Summary

In this handbook, researchers from Morgan State University and the Surveillance Technology Oversight Project (S.T.O.P.) expose how New York City has become a pervasive surveillance state that tracks residents' every movement through public and private spaces without consent. Rather than enhancing public safety, this vast network of surveillance technologies threatens civil liberties, reinforces racial inequities, and undermines democratic freedoms while operating with minimal oversight or transparency.

Key Findings Include:

• Pervasive surveillance without consent: New Yorkers are tracked from the moment they leave their homes through an extensive network of CCTV cameras, license plate readers, facial recognition systems, ShotSpotter gunshot detectors, and data collection from transit cards, bike shares, and WiFi kiosks; most without their knowledge or consent.

• Systematic racial bias and overpolicing: Surveillance technologies are disproportionately deployed in communities of color, creating feedback loops that perpetuate overpolicing.

• Vulnerable populations face heightened risks: Justice-involved individuals, undocumented immigrants, public housing residents, and those seeking reproductive or gender-affirming care face amplified surveillance threats that can result in re-incarceration, deportation, eviction, or prosecution for accessing legal healthcare.

• Inaccurate and unaccountable technologies: ShotSpotter alerts result in evidence of actual gunshots only 20% of the time in NYC, yet the city renewed its $21.8 million contract. The NYPD has used facial recognition in 22,000 cases between 2017-2021 despite documented accuracy problems and racial bias.

• Weak oversight and transparency: New York's POST Act provides limited oversight only over NYPD surveillance, with no enforcement power. Unlike other jurisdictions with comprehensive surveillance ordinances, New York lacks meaningful public input, independent oversight, or restrictions on surveillance technology procurement and use.

• Threats to democracy and civil liberties: Surveillance of activists and protesters chills free speech and assembly. The technology enables tracking of individuals seeking abortion care, attending religious services, or engaging in political activities; fundamentally threatening democratic participation.

• Public-private surveillance partnerships: Companies like Amazon (Ring), Cubic (OMNY), and others collect vast amounts of personal data that can be accessed by law enforcement, extending police surveillance capacity through private networks while avoiding public accountability.

In the handbook, we call for comprehensive surveillance oversight ordinances, community engagement in technology decisions, and a fundamental shift toward privacy-protective data collection practices that prioritize civil liberties over mass surveillance.

By Miloš Resimić

Omar al-Bashir’s thirty-year rule transformed Sudan into a kleptocratic state where public resources were systematically diverted to regime cronies, family members and armed actors. A transitional civilian-military government was formed after his ousting in 2019 but was disrupted by a military coup in 2021. The failure to agree on a new governance structure led to the outbreak of civil war in April 2023. Military and paramilitary actors now dominate key sectors of the economy through vast networks of affiliated companies with preferential access to public funds and resources. Agriculture, the energy sector and the environment are vulnerable to corruption, marked by land grabbing, secretive investment deals, diversion of state funds and institutional capture that enables environmental degradation.

Bergen: U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre, Chr. Michelsen Institute. , U4 Help Desk,2025. 35p.

By Caitlin Maslen

“Nature-based” solutions to climate change require the acquisition of large swaths of land for reforestation, afforestation, conservation and renewable energy sources. However, corruption in the land sector is already widespread and this additional demand for land may aggravate pre-existing corruption risks, as well as causing new ones. National governments and project implementers of land-based solutions should therefore implement anti-corruption measures in projects and, most importantly, ensure that they take into account the communities (such as Indigenous Peoples) who may already live on the land.

Bergen: U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre, Chr. Michelsen Institute. , U4 Help Desk,, 2023. 24p.

By Caitlin Maslen

Wetlands are vital ecosystems that play a crucial role in carbon sequestration while supporting the livelihoods of communities worldwide. However, they face growing threats from extractive industries, urban expansion, illegal logging and other destructive activities. Protecting these ecosystems requires countering corruption through transparency and accountability measures. In doing so, this can help wetlands continue to sustain local communities and wildlife, and contribute to nature-based solutions for curbing climate change.

Bergen: U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre, Chr. Michelsen Institute. , U4 Help Desk,2025. 31p.

