By Adam Teperski and Ilya Klauzner
 

To examine whether changes in school attendance before and after COVID-19 were associated with changes in rates of youth crime in New South Wales (NSW). METHOD We linked Local Government Area (LGA) level measures of school attendance for Year 1 to 10 students from the Australian Curriculum, Assessment and Reporting Authority (ACARA) to data on legal actions involving persons under the age of 17 from the NSW Police Force’s Computerised Operational Policing System (COPS). Our analysis dataset included observations from January 2013 to December 2023 in Semester 1 and Term 3 for 120 NSW LGAs. We first examined trends in school attendance and trends in the rate of persons aged 10-16 legally proceeded against by police per 100,000 young people. We then implemented a fixed effects regression to estimate the association between school attendance and youth legal action rates. This method allowed us to control for both observable LGA level factors that varied over time and unobserved LGA-specific factors that were constant over time. We separately estimated the relationship between school attendance and the rate of youth legal actions for different subsets of our data.

This includes different crime types (i.e., all crime, violent crime and property crime), for observations in 2019 vs. 2023, and for LGAs located in Greater Sydney vs. Regional NSW. RESULTS From 2014 to 2019, average school attendance rates acrossNSW were stable at around 90%, before falling to 86% in 2022 and recovering to 88% by 2023. Overall rates of youth crime per 100,000 young people declined from 1,719 in 2017 to 1,205 in 2023, despite a slight increase in 2021. Rates of youth property crime and violent crime were both stable pre COVID-19 but increased post COVID-19 (from 222.5 in 2019 to 256.9 in 2023, and 177.2 in 2019 to 206.5 in 2023, respectively). The results from the fixed effects regression suggested no significant relationship between the average school attendance rate and the overall rate of youth crime from January 2013 to December 2023. Similar results were found for property and violent offences. When focusing specifically on observations in 2019 and 2023, school attendance rates were not associated with any changes in rates of youth crime. This was true: 1) across all LGAs included in our sample; 2) for LGAs in Greater Sydney versus Regional NSW and 3) across different crime categories (total/violent/property offences). While the method employed in this study was able to control for multiple factors related to school attendance and rates of youth crime, we cannot exclude the possibility that unobserved time-varying factors may be influencing our results. CONCLUSION Decreases in school attendance in the post-COVID period were not associated with changes in youth crime rates in NSW. These findings reflect an associative relationship rather than a causal effect and should be interpreted with this limitation in mind.

By Donovan Tan

Australia's recent anti-hate legislation, passed in January 2026, has ostensibly crippled domestic far-right organisations. The National Socialist Network’s disbandment, which immediately followed, has been celebrated by some. However, disbandment merely reframes the threat, as far-right elements have decentralised to avoid prosecution. Decentralisation disperses extremists instead of defeating them. This risks catalysing the very violence the legislation seeks to prevent. Without addressing ideological motivations, restrictive measures may prove inadequate, and even counterproductive.

By Sinclair Davidson

Australia’s tobacco control policy has reached a breaking point. For decades, bans on advertising and steady excise increases reduced the incidence of smoking and raised reliable revenue. Since 2019–20, however, revenue has persistently fallen short of Budget forecasts and a violent illicit market has expanded. This paper explains how split responsibilities and misaligned incentives have produced this outcome. The paper shows that excise has moved beyond the point where it is either efficient or corrective. It argues that the Commonwealth is rewarded for over-taxing while states and local communities bear the health, policing and insurance costs of the disorder that results. The paper concludes that Australia needs policy clarity and institutional reform. Tobacco control cannot be both a public health programme and a revenuemeasure. To stabilise the market, starve organised crime and bring control back to the legitimate sector, the paper calls for bold policy change.

By: Government of Queensland. Child Death Review Board

The review examined system responses to child sexual abuse in Queensland, with a focus on the early childhood education and care sector, police services and the blue card system, using the case of a convicted offender of child sexual abuse as a case study. It made recommendations for improvements needed to laws, policies, procedures and practices.

