By Jodie M. Dewey , Patrick Hibbard , Dennis P. Watson , Juleigh Nowinski Konchak and Keiki Hinami 

Roughly 24–36% of people who are incarcerated in the U.S. are formally diagnosed with opioid use disorder (OUD). Once released, individuals involved with the criminal legal system (CLS) face increased risks of return to use and fatality and are 129 times more likely to die from an overdose within the first two weeks of release compared to those without CLS involvement. People who are CLS-involved and who are seeking a recovery living environment can access temporary stable housing through recovery homes. However, entering a recovery home can be difficult due to fragmentation among recovery housing organizations and their non-uniform application and screening procedures. A navigation pilot program was implemented to provide clients with recovery home placement advice, pre-screening, and referrals in Cook County, IL. Existing research on recovery homes has rarely examined the importance of recovery housing navigation for enhancing service engagement among CLS-involved individuals receiving medications for OUD. Methods.   Semi-structured qualitative interviews were conducted with 22 clients and three recovery housing navigators as part of a program evaluation of the navigation program pilot. Qualitative software was used to organize and qualitatively analyze transcripts through several rounds of coding producing emergent themes, which were then triangulated, and expanded using navigator data. Results.  Clients seeking recovery home services reported multiple prior challenges securing safe and supportive recovery living environments. Despite low initial expectations, clients described their interactions with housing navigators in favorable terms and felt navigators worked with them effectively to identify and meet their housing and substance use needs in a timely manner. Clients also commented on their partnerships with the navigator throughout the process. Interactions with navigators also calmed fears of rejection many clients had previously experienced and still harbored about the process, which bolstered client-navigator relationships and client motivation to engage with additional services. 

Health Justice 2024 Sep 14;12(1):37

By Lauren B. Edelman, and Jessica Cabrera

With the rise of the #MeToo movement, there has been a groundswell of attention to sex-based harassment. Organizations have pressured high-level personnel accused of harassment to resign or fired them outright, and they have created or revised their anti-harassment policies, complaint procedures, and training programs. This article reviews social science and legal scholarship on sex-based harassment, focusing on definitions and understandings of sexual (and sex-based) harassment, statistics on its prevalence, the consequences of harassment both for those who are subjected to it and for organizations, and explanations for why sex-based harassment persists. We then discuss the various steps that organizations have taken to reduce sex-based harassment and the social science literature on the effectiveness of those steps. We conclude that many organizational policies prevent liability more than they prevent harassment, in part because courts often fail to distinguish between meaningful compliance and the merely symbolic policies and procedures that do little to protect employees from harassment

Annual Review of Law and Social Science Vol. 16:361-383 Vol. 16:361-383 

By Luc Altmann, Mariane Piccinin Barbieri and Sophia Kilroy 

This policy paper presents a step-by-step assessment to help countries implement the OECD Recommendation on Access to Justice and People-Centred Justice Systems. The paper draws on the United Kingdom's model for measuring access to His Majesty’s Courts and Tribunals Service. It is designed to help policymakers adapt this assessment model to their specific contexts and provides guidance on using data to identify and address barriers to court services. With a focus on people-centred justice, it includes good practices and country examples for using data to realise equal access to justice for all.

OECD Public Governance Policy Papers, No. 60, OECD Publishing

By Leigh Goodmark

The Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) has been hailed as the federal government's signature legislation responding to gender-based violence. VAWA, passed in 1994 and reauthorized three times since then, has created several new programs and protections for victims of gender-based violence. VAWA is, however, primarily a funding bill and what it primarily funds is the criminal legal system. But the criminal legal response to gender-based violence has not been effective in decreasing rates of gender-based violence or deterring violence. A VAWA that discontinued funding for the criminal legal system and instead focused on economics, prevention, and community-based resources—a noncarceral VAWA—could better meet the needs of victims of gender-based violence and target the underlying causes of that violence.

