By Anthony Morgan

This report examines the effect of money laundering on the harm associated with organised crime by linking data on organised crime groups known to law enforcement, and data on suspicious transactions reported to the Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre (AUSTRAC). This study is the first step in assessing the social and economic harms associated with money laundering and terrorism financing in Australia.

Key Findings

• Suspicious matter reports captured a high proportion of individuals and groups known by law enforcement to be involved in organised crime.

• Known organised crime groups accounted for a very small proportion of suspicious matter reports.

• The amount of money laundered by groups varied according to where they laundered their funds and whether they had professional facilitators.

• The presence and amount of money laundering was consistently associated with an increase in recorded crime-related harm and the probability of organised crime.

• Evidence indicates that the laundering of illicit funds preceded increases in crime-related harm.

Consultancy Report Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology, 2024. 73p.

By W. Bentley Macleod and Roman Rivera

Abstract: Theories of crime in economics focus on the roles of deterrence and incapacitation in reducing criminal activity. In addition to deterrence, a growing body of empirical evidence has shown that both income support and employment subsidies can play a role in crime reduction. This paper extends the Becker-Ehrlich model to a standard labor supply model that includes the notion of a consumption need (Barzel and McDonald (1973)) highlights the role of substitution vs income effects when an individual chooses to engage in crime. Second, we show that whether the production of criminal activity is a substitute or a complement with the production of legitimate activity is central to the design of optimal policy. We find that both individual responsiveness to deterrence and optimal policy vary considerably with context, which is consistent with the large variation in the effect of deterrence on crime. Hence, optimal policy is a combination of deterrence, work subsidies and direct income transfers to the individual that vary with both income and location.

Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2024. 48p.

By Jason Beaman

This final research report describes a project that used various data sources to analyze the relationship between methamphetamine usage metrics, such as overdose deaths and related crimes, and violent crime such as rape and robbery, in order to inform law enforcement and other stakeholders of upstream prevention for crimes related to methamphetamine use. The project’s key objectives included developing a dashboard, analyzing methamphetamine-crime intersections, and assessing the influence of social determinants of health (SDOH) of methamphetamine use. Results demonstrated significant correlations between methamphetamine overdoses and violent crimes, especially economic-compulsive crimes. The report highlights distinct patterns and geographic variations among rural and American Indian communities. The report notes that results emphasize the complex interplay between methamphetamine use, violent crime, and socio-economic factors, and it advocates for targeted prevention strategies. It also offers the Oklahoma Methamphetamine Data Initiative (OKMDI) framework for addressing substance use and violence as a tool for policymakers and law enforcement.

Stillwater, OK: Oklahoma State University, 2024. 39p.

By Ben Mostyn

This article presents archival data produced by Australian diplomats in the 1980s that report on the ‘drug problem’ in various host countries. The reports reveal growing concern in many countries at a rapid increase in drug use. The second half of the article focusses on diplomatic reports from the United Nations where discussions were beginning about creating a third convention against drug trafficking. These early drafts of the convention labelled drug trafficking a ‘crime against humanity’—a criminal charge that had not been prosecuted since the Nuremburg trials. The article applies elements of moral panic theory, neorealism, and the sociology of punishment. Combining these theories suggests that condemning drug traffickers in the 1980s allowed diplomats to create a global social solidarity that may have helped end the Cold War.

Critical Criminology, August 2024. Crit Crim (2024).

By Irene María Álvarez-Rodríguez Translated by Victoria Furio

The consolidation of armed civilian collectives in the Mexican state of Michoacán arose in a setting in which the illegal regional economy no longer focused on drug smuggling but had turned to a variety of criminal activities and in which the perspective of a moral economy had been restored. This restructuring of the criminal economy was a strong factor in the emergence of the armed collectives.

LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES, Issue 236, Vol. 48 No. 1, January 2021, 231–244

By The International Crisis Group

Launched soon after they retook power in 2021, the Taliban’s campaign against narcotics has drastically reduced opium poppy cultivation and upended Afghanistan’s drug economy. Driven by ideology, the Taliban’s anti-drug efforts include rounding up drug users, eradicating crops, and shuttering drug bazaars. The Taliban’s enforcement impacts the livelihoods of millions of people, particularly poor labourers and rural women. Wealthy traders, meanwhile, are profiting from high prices by selling existing stocks. Many farmers have switched to crops such as wheat, but struggle with the reduced income. The ban’s future is uncertain; although the Taliban are adamant about implementing it, it could collapse under the weight of economic hardship. Foreign donors, who have much to gain from reduced drug production in Afghanistan, should harness the Taliban’s zeal for counter-narcotics and encourage licit economic growth. In the meantime, the Taliban should consider the welfare of the poorest farmers and implement a phased approach to the ban. Implemented with growing seriousness, the Taliban’s anti-narcotics campaign has profoundly affected a country that ranks among the world’s largest suppliers of illegal drugs. The main focus has been opium, a central part of Afghanistan’s agricultural sector. Enforcement began slowly, but has grown stricter. Taliban forces started with easy targets, herding drug users into jails and rehabilitation centres. They then warned farmers not to cultivate the opium poppies whose resin they have harvested for centuries. When that failed, the Taliban deployed fighters to face down villagers and destroy their crops. As a result, the UN estimates, cultivation declined by 95 per cent – more than any other counter-narcotics campaign in recent history. The Taliban also started to apply pressure on traffickers, despite the fact that some of them backed their movement for decades. More recently the de facto authorities shut down drug bazaars and arrested hundreds of dealers. While underworld kingpins and big landowners have thrived under the ban, reaping the benefits of skyrocketing prices by selling stockpiles, many farmers have suffered. By UN estimates, the halt to opium farming has affected the livelihoods of almost seven million people. These individuals are unlikely to find other work in a stagnant economy burdened with sanctions. Farmers have lost an estimated $1.3 billion annually, or 8 percent of GDP in 2023. Farm work remains the biggest source of employment for Afghan women. The ban has hit them especially hard, given their lack of opportunities under a Taliban regime that severely limits their ability to work. The economic shock has been compounded by the Taliban’s limited capacity to offer farmers and rural workers alternatives. Many switched to cultivating wheat or cotton, but struggle to make ends meet. Development of licit agriculture would require more irrigation, cold storage facilities and better roads. The Taliban does not have the budget to develop such infrastructure. Meanwhile, the opium price has soared, tempting farmers to flout the ban. So far, few dare to defy the Taliban. Farmers respect the ban most faithfully in the south, where the Taliban have many supporters, and where bigger farms produced stocks of opium that could be sold after the ban. Still, pockets of disobedience remain, even in the Taliban’s home province of Kandahar. In the smaller fields of the mountainous north and east, resistance is more widespread. While the Taliban’s measures have shaken the drug sector to its very foundations, the future of the ban remains in doubt. Some experts predict that its economic impact will force the Taliban to back track on a signature policy. Of course, it is also possible that the Taliban leadership will remain stubborn and steadfast. Foreign governments have a lot to gain from Afghanistan no longer flooding global markets with drugs. After the Taliban’s severe restrictions on women’s rights made the regime odious to much of the outside world, the narcotics ban offers a rare opportunity to work with the new authorities on a pressing issue to the benefit of all sides. The Taliban’s strategy of banning drugs without providing alternative jobs risks large-scale displacement of rural Afghans and rising emigration, along with growing desperation among the poor. Donors should support a transition toward licit and equitable growth in the economy, easing the acute poverty crisis the country currently faces. Some already give aid for food security and rehabilitation of drug users, but the assistance falls far short. Effective support at a national scale would require working with the Taliban regime, which is politically difficult and, for many Western policymakers, unpalatable. It would, however, aid Afghan civilians, especially rural women. In the first instance, support could focus on rural development, agricultural support, water conservation and investments in agro-processing. But the reality is that a drug-free agricultural sector will not provide enough jobs, so the country needs a development plan focusing more broadly on non-farm employment, including for women. Regional countries should support Afghanistan’s integration into transport networks and trade arrangements, for their own interests and to stabilise their neighbourhood. All of this will require time. Until the country makes the painful transition away from dependence on narcotics as a cash crop, the Taliban should show a bit of leni ency. Although it is unlikely it will backtrack on the ban, at a minimum the regime should halt more intrusive eradication practices such as house-to-house searches. Adopting more lenient practices such as turning a blind eye to small garden plots of poppy and cannabis would give the poorest farmers a better chance of survival in the coming years. Farmers selling tiny amounts of opium for prices hundreds of times higher than what is paid for other crops would give them a lifeline without jeopardising the ban’s overall objectives. 

