By The Arizona Statistical Analysis Center

As part of the Arizona Criminal Justice Commission’s (ACJC) work as required by A.R.S. §41-2405, section A, the Commission is to: - Monitor the progress and implementation of new and continuing criminal justice legislation; - Analyze criminal justice programs created by the legislature in the preceding two years; and, - Analyze the effectiveness of the criminal code, with a discussion of any problems and recommendations for revision if deemed necessary This report is an update to the original felony code review report released in 2018 and adds an additional five-year period. ACJC’s Statistical Analysis Center (SAC) and policy staff reviewed those Arizona Revised Statutes containing a felony criminal penalty to determine the frequency of statute charges at the time of arrest across five-year, ten-year, 15-year, and 20-year periods. Staff reviewed an extract of the Arizona Computerized Criminal History (ACCH) repository, maintained at the Arizona Department of Public Safety (DPS), to capture arrest charging frequency across Arizona Revised Statute criminal codes. Key Findings The resulting data span from Fiscal Year (FY) 2002 to FY 2024 for a total of 20 years provided the following key findings (see overview on page 3): 􏰀 1,557 individual statutes contain a felony criminal penalty currently enforceable by Arizona law enforcement across nearly every A.R.S. Title. This is an increase of 71 new felony charges over the last five years 􏰀 545 of the 1,557 statutes (35 percent) have no arrest charges recorded. This

includes 28 statutes passed and signed into law since 2018 with no arrest charges. 􏰀 Many A.R.S. Titles have a very high percentage of statutes with a felony penalty that have not been charged in the past 20 years: o Title 06 – Banks and Financial Institutions (4 out of 6) o Title 08 – Child Safety (2 out of 3) o Title 16 – Elections and Electors (30 out of 43) o Title 20 – Insurance (20 out of 32) o Title 32 – Professions and Occupations (86 out of 107) o Title 35 – Public Finances (8 out of 12) o Title 38 – Public Officers and Employees (16 out of 20) o Title 36 – Public Health and Safety (20 out of 31) o Title 38 – Public Officers and Employees (14 out of 20) o Title 40 – Public Utilities and Carriers (7 out of 7) o Title 41 – State Government (30 out of 39) o Title 43 – Taxation of Income (1 out of 1) o Title 44 – Trade and Commerce (63 out of 90) o Title 45 – Waters (3 out of 3) o Title 49 – The Environment (47 out of 53) Expected Outcomes The Arizona Criminal Justice Commission hopes that this report, outlining the Arizona Revised Statutes that contain a felony criminal penalty and their use over the past twenty years, will spark a dialogue among Arizona’s legislators and policymakers about the increasingly complex landscape that has been created for Arizona citizens and law enforcement to navigate regarding illegal activities. Possible activities that could occur might include: 􏰀 Convening of stakeholder groups that deal with specific issue areas to review existing statutes that contain felony penalties to determine if they are still applicable and necessary 􏰀 Review by the legislature to determine if penalties contained in one statute are duplicative of penalties contained in another (for example is A.R.S. §5-115A2, Bribe of a Racing Personnel is a class 4 felony and has not been charged in the past 20 years, but A.R.S. §13-2309, Bribery of Participants in Professional or Amateur Games, Sports, Horse Races, Dog Races, Contests is also a class 4 felony and is regularly being charged) 􏰀 Action by the legislature to repeal statutes that are determined to be duplicative or have not been utilized after a specific period of time has elapsed

Phoenix: Arizona Statistical Analysis Center, 2024. 40p.

By The Center for Justice Research and Evaluation.

In response to feedback from Illinois Correctional Officers (COs) seeking stronger consequences for occurrences of indecent exposure and harassment by inmates within the confines of their correctional facilities, the Illinois legislature amended the Criminal Code of 2012, 750 ILCS 5 (Illinois Senate Democrats, 2023). The criminal offense of “lewd sexual display in a penal institution” became effective January 1, 2024 (Public Act 103- 283), with support from the Illinois Fraternal Order of Police and staff at Illinois correctional facilities (Kluver, 2023). This is defined specifically in 720 ILCS 5/11-9.2-1: (Section scheduled to be repealed on January 1, 2028) Sec. 11-9.2-1. Lewd sexual display in a penal institution. a) A person commits lewd sexual display in a penal institution when he or she is in the custody of a penal institution and knowingly engages in any of the following acts while he or she is confined in a penal institution: engages in a lewd exposure of the genitals or anus, for the purpose or effect of intimidating, harassing, or threatening one whom he or she believes to be in the presence or view of such acts. For purposes of this Section, "penal institution" does not include a facility of the Department of Juvenile Justice or a juvenile detention facility. b) Sentence. Lewd sexual display in a penal institution is a Class A misdemeanor. A person convicted of a second or subsequent violation for lewd sexual display in a penal institution is guilty of a Class 4 felony. c) A person charged with a violation of this Section shall be eligible for an evaluation for a mental health court program under the Mental Health Court Treatment Act, the provisions of Section 20 of that Act notwithstanding, and shall be given an eligibility screening and an assessment, pursuant to the provisions of Section 25 of the Mental Health Court Treatment Act, administered by a qualified mental health court professional independent of the penal institution where the individual is in custody. d) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (e) of Section 25 of the Mental Health Court Treatment Act, a person who has been charged with a violation of this Section shall not be liable for any fines, fees, costs, or restitution unless the person fails to successfully complete that person's court-ordered mental health court treatment program. e) All charges against a person for a violation of this Section shall be dismissed upon the court's