Annu. Rev. Criminol. 2022. 5:115–31

By Sarah Esther Lageson

This review analyzes criminal record stigma and surveillance through the concept of digital punishment: the collection and widespread dissemination of personally identifiable data by the American criminal legal system and subsequent private actors. The analysis is organized into three parts: a descriptive account of the technological, legal, and social factors that have created mass criminal record data; a theoretical framework for understanding digital criminal records through stigma and surveillance theories; and an argument that contemporary criminal records constitute digital punishment, with emphasis placed on how digital records are disordered, commodified, and biased. I close by raising policy-relevant questions about the widespread disclosure and use of criminal legal system data for extralegal purposes.

Annu. Rev. Criminol. 2022. 5:67–90

By Ben Grunwald

We know that criminal defendants who plead guilty receive lower sentences than those convicted at trial, but there’s widespread disagreement about why. One camp of scholars believes this plea-trial differential represents a deeply troubling and coercive penalty; a second believes it’s merely a freedom-enhancing discount; and a third denies any meaningful distinction between the two at all. One reason for this disagreement is theoretical—it’s not at all clear what these concepts mean. Another is empirical—in the absence of precise conceptual definitions, we lack relevant data because scholars don’t know what to look for when searching for evidence of penalties and discounts in the real world. This Article seeks to bring greater theoretical and empirical clarity to the debate. To that end, I propose a theoretical definition of plea discounts and trial penalties. Applying this framework to the existing literature, I argue that there is strong theoretical and anecdotal evidence of trial penalties but little systematic empirical evidence. Nearly all of the statistical research has only studied the plea-trial differential; because both discounts and penalties are equally consistent with the existence of such a differential, the literature cannot distinguish between them. To develop a robust statistical test of the discount and penalty theories, we need to look elsewhere—where they make different predictions about prosecutorial behavior. Contrary to the views of the third camp of scholars—who maintain that’s impossible—I show that discounts and penalties are only indistinguishable if we assume litigation costs and acquittal probabilities are static. But they aren’t. They change all the time, and as a result, the discount and penalty theories diverge from each other, predicting different prosecutorial behavior. I argue that this theoretical insight might be used to develop an empirical test to help assess the prevalence and intensity of discounts and penalties in criminal court.

 37 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 261 (2021).

By James Osborne

This paper explores the intersection of federalism and legal forgiveness mechanisms in the United States, emphasizing the role of the Tenth Amendment in safeguarding state autonomy. It examines how executive and legislative mechanisms, such as pardons, commutations, set-asides, and expungements, have evolved from their common law origins into modern legal practices. While executive clemency remains a crucial tool, legislative actions have also significantly shaped state-level forgiveness processes. By analyzing the balance between federal and state authority, the paper argues that states maintain the right to define and manage their mechanisms of legal forgiveness, reflecting the enduring principles of mercy, justice, and rehabilitation.

By James A. Densley and Jillian K. Peterson

This study investigates how the COVID-19 pandemic and the civil unrest following George Floyd’s murder influenced the 2020 homicide surge, focusing on individuals already at high risk for violence. Based on life history interviews with 18 people convicted of homicide in Minnesota, the research explores how the disruptions of 2020 intensified pre-existing vulnerabilities, accelerating pathways to lethal violence. Participants reported that the breakdown of social order, loss of routine, and economic instability created conditions that rapidly escalated violence within their lives and communities. This qualitative analysis complements existing quantitative research by offering a detailed account of the micro-level experiences behind the homicide spike, revealing how large-scale societal disruptions can shape individual trajectories toward serious violence. Findings underscore the need for policies that address structural inequalities and ensure continuity of social support and mental health services during periods of widespread upheaval to prevent future escalations in violence.

JOURNAL OF CRIME AND JUSTICE 2024, AHEAD-OF-PRINT, 1-10

By Rajan Khatiwoda

The main ambition of this book lies in a detailed analysis of the formation and enforcement of Nepal’s Mulukī Ain of 1854, specifically focusing on the provisions regarding homicide within the Mulukī Ains of 1854 and 1870. This study also examines contemporaneous legal records, revealing the complexities of the Ain’s implementation. The articles on homicide serve as a microcosm illustrating the broader evolution of Nepal’s legal code, which departed from outdated punishments like genital mutilation and introduced fines and imprisonment instead. Still, the innovations introduced into the Ain of 1854 were not uniformly progressive. The Ain in its various stages of development thus showcases the complex ways in which legal systems inevitably undergo transformation.

