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Understanding How Supervision Conditions are Set for People on Parole and Probation

By Kelly Lyn Mitchell and Ebony L. Ruhland 

Study Purpose This report is one in a series of reports for the Aligning Supervision Conditions with Risk and Needs (ASCRN) project, the goal of which was to reduce probation and parole revocations and reorient community supervision toward promoting success by changing the way probation and parole conditions are imposed. The hypothesis for this project was that if probation and parole conditions targeted individuals’ criminogenic needs and were based upon risk level, individuals on supervision would be more successful.1 To learn about the condition-setting process for probation and parole, we worked with three sites: the Iowa Board of Parole, the Connecticut Board of Pardons and Paroles, and the Kansas Department of Corrections and Johnson County Court Services. This report sets forth our findings across all three sites. Conclusions 1. Parole Boards and Judges Played a Less Significant Role in Setting Conditions Than Expected As we started this project, our hypothesis was that parole boards and judges would be key actors in setting conditions. However, this proved not to be the case in the three sites included in this study. The parole boards relied heavily on standard conditions, so most parole conditions were passively rather than actively imposed. The judges relied on plea negotiations, which are initiated by prosecutors; therefore, prosecutors rather than judges played a key role in setting probation conditions. 2. Most Conditions are Set by Rote In both Connecticut and Iowa, the parole boards relied heavily on standard conditions, which were imposed automatically. Moreover, standard conditions made up the majority of conditions imposed; therefore, most parole conditions were set by rote rather than being individualized to the person being granted parole. In the Kansas probation site, most interviewees described standard conditions as the conditions that are fre quently imposed based on offense type or routine. Kansas has a unique law allowing any conditions to be adjusted by the judge, and there was evidence that this authority was sometimes used. But the overall driving factor in setting conditions appeared to be routine, indicating that conditions are not individualized to the person. 3. Conditions Reassure Authorities When Making Decisions that Involve Risk Interviewees across all three sites, in the contexts of parole and probation, saw supervision conditions as a way to mitigate the risk of reoffense and reassure themselves that they were making good decisions. Within the context of the parole release decision, parole board members felt pressure to make good release decisions. Conditions helped to bolster parole board members’ confidence that they were making good release decisions by placing additional restrictions and limits on parolees’ behavior. Within the context of plea negotiations, prosecutors were seeking to resolve the case, but in a way that imposed adequate punishment and accountability for the offense. In cases where probation seems riskier than incarceration, including conditions as part of the plea negotiation helps reassure prosecutors by placing limits or requirements on the person’s behavior. 4. Parole Boards, Prosecutors, and Judges Lacked a Feedback Loop for Understanding the Effects of Their Decisions Though everyone that participated in the interviews for this project had clear ideas about what they perceived conditions should do, most had little to no idea if the conditions they imposed or recommended actually accomplished those purposes. Instead, interviewees in every jurisdiction indicated that they lacked a feedback mechanism to understand whether parole or probation has positive or negative effects, or more specifically, whether the conditions they imposed had such effects. Because these individuals did not receive any feedback, there was nothing to challenge or inform their professional judgment about which conditions to impose in different situations. Thus, as noted in the second finding, conditions continue to be assigned by routine, with little attention being paid to whether they are effective. 

Recommendations 1. Authorities that Set Supervision Conditions Should Review Existing Research on Supervision Conditions and Create Demand for Expanded Research As noted above, the authorities in the three sites we studied had no idea whether parole or probation has positive or negative effects, or more specifically, whether the conditions they imposed had such effects. The fact is, there is very little research on the effectiveness of specific parole and probation conditions. Though there have been some efforts to catalogue the research that does exist,2 efforts are only now beginning to make this information broadly available in the criminal justice field. To advance the effectiveness of parole and probation it is important that the authorities who set supervision conditions seek out and review existing research. Equally important is for more research to be done to guide decision makers so their practices can be more effective at promoting behavioral change to increase success and reduce recidivism. Parole boards, judges, and prosecutors can create demand for such research by insisting that their practices be evidence-based, seeking funding for research and evaluation, and partnering with researchers to test the effectiveness of their conditions. 2. Individualize Condition Setting Probation and parole are periods of community supervision during which individuals are subject to supervision conditions, which are requirements they must complete or follow. As shown in this report, most conditions are set by routine rather than being individualized to the needs of the individual. Interviewees utilized many different types of information to assist them in condition setting, and there was little consistency in their approach. The standard conditions also largely drove how interviewees set conditions, and thus were broad in scope rather than targeting individuals’ risks. However, conditions have the potential to be more effective if they are individualized to meet the needs of the individual. Conditions can serve as a mechanism for targeting a person’s criminogenic needs (factors that lead to criminal offending that can be changed with intervention) and promoting behavioral change to reduce reoffending. One way to accomplish this is to utilize risk-and-needs assessment tools to identify a person’s criminogenic needs, and to impose conditions that provide programming to target and address those needs.3 This method has greater potential to reduce an individual’s risk of reoffending than imposing a long list of conditions to reassure decisionmakers that they are making the right decision because it is aimed at addressing the behavior that places a person at a higher risk to reoffend. However, it is critical to provide adequate training to assist judges and parole boards in understanding how to translate assessment results to aid in condition setting and to evaluate the approach. 3. Establish a Feedback Loop Sentencing and parole release are decision points that may involve some risk. There is a risk that the person will reoffend. Authorities might be more confident in their decisions if they received regular feedback about outcomes, such as how the person did on supervision and what conditions helped them. Frequently, the authorities that set conditions only saw the failures—that is, those individuals who were returned for violations or reoffense. Regular information about the success of individuals on parole and probation, as well as more detail about the reasons other individuals failed parole and probation, could engender more confidence in their decision making, and potentially reduce their reliance on a multitude of rote supervision conditions. 

Minneapolis; Robina Institute of Criminal Law and Criminal Justice , 2024.  43p.

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