By Stephen Riley and Gemma Buckland. 

  Building Bridges, Safer Communities is a project delivered by Revolving Doors, in partnership with Shared Future CIC. The specific purpose of the project was to design a participatory process for public safety and resourcing, including developing a community-generated definition of safety in Merseyside. Merseyside as a region, with a particular focus on Liverpool, was chosen as the geographic focus for this project due to its unique history as an area with a strong sense of shared identity and culture, and a rich tradition of activism and innovation. The project had a particular focus on groups and communities who are traditionally not included in discourse around public safety. In particular, this focused on people with experience of multiple disadvantage. This was defined as a combination of contact with the criminal justice system, homelessness, problems with drugs and alcohol, mental ill health, and/or poverty. We wanted to better understand how safe people in Merseyside feel, what could help make them feel safer, what the role of the police is in making people feel more or less safe, and how relationships between the police and communities could be improved.

This report captures learning from one stage of this project, which is the peer research conducted by Revolving Doors. Peer research was conducted to shine a light on what feeling safe means to people in Merseyside—with a focus on the City of Liverpool and Birkenhead— and what people felt the police’s role should be in helping people feel safer. Research themes were defined in part from initial polling conducted across Merseyside with Opinium, by perceived gaps in existing knowledge, and where local stakeholders such as the police, local authorities and others, felt more information would be most valuable. This included a specific focus on the ‘revolving door’ cohort of people caught up in a cycle of crisis and crime because of unmet health and social needs, and what impacts their perceptions of safety. A reason for this was our expertise in engaging with this group and, in our experience, the high levels of mistrust of authorities which can make successful engagement with them more difficult. The Opinium poll took place online between 18 and 27 January 2023 and focused on public safety and policing in Merseyside. Over 1,500 people responded from across all five boroughs. Where relevant, findings from the polling are explored within this report in relation to the peer research findings.   

London: Revolving Doors, 2024.   40p.

By Steven Dudley,  Sara García, Jaime López-Aranda, Annie Pforzheimer, and Ben Westhoff , et al.

Precursor chemicals pose an unprecedented challenge for governments and multilateral organizations seeking to mitigate the development, manufacturing, production, and distribution of illicit synthetic drugs. As opposed to most legacy drugs -- which rely on plants, harvests, favorable weather, significant and varied manual labor, and transport of bulk amounts of illicit substances across heavily-policed terrain -- synthetic drugs can be produced in laboratories all year-round using a wide variety of mostly sparsely or unevenly regulated chemicals, which can be employed at different stages of the process in rudimentary laboratories and transported in large or small amounts, often without the knowledge of the transporters themselves. The sources for these chemicals span the globe. They are currently concentrated in China, where a relatively small number of companies appear to be producing precursor chemicals, in mainly two provinces. These chemicals are marketed and sold on the internet, where an army of online providers offer well-regulated and unregulated chemicals via the Clearnet and the dark web. These marketers are sometimes extensions of these same production companies and sometimes independent. Some are also clans, which appear to own numerous production and marketing companies. The precursors are transported to Mexico via cargo ships or air cargo, traveling direct or via circuitous routes. Cargo is often mislabeled, camouflaging the contents, purpose, or amount of their shipment. In Mexico, brokers and independent buyers facilitate this trade, filing paperwork, creating fictitious companies, or bribing officials. The chemicals then make their way to small producers. Often referred to as “cooks,” these producers synthesize the precursors into illicit synthetic drugs that are then sold to large buyers and transport specialists. Two large criminal networks buy and move synthetic drugs in bulk: the Sinaloa Cartel and Jalisco Cartel New Generation (Cartel de Jalisco Nueva Generación – CJNG). These networks are responsible for bringing this product across the most difficult part of its journey and thus charge a premium for their services. After they sell the drugs wholesale, they are largely absent, leaving the distribution and retail sales to other local criminal networks. The precursor industry -- and the synthetic drug industry writ large -- is so challenging to disrupt precisely because it works across legal and illegal spheres, involves many layers and different criminal networks, and has many means to obtain its final objective: the sale of synthetic drugs to an increasing number of consumers. Those consumers are not just in the United States. Places like Mexico are experiencing a dramatic uptick in synthetic drug consumption -- mostly methamphetamine but also fentanyl. The synthetic drug industry is also having ill effects on the environment in Mexico and is behind a surge in violence in the corridors where it is trafficked and sold on the local market. The problem requires governments to rethink their traditional strategies for fighting illicit drugs. In addition to developing regional and global coalitions to monitor and regulate the chemicals, governments must enlist private industry to play a much more active role in mitigating the trade and limiting the spread of these destructive substances 

