By Schouten, Peer; Barnett, James

Banditry in northwest Nigeria has emerged as a pervasive security challenge, yet remains overshadowed by the focus on jihadist violence in the region. This report examines the evolution of banditry as a decentralised and dynamic phenomenon, encompassing cattle rustling, kidnapping for ransom, extortion and illicit mining. Unlike jihadist groups, bandit networks operate without ideological ambitions but significantly influence rural governance, challenging state authority through both roving predation and stationary extortion. The study explores the structure of bandit society, revealing a fragmented yet resilient hierarchy where power is defined by access to weapons, wealth and followers. Based on extensive field research and historical analysis, the report highlights how contemporary banditry borrows from precolonial patterns of violent regulation. It maps the emerging political geography of banditry, which, like precolonial rule, involves a system of concentric circles: bandit heartlands marked by cohabitation and governance, tribute zones where communities pay levies for security, and volatile raiding frontiers. This spatial model offers new insight into the variable of banditry and its differential effects on rural communities

DIIS Report Vol. 2025 No. 07 Copenhagen: DIIS: Danish Institute for International Studies, 2025. 77p.

By Daniel C. Semenza PhD 1 2 3, Ian A. Silver PhD 4, Richard Stansfield PhD 1, Brielle Savage MA 5

Firearm dealer presence and density are associated with rates of local firearm violence, a significant threat to public safety and collective well-being in the U.S. However, the authors are unaware of any studies that have examined how dealer presence and absence influence shooting rates over time using longitudinal data.

Methods

This study investigates the relationship between licensed firearm dealer presence and firearm violence using longitudinal data from over 20,000 census tracts in the 100 largest cities in the U.S. from 2015 to 2022. The analysis was conducted in 2025. The association between licensed firearm dealer openings and closings and total shooting rates was analyzed across 1-, 2-, and 3-year lag periods to account for differences in how dealer presence influences local firearm violence dynamics over time.

Results

Findings demonstrate that neighborhoods with newly opened firearm dealers experience increases in shootings that sustain after 2 and 3 years. No significant effects were found for firearm dealer closings.

Conclusions

The results highlight a complex temporal dynamic, suggesting that firearm availability through licensed firearm dealers may influence patterns of shootings within communities, particularly when new dealers open in neighborhoods without a prior dealer presence over time.

American Journal of Preventive Medicine 10 October 2025, 108079 In Press, Corrected Proof

By Sutherland R, Uporova J, Karlsson A, Palmer L, Tayeb H, Chrzanowska A, Chandrasena U, Price O, Bruno R, Dietze P, Lenton S, Salom C, Radke S, Curran J, Vella-Horne D, Wilson J, Daly C, Thomas N, Degenhardt L, Farrell M, & Peacock A

The IDRS comprises a sentinel sample of people who regularly inject illicit drugs, recruited via advertisements in needle syringe programs and other harm reduction services, as well as via peer referral, across each capital city of Australia. The results are not representative of all people who inject drugs, nor of use in the general population. Data were collected in 2025 from May-July. Since 2020, interviews were delivered face-toface as well as via telephone, to reduce risk of COVID-19 transmission; all interviews prior to 2020 were conducted face-to-face. This methodological change should be factored into all comparisons of data from the 2020-2025 samples relative to previous years.

Australian Drug Trends 2025: Key Findings from the National Illicit Drug Reporting System (IDRS) Interviews. Sydney: National Drug and Alcohol Research Centre, UNSW Sydney; 2025