determination that the person has successfully completed the person's court-ordered mental health court treatment program. Unwillingness to participate in a court-ordered mental health court treatment program may result in prosecution under this Section. Failure to complete a mental health treatment court program shall have the consequences prescribed by the rules and regulations of that treatment court program. f) A person is not guilty of a violation of this Section for engaging in the conduct prohibited by this Section, if any of the following are true: a. The person is under 18 years of age or not confined to a penal institution. b. The person suffered from a behavioral health issue at the time of the prohibited conduct and that behavioral health issue was the direct cause for the person having engaged in the prohibited conduct. c. The person was not in the actual presence or view of another person. (g) This Section is repealed on January 1, 2028.

Chicago: Illinois Criminal Justice Information Authority. 2025. 12p.

By Lauren Knoth-Peterson, Whitney Hunt

The purpose of this resource is to identify whether states have established unique sentencing policies for individuals convicted of a sex offense authorizing community supervision for life. In states where lifetime supervision policies were identified, we also examined whether the state has an established pathway off of lifetime supervision status. This resource highlights each state’s relevant statutes to lifetime supervision policies with the green text emphasizing the pathway off of supervision (when applicable). There are limitations to this resource. First, we looked only for unique sentencing policies for individuals convicted of a sex offense. In some instances, states may have general

indeterminate sentencing structures by which convicted defendants may end up under supervision orders for life. For example, states may allow defendants sentenced to life in prison to apply for parole. If granted, parole may include community supervision for life, consistent with the underlying life incarceration sentence. Since these parole policies are not unique to sex offenses, but instead are applicable only when the court explicitly imposes a life sentence, we did not include these statutes in this report. For example, Idaho is an indeterminate sentencing state with a parole system. In some cases, individuals convicted of a sex offense may receive a sentence of life incarceration with the possibility of parole. If paroled, those individuals would be under parole supervision for the remainder of their sentence, which is for life. The Board of Correction in Idaho may submit a request to the Idaho Commission of Pardons and Parole for early termination of parole after serving at least 5 years on parole. However, since these parole policies do not apply to all sex offenses and are related to the underlying life imprisonment sentence and standard parole processes, we do not include these statutes in this report. State laws frequently change. Please note that any statutory language included in this document may be subject to change over time, and readers should verify that statutes have not been amended after publication of this resource.

Olympia, WA: Washington State Office of Financial Management, Public Safety Policy & Research Center. 2025. 96p.

By Nicole D. Porter

The United States has one of the highest incarceration rates in the world. Nearly two million people – disproportionately Black – are incarcerated in the nation’s prisons and jails. In the early 1970s, 360,000 persons were incarcerated in correctional facilities.

Criminal legal reform trends in 2024 were divergent at a time when politicians used punitive-sounding talking points to move voters fearful of a recent uptick in crime. However, stakeholders, including formerly incarcerated activists and lawmakers, saw some success in scaling back mass incarceration. Advocacy organizers and officials in at least nine states advanced reforms in 2024 that may contribute to decarceration, expand and guarantee voting rights for justice impacted citizens, and advance youth justice reforms.

Highlights include:

Decarceration Reforms: State lawmakers enacted legal reforms to reduce prison admissions and to adjust penalties to criminal sentences to more fairly hold persons convicted of certain crimes accountable. During 2024, policymakers in Oklahoma and Michigan adopted or expanded second look and compassionate release policies authorizing reconsideration of certain criminal legal sentences after a term of years.

Guaranteeing Voting Rights: While over 4 million people are ineligible to vote because of a felony conviction, voting rights reforms have expanded the vote to over two million people since 1997. This year, officials in Nebraska and Oklahoma approved measures to expand voting rights to persons after incarceration while lawmakers in Colorado passed legislation requiring all county jails to establish polling stations guaranteeing access to the ballot for incarcerated voters.

Youth Justice: Lawmakers in Indiana and Pennsylvania adopted policies that demonstrated a commitment to supporting young defendants including eliminating automatic charging of youth as adults for certain offenses and establishing practices that may reduce length of detention stays.

Highlights include:

Decarceration Reforms: State lawmakers enacted legal reforms to reduce prison admissions and to adjust penalties to criminal sentences to more fairly hold persons convicted of certain crimes accountable. During 2024, policymakers in Oklahoma and Michigan adopted or expanded second look and compassionate release policies authorizing reconsideration of certain criminal legal sentences after a term of years.

Guaranteeing Voting Rights: While over 4 million people are ineligible to vote because of a felony conviction, voting rights reforms have expanded the vote to over two million people since 1997. This year, officials in Nebraska and Oklahoma approved measures to expand voting rights to persons after incarceration while lawmakers in Colorado passed legislation requiring all county jails to establish polling stations guaranteeing access to the ballot for incarcerated voters.

Youth Justice: Lawmakers in Indiana and Pennsylvania adopted policies that demonstrated a commitment to supporting young defendants including eliminating automatic charging of youth as adults for certain offenses and establishing practices that may reduce length of detention stays.

