By Robin S. Engel, Jennifer Calnon Cherkauskas

The 2024 Annual Report of the Pennsylvania State Police (PSP) Traffic Stop Study presents a comprehensive analysis of member-initiated traffic stops conducted between January 1 and December 31, 2024. It continues a multi-year initiative to collect, audit, and analyze traffic stop data. In 2021, the Pennsylvania State Police (PSP) revitalized its effort to collect traffic stop data This initiative builds on a voluntary traffic stop data collection system created by the PSP twenty-five years ago in partnership with the current research team, which was operational from 2001 to 2010 and served as a national model for traffic stop data collection (Engel & Cherkauskas, 2022). The report provides a detailed breakdown of traffic stop characteristics and outcomes at the department level, as well as across PSP’s four Areas, 16 Troops, and 89 Stations. PSP’s voluntary data collection and analysis align with best practices, showcasing its commitment to transparency and accountability to its communities and reinforcing its dedication to evidence-based policing practices. The objectives of the traffic stop data collection and analysis are to: (1) identify patterns and trends in traffic stops and their outcomes, specifically documenting any racial/ethnic disparities; (2) utilize data analysis to promote effective and fair law enforcement practices that enhance public and traffic safety; (3) foster public trust through transparent documentation of traffic stop data and findings; (4) identify opportunities for improvement in PSP policies, training, and supervisory oversight concerning traffic stops. 

Harrisburg: Pennsylvania State Police, 2025. 139p.

By The  United States Department of Justice Civil Rights Division and United States Attorney’s Office For the Southern District of Mississippi

• Hours after the Department of Justice announced its investigation of the Lexington Police Department (LPD) on November 8, 2023, officers chased a Black man through a field and tased him nine times. The man began foaming at the mouth. One officer pointed to a Taser probe lodged in the man’s hat and said, “Damn, one of my probes hit him in the head.” The man, who has a behavioral health disability, had been accused of disturbing a business. This was not the man’s first encounter with LPD. Earlier that year, LPD officers had jailed him for ten days for trespassing; four days for stealing a cup of coffee; and twelve days for stealing packets of sugar. Each time they arrested him, LPD unlawfully refused to release the man until he paid money towards old fines and fees he owed from misdemeanors and traffic tickets. But each arrest added more fines and fees to the ledger. By November 2023, the man— who has no job, no assets, and no bank account—owed more than $7,500. In encounter after encounter with the man, LPD violated his rights. But like countless people in Lexington, the man had little recourse. Through a combination of poor leadership, retaliation, and a complete lack of internal accountability, LPD has created a system where officers can relentlessly violate the law. FINDINGS The Department of Justice has reasonable cause to believe that the City of Lexington and the Lexington Police Department engage in a pattern or practice of conduct that deprives people of their rights under the Constitution and federal law. Specifically, we find that LPD unlawfully: • Arrests, jails, and detains people who cannot pay fines or fees, without assessing their ability to pay; • Uses excessive force; • Conducts stops, searches, and arrests without probable cause, including jailing people on illegal “investigative holds” and arresting people solely because they owe outstanding fines; • Imposes money bail without justification or assessment of ability to pay; • Jails people without prompt access to court; • Violates the rights of people engaged in free speech and expression, including by retaliating against people who criticize the police; • Discriminates against Black people; and • Operates under an unconstitutional conflict of interest because LPD’s funding depends on the money it raises through its enforcement. 

Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice 2024. 42p.

By Jessica M. Eaglin 

 In response to the tenth anniversary of the Ferguson uprisings, this Essay examines how the protests reshaped legal discourse on algorithmic decision-making in criminal law, with a specific focus on systemic racial injustice. By deconstructing the metaphorical “black box,” the Essay surveys the intersection of race, technology, and incarceration while also illustrating how the uprisings influenced public and scholarly engagement with criminal legal technologies. The Essay analyzes current critiques and cautions against focusing too narrowly on reforming specific technologies rather than addressing the legal and social structures that sustain racial inequality. The Essay concludes by urging scholars and policymakers to engage with the structural dimensions of technology in criminal law and develop more comprehensive approaches to justice in the digital age.

