By Adrian Usher, the Prisons and Probation Ombudsman (PPO)

This learning lessons bulletin summarises the learning from Prisons and Probation Ombudsman (PPO) investigations into the deaths of those who died within 14 days of release from prison. Prison leavers often have multiple and chronic co-morbidities or risk factors, including substance misuse and mental health issues. This can present difficulties with release planning, especially when combined with external factors, such as a lack of available accommodation. Homelessness on release was a considerable issue in our investigations and has a detrimental impact on the individuals involved. Based on our period of research and reporting 32% of the prisoners who died within two weeks of release were homeless. When viewed in the context of other MOJ research, it seems that prisoners who are released homeless may be overrepresented in our post release death investigations. While we are seeing positive changes to policy and examples of positive practice, analysis of our investigations also found that of those who died within 14 days, just over 50% died within the first four days of being released. This stark finding demonstrates how acutely vulnerable prison leavers are, especially in those first few days after release. There is a desperate need for more joined-up and partnership working between HM Prison and Probation Service (HMPPS) and community services. More needs to be done to ensure that prisoners are released with suitable accommodation and that support measures (such as substance misuse or mental health services) are in place and readily available on release.

By Andrew Gilligan

   Westminster is the physical heart of the British state, a centre of the Christian faith, and the symbol of Britain to the world. Nowhere else in Europe, with the possible exception of the Eiffel Tower, is more famous, or more emblematic of its nation. Nowhere else combines those supreme symbolic qualities with being the place where actual power resides and the highest work of government is done. Yet what should be a showpiece has declined into a degree of squalor and disorder. Windows of the great public buildings, broken by protestors, are splintered or patched with duct tape. Anarchist and anti-police graffiti is painted on those buildings’ walls; some of it has been there for more than two years. Urine trickles from the corners. Protestors have privatised the pavement, illegally and for hours blasting out amplified music that hinders the often critical work being done in the offices along Whitehall. Skateboarders use the steps of the parliamentary building, Portcullis House, as a regular practice area. The experience for visitors is dispiriting and may include being cheated by con-men on Westminster Bridge. Crowds of people press round the entrances to Parliament, banging on the sides of MPs’ cars as they drive in. Parliament Square is a three and four-lane traffic roundabout. MPs are verbally abused, occasionally chased. Some parliamentarians say they feel physically afraid to leave the building. People coming to see their MPs, or keep appointments in government buildings, can’t always get in. “Broken windows” theory says that visible signs of vandalism, anti social behaviour and neglect encourage further crime and disorder. It appears to hold true amid the literally broken windows of Westminster. Between 2013/14 and 2021/22, this study finds, violent crime in the quarter-mile immediately around Parliament has risen by 168 per cent, against a 47 per cent rise in the borough of Westminster as a whole and a 67 per cent rise in London. Public order offences have risen by 252 per cent - three and a half times - versus 75 per cent in the borough as a whole and 93 per cent in London.1 Offences, particularly of violence, have fallen recently, but remain at very high levels. Even without becoming a victim of any of these crimes, someone taking the ten-minute walk from, say, Waterloo Station to Parliament could easily pass as many as half a dozen breaches of the law, from the illegal vendors and confidence tricksters on the bridge, to the pedicabs blocking the traffic, to the bellowing loudspeakers of the protestors, to the people camping in the shop doorways. None individually is serious, but  they have an important cumulative effect. The area is a mess because its governance is a mess. Control of the public spaces around Parliament is split between eight different bodies, often with different policies. Parliament Square alone is controlled by three different official agencies. The government publishes a map to show you which bits are whose, and where certain restrictions apply.2 Symbolising the muddle, key details on it are wrong, so no wonder the policing of the area is a little confused. But the area is also a mess because of a lack of confidence and consistency by those in charge. There is of course no right to urinate in the street, or cheat tourists, or vandalise, but the authorities often seem unwilling to challenge such practices. The law is often ignored around the very building where the laws are made. There is a right to protest - or rather, there are rights to freedom of speech and assembly, including around Parliament, which this paper supports. But there is an important, if not always recognised, distinction between protest that happens to cause disruption to others (for instance, because many people have gathered in the same place) and protest that aims to cause disruption to others as a principal objective (for instance, by a handful of people blocking a road, or using amplification to make it difficult or impossible to work nearby.) The disruption caused by demonstrations of thousands is part of the price of democracy. But we question the way in which much smaller numbers of people are regularly, repeatedly and illegally allowed to cause disproportionate disruption, sometimes risk, and sometimes fear to others. The right to protest has sometimes been privileged over other rights, such as the rights of others to move freely, to work, to speak, and even to be safe. The authorities should act more strongly against protest whose principal aim is to annoy, inconvenience or intimidate, rather than to convey a message. Yet if enforcement is inconsistent, another part of the problem is that decisions by the courts and Parliament have made consistent enforcement harder. Over the last two decades the law has vaccillated. The “controlled area” around Parliament - where, for instance, loudspeakers and structures are supposed to be banned - has been reduced, then enlarged, then cut to almost nothing, then gradually enlarged again. But it is still smaller than it was - it excludes, for example, the whole of Whitehall (Parliament Street, which joins Whitehall to Parliament Square, is included, however). The Supreme Court’s Ziegler judgement, which says that those obstructing the road should not be convicted if it was a disproportionate interference with their rights of protest, has made it more difficult for the police to act. Amendments currently in Parliament seek to deal with this issue. Many of these problems were raised in a report by Parliament’s own Joint Committee on Human Rights (JCHR), more than three years ago, after high-profile mobbing incidents of MPs in the area.3 Some things have changed for the better. The protestor camps in the middle of Parliament Square went in 2013. In 2016, a new pedestrian crossing allowed the square to be reached, and reclaimed, by the public. More recently, there appears to be slightly more proactive policing in Westminster. But not enough has changed, as the crime figures show. The government took almost 18 months to respond to the JCHR report and much of its response is non-committal.4 There are plans to dramatically improve at least the physical environment, removing traffic from two sides of Parliament Square and making the Palace of Westminster safer from terrorist attack. But they have been drawn up almost in secret; and they are stalled because the various official bodies are quarrelling about who should pay for them. In all these ways, too, Westminster symbolises Britain.   

