By Melanie Baak, Joel Windle, Emily Miller

The University of South Australia (UniSA) and Australian Refugee Association (ARA) entered into an agreement for UniSA researchers to conduct an evaluation of the Youth Connect program. The evaluation sought to explore the processes and impacts of the Youth Connect program in relation to social participation, economic independence, personal wellbeing and at-risk or anti-social behaviour. Formal data collection for the evaluation took place from mid-2023 to early 2024. Evaluation of the project focused on consideration of the effectiveness and impact of the project and whether expectations and program outcomes were met. The research used qualitative and quantitative approaches with youth participants from the Youth Connect program and qualitative approaches with participating school staff and ARA staff members.

To understand the views and experiences of youth participants, the research team undertook four focus groups with youth participants in the program. Three focus groups were conducted at ARA venues and one at a school. In total, 44 young people participated in evaluation focus groups. In addition, to capture the breadth of experiences of young people who had participated across the full range of Youth Connect programs, researchers undertook an online survey using Qualtrics software.

The Youth Connect program offered support for young people facing a series of interconnected challenges. Young people from culturally and linguistically diverse (CALD) backgrounds often experience difficulty in engaging with the wider community and building connections.

The program initially aimed to engage young people aged 15-25 years from African, Afghan and Syrian backgrounds, with young people aged from 12-25 ultimately engaging in the program. Other young people from CALD refugee and migrant backgrounds were also included throughout program activities.

Adelaide: University of South Australia 2024.

Proposing the domestic violence threat assessment centre

By Timothy Cubitt, Anthony Morgan, Christopher Dowling, Samantha Bricknell and Rick Brown

    Intimate partner homicide (IPH) is one of the most common forms of homicide in Australia. Despite rates falling over time, it remains the most common homicide threat for Australian women, who are the victims of three quarters of all IPH incidents. Recent research has viewed some IPH perpetrators as being motivated by fixation and grievances. These fixated perpetrators hold an intense preoccupation with an individual, which may be driven by a grievance, during the acute phases of risk. In this paper we propose a trial of the Domestic Violence Threat Assessment Centre (DVTAC). Modelled on the Fixated Threat Assessment Centres, the DVTAC could offer a multi-agency approach to information gathering, monitoring and intervention among high-risk domestic violence offenders during periods of acute risk

Research in practice no. 48.

 Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology. 2024. 14p.

By HM Chief Inspector of Prisons

 Close supervision centres (CSCs) are small, specialist units located within six of the high security prisons. With capacity for 66 adult men, 44 were being held in the centres at the time of this thematic inspection. An additional nine were being held in ‘designated cells,’ located in some segregation units within the long-term and high security estate (LTHSE). They were located there following their removal from association due to their active and presenting risks in a CSC, or following their transfer to another prison to attend court or access visits with their family and friends. Most men selected for a CSC were serving indeterminate sentences, many were category A, and the selection criteria, which in our view were applied proportionately and based on evidence, indicated very clearly that all had committed serious, often repeated, acts of violence against others while in prison. As such, the CSC system is effectively the deepest form of custody that exists in the country, managing some of the most dangerous men in the system. During this inspection we adopted a slightly different approach, which, although informed by our healthy prison structure, applied tests that better reflected the priorities and processes of the CSC system: management of the centres, progression, safety, and respect. We judged outcomes to be good, our highest assessment, in three tests and reasonably good in the test of progression. These assessments reflect the success and effectiveness of the CSC system, as well as some improvement to the safety of the units since we last conducted an inspection in 2017. In general, we found that units were remarkably stable with infrequent incidents of violence, no self-inflicted deaths and low levels of self-harm. The quality of relationships between staff and prisoners were good, with staff evidencing commendable resilience in their dealings with prisoners. Most units were clean and well equipped, except for the Wakefield unit which needed investment and development. Daily routines were applied reliably but the amount of time men were able to spend out of their cells varied. There was not enough to do on the units and a lack of work and education was unhelpful given this was a target in some progression plans. There were also variations in practice between the units, including prisoner access to services and privileges, that were not explained or justified logically. The quality of multidisciplinary working, and the individualised support and planning offered to each man was, however, impressive. Progress, no matter how small, was acknowledged and those selected for the units were given every opportunity to address their risks and move on from the CSC, including into other types of dedicated intervention in the prison system or to the health sector. The quality of leadership, at both national and local level, was coherent and effective. Leaders and staff knew what they were doing and should be congratulated on their achievements.

London:  HM Inspectorate of Prisons, 2024. 43p.