 Heidelberg: Heidelberg University Publishing (heiUP), 2024. 439p.

By JFA Institute

The Colorado Justice Data Landscape Report is provided as a service to the public and to policy makers interested in Colorado’s adult criminal and youth justice systems. This report is a compilation of existing information available on criminal justice systems that should be seen as a summary and a benchmark for future data metrics. It is not intended to be an exhaustive or single-use resource. The report also provides an overview of Colorado’s adult and juvenile justice legislation from 2013 to present. Direct links to how this legislation may have quantitatively affected the criminal justice system cannot be made from this analysis. This report is first an almanac of key criminal justice system indicators but can serve as a means to highlight areas where more in-depth research can be done to expand understanding on how demographics, socio-economic factors, and racial inequities can influence an individual’s involvement in the Colorado justice system. Criminal justice systems are often complex and influenced by many factors. It is impossible to attribute a single cause or condition to “explain” what may cause crime, individual behaviors, or emerging trends that cause harm or jeopardize public safety. The best we can hope for is to use historical data and provide context to explain trends and better inform policy makers. Government policy should be based on informed decision making and this report is designed as a visual summative reference document of tables, charts, and narrative to offer highlights into criminal justice trends in Colorado. The most up to date trend data on state demographic, socio-economic factors, crime, arrests, court processes, incarceration, and community supervision are provided by age, race/ethnicity, gender, and region, where available. This report attempts to use “person first” language where possible and will generally use this language unless directly referring to, citing or quoting data sources. Words that encompass and define multiple groups of individuals and situations, like homeless or absconder, remain unchanged.

The presentation of data in this report shows Colorado as a State that has been greatly impacted by high levels of overall population growth over the past twenty years. According to U.S. Census data, Colorado’s overall population grew every year in the last decade making it the 6th fastest growing state in the US since 20101 . During that time, the population became less White with People of Color making up almost 35 percent of the state population by 2022. While this percentage is still well below the comparable US percentage, it marks a sizeable shift in Colorado demographics. Total population growth was concentrated in but not limited to urban areas. While the resident population grew, Colorado also experienced positive metrics of prosperity as the unhoused population and unemployment declined universally prior to 2020. After implementation of COVID-19 societal restrictions in 2020, Colorado saw a sharp increase in unemployment to over two and half times that of pre-COVID levels, followed by a quick rebound two years later. The unhoused population has been a recent issue in Colorado’s Denver capital area since COVID, gaining both political and media attention. Incidents of homelessness in the metro Denver area have increased almost 30 percent since 2019. The number of individuals experiencing homelessness throughout the rest of the state, however, followed a different trend, declining slightly from 2020 to 2022. Like national trends, crime rates in Colorado have been on a long-term trajectory of decreasing. Because of Colorado’s rapidly growing population, it is necessary to examine crime as a rate standardized against the size of the state population. Beginning in 2021, Colorado experienced a sharp rebounding increase in both violent and property crime rates, although the increases were pocketed to certain crimes in each category. Total increases in the violent crime rate were fueled by an increase in aggravated assaults while increases in the total property crime rate were fueled by a spike in thefts of motor vehicles and motor vehicle parts. Court filings, felony case resolutions, and sentence dispositions have remained stable in recent years, with declines in 2020 due to COVID-19 court shutdowns. Directly related to the slowing of case processing by courts and decreased law enforcement activity, newly sentenced prison admissions and jail bookings both saw a downward trajectory. Like US trends, all Colorado adult incarcerated and supervised populations were greatly impacted. As the pandemic waned in recent years, these populations have begun to rebound but have yet to reach pre-CVOID levels. Colorado’s Youthful Offender System continues its long-term de-incarceration trend, housing less than one-quarter of the youths it did in 2005. This is the result of a historic movement in 1991 by the state to limit the use of the criminal justice system for youths. As Colorado and the nation move beyond the impacts of COVID 19, it is important to learn from both the non-intended impacts and the impacts of measures taken intentionally to address the pandemic on the criminal justice system to better inform future decision making.    

