By Peter K. Levine, Joseph F. Adams, Amy A. Alrich, Rachel G. Augustine, Margaret D.M. Barber, Sujeeta B. Bhatt Kathleen M. Conley, Dave I. Cotting, Alan B. Gelder, Jeffery M. Jaworski, Mark F. Kaye, Carrington A. Metts, Neil V. Mithal, and Matthew J. Reed.

From the document: "The objectives of the IDA [Institute for Defense Analyses] study are to gain greater fidelity on the scope and nature of extremist ideologies and behaviors in the [DOD]; identify the sources of such ideologies and behavior; assess their impact; and develop strategies for preventing, countering, and neutralizing that impact. To that end, the project description calls for IDA to: 1. Document the range of known extremist ideologies and behaviors that are contrary to U.S. law and policy; 2. Identify existing definitions of extremism and prohibited extremist activities; 3. Identify pathways of extremist ideology and behavior broadly and within the Department in particular; 4. Assess why the DOD workforce and others in the military community (including veterans, DOD civilians, and contractor employees) might be susceptible to extremist recruiting efforts; 5. Survey DOD approaches to the prevention of other forms of violence (including suicide, domestic violence, assault, sexual assault, and hate crimes) to identify strategies that might be adopted; 6. Assess policies and initiatives of other federal agencies that might be helpful to the Department; 7. Identify existing legal frameworks for addressing prohibited extremist activities in the Total Force; 8. Evaluate current DOD efforts to counter extremist ideologies and behaviors in the ranks, identifying gaps and strengths; and 9. Review and evaluate current DOD information collection, tracking, and data sharing systems (including through the military justice, equal employment opportunity, command discipline, hotline response systems, insider threat, and law enforcement/security systems)."

INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSES. 2023. 282p.

By PAYNE, KEITH B.

From the document: "With Russia and China as heavily armed and aligned nuclear foes, Washington faces an unprecedented deterrence context and looming threats. Given this new great power alignment, more than 30 states are at increased risk, namely, those allies directly covered by the U.S. nuclear deterrent and those partners greatly affected by the credibility of that deterrent, such as Taiwan and Ukraine. Most U.S. civilian and military leaders who must pay attention to this challenge appear to recognize that the U.S. understanding of deterrence, largely based on its Cold War experience, must be reconsidered in this unprecedented context. The search for guideposts for that understanding is now ongoing. The current war in the Middle East appears to offer some tentative lessons in this regard."

NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY (U.S.). 2024. 6p.

By GANDHI, MILAN

From the document: "Focussing on current and emerging issues, this policy briefing paper ('Paper') surveys the ways in which technologies under the umbrella of artificial intelligence ('AI') may interact with democracy and, specifically, extremism, mis/disinformation, and illegal and 'legal but harmful' content online. The Paper considers examples of how AI technologies can be used to mislead and harm citizens and how AI technologies can be used to detect and counter the same or associated harms, exploring risks to democracy and human rights emerging across the spectrum. [...] Given the immense scope and potential impacts of AI on different facets of democracy and human rights, the Paper does not consider every relevant or potential AI use case, nor the long-term horizon. For example, AI-powered kinetic weapons and cyber-attacks are not discussed. Moreover, the Paper is limited in examining questions at the intersection of AI and economics and AI and geopolitics, though both intersections have important implications for democracy in the digital age. Finally, the Paper only briefly discusses how AI and outputs such as deepfakes may exacerbate broader societal concerns relating to political trust and polarisation. Although there is a likelihood that aspects of the Paper will be out-of-date the moment it is published given the speed at which new issues, rules and innovations are emerging, the Paper is intended to empower policymakers, especially those working on mis/disinformation, hate, extremism and terrorism specifically, as well as security, democracy and human rights more broadly. It provides explanations of core concerns related to AI and links them to practical examples and possible public policy solutions."

INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC DIALOGUE. 2024.