Report No. 340 Kabul/Brussels,  International Crisis Group, 2024. 35p.

By Sintiki Tarfa Ugbe, et al.

This policy brief by the West African Epidemiology Network on Drug Use (WENDU) details regional drug use trends for 2023. Based on data from 11 countries, the brief reviews supply, consumption, treatment opportunities and counter-narcotics efforts. In a continuing trend, cannabis dominates the regional substance use data matrix, followed by medical opioids. However, alcohol use disorders are growing across multiple countries and, worryingly, more minors are getting caught in the toxic web of drug use. Recommendations • The increasing involvement of minors in drug use demands the urgent introduction of comprehensive substance abuse prevention programmes across all educational levels. • Given the rising prevalence of substance abuse among women and their limited access to treatment opportunities, women-focused rehabilitation centres are urgently needed. • There is a need for regionwide adoption of the Alternative to Incarceration programme introduced by ECOWAS. • ECOWAS and political leaders across West Africa need an evidence-based and context-appropriate stance on the region’s cannabis problem.  

Issue 32, WENDU policy brief 2 | September 2024 24p.

 By Gautam Basu 

 Customs and border control agencies face key challenges in preventing illicit trade and disrupting transnational smuggling operations. Maintaining the delicate balance between facilitating legitimate trade flows while concurrently deterring those that are illicit is a complex operational task. This paper identifies and delves deeper into three of those challenges: the scale of complexity of physical transportation geography in border management, adaptive capabilities of concealment, evasion, structural and operational flexibility by professional smugglers, and institutional coordination problems which may arise in customs and border control management.  

World Customs Journal,  Volume 8, Number 2

By Michael J. Zoorob,; Ju Nyeong Park,; Alex H. Kral,; et al

Importance: With the implementation of Measure 110 (M110) in 2021, Oregon became the first US state to decriminalize small amounts of any drug for personal use. To date, no analysis of the association of this law with overdose mortality has fully accounted for the introduction of fentanyl-a substance that is known to drive fatal overdose-to Oregon's unregulated drug market.

Objective: To evaluate whether the decriminalization of drug possession in Oregon was associated with changes in fatal drug overdose rates after accounting for the rapid spread of fentanyl in Oregon's unregulated drug market.

Design, setting, and participants: In this cohort study, the association between fatal overdose and enactment of M110 was analyzed using a matrix completion synthetic control method. The control group consisted of the 48 US states and Washington, DC, all of which did not decriminalize drugs. The rapid spread of fentanyl in unregulated drug markets was determined using the state-level percentage of all samples reported to the National Forensic Laboratory Information System that were identified as fentanyl or its analogues. Mortality data were obtained from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention for January 1, 2008, to December 31, 2022. Data analysis was performed from fall 2023 through spring 2024.

Exposures: Measure 110 took effect in Oregon on February 1, 2021.

Main outcomes and measures: The primary outcome assessed was fatal drug overdose rates per half-year. A changepoint analysis also determined when each state experienced a rapid escalation of fentanyl in its unregulated drug market.

Results: In this analysis, rapid spread of fentanyl in Oregon's unregulated drug supply occurred in the first half of 2021, contemporaneous with enactment of M110. A positive crude association was found between drug decriminalization and fatal overdose rate per 100 000 per half year (estimate [SE], 1.83 [0.47]; P < .001). After adjusting for the spread of fentanyl as a confounder, the effect size changed signs (estimate [SE], -0.51 [0.61]; P = .41) and there was no longer an association between decriminalization and overdose mortality in Oregon. Sensitivity analyses were consistent with this result.

Conclusions and relevance: In this cohort study of fatal drug overdose and the spread of fentanyl through Oregon's unregulated drug market, no association between M110 and fatal overdose rates was observed. Future evaluations of the health effects of drug policies should account for changes in the composition of unregulated drug markets.  