By Luke Kelly

This rapid literature review finds evidence of varied bail conditions in Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda and Tanzania. The African Charter, which all the states have ratified, supports the right to bail, as do other international instruments. Most of the countries surveyed allow bail, but conditions vary as do practical applications. This review surveys the law on bail, as well as evidence on how the laws are enacted in practice. Legal documents, as well as academic and policy analysis have been used. This includes some analysis of "wider structural socio-political contexts, existing institutions/rules of the game (both formal and informal), associated incentive and interest structures and the particular features of the balance of power between relevant actors and stakeholders. This review highlights some key findings, including in Kenya, there is a right to bail for all offences (serious offences by a court only), but much discretion is granted to the authorities, and research has found that the rules are applied inconsistently and there is a high rate of pre-trial detention. Meanwhile, bail is a right for most in Uganda, but bail for some serious crimes can only be granted by the High Court; however, in practice, it is hard to get bail and there is a high rate of pre-trial detention. In Rwanda, bail may be given for all offences provided conditions are met and the rate of pre-trial detention is relatively low, although there is evidence that some are detained outside of the judicial system and without a trial or the option of bail. Finally, in Tanzania, bail can be granted with certain mandatory restrictions and there is an on-going legal dispute about whether the right to bail extends to those accused of certain serious crimes. Research shows refusal of bail is being used against critics of the Tanzanian government and there is a high rate of pre-trial detention.

Brighton, UK: Institute of Development Studies, K4D helpdesk service, 2020. 14p.

By Arie Freiberg

The relationship between alcohol and other drugs (AOD), the criminal law, and sentencing has a long and tortuous history in Victoria. It is a saga of changing theories regarding the nature of substance use and addiction, the link between substance use and crime1 and oscillating responses to AOD-related crime ranging from ‘law and order’ to harm minimisation, from more severe penalties to decriminalisation. Over 170 years or so, Victoria’s sentencing responses have evolved from the traditional sanctions of fines, imprisonment, common law bonds and probation to a complex mix of pre-sentence interventions, diversion programs, a range of intermediate sanctions, various forms of suspended sentences and problem-oriented court models such as the drug and alcohol court. Although the criminal law forms the foundation of the legal framework for AOD offending, sentencing law and practice play an important part in that structure. They provide the context for medical and other interventions aimed at addressing the underlying causes of drug related offending.2 This paper argues that although there have been many innovations in sentencing, they have generally had only a marginal effect on AODrelated crime. While there exists a substantial literature on the sentencing of AOD-related offences (Sentencing Advisory Council 2015), and on AOD treatment policy (Ritter and Berends 2016), less attention has been paid to the structure, content and effectiveness of the various sanctions employed over the years. In contrast, this paper reflects on over 170 years of AOD sentencing reform, arguing that many of the interventions have been less than successful due to their poor construction, inadequate resourcing, lack of continuity and clarity of purpose, unrealistic and inflexible conditions, geographic disparity, and unresponsiveness to different groups of offenders. This paper concludes that sentencing alone can never provide the answer to AOD-related crime and that far more fundamental reform to the regulation of AOD-related offending is required. These conclusions reflect the current impasse between the clear and undeniable failure of the war on drugs and the continued pursuit of the same law and order policies that, asthis paper shows, have failed to provide lasting solutions  

Collingwood 3066, Victoria : The Victorian Alcohol and Drug Association (VAADA) i , 2023. 34p.