Washington University Journal of Law and Policy, Volume 78 • Issue 1 • 2025 

By Jeremy D. Barnum., Kevin D. Lucey,  Meagan E. Cahill,  William H. Sousa, 

  Illicit drug use is a significant problem in the United States, driven in large part by the opioid crisis. In 2023, the nation reported 107,543 drug overdose deaths, with more than 80,000 deaths involving an opioid. Stimulants have also become a growing problem; in 2023, more than 36,000 overdoses involved a psychostimulant, and nearly 30,000 involved cocaine (CDC 2024). Law enforcement is a crucial piece of the broader response to the drug crisis (PERF 2021). Proactive police interventions that leverage problem-solving and involve partnerships with community stakeholders offer the most substantial evidence of effectiveness (Mazerolle, Soole, and Rombouts 2007). One strategy to reduce drug problems is third-party policing (TPP). TPP involves police efforts to persuade or coerce nonoffending third parties (landlords, business owners, etc.) to take on more responsibility for addressing crime and disorder at or around their premises (Mazerolle and Ransley 2006). Typically, police begin by seeking voluntary cooperation of third parties by sharing information with them about specific problems, educating third parties on ways to prevent problems, or providing support to third parties to make changes. When third parties resist collaborative efforts, police may use coercive approaches, such as warnings, property inspections, or enforcement of civil remedies (Bichler, Schmerler, and Enriquez 2013; Eck and Wartell 1998; Mazerolle and Roehl 1998b). The study This report describes a randomized controlled evaluation of a TPP intervention implemented in Anne Arundel County, Maryland. The intervention, called Operation CheckOut, aimed to reduce drug problems at hotel s and motels by fostering trusted partnerships between police and hotel staff. Officers from the Anne Arundel County Police Department (AACOPD) conducted four in-person visits between August 2022 and May 2023 to a randomly selected group of hotels. During in-person visits, officers engaged in a scripted procedural justice dialogue with hotel managers, delivered educational materials, identified legal responsibilities, and provided a dedicated email address that functioned as a “tip line” to report problems or suspicious activity directly to the Operation Check-Out team. The intervention was designed as a partial replication of Operation Galley, a TPP intervention   implemented by the Queensland (Australia) Police Service in 2017 (Mazerolle et al. 2018). The goal of the intervention was to bolster intelligence, investigations, and enforcement actions; reduce crime and disorder; and improve perceptions of police. Key findings Outcome analysis Calls for service data were analyzed to determine the impact of Operation Check-Out on four outcomes: (1) drug activity, (2) sick persons (e.g., overdoses), (3) disorder, and (4) violence. Average monthly calls for service for each outcome were compared among hotels in the treatment and control groups during the pre-intervention period, during the intervention period, and during the post-intervention period. Three findings were significant: 1. Calls reporting drug activity were lower at treatment hotels during the post-intervention period than during the pre-intervention or intervention periods. 2. Calls reporting sick persons were lower at treatment hotels during the post-intervention period than during the pre-intervention or intervention periods. 3. Calls reporting disorder were higher at treatment hotels during the intervention period than during the pre-intervention or post-intervention periods. That there were significantly fewer drug activity calls at treatment hotels following Operation Check-Out than there had been before is encouraging, as the intervention was specifically designed to mitigate drug problems. Reducing drug activity reduces the need for hotel staff to call 911. Also, as part of their efforts to build rapport with hotel management, officers often provided their direct work lines—allowing management to call specific officers familiar with their facility and problems instead of the generic 911 line. That there were significantly fewer sick person calls at treatment hotels during the postintervention period than during the pre-intervention or intervention periods further supports the idea that Operation Check-Out reduced drug activity during the intervention period with impacts realized during the post-intervention period. Given less drug activity, fewer overdoses would be expected. Finally, the finding that there were more disorder calls at treatment hotels during the intervention period than during the pre-intervention or post-intervention periods is somewhat unexpected, as fewer disorder calls would be expected in an environment with greater cooperation, enforcement, and police presence. One plausible explanation is that hotel staff were more willing to contact the police as a result of Operation Check-Out because, for example, they may have felt they had a supportive partner in addressing issues at their hotel, or they may have understood that the intervention involved repeated visits and become concerned about bringing trouble to the hotel if they failed to report problems to police.