By Jacqui Tassone, Data Analyst

This report provides analysis and insights on data collected through Safe and Equal’s 2025 Demand and Capacity survey for Victoria. The data collection is focused on gathering an overall picture of demand for specialist family violence services and case management support. The report finds services are operating and directing resources mostly towards crisis response.

By Oliver Fredrickson

New Zealand has a range of problem-solving courts which address common drivers of offending, such as substance use, mental health, homelessness and family violence. This report outlines the historical, political, and legal context in which problem-solving courts developed and continue to operate in New Zealand, before surveying the country's various problem-solving courts and reviewing the new model for the District Court of New Zealand, Te Ao Mārama, which seeks to integrate the best practice features from these problem-solving courts into the mainstream courts. This report was commissioned by the Centre and undertaken by Oliver Fredrickson, a New Zealand-qualified lawyer who completed a fellowship at the Centre.

On 7 August 2025, the UK Ministry of Justice announced its intention to expand Intensive Supervision Courts (“ISCs”). ISCs address the underlying causes of criminal offending and provide “enhanced community-based sentences” to divert those at risk of facing custodial sentences.a To this end, the Ministry circulated an Expression of Interest to gauge interest across England and Wales for potential new ISCs. With the Sentencing Bill receiving Royal Assent on 22 January 2026- becoming the Sentencing Act 2026- this ISC expansion is being realised, with the new sites due to be announced shortly. We are pleased to have supported the Ministry of Justice throughout the Expression of Interest process. We worked with all successful areas during the development of their proposals, supporting them to deepen their understanding of existing ISC and wider problem-solving court models, and supporting local partnerships to consider how these nationally defined models could be implemented in their local context.

Alongside this process – and to potentially spark some inspiration in how these run going forwards – the Centre for Justice Innovation has commissioned this report, which examines the experience of problem-solving courts in New Zealand. New Zealand has various problem-solving courts which address common drivers of offending, such as substance use, mental health, homelessness, family violence, and youth. This report surveys these problem-solving courts and outlines how their best practices features are now being integrated into the mainstream courts. This report adopts the following structure: • Part One outlines the historical, political, and legal context in which problem-solving courts developed and continue to operate in New Zealand. • Part Two surveys the various problem-solving courts in New Zealand, examining how (and why) they emerged, how they were established, how they currently operate, and how they have performed.

By The Attorney-General's Department (Australia)

The report provides a summary of civil laws, criminal laws, reviews or reforms currently in progress, and best practice initiatives in response to antisemitism and Islamophobia in Australia – presenting anti-vilification measures for each state and territory government and the Commonwealth. The Australian Attorney-General's Department, alongside the Federal Government, has responded to rising antisemitism and Islamophobia by appointing Special Envoys, criminalizing hate symbols (e.g., Nazi salute), initiating legislative reforms against hate speech (Combatting Antisemitism, Hate and Extremism Bill 2026), and providing funding for community security. Department of Home Affairs Website

Key Responses and Actions (2024-2026):
Special Envoys: Appointed Ms. Jillian Segal AO as Special Envoy to Combat Antisemitism and Mr. Aftab Malik as Special Envoy to Combat Islamophobia in 2024/2025 to lead national responses, according to a Department of Home Affairs document.
Legislative Action: The government banned Nazi salutes and symbols (2024), and is developing the Combatting Antisemitism, Hate and Extremism Bill 2026 to strengthen laws against hate speech and discrimination, notes an article from Crikey.

Targeted Measures: The Attorney-General's Department is involved in creating a national strategy to combat violence and harassment. Specific actions include investigating laws against doxxing and delivering $25 million to enhance security at Jewish sites.
Education and Monitoring: An Antisemitism Education Taskforce chaired by David Gonski AC was established in December 2025 to tackle antisemitism in schools, according to a report from the Department of Home Affairs.
Consultation and Criticism: The Attorney-General's Department has consulted stakeholders on new hate speech laws, though some groups, such as the Australian National Imams Council (ANIC), have raised concerns about the breadth of the proposed legislation, according to Facebook posts from ANIC.