London: Policy Exchange, 2023. 37p.

By Nicole D. Porter, Alison Parker, Trey Walk, Jonathan Topaz, Jennifer Turner, Casey Smith, Makayla LaRonde-King, Sabrina Pearce and Julie Ebenstein 

  The United States is an outlier nation in that it strips voting rights from millions of citizens solely on the basis of a criminal conviction.2As of 2022, over 4.4 million people in the United States were disenfranchised due to a felony conviction. This is due in part to over 50 years of U.S. mass incarceration, wherein the U.S. incarcerated population increased from about 360,000 people in the early 1970s to nearly 2 million in 2022. While many U.S. states have scaled back their disenfranchisement provisions, a trend that has accelerated since 2017, the United States still lags behind most of the world in protecting the right to vote for people with criminal convictions. The right to vote is a cornerstone of democratic, representative government that reflects the will of the people. The international consensus on the importance of this right is demonstrated in part by the fact that it is protected in international human rights law. A majority of the world’s nations either do not deny people the right to vote due to criminal convictions or deny the right only in relatively narrow and rare circumstances.  

Washington, DC: Sentencing Project, 2024. 55p.

By Jacqueline M. Nowicki

  Why GAO Did This Study 

 The Departments of Education and Justice are responsible for enforcing certain federal civil rights laws that prohibit discrimination report for the Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services, Education, and Related Agencies Appropriations Bill, 2023, includes a provision for GAO to review the role of policing in schools, including the effect on students of different races. This report addresses (1) what Education’s data show about the extent to which different student groups are arrested in K-12 schools and (2) whether police presence in schools is associated with student arrests. GAO analyzed two federal Education datasets for the two most recent school years before the pandemic (2015 2016 and 2017–2018) and 2019–2020. GAO also visited three school districts, selected for factors such as high rates of arrests; reviewed federal laws and regulations; and interviewed federal officials and representatives of national education and civil rights groups. What GAO Recommends GAO is making three recommendations that Education: (1) collect arrest and referral data, by race, for students with disabilities who receive services under Section 504; (2) disclose the limitations of its 2021 2022 arrest data; and (3) clearly inform school districts about future changes to arrest and referral data in its civil rights data collection. Education generally agreed with these recommendations.   

GAO-24-106294

Washington, DC:  United States Government Accountability Office, 2024. 67p.

By Thomas Costa

  Why GAO Did This Study Millions of Americans struggle with substance misuse. Some pursue treatment and recovery at over 3,660 residential facilities, according to 2020 HHS data. Some of these facilities may require residents to work. GAO was asked to review work practices at these facilities. This report examines (1) the prevalence of facility work and pay practices, (2) selected stakeholders’ views on the role of work in substance misuse treatment and recovery, and (3) the extent to which federal guidance and enforcement address work and pay at facilities. In March to June 2023 GAO surveyed a statistical sample of facilities and obtained generalizable responses from 96 licensed treatment facilities and 48 certified recovery residences. GAO visited facilities, some covertly, selected for geographic variation and other considerations; interviewed HHS and Department of Labor officials and selected stakeholders such as state substance misuse agency officials and researchers; and reviewed relevant federal laws, regulations, and agency documents. What GAO Recommends GAO recommends that HHS (1) develop a process to consult state substance misuse agencies about their guidance needs for incorporating work into treatment and recovery and (2) state in SUPTRS Block Grant documents if and when work requirements are acceptable as a condition of accessing services in residential treatment and recovery facilities. HHS agreed with GAO’s recommendations.   

Performance audit report

BY THE Queensland Auditor-General

This report focuses on serious repeat offenders and the work entities are doing to address crime by high-risk and serious repeat offenders and assessed whether youth justice strategies and programs are effective in reducing crime by serious repeat offenders and improving community safety. 

