctions regimes; and invest in international cooperation for implementation. 

New York: Soufan Center, 2022. 72p.

By Nina Rabin

This Article describes the ways in which prolonged states of legal limbo have grown more precarious, and thereby subordinating, under the Trump administration. Liminal forms of status have long been a feature of U.S. immigration law. But under the Trump administration, legal limbo grew both in prevalence and precarity. Due to Trump’s pursuit of an aggressive enforcement agenda, the legal system has become so overwhelmed that non-detained immigrants find themselves in protracted removal proceedings that routinely last for years. During this time, immigrants are consigned to a marginalized existence that harms their long-term ability to achieve social and economic mobility and integration. In this way, legal limbo has become increasingly tied to the creation and maintenance of a caste system in U.S. society. This Article offers a new conceptual framework, the “spectrum of precarity,” to analyze how and to what extent various types of liminal legal status in immigration law marginalize immigrants. Application of this spectrum to the states of limbo experienced by immigrants under the Obama and Trump administrations reveals very different approaches and outcomes. President Obama created liminal forms of legal status through specific policies and programs: administrative closure and the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals program (DACA). These efforts were explicitly designed to provide immigrants with a measure of social integration, along with protection from deportation. In contrast, immigrants in the Trump Era found themselves in limbo due to ballooning backlogs in the over-burdened legal immigration system. As a result, at the close of the Trump administration, immigrants with pending visas and asylum-seekers live in a state of prolonged uncertainty and fear that forces them into a marginalized existence in the shadows. This state of affairs poses a challenge for removal defense attorneys of non-detained immigrants and calls into question the due process framework that often serves as a guiding structure for advocates in the immigration system. Due process, with its focus on discrete legal events and its failure to pay sufficient attention to the passage of time, risks causing attorneys to become accomplices in the creation of caste. Instead, in the current dysfunctional and disempowering legal immigration system, removal defense attorneys must seek to counterbalance the marginalizing effects of legal limbo on their clients’ daily lives and future trajectories through multi-faceted, interdisciplinary, and community-based models of lawyering.   

35 Geo. Immigr. L.J. 567,569. 2021.

By Jonathan Booth

Privately managed detention centers hold the majority of detained immigrants in Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) custody.1 Coerced detainee labor in these for-profit facilities is commonplace. The practice contributes significantly to the financial viability of CoreCivic and GEO Group, the two corporations that manage most ICE detention centers, but it violates the prohibition on forced labor contained in the 2000 Trafficking Victims Protection Act (“TVPA”).2 Despite a growing field of scholarship on “immigration” and proposals to abolish immigration detention, or on its extraterritorial application.7 Because practitioners, rather than scholars, were the first to recognize that the TVPA’s prohibition of forced labor applies to private detention centers, there has been little scholarly analysis of the application of the TVPA to forced labor within detention facilities. This Article provides the first scholarly assessment of a wave of pending class action lawsuits challenging forced labor in privately managed ICE facilities under the TVPA. It concludes that such lawsuits are likely to succeed, given the facts known about conditions in for-profit immigrant detention facilities and the broad text and favorable legislative history of the TVPA. If the plaintiffs win a favorable jury verdict or a far-reaching settlement, the cases may cause fundamental changes to the current system of mass immigration detention. Part I of this Article examines the rise of for-profit detention in the United States and shows that detaining immigrants is now a central business of for-profit detention corporations. Next, Part II describes the labor policies within ICE detention that plaintiffs in these lawsuits allege amount to forced labor and thus violate the TVPA. Part III turns to the TVPA itself and analyzes its text, legislative history, and applicability to class actions. Part IV argues that its text and legislative history demonstrate that the TVPA covers forced labor claims within for-profit immigrant detention facilities and that such claims, if successful, could transform the business of detaining immigrants. Finally, Part V argues that publicly available information, including that revealed through discovery in these lawsuits, makes it likely that plaintiffs will prevail at trial.   