Washington, DC: The Sentencing Project, 2024.

By Michael Vitiello

The United States’ War on Drugs has not been pretty. Moral panic has repeatedly driven policy when states and the federal government have regulated drugs. Responding to that panic, legislators have authorized severe sentences for drug offenses.

By design, Article III gives federal judges independence, in part, to protect fundamental rights against mob rule. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has often failed to protect fundamental rights in times of moral panic. For example, it eroded Fourth Amendment protections during the War on Drugs. Similarly, it failed to protect drug offenders from excessive prison sentences during the War on Drugs. This Article examines whether it is time for the Supreme Court to rethink its precedent upholding extremely long sentences for drug crimes.

In 1983, in Solem v. Helm, the Supreme Court held that the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause applies to terms of imprisonment. There, it found the imposition of a true-life sentence imposed on a repeat offender to be grossly disproportionate to the gravity of the defendant’s offense. Whatever hope Solem created that courts might limit excessive sentences proved to be false.

Two Supreme Court cases dealing with drug sentences, bracketing Solem, demonstrate the Court’s unwillingness to override legislatures’ discretion in imposing sentences. In 1982, the Court upheld a 40-year term of imprisonment imposed on an offender who possessed less than nine ounces of marijuana. In 1991, the Court upheld a true-life sentence imposed on an offender who possessed 672 grams of cocaine. The Court’s refusal to curtail such extreme sentences reflects its willingness to accede to the nation’s moral panic over drug usage.

Since the height of the War on Drugs, Americans have changed their views about drugs. Significant majorities of Americans favor legalization of marijuana for medical and recreational use. Many Americans favor a wholesale rethinking of drug policy. Despite studies in the 1950s and 1960s demonstrating beneficial use of drugs like LSD and psilocybin, Congress yielded to moral panic and included them in Schedule I when it enacted the Controlled Substances Act of 1970. Efforts are afoot at the state level to legalize the study of and to decriminalize the use of those and other drugs.

This Article argues that the Court should rethink its Eighth Amendment caselaw upholding severe drug sentences. The Court’s Eighth Amendment caselaw balances the severity of punishment against the gravity of an offense. In turn, the gravity of an offense turns on its social harm and the culpability of the offender. The Court upheld extreme drug sentences based on the view that drugs were a national scourge. Moral panic led it to overstate the social harm and the culpability of drug offenders. Scientifically based examination of drugs and drug policy should compel the Court to rethink its excessive punishment caselaw because the balance between severity of punishment and the gravity of drug offenses looks different when one has a better understanding of true costs and benefits of drug use.

Clev. St. L. Rev., 69, 441 2921

By Claire Austin

In the U.S., death row is made up of a disproportionate number of black persons. In capital trials, black defendants often face all white juries. The deep-rooted racial discrimination in the justice system impacts jury selection because prosecutors use peremptory strikes to remove black jurors from the jury panel. As the law stands today, the Sixth Amendment guarantee of an impartial jury made up of a fair representation of the jury applies only to the pool of jurors called in for jury service, not those who are actually selected to hear the case. This comment analyzes the Supreme Court decision, Holland v. Illinois 493 U.S. 474 (1990), which held that the Sixth Amendment does not prevent prosecutors from striking potential jurors based on their race. In doing so, the Court missed an opportunity to provide meaningful relief to black capital defendants who faced all-white juries. This comment argues for the reversal of Holland, extension of Sixth Amendment protections, and a change in the framework for questioning the use of peremptory challenges to remove black jurors.

Marquette Benefits and Social Welfare Law Review, 25 Marq. Ben. and Soc. Welfare L. Rev. 59 (2023)

By Equal Justice Initiative

Race and the Jury: Illegal Discrimination in Jury Selection, released online July 27, 2021, places the continuing illegal exclusion of jurors of color in its historical context as “a continuing legacy of our history of racial injustice,” documenting the country’s “long history of tolerating racial bias in jury selection and a continuing indifference to correcting widespread underrepresentation of people of color on juries.” The report, a follow up to the organization’s 2010 report, Illegal Racial Discrimination in Jury Selection, details the numerous factors that contribute to ongoing jury discrimination today, and what EJI describes as the “persistent and widespread” impact it continues to have on the U.S. legal system.

While racial discrimination in jury selection is present throughout the criminal legal system, the report finds that it has especially pernicious effects in capital trials. “In cases where the death penalty is a possible punishment, the absence of meaningful representation on juries shapes sentencing outcomes, making them less reliable and credible,” the report explains. “The effect is greatest for non-white defendants, as studies show that less representative juries convict and sentence Black defendants to death at significantly higher rates than white defendants. White jurors are also less likely to consider critical mitigating evidence supporting a life sentence, rather than the death penalty, for Black defendants.”

EJI says illegal jury discrimination “persists because those who perpetrate or tolerate racial bias — including trial and appellate courts, defense lawyers, lawmakers, and prosecutors — act with impunity. Courts that fail to create jury lists that fairly represent their communities face no repercussions. Prosecutors who unlawfully strike Black people from juries don’t get fined, sanctioned, or held accountable.”