Washington, DC: Police Executive Research Forum, 2025. 103p.

By Letitia James

  Every day, millions of New Yorkers take to the roads. They deserve traffic safety and policing that is fair and effective. This report describes some of the harms that can arise from police vehicle pursuits and high-speed vehicle chases and proposes reforms to help keep New Yorkers safe. Police chases have been shown to increase danger and result in injury or fatalities to drivers, passengers, bystanders, and police. We offer the following recommendations: Pass legislation to increase transparency New York law enforcement agencies should be required to track and publish a standardized set of data about traffic pursuits and high-speed chases. This should be facilitated by a centralized agency such as the Division of Criminal Justice Services (DCJS). Ban high-speed police pursuits, with very narrow exceptions High-speed chases can be deadly. Chases may be necessary when a serious or violent felony has been or will be committed, and when the driver’s conduct poses an imminent threat of death. But, in large part, ordinary speeding or minor traffic infractions should not lead to a high-speed, dangerous chase.  

Albany:  Office of the New York State Attorney General Letitia James, 2025. 11p.

By Lauren Lyons  

  he alarming recurrence of unjustified killings by police highlights systemic issues that should be deeply concerning to us all. Beyond excessive use of force, the police treat marginalized people in disproportionately harmful ways that reflect and perpetuate endemic injustice; they respond inappropriately to complex social and public health problems like homelessness, addiction, and mental illness, risking harmful escalation and exacerbating underlying issues. Police culture tends towards cynical authoritarianism, adopting an “us-versus-them” mentality that positions (at least a subset of) citizens as adversaries. All of this has resulted in severely diminished public trust in the police, fraught police-community relations, and rising skepticism of the legitimacy of policing institutions. Public outcry over these problems has catalyzed the ongoing Black Lives Matter movement. The police murder of George Floyd was followed by mass protests in the summer of 2020, and since then, there has been widespread public debate on how to mitigate police violence and the distrust it engenders. Some call for incremental reforms, like changing laws and policies governing police use of force or strengthening misconduct reporting and decertification processes. Others demand that we reimagine the role of policing in our institutional landscape, reallocating powers, resources, and responsibilities from the  police to other institutions. The goal of this paper is to refine and defend this reallocative demand, which I refer to as the unbundling proposal. There has been a promising uptick in philosophical discussions of policing in recent years. Some focus on principles to guide police conduct, often drawing on theories of self-defense and professional ethics. Philosophers also propose measures to address police misconduct such as expanding legal statutes to outlaw harmful tactics, revoking the licenses of bad actors, providing reparations to victims of police violence, implementing self-evaluation and evidence-based improvements to departmental policy, restructuring police departments, broadening police participation in harm reduction and other forms of nonviolent order maintenance, and avoiding tactics that heighten the risk of illegitimate policing. These strategies, especially when combined, can improve policing. Rather than a discussion of their comparative merits and disadvantages, I present and defend an alternative ameliorative approach. The unbundling proposal asks not how police should act but rather what the scope of policing should be: Which situations require police presence? In the ethics of war, we distinguish between jus in bello (the ethics of conduct in war) and jus ad bellum (the ethics of whether war is justified). The unbundling proposal addresses an issue that is analogous to jus ad bellum considerations: when police should be deployed (instead of how they should behave). This approach complements rather than conflicts with many proposed reforms, but it also addresses a broader and less examined issue. Moreover, despite substantial public support, there has been no sustained discussion of unbundling in analytic ethics and political philosophy, and the attention the proposal has received is largely critical. The unbundling proposal is connected closely to movements to defund and eventually abolish the police. The slogan “defund the police” really means “defund and refund,” with activists calling for cutting police funding and reallocating it to other nonpolice institutions and community organizations. As such, “defund, refund” is one public finance-focused component of the broader unbundling proposal. For abolitionists, unbundling and other measures that reduce the scope and power of the police are critical steps toward ultimately dismantling the institution. Though I am not defending abolition here, the discussion should (1) clarify the practical action strategy of police abolitionists and (2) offer a more robust and appealing picture of the defund demand. The structure of this paper is as follows. In section 1, I present the unbundling proposal, identifying the specific dimensions of policing that proponents argue should be unbundled and reallocated. There I also discuss the definition of policing upon which unbundling is based. Then, I present a novel set of normative arguments for unbundling that reflect various rationales emanating from policing-critical social movements. The case for unbundling is strongest if we take them in tandem. The first two arguments (section 2) draw on principles of institutional design. I argue first that we should unbundle policing because public institutions with violent capacities should have narrow mandates; nonviolent, noncoercive responses to social problems should be the default. I then claim that unbundling constitutes a better distribution of epistemic labor. Catchall order-maintenance policing is epistemically overdemanding, while more narrowly defined roles foster better expertise and outcomes. The argument in section 3 centers on the effects of policing in unequal societies with historical injustice—specifically, how policing disproportionately burdens Black people, other people of color, and members of marginalized groups, driving structural injustice. I aim to reconstruct one argumentative thread that leads us from (1) these unfair effects to (2) the unbundling proposal. In doing so, I address the broader question of what forms of solutions are appropriate when institutions are infected with injustice, suggesting that in this case and others, justice-undermining effects require us to turn towards extra-institutional, reallocative measures. My hope is that the paper will be interesting for skeptics and advocates of unbundling and related proposals, adding some clarity to divisive debates and expanding the library of solutions to the pressing problems with policing defended within philosophy 

Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy

By Salla Huikuri

  Online communities of pedophiles in darknet facilitate sexual violence against children. They provide a criminogenic space for socially sidelined offenders to share and reinforce their sexual distortions. They accommodate illegal Child Sexual Abuse Material and enable its trading, sharing, and exchange. They offer advice on how to protect one’s online identity and how to physically proceed into sexual violence against children. This review deals with online child sexual offenders and their communities in darknet. It defines key terms dealing with online sexual offences against children and discusses different types of child sexual abuse offenders operating online. Moreover, it sheds light on the psychological side of offending – the justifications for sexual violence against children – and elaborates the underlying logics underpinning the respective trains of though in the online communities of pedophiles.  

Tampere: Police University College.   2022.

Lee Schlenker

US–Mexico security tensions are reaching potentially unprecedented levels amid repeated threats from President Trump to unilaterally strike Mexican drug cartels, which he now claims “run” the country. The violent reaction by the Cartel Jalisco Nueva Generación, or CJNG, after the Mexican National Guard killed its leader, “El Mencho,” with the support of US military intelligence in late February underscores the broad impacts of cartel terror in Mexico and the lack of neat solutions to eliminating it. 

What restraint-oriented strategies can the United States and Mexico develop together to tackle this scourge? To address the issue of crime and drugs from Mexico, Congress has appropriated $3.6 billion in security assistance between 2008 and 2024, and the Trump administration has designated six Mexican cartels as foreign terrorist organizations. Both of these measures have done little to address the surging demand for illicit narcotics or the “iron river” of US weapons flowing across the border. Meanwhile, Mexican President Claudia Sheinbaum has deployed 10,000 additional troops to the US–Mexico border, transferred almost 100 high-level drug criminals to US custody, and allowed expanded US drone flights over Mexican territory. 

But unilateral US strikes in Mexico and American boots on the ground for joint operations with Mexican personnel remain a red line for Sheinbaum, who, under immense pressure, has overseen targeted interventions in high-crime Mexican states that have led to a 32 percent drop in homicides. 

The Trump administration should focus on three broad policy areas to help effectively stem the flow of illicit narcotics into the United States and weaken transnational criminal threats, while also avoiding counterproductive unilateral military strikes on Mexican territory: 

• Improved security cooperation and bilateral coordination, including making better use of the Department of Defense’s advise-and-assist, educational, and professional training programs as well as exploring a US advisory role in Mexican command centers over the country’s domestic operations. 

• Tougher laws to combat arms smuggling, judicial cooperation to disrupt illicit financial networks and money laundering, and joint cross-border investigations into Mexican and US officials credibly alleged of ties to drug trafficking and corruption. 

