By R. Evan Ellis

The security environment in Mexico is characterized by a dangerous fragmentation of and competition among criminal groups that pushed the nation’s homicide rate to a record high of 22.5 per 100,000 in 2017, a 27.5 percent increase over the prior year.1 The nation, whose security and prosperity strongly impacts the United States through geographic proximity and associated flows of people, money, and goods (both licit and illicit), is at a critical juncture in its fight against transnational organized crime. Since Mexican President Felipe Calderón launched the “war against the cartels” in December 2006 with the deployment of the Mexican army into the state of Michoacán, the nation’s security forces have taken down the leaders of multiple powerful criminal groups and debilitated their organizations.2 In the process, the Mexican military, police, and other security institutions have evolved their institutional structures, modified both their strategy and their doctrine, and strengthened their ability to combat transnational organized crime. Yet as with the experience of the United States in combatting terrorist groups in Iraq and Afghanistan, Mexico’s fight against the cartels, both despite and because of its successes, has created a more chaotic criminal landscape, with both a higher level of violence and a broader range of criminality.

Complicating Mexico’s security challenge is the disposition of the Trump administration to act aggressively against illegal immigration from Mexico (among other countries) into the United States, along with U.S. renegotiation and possible abandonment of the North American Free Trade Agreement. These actions increase stressors on Mexico, including the prospect of expanded deportations of immigrants to Mexico, the loss of remittance income, and impeded access by Mexican producers to the U.S. market. The Trump administration’s actions, magnified by rhetoric that many Mexicans perceive as an insult to their country and people, have combined with Mexican frustration over the persistence of violence and corruption to create the real prospect that leftist populist candidate Andrés Manuel López Obrador could win the July 2018 presidential election, potentially taking Mexico on a course of more distant political relations and decreased security cooperation with the United States and expanded engagement with extra-hemispheric rivals of the United States such as Russia and China.

This article examines Mexico’s serious and evolving security challenges, and the key initiatives and critical issues confronting the nation’s security forces. It argues that the Mexican government has made important progress against a range of criminal groups and in innovating and strengthening its own capabilities to combat such entities and associated flows of illegal goods—capabilities that deserve to be recognized, further refined, and exploited in partnership with the United States and Mexico’s other neighbors. It concludes with recommendations for U.S. policy makers regarding the importance of strong and respectful support for Mexico at the present critical juncture.

2028. 13p.

Women and Illicit Finance in Russia’s Occupation of Ukraine Orly Stern Olivia Allison

Addressing police and military involvement in serious organised crime (Research Paper 39)

Lee Schlenker

US–Mexico security tensions are reaching potentially unprecedented levels amid repeated threats from President Trump to unilaterally strike Mexican drug cartels, which he now claims “run” the country. The violent reaction by the Cartel Jalisco Nueva Generación, or CJNG, after the Mexican National Guard killed its leader, “El Mencho,” with the support of US military intelligence in late February underscores the broad impacts of cartel terror in Mexico and the lack of neat solutions to eliminating it. 

What restraint-oriented strategies can the United States and Mexico develop together to tackle this scourge? To address the issue of crime and drugs from Mexico, Congress has appropriated $3.6 billion in security assistance between 2008 and 2024, and the Trump administration has designated six Mexican cartels as foreign terrorist organizations. Both of these measures have done little to address the surging demand for illicit narcotics or the “iron river” of US weapons flowing across the border. Meanwhile, Mexican President Claudia Sheinbaum has deployed 10,000 additional troops to the US–Mexico border, transferred almost 100 high-level drug criminals to US custody, and allowed expanded US drone flights over Mexican territory. 

But unilateral US strikes in Mexico and American boots on the ground for joint operations with Mexican personnel remain a red line for Sheinbaum, who, under immense pressure, has overseen targeted interventions in high-crime Mexican states that have led to a 32 percent drop in homicides. 

The Trump administration should focus on three broad policy areas to help effectively stem the flow of illicit narcotics into the United States and weaken transnational criminal threats, while also avoiding counterproductive unilateral military strikes on Mexican territory: 

• Improved security cooperation and bilateral coordination, including making better use of the Department of Defense’s advise-and-assist, educational, and professional training programs as well as exploring a US advisory role in Mexican command centers over the country’s domestic operations. 

• Tougher laws to combat arms smuggling, judicial cooperation to disrupt illicit financial networks and money laundering, and joint cross-border investigations into Mexican and US officials credibly alleged of ties to drug trafficking and corruption. 

• Funding for overdose-prevention and demand-reduction programs, strengthening the Treasury Department’s Counter-Fentanyl Strike Force, and pursuing commercial diplomacy with Mexico and China to stem the production and flow of precursor chemicals. 

Washington, DC: Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft

2026. 6p.

By: Ghaleb Krame, Amanda Davies, Magdalena García & Noé Cuervo Vázquez 

This paper explores the power struggle between the Chapitos and Mayiza factions of the Sinaloa Cartel and its implications for U.S. and Mexican law enforcement. Employing scenario analysis, payoff matrices, and Nash equilibria, the study evaluates potential outcomes of this conflict and their impact on cartel power dynamics. While the Cartel de Jalisco Nueva Generación (CJNG) is poised to exploit instability and expand its influence over fentanyl trafficking and key territories, for the United States of America (U.S.A.), this internal fragmentation complicates efforts to control the opioid crisis. In Mexico, Omar García Harfuch faces the challenge of stabilizing cartel-affected regions and countering CJNG’s growth. A Mayiza victory is seen as the most favorable outcome, reducing violence and curbing CJNG’s expansion. Coordinated intelligence-sharing and strategic responses are essential for regional stability.

Security Journal (2025) 38:57

By Romain Le Cour Grandmaison

This article explores the construction – or reconstruction – of brokerage channels by violent actors in Mexico. It focuses on the construction of the Autodefensas de Michoacán (SelfDefense Groups of Michoacán) and studies the process that put illegal armed leaders in active dialogue with the Mexican federal government, but also how they became brokers capable of controlling access to strategic political resources, economic markets, and the connections that tie local citizens and the central state. Through the concept of political intermediation, I investigate how coercion, as a skill and resource, has become central to governance in Mexico; and how this leads to consolidating intermediaries that participate in reproducing local, violent political order. This article shall contribute to the understanding of brokerage in contexts of violence, and shed new light on the political logic fueling the dynamics of violence in Mexico’s war on drugs. Keywords: drug cartels, brokerage, Mexico, war on drugs, state, violence

European Review of Latin American and Caribbean Studies Revista Europea de Estudios Latinoamericanos y del Caribe 2021.