To redress the problem, EJI recommends that courts and legislatures remove procedural barriers to reviewing claims of jury discrimination, adopt policies and practices that commit to fully representative jury pools, hold accountable decision makers who engage in racially discriminatory jury selection practices, and strengthen the standard of review of jury discrimination claims. However, EJI says, only a few states “have recognized the problem and implemented reforms or initiated studies” and “[m]ost states have done nothing.”

Montgomery, AL: Equal Justice Initiative, 2021. 107p.

Accountability: How Qualified Immunity Shields a Wide Range of Government Abuses, Arbitrarily Thwarts Civil Rights, and Fails to Fulfill Its Promises

By Jason Tiezzi, Robert McNamara, and Elyse Smith Pohl

Qualified immunity is perhaps America’s most controversial legal doctrine, erupting into the national consciousness during debate over police misconduct in 2020. Created by the U.S. Supreme Court four decades ago, the doctrine protects government officials from being sued for violating constitutional rights—unless victims can show those rights are “clearly established.” In practice, this often means pinpointing a published opinion from the Supreme Court or the federal appellate court in their jurisdiction finding the same conduct in the same circumstances unconstitutional.

The Supreme Court intends for qualified immunity to give government officials leeway to make reasonable mistakes—especially in tense or dangerous situations requiring quick thinking—without facing lengthy litigation, onerous discovery, or financial ruin. By insisting rights be clearly established to receive protection, the Court aims to put officials on notice of conduct to avoid before they face such consequences. Critics counter, however, that qualified immunity sets too high a bar for victims of abuse to seek justice and winds up protecting officials who intentionally, maliciously, or unreasonably violate the Constitution. They also argue the doctrine does not work as the Court intends.

This study adds new evidence to the record using the largest ever collection of federal appellate cases, covering the 11-year period from 2010 through 2020. It is the first to use cutting-edge automated techniques to parse thousands of federal circuit court opinions and answer key questions about cases where government defendants claim qualified immunity—what kinds of officials and conduct it protects, its impact on civil rights cases, and whether the doctrine is achieving its aims.

Key findings include:

In the federal circuit courts, qualified immunity appeals have become more common.

From 2010 through 2020, at least 5,526 cases before federal circuit courts raised qualified immunity on appeal, an average of about 500 cases a year.

And from the first half of our study period to the second, the annual average of qualified immunity appeals grew by 20%, even as civil appeals of all types fell.

Contrary to popular belief, qualified immunity is not just about police accused of excessive force. It shields a wide array of government officials and conduct.

While police were the most common defendants, fully half of appeals featured other types of government officials, either alongside or instead of police. Prison officials made up the next largest share, but in more than one in five of all appeals, or 21%, defendants were neither police

nor prison officials. These other officials included mayors and city managers, university and school officials, prosecutors and judges, and child protective services workers.

Excessive force was alleged in just 27% of appeals, followed by false arrest at 25%; some alleged both. But the third largest category, alleged in 18% of appeals, encompassed violations of First Amendment rights, including speech, association, and religious liberty.

Altogether, only 23% of appeals fit the popular conception of police accused of excessive force. In most First Amendment appeals, plaintiffs alleged government officials engaged in premeditated retaliation for protected speech or activity.

In a representative sample of 125 First Amendment appeals, 59% involved plaintiffs alleging premeditated abuse by government officials in retaliation for protected First Amendment activity. In nearly half of such cases, government workers alleged retaliation from their superiors, while in nearly a third, private citizens claimed they were targeted for retaliation by government officials.

Qualified immunity favors government defendants and makes it harder for plaintiffs to win—regardless of the merits of their claims.

In all, 59% of qualified immunity appeals were resolved solely in favor of government defendants, while 24% were resolved solely in favor of plaintiffs.

Qualified immunity disadvantages plaintiffs for arbitrary reasons, such as their circuit’s population or publication rate. These vary widely and influence the volume of clearly established law in a circuit—and therefore, the volume and variety of prior cases that plaintiffs can rely on to vindicate their rights.

Qualified immunity rulings often lack precision and clarity, again making it hard for plaintiffs to pinpoint the clearly established law required to win. In common with other legal experts, ours often could not untangle courts’ reasons for granting qualified immunity—if reasons were even offered.

When denied qualified immunity, government defendants have the right to file special immediate appeals—a right unavailable to plaintiffs. And they can do this multiple times in the same lawsuit. Such “interlocutory appeals” accounted for 96% of all defendant appeals.

These special appeals risk wearing down worthy plaintiffs with extended litigation. Their prevalence likely helps explain why the median duration of a qualified immunity lawsuit was three years and two months, 23% longer than the typical federal civil suit up on appeal.

Our findings provide more evidence that qualified immunity is a poor fit for achieving its goals.

Qualified immunity confuses instead of clarifies the rules government workers must follow to avoid burdensome litigation. If legal experts struggle to make sense of qualified immunity, the average government official—let alone one facing a life-or-death situation—cannot be expected to do so.

Qualified immunity fails to protect officials from the burdens of litigation, most notably potentially intrusive discovery. Nearly 70% of appeals came at the summary judgment stage of litigation, when courts typically have already allowed discovery.

