By Vania Ceccato.
Rural Crime and Community Safety makes a significant contribution to crime science and integrates a range of theories to understand patterns of crime and perceived safety in rural contexts. Based on a wealth of original research, Ceccato combines spatial methods with qualitative analysis to examine, in detail, farm and wildlife crime, youth related crimes and gendered violence in rural settings.
NY. Routledge (2016) 425 pages.
A Historical Sketch 1672-1916 by S. M. Edwardes. “A perusal of the official records of the early period of British rule in Bombay indicates that the credit of first establishing a force for the prevention of crime and the protection of the inhabitants belongs to Gerald Aungier, who was appointed Governor of he Island in 1669 and filled that office with conspicuous ability until his death in Surat in 1677.” Oxford University Press (1923) 240.
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By Bennett Clifford and Jon Lewis
On January 6, 2021, a mob composed of activists, unaffiliated sympathizers, and hardened extremists violently entered the United States Capitol, destroying property, assaulting law enforcement, and attempting to disrupt the American electoral process. During the siege, as it has come to be known, several thousand people are believed to have unlawfully breached the Capitol. The violence that day left five dead and more than a hundred injured.1 The Capitol Siege was a watershed moment for domestic violent extremism in the United States. In its immediate aftermath, the Department of Justice and the Federal Bureau of Investigation launched a nationwide investigation into the alleged perpetrators of the violence. It quickly became the largest investigation of its type in the Bureau’s history, heralding investigations in nearly all 50 states and 704 criminal charges to date (as of January 1, 2022). The breadth of the federal 2 investigation has resulted in an unprecedented pace of prosecutorial activity, with nearly two criminal charges released per day on average during the first three months after the Capitol Siege. Today, a year after January 6, 2021, new charges are still being released every week, and the operational tempo for the DOJ and FBI has not significantly slowed. The events of that day also led the U.S. government to redesign its approach to counterterrorism, largely reorienting its focus from international to domestic extremism. At the same time, January 6, 2021, was not only a turning point for counterterrorism authorities, but has numerous ramifications for various American domestic violent extremist groups and their efforts to recruit and plan activities while avoiding law enforcement scrutiny. On the one-year anniversary of January 6, 2021, this report takes stock of the Capitol Siege’s impacts on domestic violent extremism in America, and the U.S. federal government’s efforts to respond to the threat over the past year. This research is based on the Program on Extremism’s Capitol Siege Database, a collection of over 20,000 pages of court documents from cases of individuals who have been federally charged for their participation in the Capitol Siege, as well as Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests, interviews with U.S. government officials and defense attorneys, media reports, and other open-source information.
Washington, DC: George Washington University, Program on Extremism, 2022. 48p.
By The United Nations Office on drugs and Crime (UNODC)
The unique socioeconomic context in Palestine, characterized by political and economic tensions, has created conditions that facilitate the spread of illicit drug use among Palestinians. Data are lacking on the extent of high-risk drug use (HRDU) in both the West Bank and Gaza Strip but are a prerequisite to inform policy-making. HRDU is defined as ‘recurrent drug use that causes actual harm (negative consequences) to the person (including dependence, but also other health, psychological or social problems) or places the person at a high probability/risk of such harm’. The overall objective of this study was to provide insight into the extent of male HRDU in Palestine. This survey sampled only male participants based on findings from formative research indicating that females are not connected socially to males and/or to other females who use drugs. The study had four sites representing the Gaza Strip and the three regions in the West Bank: north, middle, and south. The study found that drug use is not confined to specific areas or localities within Palestine, but is widely distributed across the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Based on the data, it is estimated that there are 26,500 high risk drug users (HRDU) in Palestine, comprising 1.8% of the male population aged 15 and above.
Vienna: United Nations Offce on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). 2017. 77p.
By Mark Micallef
This report provides an assessment of drug smuggling routes and dynamics in Libya and aims to establish areas for further in-depth research. It draws on a mixed-methods approach, which includes the analysis of relevant open-source data alongside data from interviews with a variety of key stakeholders in the region. Libya’s smuggling and trafficking economies have been in a tumultuous state of flux since the 2011 revolution, and drug trafficking is no exception. The initial post-revolution period was characterised by changes that opened the door to new players, and even new markets, and led to a huge increase in the country’s internal consumption of illicit drugs, as well as to an expansion in its role as a transit point for drugs heading to Europe and countries neighbouring Libya. The disruption caused by the revolution also reordered the control of this profitable criminal activity, in some cases resulting in wars between criminal actors, including several tribes. Much of this reorganisation was related to the involvement of armed groups in drug trafficking. Two concurrent and conflicting developments in drug trafficking have taken place in the past few years.