JAMA Netw Open. 2024;7(9):e2431612. doi:10.1001/jamanetworkopen.2024.31612

By Drug Policy Alliance

In 2020, Oregon voters overwhelmingly approved Ballot Measure 110. This made Oregon the first state in the U.S. to decriminalize possession of small amounts of all drugs, while greatly expanding addiction services and social supports. But in 2024, state leaders recriminalized drug possession after a disinformation campaign led by drug war defenders and backed by corporate interests. Statewide criminal penalties for drug possession returned on September 1, 2024. Promised deflection programs were not ready, meaning people will be arrested and prosecuted because of their addictions. As before, drug use will be used as an excuse to arrest Black and Brown Oregonians at higher rates (they are statistically more likely to face incarceration and harsher sentencing due to targeted policing and enforcement). Oregon’s public defender shortage continues. People who are arrested will likely have their cases dismissed for lack of counsel. In a return to the failed war on drugs, people will cycle through the criminal legal system without connection to services. The successes of Measure 110 should neither be downplayed nor contributed to H.B. 4002. Measure 110 provided over $300 million for addiction services, including a program where police connect people to care without arrest. Policymakers must focus on implementing a thorough public health approach to drugs and real solutions to other pressing issues, not on the false promises of criminalizing drug possession.

New York: Drug Policy Alliance, 2024. 5p.

By Russ Scott

Australia has one of the highest rates in the world of the use of the crystalline form of methamphetamine, a highly addictive stimulant that is often associated with a chronic, relapsing dependency. Methamphetamine use is associated with both acquisitive and violent offending, which cause substantial personal and societal costs. Whilst the short-term euphoria and stimulation provide a positive reinforcement to methamphetamine use, the aversive states of withdrawing from methamphetamine and the associated craving, which may last up to five weeks into abstinence, underlie the negative reinforcement to continued methamphetamine use. Although many methamphetamine-dependent users experience high levels of psychological distress, it is likely that less than half engage with treatment or support services, and current intervention and treatment programmes have high discontinuation rates. Stigma and discrimination, even from paramedics and health clinicians, are prominent barriers to methamphetamine-dependent users accessing treatment in Australia

Psychiatry, Psychology and Law; Vol. 31, No. 4, 671–704,, 2024

By Delvon T. Mattingly  , Maggie K. Richardson ,  Joy L. Hart

Introduction: Cannabis use is increasing due to several factors including the adoption of laws legalizing its use across the United States (US). We examined changes in current cannabis use among US youth and adults and by key socio-demographic groups. Methods: Using data from the 2013–2022 National Survey on Drug Use and Health (n=543,195), we estimated the prevalence of (2013–2019, 2020, 2021–2022) and trends in (2013–2019, 2021–2022) current (i.e., past 30- day) cannabis use among US youth (aged 12–17) and adults (aged 18+) overall and by age, gender, race and ethnicity, educational attainment, and total annual family income. We also examined sociodemographic factors associated with use from 2013 to 2019, in 2020, and from 2021 to 2022. Results: Cannabis use increased from 7.59 % to 11.48 % in 2013–2019, was 11.54 % in 2020, and increased again from 13.13 % to 15.11 % in 2021–2022. Among youth, cannabis use remained constant from 2013 to 2019 and 2021–2022. In 2022, use was highest among aged 18–34, male, non-Hispanic multiracial, and generally lower SES adults. From 2021–2022, cannabis use increased among several groups such as adults who were aged 35–49 (14.25–17.23 %), female (11.21–13.00 %), and Hispanic (10.42–13.50 %). Adults who were aged 18–25, male, non-Hispanic multiracial, some college educated, and of lower annual family income had consistently higher odds of current cannabis use from 2013 to 2019, in 2020, and from 2021 to 2022. Conclusions: Cannabis use is increasing overall and among certain sociodemographic groups. Our findings inform prevention and harm reduction efforts aimed at mitigating the prevalence of cannabis use in the US. 