• Funding for overdose-prevention and demand-reduction programs, strengthening the Treasury Department’s Counter-Fentanyl Strike Force, and pursuing commercial diplomacy with Mexico and China to stem the production and flow of precursor chemicals. 

Washington, DC: Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft

2026. 6p.

By Bram Ebus

In the jungle along the Colombian-Venezuelan frontier, guerrillas, criminals and shadowy state elements jostle for illicit profits. Venezuela’s campaign against one armed group has raised tensions. Bogotá and Caracas should temper their war of words and work to forestall an inadvertent bilateral escalation.

By Heidi Mathis, 

The purpose of this quantitative study was to compare the characteristics of offenders who posted on social media for attention versus those who posted on social media for fame using discriminant factorial analysis (DFA). To date, there has been very little research done on social media usage with regards to mass shootings. The wealth of the research close to the study at hand has to do with not naming the offender and the media contingency effect. The current research helped close some of that gap. Researching social media usage and mass shootings showed how the variables: location, rejection, mental health history, criminal history, how weapons were obtained, how the offender(s) were apprehended, household status, education, and whether the offender killed family members relate to criminality. This was in line with the framework for this study, anomie, and strain theory. Out of 300 cases analyzed, 72 were chosen that contained all the variables being analyzed in this study. The results of this study were not significant. The variables did not significantly differentiate the mass shooting offenders who posted for attention versus those who posted for fame. This study may be used by forensic experts for positive social change by understanding social media statements made by mass shooters.

By Victoria Nagy  and Georgina Rychner

The historical examination of filicide in Australia is limited and often focuses on case studies of maternal filicides. Longitudinal trends of Australian filicide offending have focused almost exclusively on the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. Our study aims to fill a gap in Australian criminological knowledge about filicide. Utilising prison and Supreme Court records from 1860 and 1920, we plot the extent of filicide offending by men and women in Victoria to create a more comprehensive picture of filicide perpetration. This study also tests whether identified motives and risk factors for filicide today can be applied to historical data, to make these data accessible to criminologists studying filicide in the twenty-first century

By Terra Wiens  

  KEY FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS KEY FINDINGS ■ In 2023, more than 5,700 Hispanics were killed by guns. That year, 3,284 Hispanics died in gun homicides, 2,198 died in gun suicides, 63 died in unintentional shootings, and 202 died in other circumstances (including legal interventiona and undetermined intent). ■ More than 83,000 Hispanics were killed by guns between 2002 and 2023. During this period, 51,780 Hispanics died in gun homicides, 27,160 died in gun suicides, and 1,220 died in unintentional shootings. ■ Most Hispanic murder victims are killed with guns. In 2023, guns were used in more than three-quarters of the homicides where the victims were Hispanic. The latest data show that for homicides where the victim was Hispanic and a gun was used, 53.0 percent of these shootings involved a handgun. ■ The homicide victimization rate for Hispanics in the United States is higher than the homicide victimization rate for whites. The Hispanic homicide victimization rate in 2023 was 6.3 per 100,000. In comparison, the homicide victimization rate for whites was 2.9 per 100,000. ■ As a result of the limitations in current data collection, the total number of Hispanic victims is almost certainly higher than the reported numbers suggest. Government agencies often report data on race but not on ethnic origin. Recognizing the changing demographic landscape in the United States, it is clear that fully documenting such victimization is a crucial step in preventing it. RECOMMENDATIONS Governmental agencies that collect data on death and injury should obtain complete information on the ethnic origin of individuals in addition to their race. This will ensure complete and accurate data collection on Hispanic victims of lethal violence. ■ Individual-level ethnic origin information should be captured by all governmental agencies, regardless of department, and at all levels — local, state, and national — for all pertinent users and subjects of agency services. ■ Individual-level ethnic origin information should be self-reported and not based solely on a person’s surname or other measure. ■ All public access data and published reports issued by governmental agencies should include information on ethnic origin in addition to race. ■ The U.S. Department of Justice should issue periodic or special reports on Hispanic victimization. ■ States with a substantial proportion of Hispanic residents should issue periodic or special reports on Hispanic victimization and deaths due to all causes, including violence. Improved data collection is essential to fully understanding the scope of lethal firearms violence against Hispanics and helping develop effective measures to reduce such violence. At the same time additional efforts, both supporting current programs and activities as well as identifying new violence-reduction opportunities and approaches, should include the following: ■ Support for community-based violence intervention programs that are holistic and encourage participation by all stakeholders. ■ Educational efforts to better inform Hispanics of the risks associated with bringing a firearm into the home as measured by increased risk for homicide, suicide, and unintentional firearm deaths compared to how rarely guns are used in justifiable homicides. This is especially important in the face of current coordinated efforts by the gun industry targeting Hispanics as potential first-time gun buyers.b ■ Improved access to resources for victims and survivors of domestic violence. ■ Identification of anti-trafficking measures that could help interrupt the flow of illegal firearms into impacted communities   