Youth crime is complex and has been a growing public concern in recent years. It can have significant impacts – physical, emotional, psychological, and economic – for victims and the wider community. Most young offenders only commit a small number of offences and are diverted away from the youth justice system. However, a small proportion reoffend and commit serious offences. As the underlying causes of youth crime are multi-faceted, effectively addressing the problem requires a whole-of-system approach.

Key findings

• System leadership has improved, but needs to be more effective

• Better system-wide analysis is required to inform investment

• Better system-wide analysis is required to inform investment

• Entities need to better implement their new youth justice strategy

• More can be done to monitor and rehabilitate serious repeat offenders

• The department needs to better manage a young offender’s transition from detention to the community

The report makes recommendations for the Departments of Premier and Cabinet, and Youth Justice, as well as the Queensland Police Service. 

  (Report 15: 2023–24)

Brisbane: Queensland Audit Office, 2024. 70p.

By The Regulatory Institute

Corruption remains one of the foremost challenges faced by countries worldwide. Its destructive effects impact societies, economies, and individuals globally, with developing nations bearing the brunt of this widespread issue. While many countries have implemented anti-corruption regulations, their effectiveness may be limited. To address this gap, the Regulatory Institute has developed this model law on corruption.

This model law serves as a comprehensive guide for regulatory practitioners in drafting and implementing robust anti-corruption measures tailored to their specific legal and cultural contexts.

The model law aims to provide a clear and comprehensive framework, outlining responsibilities, defining offences, and establishing stringent penalties for corrupt activities. It is divided into six chapters, each addressing a critical aspect of the fight against corruption.

Drawing on a wide range of solutions from anti-corruption laws around the world, the model law highlights the importance of robust investigation and enforcement mechanisms to deter and address corruption effectively.

The purpose of the Regulatory Institute’s model laws is to facilitate the tasks of regulatory practitioners, be they working for administrations or parliaments, to improve the quality of laws by triggering more conscious choices. These model laws should be used as a toolbox, a checklist or the basis for the development of an adapted law, and optimised as such. The model laws are not intended to be used exactly as they are drafted. They try to point to important decisions to be taken by regulatory practitioners without preempting respective choices. Therefore, they often present choices, be they alternatives or add-on modules, that can be kept or deleted.

In view of that specific task, the model laws of the Regulatory Institute offer so many possibilities for differentiation that no jurisdiction will use all of them. Consequently, once a decision has been taken regarding the possibilities for differentiation to be used, the law can and should be simplified.

Brussels: Regulatory Institute, 2024. 62p.

By Appleseed Mexico

The updated 2024 recommendations for Appleseed Mexico’s “Children at the Border” report focus on improving the treatment of Mexican Unaccompanied Children (UACs) at the U.S.-Mexico border. Key findings highlight deficiencies in current practices, such as inadequate training for Customs and Border Protection (CBP) personnel, unsuitable facilities for holding children, and insufficient communication with Mexican authorities. Recommendations include transferring TVPRA screening responsibilities to USCIS, improving care and facilities, providing free legal representation, and enhancing data tracking and reporting. These changes aim to align U.S. practices with child protection principles and ensure better outcomes for UACs.

Washington DC: Appleseed,  2024. 123p.

By Melanie Baak, Joel Windle, Emily Miller

The University of South Australia (UniSA) and Australian Refugee Association (ARA) entered into an agreement for UniSA researchers to conduct an evaluation of the Youth Connect program. The evaluation sought to explore the processes and impacts of the Youth Connect program in relation to social participation, economic independence, personal wellbeing and at-risk or anti-social behaviour. Formal data collection for the evaluation took place from mid-2023 to early 2024. Evaluation of the project focused on consideration of the effectiveness and impact of the project and whether expectations and program outcomes were met. The research used qualitative and quantitative approaches with youth participants from the Youth Connect program and qualitative approaches with participating school staff and ARA staff members.

To understand the views and experiences of youth participants, the research team undertook four focus groups with youth participants in the program. Three focus groups were conducted at ARA venues and one at a school. In total, 44 young people participated in evaluation focus groups. In addition, to capture the breadth of experiences of young people who had participated across the full range of Youth Connect programs, researchers undertook an online survey using Qualtrics software.

The Youth Connect program offered support for young people facing a series of interconnected challenges. Young people from culturally and linguistically diverse (CALD) backgrounds often experience difficulty in engaging with the wider community and building connections.

The program initially aimed to engage young people aged 15-25 years from African, Afghan and Syrian backgrounds, with young people aged from 12-25 ultimately engaging in the program. Other young people from CALD refugee and migrant backgrounds were also included throughout program activities.

Adelaide: University of South Australia 2024.