Washington, DC: InsightCrime, 2040;    

By Mary L. G. Theroux, Adam B. Summers, Lawrence J. McQuillan, Jonathan Hofer, Hovannes Abramyan, and Scott Beyer;    Edited by Adam B. Summers

  Most cities do not have this complete integration of police and fire departments, emergency services, hospitals, psychiatric providers, and all other homeless service providers. Communities across the United States could benefit substantially from looking at the homelessness issue through a more systemic lens. Ultimately, homelessness in itself is not the problem; it is a symptom of larger systems-level problems. We need to enact systems-level solutions to truly address the root causes of homelessness. As a nation, we can overcome homelessness. In order to do so, we have to stop dealing with the symptoms and start dealing with the real issues. This report offers a good starting point for doing so  

   Causes of homelessness are many and often attached to trauma with a strong correlation to mental health issues. Other progressions into homelessness could involve compounded health issues, hospitalization later in life, losing resources, or becoming financially homeless. Each needs long-term personalized and customized care for success. A big part of the current homelessness crisis stems from the unintended consequences of the 2009 HEARTH Act. Our nation shifted from providing funding for emergency shelters to focusing solely on permanent housing and supportive services. Theoretically, this is not a bad way to approach homelessness—but as described in more detail herein, Housing First is only effective if you have the housing capacity to make sure people have a home and the necessary resources to provide wraparound services. In reality, this funding shift caused many cities to either downsize or eliminate shelters due to lack of available f inancial resources and created a ripple effect where people on the street did not have any safe, secure places to go. A larger part of the problem is the lack of affordable housing across the nation. The authors describe the factors driving California’s housing crisis with many of these replicating in cities across the country, resulting in unobtainable housing for the middle class. When dual phenomena of the lack of emergency shelters and an inadequate housing supply occurs, the eventual alternative is the street. It is important that the solutions offered herein address both homelessness policies as well as housing. Homeless intervention does not end or prevent homelessness, it only helps individuals currently experiencing homelessness. To end homelessness, we must address and solve the upstream issues, which include access to safe, affordable housing. T he “Beyond Homeless” report includes profiles of a few sample programs across the country that are achieving positive outcomes, and I am proud of my association with one of them, Haven for Hope of Bexar County located in San Antonio, Texas. As with most cities dealing with homelessness, San Antonio had the police department, emergency medical services, hospital systems, mental health systems, and nonprofit services providers all working in silos and not working collectively to have an impact. In creating Haven for Hope, we were able to bring all these systems together to collaboratively move in the same direction, thus making Haven a community wide model.   

Oakland, CA: Independence Institute, 2021. 66p.