Geneva: European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA), 2019. 29p.
By Fiona Mangan
This report explores how illicit drug trafficking and drug use in Libya has shaped and been shaped by the country’s ongoing conflict. Drawing on hundreds of interviews and dedicated research, it examines Libya’s pre-2011 illicit economy, delves into the social impact of drugs, and focuses on drug use on the frontlines of Libya’s ongoing conflict, the corrosive impact of drug trafficking and use on the justice and security sector, and how trafficking and organized crime undercut peacebuilding and state consolidation.
Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2020. 36p.
By United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)
This is a time for science and solidarity, as United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres has said, highlighting the importance of trust in science and of working together to respond to the global COVID19 pandemic. The same holds true for our responses to the world drug problem. To be effective, balanced solutions to drug demand and supply must be rooted in evidence and shared responsibility. This is more important than ever, as illicit drug challenges become increasingly complex, and the COVID-19 crisis and economic downturn threaten to worsen their impacts, on the poor, marginalized and vulnerable most of all. Some 35.6 million people suffer from drug use disorders globally. While more people use drugs in developed countries than in developing countries, and wealthier segments of society have a higher prevalence of drug use, people who are socially and economically disadvantaged are more likely to develop drug use disorders. Only one out of eight people who need drug-related treatment receive it. While one out of three drug users is a woman, only one out of five people in treatment is a woman. People in prison settings, minorities, immigrants and displaced people also face barriers to treatment due to discrimination and stigma. Of the 11 million people who inject drugs, half of them are living with hepatitis C, and 1.4 million with HIV. Around 269 million people used drugs in 2018, up 30 per cent from 2009, with adolescents and young adults accounting for the largest share of users. More people are using drugs, and there are more drugs, and more types of drugs, than ever.
Vienna: UNODC, 2020. 64p.
By Erik Hornung, Eduardo Hidalgo, Pablo Selaya
We study how NAFTA changed the geography of violence in Mexico. We propose that open borders increased trafficking profits of Mexican cartels and resulted in violent competition among them. We test this hypothesis by comparing changes in drug-related homicides after NAFTA’s introduction in 1994 across municipalities with and without drug-trafficking routes. Routes are optimal paths connecting municipalities with a recent history of drug trafficking with U.S. ports of entry. On these routes, homicides increase by 27% relative to the pre-NAFTA mean. These results cannot be explained by changes in worker’s opportunity costs of using violence resulting from the trade shock.
CEPR Press Discussion Paper No. 17608. 2022. 46p.
By the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
In general, there was high level agreement reported by Member States on the need for alternatives to conviction or punishment in the responses to the NVs. Many countries already have legal provision for these to be applied to people with drug use disorder in contact with the criminal justice system and in some cases they have them at all stages in the criminal justice process (and even a range of different types of measures available at each stage).
Nevertheless, despite the high level of policy commitments, the realities of implementing alternative options are striking; some countries reported having no alternatives available, and others have legal provision for alternatives that are never or rarely used. This may be a reflection of wider issues around the overall availability of treatment for drug use disorders. According to the 2021 UNODC World Drug Report, 49 only 1 in 8 persons with a drug use disorder has access to treatment. This is a challenge that needs to be addressed jointly with developing the legal framework and the implementation of alternatives to conviction or punishment for people with drug use disorders in contact with the criminal justice system.
Alternatives can be challenging to establish as it is essential to have the infrastructure and trained human resources for evidence-based assessment, treatment, supervision, and other health and social support available and they should be evaluated to demonstrate their effectiveness and positive health, social and justice outcomes. Alternative measures also need to be designed so that those who should benefit from them are legally eligible – making the criteria for who can qualify overly complex and prescriptive can make alternatives difficult to be applied in practice. Also, both professionals and the public need to be supportive of the approach if it is to be successful so programmes need to be developed to ensure they have the information and knowledge and see the benefits of providing health services and other effective alternatives to conviction or punishment for people who use drugs in contact with the criminal justice system.
Vienna: UNODC, 2022. 64p.