Proposing the domestic violence threat assessment centre

By Timothy Cubitt, Anthony Morgan, Christopher Dowling, Samantha Bricknell and Rick Brown

    Intimate partner homicide (IPH) is one of the most common forms of homicide in Australia. Despite rates falling over time, it remains the most common homicide threat for Australian women, who are the victims of three quarters of all IPH incidents. Recent research has viewed some IPH perpetrators as being motivated by fixation and grievances. These fixated perpetrators hold an intense preoccupation with an individual, which may be driven by a grievance, during the acute phases of risk. In this paper we propose a trial of the Domestic Violence Threat Assessment Centre (DVTAC). Modelled on the Fixated Threat Assessment Centres, the DVTAC could offer a multi-agency approach to information gathering, monitoring and intervention among high-risk domestic violence offenders during periods of acute risk

Research in practice no. 48.

 Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology. 2024. 14p.

By HM Chief Inspector of Prisons

 Close supervision centres (CSCs) are small, specialist units located within six of the high security prisons. With capacity for 66 adult men, 44 were being held in the centres at the time of this thematic inspection. An additional nine were being held in ‘designated cells,’ located in some segregation units within the long-term and high security estate (LTHSE). They were located there following their removal from association due to their active and presenting risks in a CSC, or following their transfer to another prison to attend court or access visits with their family and friends. Most men selected for a CSC were serving indeterminate sentences, many were category A, and the selection criteria, which in our view were applied proportionately and based on evidence, indicated very clearly that all had committed serious, often repeated, acts of violence against others while in prison. As such, the CSC system is effectively the deepest form of custody that exists in the country, managing some of the most dangerous men in the system. During this inspection we adopted a slightly different approach, which, although informed by our healthy prison structure, applied tests that better reflected the priorities and processes of the CSC system: management of the centres, progression, safety, and respect. We judged outcomes to be good, our highest assessment, in three tests and reasonably good in the test of progression. These assessments reflect the success and effectiveness of the CSC system, as well as some improvement to the safety of the units since we last conducted an inspection in 2017. In general, we found that units were remarkably stable with infrequent incidents of violence, no self-inflicted deaths and low levels of self-harm. The quality of relationships between staff and prisoners were good, with staff evidencing commendable resilience in their dealings with prisoners. Most units were clean and well equipped, except for the Wakefield unit which needed investment and development. Daily routines were applied reliably but the amount of time men were able to spend out of their cells varied. There was not enough to do on the units and a lack of work and education was unhelpful given this was a target in some progression plans. There were also variations in practice between the units, including prisoner access to services and privileges, that were not explained or justified logically. The quality of multidisciplinary working, and the individualised support and planning offered to each man was, however, impressive. Progress, no matter how small, was acknowledged and those selected for the units were given every opportunity to address their risks and move on from the CSC, including into other types of dedicated intervention in the prison system or to the health sector. The quality of leadership, at both national and local level, was coherent and effective. Leaders and staff knew what they were doing and should be congratulated on their achievements.

London:  HM Inspectorate of Prisons, 2024. 43p.

By Counter Extremism Project

The Nordic Resistance Movement (Nordiska motståndsrörelsen, or NRM) is a transnational, neo-Nazi organization with official chapters operating in Sweden, Finland, and Norway. The NRM also draws support from neo-Nazis in Denmark and has some registered members in Iceland, though the group has failed to establish formal branches in those countries. NRM-Sweden has grown more than one-third in size since 2015. Formed by neo-Nazi nationalists in Sweden in 1997, the NRM seeks to merge all Nordic countries into a single, nationalist-socialist state, either by elections or through revolution. The group is openly racist, anti-immigrant, anti-Semitic, and pro-Hitler—and has carried out violence targeting gay people, ideological opponents and, more recently, Muslim refugees. Since the start of 2015, NRM’s branch in Sweden (NRM-Sweden) has grown more than one-third in size by advocating against Sweden’s open-door policy to Muslim asylum seekers. That chapter registered as a political party in July 2015, and and held its largest rally in September 2017—convening more than 600 demonstrators in the streets of Gothenburg. Many of the NRM’s co-founders and early members came from the now-defunct White Aryan Resistance (Vitt Ariskt Motstand, or VAM) and its offshoot National Youth (Nationell Ungdom). The VAM, a network of Swedish neo-Nazis formed in the early 1990s, was notorious for carrying out attacks against immigrants and gay people and for funding its violence through bank robberies. The group splintered into several white-power groups in or around 1995, among them National Youth, which would go on to serve as the NRM’s youth movement.  