U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division

  EXECUTIVE SUMMARY On August 5, 2021, the Department of Justice opened a pattern or practice investigation of the Phoenix Police Department (PhxPD) and the City of Phoenix (“the City” or “Phoenix”). Our investigation revealed systemic problems within PhxPD that deprive people of their rights under the Constitution and federal law. We found pervasive failings in PhxPD’s policies, training, supervision, and accountability systems that have disguised and perpetuated these violations for years

The Department of Justice has reasonable cause to believe that the City of Phoenix and the Phoenix Police Department engage in a pattern or practice of conduct that deprives people of their rights under the Constitution and federal law: • PhxPD uses excessive force, including unjustified deadly force and other types of force. • PhxPD and the City unlawfully detain, cite, and arrest people experiencing homelessness and unlawfully dispose of their belongings. • PhxPD discriminates against Black, Hispanic, and Native American people when enforcing the law. • PhxPD violates the rights of people engaged in protected speech and expression. • PhxPD and the City discriminate against people with behavioral health disabilities when dispatching calls for assistance and responding to people in crisis 

Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division, 2024.   

By United States Sentencing Commission

This report examines trends in the prevalence of federal methamphetamine trafficking sentences, and the purity levels of methamphetamine trafficked in the United States. The Commission analyzed 20 years of sentencing data and conducted a special data collection project examining the purity of methamphetamine trafficked and offense conduct of individuals sentenced for trafficking methamphetamine in fiscal year 2022. This report is the Commission's first comprehensive analysis of federal methamphetamine trafficking offenses in nearly 25 years.

Washington, DC: United States Sentencing Commission, 2024. 

by Mafalda Pardal, Elle Wadsworth, Beau Kilmer

Potent synthetic opioids, illegally produced, are starting to emerge in Europe. Considering the damaging harms caused by the opioid crisis in North America, which has led to a substantial surge in overdose deaths, it is crucial that European leaders understand the challenges associated with synthetic opioids. In this Perspective, we present and discuss the current situation in Europe concerning synthetic opioids, and draw on earlier and ongoing crises involving this group of substances to reflect on likely challenges ahead and ways to improve preparedness.

Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2024. 20p.

By Claudia Wallner ,  Jessica White and  Simon Copeland

  With an increasing focus on far-right extremism globally, the threat both to and within the security forces must be considered. Recent high-profile cases from national and local security forces, as well as critical reviews of internal cultures, indicate that the UK’s security forces are no exception. This paper addresses these challenges in the UK context, focusing on the police and military services, and offers practical guidance and recommendations. The analysis highlights the following four critical areas for reform: 1. Vetting processes are essential. However, it seems that there remain significant gaps and challenges in effectively identifying potential extremists. This poses a considerable risk, particularly as far-right organisations strategically infiltrate security forces, exploiting organisational similarities and cultural overlaps. 2. Training emerges as a critical area for prevention. The need for continuous, well-structured training programmes is emphasised, with a focus on addressing hypermasculinity and racism. Fostering a culture that counters stigma around mental health is also identified as a crucial factor in reducing radicalisation risk, aligning with the broader goal of building resilient and adaptive security forces. 3. Accountability mechanisms within security forces are equally important, especially in the face of an evolving extremist threat. Transparency, consistency and leadership support in enforcing consequences for misconduct and extremist ideologies are highlighted. 4. Separation from the police or military is identified as a critical phase of vulnerability to radicalisation. Comprehensive support programmes, including mental health assistance, exit interviews and tailored interventions, are highlighted as crucial for successful reintegration into civilian life. Addressing these challenges is vital to building the resilience of the UK’s security forces against extremist influences.   

London: The Royal United Services Institute (RUSI),  2024. 32p.