Drug and Alcohol Dependence Reports 12 (2024) 10025 

By Michelle Minton and Geoffrey Lawrence

Hawaii may be poised to become the 25th state to legalize the recreational use of cannabis for adults aged 21 and over. Nearly 90 percent of Hawaii residents supported full legalization of cannabis for adult use in a January 2023 poll conducted by the Hawaii Cannabis Industry Association. Gov. Josh Green has said he would sign a legalization bill if one is delivered to his desk—marking a significant departure from former Gov. Dave Ige, who left office in 2023. During the 2023 legislative session, lawmakers considered proposals to legalize adult-use cannabis. One of these bills was passed by the state Senate but was not heard in the state House of Representatives. Between the conclusion of the 2023 legislative session and the convening of the 2024 session, Attorney General Anne Lopez met with key lawmakers to develop proposed language for a legalization bill that could gain the support of the administration and the legislature. This working group produced a 315-page draft bill, introduced in each chamber of the legislature as House Bill 2600 and Senate Bill 3335, respectively. Despite having played a key role in drafting the legislation, however, the attorney general’s office testified in early hearings that it “does not support the legalization of adult-use cannabis,” although the current legislation is a “good faith effort toward protecting the public welfare and is an improvement on previous bills that have been heard by the legislature.” Reason Foundation has offered recommendations for improvement to successive cannabis legalization proposals in Hawaii. Several of these recommendations were adopted by Senate committees during the 2023 legislative session. Reason Foundation has also reviewed the provisions of Senate Bill 3335, as amended, and submitted recommendations for improvement. This brief goes beyond those recommendations and provides key background on the Hawaiian marijuana market and considerations for market structure and tax policy. Cannabis consumers are price-sensitive and have many options for purchasing cannabis. Prices and availability within the licensed cannabis industry can strongly influence the decisions of both producers and consumers to either participate in this industry or engage in illicit cannabis activity. In California, high taxes and a lack of legal sellers resulted in roughly two-thirds of cannabis demand being satisfied by the illicit market six years after legalization. The prevalence of illicit sales also negatively affects state tax collections, as only a minority of cannabis transactions are legal and subject to taxation. California has recently begun to take corrective action to lower the tax-induced price disparity between licensed and illicit goods, but Hawaiian lawmakers can circumvent the rise of large illicit markets with an appropriate market design. 

Los Angeles: The Reason Foundation, 2024. 18p.

By Michelle Minton and Geoffrey Lawrence

In the wake of the 2018 Farm Bill, which legalized hemp and its derivatives across the country, an unexpected flood of hemp-derived cannabinoid products hit the market and has sparked a whirlwind of interest—and concern—among state lawmakers. Unlike marijuana, which for now remains a Schedule I controlled substance under federal law, hemp-derived cannabinoids, such as cannabidiol (CBD) and delta-8 THC, occupy a murkier legal and regulatory landscape. This ambiguity, along with a lack of guidance from federal authorities, has left states grappling with how to ensure consumer safety, prevent underage access, facilitate interstate commerce, and support existing marijuana markets. The growing popularity of hemp-derived products has stimulated significant legislative attention in recent years, with over 90 regulatory proposals introduced in state legislatures in 2024 alone and 14 states adopting restrictions or prohibitions to some degree. A small but growing number of states have sought to legalize and regulate intoxicating hemp derivatives as general consumer goods, similar to alcoholic beverages or tobacco, or by incorporating them into their existing regulations governing medical or recreational marijuana. Yet, the continued proliferation and evolution of hemp-derived cannabinoid products has exposed significant gaps in existing regulatory paradigms. State regulations governing hemp products vary widely and are unevenly enforced, creating a patchwork of rules that can change dramatically from one state to the next. Unlike the market for marijuana, which has remained largely intrastate due to federal prohibition, federally-legal hemp products can cross state lines more freely. This has resulted in a marketplace where consumers face an increasingly confusing array of products of uncertain quality while businesses must navigate a shifting and uncertain regulatory environment. Additionally, lawmakers and regulators must continually update or amend rules in response to the emergence of new products, consumer behaviors, and industry dynamics. This piecemeal approach leaves consumers at risk, strains state resources, and hampers the ability for even willing actors to comply with state rules. This paper advocates for a cohesive approach to regulating hemp cannabinoid products that includes action by both federal and state policymakers. Our paper presents a series of recommendations for both federal and state authorities aimed at harmonizing standards across testing, labeling, packaging, and taxation for all cannabis products. By implementing these measures, states can enhance compliance and market competitiveness, reduce costs, and ensure consumer safety as both marijuana and hemp markets evolve. Ensuring consumer safety and minimizing youth access to potentially intoxicating products can also be achieved through state regulations that differentiate between high-THC and low-THC hemp products. We recommend states adopt labeling standards by which high THC product labels must provide detailed potency disclosures and risk warnings, while low THC products may adhere to general consumer goods standards. Consistent advertising restrictions across all cannabis products will also avoid bias based on the source of cannabinoids. The disparity in tax and regulatory burdens between marijuana and hemp products also fosters an uncompetitive landscape between the two product categories. High costs in state-regulated marijuana markets, such as those in California, push consumers toward cheaper alternatives, including both illicit marijuana or less-regulated hemp. To level the playing field, states should reduce the tax and compliance costs imposed on legal marijuana businesses, aligning them more closely with those for hemp producers. Imposing a single, uniform excise tax on all intoxicating cannabis products would simplify the tax system and reduce incentives for consumers to seek cheaper, illicit options. Restrictive licensing frameworks for marijuana businesses also contribute to its competitive disadvantage compared to hemp, limiting market entry, innovation, and consumer access, with the artificial scarcity raising prices and pushing consumers toward alternatives. In contrast, intoxicating hemp products can be produced in any state, shipped to a variety of retailers, and sold directly to consumers even in states without legal marijuana sales. This dynamic distorts the market in favor of hemp products, sometimes sold under transient branding and lacking clear originating information for the producer, which consumers might not choose if legal marijuana were more affordable or available. Regulators ought to be aware of who is selling intoxicating cannabis products, but regulatory schemes should not push market participants toward the hemp market merely because marijuana licensing is too costly or unavailable. We recommend states adopt a middle ground approach between overly-restrictive marijuana licensing regimes and the lack of any such framework for hemp. In particular, we suggest state law at least require hemp producers to register with state regulatory authorities while also drastically reducing both financial and non-financial barriers to entry into the marijuana market. This may include allowing any retailer who can demonstrate competence over inventory management for age-gated products to become eligible to retail both hemp cannabinoid and marijuana products. Finally, to fully realize the potential of a national cannabis market, particularly in light of the emerging hemp derivatives sector, states must also permit the interstate sale of marijuana products. As these authors argued in a prior paper, existing bans on out-of-state marijuana products are unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause and exacerbate the competitive advantage hemp currently enjoys. State lawmakers should agree to remove bans on the import of marijuana and allow state-licensed producers to export to purchasers in other states. In addition, lawmakers should take steps to align packaging, labeling, and testing protocols to facilitate a robust and legal interstate market. The rapidly evolving cannabis industry presents both opportunities and challenges for state regulators. By adopting a more unified and flexible approach to both hemp and marijuana regulation, states can enhance market competitiveness, reduce costs, and protect consumers. Embracing these recommendations will position states to lead in the burgeoning cannabis sector while ensuring consumer safety and market integrity