The UN and the African Union (AU) have repeatedly warned about the growing use of mercenaries and private military companies (PMCs) in conflict situations. Concerns include the involvement of mercenary groups in transnational organized crime and human rights violations, and the ‘re-routing’ of weapons intended for a state’s military to mercenary groups and PMCs. This re-routing of weapons undermines international and domestic arms control regimes, which are intended to ensure that arms are not used to undermine peace and security, or breach human rights. Since 2021, Mali’s security and political landscape has transformed. After coming to power, the military junta invited the Wagner Group into the country, cut ties with Mali’s former security partners, requested the departure of international forces (from France and the UN peacekeeping mission) and (in 2024) left the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). In this new landscape, the Wagner Group emerged as the junta’s new ally and was soon actively involved in combat operations against insurgents. The Wagner Group’s tenure in Mali, as widely documented by UN bodies, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and the media, was characterized by serious human rights abuses and war crimes, including massacres, torture and rapes of civilians, and criminal activity, from looting communities to illicit taxation of gold mining sites. For observers of the conflict, such atrocities were not unexpected, as Wagner troops were operating alongside the Malian Armed Forces (Forces Armées Maliennes, FAMa), which have been accused of human rights violations and mismanagement of weapons. However, with the deployment of Wagner troops, violence against civilians increased drastically, beyond the norms set previously by FAMa – civilian casualties per incident doubled between 2021 and 2024. The Wagner Group did not arrive in Mali fully equipped, and troops were expected to source weapons locally, which they did through seizing arms during combat and stealing official stock. This was one of the reasons for communications between Wagner and FAMa troops breaking down. From 2023, joint Wagner/FAMa missions declined, meaning that the Wagner troops operated independently using FAMa-owned equipment. Drawing from an extensive review of open-source material related to Wagner Group operations in Mali and interviews with military sources in Mali and other experts, this paper identifies instances of weapons and equipment intended for use by FAMa being re-routed to Wagner, enabling war crimes and human rights violations. They include FAMa armoured vehicles, vehicle-mounted heavy machine guns (widely known as ‘technicals’) and possibly attack drones – all of which are covered under the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT). Some instances of re-routing weapons from FAMa to the Wagner Group appear to be in breach of commitments under the ATT, which has been signed by Mali, as well as some of the domestic arms control commitments of several weapons-supplying countries. The Wagner Group’s operations in Mali came to an end in June 2025, and the group has been replaced with the Africa Corps, which is more closely controlled by the Russian state but continues to employ a majority of former-Wagner personnel. Therefore, the Wagner Group may have left Mali in name but has not left in practice. Furthermore, Wagner’s operations in Mali are just one example of re-routing state-to-state transfers of weapons to private military actors, which undermines the international legal frameworks that regulate the arms trade. The international community will need to deal with the phenomenon of the growing use of mercenaries and PMCs in global conflicts and their impact on arms control regimes. The paper makes recommendations for improving governance of the sector, which are summarized below: ■ Arms-exporting countries should undertake additional due diligence when considering an export to any country that has engaged with, hired or collaborated with a PMC. ■ Arms manufacturers should also undertake additional due diligence when looking to supply countries that have engaged with PMCs. ■ International forums on arms control and counter-proliferation should address the emerging role of PMCs in global conflicts, and the impact on arms control mechanisms and on reshaping illicit arms markets. ■ The AU should revise the 1977 Convention for the Elimination of Mercenaries in Africa to include better provisions for monitoring human rights abuses by mercenaries, including those that are backed by a third-party state. ■ International peacekeeping forces should continue to ensure that any equipment left following drawdown is withdrawn or destroyed in line with UN guidelines. After providing a background on the Wagner Group’s tenure in Mali, this paper documents evidence of weapons and equipment intended for use by FAMa being re-routed to Wagner Group operations, enabling war crimes and human rights violations. It then examines the legal implications for exporting countries, arms suppliers and Mali of arms transferred to FAMa being re-routed to Wagner. In so doing, the paper provides a case study that highlights the need for global arms control regimes to grapple with the growing reality of rogue PMCs being embedded within national militaries and the hybridization of PMCs in conflict and organized criminal activity. As the UN Working Group (UNWG) 2024 report indicates, this is a broader issue than just the Wagner Group and their recent tenure in Mali.

Geneva: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime. 2025. 36p.

By Arthur MacDonald.

The narrative in Volume 1 asks many pointed questions: What does it mean to be “abnormal”? Who decides? And how have these judgments shaped modern science, education, and criminal justice?

