By Katherine J McLachlan

Women who have been raped rarely report their assaults to police. Researchers have attributed this to a range of reasons, both personal and systemic, including the influence of stereotypes and myths about rape on victims’/survivors’ decision- making. Rape myths often reflect community attitudes, social norms and police responses. For example, victims/survivors may blame themselves and also expect police will blame or disbelieve them. Such expectations (or subsequent experiences) of negative police responses undermine victims’/survivors’ faith in police. Poor or uncertain expectations held by victims/survivors are often borne out in reality, for police responses to rape are typically inconsistent and unpredictable. The potential diversity of responses is reflected in the mixed experiences reported by victims/survivors in my study.

Faculty of Education, Humanities, Law and Theology,, March 2007, 256p.

By Kiran Kaur Grewal PhD

This thesis is a comparative analysis of the public discourses in France and Australia on a series of highly mediatised gang rapes. In the context of Australia, the ‘Sydney gang rapes’ attracted intense media and political attention in 2001 through reports of a gang rape phenomenon involving gangs of young ‘Lebanese’/’Muslim’ men targeting and raping ‘Australian’ girls. Some commentators also identified links between these gang rapes and what they identified as being similar gang rapes involving ‘young Muslim men’ in France: a phenomenon known as ‘les tournantes’.

Yuval-Davis, Nira 1997, Gender and nation, SAGE Publishers, London, 2009, 424p.

BY Richard Grelling.. Translated By Alexander Gray. Introduction by Colin Heston.

Richard Grelling’s The Crime (Das Verbrechen), translated into English by Alexander Gray and published in London and New York between 1917 and 1919, is conceived as both a moral successor and completion to his earlier pacifist landmark, J’Accuse!, written between August 1915 and November 1916. In creating this extended work, Grelling sought to underscore the causes of World War I and dissect the self-justifying rhetoric that sustained the conflict long after its outbreak. Volumes I and II lay foundational groundwork, tracing the immediate antecedents of the war: imperialist tendencies within Germany and, on the part of the opposing Entente powers, ostensibly defensive motives followed by trait protectionism.

Never before in the annals of humankind has a crime of such sweeping magnitude been committed—and seldom has its perpetration been met with denial so unashamed. Within the very citadels of reason and culture, a proud civilization unleashed catastrophe under the guise of necessity—only to scramble afterward in self-exculpation. It is in this spirit of moral defiance—standing firm against voices of dissent, even from one’s own kin—that The Crime is offered to you. In the trilogy’s third volume, Grelling moves beyond the origins of war into the heart of wartime rationalization, exposing the “war-aims” that enabled aggression to persist under the cloak of purpose. May this work cast a clear light upon the structures of self-deception that allowed the world’s descent, and may it stir an unyielding clarity in us to recognize—and reject—such patterns again.

Read-Me.Org Inc. New York-Philadelphia-Australia. 2025. 261p.

By Ian Mynot and Oksana Ihnatenko

This report summarises the main findings of the first meeting of the Taskforce on Public–Private Partnership in Fighting Financial Crime in Ukraine

Overview

On 15 November 2024, RUSI’s Centre for Finance and Security and the Center for Financial Integrity (CFI)1 launched a Taskforce on Public–Private Partnership in Fighting Financial Crime in Ukraine. An in-person meeting in Warsaw, held on a non-attributable basis, convened 40 representatives, including those from the public and private sectors in Ukraine, and international experts.

The discussion included two sessions focused on the current state of public–private partnerships (PPPs) in Ukraine and on international experience and recommendations. This report summarises the main findings of each of these sessions.

London: The Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies. (RUSI) 2025. 15p.

By Rusi - Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies

Economic crime poses a significant threat to the UK, undermining its financial stability and security. To address this threat, in March 2023, the UK government launched the Economic Crime Plan 2,1 outlining a series of coordinated actions that should be undertaken across multiple government departments. Among these measures, the National Economic Crime Centre (NECC) was tasked with developing a people strategy to strengthen expertise and cross-sector collaboration, considering partnerships with industry and other stakeholders such as academia.2 Although there is a growing body of research on economic crime in the UK, there is scope for academia to play a more important role as a valuable resource in combatting economic crime. In October 2024, the NECC and the Home Office convened the first Economic Crime Academic Forum, hosted by RUSI’s Centre for Finance and Security. The forum aimed to bridge the gap between academic research and policymaking by fostering dialogue and identifying actionable solutions to issues including money laundering, fraud, kleptocracy and corruption. Academic participants came from a range of related disciplines and included both more established and early career academics, bringing a range of perspectives. Government attendees came from multiple government departments and law enforcement. The discussions focused on three aspects of research on economic crime: economic crime threats; the response to economic crime in terms of policy, enforcement and evaluation; and research methods and associated challenges. Due to the breadth and fluidity of the discussion, this report does not provide a linear summary of the matters raised. Instead, it details ways in which academics conduct research on economic crime, identifies gaps and challenges in research and academic engagement with government initiatives, and explores potential solutions. The forum was conducted on a non-attributable basis.