By Anne-Marie Weeden, Mark Williams, Cathy Haenlein and Elijah Glantz

  The importance of ‘following the money’ in illegal wildlife trade (IWT) investigations is increasingly clearly recognised, given the need to isolate ‘upstream’ criminal actors – higher-level threat actors who control and drive illicit activity – as opposed to the low-level, downstream offenders who can easily be replaced. In 2019, RUSI’s Organised Crime and Policing team, working with the government of the Lao People’s Democratic Republic (Lao PDR), pioneered a new technique in the environmental crime domain to support capacity building in this area: the use of multi-agency reviews of closed IWT cases – the Closed Case Method. Based on the pilot exercise’s success, this novel capacity-building methodology was subsequently adopted as a recommendation by the Financial Action Task Force, which urged affected countries to ‘undertake (multi-agency) case reviews of historic/closed IWT cases that focus on the unexplored financial elements of a case’, arguing that such reviews can identify typologies of IWT-related financial crime, develop risk indicators, and potentially reveal new leads. The RUSI team has since refined the Closed Case Method through multi-agency capacity-building workshops held in Malawi, Namibia, Uganda and Zambia in 2022–23. These workshops were designed and delivered as part of the RUSI project, ‘Case Closed? Using Historic Cases to Enable New Financial Investigations’, funded by the UK government under the Illegal Wildlife Trade Challenge Fund. This Whitehall Report summarises the lessons learned from this workshop activity, presenting a best practice guide for the use of closed case reviews to support financial investigation in IWT cases. This approach involves the retroactive analysis of previous IWT cases to identify fresh opportunities to gather and act on financial intelligence. The team’s methodology for using closed case reviews in capacity building can be broken down into three different stages: • First, the ‘research and preparation stage’ involves context-specific literature reviews, targeted stakeholder engagement, case criteria development, case selection and development of training materials. • Second, the ‘capacity building stage’ comprises delivery of multi-agency

workshops, involving baseline financial investigative skills training and small group case reviews, in which all relevant agencies are charged with re-examining the details of the case and developing missed opportunities to follow financial leads. 

• Third, the ‘learning and dissemination stage’ involves the development of red flags (risk indicators for suspected money laundering activity), the dissemination of financial intelligence to both the private and the public sector, and monitoring and evaluation.    

  RUSI Whitehall Report 4-23,  

London: The Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) 2023. 43p.

By European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA)

FRA’s third LGBTIQ survey shows that people still experience hate-motivated violence and discrimination. Trans and intersex people face even greater victimisation. Yet, signs of progress show that the EU’s and Member States’ efforts can positively affect people’s lives. More LGBTIQ people are open about their sexual orientation, gender identity, gender expression and sex characteristics.

FRA’s survey is one of the biggest of its kind globally. It analyses the experiences of over 100,000 LGBTIQ people of all backgrounds aged 15 years and above in the EU and neighbouring countries. This is the third wave of the survey FRA first conducted in 2012 and again in 2019. It presents results showing gradual progress in equality over time. The findings contribute to developing legal and policy responses to meet the needs of LGBTIQ people and protect their fundamental rights. The report sets out ways forward for the EU and Member States to ensure dignity and equality. Now is a critical moment to step up efforts.

In this report:

• Why is this survey needed?

• Survey in a nutshell

• Key concepts and terminology

• Assessing progress - comparing selected results from 2019 and 2023

1. Discrimination and awareness of rights

   • Assessing progress between 2019 and 2023 - selected results

   • Key 2023 survey findings

2. Violence and harassment

   • Assessing progress between 2019 and 2023 - selected results

   • Key 2023 survey findings

3. Life and dignity in inclusive societies

   • Assessing progress between 2019 and 2023 - selected results

   • Key 2023 survey findings

• Annex: Survey sample, methodology and socio-demographics

Vienna: European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights. 2024. 112p.

By Brandon L. Garrett & Cynthia Rudin

Artificial intelligence (“AI”) increasingly is used to make important decisions that affect individuals and society. As governments and corporations use AI more pervasively, one of the most troubling trends is that developers so often design it to be a “black box.” Designers create AI models too complex for people to understand or they conceal how AI functions. Policymakers and the public increasingly sound alarms about black box AI. A particularly pressing area of concern has been criminal cases, in which a person’s life, liberty, and public safety can be at stake. In the United States and globally, despite concerns that technology may deepen pre-existing racial disparities and overreliance on incarceration, black box AI has proliferated in areas such as: DNA mixture interpretation; facial recognition; recidivism risk assessments; and predictive policing. Despite constitutional criminal procedure protections, judges have often embraced claims that AI should remain undisclosed in court.