By Barry Friedman & Danielle Keats Citron

Working hand-in-hand with the private sector, largely in a regulatory vacuum, policing agencies at the federal, state, and local levels are acquiring and using vast reservoirs of personal data. They are doing so indiscriminately, which is to say without any reason to suspect the individuals whose data they are collecting are acting unlawfully. And they are doing it in bulk. People are unlikely to want this personal information shared with anyone, let alone law enforcement. And yet today, private companies are helping law enforcement gather it by the terabyte. On all of us. Our thesis is straightforward: the unregulated collection of this data must cease, at least until basic rule-of-law requisites are met. Any collection must be authorized by democratically accountable bodies. It must be transparent. It must be based on clear proof of efficacy (that a legitimate purpose actually is being served). There must be protections that minimize or avoid harms to individuals and society. And, of course, there must be judicial review of whether indiscriminate bulk data collection is constitutional, either at all or with regard to specific programs. The basis for this thesis is a first-of-its-kind review of instances, from the dawn of the Information Age, in which Congress acted on these very issues. Much of that history involves indiscriminate collection of data on Americans for reasons of national and domestic security, because national security represents the outer bounds of what law enforcement and intelligence agencies are permitted to do, and much of what is done in the name of national security is inappropriate for domestic policing. Yet, in incident after incident, Congress made clear that indiscriminate bulk collection of Americans’ data is unacceptable, unlawful, and of dubious constitutionality. To the extent that such collection was permitted at all, Congress demanded the very requisites specified above. Today’s indiscriminate bulk surveillance by federal, state, and local policing agencies violates virtually all of these congressionally established norms. It should cease, at least until the rule-of-law requisites are met. 

Virginia Law Review [Vol. 110:1351 2024.

By David Hyman | Mohammad H. Rahmati

Crime doesn’t pay. Or does it? We study the role of expectations regarding sanctions and the likelihood of detection on whether people obey the law. We examine how expectations influence whether people obey the law and conduct simulations of various enforcement counter-factuals. We find the average assessment of the likelihood of detection is quite accurate, but those who (mistakenly) believe the probability is lower than it is are much more likely to break the law. Further, expectations with regard to the likely consequences of getting caught are also heterogeneous. In our simulations, perceived fines have little impact on willingness to break the law, but a higher perceived likelihood of apprehension has an appreciable impact. Because marginal respondents are pivotal in the rate of law-breaking, debiasing expectations among the whole population has little impact.

Unpublished paper, 2024.

By J. Gormley

This new report published by the Sentencing Council is part of a biennial series reviewing the existing research into the effectiveness of sentencing commissioned to enable the Council to consider the most up-to-date evidence when developing and revising guidelines. This report updates the report published by the Sentencing Council in 2022 and reviews what ‘effectiveness’ might mean from the perspective of four key groups: offenders (specifically with regard to deterrence); the public; victims; and sentencers (judges and magistrates).

By Stephen Eide

Introduction - Mental health courts place seriously mentally ill defendants in community treatment as an alternative to incarceration. In recent decades, these and other “problem-solving” courts have expanded dramatically nationwide. These programs were long seen as core elements of criminal justice reform and frequently reduce recidivism more effectively than traditional court systems. But recently, problem-solving courts’ place in the criminal justice reform agenda has become more ambiguous. Not only has energy shifted toward more radical ideas (such as jail “abolition”), but some far-reaching reforms threaten court programs’ traditional incentive structure. Mental health courts rely on criminal sanctions as leverage; they lose that leverage when criminal justice reforms reduce or jettison the use of criminal sanctions entirely. This brief assesses mental health courts’ future in an era of criminal justice reform. It considers how sentencing, bail, and discovery reforms threaten the structure of mental health courts. It also evaluates attempts to “co-opt” the model, through New York’s “Treatment Not Jail Act.” Overall, the brief argues that mental health courts will retain their relevance for the foreseeable future, owing mainly to their small scale. Mental health courts serve only a small fraction of the universe of mentally ill offenders. They will therefore never contribute significantly to mass de-carceration, the goal of progressive reformers. But that also means that they are likely to retain their relevance, even if the use of criminal sanctions declines, as long as the population of mentally ill offenders remains substantial. This brief will conclude with suggestions on how to sustain mental health courts in the future 

New York: The Manhattan Institute, 2024. 15p.