NRM [has] carried out attacks targeting gay people, Muslims asylum seekers, and [others]... using smoking flares, pepper spray, tear gas, knives, and guns. At its founding in 1997, the NRM was known as the Swedish Resistance Movement (Svenska motståndsrörelsen)—though the group expanded from a Swedish-centered group to one spanning the Nordic region and adopted the name NRM after establishing Finnish and Norwegian chapters in 2008 and 2011, respectively. Media outlets and government officials, however, at times refer to NRM-Sweden as the Swedish Resistance Movement; NRM-Norway as the Norwegian Resistance Movement; and NRM-Finland as the Finnish Resistance Movement.5 The group itself identifies as the “Nordic Resistance Movement,” and may refer to its various chapters as the “Swedish branch of the Nordic Resistance Movement,” for example. NRM members have been responsible for the murder of at least three individuals—two in Sweden and one in Finland. Future NRM-Sweden co-founder Klas Lund was convicted in 1986 of killing anti-racist campaigner Ronny Landin who, according to authorities, had intervened to stop an assault on three immigrants by Lund and other neo-Nazis. In 1999, three men connected to National Youth, NRM-Sweden’s youth movement, shot to death trade unionist Björn Söderberg outside of his Stockholm apartment. According to reports, the shooting was revenge for a tip Söderberg had given a local newspaper regarding the identity of one of the NRM members. More recently, in December 2016, key NRM-Finland member Jesse Torniainen was handed a two-year prison sentence for aggravated assault in connection to the murder of 28-year-old Finnish man Jimi Joonas Karttonen. According to reports, Torniainen and others had violently beaten Karttonen that September after the latter openly expressed disapproval of the group during one of its rallies. Karttonen died one week later from his wounds. In November 2017, a Finnish district court banned the NRM and its affiliated chapters. An appeals court upheld the decision in September 2018, but the NRM has since sought permission to appeal its case to the Supreme Court and remains legal in Finland until all options for appeal are exhausted. A decision is expected for fall 2019. 

Sweden: Counter Extremism Project, 2024. 20p.

Abuse, protection, and justice along routes between East and West Africa and Africa’s Mediterranean coast

By Duncan Breen

At the end of May, 30 people were murdered in the town of Mizdah, south of Tripoli, allegedly by traffickers. These were among the latest in a long series of deaths along the route from West Africa or the East and Horn of Africa to Libya. At least 68 refugees or migrants are known to have died along the route this year alone. As refugees and migrants travel along the Central Mediterranean route to Libya, many continue to be subjected to horrific violence at multiple points along the way, as the testimonies in this report show, even before any attempt to cross the sea to Europe. It remains one of the deadliest land crossings in the world. This report draws on data collected by the Mixed Migration Centre’s 4Mi monitors along the route to map the places where refugees interviewed in 2018 and 2019 most frequently reported deaths, sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV), physical violence, and kidnappings occurred.

At the end of 2017, UNHCR shared recommendations related to trafficking with several key States and agencies to encourage further actions to protect refugees and migrants from abuses along the Central Mediterranean route. In follow up to those recommendations, UNHCR, together with the Mixed Migration Centre (MMC), seeks to draw further attention to the human rights abuses that take place along multiple sections of the Central Mediterranean land route. In doing so, and through the recommendations included in this report, UNHCR and MMC call for measures to hold perpetrators of crimes and human rights violations along the route accountable; for more measures to assist and protect victims; and for greater cooperation between States to increase protection and access to solutions, and enhance access to justice.

Geneva: Mixed Migration Centre, 2020. 48p.

Abuse, Protection and Justice along Routes between East and West Africa and Africa’s Mediterranean Coast. A route-based perspective on key risks

By  Michele Cavinato

In the complex landscape of migration, this second volume of the report ‘On This Journey, No One Cares if You Live or Die’ emerges as a crucial body of work that sheds light on the stark realities faced by refugees and migrants traversing the perilous Central Mediterranean Route (CMR) all the way from East and Horn of Africa and West Africa to the North African coast of the Mediterranean and  across the sea. Jointly published by IOM, MMC, and UNHCR, this report delves into the protection risks faced by refugees and migrants during these journeys. It aims to inform increased and concrete routes-based protection responses to reduce the suffering associated with the desperate journeys refugees and migrants undertake, and a call to action to address the root causes of displacement and drivers of irregular migration through positive action on peace, climate change, governance, inequality and social cohesion, as well as the creation of safe migration  pathways.

Geneva: Mixed Migration.Centre, .2024. 71p. _____________________________ This is a joint IOM, MMC and UNHCR publicatio