Qualified immunity clogs up the courts with extra, often lengthy, appeals—some 2,000 interlocutory appeals that would not have existed without the special appeal rights given to government defendants.

These results suggest qualified immunity shields a much wider array of government officials and conduct than commonly thought. They also add to a growing body of research finding qualified immunity protects officials too much and our rights too little, all while failing to achieve its goals. This strengthens the argument for the Supreme Court or Congress to temper or—better yet—abolish the doctrine.

Whether through outright abolition or significant reform, courts and lawmakers can and should act to eliminate the unbounded impunity allowed by qualified immunity.

Arlington, VA: Institute for Justice, 2024. 6op.

By DICK M. CARPENTER II, JAIMIE CAVANAUGH & SAM GEDGE

Most, if not all, incorporated communities in the United States have municipal and traffic codes that delineate the powers and duties of local governments or provide rules and regulations for public activity in the community. The primary stated purpose of code enforcement is promoting and protecting public health and safety. Codes are commonly enforced through monetary fines and administrative fees. Recent years have seen growing concern about cities engaging in “taxation by citation”—that is, the use of code enforcement to raise revenue from fines and fees in excess of citations issued solely to protect and advance public safety. A significant focus of the concern is how taxation by citation violates rights in the pursuit of revenue. In this way, taxation by citation seems to illustrate Professor Bernadette Atuahene’s theory of stategraft: state agents transferring property from residents “to the state in violation of the state’s own laws or basic human rights,” often during times of budgetary austerity. But this Essay identifies important features of municipal codes and their enforcement that are not necessarily encompassed by this theory. It suggests how stategraft may be expanded to encompass laws, regulations, and systems that legally—if arguably unconstitutionally—allow or incentivize state actors to exploit their residents for the benefit of the bureaucrat’s budget.

Wisconsin Law Review, 2024(2), 707–728.

By Angelica Duran-Martinez

In the mid 2010s discussions about the pertinence of negotiating with criminal groups increased in Latin America. Although controversial, such negotiations are more common than often thought. This article asks: can negotiations reduce violence and generate peace? I argue that the homicide reduction potential of negotiations depends on the cohesion of the state and on the cohesion and hierarchical control of criminal groups. This in turn generates two challenges for peacebuilding: the challenge of scaling up and down security gains beyond homicide reduction, and the challenge of creating three-way arrangements that include civilians and navigate the blurry boundaries between states, civilians, and criminal actors. To conceptualize these challenges, I also distinguish top-down and bottom-up negotiations and argue that addressing these challenges requires bridging a divide between peace building principles emphasizing the importance of local contexts, and peace processes literature focusing on objective power considerations. I substantiate the theory using evidence from long term fieldwork, archival analysis, and forty-three interviews conducted for this project in Medellín-Colombia and extend the insights to assess the potential for peace negotiations in Mexico.

Crime Law and Social Change 82(4):867-891, 2023

By Megan T. Stevenson and Jennifer L. Doleac

Virginia adopted a risk assessment to help determine sentencing for sex offenders. It was incorporated as a one-way ratchet toward higher sentences: expanding the upper end of the sentence guidelines by up to 300 per cent. This led to a sharp increase in sentences for those convicted of sexual assault. More surprisingly, it also led to a decrease in sentences for those convicted of rape. This raises two questions: (a) why did sentencing patterns change differently across these groups, and (b) why would risk assessment lead to a reduction in sentence length? The first question is relatively easy to answer. While both groups saw an expansion in the upper end of the sentencing guidelines, only sexual assault had the floor lifted on the lower end, making leniency more costly. The second question is less straightforward. One potential explanation is that the risk assessment served as a political or moral shield that implicitly justified leniency for those in the lowest risk category. Even though the risk assessment did not change sentencing recommendations for low-risk individuals, it provided a 'second opinion' that could mitigate blame or guilt should the low-risk offender go on to reoffend. This decreased the risks of leniency and counterbalanced any increase in severity for high-risk individuals.

University of Toronto Law Journal, Volume 73, Supplement 1, 2023, pp. 59-72

By Jennifer L. Doleac

Half of individuals released from prison in the United States will be re-incarcerated within three years, creating an incarceration cycle that is detrimental to individuals, families, and communities. There is tremendous public interest in ending this cycle, and public policies can help or hinder the reintegration of those released from jail and prison. This review summarizes the existing empirical evidence on how to intervene with existing offenders to reduce criminal behavior and improve social welfare.

JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC LITERATURE

VOL. 61, NO. 2, JUNE 2023

(pp. 383–427)

By Emilie Bruzelius and Silvia S. Martins

Recreational cannabis laws (RCL) in the United States (US) can have important implications for people who are non-citizens, including those with and without formal documentation, and those who are refugees or seeking asylum. For these groups, committing a cannabis-related infraction, even a misdemeanor, can constitute grounds for status ineligibility, including arrest and deportation under federal immigration policy—regardless of state law. Despite interconnections between immigration and drug policy, the potential impacts of increasing state cannabis legalization on immigration enforcement are unexplored.