Implementation: The government adopted the Special Envoy's Plan to Combat Antisemitism in December 2025, committing to implement 13 recommendations to protect the Jewish community, says a report from Australian Policy Online.

By Hilde Tubex, Lorana Bartels, Ashlee Curtis Hunter Culbong, Emma Tufuga

This research report describes the experiences of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people with the criminal legal system in Western Australia, the Australian Capital Territory and Victoria. The findings confirm the lasting impacts of colonisation and intergenerational trauma, which create the conditions that lead Indigenous people into engagement with the criminal legal system.

By Steve Yeong

AIM To determine whether the Education Amendment Act 2009 (NSW), which raised the Minimum School Leaving Age (MSLA) from 15 to 17 from 2010 onwards, had an impact on crime. METHOD We use four datasets in this study: birth records from the NSW Registry of Births, Deaths and Marriages; educational attainment records from the NSW Education Standards Authority; crime data from the NSW Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research; and aggregate statistics from the Survey of Education and Work administered by the Australian Bureau of Statistics. These data enable us to compare the first cohort of students affected by the amendment with the last cohort of students unaffected by the amendment in a Regression Discontinuity Design. The specific outcomes we examine include: the probability of at least one proven offence between the ages of 15 and 24; the probability of at least one proven violent, property or drug offence between those ages; and whether a student completed Grades 10 - 12. RESULTS The amendment increased the probability of a boy completing Grades 10 and 11 by 1 –2 percentage points. The amendment had no impact on the probability of a boy completing Grade 12, and no impact on educational attainment for girls. We also find the amendment had no impact on the probability of an individual committing a violent crime, property crime, drug crime or crime of any type between the ages of 15 and 24. CONCLUSION The amendment had no discernible impact on crime. This is likely the result of the fact that almost 90 percent of 17 year olds were already meeting the requirements set out under the amendment prior to its ntroduction. For that reason, the amendment had limited scope to influence education or criminal justice outcomes.

By The Parliament of Queensland.  The Justice, Integrity and Community Safety Committee

This report presents a summary of an examination of Queensland's Fighting Antisemitism and Keeping Guns out of the Hands of Terrorists and Criminals Amendment Bill 2026. The committee’s task was to consider the policy to be achieved by the legislation and the application of fundamental legislative principles. The committee recommends that the Bill be passed.

By the National Anti-Corruption Commission (Australia)

This is the report on the investigation of corruption issues relating to the conduct of six persons referred by the Royal Commission into the Robodebt Scheme. The report found that two of the six individual engaged in serious corrupt conduct, and that the remaining four did not engage in corrupt conduct.

By James Paterson, Lydia Khalil

In the past two decades, drones have transformed from niche military tools into widely available 'commercial off-the-shelf' technologies. What was once the exclusive domain of state actors now rests within reach of nearly anyone with a credit card and a data signal. With uncrewed aircraft systems – or drone platforms – becoming cheaper, smaller, and easier to operate, the number of drone plots by domestic extremist groups has increased rapidly.
Key findings

Domestic extremist actors are incorporating drone technology into operational capabilities and attack plots, taking inspiration from the battlefield. The number of violent plots utilising drones has increased sharply over the past five years. Domestic counter-drone frameworks are mismatched to the threat. Effective protection requires layered, multi-system approaches across potential civilian targets and critical infrastructure. Easy-to-access technologies, such as 3D printing, open-source design files, additive hardware, and AI-assisted navigation are lowering the barriers to modifying and weaponising drones.

Recommendations

Countries should establish domestic counter-drone task forces to tackle domestic actor exploitation of drones. Internationally coordinated safety-by-design regulations should be implemented to make it easier to identify and respond to malicious drone use. Specific policy attention and response should be directed towards the threat posed by 3D printing in the additive manufacturing ecosystem.