By  Kingsley L Madueke, et al

  This report explores the dynamics of armed banditry in North West Nigeria, aiming to unravel their evolution, structure and the illicit economies that bandit groups engage in for financing and resourcing, as well as their interactions with local communities and other non-state armed groups. Focusing on Nigeria’s North West region, this report explores the internal dynamics of armed bandit groups,1 as well as the ecosystem and landscapes within which they operate, identifying potential entry points for interventions. As concerns grow regarding potential alliances between some bandit groups and violent extremist organizations – namely Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP), Ansaru and Jama’atu AhlusSunnah Lidda’Awati Wal Jihad (JAS) – operating in North West, this report explores not only to what extent these alliances exist but what shapes their formation. Nigeria’s North West region, encompassing Katsina, Kaduna, Kano, Sokoto, Jigawa and Zamfara states, has since 2011 witnessed a surge in armed bandit activities.2 Reported civilian fatalities resulting from violence by armed bandits in North West between 2018 and 2023 surpassed those inflicted by JAS and ISWAP in Nigeria’s North East region within the same period.3 Responses have largely consisted of military operations and local vigilante efforts. However, military operations’ impact has been temporary and banditry persists. This necessitates a better understanding of why banditry is resilient: bandit group structure and engagement with illicit economies are key elements of this resilience. The existing body of media and expert analyses pertaining to armed bandits in North West Nigeria has predominantly concentrated on the violence they inflict and its repercussions, with less focus on their structure, resourcing and financing mechanisms, and the physical and social environment within which they operate. This report aims to fill this gap, focusing on Zamfara and Kaduna – two major flashpoints of armed banditry in Nigeria’s North West. This report engages with the ongoing debate around categorizing non-state armed groups and explores whether the bandits can be said to exercise any governance functions or operate as political, as well as criminal, actors. This report explores the dynamics of armed banditry in North West Nigeria, aiming to unravel their evolution, structure and the illicit economies that bandit groups engage in for financing and resourcing, as well as their interactions with local communities and other non-state armed groups. Focusing on Nigeria’s North West region, this report explores the internal dynamics of armed bandit groups,1 as well as the ecosystem and landscapes within which they operate, identifying potential entry points for interventions. As concerns grow regarding potential alliances between some bandit groups and violent extremist organizations – namely Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP), Ansaru and Jama’atu AhlusSunnah Lidda’Awati Wal Jihad (JAS) – operating in North West, this report explores not only to what extent these alliances exist but what shapes their formation. Nigeria’s North West region, encompassing Katsina, Kaduna, Kano, Sokoto, Jigawa and Zamfara states, has since 2011 witnessed a surge in armed bandit activities.2 Reported civilian fatalities resulting from violence by armed bandits in North West between 2018 and 2023 surpassed those inflicted by JAS and ISWAP in Nigeria’s North East region within the same period.3 Responses have largely consisted of military operations and local vigilante efforts. However, military operations’ impact has been temporary and banditry persists. This necessitates a better understanding of why banditry is resilient: bandit group structure and engagement with illicit economies are key elements of this resilience. The existing body of media and expert analyses pertaining to armed bandits in North West Nigeria has predominantly concentrated on the violence they inflict and its repercussions, with less focus on their structure, resourcing and financing mechanisms, and the physical and social environment within which they operate. This report aims to fill this gap, focusing on Zamfara and Kaduna – two major flashpoints of armed banditry in Nigeria’s North West. This report engages with the ongoing debate around categorizing non-state armed groups and explores whether the bandits can be said to exercise any governance functions or operate as political, as well as criminal, actors. ■ Depending on the type of illicit economy and the level of influence they exert over it, armed bandits vary their engagements with illicit economies, shifting between attacks and robberies targeting actors in licit and illicit supply chains; imposition of levies; and assumption of control of part (or more rarely the entirety) of the supply chain. This variability in engagements with illicit economies renders a unidimensional response strategy inadequate. ■ A bandit group’s degree of influence over an area and the type of economy bandits are using for resource extraction contribute to shaping the level of violence against communities. Violence by bandits is higher when their influence is lower, and kidnapping and cattle rustling are characterized by greater violence than engagement in other revenue-generating activities. ■ Armed bandits exhibit some behaviours that fall within definitions of ‘governance’, though profit and predation appear to be the primary motivations for their actions. The concept of governance is important for understanding bandits in the political/criminal spectrum    

Geneva: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2024. 53p.

By Héni Nsaibia, et al.

  This report analyzes the operations and organizational structure of the al-Qaeda-affiliated Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) in the Sahel region of Africa, focusing on the group’s engagement with illicit economies and tactical use of economic warfare. Specifically, the report emphasizes the central role of illicit economies in JNIM’s governance strategies, and in financing and resourcing the group’s armed struggle. It also tracks how JNIM has evolved organizationally, with these internal changes dictating shifts in its involvement in regional illicit economies. These political and organizational changes, and the group’s highly strategic engagement with illicit economies, have underpinned JNIM’s expansion into new geographies, its retention of influence in areas of control, and its resilience to disruption. Further, the report provides further insights into JNIM’s strategies for expansion and population control, and argues that understanding the role of JNIM within illicit economies is crucial to gaining insights into the group’s governance, financing, and resourcing, as well as its strategic objectives across the central Sahelian states of Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, and the northernmost areas of several West African littoral states. JNIM’s organizational structure balances unity and central power with local adaptation and flexibility, which has allowed the group to build a cohesive yet adaptable organization. However, the group’s exponential growth since its formation strains ongoing cohesion, and operational and tactical objectives differ due to differences within the vast territories in which the group operates. JNIM exerts control and authority over local populations by force using both violent and non-violent means, such as providing civilian services, justice, and dispute mediation; these means vary depending on the context. This unified and locally flexible strategy is also evident in JNIM’s strategic engagement with local licit and illicit economies. While JNIM’s engagement in illicit activities is intimately linked to the diverse financing and resourcing of JNIM’s war economy, it goes beyond merely accumulating financial resources. JNIM utilizes these resources to enhance its legitimacy and to gain  popular support while furthering its strategic and governance objectives. Further, JNIM’s quasi-regulatory role in certain illicit economies – including in enabling access to some stateprohibited resources – is central to its positioning as an alternative governance provider, posited as preferable to regulatory regimes imposed by the state. The under-explored dimension of economic warfare is highlighted in the report as a vital component of JNIM’s overall strategy, which encompasses the destruction and sabotage of critical and public infrastructure, the establishment of checkpoints along transport routes, attacks on commercial and logistic convoys, the imposition of embargoes and blockades, and other tactics such as forced population evictions. The economic warfare dimension of JNIM’s strategy significantly overlaps with the organization’s effort to expand its competitive systems of control over the population, through which JNIM seeks to weaken the state and impair its authority. The report concludes by forecasting the trajectory of JNIM’s expansion, especially in light of evolving state responses. Given its current organizational structure and adaptive strategies, JNIM appears poised to continue its growth and influence. The group’s strategic use of illicit economies and economic warfare serves as a potent driver of its territorial control strategies, and these elements are expected to remain integral to JNIM’s operational blueprint. As state actors devise their own strategies to respond to JNIM’s activities, the group’s adaptability will be put to the test. The effectiveness of these state responses, in turn, will hinge on a profound understanding of JNIM’s organizational dynamics, its strategic engagement with local economies, and the ways in which it navigates and leverages the complex socio-political landscapes within which it operates. Anticipating the future of JNIM necessitates a sustained and nuanced focus on these factors. This report aims to contribute to such an understanding, providing a foundation upon which more effective and informed strategies can be developed to address the challenges posed by JNIM in the Sahel region  