By Maria Leonor Rodriguez Prat

In Cuba, the economic crisis and resource scarcity contribute to petty corruption, while opaque institutions and military control over key economic sectors enable forms of grand corruption. Cuba’s partial financial isolation both limits and obscures illicit inflows, but select recent cases indicate a growing vulnerability to transnational money laundering. While formal anti-corruption frameworks exist in Cuba, enforcement remains highly selective and politicised, particularly in cases involving state and military elites.

Bergen: U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre, Chr. Michelsen Institute. , U4 Help Desk,2025, 29p.

By Nieves Zúñiga, Jamie Bergin

The Western Balkans is a transit region for smuggling of migrants, trafficking in persons and illicit trade. These illicit activities often perpetrated by organised criminal groups lead to heightened risks of corruption among border officers and customs officials. Dedicated policy responses to border corruption are generally underdeveloped, but there are some emerging positive developments at the national level as well as increasing regional cooperation efforts.

Bergen: U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre, Chr. Michelsen Institute. , U4 Help Desk, 2025. 33p

By Jamie Bergin

Despite challenges in defining and measuring illicit financial flows (IFFs), academic and policy circles have increasingly recognised their negative effects on development, including by reducing domestic resource mobilisation and distorting markets, but also by facilitating predicate crimes that wreak wider harms. Evidence indicates that IFFs similarly undermine recent levels of economic growth and security in the region of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). 

Bergen: U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre, Chr. Michelsen Institute. , U4 Help Desk,2025. 58p

By Thomas Young

Financial fraud is on the rise nationally. Across all 50 states and D.C., the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) Internet Crime report tracked 859,532 fraud claims in 2024. These claims resulted in $16.6 billion in financial loss, up 33% from 2023. A separate source, the Federal Trade Commission’s (FTC) Consumer Sentinel Network, reported 2.6 million fraud cases in 2024, of which 38% involved losing money. According to this source, citizens reported losing $12 billion to fraud, up $2 billion from 2023. This study seeks to answer the pressing question: What is the extent of financial fraud in Colorado and its impact on the lives of everyday Coloradans and the overall health of the state’s economy?

According to the Colorado Department of Public Safety, reported fraud cases summed to 75,119 from 2022 through 2024. Financial fraud is also costly, with the FTC reporting the total financial loss of financial fraud at $211 million statewide in 2024, up 314% since 2020. The FBI reported $244 million in losses from online (formally referred to as cyber-enabled) crime in Colorado, up 142% since 2020. These are just the reported figures. Unreported loss from financial fraud is higher.

The FBI reports that among all states Colorado ranks 34th best in total losses from online crime; 44th best in online crime per 100,000 citizens; 33rd best for complaints filed by individuals 60+; and 34th best for cryptocurrency losses by state. The FTC Consumer Sentinel Network figures on fraud, identity theft, and telemarketing suggests Colorado is doing slightly better than the FBI’s statistics. Colorado has the 32nd lowest rate of fraud and the 24th lowest rate of identity theft by their metrics.

In Colorado and across the nation, fraudulent financial activity is becoming increasingly sophisticated, encompassing a broad array of schemes such as identity theft, phishing, wire fraud, investment scams, and elder financial abuse. As the digital economy expands and cybercriminal tactics evolve, Coloradans face heightened risks from fraud schemes that attempt to exploit personal vulnerabilities, holes in financial systems, social media platforms, payment technologies, and personal data security. Fraudulent activities result not only in direct financial losses for individuals, businesses, and financial institutions, but they also have ripple effects throughout the state’s economy—affecting prices, consumer behavior, public safety expenditures, and overall economic productivity. 

This report presents evidence of the economic consequences of financial fraud, covering both the direct and indirect costs of fraudulent activity by examining incident data, economic modeling, and a fraud case study. By analyzing trends in fraud—including the types, methods, and demographic factors associated with its presence—it aims to provide policymakers, businesses, and consumers with actionable insights into the economic stakes of financial fraud.

Key Findings

• For the state of Colorado, CSI estimates in 2025 the losses from financial fraud include—

•  An estimated $375 million in direct, reported losses

• An estimated $2.5 billion in unreported losses

• The state’s General Fund will lose an estimated $88 million in tax revenue this year due to financial fraud.