By Counter Extremism Project

The Nordic Resistance Movement (Nordiska motståndsrörelsen, or NRM) is a transnational, neo-Nazi organization with official chapters operating in Sweden, Finland, and Norway. The NRM also draws support from neo-Nazis in Denmark and has some registered members in Iceland, though the group has failed to establish formal branches in those countries. NRM-Sweden has grown more than one-third in size since 2015. Formed by neo-Nazi nationalists in Sweden in 1997, the NRM seeks to merge all Nordic countries into a single, nationalist-socialist state, either by elections or through revolution. The group is openly racist, anti-immigrant, anti-Semitic, and pro-Hitler—and has carried out violence targeting gay people, ideological opponents and, more recently, Muslim refugees. Since the start of 2015, NRM’s branch in Sweden (NRM-Sweden) has grown more than one-third in size by advocating against Sweden’s open-door policy to Muslim asylum seekers. That chapter registered as a political party in July 2015, and and held its largest rally in September 2017—convening more than 600 demonstrators in the streets of Gothenburg. Many of the NRM’s co-founders and early members came from the now-defunct White Aryan Resistance (Vitt Ariskt Motstand, or VAM) and its offshoot National Youth (Nationell Ungdom). The VAM, a network of Swedish neo-Nazis formed in the early 1990s, was notorious for carrying out attacks against immigrants and gay people and for funding its violence through bank robberies. The group splintered into several white-power groups in or around 1995, among them National Youth, which would go on to serve as the NRM’s youth movement.  

NRM [has] carried out attacks targeting gay people, Muslims asylum seekers, and [others]... using smoking flares, pepper spray, tear gas, knives, and guns. At its founding in 1997, the NRM was known as the Swedish Resistance Movement (Svenska motståndsrörelsen)—though the group expanded from a Swedish-centered group to one spanning the Nordic region and adopted the name NRM after establishing Finnish and Norwegian chapters in 2008 and 2011, respectively. Media outlets and government officials, however, at times refer to NRM-Sweden as the Swedish Resistance Movement; NRM-Norway as the Norwegian Resistance Movement; and NRM-Finland as the Finnish Resistance Movement.5 The group itself identifies as the “Nordic Resistance Movement,” and may refer to its various chapters as the “Swedish branch of the Nordic Resistance Movement,” for example. NRM members have been responsible for the murder of at least three individuals—two in Sweden and one in Finland. Future NRM-Sweden co-founder Klas Lund was convicted in 1986 of killing anti-racist campaigner Ronny Landin who, according to authorities, had intervened to stop an assault on three immigrants by Lund and other neo-Nazis. In 1999, three men connected to National Youth, NRM-Sweden’s youth movement, shot to death trade unionist Björn Söderberg outside of his Stockholm apartment. According to reports, the shooting was revenge for a tip Söderberg had given a local newspaper regarding the identity of one of the NRM members. More recently, in December 2016, key NRM-Finland member Jesse Torniainen was handed a two-year prison sentence for aggravated assault in connection to the murder of 28-year-old Finnish man Jimi Joonas Karttonen. According to reports, Torniainen and others had violently beaten Karttonen that September after the latter openly expressed disapproval of the group during one of its rallies. Karttonen died one week later from his wounds. In November 2017, a Finnish district court banned the NRM and its affiliated chapters. An appeals court upheld the decision in September 2018, but the NRM has since sought permission to appeal its case to the Supreme Court and remains legal in Finland until all options for appeal are exhausted. A decision is expected for fall 2019. 

Sweden: Counter Extremism Project, 2024. 20p.

Abuse, protection, and justice along routes between East and West Africa and Africa’s Mediterranean coast

By Duncan Breen

At the end of May, 30 people were murdered in the town of Mizdah, south of Tripoli, allegedly by traffickers. These were among the latest in a long series of deaths along the route from West Africa or the East and Horn of Africa to Libya. At least 68 refugees or migrants are known to have died along the route this year alone. As refugees and migrants travel along the Central Mediterranean route to Libya, many continue to be subjected to horrific violence at multiple points along the way, as the testimonies in this report show, even before any attempt to cross the sea to Europe. It remains one of the deadliest land crossings in the world. This report draws on data collected by the Mixed Migration Centre’s 4Mi monitors along the route to map the places where refugees interviewed in 2018 and 2019 most frequently reported deaths, sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV), physical violence, and kidnappings occurred.