By  Hannah S. Laqueur · Christopher McCort · Colette Smirniotis · Sonia Robinson · Garen J. Wintemute

Firearm-related interpersonal violence is a leading cause of death and injury in cities across the United States, and understanding the movement of firearms from on-the-books sales to criminal end-user is critical to the formulation of gun violence prevention policy. In this study, we assemble a unique dataset that combines records for over 380,000 crime guns recovered by law enforcement in California (2010– 2021), and more than 126,000 guns reported stolen, linked to in-state legal handgun transactions (1996– 2021), to describe local and statewide crime gun trends and investigate several potentially important sources of guns to criminals, including privately manufactured firearms (PMFs), theft, and “dirty” dealers. We document a dramatic increase over the decade in firearms recovered shortly after purchase (7% were recovered within a year in 2010, up to 33% in 2021). This corresponds with a substantial rise in handgun purchasing over the decade, suggesting some fraction of newly and legally acquired firearms are likely diverted from the legal market for criminal use. We document the rapid growth of PMFs over the past 2–3 years and find theft plays some, though possibly diminishing, role as a crime gun source. Finally, we find evidence that some retailers contribute disproportionately to the supply of crime guns, though there appear to be fewer problematic dealers now than there were a decade ago. Overall, our study points to temporal shifts in the dynamics of criminal firearms commerce as well as significant city variation in the channels by which criminals acquire crime guns. 

By Theodore E. Trigylidas  , Patricia G. Schnitzer  , Heather K. Dykstra  , Gia M. Badolato  , Robert McCarter, Jr. , Monika K. Goyal and Richard Lichenstein 

We sought to compare risk factors contributing to unintentional, homicide, and suicide firearm deaths in children. We conducted a retrospective review of the National Fatality Review Case Reporting System. We included all firearm deaths among children aged 0–18 years occurring from 2007 to 2016. Descriptive analyses were performed on demographic, psychosocial, and firearm characteristics and their relationship to unintentional, homicide, and suicide deaths. Regression analyses were used to compare factors contributing to unintentional vs. intentional deaths. There were 6148 firearm deaths during the study period. The mean age was 14 years (SD ± 4 years), of which 81% were male and 41% were non-Hispanic White. The most common manners of death were homicide (57%), suicide (36%), and unintentional (7%). Over one-third of firearms were stored unlocked. Homicide deaths had a higher likelihood of occurring outside of the home setting (aOR 3.2, 95% CI 2.4–4.4) compared with unintentional deaths. Suicide deaths had a higher likelihood of occurring in homes with firearms that were stored locked (aOR 4.2, 95% CI 2.1–8.9) compared with unintentional deaths. Each manner of firearm death presents a unique set of psychosocial circumstances and challenges for preventive strategies. Unsafe firearm storage practices remain a central theme in contributing to the increased risk of youth firearm deaths. 