Methods

In this repeated cross-sectional analysis, we tested the association between state-level RCL adoption and monthly, state-level prevalence of immigration arrests and deportations related to cannabis possession. Data were from the Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse. Immigration arrest information was available from Oct-2014 to May-2018 and immigration deportation information were available from Jan-2009 to Jun-2020 for. To test associations with RCLs, we fit Poisson fixed effects models that controlled for pre-existing differences between states, secular trends, and potential sociodemographic, sociopolitical, and setting-related confounders. Sensitivity analyses explored potential violations to assumptions and sensitivity to modeling specifications.

Results

Over the observation period, there were 7,739 immigration arrests and 48,015 deportations referencing cannabis possession. By 2020, 12 stated adopted recreational legalization and on average immigration enforcement was lower among RCL compared to non-RCL states. In primary adjusted models, we found no meaningful changes in arrest prevalence, either immediately following RCL adoption (Prevalence Ratio [PR]: 0.84; [95% Confidence Interval [CI]: 0.57, 1.11]), or 1-year after the law was effective (PR: 0.88 [CI: 0.56, 1.20]). For the

deportation outcome, however, RCL adoption was associated with a moderate relative decrease in deportation prevalence in RCL versus non-RCL states (PR: 0.68 [CI: 0.56, 0.80]; PR 1-year lag: 0.68 [CI: 0.54, 0.82]). Additional analyses were mostly consistent by suggested some sensitivities to modeling specification.

Conclusions

Our findings suggest that decreasing penalties for cannabis possession through state RCLs may reduce some aspects of immigration enforcement related to cannabis possession. Greater attention to the immigration-related consequences of current drug control policies is warranted, particularly as more states weigh the public health benefits and drawbacks of legalizing cannabis.

BMC Public Health volume 24, Article number: 936 (2024)

By Jeremy D. Barnum, Dustin A. Richardson, Dulani Woods, Kevin D. Lucey, Meagan E. Cahill, Michael J. D. Vermeer, Brian A. Jackson

Midlevel police leaders (MLPLs), such as sergeants and lieutenants, have great influence over officers' perceptions, behaviors, and well-being and are crucial for effectuating organizational culture, goals, and objectives. Therefore, they are lynchpins for organizational function, innovation, and change. Given the substantial impact that MLPLs have on a police organization — and ultimately the delivery of public safety — agencies must have mechanisms in place to cultivate, identify, and select the best individuals for these positions. This is achieved through the promotion process — the advancement of organizational members to higher ranks and increased levels of responsibility. In general, the promotion process in police agencies involves some combination of written testing, oral interviews, and assessment center analyses. However, this process lacks uniformity across agencies, and there is a dearth of research on the most-effective ways to conduct police promotions.

On behalf of the National Institute of Justice, RAND and Police Executive Research Forum researchers convened an expert panel to discuss how agencies currently conduct promotions for MLPL positions. Through a series of interviews and a group discussion session, the workshop participants identified and prioritized 47 needs for improving promotions in policing, 26 of which were considered highest priority. These needs are related to bias, disparity, and barriers in promotions; the development of metrics to identify successful candidates; valid and reliable methods to assess candidates; training and career progression; and considerations about transparency and organizational justice.

Key Findings

Some promotion policies, practices, or accepted norms in some agencies may be in violation of employment law.

The existence of or lack of organizational policies (e.g., assignments, training opportunities, bargaining agreements, promotion procedures, accommodations for family circumstances) can create barriers that prevent some employees, particularly women and people of color, from pursuing promotions or being successful in the promotion process.

Although it is important to evaluate past performance, it is currently challenging to use performance evaluations as a metric in the promotion process because evaluation processes are inadequate, inconsistent, and inequitable.

There is a lack of longitudinal and follow-up research with people who have gone through the promotion process and served in leadership roles to assess the promotion process.

Human assessments are inherently subjective, which can lead to inconsistency, and are subject to intentional and unintentional bias. Agencies lack processes for selection, preparation, tools, and oversight for rater selection.

There are no standards or best practices for how stakeholders (e.g., community members, staff from other police agencies, members of the civil service commission, or representatives from other criminal justice and government agencies) should be involved in promotion processes.

Police agencies are not doing enough to provide transparent, fair, equitable, and reasonable assistance to their employees preparing for the promotion process.

Some police agencies provide insufficient constructive feedback to individuals who participated in a promotion process in an honest and respectful way. This prevents employees from remaining engaged and motivated and exposes agencies to turnover and legal liability.

Recommendations

Develop educational materials, curricula, and resource guides that summarize what organizations and employees should know about employment law.

Conduct quantitative and qualitative research to identify disparate barriers to promotion for otherwise qualified candidates.

Develop and validate metrics to evaluate performance across positions.

Conduct qualitative and quantitative research to identify challenges and successes from the perspective of the agency leaders who managed the process.

Conduct longitudinal research to identify challenges and successes from the perspective of the candidates who went through the process.

Conduct a systematic review to identify evidence-based best practices for selecting, training, and overseeing evaluators or raters.

Develop a best-practices guide to help agencies appropriately include stakeholders in promotion processes.

Develop a best-practices guide based on what effective agencies (and those in other industries) are already doing.

Develop training experiments that evaluate different feedback models.

Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2024, 31p.