35 Georgetown Immigration Law Journal 573 (2020)

By Lord Verdirame KC and Professor Richard Ekins KC (Hon)

The International Criminal Court Act 2001 is an Act to give effect to the Statute of the International Criminal Court (the ICC Statute or Rome Statute). Part 2 of the Act makes provision for the arrest, detention and delivery up to the International Criminal Court (ICC) of persons against whom the ICC has issued an arrest warrant. But section 23 of the Act does not allow any action under Part 2 of the Act to be taken in relation to a person to whom state or diplomatic immunity attaches by reason of a connection with a state that is not a State party to the Rome Statute. The only exceptions to this limitation are if (a) the ICC obtains a waiver from that state or (b) the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) makes a resolution. The ICC has issued an arrest warrant against Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel. Israel is not a State party to the Rome Statute and has not waived state or diplomatic immunity. There is no relevant UNSC resolution. As a matter of customary international law, a Head of Government is entitled to absolute immunity against arrest. For this reason, it would be unlawful, as a matter of UK law and international law, to attempt to arrest Prime Minister Netanyahu. If the Government were to attempt to comply with the arrest warrant it would be acting beyond the parameters of the powers conferred on it by an Act of Parliament and would be violating the UK’s obligations in international law to respect state or diplomatic immunity. To the extent that the Government has indicated that it would attempt to execute an arrest warrant, its actions warrant strong denunciation. Any court hearing an application from the Secretary of State under Part 2 of the Act should reject the application on the grounds that it is incompatible with section 23 and with the rules about state or diplomatic immunity incorporated into and having effect in UK law

London: Policy Exchange, 2024. 17p.

By Brian Johnson, Kiminori Nakamura, Lydia Becker, Raquel Hernandez

Firearms violence is a major policy concern in America. How criminal courts address firearm crimes represents a critical opportunity for improving public safety. The overwhelming majority of criminal cases are settled by guilty plea, yet little is known about the ways that plea deals impact criminal punishment for firearms-involved offenders, or how they shape subsequent recidivism. This project investigates the association between plea bargaining, sentencing, and recidivism outcomes in state-wide sample of firearms-involved offenders. It provides a descriptive overview of case characteristics and outcomes in firearms cases, examines the scope and impact of plea bargaining for these offenses, and considers how plea discounts potentially impact future reoffending. Findings indicate that plea negotiations are common in firearms-related offenses – a majority of cases involve multiple filed charges but a single conviction charge, and more than half of all cases include a reduction in the severity of the top charge between filing and conviction. The mean distance traveled, or average magnitude of plea discounts, results in a significant reduction in the likelihood of incarceration and expected sentence lengths. Results also reveal significant relationships between plea discounts and recidivism. Defendants who are convicted and sentenced to longer incarceration terms have lower odds of coming back into the system for a new offense, whereas those who receive charge reductions and are given larger plea discounts are more likely to recidivate during our study period. Because average sentences in firearms cases are substantial, and because our follow-up period is limited, these results likely reflect the short-term incapacitation effects of lengthier incarceration terms. Overall, the current study suggests there may be significant public safety implications of plea discounts in firearms cases, though future research is needed before strong policy recommendations can be offered.

College Park, MD: University of Maryland, 2024. 88p.

By Deepak Premkumar, Andrew Skelton, Magnus Lofstrom, and Sean Cremin

In April 2020, the Judicial Council of California responded to the COVID-19 pandemic by implementing an emergency bail order, sometimes called “zero bail,” to reduce viral transmission in courts and jails. The policy maintained cash bail for more severe offenses but set bail at zero dollars for most misdemeanors and felonies, sharply increasing the number of people who were immediately released after being arrested. Although the statewide mandate lasted for roughly two months, many county courts temporarily adopted similar policies, and until July 2022, most Californians lived in a county with an emergency bail order in place. California’s emergency bail orders dramatically altered the pretrial process and drew concerns that those released would commit additional crimes. This report examines the impact of these emergency bail measures on the likelihood of arrested individuals being rearrested soon after release. The disruptive nature of the pandemic was likely a key factor in the temporary increase in overall rearrests when emergency bail orders were in place. Notably, increases in felony rearrests did not subside over time or when emergency orders were revoked. While our data do not allow us to determine why this was the case, arrest, and booking rates, as well as jail populations, have stayed well below pre-pandemic levels, suggesting the possibility that some pandemic-era practices may have persisted, which could affect more recent felony rearrest rates. Because their goal was to protect public health, emergency bail orders set a unilateral policy of detention or release based on the accused offenses—a marked difference from broader bail reform efforts that have implemented tools such as assessing arrested individuals’ risk to public safety and not appearing in court, as well as monitoring and/or providing pretrial services to the accused if they are released pretrial. Our findings suggest that pretrial detention policy may benefit from a more holistic measure than the arresting offense when assessing public safety risk, and pretrial risk assessments could be a promising approach.

  San Francisco:  Public Policy Institute of California, 2024. 33p.   