By MACDONALD, STUART KEITH, 1979-; MATTHEIS, ASHLEY A.; WELLS, DAVID

From the document: "Online terrorist propaganda has been an important policy concern for at least the past decade. [...] [T]he EU Commission launched a call for proposals for projects aimed at supporting small companies in implementing the Regulation. Three projects were funded under this call. This report forms part of one of these projects, which is entitled Tech Against Terrorism Europe. It is important to note at the outset that the focus of this report is the use of AI and machine learning to identify terrorist content online using content-based approaches. Accordingly, the following are outside the scope of the report: [1] The moderation of so-called borderline content, i.e., content that does not violate a platform's Terms of Service but which is nevertheless regarded as potentially harmful. [2] The identification of individuals on a radicalisation trajectory, which is a different - and even more difficult - task; and, [3] The use of behaviour-based cues, such as abnormal posting volume and use of unrelated, trending hashtags, to identify accounts that are sharing terrorist content. This includes approaches based on recidivism. The report begins, in section 2, by explaining the terms AI, machine learning and terrorist content online. Readers that are already familiar with these concepts may wish to move straight to section 3, which discusses the two main content-based approaches to the automated identification of terrorist content online: matching-based approaches and classification-based ones. Having explained the limitations of each approach, section 4 details two ways in which it is necessary to supplement automated tools. Section 5 then addresses issues of resource, before the report concludes with three recommendations."

TECH AGAINST TERRORISM; TECH AGAINST TERRORISM EUROPE.. 2023.. 32p.

By Ndubuisi Christian Ani

The densely populated southern regions of Kayes and Koulikoro in Mali are at a watershed moment, with the rapid expansion into the regions by Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin (JNIM) from the north and central regions. The two regions provide JNIM with new and profitable frontiers for resource exploitation, such as access to a vast tax base and control of the lucrative timber logging sector. The regions also provide JNIM with opportunities for cattle rustling, kidnapping, banditry and access to artisanal gold mining sites. Key points For the government l Promote regular confidence-building initiatives between farmer and herder communities in order to reduce stigmatisation and alliance with JNIM. l Initiate a national dialogue with the aim of prohibiting hereditary slavery. l Work proactively together with community. For ECOWAS l Urge Mali to revitalise the 2015 Algiers peace agreement. l Seek international partnerships to support developmental and humanitarian initiatives in Mali in order to prevent radicalisation in the southern regions. l Support national consultations over the abolition of hereditary slavery.

Africa, OCWAR-T Research Report 13  Ecowas Commission. 2023. 20pg

By Alexander Landry, James Druckman, and Robb Willer

Recent, high-profile acts of partisan violence have stimulated interest among academics and the general public in the etiology of support for such violence. Here, Landry, Druckman, and Willer report results of an exploratory study that (1) measures support for partisan violence with both abstract items (e.g., general support for partisan violence) and support for more specific acts (e.g., support for a partisan motivated shooting), (2) follows recently established best practices by including attention checks to attenuate response bias, and (3) incorporates measures of a wide range of potential confounders as control variables. Across three data collections (total N = 2,003), including two with nationally representative samples, and tracking seven unique operationalizations of support for the use of violence against out-partisans, they find the most consistent and typically largest relationships with an individual’s reported “need for chaos” (e.g., agreement with statements like: “Sometimes I just feel like destroying beautiful things”) and the extent to which they dehumanize supporters of the opposing party. The researchers speculate this reflects a motivation to use extreme methods (need for chaos) toward one’s political rivals, liberated from the moral restraints that inhibit harming fellow human beings (dehumanization). System justification and social dominance orientation were also both positively related to support for partisan violence, which may reflect partisans’ desire to protect their preferred social order from out-partisans deemed to threaten it. Collectively, these results offer a framework for future research on support for partisan violence, highlighting the role of extreme orientations toward society and rival partisans.