At the end of 2017, UNHCR shared recommendations related to trafficking with several key States and agencies to encourage further actions to protect refugees and migrants from abuses along the Central Mediterranean route. In follow up to those recommendations, UNHCR, together with the Mixed Migration Centre (MMC), seeks to draw further attention to the human rights abuses that take place along multiple sections of the Central Mediterranean land route. In doing so, and through the recommendations included in this report, UNHCR and MMC call for measures to hold perpetrators of crimes and human rights violations along the route accountable; for more measures to assist and protect victims; and for greater cooperation between States to increase protection and access to solutions, and enhance access to justice.

Geneva: Mixed Migration Centre, 2020. 48p.

Abuse, Protection and Justice along Routes between East and West Africa and Africa’s Mediterranean Coast. A route-based perspective on key risks

By  Michele Cavinato

In the complex landscape of migration, this second volume of the report ‘On This Journey, No One Cares if You Live or Die’ emerges as a crucial body of work that sheds light on the stark realities faced by refugees and migrants traversing the perilous Central Mediterranean Route (CMR) all the way from East and Horn of Africa and West Africa to the North African coast of the Mediterranean and  across the sea. Jointly published by IOM, MMC, and UNHCR, this report delves into the protection risks faced by refugees and migrants during these journeys. It aims to inform increased and concrete routes-based protection responses to reduce the suffering associated with the desperate journeys refugees and migrants undertake, and a call to action to address the root causes of displacement and drivers of irregular migration through positive action on peace, climate change, governance, inequality and social cohesion, as well as the creation of safe migration  pathways.

Geneva: Mixed Migration.Centre, .2024. 71p. _____________________________ This is a joint IOM, MMC and UNHCR publicatio

By  Kingsley L Madueke, et al

  This report explores the dynamics of armed banditry in North West Nigeria, aiming to unravel their evolution, structure and the illicit economies that bandit groups engage in for financing and resourcing, as well as their interactions with local communities and other non-state armed groups. Focusing on Nigeria’s North West region, this report explores the internal dynamics of armed bandit groups,1 as well as the ecosystem and landscapes within which they operate, identifying potential entry points for interventions. As concerns grow regarding potential alliances between some bandit groups and violent extremist organizations – namely Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP), Ansaru and Jama’atu AhlusSunnah Lidda’Awati Wal Jihad (JAS) – operating in North West, this report explores not only to what extent these alliances exist but what shapes their formation. Nigeria’s North West region, encompassing Katsina, Kaduna, Kano, Sokoto, Jigawa and Zamfara states, has since 2011 witnessed a surge in armed bandit activities.2 Reported civilian fatalities resulting from violence by armed bandits in North West between 2018 and 2023 surpassed those inflicted by JAS and ISWAP in Nigeria’s North East region within the same period.3 Responses have largely consisted of military operations and local vigilante efforts. However, military operations’ impact has been temporary and banditry persists. This necessitates a better understanding of why banditry is resilient: bandit group structure and engagement with illicit economies are key elements of this resilience. The existing body of media and expert analyses pertaining to armed bandits in North West Nigeria has predominantly concentrated on the violence they inflict and its repercussions, with less focus on their structure, resourcing and financing mechanisms, and the physical and social environment within which they operate. This report aims to fill this gap, focusing on Zamfara and Kaduna – two major flashpoints of armed banditry in Nigeria’s North West. This report engages with the ongoing debate around categorizing non-state armed groups and explores whether the bandits can be said to exercise any governance functions or operate as political, as well as criminal, actors. This report explores the dynamics of armed banditry in North West Nigeria, aiming to unravel their evolution, structure and the illicit economies that bandit groups engage in for financing and resourcing, as well as their interactions with local communities and other non-state armed groups. Focusing on Nigeria’s North West region, this report explores the internal dynamics of armed bandit groups,1 as well as the ecosystem and landscapes within which they operate, identifying potential entry points for interventions. As concerns grow regarding potential alliances between some bandit groups and violent extremist organizations – namely Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP), Ansaru and Jama’atu AhlusSunnah Lidda’Awati Wal Jihad (JAS) – operating in North West, this report explores not only to what extent these alliances exist but what shapes their formation. Nigeria’s North West region, encompassing Katsina, Kaduna, Kano, Sokoto, Jigawa and Zamfara states, has since 2011 witnessed a surge in armed bandit activities.2 Reported civilian fatalities resulting from violence by armed bandits in North West between 2018 and 2023 surpassed those inflicted by JAS and ISWAP in Nigeria’s North East region within the same period.3 Responses have largely consisted of military operations and local vigilante efforts. However, military operations’ impact has been temporary and banditry persists. This necessitates a better understanding of why banditry is resilient: bandit group structure and engagement with illicit economies are key elements of this resilience. The existing body of media and expert analyses pertaining to armed bandits in North West Nigeria has predominantly concentrated on the violence they inflict and its repercussions, with less focus on their structure, resourcing and financing mechanisms, and the physical and social environment within which they operate. This report aims to fill this gap, focusing on Zamfara and Kaduna – two major flashpoints of armed banditry in Nigeria’s North West. This report engages with the ongoing debate around categorizing non-state armed groups and explores whether the bandits can be said to exercise any governance functions or operate as political, as well as criminal, actors. ■ Depending on the type of illicit economy and the level of influence they exert over it, armed bandits vary their engagements with illicit economies, shifting between attacks and robberies targeting actors in licit and illicit supply chains; imposition of levies; and assumption of control of part (or more rarely the entirety) of the supply chain. This variability in engagements with illicit economies renders a unidimensional response strategy inadequate. ■ A bandit group’s degree of influence over an area and the type of economy bandits are using for resource extraction contribute to shaping the level of violence against communities. Violence by bandits is higher when their influence is lower, and kidnapping and cattle rustling are characterized by greater violence than engagement in other revenue-generating activities. ■ Armed bandits exhibit some behaviours that fall within definitions of ‘governance’, though profit and predation appear to be the primary motivations for their actions. The concept of governance is important for understanding bandits in the political/criminal spectrum    