First published in 1893, Arthur MacDonald’s Abnormal Man is one of the earliest American attempts to systematically study human difference through the emerging tools of psychology, anthropology, and criminology. Drawing on international research—from European criminal anthropology to American child-study movements—MacDonald sought to classify the physical, mental, and moral traits considered “aberrant” in his era. His work reflects the hopes and anxieties of a society confronting rapid industrialization, immigration, social change, and new scientific approaches to crime and mental health.

To the modern reader, Abnormal Man reveals both the ambition and the pitfalls of nineteenth-century science. Its pages contain pioneering observations about child development, deviance, and social responsibility, alongside early theories—now discredited—about heredity, physiognomy, and race. What emerges is a vivid and sometimes unsettling portrait of a culture striving to understand human variation without the benefit of modern psychology or ethical safeguards.

The Read-Me.org edition Volume 1 presents Abnormal Man as both a historical artifact and a gateway to critical reflection. It illustrates how scientific thought evolves, how cultural bias can shape research, and how early debates about abnormality laid the groundwork for contemporary approaches to mental health, special education, criminology, and social policy. To make such work, much of it controversial then as it is today, minimally believable, requires extensive documentation. The voluminous Bibliography of Abnormal Man reproduced here in Volume 2, contains all that Macdnald referred to within his detailed exposition. To some, his arguments may seem unsupported, or lacking in evidence. But he left no stone untuned as this amazing bibliographical documentation of all relative contemporary research

A foundational text at the crossroads of science and society, Abnormal Man invites readers to explore the origins of modern debates about deviance, diversity, and the boundaries of the “normal.”

Read-Me.Org Inc. New York-Philadelphia-Australia. 2025. 240p.

By Arthur MacDonald. Introduction by Graeme R. Newman

What does it mean to be “abnormal”? Who decides? And how have these judgments shaped modern science, education, and criminal justice?

First published in 1893, Arthur MacDonald’s Abnormal Man is one of the earliest American attempts to systematically study human difference through the emerging tools of psychology, anthropology, and criminology. Drawing on international research—from European criminal anthropology to American child-study movements—MacDonald sought to classify the physical, mental, and moral traits considered “aberrant” in his era. His work reflects the hopes and anxieties of a society confronting rapid industrialization, immigration, social change, and new scientific approaches to crime and mental health.

To the modern reader, Abnormal Man reveals both the ambition and the pitfalls of nineteenth-century science. Its pages contain pioneering observations about child development, deviance, and social responsibility, alongside early theories—now discredited—about heredity, physiognomy, and race. What emerges is a vivid and sometimes unsettling portrait of a culture striving to understand human variation without the benefit of modern psychology or ethical safeguards.

This new Read-Me.org edition presents Abnormal Man as both a historical artifact and a gateway to critical reflection. It illustrates how scientific thought evolves, how cultural bias can shape research, and how early debates about abnormality laid the groundwork for contemporary approaches to mental health, special education, criminology, and social policy.

A foundational text at the crossroads of science and society, Abnormal Man invites readers to explore the origins of modern debates about deviance, diversity, and the boundaries of the “normal.”

Read-Me.Org Inc. New York-Philadelphia-Australia. 2025. p.193.

By Florence Yosne. National Criminal Justice Educational Development Project Portland State University And Center Of Criminal Justice Arizona State University.

From the Introduction: This bibliography is the result of a cooperative effort between Portland State University and Arizona State University. It was developed in response to a need for a comprehensive and detailed multi-disciplinary compilation of available books and government documents that relate to the emerging field of Criminal Justice. Professional journals and magazine sources were not included due to person power constraints and the recognition that many of the more significant articles and statements relating to Criminal Justice can be found contained in recently-published books.

The bibliography is broken down into four general substantive areas: (1) criminal justice; (2) law enforcement; (3) corrections;  and (4) courts. The majority of the works are included under the heading "Criminal Justice." In this area, titles are included from such diverse fields as anthropology, economics, education, history, law, political science, psychology, the physical sciences, public administration, and sociology. The other three areas--"Law, Enforcement, " "Corrections, " and "Courts"--while more specific in nature, also reflect the use of information and research from many related and diverse sources.