By Skye Predavec, Rod Campbell, Alice Grundy

To get a firearm licence in Australia requires having a “genuine reason” to own a gun. In most jurisdictions, this requirement can be satisfied by being a paid-up member of a sports shooting club. Shooting groups promote this fact, advertising that you can join “from the comfort of home”. This may explain why up to 253,000 NSW firearms licences list shooting sports or recreational hunting as a reason for gun ownership, but fewer than 36,000 people in NSW participated in either activity in 2025. Ever since the Port Arthur massacre, Australia has been united behind the principle that strict firearm controls are important for public safety. The thin practical requirements for getting a firearm licence are not in the spirit of that principle and allow for a worrying erosion of Australia’s gun control regime.

By Citizens for Juvenile Justice

This report by Citizens for Juvenile Justice (CfJJ) investigates the level of information sharing and collusion between police and courthouse staff with federal Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) in Massachusetts. CfJJ filed more than 90 public records requests in the state and found that police and courthouse staff regularly share information with ICE, effectively becoming “force multipliers” for ICE. This report details specific ways police and courthouse staff are cooperating with ICE and cautions that this
practice undermines public trust, legitimacy, and democratic accountability. This report offers key policy and narrative recommendations to create guardrails around information sharing practices with ICE, including a proposed ban on transmitting youth fingerprints to the FBI (which are then shared with ICE).

By Rob Bonta; Immigration Detention Facility Review Team

Enacted in response to growing concerns for the health and safety of people in civil immigration detention, Assembly Bill 103 (2017) (AB 103) requires the California Department of Justice (Cal DOJ) to review and report on civil immigration detention facilities operating within the State of California. This mandate has been a critical source of transparency for the public and policymakers regarding conditions in these facilities across California. Cal DOJ has previously issued four reports on conditions in immigration detention facilities in California in 2019, 2021, 2022, and 2025, identifying and documenting substandard and inhumane conditions that fail to meet U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s (ICE) own applicable standards. In 2025, Cal DOJ found that many of these conditions worsened as the current administration’s mass deportation campaign led to overcrowding and strained resources at new and existing facilities. Tragically, there were six deaths of detained individuals between September 2025 and March 2026, four at the Adelanto ICE Processing Center and two at the Imperial Regional Detention Center—the highest number since Cal DOJ started conducting AB 103 reviews. These deaths raise serious concerns about these facilities’ ability to safely detain a growing detainee population and highlight the need for greater accountability and oversight. For its fifth report, Cal DOJ inspected all seven facilities active in 2025 in California operating pursuant to contracts with ICE, including the newly opened California City Detention Facility: 1. Adelanto ICE Processing Center
(Adelanto) operated by The GEO Group, Inc. (GEO Group) in Adelanto; 2. Desert View Annex (Desert View) operated by GEO Group in Adelanto; 3. Golden State Annex (Golden State) operated by GEO Group in McFarland; 4. Mesa Verde ICE Processing Facility (Mesa Verde) operated by GEO Group in Bakersfield; 5. Imperial Regional Detention Facility (Imperial) operated by Management & Training Corporation (MTC) in Calexico; 6. Otay Mesa Detention Center (Otay Mesa) operated by CoreCivic in San Diego; and 7. California City Detention Facility (Cal City) operated by CoreCivic in California City.

Most of these facilities are located in remote parts of the state that are difficult for family members and attorneys to access. An eighth facility, Central Valley Annex, began to hold ICE detainees in April 2026 as
Cal DOJ was finalizing publication of this report. This report does not include a review of conditions at
Central Valley Annex. Since Cal DOJ’s 2023 inspections, there has been an unprecedented surge of the population in civil immigration detention facilities within the state, which grew approximately 162% from 2,303 detainees at the time of Cal DOJ’s 2023 site visits to 6,028 at the time of site visits in 2025. This population
growth included a notable increase of about 379% in the number of female detainees, from 170 at the time of Cal DOJ’s 2023 site visits to 815 as of the 2025 visits. Notably, many of these individuals had no criminal history and were classified as low security, a significant divergence from our 2023 findings.