Both champions and critics of AI, however, mistakenly assume that we inevitably face a trade-off: black box AI may be incomprehensible, but it performs more accurately. But that is not so. In this Article, we question the basis for this assumption, which has so powerfully affected judges, policymakers, and academics. We describe a mature body of computer science research showing how “glass box” AI—designed to be fully interpretable by people—can be more accurate than the black box alternatives. Indeed, black box AI performs predictably worse in settings like the criminal system. After all, criminal justice data is notoriously error prone, and it may reflect preexisting racial and socioeconomic disparities. Unless AI is interpretable, decisionmakers like lawyers and judges who must use it will not be able to detect those underlying errors, much less understand what the AI recommendation means.

Debunking the black box performance myth has implications for constitutional criminal procedure rights and legislative policy. Judges and lawmakers have been reluctant to impair the perceived effectiveness of black box AI by requiring disclosures to the defense. Absent some compelling—or even credible—government interest in keeping AI black box, and given the substantial constitutional rights and public safety interests at stake, we argue that the burden rests on the government to justify any departure from the norm that all lawyers, judges, and jurors can fully understand AI. If AI is to be used at all in settings like the criminal system—and we do not suggest that it necessarily should—the presumption should be in favor of glass box AI, absent strong evidence to the contrary. We conclude by calling for national and local regulation to safeguard, in all criminal cases, the right to glass box AI.

  CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 109 (3): 2024.

By Megan Moore and Angie Weis Gammell 

  In 2020, 165,700, or 23%, of incarcerated individuals were seniors. This represents a 280% increase in incarcerated older adults since 1999 and is in stark contrast to the steady decline of total prison populations since peaking in 2009.  The growing number of older adults has a distinct set of healthcare needs that must be met, including aging-related cognitive impairments like dementia. Older adults behind bars are at a greater risk for developing cognitive impairment and carceral facilities are not properly staffed or equipped to recognize, assess, or care for incarcerated individuals with cognitive decline.  The U.S. Census Bureau projects that by 2030, U.S. prisons will hold 400,000 older adults who will comprise one-third of the total incarcerated population. Between approximately 70,000 and 210,000 of those incarcerated older adults will develop dementia.  With few national standardized dementia trainings, screenings, and practices across carceral facilities, there is a pressing need to address the diagnostic, medical, and rehabilitative needs of the aging prison population. Importantly, none of the purposes of punishment—incapacitation, rehabilitation, retribution, and deterrence—are advanced by the continued incarceration of individuals living with dementia. Many are unaware of their surroundings or the “why” of their existence in a carceral institution. They are already incapacitated by their medical condition. They no longer have the opportunity for rehabilitation. They are unable to understand their living environment as a consequence of their crime, rendering retribution impossible. Additionally, incarceration is not an effective deterrent against crime, and may actually serve to increase crime.  Despite this, state programs providing for geriatric release or release based on cognitive decline are rare. This leaves many individuals living with dementia in prison, burdening states with hefty medical bills. Prison systems must provide adequate medical care to allow those living with cognitive decline to maintain their dignity and protection to prevent their victimization.  

Durham, NC: Wilson Center for Science and Justice at Duke Law, 2024.  23p.

By: Jay Szkola, Megan J. O’Toole, Sarah Burd-Sharps

On average, at least one gun is stolen from a car every nine minutes in the United States. The rate of gun thefts from cars is triple what it was a decade ago. This includes both consistent increases nearly every year over the decade and a marked spike during the pandemic. A decade ago, roughly a quarter of gun thefts were from cars; in 2022, over half were. Cars parked at residences (in driveways, outside homes, etc.) are the most common source of stolen guns, demonstrating the importance of securely storing guns at all times and locations. Cities in states with the weakest gun safety laws see nearly 18 times the rate of gun thefts from cars as those in states with the strongest gun laws. Memphis, Tennessee—the city with the highest rate of guns stolen from cars— had over 3,000 gun thefts from vehicles in 2022. A range of cities in Massachusetts, New York, New Jersey, and Rhode Island, reported zero gun thefts from cars. 