By Hannah Rose and Gina Vale

Also‑called ‘new generation of extremists’ has attracted significant media attention but has suffered from a lack of transparent data and comprehensive, youth‑specific analysis. Against the backdrop of a rapidly evolving threat landscape, this report presents the first in‑depth research into child terrorist activity in England and Wales. Through the construction of a unique dataset of children convicted of terrorism offences in England and Wales since 2016 – published live alongside this report – it investigates how domestic policing and the criminal justice system understand child‑terrorism offending. Key Data Points In the UK since 2016, 43 individuals have been convicted of terrorism offences they committed as minors. Of these, 42 were boys, with only one girl. While the oldest offenders were days before their respective 18th birthdays, the youngest was only 13 years old. Two clear waves of child terrorism offending can be identified. The first, dominated by Islamist cases, runs concurrently with the peak of Islamic State’s territorial ‘caliphate’ until its collapse in 2018. The second wave predominantly comprises extreme‑right cases, emerging in 2018 in the context of post-National Action and the decentralisation of extreme‑right online networks. In total, 16 cases relate to Islamist activity, 25 to the extreme right, and two to unknown or unclear ideologies. Almost a third of the children were convicted of preparing an act of terrorism, including the construction of improvised explosive devices, the plotting of complex mass‑casualty attacks, and attempts by seven children to travel independently overseas for the purpose of engaging in terrorism. Eight children – five extreme right and three Islamist – planned to commit domestic acts of terrorism on UK soil. Eleven minors were convicted of encouraging terrorism, one for providing training for terrorism, one for membership of a banned organisation and one for inviting support for a banned organisation. The most common offence, committed by 26 minors, was the collection of terrorist propaganda. Children created their own propaganda, engaged with violent extremist literature and downloaded operational materials. 19 minors disseminated banned materials with friends, family and anonymous online networks. Proportionally, more extreme right than Islamist offenders pleaded guilty, with many denouncing previously held views, citing adverse childhood experiences, explaining their isolation and desire to fit in with online ecosystems, and claiming childhood innocence. The most common sentence was non‑custodial, accompanied by a rehabilitative and monitoring order, which was handed down to twel  sentence, awarded in two separate Islamist cases, was eleven years to life. The disparity in sentencing between ideological categories may be shaped by four factors: the age at sentencing, greater severity of offence, stronger mitigating circumstances among extreme‑right offenders and a higher proportion of not‑guilty pleas entered by Islamist defendants. A New Threat? Children did not merely mimic the actions or do the bidding of older individuals, but proved to be innovators and amplifiers in their own right. Many attempted and managed to recruit peers and older family members, prepare acts of terrorism without the help of adults, and create their own propaganda images, videos and manifestos. In anonymous transnational online extremist ecosystems, which are widely available and have very low barriers to participation, the potential impact of extremist minors is on a par with adults. Children’s support of terrorist networks presents a new threat. While no attack has been committed by a child in the UK to date, late‑stage foiled plots and transnational activism demonstrate this potentiality. However, children cannot merely be treated as ‘small adults’ with heavily securitised policies. An outcome‑focused system must balance the interests of the public and targeted communities with the best interests of the child to address root causes of radicalisation and secure successful reintegration and threat mitigation.  

London: International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation, 2023. 76p.

By Vanessa Bettinson

• Coercive control is a recognised form of domestic abuse under section 1 of the Domestic Abuse Act 2021 and it is a criminal offence to engage in controlling or coercive behaviour in an intimate or family relationship under section 76 of the Serious Crime Act 2015. Domestic abuse disproportionately affects women as victims and this is reflected in the female prison population where research has found that 57% of women in the prison population in England and Wales have been victims of domestic abuse.

• Coercive control by a male intimate partner or relative can directly result in women’s offending. This occurs in a variety of ways such as taking responsibility for a partner’s crime, possession of a controlled substance belonging to an abuser and theft to support a partner’s drug habit, stealing personal items or using violent resistance against the abuser.

• Coercive control has also been linked to women’s reoffending with short custodial sentences leading to financial hardship and homelessness. Access to women’s refuges is limited as female offenders often have complex and multiple needs which make them ineligible for most refuges. Returning to an abuser to avoid homelessness is likely to lead to the continuation of coerced offending. Abusive partners can also prevent a female offender from complying with supervision under a community order by exerting coercive and controlling behaviours on them. In an effort to maintain their safety, the victim-offender can perceive that compliance with the abuser’s demands is their safest option.

• Existing sentencing guidelines do recognise ‘coercion, intimidation or exploitation’ as a mitigating factor in sentencing. It can operate as a factor that lowers the culpability threshold in some offence specific sentencing guidelines or, alternatively, it can be assessed as personal mitigation in accordance with the Sentencing Council’s ‘General guideline: overarching principles’. This means there is a high potential that coercive control as mitigation in sentencing is not consistently applied to all sentencing decisions.