By María Victoria Llorente and Jeremy McDermott,  Raúl Benítez Manaut , Marta Lucía Ramírez de Rincón , John Bailey

Since the mid-2000s, violence related to drug trafficking and other transnational crime has increased exponentially in Mexico. By the end of the decade the public began to seriously doubt the government’s strategy and its ability to guarantee public safety. The nature and intensity of violence in Mexico brought forth memories of the 1980s and ’90s in Colombia, when the country was besieged by the Medellín and Cali drug cartels. Over the course of more than a decade, Colombia’s security situation has improved dramatically; it has become an “exporter” of security expertise and has trained thousands of military and police personnel in Mexico, Central and South America, and the Caribbean as well as around the world. What aspects of Colombia’s strategy and tactics for fighting organized crime in its own territory offer useful lessons for Mexico? What might Colombia’s steps and missteps offer by way of example or counter-example? What is unique about each case such that comparisons are misleading? What do current security challenges in Colombia suggest about the threat posed by organized crime more generally? In One Goal, Two Struggles: Confronting Crime and Violence in Mexico and Colombia, international experts address the utility of comparing Colombia and Mexico’s experiences and strategy for combatting organized crime and violence more generally.

By Juan Albarracín, Juan Corredor-Garcia, Juan Pablo Milanese, Inge H. Valencia & Jonas Wolff

Violence in post-conflict settings is often attributed to a post-war boom in organized crime, facilitated by the demobilization of armed groups and the persisting weakness of the state. The article argues that this is only one pathway of post-conflict violence. A second causal pathway emerges from the challenges that peace processes can constitute for entrenched local political orders. By fostering political inclusion, the implementation of peace agreements may threaten subnational political elites that have used the context of armed conflict to ally with armed non-state actors. Violence is then used as a means to preserve such de facto authoritarian local orders. We start from the assumption that these two explanations are not exclusive or competing, but grasp different causal processes that may well both be at work behind the assassination of social leaders (líderes sociales) in Colombia since the 2016 peace agreement with the FARC guerrilla. We argue that this specific type of targeted violence can, in fact, be attributed to different, locally specific configurations that resemble the two pathways. The article combines fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis with the case studies of the municipalities

By John J. Donohue

Substantial evidence has documented a powerful “instrumentality†effect: the more lethal the weaponry employed, the greater the likelihood that death will result from any given assault. This finding provides the foundation for the subsequent findings that a variety of measures that restrict the prevalence or limit the permissible types of lethal weaponry can lower the costs of gun violence. The literature has advanced to the point that there is a sufficient empirical basis to call for the elimination of right-to-carry laws, to reestablish bans on assault weapons and high-capacity magazines, to maintain restrictions on youthful access to guns, and to repeal stand-your-ground laws. The Supreme Court’s recent decision expanding the scope of the Second Amendment in New York State Rifle and Pistol Association v. Bruen shows a concerning disinterest in the importance of these empirical findings.

By Yennesit Palacios Valencia and Ignacio García Marín

  Colombia is among the countries with the highest levels of violence and crime in the world, despite the peace agreements between the State and different armed groups, including the FARC. This is partly due to the fact that the Colombian case is complex and multifaceted because of the variety of participants in the armed conflict context and due to the mutation of new actors, under the modality of organized crime. Based on the above, the objective is to study the Colombian reality, contextually and diachronically, from theoretical and epistemological elements to demonstrate how violence and criminality factors intersect in the context of the armed conflict. The study concludes, among other findings, that in Colombia the ambiguity and the multiplicity of terms used to name the emerging criminal groups presents a legal problem because of their hybrid composition and regarding their treatment within or outside of the armed conflict

By Eric Hershberg, Edward Maguire, Steven Dudley

In October 2012, the U.S. government designated MS-13 as a transnational criminal organization (TCO), raising serious questions about the breadth of the gang’s criminal capacity. Some analysts have pointed to a steady growth and professionalization of this criminal organization, but insufficient data has hindered the formulation and implementation of policies aimed at countering this trend. Our multiyear project proposed to fill gaps in the extant literature by conducting qualitative and quantitative research designed to assess MS-13’s transnational criminal capacity. More specifically, our objectives were to: 1) conduct extensive interviews with local stakeholders, gang experts, and MS-13 members in three major metropolitan areas, including two in the U.S. and one in El Salvador; 2) analyze qualitative and quantitative data gathered through tested survey and interview instruments and from official sources, with particular attention to the following factors: type of criminal activities, organizational structure, inter- and intra-gang relationships, level of community penetration, accumulation of social capital, development and migration patterns, and recruitment strategies; 3) utilize social network analysis techniques to quantify the social reach of gang member respondents; and 4) disseminate project findings to relevant constituencies in law enforcement, policymaking circles, academe, and the general public. The purpose of our research was to provide policymakers and law enforcement officials with a comprehensive understanding of MS-13 by measuring the extent and range of the organization’s criminal activity and mapping its social networks. Our goal was to generate empirical data that could serve as a foundation upon which to shape new policies and practices. Specifically, our hope was that the data would provide insights regarding the optimal allocation of law enforcement resources, the likely movements of MS-13, and the design of intervention and suppression strategies. 