Geneva: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2024. 53p.

By Héni Nsaibia, et al.

  This report analyzes the operations and organizational structure of the al-Qaeda-affiliated Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) in the Sahel region of Africa, focusing on the group’s engagement with illicit economies and tactical use of economic warfare. Specifically, the report emphasizes the central role of illicit economies in JNIM’s governance strategies, and in financing and resourcing the group’s armed struggle. It also tracks how JNIM has evolved organizationally, with these internal changes dictating shifts in its involvement in regional illicit economies. These political and organizational changes, and the group’s highly strategic engagement with illicit economies, have underpinned JNIM’s expansion into new geographies, its retention of influence in areas of control, and its resilience to disruption. Further, the report provides further insights into JNIM’s strategies for expansion and population control, and argues that understanding the role of JNIM within illicit economies is crucial to gaining insights into the group’s governance, financing, and resourcing, as well as its strategic objectives across the central Sahelian states of Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, and the northernmost areas of several West African littoral states. JNIM’s organizational structure balances unity and central power with local adaptation and flexibility, which has allowed the group to build a cohesive yet adaptable organization. However, the group’s exponential growth since its formation strains ongoing cohesion, and operational and tactical objectives differ due to differences within the vast territories in which the group operates. JNIM exerts control and authority over local populations by force using both violent and non-violent means, such as providing civilian services, justice, and dispute mediation; these means vary depending on the context. This unified and locally flexible strategy is also evident in JNIM’s strategic engagement with local licit and illicit economies. While JNIM’s engagement in illicit activities is intimately linked to the diverse financing and resourcing of JNIM’s war economy, it goes beyond merely accumulating financial resources. JNIM utilizes these resources to enhance its legitimacy and to gain  popular support while furthering its strategic and governance objectives. Further, JNIM’s quasi-regulatory role in certain illicit economies – including in enabling access to some stateprohibited resources – is central to its positioning as an alternative governance provider, posited as preferable to regulatory regimes imposed by the state. The under-explored dimension of economic warfare is highlighted in the report as a vital component of JNIM’s overall strategy, which encompasses the destruction and sabotage of critical and public infrastructure, the establishment of checkpoints along transport routes, attacks on commercial and logistic convoys, the imposition of embargoes and blockades, and other tactics such as forced population evictions. The economic warfare dimension of JNIM’s strategy significantly overlaps with the organization’s effort to expand its competitive systems of control over the population, through which JNIM seeks to weaken the state and impair its authority. The report concludes by forecasting the trajectory of JNIM’s expansion, especially in light of evolving state responses. Given its current organizational structure and adaptive strategies, JNIM appears poised to continue its growth and influence. The group’s strategic use of illicit economies and economic warfare serves as a potent driver of its territorial control strategies, and these elements are expected to remain integral to JNIM’s operational blueprint. As state actors devise their own strategies to respond to JNIM’s activities, the group’s adaptability will be put to the test. The effectiveness of these state responses, in turn, will hinge on a profound understanding of JNIM’s organizational dynamics, its strategic engagement with local economies, and the ways in which it navigates and leverages the complex socio-political landscapes within which it operates. Anticipating the future of JNIM necessitates a sustained and nuanced focus on these factors. This report aims to contribute to such an understanding, providing a foundation upon which more effective and informed strategies can be developed to address the challenges posed by JNIM in the Sahel region  

Issue 1

Geneva: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime 2023. 49p.