Issue 1

Geneva: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime 2023. 49p.

By Noemi Magugliani | John Trajer | Jean-Pierre Gauci

, 

In light of these developments, the report addresses the following research questions: - - What has been the impact of the operationalised NABA measures on the identification and wellbeing of people with lived experience of modern slavery, and are these impacts in line with the stated objectives of the legislation? What has been the impact of the operationalised NABA measures on the modern slavery sector more broadly? Given the timing of this report, the analysis is restricted to the impacts of Part 5 of NABA in the year following its implementation (covering the period from the first quarter of 2023, when      most of the key provision entered into force, up to the fourth quarter of 2023).1 It is hoped that this analysis will inform any future research on the impacts of this Act, as well as the impacts of other legislation adopted in this area (in particular, the Illegal Migration Act 2023).

London: British Institute of International & Comparative Law, the Anti-Trafficking Monitoring Group and the Human Trafficking Foundation, 2024. 74p.

World Health Organization;

The Global status report on alcohol and health and treatment of substance use disorders presents a comprehensive overview of alcohol consumption, alcohol-related harm and policy responses as well as treatment capacities for alcohol and drug use disorders worldwide. The report is based on data collected by WHO from Member States and organized in accordance with the Sustainable Development Goals health target 3.5 which calls on countries to strengthen “the prevention and treatment of substance abuse, including narcotic drug abuse and harmful use of alcohol”. The chapter on alcohol and health continues the series of WHO global status reports on alcohol and health and presents the latest available data on the status of, and trends in, alcohol consumption, as well as estimates of the alcohol-attributable disease burden and descriptions of policy responses worldwide. On the basis of data collected from countries on the treatment of substance use disorders the report describes the status of key components of treatment responses to alcohol and drug use disorders and proposes a new service capacity index for these disorders as an additional contextual indicator for monitoring progress in this domain of SDG health target 3.5. The report concludes with broad directions for international action to accelerate progress towards achievement of SDG health target 3.5. 

World Health Organization, 2024. 335p.

By Spencer Faragasso and David Albright

Key Findings

• JSC Alabuga dealt with an acute labor shortage to build Shahed 136 drones by raising salaries and exploiting high school-age students and immigrant employees recruited under false pretenses.

• JSC Alabuga has been using two programs to actively recruit young men and women, primarily aged 16-22, to make military drones:  Alabuga Polytechnic is used to recruit students within Russia, and the Alabuga Start program is used to recruit workers from the Commonwealth of Independent States (also known as CIS countries) and other countries, primarily African countries.

• This deceptive and manipulative recruitment effort is intended primarily to enable JSC Alabuga to meet its ambitious Shahed 136 kamikaze drone production goals for the Russian military, a project that Russia steeps in secrecy, to the point of calling it motorboat manufacturing.  

• Potential recruits are not told that they could be involved in producing Shahed 136 drones. Instead, when drone production work is mentioned, the recruitment process emphasizes the making of M5 drones, built in the same building as the Shahed 136 drones, but by a different company, Albatross LLC, and on a much smaller scale, and advertised for civilian use (but leaked documents and media reporting state that some fraction of the M5 drones have been used in Russian combat operations).

• Alabuga Polytechnic’s students and Alabuga Start’s recruits have produced thousands of Shahed drones and dozens, perhaps hundreds of Albatross M5 drones for Russian combat operations against Ukraine, often against civilian targets in the case of the Shahed 136 drones.

• For the Albatross M5 drone, participants are employed and trained in building the airframe, assembling and installing electronics, and testing the drone. For the Shahed 136 drone, they are involved in all aspects of making the drone. According to early internal Alabuga plans, many students and recruits worked on Albatross M5 production before participants were moved to work on producing Shahed 136 drones for JSC Alabuga. 