Clearly, the specific subjects appearing within these four broad rubrics are varied and numerous. In order to facilitate the use of this bibliography, the four broad areas were further broken down into specific subjects such as "civil liberties, " "victimless crimes, " etc., with bibliography entries relating to those topics being identified. The detailed classification of bibliography entries appears at the end of this "Introduction."

It will be readily apparent to the user that the bibliography is multi-disciplinary in nature. This reflects the editor's view that Criminal Justice is a multi-disciplinary, problem-oriented field of scholarship, research, and teaching, embracing those aspects of the social, behavioral, natural, and medical sciences relating to understanding crime and social deviance and entailing a critical examination of the system which has evolved for the handling of attendant problems. The selection of authors, titles, and subjects reflects the need of Criminal Justice, as an emerging field of study, to be sensitive to the ideas and philosophies of a wide range of scholar sand researchers. A bibliography with a narrow focus is of organization and functioning of an entire society.

The sources for the bibliography were legion, and they also reflect the multi-disciplinary approach. Bibliographies from the faculty at Portland State University, Florida Slate University, Michigan State University, San Jose State University, and the University of California at Berkeley, in addition to the Index of Books in Print, catalogs from the National Criminal Justice Reference Service, lists from publishers, and reviews from the New York Review of Books, Psychology Today, and the Atlantic Monthly, provided the editor with the reference material necessary for so vast an undertaking.

 MEMBERS NATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE EDUCATIONAL CONSORTIUM. 1975. 418p.

By Kacper Rekawek, Julian Lanchès, and Maria Zotova 

In this Report, Kacper Rekawek, Julian Lanchès, and Maria Zotova document how Russia has institutionalised a “crime-terror nexus” in its hybrid warfare strategy by recruiting criminal actors with weak societal ties across Europe to carry out kinetic and non-kinetic operations in support of state policy. They argue that since its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, this nexus has become central to Moscow’s ability to project power and evade accountability, and they offer policy recommendations to help European states and EU institutions detect, disrupt, and contain these criminally driven hybrid threats.

This report takes stock of Russian hybrid warfare in Europe in the context of its war of aggression against Ukraine. While doing so, it offers more than a catalogue of kinetic incidents attributed to Moscow; it focuses on the perpetrators and situates their actions within Russia’s longstanding reliance on hybrid warfare. This analysis highlights that many of these actors have criminal backgrounds and demonstrates how Russia has built its own state-driven “crime-terror nexus.” The phenomenon recalls earlier patterns seen in terrorist organisations such as ISIS, which recruited Europe’s criminals into violent campaigns under the guise of ideological redemption. This time, however, the state itself actively recruits and grooms socially marginalised, often Russian-speaking individuals residing in Europe to assist in state terrorism against European societies. This strategy complements the “spook-gangster” nexus that has for years underpinned Russia’s governance and operationalisation of foreign policy. Since the 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine, this nexus has become even more instrumental in mitigating the economic and geopolitical consequences of Moscow’s aggression. The report shows the extent to which criminality – whether through direct reliance on criminals to conduct attacks or through the “spook-gangster” nexus – constitutes a central pillar of Russia’s hybrid warfare. It opens with an overview of the phenomenon and traces Russia’s experience with hybrid tactics back to at least the 1920s. It then explores Moscow’s enduring use of criminality as a tool of domestic control and foreign policy, with particular emphasis on the post-2022 period. A brief comparative perspective highlights how other hostile state actors similarly integrate criminality into hybrid campaigns waged globally. All of these components build toward the report’s central focus: an assessment of Russia’s kinetic campaign as an integral part of its broader hybrid warfare, and of the actors enabling it. The final section provides practical recommendations to inform policies for both national authorities and EU institutions.

GLOBSEC and the International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT)2025. 23p.