United States, Northwestern University,  Institute for Policy Research. 2023, 56pg

ByJoshua D. Freilich, Steven M. Chermak, Rachael A. Arietti, and Noah D. Turner

This review focuses on terrorism and extremist crimes, including ideologically motivated hate crimes. Research on these topics has become more rigorous in recent decades, and more scholars have engaged in original data collection. Our assessment found a burgeoning literature that increasingly includes the application of integrated theories, but gaps remain as few studies examine life-course and critical approaches. Our review of the policing of terrorism found a limited evidence base for counterterrorism initiatives. We also found that court/sentencing issues are understudied. We suggest improving data quality in these areas by creating a national data collection protocol on these crimes, enhancing the rigor of offender and victim self-report studies, and requiring more transparency from open-source research efforts. We propose that government agencies fund rigorous evaluations of policing strategies in the terrorism context. Finally, it is hoped that increased access to federal court documents will lead to more scholarly attention on sentencing issues.

Annual Review of Criminology, Volume 7, Page 187 - 209

By Baklitskiy, Andrey

From the document: "The space dimension is crucial in nuclear relations between the US and Russia. Space systems support vital functions like early warning, communication, reconnaissance, and targeting directly connected to strategic stability. However, shifting geopolitics and the disappearance of arms control agreements put the space dimension under strain. The Russian invasion of Ukraine showcases modern warfare's reliance on space assets. It also influences space dynamics and US-Russian relations. Although the current impact on strategic stability is limited, it is important to consider it. The most essential element of strategic stability in the space domain--the taboo against kinetic satellite attacks--endures, but there are reasons for concern. The broad use of civilian satellites for military purposes, Russia's evolving stance regarding targeting space objects, cyber-attacks against space infrastructure, the disappearance of provisions for noninterference with space assets, and sanctions affecting space industry--all of these in their separate ways could lead to crisis and undermine strategic stability. On top of this, the lack of dedicated channels for US-Russian dialogue on space security diminishes prospects for crisis prevention or mitigation."

CNA Corporation. 2023. 34p.

By Kleemann, Aldo

From the document: "Deception and media manipulation have always been an integral part of wartime propaganda. But never before has it been so easy to create high-quality fabrications of images as well as sound and video recordings. The tendency to react emotionally to these media opens up a whole new possibility for abuse by their creators. A call to surrender by President Volodymyr Zelensky, which was immediately exposed as a deepfake, is the first attempt to use the new technology in an armed conflict. The quality of such fabrications is improving, detecting them is becoming increasingly complex and there is no end in sight to these developments. Banning deepfakes would be futile. It is therefore time to look at current and potential applications and possible counter-strategies."

German Institute For International And Security Affairs. 2023. 6p.

By Ekrem Ersen Emeksiz

ABSTRACT This research presents Istanbul, Turkey and its law enforcement as a case study for the design of a contingency plan to increase efficiency of counterterrorism efforts and coordination among the agencies. This contingency plan involves the implementation of techniques and strategies based on situational crime prevention, moral panic and crisis theories on predetermined terror targets in the city of Istanbul to reduce the impact of a mega terrorist attack. The research applies the EVIL DONE and CARVER concepts to assess current terrorism risks and threats for critical targets. In assessing risks and threat conditions, this research proposes a contingency plan for law enforcement in Istanbul. The purpose of the contingency plan is to reduce target vulnerabilities and enhance target resilience as well as control moral panic conditions during large-scale terror incidents.

BY Yuri van Hoef, Erasmus University Rotterdam

Introduction

While friendship scholarship in the humanities and social sciences has risen exponentially in the last decade, it focuses almost exclusively on the alliances of great powers.[1] This article introduces a new research agenda by drawing upon scholarship that suggests middle powers behave differently, arguing that middle powers pursue international friendship different than great powers. This example is illustrated by comparing how the Netherlands and Denmark, both considered traditional examples of middle powers and of atlanticist states, supported the US during the War on Terror, and how this affected their relationship with the US.

. Academia Letters, Article 1972. 10P.

Institute For Defense Analyses.