By Michael Jensen,  Sean Doody, and Elena Akers

To date, very little research has examined the specific challenges that individuals with ties to extremism face when reintegrating into their communities after arrest or incarceration. This has produced significant gaps in the scholarship on extremism, including a lack of data on terrorist recidivism from which to devise effective post-release supervision and support strategies. The implications of this knowledge gap extend beyond the halls of academia to matters of national security. Indeed, the United States is currently seeing an unprecedented surge in the number of individuals being released from custody due to their involvement in extremism. Without a robust research literature dedicated to this population, probation officers and service providers are without the scientific knowledge they need to help formerly incarcerated individuals achieve reintegration success. This project sought to address these challenges by focusing on three primary research objectives: 1. Build on existing NIJ-funded research to provide criminal justice professionals empirical data and rigorous analysis on the characteristics of U.S. extremists, their risks for recidivism, and their needs for reintegration success. 2. Gather evidence from in-depth interviews of pretrial services and probation officers, service providers, and system-involved individuals to understand the keys to successful reintegration. 3. Identify the training and education needs of pretrial services and probation officers to help them more effectively support the cases of formerly incarcerated individuals with links to extremism. Our mixed methods approach leveraged: (1) an extension to the Profiles of Individual Radicalization in the United States (PIRUS) dataset designed to estimate instances of both ideological and non-ideological recidivism amongst system-involved individuals with ties to extremism; (2) interviews with pretrial services and probation officers, service providers, and  system-involved individuals to understand the needs and challenges this population faces during disengagement and reintegration; and (3) a survey of probation officers to identify the training and education they need to better support their releasees. We summarize our results below. Recidivism • We analyzed more than 1,800 cases of individuals who spent time incarcerated or on probation for committing extremist crimes from 1990-2022 and found an overall recidivism rate of 18.1%. • This rate is significantly higher than previous estimates, but lower than most estimates of recidivism among individuals who commit more typical crimes. • Recidivism rates were more than twice as high for the individuals in our data who were prosecuted by state or local authorities (26.4%) compared to those who were prosecuted in federal courts (13.1%). • Among individuals who recidivated, 59.2% committed new extremist crimes, 27.9% committed non-ideologically motivated crimes, and 12.9% committed both. • Our detection of a higher overall recidivism rate than previous estimates is due to the inclusion of individuals linked to domestic terrorist groups and movements in our analysis. • We find an exceptionally low rate of recidivism among individuals who committed crimes linked to their support of, or involvement in, international jihadism (7.7%), but a notably higher (19.8%) recidivism rate among individuals involved in domestic extremism. • Individuals motivated by their opposition to abortion reoffended at the highest rate (44.2%) in our data, followed by individuals motivated by environmental and animal rights concerns (27.3%). White supremacists and those with anti-government beliefs—the largest subsamples within our data—had recidivism rates of 18.9% and 16.1%, respectively. • The most important risk factor associated with recidivism is the presence of a criminal record prior to an individual radicalizing to their first extremist offense. For instance, individuals with a pre-radicalization history of violent crime were more than two times as likely to recidivate than individuals without a criminal record prior to radicalization (31.3% vs. 14.6%). • Co-offending, extremist group membership, a family history of extremism, and past trauma are associated with committing new ideologically motivated crimes. • Protective factors like being married, older, or having children did not significantly reduce the likelihood of recidivism in our data. Disengagement from Extremism • Past incarceration is a significant obstacle to disengagement from extremism and tends to co-occur with related exit barriers, such as low social mobility, low educational attainment, unstable work histories, substance use disorder, and mental illness. • The presence of a family member or romantic partner involved in extremism can be a barrier to disengagement as well. When present, this obstacle tends to co-occur with identity-related barriers, like social prestige and financial dependency on an extremist group or movement. • Individuals who spent time in prison, but who did not have family members or romantic partners with ties to extremism, were more likely to disengage when they accessed support services like mental health counseling and substance use treatment and were able to find stable employment. • Individuals who had extremist family members or romantic partners, but who did not experience confinement, disengaged when they became disillusioned with their ideology and severed personal relationships with extremists. • When individuals had both family histories of extremism and periods of incarceration, they were significantly less likely to disengage from extremism. These subjects faced a complex set of psychological, emotional, economic, and social barriers to disengagement that were challenging to overcome. Challenges to Successful Reintegration • System-involved individuals face difficult obstacles to securing basic needs, like housing, employment, and financial security, due to their criminal records and the social stigma associated with their involvement in extremism. • Severing anti-social relationships is an important part of successful reintegration, but it can be socially isolating, emotionally taxing, and traumatizing for system-involved individuals. Moreover, system-involved individuals often find it hard to establish new pro-social relationships upon release. • Mental health concerns and trauma are common experiences among system-involved individuals, as is difficulty accessing needed care. • Substance use, while not unique to extremism, can be a challenge among system-involved individuals after their release from custody. While some individuals may develop substance use disorders prior to entering prison, others describe turning to substances upon release as a form of self-medication and emotional coping. • Stigma is a constant challenge facing system-involved individuals with links to extremism. Beyond undermining individuals’ ability to find gainful employment and housing, social stigma also causes psychological distress due to public skepticism about the individuals’ ability to genuinely disengage from extremism. Case Management, Monitoring and Support Services for Successful Reintegration • Currently, there is no systematic process for identifying and triaging cases of extremism among the federally incarcerated population. Some probation officers reported the use of inconsistent heuristics and strategies to identify potential cases. Other officers reported that their districts do not flag cases with a nexus to extremism. • Probation officers do not always have well-established relationships with other law enforcement agencies, such as the FBI, that may be monitoring the individuals under their care. This can lead to a lack of information sharing and an inability for officers to adequately assess risk.  (CONTINUED)   