• CSI estimates reported fraud alone will have the following impact on Colorado’s economy in 2025:

  • A $954 million reduction in state GDP

  • A $932 million reduction in statewide personal income

  • A loss of approximately 6,628 jobs

• Estimates on the reporting of financial fraud suggest formal reporting of financial fraud may be quite low, with one estimate putting the figure at 14%. This means that most financial fraud does not get reported to government authorities.

• CSI estimates all financial fraud, reported and unreported, will have the following impact on Colorado’s economy in 2025:

• A $5.1 billion reduction in state GDP ($856 per person)

• A $3.9 billion reduction in statewide personal income ($655 per person)

• A loss of approximately 16,374 jobs (0.5% of nonfarm jobs)

• Financial fraud has wide-ranging economic implications. The impact is felt across consumer spending, interest rates, available loanable funds, capital investment, government spending and taxing, profit, and community trust.

• Colorado’s incidence of financial fraud is around the middle of the states at 18th highest, at 1,260 reported incidents per 100,000 residents, lower than 17th ranked California at 1,291 and 19th ranked Mississippi at 1,221. The states with the highest incidence of financial fraud are Florida and Georgia with rates that are 72% and 67% higher than Colorado’s. 

Greenwood Village,  CO: Common Sense Institute 2025. 24p.

By Women's Aid Child First

Nineteen More Child Homicides is the third report published by Women’s Aid in the past three decades as part of Women’s Aid Child First campaign. This report tells the stories of children who have been killed by a parent who is a perpetrator of domestic abuse through child contact (formally or informally arranged). Nearly a decade on from the publication of Nineteen Child Homicides, this report documents a further 19 children’s lives that have been lost as a result of unsafe contact arrangements. These findings illustrate the need for a culture shift at all levels to domestic abuse from professionals involved in child contact arrangements, whether informal and formal. 

Bristol:  Women’s Aid, June 2025   62p.

By Kerry L. Papps 

The effects on criminal behaviour of raising the minimum wage for those aged 25 and over in the United Kingdom are analysed, using data on police stop and search activities. A 1% increase in the minimum wage raises the fraction of people stopped by the police by 2.96%, the fraction of people caught with an incriminating item by 1.43%, and the fraction of people arrested as a consequence by 1.27%. This effect is almost entirely driven by drug searches made outside business hours, suggesting that the minimum wage raises crime principally by raising disposable income – and drug consumption – among workers. 

IZA DP No. 17989  Bonn: IZA – Institute of Labor Economics, 2025. 27p.

By Ian Tennant, Simone Haysom, Tiphaine Chapeau

In October 2024, Brazil, France, and Peru tabled a resolution at the 12th session of the Conference of the Parties (COP) to the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC) for a new intergovernmental process to take stock of how the convention addresses crimes that affect the environment. In addition, the resolution called for possible gaps to be identified in the current international legal framework to prevent and combat these crimes, and to discuss whether any additional protocol should be developed. The work of the new intergovernmental expert group (IEG) will therefore become a key focus of multilateral discussions on environmental crimes in the future. The first meeting of this group will take place in Vienna from 30 June to 2 July 2025, and may be followed by a second meeting in early 2026, ahead of the 15th UN Congress on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice in the United Arab Emirates in April. The group will be expected to report on its work at the 13th UNTOC COP in October 2026. This new process is the culmination of a long-brewing movement towards addressing environmental crimes beyond what can be controlled through CITES. For example, it builds on progress made at France’s initiative to push forward resolutions on environmental crime that are within the scope of existing UN instruments. In 2022, Resolution 31/1 of the UN Commission of Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice (CCPCJ) called for views on a potential new protocol on wildlife trafficking to be collected, following a campaign led by the Global Initiative to End Wildlife Crime consortium, which had high-profile government support from countries such as Angola, Kenya, Peru and Gabon, but for which consensus could not be reached as part of UN General Assembly Resolution 75/311 on wildlife trafficking. The UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) has published several analyses of what it calls the ‘patchwork’ of existing legislation, and documented member states’ views on the topic through questionnaires coming out of the latest CCPCJ and UNTOC resolutions. Calls for discussions on updating the international legal framework on environmental crimes, including potentially a new protocol, date back even further. For example, a joint paper by the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime (GI-TOC) and the World Wildlife Fund was launched at the 13th UN Crime Congress in Doha in 2015, and the UN system itself has adopted calls for further action since 2014, primarily with regard to the illegal wildlife trade. Environmental criminal markets have changed considerably since, increasing the need for the urgent updating of the existing multilateral response. Crimes that affect the environment are deeply globalized and require diverse action across value chains, including in transit countries, to be successfully combatted. Moreover, incentives for actions and consequences for inaction are grossly skewed across the globe, and preventive and remedial measures, convictions and recovery of proceeds from these crimes often lag behind. Despite some progress – notably on trafficking in wildlife, and especially in some iconic species – it has not been enough. It has never been clearer that more internationally coordinated action and globally funded and resourced responses are needed.