From the document: "The United States faces a strategic challenge requiring urgent action. Given current threat trajectories, our nation will soon encounter a fundamentally different global setting than it has ever experienced: we will face a world where two nations possess nuclear arsenals on par with our own. In addition, the risk of conflict with these two nuclear peers is increasing. It is an existential challenge for which the United States is ill-prepared, unless its leaders make decisions now to adjust the U.S. strategic posture. The Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States was established by the Fiscal Year (FY) 2022 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), and concludes that America's defense strategy and strategic posture must change in order to properly defend its vital interests and improve strategic stability with China and Russia. Decisions need to be made now in order for the nation to be prepared to address the threats from these two nuclear-armed adversaries arising during the 2027-2035 timeframe. Moreover, these threats are such that the United States and its Allies and partners must be ready to deter and defeat both adversaries simultaneously. We arrive at these conclusions following a comprehensive year-long review of the threats America faces and its strategy and planned capabilities to address those threats."

Congressional Commission On The Strategic Posture Of The United States . 2023. 160p.

United States. Department Of Defense. Office Of The Secretary Of Defense;

From the document: "The DoD annual report on Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China [PRC] charts the current course of the PRC's national, economic, and military strategy, and offers insight on the People's Liberation Army's (PLA) strategy, current capabilities and activities, as well as its future modernization goals. In 2022, the PRC turned to the PLA as an increasingly capable instrument of statecraft. Throughout the year, the PLA adopted more coercive actions in the Indo-Pacific region, while accelerating its development of capabilities and concepts to strengthen the PRC's ability to 'fight and win wars' against a 'strong enemy,' counter an intervention by a third party in a conflict along the PRC's periphery, and to project power globally. At the same time, the PRC largely denied, cancelled, and ignored recurring bilateral defense engagements, as well as DoD requests for military-to-military communication at multiple levels. This report illustrates the importance of meeting the pacing challenge presented by the PRC's increasingly capable military. [...] 'This report covers security and military developments involving the PRC until the end of 2022.'"

United States. Department Of Defense . 2023. 212p.

By Malhotra, Ananya Agustin; Jaworek, Patricia

From the document: "Forty years ago, findings on the global climatic effects of nuclear war first introduced the prospect of 'nuclear winter.' In the decades since, the consequences of nuclear use have remained only incidental to considerations of nuclear policy. This paper explores that history and presents new research and key questions for policymakers to address given today's increasingly interconnected world. The authors highlight the need for renewed attention to the catastrophic effects of nuclear conflict as a crucial step toward reducing the risk of nuclear use."

Nuclear Threat Initiative. 2023.

By Nicholas Corsaro, Robin S. Engel, Tamara D. Herold,. Murat Yildirim

The gang and gun violence reduction project implemented in Las Vegas consisted of three components: hot spots deployment, focused deterrence, and place network investigations. This report focuses on the development, implementation, and evaluation of the hot spots strategy. The hot spots strategy involved the strategic deployment of additional saturation police patrols in high-crime locations. Specifically, to address violent street crime, the LVMPD engaged in a 6- month (Nov 1, 2018 to Apr 30, 2019) cluster randomized controlled trial (RCT) design of street segments receiving additional hot spots deployment (saturation patrols) and streets receiving patrol as usual (control segments). All potential street segments were identified from an analysis of persistent violent crime hot spots (where intensive police focus has been paid by the violent crime unit officers since January of 2018). Researchers stratified highest risk and independent segments within chronic and persistent hot spot locations. Specifically, 22 treatment segments and 22 control segments were selected to form the evaluation. No treatment segment was within a block or intersection of another treatment or control segment to reduce potential contamination of findings. Deployment of officers to the treatment hot spots occurred via calls for service every day, randomly for a total of two hours of exposure at each hot spot. Officers were instructed to remain at the hot spot for a total of 15 minutes, which is the optimum time for deployment to achieve effects as identified by researchers (Koper, 1995). When reaching the hot spot, officers were also randomly instructed to either stay in their vehicle with the lights on, or patrol the segment on foot. Interviews with arrestees have shown police presence is understood and alters criminal behaviors in patrolled areas (Golub et al., 2003). However, hot spot patrols such as walking are likely to go unnoticed by ordinary citizens (Weisburd, Hinkle, Fameaga, & Ready, 2011). Therefore, using both treatment types (stationary with lights and foot patrol) likely leads to increased awareness of police, thereby reducing criminal activity. The control treatment was for business to occur as usual at the control street segments. Center researchers conducted fidelity assessments during the project implementation phase, in order to ensure that the strategy was being implemented properly. These assessments indicated a strong adherence to the research design. Specifically, the research design called for a total of 2 hours of saturation patrol (in 15-minute increments) each day. Analysis of all hot spot patrols revealed that approximately 1.5 hours of additional patrol was observed each day for 90% of all hot spots. A total of 2 hours of additional patrol as observed for 55% of all hot spots. These findings demonstrate that the LVMPD carried out the hot spots strategy as designed.