New York: Everytown for Gun Safety, 2024. 14p.

By Emily Berg,  Susannah N. Tapp

This report presents a new method of estimating prevalence that overcomes the problems associated with the old procedure; it will be adopted beginning with the Criminal Victimization, 2023 report. Limitations of the old prevalence measure are discussed, followed by guiding principles for the new prevalence measure. The new measure is presented, as is a comparison of estimates using both methods. Additionally, see the accompanying third-party report, National Crime Victimization Survey: Prevalence Estimation Methods.  

U.S. Department of Justice Office of Justice Programs Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2024. 20p.  

By Neil Shortland; Jason Rydberg; John Horgan; Michael Williams; Georgia Elena Savoia; T. H. Chan; Tyler Cote; Kurt Braddock

This study evaluated the Operation250 campaign focused on online safety and risk assessment.

Abstract

This evaluation of Operation250 reported positive results for students who experienced the Operation250, an important step in efforts to identify “what works” in the realm of prevention. However, several issues were identified that center on both (1) the wider issues associated with conducting interventions and (2) evaluating those interventions to assess the degree to which they are achieving their stated goals. Researchers conducted a formal and summative evaluation of Operation250 (Op250) using a mixed-method approach, including a randomized control trial and a wait-list control trial design with 1) an intervention group and 2) a control group (i.e., a matched-control group that has not received the Op250 intervention) at a series of schools in the North Adams District in Massachusetts. The goal of this independent evaluation was to objectively measure the ability of Op250 to (1) reduce unsafe online behavior in pre- teen ,and teenagers and (2) increase the ability of pre-teens and teenagers to assess risk online.

Lowell, MA: University of Massachusetts, Lovell, 2024. 150p.

By Farid Badrán

  Recent scholarship has seen the peace agreement between Colombian government and the Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces (FARC) guerrillas a milestone in closing more than 50 years of internal armed conflict. Indeed, the traditional practice of subversive warfare between the two sides ended. However, this did not imply a true path to peacebuilding. The empirical and statistical evidence indicates the worsening of the conflict through the transformation of its practices and representations, into terrorism and transnational organized crime. This article contends that the FARC, as a political party, a new insurgent group, and a criminal actor, continues to have a main role

Trends in Organized Crime (2024) 27:173–196 

By Yarin Eski, Anna Sergi

   This article will explore how the current narratives (and corresponding changes) in Dutch organised crime policing relate to ethnic profiling of minorities in the Netherlands. It will do so by developing a theoretically informed narrative understanding of what we would like to conceptualise as ethnic profiling of organised crime (in the Netherlands), digging deeper into the connection between the role of ethnicity in organised crime studies inasmuch as it relates to the history of the mafia concept and, even further, lingering colonialism in law-and-order approaches. By focusing on (assumed) socio-historical connections between Italy, mafia and organised crime and on the social construction of Italian mafia as organised crime, based on narrative criminology, this article discursively and interpretatively understands the dominant and hidden Dutch narratives on (policing) organised crime. The discovered narratives will be critically discussed in light of the juxtaposition between mafias and ethnic organised crime and post-colonial implications.

  Trends in Organized Crime (2024) 27:120–139

By Robert A. Roks, Edwin W. Kruisbergen, Edward R. Kleemans

   In this article, we aim to further our understanding of the social embeddedness of organized crime by exploring the (possible) ways the social environment adds to the shielding of organized crime or criminal activities by organized crime groups. We argue that the metaphor of ‘walls of silence’ provides a fruitful way to examine the shielding of organized crime. Based on a theoretical and empirical exploration of 30 cases from the fifth data sweep of Dutch Organized Crime Monitor, we illustrate how organized crime offenders in the Netherlands depend on the silence and secrecy of co-offenders, victims, bystanders, and others who are aware of their (criminal) activities. Furthermore, we present a framework of the shielding of organized crime activities to provide insight into how offenders not only make use of the social environment to shield their activities, but also how the social environment can (pur posely) act as walls of silence and secrecy.