• The guidelines do not explicitly adopt the term coercive control and sentencers could be limiting their approach to coercion for mitigation purposes to physical forms of coercion. HM Courts and Tribunals ought to apply the statutory guideline that supports the Domestic Abuse Act 2021 at sentencing hearings, however, there is no research on the ability of sentencers to identify coercive control and apply it to sentencing decisions.

• Pre-Sentence Reports (PSRs) are a valuable tool to assist the court in understanding the role coercive control played in the offending, however, there is a reduction in the volume of full written PSRs being requested by courts. In addition, there is no research on the ability of probation officers to identify coercive control and the extent it is included in PSRs

London: Sentencing Academy, 2024. 16p.

By Kathryn Hollingsworth, Jonathan Bild and Gavin Dingwall

This report describes the findings from a survey of 1,038 children living in England and Wales aged between 10-17 years, drawn from the general public and conducted in 2023. The research contributes to the literature on the public’s knowledge and opinion of sentencing and this survey follows up an earlier report by the Sentencing Academy, published in January 2022, which explored public knowledge of sentencing practice and trends through a survey of adult respondents. This report, however, focuses on a cohort – children over the minimum age of criminal responsibility – who are largely absent from the existing research literature.

Key Findings

• Most children reported having spoken to someone about what happens in a criminal court. The most common answer (57%) was that they had spoken to ‘my family’, with 39% of respondents having spoken to ‘my teacher at school’. However, very few respondents (2%) reported having been to a criminal court.

• Respondents reported having seen what happens in a criminal court from a variety of sources, with the two most common responses being ‘on a TV programme’ and ‘in a film’.

• Despite all participants in the survey having reached the minimum age of criminal responsibility, respondents generally over-estimated the age at which children become criminally responsible: 61% of those who provided an answer to the question of at what age does a child become criminally responsible (i.e. excluding those who answered ‘don’t know’) thought it was over the correct age of 10-years-old.

• The children in this survey were much less likely than adult respondents to think that the sentencing of adults is too lenient: 27% of respondents thought that sentencing was too lenient but a greater proportion – 34% – thought it was ‘about right’. Only 16% of respondents thought that the sentencing of children was too lenient.

• Whilst the vast majority (81%) of respondents correctly identified that a judge ‘would’ sentence a 25-year-old more severely than a 15-year-old for an identical offence, only 50% of respondents thought that they ‘should’ do so; 38% thought that both offenders should receive the same punishment.

• Respondents generally under-estimated the severity of sentencing for children convicted of a repeat knife offence. In a scenario crafted to engage a mandatory custodial sentence as the most likely outcome, 57% of respondents thought that the offending would most likely be met with a non-custodial sentence. This included a majority of 16- and 17-year old respondents to whom the mandatory sentencing provisions apply

London: Sentencing Academy, 2024. 26p.

By Rita E. Kuckertz

This study examines the impact of Mexico’s 2008 criminal justice reform on the practice of utilizing torture and mistreatment to extract criminal confessions. Complaint data submitted to the National Commission on Human Rights (Comisión Nacional de Derecho Humanos, CNDH) and detainee survey data compiled by the National Institute for Statistics and Geography (Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía, INEGI) were employed to assess if the use of torture and mistreatment by judicial sector operators had decreased (1) in states with advanced levels of reform implementation and (2) in judicial districts that had already implemented the reform. The author also examined the incidence of forced confessions before and after the reform’s implementation at the judicial district level. The author hypothesized that decreases in torture, mistreatment, and forced confessions would be observed in each of these cases. Basic correlation and regression tests were employed to assess the geographic hypothesis, while two chi-square tests for independence were utilized for judicial district data. The results of these analyses demonstrate evidence rejecting the null hypothesis in each instance, suggesting that the reform can indeed be credited for small but meaningful reductions in torture, mistreatment, and forced confessions in Mexico. The author argues that reforms must be accompanied by further action to address the pervasive use of torture and mistreatment in Mexico

San Diego: Justice in Mexico Department of Political Science & International Relations University of San Diego 2020. 51p.