By Olga Smirnovaa and Thomas J. Holt

Research on cybercrime-as-service markets has increased substantially over the last decade, particularly the use of so-called booter and stresser services that enable individuals to engage in high volume denial of service attacks against websites and servers. There is far less research considering the reven-ues vendors may generate from running these services, calling to question whether the economic gains from this form of crime are greater than the potential risk of arrest or legal sanctions. This analysis attempted to estimate the revenues of 42 booter and stresser services in operation after a series of arrests and takedowns by law enforcement. The models presented were basedon the visible characteristics of vendor services, attack volume and customer detail. Three pricing tiers were developed using different potential distribu-tions for booter/stressor markets and find that their potential revenues are of such a magnitude that they may be viewed as an incentive for individuals to enter the market and persist despite the risk of formal sanctions.

DEVIANT BEHAVIOR, 2025, VOL. 46, NO. 10, 1300–1313

By Chad Whelan, David Bright, James Martin, Callum Jones and Benoît Dupont

Ransomware is one of the most prolific and economically damaging cybercrime threats of the contemporary era. This exploratory study aims to enhance knowledge about ransomware criminal groups. Our focus is on ransomware criminal groups that targeted organisations in Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United Kingdom between 2020 and 2022. The paper examines the evolution and activities of ransomware criminal groups. Results reveal the most active ransomware criminal groups, the median range of their careers and the most targeted victim organisations by country and sector type. 

Trends & issues in crime and criminal justice no. 719. Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology, 2025. 2op.

Summary

In this handbook, researchers from Morgan State University and the Surveillance Technology Oversight Project (S.T.O.P.) expose how New York City has become a pervasive surveillance state that tracks residents' every movement through public and private spaces without consent. Rather than enhancing public safety, this vast network of surveillance technologies threatens civil liberties, reinforces racial inequities, and undermines democratic freedoms while operating with minimal oversight or transparency.

Key Findings Include:

• Pervasive surveillance without consent: New Yorkers are tracked from the moment they leave their homes through an extensive network of CCTV cameras, license plate readers, facial recognition systems, ShotSpotter gunshot detectors, and data collection from transit cards, bike shares, and WiFi kiosks; most without their knowledge or consent.

• Systematic racial bias and overpolicing: Surveillance technologies are disproportionately deployed in communities of color, creating feedback loops that perpetuate overpolicing.

• Vulnerable populations face heightened risks: Justice-involved individuals, undocumented immigrants, public housing residents, and those seeking reproductive or gender-affirming care face amplified surveillance threats that can result in re-incarceration, deportation, eviction, or prosecution for accessing legal healthcare.

• Inaccurate and unaccountable technologies: ShotSpotter alerts result in evidence of actual gunshots only 20% of the time in NYC, yet the city renewed its $21.8 million contract. The NYPD has used facial recognition in 22,000 cases between 2017-2021 despite documented accuracy problems and racial bias.

• Weak oversight and transparency: New York's POST Act provides limited oversight only over NYPD surveillance, with no enforcement power. Unlike other jurisdictions with comprehensive surveillance ordinances, New York lacks meaningful public input, independent oversight, or restrictions on surveillance technology procurement and use.

• Threats to democracy and civil liberties: Surveillance of activists and protesters chills free speech and assembly. The technology enables tracking of individuals seeking abortion care, attending religious services, or engaging in political activities; fundamentally threatening democratic participation.

• Public-private surveillance partnerships: Companies like Amazon (Ring), Cubic (OMNY), and others collect vast amounts of personal data that can be accessed by law enforcement, extending police surveillance capacity through private networks while avoiding public accountability.

In the handbook, we call for comprehensive surveillance oversight ordinances, community engagement in technology decisions, and a fundamental shift toward privacy-protective data collection practices that prioritize civil liberties over mass surveillance.

By Miloš Resimić

Omar al-Bashir’s thirty-year rule transformed Sudan into a kleptocratic state where public resources were systematically diverted to regime cronies, family members and armed actors. A transitional civilian-military government was formed after his ousting in 2019 but was disrupted by a military coup in 2021. The failure to agree on a new governance structure led to the outbreak of civil war in April 2023. Military and paramilitary actors now dominate key sectors of the economy through vast networks of affiliated companies with preferential access to public funds and resources. Agriculture, the energy sector and the environment are vulnerable to corruption, marked by land grabbing, secretive investment deals, diversion of state funds and institutional capture that enables environmental degradation.