Trends in Organized Crime (2024) 27:103–119 

By Michael D. Anestis; Jayna Moceri-Brooks, Rachel L. Johnson,  et al

Abstract

Importance: Secure firearm storage may help reduce firearm injury and death. Broad implementation requires more granular assessments of firearm storage practices and greater clarity on circumstances that may prevent or promote the use of locking devices.

Objective: To develop a more thorough understanding of firearm storage practices, obstacles to using locking devices, and circumstances in which firearm owners would consider locking unsecured firearms.

Design, setting, and participants: A cross-sectional, nationally representative survey of adults residing in 5 US states who owned firearms was administered online between July 28 and August 8, 2022. Participants were recruited via probability-based sampling.

Main outcomes and measures: Firearm storage practices were assessed via a matrix provided to participants in which firearm-locking devices were described both via text and images. Locking mechanisms (key/personal identification number [PIN]/dial vs biometric) were specified for each type of device. Obstacles to the use of locking devices and circumstances in which firearm owners would consider locking unsecured firearms were assessed via self-report items developed by the study team.

Results: The final weighted sample included 2152 adult (aged ≥18 years), English-speaking firearm owners residing in the US; the sample was predominantly male (66.7%). Among the 2152 firearm owners, 58.3% (95% CI, 55.9%-60.6%) reported storing at least 1 firearm unlocked and hidden, with 17.9% (95% CI, 16.2%-19.8%) reporting storing at least 1 firearm unlocked and unhidden. Gun safes were the most frequently used device both among participants who use keyed/PIN/dial locking mechanisms (32.4%; 95% CI, 30.2%-34.7%) and those who use biometric locking mechanisms (15.6%; 95% CI, 13.9%-17.5%). Those who do not store firearms locked most frequently noted a belief that locks are unnecessary (49.3%; 95% CI, 45.5%-53.1%) and a fear that locks would prevent quick access in an emergency (44.8%; 95% CI, 41.1%-48.7%) as obstacles to lock usage. Preventing access by children was the most often reported circumstance in which firearm owners would consider locking unsecured firearms (48.5%; 95% CI, 45.6%-51.4%).

Conclusions and relevance: In this survey study of 2152 firearm owners, consistent with prior research, unsecure firearm storage was common. Firearm owners appeared to prefer gun safes relative to cable locks and trigger locks, indicating that locking device distribution programs may not match firearm owners' preferences. Broad implementation of secure firearm storage may require addressing disproportionate fears of home intruders and increasing awareness of the risks associated with household firearm access. Furthermore, implementation efforts may hinge on broader awareness of the risks of ready firearm access beyond unauthorize 

access by children

JAMA Netw Open. 2023 Mar 1;6(3):e231447.

 doi: 10.1001/jamanetworkopen.2023.1447.

By Catherine M. Grosso, Jeffrey Fagan, Michael Laurence

The California Racial Justice Act of 2020 recognized racial and ethnic discrimination as a basis for relief in capital cases, expressly permitting several types of statistical evidence to be introduced. This statewide study of the influence of race and ethnicity on the application of capital punishment contributes to this evidence. We draw on data from over 27,000 murder and manslaughter convictions in California state courts between 1978 and 2002. Using multiple methods, we found significant racial and ethnic disparities in charging and sentencing decisions. Controlling for defendant culpability and specific statutory aggravators, we show that Black and Latinx defendants and all defendants convicted of killing at least one white victim are substantially more likely to be sentenced to death. We further examined the role that race and ethnicity have in decision-making at various points in the criminal justice system. We found that prosecutors were significantly more likely to seek death against defendants who kill white victims, and that juries were significantly more likely to sentence those defendants to death. The magnitude of the race of the defendant and race of the victim effects is substantially higher than in prior studies in other states and in single-jurisdiction research. The results show an entrenched pattern of racial disparities in charging and sentencing that privileges white victim cases, as well as patterns of racial disparities in who is charged and sentenced to death in California courts that are the natural result of California's capacious statutory definition of death eligibility, which permits virtually unlimited discretion for charging and sentencing decisions. This pattern of racial preferences illustrates the social costs of California's failure to follow the Supreme Court's directive in Furman v Georgia to narrow the application of capital punishment over 50 years ago.
Journal of Empirical Legal Studies