Washington DC: U..S. Department of Justice,  2019. 11p.

By  Lucia Bird | Saša Đorđević | Fatjona Mejdini 

Western Balkans criminal groups, comprising both Albanian- and Slavic-speaking networks, have become dominant players in the global cocaine trade. While their influence in Europe and Latin America has been well documented, their growing role in West Africa has largely flown under the radar. Since 2019, these groups have expanded their operations in West Africa, using the region as a critical logistical, storage and redistribution hub for cocaine shipments en route to European consumption markets and beyond. This expansion has been shaped by their effective leverage of geography, governance weaknesses and infrastructure, both hard and digital. Initially limited to occasional trafficking links, the Western Balkan groups have deepened their presence across West Africa’s coastal states, including Senegal, Sierra Leone, Gambia, Guinea-Bissau and Cabo Verde. This growing focus on West Africa was driven by rising demand for cocaine in Europe, increased enforcement on direct routes to Europe and strengthened partnerships with Latin American cartels, especially Brazil’s Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC). Western Balkan groups now operate through multiple trafficking methods in West Africa, exploiting fully containerized routes, non-containerized shipments (i.e. shipments not stored in containers, but hidden elsewhere on vessels) by other types of vessels, trans-shipments at sea and in-region containerization to conceal the cocaine’s origin. They have embedded brokers in West African countries who organize logistics, establish infrastructure and liaise with local actors. In Sierra Leone, for example, they have reportedly established companies to launder funds and warehouses to store and repackage cocaine, coordinating onward shipments through formal seaports using legitimate cargo. These brokers are key to operations and are often shared among the different groups. The groups’ structures are flexible and typically consist of small, trusted units supported by collaborators. Groups leverage local vulnerabilities to build relationships with corrupt law enforcement, port operators and security services. Particularly significant Western Balkan groups in West Africa include the Montenegrin Kavač clan and its rival, the Škaljari clan. The Kavač clan’s operations have been linked to ports in Brazil and Sierra Leone, with brokers overseeing logistics from Freetown. As we explain in this report, in some cases a single broker will work with more than one group from the Western Balkans. In parallel, Albanian-speaking groups, which have a strong presence in Spain and Brazil, have been operating through countries including Senegal and Gambia, sometimes collaborating with the Italian ‘Ndrangheta or the PCC. The example of an Albanian national who, according to Brazilian law enforcement investigations, is a major European supplier coordinating shipments through West Africa from Brazil, exemplifies the growing use of multi-tonne cocaine operations routed through the Gulf of Guinea. Looking ahead, Western Balkan groups are likely to further entrench themselves in West Africa, gradually relying less on their alliances with the ‘Ndrangheta, the PCC and other Western Balkan groups and instead investing directly in infrastructure and protection mechanisms. As in Latin America, their growing presence is likely to be accompanied by deeper corruption, potential violence and fragmentation into more autonomous cells. To address the growing role of Western Balkan criminal groups in West Africa, a coordinated response should focus on three key pillars. First, strategic cross-continental partnerships should be built with law enforcement, port authorities and international actors, underpinned by a political-economy analysis, to strengthen cooperation and to identify aligned priorities. Second, an enhanced data picture, drawing on a wider range of formal and informal sources, is needed to map trafficking routes and financial flows more effectively and to empower regional and international actors to tailor their risk assessments of specific routes, to profile criminal actors and to develop viable strategies for detection and disruption. Third, smart targeting strategies that prioritize brokers should be adopted, supported by parallel financial and criminal investigations. 

Geneva:  Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime   2025. 61p.