Los Angeles: The Reason Foundation, 2024. 85p.

By Andy Hochstetler1,2, David J. Peters1, Kyle Burgason1, Jeff Bouffard1, Glenn Sterner III3, Shannon Monnat

Introduction: The goal of this project was to identify rural jurisdictions with high drug overdose rates and collaborate with resourced mentors to create law enforcement intelligence responses to local opioid problems. Methods: The first part of the strategy was to control for known contributors to opioid death that are largely beyond the control of law enforcement, and thereby focus on jurisdictions that are outliers in terms of drug problems. (Work products include a Non-Metropolitan County Opioid Overdose Calculator that allows one to examine how demographics and other county conditions affect overdose risk.) Use of maps of drug overdose deaths identified high overdose places by drug type with a classification technique to group places with like drug problems (latent profile analysis) and a multiple regression data analysis to identify outliers. A survey of law enforcement agencies provided an understanding of intelligence resources available in rural areas and agencies. This information informed recruitment of enthusiastic participant agencies. A small scale, intelligence strategy appropriate to resource deprived, rural departments was developed in collaboration with participating agencies, leaving them great flexibility in design. Evaluation of outcomes included a survey, qualitative interviews providing anecdotal feedback, and official data that each department had decided would speak to successful implementation. Conclusions: Variables significantly predicting death rates include population, indicators of ethnic diversity, natural resource amenities, and labor market characteristics. Lagged indicators of drug deaths and prescribing rates are the most consistently significant and convincing block of variables as predictors of current death. The most successful departments implemented efforts based on what they had learned in previous collaborations with better resourced areas, where efforts led to arrests and judges supported use of intelligence in court proceedings, and either information sharing or use of electronic surveillance was supported such as using cell phone opening software. Also, closed network iPads were used in relation to controlled buys, search warrants, pre and post raids, evidence and picture recording during searches, overdose mapping, surveillance photos and messaging to the narcotics officer, confidential informant files and referencing files, and notes from scenes. ODMAP can inform efforts but proved difficult to use on mobile devices, lagging in time, and imprecise to use as daily actionable intelligence. Funds can be well spent in rural places, but investments in departments with little resource slack, lacking in administrative capacity, and where there are few personnel or hours of investment to spare are risky and make for difficult collaborations. Analytics and predictive problem solving are near impossible. Therefore, immediate and accessible intelligence for patrol officers without investment in analytics likely should be the goal.