By Peter Gastrow
Extortion is not likely to be uppermost in the minds of those South Africans, or the tens of thousands of international tourists, businesspersons and migrants who regularly flock to Cape Town to enjoy the beauty and prospects that the city has to offer. In the past, public discussion about extortion in South Africa was limited and media coverage sporadic. Reports focused mainly on isolated instances of extortion in the entertainment and nightclub areas of central Cape Town. Extortion-linked murders of foreign nationals running shops also received only occasional coverage. But the silence around extortion changed significantly during 2020. From about August and September 2020, the media began to increasingly report on a significant expansion of extortion rackets in central Cape Town.
The phenomenon, reportedly, was no longer confined to the night-time entertainment industry but increasingly affected small day-time businesses, including restaurants and coffee bars. This is likely to have been linked to the effect of the COVID-19 lockdown restrictions, which affected the night-time entertainment industry. More alarmingly, reports appeared of a surge in extortion incidents in township areas on the periphery of the city. In places such as Khayelitsha, Gugulethu and Philippi, South African residents were being targeted by extortion gangs.
Geneva: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2021. 63p.
By Philip Zimbardo
Renowned social psychologist and creator of the Stanford Prison Experiment Philip Zimbardo explores the mechanisms that make good people do bad things, how moral people can be seduced into acting immorally, and what this says about the line separating good from evil.. The Lucifer Effect explains how—and the myriad reasons why—we are all susceptible to the lure of “the dark side.” Drawing on examples from history as well as his own trailblazing research, Zimbardo details how situational forces and group dynamics can work in concert to make monsters out of decent men and women.
Here, for the first time and in detail, Zimbardo tells the full story of the Stanford Prison Experiment, the landmark study in which a group of college-student volunteers was randomly divided into “guards” and “inmates” and then placed in a mock prison environment. Within a week the study was abandoned, as ordinary college students were transformed into either brutal, sadistic guards or emotionally broken prisoners.
By illuminating the psychological causes behind such disturbing metamorphoses, Zimbardo enables us to better understand a variety of harrowing phenomena, from corporate malfeasance to organized genocide to how once upstanding American soldiers came to abuse and torture Iraqi detainees in Abu Ghraib. He replaces the long-held notion of the “bad apple” with that of the “bad barrel”—the idea that the social setting and the system contaminate the individual, rather than the other way around.
New York: Random House, 2008. 576p.
By INTERPOL and Enact (Africa)
The ‘Mobile money and organized crime in Africa’ report presents an overview of the criminal exploitation of mobile money services, including fraud, money laundering, extortion, human trafficking and people smuggling, the illegal wildlife trade and terrorism.
The African continent is the “world leader” in the mobile money industry, accounting for nearly half of all registered mobile money accounts globally.
The prominent role that mobile money plays in African societies and economies, and the rapid pace at which its infrastructure has been developed, has enabled criminals to “exploit weaknesses in regulations and identification systems” and commit mobile money-enabled crimes.
Lyon, France, INTERPOL, 2020. 53p.
By ENACT
As COVID-19 dominates the world’s stage, nearly every aspect of society has been affected by the deadly pandemic. While the impact of the contagion on countries’ economies, social cohesion, health and security has been widely reported on, less is known about its influence on criminal dynamics. The pandemic has not only become a central component of the everyday lives of Africans, but has also revealed the important role the continent plays in the global economy – both licit and illicit. COVID-19 measures have posed a double burden on African countries by heavily challenging people’s economic livelihood and restricting the freedom of movement of Africans, while also challenging governments in how they balance the need to address the health crisis with the provision of services and security amid declining economies. In this context, organised crime in Africa has evolved and taken advantage of the confusion and frustration wrought by the pandemic; it has filled in the gaps left by state institutions, by both adapting its illicit activities in order to circumvent COVID restrictions and providing new sources of livelihoods and parallel services. Institutional responses to stop the spread of the virus have had a profound impact on movement, trade and business, including in black markets and shadow economies. In Africa, COVID-19 was slower to take effect than in other parts of the world, and even though the continent has had experience in handling other major viral epidemics, the health, economic and security systems of many countries on the continent have found themselves ill-equipped to face the particular challenges posed by the COVID-19 pandemic. As legitimate businesses suffered extensive losses across the continent, people increasingly turned to the informal and illicit economies for alternative sources of livelihood. Meanwhile, those already vulnerable to exploitation become even more at risk due to the paucity of economic opportunities available to them and the isolating restrictions put in place in the interest of public health. While the closure of borders may have restricted illicit flows within and across countries in the short term, over the course of the pandemic, it has become clear that organised crime has found ways to adapt and bypass controls throughout Africa, with illicit activities continuing, often more covertly than ever before. As states diverted their attention and resources to curbing viral spread, new opportunities emerged for criminal groups to exploit gaps in service delivery and communities’ economic vulnerability, enabling them to expand their activities unchecked. For example, with limits on in-person interactions, illicit activities have increasingly shifted online, while cases of counterfeit, substandard and illegally diverted pharmaceuticals have been on the rise, marketed as ‘cures’ for COVID-19.
