Private Military Companies and Arms Control Challenges: The Wagner Group in Mali

The UN and the African Union (AU) have repeatedly warned about the growing use of mercenaries and private military companies (PMCs) in conflict situations. Concerns include the involvement of mercenary groups in transnational organized crime and human rights violations, and the ‘re-routing’ of weapons intended for a state’s military to mercenary groups and PMCs. This re-routing of weapons undermines international and domestic arms control regimes, which are intended to ensure that arms are not used to undermine peace and security, or breach human rights. Since 2021, Mali’s security and political landscape has transformed. After coming to power, the military junta invited the Wagner Group into the country, cut ties with Mali’s former security partners, requested the departure of international forces (from France and the UN peacekeeping mission) and (in 2024) left the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). In this new landscape, the Wagner Group emerged as the junta’s new ally and was soon actively involved in combat operations against insurgents. The Wagner Group’s tenure in Mali, as widely documented by UN bodies, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and the media, was characterized by serious human rights abuses and war crimes, including massacres, torture and rapes of civilians, and criminal activity, from looting communities to illicit taxation of gold mining sites. For observers of the conflict, such atrocities were not unexpected, as Wagner troops were operating alongside the Malian Armed Forces (Forces Armées Maliennes, FAMa), which have been accused of human rights violations and mismanagement of weapons. However, with the deployment of Wagner troops, violence against civilians increased drastically, beyond the norms set previously by FAMa – civilian casualties per incident doubled between 2021 and 2024. The Wagner Group did not arrive in Mali fully equipped, and troops were expected to source weapons locally, which they did through seizing arms during combat and stealing official stock. This was one of the reasons for communications between Wagner and FAMa troops breaking down. From 2023, joint Wagner/FAMa missions declined, meaning that the Wagner troops operated independently using FAMa-owned equipment. Drawing from an extensive review of open-source material related to Wagner Group operations in Mali and interviews with military sources in Mali and other experts, this paper identifies instances of weapons and equipment intended for use by FAMa being re-routed to Wagner, enabling war crimes and human rights violations. They include FAMa armoured vehicles, vehicle-mounted heavy machine guns (widely known as ‘technicals’) and possibly attack drones – all of which are covered under the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT). Some instances of re-routing weapons from FAMa to the Wagner Group appear to be in breach of commitments under the ATT, which has been signed by Mali, as well as some of the domestic arms control commitments of several weapons-supplying countries. The Wagner Group’s operations in Mali came to an end in June 2025, and the group has been replaced with the Africa Corps, which is more closely controlled by the Russian state but continues to employ a majority of former-Wagner personnel. Therefore, the Wagner Group may have left Mali in name but has not left in practice. Furthermore, Wagner’s operations in Mali are just one example of re-routing state-to-state transfers of weapons to private military actors, which undermines the international legal frameworks that regulate the arms trade. The international community will need to deal with the phenomenon of the growing use of mercenaries and PMCs in global conflicts and their impact on arms control regimes. The paper makes recommendations for improving governance of the sector, which are summarized below: ■ Arms-exporting countries should undertake additional due diligence when considering an export to any country that has engaged with, hired or collaborated with a PMC. ■ Arms manufacturers should also undertake additional due diligence when looking to supply countries that have engaged with PMCs. ■ International forums on arms control and counter-proliferation should address the emerging role of PMCs in global conflicts, and the impact on arms control mechanisms and on reshaping illicit arms markets. ■ The AU should revise the 1977 Convention for the Elimination of Mercenaries in Africa to include better provisions for monitoring human rights abuses by mercenaries, including those that are backed by a third-party state. ■ International peacekeeping forces should continue to ensure that any equipment left following drawdown is withdrawn or destroyed in line with UN guidelines. After providing a background on the Wagner Group’s tenure in Mali, this paper documents evidence of weapons and equipment intended for use by FAMa being re-routed to Wagner Group operations, enabling war crimes and human rights violations. It then examines the legal implications for exporting countries, arms suppliers and Mali of arms transferred to FAMa being re-routed to Wagner. In so doing, the paper provides a case study that highlights the need for global arms control regimes to grapple with the growing reality of rogue PMCs being embedded within national militaries and the hybridization of PMCs in conflict and organized criminal activity. As the UN Working Group (UNWG) 2024 report indicates, this is a broader issue than just the Wagner Group and their recent tenure in Mali.

Geneva: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime. 2025. 36p.