Geneva: ECO-SOLVE Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2024. 30p.

By Tim Dekkers

As migration is increasingly seen as a matter of security, migration control and crime control seem to be merging, a process also referred to as crimmigration. To distinguish between migrants that are wanted and those who are not, new technologies are introduced regularly and existing technologies are increasingly interconnected. This could lead to what is called function creep: technology developed for a specific purpose over time being used for other purposes as well. This article aims to explore the relation between crimmigration and function creep by examining a case study of a smart camera system called Amigo-boras used by the Royal Netherlands Marechaussee. While originally designed to assist in enforcing migration law, recent developments allow the RNM to use Amigo-boras for crime control purposes as well. This article will uncover what the rationales behind this function creep in the use of the Amigo-Boras system are/were – both from a street-level and policy-level perspective – and how these relate to crimmigration. The data shows that concerns of cross-border crime are an important reason to use Amigo-boras for more than just migration control. As a result, a significant element of crime control is introduced in Dutch migration control, pushing the crimmigration process further.

Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, Volume 46, 2020 - Issue 9

By Christopher Inkpen, Jonathan Holt, John Bollenbacher, Heather Deforge, Lilly Yu, Pranav Athimuthu, Nicole Jasperson, Renata Zablocka, Nick Kruskamp

This report, funded by the National Institute of Justice (award #: 2020-R2-CX-0027) and prepared by RTI International, describes the results of a National Institute of Justice-funded research study that uses advanced analytical methods and novel datasets to explore the complex relationship between immigration, crime, and crime reporting at the neighborhood level. The study, which employs crime and crime reporting data from ten jurisdictions across the United States paired with a synthetic population that estimates the unauthorized immigrant population, aims to provide an in-depth analysis at the Census tract level. Analyses focus on unauthorized immigration and its correlation with drug, property, and violent crime rates, while accounting for crime reporting in traditional and emerging immigrant destinations along with sites with low foreign populations. BackgroundL  Despite persistent political discourse linking immigration and increases in crime, most academic research contradicts this notion, showing either a negative or null relationship between immigration and crime. At the individual level, first-generation immigrants tend to have lower arrest rates than native-born citizens. Yet this trend diminishes with subsequent generations, as the children of first-generation immigrants (i.e., second generation immigrants) are often arrested at similar rates to children of native-born citizens. However, few studies assess the relationship between documentation status and offending. Macro-level analyses that focus on crime and immigration in specific areas reveal that areas with higher immigrant populations often experience lower crime rates or that the prevalence of immigrants in an area is not associated with an increase in arrests. Yet these studies frequently omit distinctions in documentation status, as these data are often unavailable. Further, many macro-level analyses are conducted at the county, state, or city level, which may obscure relationships observed at local levels. This study also attempts to control for the nuances of crime reporting among immigrant populations. Immigrant neighborhoods, especially those in emerging destinations, show lower rates of crime reporting. Trust in the police and fear of deportation are potentially significant factors influencing the likelihood of underreporting crimes. highlighting the importance of community-police relations. Strong police-community relations are crucial for public safety as they foster trust and cooperation, leading to more accurate crime reporting, effective law enforcement, and safer spaces. Methodology and Data Sources This study uses a variety of data sources to analyze the relationship between the presence of unauthorized immigrants in a Census tract and corresponding crime rates. Synthetic Population Development Traditional methods for estimating the unauthorized immigrant population in the United States rely on either demographic accounting or model-based survey imputation techniques. Defined simply, demographic accounting involves subtracting the estimated number of legally present immigrants from the total foreign-born population recorded in U.S. Census Bureau surveys. These techniques may also employ logical edits to large survey datasets that use characteristics like age, education, and place of birth to infer unauthorized status. Model-based survey imputation techniques combine data from different survey datasets to estimate unauthorized status in nationally representative surveys, using statistical techniques to merge information from surveys with immigration queries and those with extensive geographic detail. This study builds on the work of model-based imputation methods by developing models that predict unauthorized status in a survey dataset and applying them to a synthetic population of the United States, based on U.S. Census Bureau survey datasets. This approach allows for granular estimates of unauthorized immigrant populations at the Census tract level. By combining data from the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) and the American Community Survey (ACS), the study developed a robust model to predict unauthorized status and produced Census tract-level estimates of the unauthorized immigrant population for 2019. Validation efforts for these estimates included comparisons with county- and state-level estimates from sources like the Migration Policy Institute and Pew Research Center along with scaling local estimates to meet state-level figures 