ENACT (Africa), 2021. 160p.
By Romi Sigsworth
Women play a range of roles in the grey economy on the fringes of organised criminal activities in East Africa. Using studies of illegal coltan mining in the Democratic Republic of Congo, sand trafficking in Kenya and wildlife crime in Uganda, this paper sets out the conundrum they face – the roles that give them agency and economic empowerment are those that law enforcement and social development interventions seek to dismantle. Can current responses be adapted to improve their lives?
EMACT (Africa), 22p.
By ENACT
In the last two decades the percentage of imprisoned women offenders is growing globally, at a faster rate than imprisoned male offenders. Such global increase raises the question as to whether the same can be observed on the African continent . Information suggests that transnational organized crime (TOC) affects African women and girls differently than African men and boys. It is crucial to learn how and if men and women behave differently in TOC in Africa in order to uncover the main drivers of these differences and adapt policing methodology accordingly. While gendered data continues to be insufficiently reported upon by law enforcement authorities in Africa, the assessment suggests that African law enforcement authorities are possibly under -investigating and under -estimating the involvement of African women in TOC. African law enforcement authorities likely continue to perceive them as victims or accomplices only. They are possibly rarely seen as the criminals themselves and less so as being the organizers, leaders, traffickers or recruiters. This gap in police investigations is indeed known to be exploited to the benefit of organized crime as women are more likely to go under the radar. The assessment draws attention to the common features of African female offenders based on available data to share insights and encourage police forces to reconsider their approach.
ENACT (Africa), 2021. 32p.
By ENACT
Across the globe, the proliferation of new armed groups (including rebels, militias, criminal groups and gangs) has made conflict prevention and resolution even more complex. Armed groups are diversifying their revenues, which are increasingly based on organized crime activities. Organized Crime Groups (OCGs) often benefit from the turmoil of armed conflicts and violence. They can engage in violence to protect their illicit business, undermining national economic development and security. Furthermore, OCGs can team up with armed groups to access and control natural resources, competing with the state to provide public goods or even protection to their community. Different situations of violent conflict affect countries in the Eastern African region. Crime dynamics that emerge from instability in one country of the region can spill over into a neighbouring country, posing a threat to regional peace and security. The emergence of hybrid criminal groups engaged in transnational organized crime and in armed conflict most likely represents a relevant dimension of contemporary conflict in Eastern Africa. Yet, the knowledge on the multiple ways in which OCGs prey, or even amplify, local conflicts for their own benefit remains limited. Organized violence for profit continues to affect Eastern Africa. Kidnapping for ransom, looting, threats and sexual gender-based violence are among the most reported incidents in the region. The driving factors for those crimes are sometimes difficult to discern and involve a combination of reasons such as economic gain, firearms sourcing (notably for cases of looting security forces), intention to control a community or territory. Illicit financial flows, and particularly, illicit taxation, allow OCGs and armed groups to generate revenue through commodity taxes, by imposing taxes on the community to move through certain areas or to run their business.
Lyon, France: Interpol and ENACT, 2022. 32p.
By Deborah Puccio-Den
“The Mafia? What is the Mafia? Something you eat? Something you drink? I don’t know the Mafia. I’ve never seen it.” Mafiosi have often reacted this way to questions from journalists and law enforcement. Social scientists who study the Mafia usually try to pin down what it “really is,” thus fusing their work with their object. In Mafiacraft, Deborah Puccio-Den undertakes a new form of ethnographic inquiry that focuses not on answering “What is the Mafia?” but on the ontological, moral, and political effects of posing the question itself. Her starting point is that Mafia is not a readily nameable social fact but a problem of thought produced by the absence of words. Puccio-Den approaches covert activities using a model of “Mafiacraft,” which inverts the logic of witchcraft. If witchcraft revolves on the lethal power of speech, Mafiacraft depends on the deadly strength of silence. How do we write an ethnography of phenomena that cannot be named? Puccio-Den approaches this task with a fascinating anthropology of silence, breaking new ground for the study of the world’s most famous criminal organization.