By Noemi Magugliani | John Trajer | Jean-Pierre Gauci

, 

In light of these developments, the report addresses the following research questions: - - What has been the impact of the operationalised NABA measures on the identification and wellbeing of people with lived experience of modern slavery, and are these impacts in line with the stated objectives of the legislation? What has been the impact of the operationalised NABA measures on the modern slavery sector more broadly? Given the timing of this report, the analysis is restricted to the impacts of Part 5 of NABA in the year following its implementation (covering the period from the first quarter of 2023, when      most of the key provision entered into force, up to the fourth quarter of 2023).1 It is hoped that this analysis will inform any future research on the impacts of this Act, as well as the impacts of other legislation adopted in this area (in particular, the Illegal Migration Act 2023).

London: British Institute of International & Comparative Law, the Anti-Trafficking Monitoring Group and the Human Trafficking Foundation, 2024. 74p.

World Health Organization;

The Global status report on alcohol and health and treatment of substance use disorders presents a comprehensive overview of alcohol consumption, alcohol-related harm and policy responses as well as treatment capacities for alcohol and drug use disorders worldwide. The report is based on data collected by WHO from Member States and organized in accordance with the Sustainable Development Goals health target 3.5 which calls on countries to strengthen “the prevention and treatment of substance abuse, including narcotic drug abuse and harmful use of alcohol”. The chapter on alcohol and health continues the series of WHO global status reports on alcohol and health and presents the latest available data on the status of, and trends in, alcohol consumption, as well as estimates of the alcohol-attributable disease burden and descriptions of policy responses worldwide. On the basis of data collected from countries on the treatment of substance use disorders the report describes the status of key components of treatment responses to alcohol and drug use disorders and proposes a new service capacity index for these disorders as an additional contextual indicator for monitoring progress in this domain of SDG health target 3.5. The report concludes with broad directions for international action to accelerate progress towards achievement of SDG health target 3.5. 

World Health Organization, 2024. 335p.

By Spencer Faragasso and David Albright

Key Findings

• JSC Alabuga dealt with an acute labor shortage to build Shahed 136 drones by raising salaries and exploiting high school-age students and immigrant employees recruited under false pretenses.

• JSC Alabuga has been using two programs to actively recruit young men and women, primarily aged 16-22, to make military drones:  Alabuga Polytechnic is used to recruit students within Russia, and the Alabuga Start program is used to recruit workers from the Commonwealth of Independent States (also known as CIS countries) and other countries, primarily African countries.

• This deceptive and manipulative recruitment effort is intended primarily to enable JSC Alabuga to meet its ambitious Shahed 136 kamikaze drone production goals for the Russian military, a project that Russia steeps in secrecy, to the point of calling it motorboat manufacturing.  

• Potential recruits are not told that they could be involved in producing Shahed 136 drones. Instead, when drone production work is mentioned, the recruitment process emphasizes the making of M5 drones, built in the same building as the Shahed 136 drones, but by a different company, Albatross LLC, and on a much smaller scale, and advertised for civilian use (but leaked documents and media reporting state that some fraction of the M5 drones have been used in Russian combat operations).

• Alabuga Polytechnic’s students and Alabuga Start’s recruits have produced thousands of Shahed drones and dozens, perhaps hundreds of Albatross M5 drones for Russian combat operations against Ukraine, often against civilian targets in the case of the Shahed 136 drones.

• For the Albatross M5 drone, participants are employed and trained in building the airframe, assembling and installing electronics, and testing the drone. For the Shahed 136 drone, they are involved in all aspects of making the drone. According to early internal Alabuga plans, many students and recruits worked on Albatross M5 production before participants were moved to work on producing Shahed 136 drones for JSC Alabuga. 

• The Alabuga Start program primarily targets African women, using the promise of a high monthly salary (double what can be earned on average in their native country; and more than such a position would normally earn in Russia), work training, long-term accommodations and integration into Russian society. 

• Twenty-seven countries are documented to have sent nationals to Alabuga through Alabuga Start. It is unknown whether any countries have withdrawn their participation, but they should do so immediately.  If they continue to send workers, these countries directly support a U.S. and EU sanctioned entity and support Russia’s military efforts, thus risk getting sanctioned themselves.