Early View, June 2024

By New York City, Office of the City Comptroller

The audit found that the New York City Police Department (NYPD) ensures that the billing, invoices, and payments to ShotSpotter are accurate, and that ShotSpotter generally meets its currently specified contractual obligations. The auditors found that sensor coverage areas were initially set up in Brooklyn and the Bronx because the two boroughs had the highest number of confirmed shootings, and, within the two boroughs, they were generally placed in precincts with the highest number of confirmed shootings. The audit also found that ShotSpotter met its contractual performance targets, which focus on avoiding “missed incidents,” most of the time.

However, the audit found that the contractual performance standard does not measure whether alerts sent to NYPD result in confirmed shootings. When measured against the contractual performance standards set by NYPD, ShotSpotter met its 90% target for avoiding missed incidents in almost all boroughs except Manhattan, but when measured against the number of confirmed shootings, performance is far lower. During the sampled months of review in 2022 and 2023, ShotSpotter alerts only resulted in confirmed shootings between 8% and 20% of the time.

During the month of June 2023, for example, out of the 940 ShotSpotter alerts that NYPD responded to 771 could not be confirmed as shootings upon arrival at the scene (82%), 47 were determined to be unfounded (5%), and 122 were confirmed as shootings (13%). NYPD officers spent 426.9 hours investigating alerts that were not confirmed as shootings. If only one officer responded, this equates to almost 36 twelve-hour shifts; if two officers responded, this number doubles.[1]  NYPD does not currently track the amount of time ─ or the associated staff costs ─ spent responding to such instances.

NYPD does not agree that confirmed shootings should be used to measure ShotSpotter’s performance.  It asserts that ShotSpotter improves the response time to possible shots fired which in turn increases the ability to provide assistance to victims, increases officers’ safety, and provides a more accurate location of the possible shooting than a 911 call alone.

However, NYPD does not measure ShotSpotter alert response times in comparison to 911 call response times to shots fired outside, the metric most closely aligned to ShotSpotter alerts. The audit analyzed the two data sets, NYPD’s internal OCD ShotSpotter Tracking report and the Open Data NYPD Call for Service report, and found that during the month of June 2023 average response times to ShotSpotter alerts were 1 minute and 38 seconds faster than response times to reports to 911 of outdoor shots fired (3 minutes 50 seconds for ShotSpotter versus 5 minutes 28 seconds for 911), far less than the difference of 5 minutes claimed in publicly-available data.[2]

The audit found that NYPD’s data collection should be improved, analyzed more critically, and published in the interest of transparency before ShotSpotter’s contract, which expires in December 2024, is renewed. The data currently collected and published by NYPD does not support a comprehensive assessment of the tool’s effectiveness or economy, does not fully inform the public or government officials interested in ShotSpotter’s performance, and therefore does not currently support renewal of the contract.

Intended Benefits

The audit increases transparency around the use of ShotSpotter and raises questions concerning NYPD’s assessment of its performance.  NYPD has already spent over $45 million on this product and is committed to spending a further $9 million before the end of the current contract term. The audit calls on NYPD to critically and comprehensively assess ShotSpotter’s performance and determine whether its continued use remains in the City’s best interests.

New York City: Office of the City Comptroller, 2024. 48p.