By Rick Brown, Sarah Napier and Russell G Smith  

In recent years, there has been growing evidence of live streaming technologies being used to facilitate child sexual abuse (CSA). This study examined a sample of financial transactions made by a cohort of Australians who provided funds to known facilitators of CSA live streaming in the Philippines. The results showed that these individuals were likely to be aged in their 50s or 60s and the majority (55%) had no criminal record. Ten percent had a sexual offence recorded in their criminal history. Most CSA live streaming transactions involved a small proportion of individuals. Just three percent accounted for half of all transactions. In contrast, 25 percent of individuals made just three percent of transactions. As individuals purchased more CSA live streaming transactions, the median amounts they paid increased and the transactions became more frequent. These two variables were significantly correlated. This may reflect an escalation in the frequency and severity of offending.  

Trends & issues in crime and criminal justice no. 589. Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology. 2020. 16p.

By Stephen Reimer and Matthew Redhead

Numerous deadly terrorist attacks across Europe – from the 2015 Charlie Hebdo attack in Paris and the Manchester Arena bombing of 2016 to the far-right firearms assault in Hanau, Germany in early 2020 – demonstrate that self-activating terrorism (sometimes referred to as lone actor or small cell terrorism) has become a major security concern for the continent. Much of the current ‘conventional wisdom’ around these kinds of actors assumes that terrorist financing and a counterterrorist financing (CTF) response are not relevant to this growing threat. Reports of attacks involving little to no preparation or financial resourcing have shaped a false perception that self-activator activity produces no usable financial intelligence. This has generated a high degree of unease among both CTF professionals in law enforcement, whose role it is to use legal investigatory powers to apprehend terrorists and would-be terrorists, and practitioners in the financial services sector, whose controls and instruments are designed to identify and report abuse of the financial system by terrorists planning attacks. The natural fear is that if the private sector cannot produce the kind of financial intelligence required, then law enforcement cannot do its job as effectively as it might. In light of this, the European Commission commissioned RUSI Europe to carry out this research study as part of Project CRAAFT, which seeks to answer two related research questions: 

• How do self-activating terrorists operating in Europe conduct their financial attack preparations? 
   

• How should the CTF regime be changed to meet this pervasive terrorist threat? 

For evidence, the research team reviewed relevant academic and policy literature and credible media reports, conducted 37 semi-structured interviews with relevant experts, reviewed 106 cases of successful and disrupted self-activated attacks in Europe between January 2015 and November 2020, and carried out three in-depth case study analyses. 

RUSI Occasional Paper, May 2021 51p.