• The Start program uses deception and manipulation to attract low-skilled workers to perform the many relatively simple operations involved in making the airframes for Shahed 136 drones. 

• Both the Polytechnic and Start programs are exploitive of young people and require the students and recruits to work long hours, often more than full-time.  More than 90 percent of the Start program personnel and about one-third of the Polytechnic students are estimated to work in drone production, mostly the production of Shahed 136 drones.  

• Based on JSC Alabuga plans in early 2023, the design, planning, support, and production of Shahed drones would entail over 1000 personnel per daytime shift, of whom at least 70 percent would be from Alabuga Polytechnic and Alabuga Start.

• In the first half of 2023, about 100 Alabuga Polytechnic students received training in Tehran, Iran, from Iranian experts on making the Shahed 136 airframe.

•  Alabuga is actively indoctrinating the young participants at its site into supporting the Russian military through patriotic and military themed activities.

• The use of teenagers in the production of military drones used against Ukraine, including against civilian targets, should be viewed as a crime.

Washington, DC: The Institute for Science and International Security, 2024. 22P

By Kate Fitz-Gibbon, Sandra Walklate, Jasmine McGowan, JaneMaree Maher, Jude McCulloch

This project aimed to develop new understandings of risk and system interactions prior to intimate femicide in order to build the evidence base required to inform early intervention and the prevention of intimate femicide in Australia. Drawing on a quantitative and qualitative analysis of intimate femicide sentencing decisions imposed over a decade in Australian superior courts, the new knowledge generated from this project is intended to inform and assist in developing a more risk-sensitive approach to preventing and responding to intimate femicide in Australia and overseas, thereby enhancing women’s security.

This report presents findings from the collection of over 250 intimate femicide sentencing judgments and the in-depth analyses of 235 of these. These judgements were used, in part, to identify potential points of intervention that might have provided an opportunity to prevent such killings.

In Australia, at least one woman a week is murdered by her current or former partner. According to Destroy the Joint, this equated to the killing of at least 57 women in 2022 and at least 64 women in 2023 allegedly as a result of men’s violence. At the time of finalising this report, an unusually high number of killings allegedly by men’s violence in the first four months of 2024 in Australia has reignited national attention over the need to better address women’s risk of fatal violence (see, inter alia, AAP, 2024; Priestley, 2024; Tuohy, 2024).

Intimate partner homicides are recognised as the most preventable type of homicide because it is assumed that histories of abuse can provide clear indicators of risk (see, inter alia, Bugeja et al., 2013; Dearden & Jones, 2008; Virueda & Payne, 2010). While intimate partner homicides are monitored and examined in Australia via the work of the Australian Institute of Criminology and state-based death review teams, there is no fully funded, multi-systems approach to the prevention of men’s lethal violence against women (McPhedran & Baker, 2012). As in Australia, international efforts to review and count such deaths are carried out in different ways and are often fraught with difficulties (see, inter alia, Walklate et al., 2020; Dawson & Vega, 2023).

In Australia and comparable international jurisdictions, a range of provisions, measures, laws and programs are designed to assess and address the risk of intimate partner violence. These include civil orders alongside programs that provide increased levels of protection and monitoring for women deemed at high risk of repeat victimisation. These instruments include the development of various risk assessment and management frameworks (Walklate et al., 2020). While magistrates, police and specialist support services use these instruments to identify and respond to risk (Boxall et al., 2015; Robinson & Moloney, 2010; Wakefield & Taylor, 2015), there is evidence that these approaches are limited by their conceptualisations of risk and in their scale of implementation and inconsistency in application.

This project sought to contribute new evidence to inform the further development of whole-of-systems preventive approaches to repeat violence and intimate femicide. Specifically, the project aimed to build evidence based on the following touchpoints:

• Places where an intervention between the initial emergence of family violence and the fatal outcomes had occurred.

• What could potentially be known about those points of intervention.

• If/how the pathway from intervention to safety could be better supported.

This report presents findings from the collection of over 250 intimate femicide sentencing judgments and the in-depth analyses of 235 of these. These judgements were used, in part, to identify potential points of intervention that might have provided an opportunity to prevent such killings. Sentencing judgments typically include narrative accounts from a judge, who describes how and where the crime took place as well as the circumstances that led to it.

This project builds current understandings of the potential points of intervention prior to the killing of women by their male intimate partners. In doing so, this project has contributed to building understanding of who perpetrates intimate femicide.