Bergen: U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre, Chr. Michelsen Institute. , U4 Help Desk,2025. 35p.

By Caitlin Maslen

“Nature-based” solutions to climate change require the acquisition of large swaths of land for reforestation, afforestation, conservation and renewable energy sources. However, corruption in the land sector is already widespread and this additional demand for land may aggravate pre-existing corruption risks, as well as causing new ones. National governments and project implementers of land-based solutions should therefore implement anti-corruption measures in projects and, most importantly, ensure that they take into account the communities (such as Indigenous Peoples) who may already live on the land.

Bergen: U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre, Chr. Michelsen Institute. , U4 Help Desk,, 2023. 24p.

By Caitlin Maslen

Wetlands are vital ecosystems that play a crucial role in carbon sequestration while supporting the livelihoods of communities worldwide. However, they face growing threats from extractive industries, urban expansion, illegal logging and other destructive activities. Protecting these ecosystems requires countering corruption through transparency and accountability measures. In doing so, this can help wetlands continue to sustain local communities and wildlife, and contribute to nature-based solutions for curbing climate change.

Bergen: U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre, Chr. Michelsen Institute. , U4 Help Desk,2025. 31p.

By Maria Leonor Rodriguez Prat

In Cuba, the economic crisis and resource scarcity contribute to petty corruption, while opaque institutions and military control over key economic sectors enable forms of grand corruption. Cuba’s partial financial isolation both limits and obscures illicit inflows, but select recent cases indicate a growing vulnerability to transnational money laundering. While formal anti-corruption frameworks exist in Cuba, enforcement remains highly selective and politicised, particularly in cases involving state and military elites.

Bergen: U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre, Chr. Michelsen Institute. , U4 Help Desk,2025, 29p.

By Nieves Zúñiga, Jamie Bergin

The Western Balkans is a transit region for smuggling of migrants, trafficking in persons and illicit trade. These illicit activities often perpetrated by organised criminal groups lead to heightened risks of corruption among border officers and customs officials. Dedicated policy responses to border corruption are generally underdeveloped, but there are some emerging positive developments at the national level as well as increasing regional cooperation efforts.

Bergen: U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre, Chr. Michelsen Institute. , U4 Help Desk, 2025. 33p

By Jamie Bergin

Despite challenges in defining and measuring illicit financial flows (IFFs), academic and policy circles have increasingly recognised their negative effects on development, including by reducing domestic resource mobilisation and distorting markets, but also by facilitating predicate crimes that wreak wider harms. Evidence indicates that IFFs similarly undermine recent levels of economic growth and security in the region of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). 

Bergen: U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre, Chr. Michelsen Institute. , U4 Help Desk,2025. 58p

By Thomas Young

Financial fraud is on the rise nationally. Across all 50 states and D.C., the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) Internet Crime report tracked 859,532 fraud claims in 2024. These claims resulted in $16.6 billion in financial loss, up 33% from 2023. A separate source, the Federal Trade Commission’s (FTC) Consumer Sentinel Network, reported 2.6 million fraud cases in 2024, of which 38% involved losing money. According to this source, citizens reported losing $12 billion to fraud, up $2 billion from 2023. This study seeks to answer the pressing question: What is the extent of financial fraud in Colorado and its impact on the lives of everyday Coloradans and the overall health of the state’s economy?

According to the Colorado Department of Public Safety, reported fraud cases summed to 75,119 from 2022 through 2024. Financial fraud is also costly, with the FTC reporting the total financial loss of financial fraud at $211 million statewide in 2024, up 314% since 2020. The FBI reported $244 million in losses from online (formally referred to as cyber-enabled) crime in Colorado, up 142% since 2020. These are just the reported figures. Unreported loss from financial fraud is higher.