By Lorenzo Vidino, Sergio Altuna

In December 2015, the Canada Revenue Agency (CRA), the Canadian federal government tax authority, opened an audit of the Muslim Association of Canada (MAC), the largest grassroots Muslim charity in Canada. MAC is a very influential actor within Canada’s organized Muslim community and is open about being a Muslim Brotherhood legacy group, admitting it was founded by individuals linked to the Brotherhood and is inspired by the group’s ideology. The CRA initiated its investigation with a comprehensive review of more than one million financial transactions and 415,874 emails. In doing so, it alleged multiple areas of MAC’s suspected non-compliance with Canada’s Income Tax Act and related regulations. Aside from various alleged irregularities related to accounting and funding matters, the CRA opened its inquiry on suspicion that MAC had advanced “unstated non-charitable collateral purposes,” namely the advancement of the Muslim Brotherhood organization. The CRA, argued further that MAC was not merely inspired by the ideas of Hassan al-Banna and the Muslim Brotherhood, as it stated, but that it regularly conducted a multiplicity of activities clearly aimed at furthering the goals of the Muslim Brotherhood as an organization. Doing so is a violation of the requirement established by Canadian law for entities that are registered as charities. The CRA went on to substantiate its decision with hundreds of pages that summarized the ample evidence it collected during the audit. In substance, it argued that three overlapping elements indicated that MAC acted as part of the organization of the Muslim Brotherhood: 1. Numerous key MAC leaders were actively involved in activities of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, having occupied senior position in the Freedom and Justice Party and later in the government of Mohammed Morsi; 2. Several MAC leaders had key roles in Canadian-based organizations that openly supported the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and allowed them to use MAC’s premises for free; 3. Members of the Egyptian and other Middle Eastern branches of the Muslim Brotherhood could almost automatically become members of MAC upon transferring to Canada and vice versa. The CRA concluded its report by stating that “the audit found that the Organization appears to conduct and support activities that further the advancement of the Muslim Brotherhood organization.” That means that, according to the CRA, MAC has not operated exclusively for charitable purposes, and the agency therefore assessed that “there may be grounds for revocation of the charitable status of the Organization.” This report takes no position on the CRA audit and its case against MAC. However, the investigation and the evidence uncovered during the process are useful and arguably surprising to anybody studying the Muslim Brotherhood in the West. It is neither unexpected not unprecedented that many top leaders of MAC served in the Morsi government in Egypt and were actively involved in proBrotherhood organizations in Canada. What sets the CRA's findings apart is the indication of a greater level of coordination, with constant communication and requests for action coming from the East towards their counterparts in the West —or, as the CRA refers to it, “authority over.” Even more surprising and telling is the ease in membership transfer from Middle Eastern branches of the Brotherhood to MAC and vice versa, a process resembling that of a student transferring from one campus to another within the same university system. As the CRA put it, “It is not entirely clear how the Organization, which purports to be entirely Canadian based with no foreign activities, is able to transfer membership to and from foreign organizations.” Whether these findings are limited to MAC and Canada, or indicative of broader trends across Western countries, remains an open question. Nonetheless, the evidence emerging from the Canadian investigation is unquestionably an important addition to a more complete understanding of how the Muslim Brotherhood in the West works.

Washington DC: Program on Extremism THE GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY , 2025. 25p

By Lord Verdirame KC and Richard Ekins KC (Hon)

In a paper published on 25 November 2024, we made clear that it would be unlawful for the British Government to attempt to arrest Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel pursuant to the arrest warrant that the International Criminal Court (ICC) issued on 21 November 2024. If the Government were to attempt to enforce the ICC arrest warrant, it would be acting beyond the scope of the powers conferred on it by the International Criminal Court Act 2001 and would be placing the UK in breach of its obligations in international law to respect state or diplomatic immunity. This paper develops this argument by considering three matters arising from our November 2024 paper. First, we assess what the Government has said since then about the ICC arrest warrant and about its obligations as a matter of UK law in relation to those warrants. We show that the Government has either misunderstood or misrepresented its legal obligations and seems intent on maintaining a state of uncertainty about the enforceability of the ICC arrest warrant in UK law, a position that does the Government no credit and cannot be reconciled with respect for the rule of law. Second, we consider again the immunity ratione personae of a serving Head of Government under customary international law. In our November paper, we took the view that State parties to the ICC Statute are still bound by the customary international law on immunities of senior State officials vis-à-vis non-State parties; most importantly for present purposes, they must observe the customary immunity ratione personae to which a serving Head of Government is entitled and which includes absolute immunity from arrest and from the exercise of foreign criminal jurisdiction. This view has received further support since we first outlined it. The UK would not be acting in breach of its international obligations in refusing to enforce the ICC arrest warrant against Prime Minister Netanyahu. Third, we examine the position of former Defence Minister Yoav Gallant. Being no longer in office, Mr Gallant is entitled only to immunity ratione materiae, which includes immunity from arrest and from the exercise of foreign criminal jurisdiction but only in respect of official acts. It would however be wrong to assume that the effect of the Pinochet ruling is that the immunity ratione materiae of former Minister Gallant would not extend to the crimes under the ICC Statute of which he is accused. We argue that this interpretation of the Pinochet ruling is incorrect. It thus follows that the Government has no authority under UK law to enforce the ICC arrest warrant against Yoav Gallant and any attempt to enforce the warrant,  including by transferring the warrant to an appropriate judicial officer to endorse, would place the UK in breach of its international obligations.     