Research Triangle Park, NC: RTI International, 2024. 53p.

By Mia-Maria Magnusson

The well-being of neighbourhoods in terms of socioeconomic conditions constitutes an important element in analyses focused on the explanation of crime trends and public safety. Recent developments in Sweden concerning gun violence and open drug scenes are worrying and the police are under a great deal of pressure to resolve the situation in many neighbourhoods, which is in turn affecting Swedish society as a whole. This study focuses on micro areas in terms of sociodemographic factors and the presence of drug markets and gun violence. The aim is to explore the relationship between these factors and what characterises areas that are experiencing the greatest difficulties. The study develops an index for the prediction of gun violence in micro areas, in this study portrayed by vector grids. The findings show an overlap between gun violence and drug markets and that micro areas in that overlap share harsh sociodemographic conditions. The study produces an index indicating the probability that a grid cell would experience gun violence. The index was then validated using recent gun incidents, and was found to have high accuracy. The resulting grids constitute a suitable target for resource allocation by police and other actors. This could facilitate a more accurate and precise focus for measures to prevent areas from becoming—or to disrupt already existing—hot spots for gun violence.

Eur J Crim Policy Res 31, 151–172 (2025)

By Chiara Redaelli, and Carlos Arévalo 

 This article aims to clarify how international humanitarian law (IHL) rules on targeting apply when drug cartels are party to a non-international armed conflict. The question of distinguishing between a cartel’s armed forces and the rest of the cartel members is a pertinent matter. It is crucial to avoid considering every drug dealer a legitimate target, just as we do not consider that everyone working for the government is a legitimate target. Nevertheless, it is unclear at what point a member of a cartel would change from being a criminal to being a member of the armed wing of the cartel, hence becoming a legitimate target. The present article will suggest a teleological approach to solving this conundrum. 

International Review of the Red Cross (2023), 105 (923), 652–673. 

By Martina Baradel & Niles Breuer

This paper addresses a significant gap in drug market literature by examining high-level drug trafficking networks in Japan. We focus on three aspects: the structure of drug importation networks, the impact of transport methods on these structures, and the role of Japan’s mafia, the yakuza. Using novel statistical techniques that extend exponential random graph models (ERGMs) to multi-network samples, we analyse 573 Japanese trial documents on wholesale drug importation. We test the theory that trafficking operations with higher information-processing demands exhibit more efficiency-oriented network structures, while governance-type groups avoid expanding into trade activities. Our findings support these theories, showing that networks with higher information-processing demands are more efficiency-oriented but maintain security. Conversely, smaller networks with simpler transport methods prioritise security and concealment. Additionally, the yakuza do not organisationally engage in drug trafficking; when involved, yakuza members act as independent entrepreneurs.