Alexandria, VA: International Association of Chiefs of Police, 2019. 43p.

By Robin S. Engel, Nicholas Corsaro and Tamara D. Herold

One of the most frequently used communication mechanisms associated with focused deterrence strategies are offender notification meetings, also referred to as “call-in” sessions. Typically, these meetings are used to communicate directly to offenders that their future violent behaviors (and those of their affiliated groups/gangs) will be responded to in a swift and predictable manner through a coordinated law enforcement effort to prioritize group violence, share information, and develop comprehensive group-focused responses (Engel, Tillyer & Corsaro, 2013). The purpose of sharing this information is to gain compliance through group pressure (Kennedy, 1997). The group/gang structure is believed to serve both as a communication vehicle, and a potential source of control, as the threat of group-focused enforcement encourages groups to police themselves (Tillyer & Kennedy, 2008). Additional messages regarding the availability of assistance, social services, and job opportunities are often conveyed. Finally, most meetings include some form of community messaging that describes the harm inflicted by violence to individual victims and the larger community, along with a plea to change their behavior. This type of “community moral voice” is designed to send clear messages of non-violence, and rejecting norms that promote violence (Brunson, 2015). Offender notification sessions are designed to alert offenders and alter their decision-making by conveying possible sanctions while offering available services, contingent upon the path that the offender (typically on probation and/or parole) chooses, be it desistence or continued high-risk behavior. Initiatives built on call in sessions ultimately seek to change offender behavior by blending law enforcement, community mobilization, and social service provisions in a targeted and directed fashion. While initiatives such as focused deterrence strategies, which rely heavily on offender notification sessions, have often corresponded with reductions in citywide gun violence and gang homicides, the direct influence of call in sessions on individual-level behavior (for those called-in) is far less understood. The following study examines the impact of offender notification meetings – with messaging heavily focused on compassion, support, and the harm inflicted by violence – on the likelihood of offender recidivism in Las Vegas, Nevada. Officials from the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department (LVMPD) and the Nevada Department of Public Safety, Division of Parole and Probation (NPP) worked collaboratively to conduct a series of offender notification meetings. Other components that typically accompany the implementation of focused deterrence strategies (e.g. targeted gang enforcement and social services provision) however, were not systematically implemented. Therefore, the following research represents a test solely of the impact of the offender notification meetings, answering the question of whether this form of communication with offenders has an impact on their individual likelihood of recidivism. In order to better understand the influence of call in sessions on offender recidivism patterns, officials from LVMPD partnered with researchers from the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) / University of Cincinnati (UC) Center for Police Research and Policy, along with academic partners from the University of Nevada Las Vegas (UNLV) to randomize and implement an experimental trial to assess the impact of call in sessions on probationers and parolees in Las Vegas in the Spring and Fall of 2018. Using a randomized controlled trial (RCT) research design, this study addresses the following specific research questions:

1) What impact does attendance of probationers/parolees at offender notification meetings have on individual likelihood of recidivism? 2) Can a simple risk classification be developed using offender criminal histories and associations with violent gangs to assess whether risk classification correlates with offender recidivism patterns? 3) Does the impact of offender notification meetings vary based on probationer/parolees’ risk classification? Within the randomization component, probationers/parolees were first stratified into one of four possible categories dependent upon their prior violent criminal histories and current affiliation with a violent criminal gang in Las Vegas: 1) Low-Risk (neither a violent criminal history nor affiliated with a violent gang), 2) Low/Moderate-Risk (no prior violent criminal history but affiliation with a violent gang), 3) Moderate-Risk (prior violent criminal history but no affiliation with a violent gang), and 4) High-Risk (both violent criminal history and affiliation with a violent gang). A random case-control selection occurred within each risk-level stratum, and various waves of probationers and parolees who were assigned to treatment were called-in to attend notification sessions in May 2018 and October 2018. In total, 216 probationer/parolees were randomly assigned to treatment, and 300 to control groups. Probationer/parolee recidivism is the primary outcome of interest, operationalized in two forms: 1) a re-arrest of any type, and 2) an administrative failure (revocation) of probation/parole supervised by NPP. If either event occurred in the follow-up period (i.e., 12 months for May sessions, 9 months for October sessions) – the probationer/parolee (in either treatment or control condition) is classified as having recidivated. Three analytic strategies are employed for the various strata (as well as overall treatment-tocontrol comparisons) and waves of probation/parolee participants. First, a set of bivariate chisquare analyses on recidivism patterns for each risk group to set the foundation regarding covariation in treatment assignment (and attendance) calibrated with recidivism across the risk groups and waves of participants during the study period. Second, a series of binary logistic regression models for our recidivism outcome (where yes = 1 or no = 0) for each risk group (including culling all strata into a single analysis) and each wave of probationers and parolees in the study are estimated (see Long, 1997). The use of the multivariate regression model on our dichotomous outcome of interest allows, where appropriate, to include control variables in the analyses. While the use of statistical controls in randomized controlled trials is subject to debate, where statistical controls are potentially necessary (e.g., unbalanced covariates of importance between treatment and control probationers/parolees within each strata), the multivariate regression framework (including the logistic regression model) allows for such controls to be included into a single regression estimation. Finally, a series of Cox proportional hazard models are estimated to assess the effect that randomized treatment had on individual recidivism (see Cox, 1972).

Alexandria, VA: International Association of Chiefs of Police, 2020. 49p.

By Jian Wang

The thesis focuses on participants involved in the January 6 insurrection. The major aims of this thesis are to find out who stormed the Capitol on January 6, 2021, and to learn what major factors influenced them to engage in the insurrection that broke the tradition of peaceful transition of power for the first time since Lincoln’s Presidential election. It is also to study the current intertwined relationships between political elites, social media, technology, disinformation and mass audiences, and how they gathered together and organized the 'stop the steal' campaign, causing the violence on the Capitol on January 6, 2021. By studying this, we can learn how to prepare to face other looming and ongoing challenges that disinformation poses to democracy in the near future such as the mid-term election this November and the next Presidential Election in 2024, creating viable solutions. The thesis selected 124 subjects out of 691 on the Capitol Breach Cases' list across all regions of the U.S. It organized their data, including their names, and primary demographics such as gender, race, the geography of residence, and age, and reviewed and examined their attitudes towards the insurrection on January 6, 2021 in response to a belief that the 2020 election was fraudulent. The findings show that majority of participants are white male. 91.13% or 630 (0.9113 x 691 = 630) of whom are employed and 30% of or 207 (0.3 x 691) participants who are university or college educated. A number of defendants had associations with QAnon conspiracy theory and some known DVE (domestic violent extremist) groups such as Proud Boys, the Oath Keepers, and Three Percenters. The most striking finding is that veterans were highly over-represented in the mob (17% or 117), which exceeds the percentage of veterans in the U.S. population as a whole. The thesis suggests that four possible motivations for their participation: extremism in the military, nationalism and patriotism, a belief in Donald Trump's false claims, and social media. It also reveals that there is a strong positive connection between disinformation on social media and participants as they (96% of or 663 participants) were nearly all active on social media platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, Parler and Instagram, sharing and receiving misinformation about the election. More specifically, social media platforms should bear responsibility because social media technology employs popularity-based algorithms that tailor content to maximize user engagement, increasing the level of polarization, partisan animosity and political sectarianism

Cambridge, MA: Master's thesis, Harvard University Division of Continuing Education., 2022. 131p.