London: Policy Exchange, 2025. 30p.

By Jennifer A. Tallon, Sruthi Naraharisetti, Viet Nguyen, Lisa Bailey Vavonese, and Michael Mrozinski

Recognizing the “obvious truth” that defendants cannot be assured a fair trial without representation, the Supreme Court has held that the right to counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment requires states to provide a lawyer if a defendant cannot afford one. However, in 42 states and the District of Columbia, individuals experiencing poverty are charged a fee for invoking their Sixth Amendment right to counsel (hereafter referred to as “defender fees”). While defender fees are a marginal contributor to legal system fines and fees imposed on individuals, these fees are unique amongst the larger universe of fines and fees insofar as they essentially impose a fee for a Constitutional guarantee. Although there is a growing body of research on the use and impact of legal system fines and fees broadly defined, specific attention to defender fees remains underexplored within this literature. Policymakers and practitioners can help to ensure quality representation through an evidence-based approach to the problems and potential solutions associated with defender fees. To fill this research gap and start building the necessary evidence base, the Center for Justice Innovation (Center) partnered with the National Legal Aid & Defender Association (NLADA) to conduct two national surveys to document the uses and perceptions of defender fees among (1) public defense attorneys and (2) public defense and court leadership. What follows is a summary of those findings and a discussion of potential policy and practice considerations. Findings suggest that public defense attorneys are receptive to exploring policy and practice solutions to mitigate the impact of defender fees. • Most public defense attorneys surveyed for this study opposed the use of defender fees, the most common reason being the collateral consequences experienced by clients. Public defense leaders who responded to our survey5 were more supportive, seeing the benefit of fees in offsetting the costs of the public defense system. • Contrary to prior research, few attorneys in our study reported defender fees negatively impacting the attorney-client relationship. Still, some had witnessed clients waive their right to counsel because they could not pay an upfront defender fee. • We also asked attorneys to describe how statutes on defender fees apply in practice, and there was considerable variability, suggesting the need for greater standardization in terms of equipping attorneys with the skills to advocate against the fees and for judges to consistently apply procedural safeguards like ability to pay determinations. • Finally, a secondary survey of public defense and court leaders illustrated jurisdictions’ difficulties tracking data, specifically estimating outstanding debt or the revenue associated with defender fees.

New York: New York Center for Justice Innovation, 2025. 25p.

Edited by Kaius Tuori and Heta Bjorklund

Roman law is widely considered to be the foundation of European legal culture and an inherent source of unity within European law. Roman Law and the Idea of Europe explores the emergence of this idea of Roman law as an idealized shared heritage, tracing its origins among exiled German scholars in Britain during the Nazi regime. The book follows the spread and influence of these ideas in Europe after the war as part of the larger enthusiasm for European unity. It argues that the rise of the importance of Roman law was a reaction against the crisis of jurisprudence in the face of Nazi ideas of racial and ultra-nationalistic law, leading to the establishment of the idea of Europe founded on shared legal principles. With contributions from leading academics in the field as well as established younger scholars, this volume will be of immense interests to anyone studying intellectual history, legal history, political history and Roman law in the context of Europe.

London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2019

By Carolyn Strange, Daniel Pascoe, and Andrew Novak

Literature on opposition to the death penalty typically characterizes abolition as inexorable and attributes its fulfillment to the age of human rights. Although most countries abolished capital punishment after the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, this article uses three comparative case studies to demonstrate abolition’s entanglement with a broader range of political, legal, and cultural factors. Applying a historically grounded non-teleological approach, we offer three insights. First, civilizationist values drove abolitionism in countries in the “vanguard,” such as Canada and England/Wales, where human rights rationales were expressed well after abolition and as a mark of superiority. Second, death penalty abolition has often allied with decolonization and penal reform, but assertions of independence and sovereignty have periodically provoked reinstatement, as in Mexican and Philippine history, which underscores the fragility of abolition. Third, state-centric approaches to de jure and de facto abolition overlook the practice of extrajudicial and summary “rebel” executions in polities such as Myanmar and Mali, which lack a state monopoly on force. Further historical studies that do not presuppose a human rights explanation of abolition and that compare jurisdictions within as well as between the Global North and South will better grasp the death penalty’s complex history.

Punishment & SocietyOnlineFirst, 2024, 20p.

Edited by Jacqueline Behrend and Laurence Whitehead

This important book offers an original perspective on the rule of law, development, and democracy in Latin America, establishing a new approach in recognizing the realities of political economy as opposed to merely structural and institutional factors. With contributions from an international team of experts, the book outlines the main challenges that have arisen in the pursuit of a developmental agenda in the region, including subnational variations, state capture by local elites, variations in state capacity, border divergence from centrally designed perspectives, environmental conflicts, uneven access to justice and the role of international organizations. In doing so, the book explores the democratic and developmental implications of conflicts over the rule of law and its application, uneven enforcement, and state capture. Whether a reference tool for the seasoned scholar, a guide aiding practitioner's individual expertise or an introduction to students interested in the complex intersections between the rule of law, development and democracy, this book is a must-have for any library.

London; New York: Routledge, 2025. 318p.