College Park, MD: National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), University of Maryland 2024. 111p.

By Julian V. Roberts, Lilly Crellin, Jonathan Bild and Jade Mouton

This report summarises findings from a survey of the public conducted in 2024. It contributes to the well-established and still growing literature on public opinion and imprisonment. The primary focus was upon public knowledge of prisons and prison trends in England and Wales. This survey is a follow-up to an earlier report by the Sentencing Academy on public knowledge of sentencing. Key Findings ¨ Most people acknowledge that they know little about prisons in England and Wales, with almost three-quarters of respondents stating that they knew either ‘not very much’ or ‘nothing at all’. ¨ More than nine in ten respondents significantly over-estimated the proportion of women within the prison population; 93% of respondents thought that women made up 10% or more of the prison population. The correct answer is 4%. ¨ Respondents also over-estimated the proportion of the prison population serving a sentence for a violent offence; whilst around one in three adult sentenced prisoners have been sentenced for a violent offence, 58% of respondents thought that violent offenders made up 40% or more of the prison population. ¨ Offenders who have served a short prison sentence of less than 12 months have the highest re-offending rate. However, most respondents considered that prisoners released after having served longer sentences had a higher re-offending rate. ¨ When asked to specify what they considered to be the single most important purpose of imprisonment, the most popular option, chosen by 42% of respondents, was protecting the public by removing offenders from society. Rehabilitation was the next most commonly-chosen purpose, attracting 19% of respondents. ¨ Approximately three-quarters of respondents (73%) considered prisons to be either ‘not at all’ or ‘not very’ effective at rehabilitating offenders and preventing re-offending. Whilst the perception of prisons as being effective at punishing offenders was less negative, over half of respondents (53%) thought prisons were ‘not at all’ or ‘not very’ effective in performing this function. ¨ In common with many previous surveys, a significant proportion of respondents considered prison conditions to be ‘too easy’, with 49% of respondents holding this view.  

London: Sentencing Academy, 2024. 20p.

By Mark A. Motivans,

This report uses data from BJS’s Federal Justice Statistics Program (FJSP) and other published sources to describe persons arrested and convicted for a federal drug offense involving methamphetamine, cocaine, methylenedioxyamphetamine (MDA), methylenedioxymethamphetamine (MDMA), and other amphetamines. It focuses on psychostimulants, including their classification under the Controlled Substances Act (P.L. 91–513), persons arrested for a federal offense involving psychostimulants, deaths due to overdose, and persons sentenced for a federal offense involving these substances. The FJSP receives administrative data files from six federal criminal justice agencies: the U.S. Marshals Service, Drug Enforcement Administration, Executive Office for U.S. Attorneys, Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, U.S. Sentencing Commission, and Federal Bureau of Prisons. Data represent the federal criminal case-processing stages from arrest to imprisonment and release. FJSP data are available in the Federal Criminal Case Processing Statistics Data Tool, which provides statistics by stage of the federal criminal case process, including law enforcement, prosecution and courts, and incarceration

Highlights

• From FY 2021 to FY 2022, the number of arrests the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) made for psychostimulants decreased by 9%, from 15,846 to 14,392.

• More than half (55%) of the arrests the DEA made in FY 2022 were for psychostimulants.

• Of the 26,233 total arrests by the DEA in FY 2022, 8,035 (31%) were for methamphetamine, 5,118 (20%) were for powder cocaine, 1,009 (4%) were for crack cocaine, and 230 (<1%) were for other psychostimulants.

• DEA arrests for methamphetamine increased from 6,518 in FY 2002 to 9,335 in FY 2021, then decreased to 8,035 in FY 2022.

Washington, DC:  U.S. Department of Justice Office of Justice Programs Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2024. 25p.