London: Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies (RUSI), 2025. 11p

By European Union Drugs Agency (EUDA)

The European Drug Report 2025: Trends and Developments presents the EUDA’s latest analysis of the drug situation in Europe. Focusing on illicit drug use, related harms and drug supply, the report provides a comprehensive set of national data across these themes, as well as on specialist drug treatment and key harm reduction interventions

This report is based on information provided to the EUDA by the EU Member States, the candidate country Türkiye, and Norway, in an annual reporting process. The purpose of the current report is to provide an overview and summary of the European drug situation up to the end of 2024. All grouping, aggregates and labels therefore reflect the situation based on the available data in 2024 in respect to the composition of the European Union and the countries participating in the EUDA’s reporting exercises. However, not all data will cover the full period. Due to the time needed to compile and submit data, many of the annual national data sets included here are from the reference year January to December 2023. Analysis of trends is based only on those countries providing sufficient data to describe changes over the period specified. The reader should also be aware that monitoring patterns and trends in a hidden and stigmatised behaviour such as drug use is both practically and methodologically challenging. For this reason, multiple sources of data are used for the purposes of analysis in this report. Although considerable improvements can be noted, both nationally and in respect to what is possible to achieve in a European-level analysis, the methodological difficulties in this area must be acknowledged. Caution is therefore required in interpretation, in particular when countries are compared on any single measure. Caveats relating to the data are to be found in the online Statistical Bulletin 2025 , which contains detailed information on methodology, qualifications on analysis and comments on the limitations in the information set available. Information is also available there on the methods and data used for European-level estimates, where interpolation may be used :

PortugalEuropean Union Drugs Agency (EUDA); 2025 355p

By Megan Kang

This study draws on 95 interviews and observations with gang-affiliated individuals in Chicago to examine how gang structures shape disengagement and desistance from crime. Over the last two decades, the city’s gangs have experienced a decline in group closure, or their capacity to regulate membership and member behavior, and a blurring of boundaries between those active in a gang from all others. In the past, Chicago’s gangs maintained closure and bright boundaries that made gang affiliations, norms, and territories clearly defined. Leaving these gangs required costly exit rituals that signaled an unambiguous departure while facilitating desistance. Today, with weaker gang structures and blurry boundaries, leaving a gang is no longer a distinct event. However, the ease of gang disengagement makes desistance harder, as inactive members struggle to knife off past ties and access turning points. In this uncertain landscape, desistance tactics can backfire, sending blurred signals—behaviors intended to create distance from former affiliates and rivals but appear as wavering commitment to supporters—that trap individuals in a liminal space between social worlds. Contrary to leading desistance theories that emphasize individual readiness, opportunity, and pro-social bonds, this study underscores how group structures critically shape pathways out of crime

Unpublished paper 2025, 55p.

By Kristina Amerhauser and Audrey Thill with support from Martin Thorley, Louise Taylor and Matt Herbert

Cyber scam operations have surged across Southeast Asia since the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, evolving into a transnational organized crime crisis of staggering proportions. In this report, we expose the inner workings of scam compounds and the sophisticated criminal ecosystem sustaining them.

Repurposed hotels, casinos, and private compounds across Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and the Philippines have become centres of global fraud. These compounds are operated by organized criminal networks that exploit hundreds of thousands of people, many of whom are trafficked and forced to perpetrate online scams. Victims include not only those defrauded online but also the scam workers themselves, subjected to threats, violence, sexual exploitation and extreme working conditions.

The report details how cyber scams —including ‘pig-butchering’ romance-investment scams, crypto fraud, impersonation and sextortion— now generate tens of billions of dollars annually.

These illicit operations thrive due to weak rule of law, widespread corruption, and complicity from powerful figures who operate as ‘role shifters’ —individuals who blur the lines between government, business and crime. Scam compounds often enjoy protection from local elites and security forces, and rely on global money laundering networks, including cryptocurrencies and high-risk financial services providers.

This in-depth analysis, based on extensive fieldwork and case studies, highlights the devastating economic, human rights and security implications of cyber scam operations.

The report calls for urgent, coordinated responses, including better victim identification systems, crackdowns on enablers, and reforms to protect vulnerable communities.