Global Crime Volume 25, 2024 - Issue 3-4

By Thomas Joyce

While existing research has readily applied perspectives garnered from open and closed market dealing to conceptualise darknet drug vending, this has been done without clear empirical consideration of the applicability of traditional market dealing to darknet drug vending. This research addresses this gap by considering these three forms of drug dealing in light of key typological features: motivation, environment, methods, business model, and offender profile. These features are then applied to 80 arrest cases of high-level darknet vendors to determine their applicability in understanding vendor behaviour. The results show that high-level darknet drug vendors reflect the characteristics of their highly anonymised, libertarian market, distinguishing them from traditional drug sellers.

Trends Organ Crim (2025)

By Manuel Sánchez-Pérez, María Belén Marín-Carrillo, María Dolores Illescas-Manzano & Zohair Souilim 

Despite the social, health, law enforcement, and economic importance of illegal drug supply, the lack of information and understanding regarding these supply chains stands out. This paper carries out a disaggregated analysis of the structure of the hashish supply chain from Morocco to Europe to explain the value contributions at each level, the end-price formation, and the supply chain management practices. The methodology adopted is based on a mixed method of data collection where the primary data are gathered from field interviews with cannabis producers and dealers and secondary information is obtained from official statistics, research papers, informational reports, and documentaries. We review supply and value chain frameworks through the lens of cost–benefit analysis. Our main findings show an unequal contribution on the part of the different levels of distribution, with end-user prices increasing by 7000% of the cost of production during the supply chain. The chain also has high variable costs but limited fixed ones, exacerbating the lack of stability and fostering continuous adaptation. We also detect a reluctance to raise end-user prices but a great propensity to change quality. This research may have implications for several stakeholders. In the case of dealers, we find that they have created a supply-push system thanks to their dominant power, leaning on information sharing as a source of resilience. In the case of law enforcement, we delve into the operational functioning of the drug chain and the reasons for its survival. For financial investigation operations, unknown or unrealized economic parameters are quantified. For development agencies, the need to implement alternative development programs for producers is evidenced. Finally, for health authorities, we highlight the consequences of seizures and prohibitions of hashish trafficking on the deterioration of the quality of hashish and the subsequently added health hazards for end-users.

Humanit Soc Sci Commun 10, 276 (2023)

By Plan International

The result of collaboration between Plan International and CNN As Equals to hear directly from young women and girls about the harms they face online, how they protect themselves and how tech companies, governments, local communities and their own families should play their part in keeping them safe.1 The intention was to give young women and girls an opportunity to not only talk about their digital lives but also share what they believe is needed for a safer digital future. The research built upon the insights gained from previous Plan International and CNN As Equals work in this area. This includes Plan’s ‘The Truth Gap’ in 2021 which explored misinformation online and ‘Free to be Online' in 2020 which investigated the online harassment girls have faced, as well as the CNN As Equals series ‘Systems Error’.   

Surrey, UK: Plan International 2024. 46p.p.

By Anthony Morgan and Alexandra Voce

Espionage has become one of the most significant national security threats to Australia, impacting government, businesses and the university sector. The highly secretive nature of espionage makes it extremely difficult to measure. In this study we estimated, for the first time, the actual and prevented costs of espionage. Building on the Australian Institute of Criminology’s method for measuring the costs of serious and organised crime, we estimated the mitigation and response costs and the direct costs of espionage impacting Australia. We also estimated the preventable costs associated with a number of possible scenarios. The numbers are conservative and an underestimate of the true cost, given the challenges in identifying and measuring espionage activity and its consequences.

In 2023–24, espionage cost Australia at least $12.5 billion. This includes the direct costs of the consequences of known or probable espionage activity – primarily losses due to state or state-sponsored cyber attacks, insider threats and intellectual property theft – as well as the public and private sector response, remediation and mitigation costs. There are also tens of billions in additional costs that Australia may have prevented by countering potential espionage. For example, in just one week, a single incident of espionage-enabled sabotage from a large-scale cyber attack could cost the Australian economy nearly $6 billion. These prevented costs are significant, and highlight the importance and benefit of investing in efforts to reduce the threat of espionage and minimise the harm in high-risk settings.

Special reports. Bi, 21

Canberra: Australian Security Intelligence Organisation. 2025. 52p.