Ames, IA: Iowa State University, 2023. 71p.

By Vaughn Crandall, Marina Gonzalez and Reygan Cunningham

Community violence prevention is an emerging field of public safety work focused on reducing and preventing lethal and sublethal violence.1 Yet, despite growing awareness of evidence-informed approaches, historic levels of investment and political support from the federal government, few cities have been able to sustainably reduce community violence at the city level through purposeful strategies. With support from The Pew Charitable Trusts, the California Partnership for Safe Communities (CPSC) worked with a diverse range of field experts to identify key capacities that may play essential roles in reducing community violence at the city level and over time. The project team began by combining findings from research across a range of disciplines and interviews with leading subject matter experts to identify key capacities that were likely to play important roles in the ability of cities to sustainably reduce community violence. The six identified capacities were: 1. Political governance and public sector leadership, 2. Data-informed problem analysis, 3. Cross-sector collaboration on a shared strategy, 4. Effective operational management, 5. Robust violence reduction infrastructure, and 6. Sustainability planning and institutionalization. To test and refine these capacities, CPSC project leads explored the role of each capacity in seven cities with long-term violence challenges as well as significant experience with violence prevention efforts: Baltimore; Boston; Cincinnati; Los Angeles; New Orleans; Oakland; and Philadelphia. This second stage of the study surfaced the following city findings: Cities with more key capacities present appeared to be more successful. These cities were able to assemble violence reduction strategies that formal evaluations found to be effective in reducing violence over multi-year time horizons.2 Higher levels of effective political governance corresponded with more robust operational management, which appeared to play a crucial role in cities' ability to reduce violence; Sustained funding, a clear theory of change, a strategic focus on a highest-risk of violence population and organizational support were associated with effective CVI ecosystems. These ecosystems appeared to help cities sustain longer-term reductions. Problem-oriented, data-driven, collaborative policing appears to play an important role, operationally and politically; The challenge of scaling programs and strategies in larger cities is significant, but can drive creative adaptation when supported by robust management structures; and Sustainability and institutionalization of violence reduction strategies appear to depend heavily on stable political governance and effective management 

Oakland, CA: California Partnership for Safe Communities. 18p.

By Elizabeth Hacker, Ranjana Sharma, Jody Aked & Amit Timilsina

This research paper explores the findings from semi-structured interviews conducted with business owners operating spa and massage parlours, khaja ghars (snack shops), cabin/hostess bars, dance bars, and dohoris (folk-dance bars) in Kathmandu. It explores business owners’ perspectives on the day-to-day running of their businesses; the risks and stressors they face; their aspirations and motivations; and, where possible, their rationale for working with children, and the types of relationships they have with them.In addition to generating business-level evidence, the research provided evidence on a series of three business owner-led Action Research Groups, which began in February 2022 and continued until September 2023. These groups have generated theories of change, and will test and evaluate solutions to shift the system away from WFCL.

CLARISSA Research and Evidence Paper 6, Brighton: Institute of Development Studies

By Elizabeth Hacker, Kriti Bhattarai, Ranjana Sharma, Jody Aked, Bhujel, S. , Danny Burns, Mariah Cannon, Deshar, L. , Anita K.C., Pragya Lamsal, Barsha Luitel, Sudhir Malla, Mishra, N. , Rayamajhi, D. , Shakya, A. , Sherpa, P. , Kapil Shrestha & Amit Timilsina