Geneva, SWIT: 5 Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2025. 68p.

By James C. Wo, Ethan M. Rogers

Urban greenspace (UGS) has been recently linked to public safety. Criminologists, however, have been largely absent from the discussion about this association, despite having important theoretical tools and empirical findings to contribute. In the current study, we review the prominent criminological perspectives that may be used to explain the association between UGS and crime. Furthermore, we draw from prior work to extend beyond the question of whether UGS affects crime to the more crucial question of when it does. Using a sample of block groups in Washington, D.C., we examine the association between two measures of UGS—tree canopy coverage and noncanopy vegetation coverage—and violent and property crime. We also assess the moderating effects of antecedents to social disorganization (poverty and homeownership) on the association between UGS and crime. Our results suggest that both types of UGS are associated with fewer crimes, even while controlling for a range of criminogenic factors. The effects of tree canopy coverage appear to be crime general, while the effects of noncanopy vegetation coverage only apply to violent crime. The effects of tree canopy, however, are weaker in communities characterized by high levels of poverty and low levels of homeownership.

Criminology, Volume62, Issue 2, May 2024, Pages 236-275

By David Jinkins, Elira Kuka, Claudio Labanca

Research on the social safety net examines its effects on recipients and their families. We show that these effects extend beyond recipients’ families. Using a regression discontinuity design and administrative data, we study a Danish policy that cut welfare benefits for refugees, increasing crime among affected individuals. Linking refugees to neighbors, we find increased crime among non-Danish neighbors, with spillovers persisting even after direct effects stabilize. Accounting for these spillovers raises the marginal value of public funds by 20%. We explore several mechanisms and find evidence consistent with peer effects among young individuals from the same country of origin.

IZA DP No. 17958

Bonn: IZA – Institute of Labor Economics , 2025. 85p.

By Vaclav Prusa

Liberia’s mining sector accounts for a significant amount of its GDP, but its economic potential is undermined by bribery and political interference in licensing and the granting of concession agreements. While data on illicit financial flows (IFFs) derived from or enabled by corruption is limited, bribery cases involving foreign companies, the prevalence of trade mispricing and existence of a professional enabler industry, suggest vulnerabilities. Corruption and IFFs in the sector create fiscal losses, lead to environmental degradation and foster instability. Best practices for mitigation include robust legal frameworks, enhanced transparency and accountancy mechanisms, greater regional collaboration and community engagement.

Bergen: U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre, Chr. Michelsen InstituteU4 HELPDESK ANSWER 10 2025. 30p.

By Mathias Bak and Matthew Jenkins

Illicit financial flows (IFFs) undermine economic growth by weakening institutional quality, state legitimacy, facilitating corruption and discouraging foreign and domestic investment. Empirical studies that have explicitly assessed the links between IFFs and economic growth, either on a regional scale or at the national level, generally find that illicit financial outflows have a negative and significant impact on core determinants of economic growth, notably domestic investment. Evidence suggests that IFFs not only hinder growth in source countries but also distort investment patterns in destination countries, particularly in real estate markets.

Bergen: U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre, Chr. Michelsen Institute (U4 Helpdesk Answer 2025: 2. 44p.

By STEVEN BYERS, MITCH MORRISSEY & JOHN KELLNER

The last year has brought some relief to Colorado’s fentanyl overdose problem, but some measures may still be needed to erase the drug’s explosive fatality growth in the last decade. Colorado state legislators implemented stricter penalties for fentanyl possession and distribution in 2022, though those reforms have been criticized by law enforcement as not going far enough. Since the legislation’s passage, fentanyl deaths have been declining. There is evidence that similar measures in other U.S. states are producing similar results. In the Common Sense Institute’s drug overdose competitiveness index, Colorado’s ranking decreased through the early 2020s and remained at 2023 levels in 2024. This suggests Colorado’s declining drug overdose rates are falling less than in other states. Local drug seizure figures have declined since 2022. At the federal level, policy changes correlate to declining overdose rates as well. The southwestern border has seen fentanyl seizures fall since the fall of 2024. Officials should take note that fentanyl overdose rates have moved in the right direction following policy implementation. As fentanyl overdoses remain highly elevated, leaders should consider whether additional policies could press the overdose rate down even further.

Greenwood Village, CO:Common Sense Institute, 2025. 22p.