The FBI reports that among all states Colorado ranks 34th best in total losses from online crime; 44th best in online crime per 100,000 citizens; 33rd best for complaints filed by individuals 60+; and 34th best for cryptocurrency losses by state. The FTC Consumer Sentinel Network figures on fraud, identity theft, and telemarketing suggests Colorado is doing slightly better than the FBI’s statistics. Colorado has the 32nd lowest rate of fraud and the 24th lowest rate of identity theft by their metrics.

In Colorado and across the nation, fraudulent financial activity is becoming increasingly sophisticated, encompassing a broad array of schemes such as identity theft, phishing, wire fraud, investment scams, and elder financial abuse. As the digital economy expands and cybercriminal tactics evolve, Coloradans face heightened risks from fraud schemes that attempt to exploit personal vulnerabilities, holes in financial systems, social media platforms, payment technologies, and personal data security. Fraudulent activities result not only in direct financial losses for individuals, businesses, and financial institutions, but they also have ripple effects throughout the state’s economy—affecting prices, consumer behavior, public safety expenditures, and overall economic productivity. 

This report presents evidence of the economic consequences of financial fraud, covering both the direct and indirect costs of fraudulent activity by examining incident data, economic modeling, and a fraud case study. By analyzing trends in fraud—including the types, methods, and demographic factors associated with its presence—it aims to provide policymakers, businesses, and consumers with actionable insights into the economic stakes of financial fraud.

Key Findings

• For the state of Colorado, CSI estimates in 2025 the losses from financial fraud include—

•  An estimated $375 million in direct, reported losses

• An estimated $2.5 billion in unreported losses

• The state’s General Fund will lose an estimated $88 million in tax revenue this year due to financial fraud.

• CSI estimates reported fraud alone will have the following impact on Colorado’s economy in 2025:

  • A $954 million reduction in state GDP

  • A $932 million reduction in statewide personal income

  • A loss of approximately 6,628 jobs

• Estimates on the reporting of financial fraud suggest formal reporting of financial fraud may be quite low, with one estimate putting the figure at 14%. This means that most financial fraud does not get reported to government authorities.

• CSI estimates all financial fraud, reported and unreported, will have the following impact on Colorado’s economy in 2025:

• A $5.1 billion reduction in state GDP ($856 per person)

• A $3.9 billion reduction in statewide personal income ($655 per person)

• A loss of approximately 16,374 jobs (0.5% of nonfarm jobs)

• Financial fraud has wide-ranging economic implications. The impact is felt across consumer spending, interest rates, available loanable funds, capital investment, government spending and taxing, profit, and community trust.

• Colorado’s incidence of financial fraud is around the middle of the states at 18th highest, at 1,260 reported incidents per 100,000 residents, lower than 17th ranked California at 1,291 and 19th ranked Mississippi at 1,221. The states with the highest incidence of financial fraud are Florida and Georgia with rates that are 72% and 67% higher than Colorado’s. 

Greenwood Village,  CO: Common Sense Institute 2025. 24p.

By Women's Aid Child First

Nineteen More Child Homicides is the third report published by Women’s Aid in the past three decades as part of Women’s Aid Child First campaign. This report tells the stories of children who have been killed by a parent who is a perpetrator of domestic abuse through child contact (formally or informally arranged). Nearly a decade on from the publication of Nineteen Child Homicides, this report documents a further 19 children’s lives that have been lost as a result of unsafe contact arrangements. These findings illustrate the need for a culture shift at all levels to domestic abuse from professionals involved in child contact arrangements, whether informal and formal. 

Bristol:  Women’s Aid, June 2025   62p.

By Kerry L. Papps 

The effects on criminal behaviour of raising the minimum wage for those aged 25 and over in the United Kingdom are analysed, using data on police stop and search activities. A 1% increase in the minimum wage raises the fraction of people stopped by the police by 2.96%, the fraction of people caught with an incriminating item by 1.43%, and the fraction of people arrested as a consequence by 1.27%. This effect is almost entirely driven by drug searches made outside business hours, suggesting that the minimum wage raises crime principally by raising disposable income – and drug consumption – among workers. 

IZA DP No. 17989  Bonn: IZA – Institute of Labor Economics, 2025. 27p.