By Eric B. Hodges

Ten percent of the Americans arrested for storming the US Capitol on January 6, 2021, are military veterans. These veterans have been charged with federal crimes ranging from Obstruction of an Official Proceeding to Assaulting Capitol Police Officers. This paper seeks to answer three questions related to those veterans’ participation in the Capitol Riots. Were their actions patriotic? What were their motivations? And was there anything about their military experience that made these veterans more likely to riot than non-veterans? A content analysis of 71 remarks made by 40 of the veterans arrested, both before and after the riots, was used to ascertain the motivations of those individuals. Analysis of the veterans’ comments revealed that they believed they were acting patriotically; however, closer examination shows that their motivations were more consistent with nationalism than patriotism. Additionally, the military training and combat exposure of the veterans, along with the “Stop the Steal” rhetoric, particularly comments made by former President Donald Trump, also played an integral role in influencing the veterans. The analysis also indicated that the Capitol Riots should be classified as a form of proto-sectarian violence and should serve as a cautionary tale against the growing divisiveness that sparked this incident.

Journal of Veteran Studies, 2021.

By Daniel Milton and Andrew Mines

The issue of extremism in the military community has posed challenges for a long time. From the role of combat veterans in driving the rise of the militia movement after Vietnam and beyond, the U.S. military has contended with all manner of extremist movements and ideologies. Historically, extremist activities manifested in a number of ways, including attacks andor hate crimes against fellow service members and civilians, theft of military equipment, security breaches, and broader harm to morale, unit cohesion, personnel retention, recruiting efforts, and mission success. Although the vast majority of U.S. Department of Defense DoD personnel 5and veterans uphold our nations highest values during and well after their service, the worlds largest employer has struggled at times to confront a problem that affects all corners of American society. In the past decade, various organizations have raised serious red flags to both the DoD and Congressional oversight bodies regarding this looming threat. More recent reporting has pointed to growing evidence of white supremacy and racist ideologies in the military these last few years. Additionally, the siege on the U.S. Capitol and the surrounding focus on the involvement of individuals with military experience has highlighted the pressing need to take meaningful steps to understand and confront the problem at hand. To be clear, the Capitol Hill siege does not provide an all-encompassing view of modern day extremism in the military. However, an examination of the individuals charged in connection with that event can offer some perspective as to the diversity and scale of the connection between extremism and those with military experience.

Washington DC: Program on Extremism, George Washington University, West Point, NY: Combating Terrorism Center, West Point, New York: 2021. 44p.

By Piotr Bąkowski

n recent years, the United States (US) has witnessed a growing number of terrorist attacks by domestic violent extremists. Many incidents at large-scale demonstrations across the country have increased the visibility of the problem and provoked strong reactions among civilians, law enforcement and policy-makers alike. When on 6 January 2021 a crowd of supporters of the then US President, Donald Trump, broke into the US Capitol while Congress was certifying the results of the 2020 presidential election, the issue of domestic violent extremism was thrust beyond US borders and into the international spotlight. Various US government agencies have consistently assessed domestic violent extremism as a significant threat. Although for counter-terrorism purposes extremists fall under a number of categories of a general nature, the threat they pose has become more decentralised and diverse over time. That said, racially and ethnically motivated violent extremists have been responsible for the most lethal acts of violence. After 11 September 2001, the focus of US counter-terrorism efforts shifted to international from domestic terrorism. US law does define domestic terrorism but does not qualify it as a criminal offence entailing indictment. Domestic extremist groups cannot be designated as terrorist organisations, and getting clearance to conduct investigations against them is more complicated than for their foreign counterparts. The assault on the Capitol led to a significant shift in counter-terrorism priorities, however, triggering the largest-scale investigation in US law enforcement history thus far, but also a comprehensive overhaul of government policies. Consequently, 2021 saw the adoption of the first national strategy specifically dedicated to domestic terrorism. The mutual commitment of the US and the European Union (EU) to combating violent extremism has resulted in fruitful exchanges among policy-makers, researchers and frontline practitioners. Nonetheless, efforts to establish a unified regulatory framework for addressing online extremist content have faced challenges due to differing perspectives on key issues such as the limits of free speech and government intervention.

Brussels, Belgium: EPRS | European Parliamentary Research Service, 2023. 12p.