By Michelle Kendler-Kretsch

The US Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) appears to have a renewed interest in a sanctions tool first used in 2001: blocking individuals and entities pending investigation. Used in two recent sets of listings, the tool offers the agility and speed necessary to quickly and efficiently dismantle financing networks and sanctions evasion tactics. Its strategic application warrants closer attention from financial institutions, who must be responsive to their compliance obligations. Non-government organizations (NGOs) may be aware of opportunities where they can advocate for OFAC to take greater advantage of this option, particularly in cases related to sanctions evasion and conflict financing. In parallel, NGOs can also play a vital role by sharing information that supports implementation and, where applicable, reinforces the credibility of these provisional designations.

Washington, DC: The Sentry, 2025. 22p.

By ENACT Africa

In West and North Africa, a variety of criminal actors, geographically scattered from origin to destination countries, benefit from the sex trafficking process. Available information suggests that transnational trafficking is controlled by networks of cells operating in synergy from origin to destination country. Traffickers tend to have the same nationality as their victims. In West Africa, a wide diversity of nationalities of offenders are represented and there is a relatively equal distribution of men and women among offenders. Women offenders, whose role has been expanded through the digitalization of the sex trafficking process, are sometimes depicted as heads of organized crime groups (OCGs). However, it is essential to nuance this representation. While some women do hold leadership positions, others are likely to be working under the control of male-dominated criminal networks. European countries have requested the publication of most INTERPOL Notices and Diffusions targeting West and North African offenders involved in sex trafficking, with a majority of these targeting Nigerian nationals. This suggests strong linkages between OCGs from these countries, notably Nigeria, and sex trafficking in Europe. Information also suggests a possible recent decrease in activity of Nigerian OCGs involved in sex trafficking. However, this apparent decline may also be attributed to the crime becoming more clandestine, making it harder for law enforcement to detect. In West Africa, it is likely that the majority of sex trafficking victims are from Nigeria and other West African countries. To a lesser extent, victims also come from Central Africa and Asia. Due to cultural taboos, informal resolution mechanisms, and underreporting, there are likely more victims of sex trafficking in West Africa. Information indicates that minor victims are trafficked alongside adult victims for sexual exploitation. The West and North Africa regions are characterized by a complex network of domestic, intra-regional and inter-regional flows. Most victims are exploited within their home country and domestic sex trafficking can be considered as a precursor to international sex trafficking. Domestically or internationally, the victims are transported from rural areas to wealthier urban areas or locations of relative economic prosperity such as mines, agricultural sites, and commercial centers. Within West Africa, most countries are identified as either source, transit, or destination countries. Outgoing flows of victims from West Africa are primarily oriented towards North Africa. North and West African victims are also moved to Europe, transiting via countries such as Niger, Mali, Cabo Verde, Mauritania, Senegal, Libya, Algeria, and Morocco to reach Europe. Most West African victims of sexual exploitation identified in Europe are from Nigeria and reportedly transited via Niger and Libya to Italy. There is also a significant flow of victims from West Africa to the Middle East, or towards Central and South African regions. The modus operandi for recruiting victims almost always involves false promises of a better life abroad disseminated online through mainstream social media platforms. Technology also facilitates the control and sexual exploitation of the victims.

Lyon, France, INTERPOL/Impact Africa, 2025. 42p.

By Kate Seymour, Sarah Wendt,Sharyn Goudie

Family and domestic violence (FDV) is a widespread social issue in Australia with significant health, welfare, and economic consequences. While the FDV workforce is increasingly recognised, at both the Commonwealth and state/territory levels, as a key piece of the puzzle in addressing FDV in Australia, there remains limited understanding of the work itself. 

This report describes research exploring the domestic and family violence workforce in Australia and the work that it undertakes. It focuses specifically on how the work is done and experienced, why it is done in particular ways, and the structural and organisational contexts that shape this work.

The aims of the research were to: 

1. generate a coherent, qualitative evidence base on the nature and experiences of domestic and family violence work across three key domains: victim services, perpetrator services and Aboriginal specialist services

2. conceptualise the domestic and family violence workforce with reference to the nature of the work across these three domains

3. recommend workforce development strategies that are responsive to the context and needs of domestic and family violence work.

Key findings

• The diverse sociocultural and institutional contexts within which organisations operated shaped understandings of violence as well as perceptions of the skills and capacities that constitute, or are valued in, domestic and family violence work.

• DFV services (like other social welfare services) are subject to budget rationalisation, narrow funding models, and competition for government contracts and funding. This was evident across all organisations but was especially marked in victim services in the form of an intensified pace & volume of work, and accountability to funding bodies.

• Differences in work conditions were observed across the victim and perpetrator service sectors, suggesting a gendered demarcation between women’s work (victim support – caring work, femininised and devalued) and men’s work (perpetrator accountability – challenging, ‘man-to-man’).