Melbourne: Monash University, 2024. 40p.

By  Coen Teunissen, Michael John Cahill, Sarah Napier, Timothy Cubitt, Hayley Boxall and Rick Brown

This study examined the sexual exploitation of children on dating apps, and their revictimisation as adults. Findings showed that, from a sample of 9,987 Australian dating platform users surveyed, 8.8 percent had used these platforms while under 18 years of age. Of these, 59.3 percent reported receiving at least one sexually exploitative request from another dating platform user who knew they were under 18. 

Respondents who were victimised on dating platforms while under 18 were more likely to be revictimised as an adult through online and offline sexual violence. They also experienced a greater number of harms. These findings highlight the risks associated with underage dating platform use, the potential for revictimisation as an adult, and the need for these platforms to implement additional safety measures to reduce access among children and adolescents.

Trends & issues in crime and criminal justice no. 697. 

Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology. 2024. 16p.

By Emma Belton and Adrian Cherney

Violent extremism risk assessment tools have become an important way of understanding and managing the threat posed by radicalised offenders in custodial and community settings. The aim of this study was to examine the applicability, interrater reliability and predictive validity of the Violent Extremism Risk Assessment—Version 2 Revised (VERA‑2R) against data on individuals who have radicalised in Australia. Two trained assessors—the authors— completed VERA-2R risk assessments for a sample of 50 extremist offenders. Results showed differences in risk profiles between individuals who were violent and non-violent. It was found that the VERA-2R had good interrater reliability but low predictive validity.

Trends & issues in crime and criminal justice no. 690. 

Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology. 2024, 19p.

By Rae Cooper, Elizabeth Hill, Suneha Seetahul, Meraiah Foley, Marnie Harris, Charlotte Hock, Amy Tapsell

Sexual harassment is a systemic and pervasive feature of the retail industry ecosystem and a persistent part of daily interactions between retail workers, and their managers, peers and customers. It is such a common experience that many retail workers perceive it as just 'part of the job'. Sexual harassment causes harm on multiple levels - it affects the wellbeing of individual employees, damages team cohesion, and creates economic damage for businesses.

This study reveals that sexual harassment is a persistent and pervasive feature of retail work, arising from a complex interplay of institutional, industry-wide and organisational factors. Institutional frameworks, including employment laws, set the context for retail operations and workforce experiences.

The insights in this report provide a detailed understanding of the drivers of workplace sexual harassment in the retail industry, offering a foundation for industry-wide change.

Key findings:

• Sexual harassment in the retail workplace is experienced by retail workers as routine and unavoidable, influenced by industry norms and narratives such as the customer is always right.

• A range of people perpetrate sexual harassment including managers, colleagues and customers.

• The retail industry must improve its organisational policies, training practices and reporting processes to better prevent and respond to workplace sexual harassment.

ANROWS Research Report 04/2024

Australia's National Research Organisation for Women's Safety (ANROWS( 2024. 126p.

By Timothy Broady, Catherine Thomson, Ilan Katz, Sarah Judd-Lam

With funding from the Department of Communities and Justice, the NSW Ageing and Disability Commission (ADC) commissioned the Social Policy Research Centre (SPRC) at UNSW, in partnership with Carers NSW, to conduct the ADC Carers Project. 

The aim of the project was to provide the ADC with clear evidence-based findings, recommendations, and advice to inform their work with carers of adults with disability and older people. Specifically, the research was designed to inform the handling of future reports about abuse, neglect and exploitation by the ADC, ways for the ADC and service systems to better support carers, and opportunities for early intervention and prevention strategies. 

This report presents the findings from the analysis of quantitative and qualitative data held by the ADC in relation to reports about alleged abuse, neglect, and exploitation of adults with disability and older people. 

The analyses focused on identifying factors associated with different types of alleged abuse and neglect of older people and adults with disability, as well as factors associated with reported ADC actions, assistance provided, and outcomes for older people and adults with disability. 

Initial recommendations are provided based on these findings. 

Sydney: University of New South Wales, Social Policiy Research Centre,  2024. 61p.

By Alexandra Gannoni, Alexandra Voce, Sarah Napier and Hayley Boxall

This study sought to identify principles to guide the development and implementation of initiatives that aim to prevent child sexual abuse material (CSAM) offending. It did so through a review of research on the implementation and effectiveness of initiatives that aim to prevent CSAM offending, and through input from an international expert advisory group.