• The Alabuga Start program primarily targets African women, using the promise of a high monthly salary (double what can be earned on average in their native country; and more than such a position would normally earn in Russia), work training, long-term accommodations and integration into Russian society. 

• Twenty-seven countries are documented to have sent nationals to Alabuga through Alabuga Start. It is unknown whether any countries have withdrawn their participation, but they should do so immediately.  If they continue to send workers, these countries directly support a U.S. and EU sanctioned entity and support Russia’s military efforts, thus risk getting sanctioned themselves.

• The Start program uses deception and manipulation to attract low-skilled workers to perform the many relatively simple operations involved in making the airframes for Shahed 136 drones. 

• Both the Polytechnic and Start programs are exploitive of young people and require the students and recruits to work long hours, often more than full-time.  More than 90 percent of the Start program personnel and about one-third of the Polytechnic students are estimated to work in drone production, mostly the production of Shahed 136 drones.  

• Based on JSC Alabuga plans in early 2023, the design, planning, support, and production of Shahed drones would entail over 1000 personnel per daytime shift, of whom at least 70 percent would be from Alabuga Polytechnic and Alabuga Start.

• In the first half of 2023, about 100 Alabuga Polytechnic students received training in Tehran, Iran, from Iranian experts on making the Shahed 136 airframe.

•  Alabuga is actively indoctrinating the young participants at its site into supporting the Russian military through patriotic and military themed activities.

• The use of teenagers in the production of military drones used against Ukraine, including against civilian targets, should be viewed as a crime.

Washington, DC: The Institute for Science and International Security, 2024. 22P

By Kate Fitz-Gibbon, Sandra Walklate, Jasmine McGowan, JaneMaree Maher, Jude McCulloch

This project aimed to develop new understandings of risk and system interactions prior to intimate femicide in order to build the evidence base required to inform early intervention and the prevention of intimate femicide in Australia. Drawing on a quantitative and qualitative analysis of intimate femicide sentencing decisions imposed over a decade in Australian superior courts, the new knowledge generated from this project is intended to inform and assist in developing a more risk-sensitive approach to preventing and responding to intimate femicide in Australia and overseas, thereby enhancing women’s security.

This report presents findings from the collection of over 250 intimate femicide sentencing judgments and the in-depth analyses of 235 of these. These judgements were used, in part, to identify potential points of intervention that might have provided an opportunity to prevent such killings.

In Australia, at least one woman a week is murdered by her current or former partner. According to Destroy the Joint, this equated to the killing of at least 57 women in 2022 and at least 64 women in 2023 allegedly as a result of men’s violence. At the time of finalising this report, an unusually high number of killings allegedly by men’s violence in the first four months of 2024 in Australia has reignited national attention over the need to better address women’s risk of fatal violence (see, inter alia, AAP, 2024; Priestley, 2024; Tuohy, 2024).

Intimate partner homicides are recognised as the most preventable type of homicide because it is assumed that histories of abuse can provide clear indicators of risk (see, inter alia, Bugeja et al., 2013; Dearden & Jones, 2008; Virueda & Payne, 2010). While intimate partner homicides are monitored and examined in Australia via the work of the Australian Institute of Criminology and state-based death review teams, there is no fully funded, multi-systems approach to the prevention of men’s lethal violence against women (McPhedran & Baker, 2012). As in Australia, international efforts to review and count such deaths are carried out in different ways and are often fraught with difficulties (see, inter alia, Walklate et al., 2020; Dawson & Vega, 2023).

In Australia and comparable international jurisdictions, a range of provisions, measures, laws and programs are designed to assess and address the risk of intimate partner violence. These include civil orders alongside programs that provide increased levels of protection and monitoring for women deemed at high risk of repeat victimisation. These instruments include the development of various risk assessment and management frameworks (Walklate et al., 2020). While magistrates, police and specialist support services use these instruments to identify and respond to risk (Boxall et al., 2015; Robinson & Moloney, 2010; Wakefield & Taylor, 2015), there is evidence that these approaches are limited by their conceptualisations of risk and in their scale of implementation and inconsistency in application.

This project sought to contribute new evidence to inform the further development of whole-of-systems preventive approaches to repeat violence and intimate femicide. Specifically, the project aimed to build evidence based on the following touchpoints:

• Places where an intervention between the initial emergence of family violence and the fatal outcomes had occurred.

• What could potentially be known about those points of intervention.

• If/how the pathway from intervention to safety could be better supported.

This report presents findings from the collection of over 250 intimate femicide sentencing judgments and the in-depth analyses of 235 of these. These judgements were used, in part, to identify potential points of intervention that might have provided an opportunity to prevent such killings. Sentencing judgments typically include narrative accounts from a judge, who describes how and where the crime took place as well as the circumstances that led to it.

This project builds current understandings of the potential points of intervention prior to the killing of women by their male intimate partners. In doing so, this project has contributed to building understanding of who perpetrates intimate femicide.

Melbourne: Monash University, 2024. 40p.