By U.S. Government Accountability Office; Rebecca S. Gambler

Customs and Border Protection can grant parole to noncitizens, giving them temporary permission to stay in the United States. CBP granted roughly 2.4 million paroles at the southwest border from late 2018
through May 2025. Once parole is granted, Immigration and Customs Enforcement is supposed to monitor them to make sure they follow release requirements, like attending immigration court proceedings. But ICE doesn’t readily have information to identify people who were paroled at the southwest border and doesn’t monitor them as required.

By BLAAKMAN Steven

On 30 July 2026, an unprecedented mass crossing into Spain's North
African enclave of Ceuta saw an estimated 80 000 people enter from Morocco amid a wave of online
disinformation. The incident, which caused at least 72 deaths, exposed acute vulnerabilities at one
of the European Union's few land borders with Africa and rapidly became a test of European
migration, border‑management and crisis‑response policies. Ceuta's exceptional legal and geographical position has long made it a focal point for irregular migration. Earlier episodes had already demonstrated the dangers associated with attempts to cross fences, breakwaters and maritime routes. However, the scale of the July 2026 incident far exceeded previous crossings. Although Spanish authorities returned most
entrants to Morocco within days, the crisis heightened concerns over reception capacity, border security
and potential onward movement within the Schengen area. The briefing also considers whether recent Spanish measures may have influenced perceptions of migration opportunities. Spain's extraordinary regularization scheme for eligible undocumented migrants and a June Supreme Court judgment limiting summary returns for maritime arrivals have drawn criticism from several Member States. Italy and others have
argued that these developments could create a pull factor, while Spain stresses legal safeguards and rejects claims that Morocco was implicated in the crossing. At EU level, the crisis revealed both solidarity and political disagreement. Italy temporarily restricted open‑border travel with Spain, while 22 European leaders called for an urgent coordinated response. At an extraordinary meeting of interior ministers on 4 August, Member States endorsed support for Spain, stronger action against smuggling networks, improved
returns and closer partnerships with third countries. They also highlighted the need for better early‑warning systems, social‑media monitoring and coordinated communication to counter foreign information manipulation.

By U.S. Government Accountability Office; Christopher P. Currie

Federal whistleblowers are critical to fighting fraud, waste, and abuse in the government. However, they risk retaliation, such as demotion and firing.

We examined how the Department of Homeland Security handles whistleblower retaliation complaints. We found that DHS's timeliness is a problem that could undermine whistleblowers' confidence in their
protections.

DHS took more than 3 years to investigate the majority of retaliation cases. When cases are substantiated, the Secretary of DHS should decide whether and how to address them within 30 days. But cases. awaited decisions for another 4 months to over 2 years.

By U.S. Government Accountability Office; Rebecca S. Gambler

Customs and Border Protection can grant parole to noncitizens, giving them temporary permission to stay in the United States. CBP granted roughly 2.4 million paroles at the southwest border from late 2018 through May 2025.

Once parole is granted, Immigration and Customs Enforcement is supposed to monitor them to make sure they follow release requirements, like attending immigration court proceedings. But ICE doesn’t readily have information to identify people who were paroled at the southwest border and doesn’t monitor them as required.

By Graeme R. Newman and Claude AI.

LIs probation mercy, or is it a serious way of changing lives?

In 1933 probation was in use in every state, and no one could say what it accomplished. Probation and Criminal Justice, edited by Sheldon Glueck of the Harvard Law School, brought together judges, social workers, a psychiatrist, a criminologist, the builder of the new federal system, and four foreign authorities to ask how it should be done. Their answer: probation succeeds or fails according to the people who run it, and a community that wants its benefits must pay for good officers and be honest about how little it knows.

This Reader's Guide explains the arguments in plain language, supplies the history and law, and shows what has changed since. Inside are a chapter map, a worked example that turns the book's own numbers into caseloads and costs, common misreadings, and discussion questions.

A companion to the original, for students, practitioners and curious readers. Read online the original book.

Read-Me.Org Inc. New York-Philadelphia-Australia. 2026. p.64.