Chicago: HAU Books, 2021. 295p.
By The United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime
The purpose of Digest of Organized Crime Cases is to illustrate good practices in dealing with organized crime cases and in doing so, to, promote the practical implementation of the Organized Crime Convention and its Protocols. The Digest presents a compilation of illustrative cases and related good practices in criminalization, investigations, prosecution and legal experiences in dealing with organized crime and its various forms and manifestations. By providing relevant policy-makers, criminal justice officials, and investigative police with practical perspectives and insights based on expert practitioners' experience, and associated good practices, it is hoped that the Digest could serve those involved in complicated investigations and prosecutions of organized crime cases on how best to address the many pitfalls and challenges in order to conduct an efficient investigation and prosecution. Moreover, the Digest will help contribute to identifying good practice and common standards related to the investigation and prosecution of organized crime cases, while improving judicial understanding and strengthening international cooperation in criminal matters. The target reader group will be policymakers, judicial officials, central authorities and judicial/investigative police. Three Meetings of experts have been held in the course of 2011-2012: the first meeting was held in Rome, Italy, from 23-26 May 2011, the second one took place in Cartagena, Colombia, from the 28 November to the 02 December 2011, and the last one was held in Palermo, Italy, from 11-14 June 2012. The meetings were held in English, French, and Spanish and gathered approximately 30-40 experts from different countries and regions (at least three per region) with expertise in different legal systems and in specific aspects related to transnational organized crime, to present and comment relevant organized crime cases.
Vienna: UNODC, 2012. 154p.
By The U.S. National Institute of Justice
The National Institute of Justice, as part of its effort to build an international research agenda that will help the United States better understand potential threats from transnational crime, supported this project to— ■ Determine high priority areas for research on Asian transnational organized crime. ■ Assess the impact of Asian transnational organized crime on the United States. ■ Identify relevant data and information sources in Asia. ■ Identify potential collaborative research partners and institutions in Asia. This report focuses on the first two project goals.
Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, 2007. 40p.
By Virginia Comolli and Natasha Rose
China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is Beijing’s flagship programme for expanding its international trade opportunities and promoting infrastructure development. The New Silk Road, as it is often referred to, now encompasses 138 countries, and its unprecedented reach attracts the attention of policymakers and businesses worldwide – and criminals alike. BRI-related projects bring (or will do so once completed) investments, services, employment opportunities and prosperity to countries across Asia, Africa and beyond. However, like all development projects, they are also likely to have unintended consequences – including corruption, criminal exploitation and infiltration. Specifically, increases in licit trade prompted by the building or expansion of road and railway networks, ports and special economic zones provide openings for illicit trade, which ever-entrepreneurial criminal networks are quick to exploit. Indeed, the main pathways and means of illicit trade are usually also the main pathways of licit trade. Failing to acknowledge that development and trade create vulnerabilities in contexts where governance and regulatory capacity is weak, crime levels are high and illicit markets are well established opens up the risk of systematic criminal exploitation of the BRI, either through boosting existing illicit routes or facilitating the emergence of new ones. In other words, these risks call for the need to ‘crimeproof’ development initiatives. The regions at the core of this study – South East Asia and central and East Africa – present a number of vulnerabilities pertaining to the quality of governance, the socioeconomic landscape, the security sphere and the environment. As such, they are already the target of criminal enterprises and are home to some of the largest narcotics, human trafficking and illicit environmental markets in the world. From the perspective of criminal actors, increased connectivity brought about by the BRI equates to easier access to source regions and consumer markets. Larger trade volumes also provide more opportunities to conceal illicit goods among cargoes and to avoid detection at borders, ports and airports. Evidence suggests that the maritime sector in these regions is particularly susceptible to criminal activities as a result of BRI-linked ports and route expansions. Yet the BRI’s reach is much further still, with supply chains extending all the way into Europe and BRI-related projects reaching Latin America and the Caribbean, which may form the focus of a future study.
Geneva: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2021. 75p.