• The weight of responsibility associated with managing risk was especially acute for workers in victim services but relatively absent in perpetrator services where ‘high risk’ matters (i.e. immediate safety concerns) were diverted to a designated partner contact worker.

• Community and social activism were central to the work in Aboriginal FDV services as workers dealt daily with the enduring and deeply entrenched impacts of colonisation.

Adelaide: Flinders University, 2025. 96p.

by Kate Fitz-Gibbon, Sandra Walklate, Ellen Reeves

This project represents the first study in Australia and New Zealand to examine the degree to which a DVDS provides an effective intervention for victim-survivors of intimate partner violence in enhancing their safety. The findings from this project are relevant to current policy discussions and evaluations of the DVDS in all Australian states and territories, as well as in comparable international jurisdictions, including New Zealand, Canada, United States, Scotland, England and Wales.

Monash University and University of Liverpool, 2024; 50p.

By The Legislative Assembly Committee on Law and Safety ,

Parliament of New South Wales

Crime is a serious concern for many regional and rural communities in New South Wales (NSW). Since the COVID-19 pandemic, young people are increasingly involved in certain forms of crime, like motor vehicle theft. Participants in this inquiry emphasised that youth offending is a deeply complex social issue, and one that cannot be solved through increased policing alone. Early intervention is the most effective way to prevent young people from engaging in criminal behaviour. Smart, evidence-based strategies are required to deliver lasting change for communities.

There are excellent programs being delivered across NSW but there are also service gaps, inefficiencies in referral processes, and limitations around government funding that undermine the effectiveness of early intervention efforts.

The report makes a number of recommendations for improvement in areas such as supports for victims of crime; upskilling youth service providers; targeted early intervention programs; and partnering with community and educational organisations.

Key findings

While property crime in regional NSW has fallen over the two decades to 2023, it remains significantly higher compared to Greater Sydney.

Sensationalist media coverage of youth crime in rural and regional NSW heightens public anxiety and encourages negative perceptions of young people.

Youth crime is significantly impacting regional and rural communities, undermining community cohesion and adversely affecting the mental health of victims of crime and their families.

Use of violence is increasing in some cohorts of young people and is linked to offending behaviour.

Youth service providers need targeted training so they can work safely and constructively with young people who use violence.

Sydney: Parliament of New South Wales, 2025. 147p.

By The Victorian Auditor-General

School staff have a right to feel and be safe at work. Work-related violence resulting from student behaviour can negatively impact school staff's health and wellbeing. Work-related violence includes behaviours ranging from verbal abuse to physical assaults. This audit examined students behaving in a violent way toward staff in Victorian government schools.

The Department of Education must provide and maintain a safe workplace for government school staff. This audit examines if the Department provides and maintains a work environment that is safe from work-related violence resulting from student behaviour.

The report presents three key findings and four recommendations. The Department of Education has accepted the recommendations in full or in principle.

Key findings

The Department does not record and report all work-related violence incidents resulting from student behaviour.

The Department's work-related violence policies meet its legislative obligations, but it does not comprehensively review those policies.

The Department provides staff resources and training to manage work-related violence resulting from student behaviour.

Recommendations

Establish a mechanism to better estimate under-recording of work-related violence resulting from student behaviour.

Review and fix data issues to ensure incidents are reported completely to the Department’s executive leadership.

Strengthen the approach to reviewing and updating all policies and procedures for managing work-related violence as an occupational health and safety issue.

Ensure there is consistent criteria on when to conduct post-incident reviews and incorporate the lessons learned into policy reviews.

Melbourne: Victorian Auditor General, 2025. 33p.

By Heather Douglas, Kath Kerr

This review of the evidence focuses on First Nations women’s engagement with the family law system, especially in the context of family violence (FV). It consolidates key considerations gathered from existing research about, and by, First Nations people and their engagement with colonial structures and institutions.

First Nations women face a significantly higher risk of FV than non-First Nations women and are also at greater risk of having their children removed from their care by state-based child protection agencies. The family law system may offer some protection against child removal. As such, identifying barriers and exploring how these barriers to the family law system can be dismantled for First Nations women is a vital component of Australia’s strategy to reduce FV risks and harm.

This review finds that there has been limited research specifically on First Nations women’s engagement with family law in the context of FV. Further research to identify and understand the needs of First Nations women in the family law system, especially in the context of FV, is necessary. This is required to continue to enhance accessibility, equity, inclusiveness and outcomes for First Nations people and to prioritise the identification of systemic reform and to highlight required service changes and other reforms as part of this endeavour.

Canberra: ARC Centre of Excellence for the Elimination of Violence Against Women, 2025. 29p.