Spanning five years, the focus of the CLARISSA programme in Nepal was on identifying the system dynamics of WFCL in Kathmandu’s adult entertainment sector, with particular attention given to the informal economy where the worst forms of child labour are prevalent. In addition to extensive participatory and qualitative research inquiry, in Nepal, 12 Participatory Action Research Groups of children and business owners spent between 12 and 18 months learning from action to reduce WFCL and its impact. The Action Research component makes the CLARISSA programme unique in the child labour space because it has learned about the dynamics of WFCL from action as well as inquiry. This paper synthesises what the CLARISSA programme learned about WFCL in Kathmandu’s adult entertainment sector. It looks at children’s pathways into child labour, their lived experience of it, and the businesses in which they work. With a focus on both the supply and demand dynamics of child labour, this paper aims to further understanding of the reasons why children have to work and why businesses employ children. The CLARISSA programme has produced multiple research reports and the Hard Labour website, which reproduces some of the stories about children’s lives, their days, the businesses they work in and the neighbourhoods where they live. This paper synthesises the detailed evidence landscape to draw analytical conclusions about why worst forms of child labour occur in Kathmandu’s adult entertainment sector, and what can be done about it.

CLARISSA Research and Evidence Paper 18,  Brighton: Institute of Development Studies,  2024. 74p.

By Jody Aked, Danny Burns and A.K.M. Maksud  

CLARISSA (Child Labour: Action-Research-Innovation in South and South‑Eastern Asia), a research programme on worst forms of child labour (WFCL), aims to identify, evidence, and promote effective multi-stakeholder action to tackle the drivers of WFCL in selected supply chains in Bangladesh and Nepal. Spanning five years, the programme’s focus in Bangladesh was on identifying the system dynamics of WFCL in Dhaka’s leather industry, and particularly the informal economy, where WFCL is prevalent. In addition to extensive participatory and qualitative research inquiry, 13 participatory action research groups of children and business owners spent 12–18 months learning about actions to reduce WFCL and its impact. The Action Research component makes the CLARISSA programme unique in the child labour space because it has learned about the dynamics of WFCL from action as well as inquiry. The CLARISSA programme has produced multiple research reports, and the Hard Labour website, which reproduces some of the stories about children’s lives, their days, the businesses they work in, and the neighbourhoods they live in. This paper synthesises this detailed evidence landscape to draw analytical conclusions about why WFCL happens in Dhaka’s leather industry and what can be done about it. This paper synthesises what the CLARISSA programme learned about child labour in the leather industry in and around Dhaka, Bangladesh. It looks at children’s pathways into child labour and their lived experience of it, alongside the small leather businesses they work in. The aim was to understand why children have to work and why the businesses employ children, looking at both the supply and demand dynamics of child labour. The CLARISSA programme has produced multiple research reports and the Hard Labour website,2 which reproduces some of the stories about children’s lives, their days, the businesses they work in, and the neighbourhoods they live in. This paper looks across this rich and detailed evidence landscape to draw analytical conclusions about why WFCL happens and what can be done about it.   

CLARISSA Research and Evidence Paper 11, Brighton: Institute of Development Studies, 2024. 70p.  

By Malore Dusenbery, Josh Fording, Jennifer Yahner, Jeanette Hussemann, Robbie Dembo

Victim compensation programs provide financial assistance to cover out-of-pocket expenses associated with the financial, physical, and psychological burdens of victimization. From 2022 to 2024, the Urban Institute and NORC at the University of Chicago conducted a National Study of Victim Compensation Program Trends, Challenges, and Successes, which included evaluations of four state crime victim compensation programs. This brief summarizes our evaluation of West Virginia’s victim compensation program to understand its utilization and perspectives on its ability to meet victims’ needs.We conclude that the West Virginia compensation program is connected to providers in the community and provides valuable benefits to victims in a mostly efficient, effective, and comprehensive way. Its being located in the legislature allows for independence and strong legislative support, but perhaps less connection to providers. It benefits from adequate funding and wants to ensure that continues and is not affected by external changes. Program staff and assistance providers note great improvement in awareness of the program since staffing an outreach coordinator. The number of staff and staff retention, however, continue to be a challenge for the program.Our analysis found some disparities in the data related to race and gender, which may be partially attributable to differences in the crimes experienced and reported by gender and by racial group and coverage by the state’s Medicaid system. Future research could dive deeper into these findings to better understand these patterns and the role the compensation program can play in improving access and success for diverse groups.Many of these findings and recommendations align with those emerging nationally in conversations about how to improve victim compensation programs. We are grateful that programs such as West Virginia’s remain open to evaluation and eager to understand how to continue expanding and improving their accessibility, responsiveness, and coverage to provide meaningful benefits to victims.

Washington, DC: The Urban Institute, 2024. 21p.