Seven principles are described in this paper: the use of advertising campaigns; confidentiality and anonymity; an empathetic and non-judgemental approach; accessibility; training and support; tailored programs; and evaluation. These broad principles can act as a valuable resource for practitioners and policymakers.

Trends & issues in crime and criminal justice no. 696. 

Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology.2024. 18p.

By Brigitte Gilbert

There has been increasing concern over the low conviction rate for sexual assault. This paper uses data from the NSW Police Computerised Operational Policing System (COPS) and the NSW Criminal Courts datasets to track the progress of sexual assaults reported to the NSW Police Force in 2018 through the NSW criminal justice system. The study examines the attrition of incidents, defendants, and charges from the reporting stage through to the sentencing of a proven matter. Attrition rates are tracked separately for contemporary child sexual assault, historic child sexual assault, and adult sexual assault offences.
   There has been increasing concern over the low conviction rate for sexual assault. This paper uses data from the NSW Police Computerised Operational Policing System (COPS) and the NSW Criminal Courts datasets to track the progress of sexual assaults reported to the NSW Police Force in 2018 through the NSW criminal justice system. The study examines the attrition of incidents, defendants, and charges from the reporting stage through to the sentencing of a proven matter. Attrition rates are tracked separately for contemporary child sexual assault, historic child sexual assault, and adult sexual assault offences. The study findings show that: • In 2018, 5,869 incidents of sexual assault were reported to NSW police. Of these, 872, or 15%, resulted in the commencement of criminal proceedings against one of 969 defendants and involving 3,369 individual criminal charges for sexual assault or a related sex offence. • Only a small proportion of reported sexual assault incidents resulted in a criminal conviction, with just 8% of reported contemporary child sexual assault incidents, 7% of reported historic child sexual assault incidents, and 6% of reported adult sexual assault incidents resulting in a proven charge. • The largest point of attrition was seen during the police investigation stage, with no legal action taken against an accused in 85% of reported sexual assault incidents. This was consistent across contemporary child, historic child, and adult sexual assaults. • The second largest attrition point was during court proceedings, with two out of five defendants having all their charges withdrawn by the prosecution, dismissed due to mental health, or ‘otherwise’ disposed of. A slightly higher proportion of defendants appearing in historic child sexual assault matters (49%) had all charges against them withdrawn/dismissed or otherwise disposed of, than defendants appearing in contemporary child sexual assault (43%) and adult sexual assault (43%) matters. • For the small number of matters that did progress to court, only a minority of defendants (41%) had a sexual offence charge proven, either by way of a guilty plea or guilty verdict. A lower conviction rate was observed amongst those charged with adult sexual assault (38%) compared with defendants charged with contemporary child sexual assault (43%) and historic child sexual assault (44%). • The majority of defendants (77%) found guilty of sexual assault were sentenced to prison. Prison sentences were imposed for 72% of defendants found guilty of contemporary child sexual assault, 87% of defendants found guilty of historic child sexual assault and 80% of defendants found guilty of adult sexual assault  

Bureau Brief No. BB170

Sydney: The NSW Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research (BOCSAR), 2024. 23p.

By Heather Wolbers and Hayley Boxal

People with disability are at an increased risk of sexual violence. The extent of this increased risk online, particularly in the context of online dating, is unclear as research on dating app facilitated sexual violence (DAFSV) is in its infancy.

This study examines the prevalence and nature of online DAFSV experienced by people with disability (n=1,155), using data from a large national survey of dating platform users (n=9,987).

Overall, 88 percent of users with disability experienced some form of online DAFSV. Rates of harm were significantly higher for users with disability than for users without disability. Further, women and First Nations users with disability were particularly at risk of victimisation.

Findings support the urgency of responses to protect those most at risk of harm facilitated by online dating platforms.

Trends & issues in crime and criminal justice no. 695. 

Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology. 2024. 18p.

By Don Weatherburn,  Michael Doyle, Teagan Weatherall, Joanna Wang

   The Australian Indigenous imprisonment rate is currently 16.7 times the non-Indigenous imprisonment rate. The leading proximate cause of this over-representation is a high rate of Indigenous arrest. In this report we develop and test a model of Indigenous arrest in which the primary drivers of risk are substance use, stress and trauma, adverse social environment, exposure to arrest, human/economic/social capital, and state/territory of residence. We test the model using data from the 2014–15 National Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Survey. The strongest risk factors are alcohol and other drug use and having a high or very high level of psychological distress. The strongest protective factors are completing school, having an income in the top four deciles, and having a permanent home.   

  AIC reports Research Report 32

Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology, 2024. 50p.