Antisemitism, Anti-Zionism, and Title VI: A Guide for the Perplexed

By Benjamin Eidelson, Deborah Hellman,

Universities are facing an unprecedented wave of claims that they have violated their obligations to Jewish students under Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. These charges center on an equally unprecedented wave of anti-Israel activity on college campuses, much of which is alleged to cross the line into antisemitism. This essay, forthcoming in the Harvard Law Review Forum, provides one of the first systematic analyses of these exceptionally high-stakes claims about Title VI.

Our analysis reveals that the Title VI claims face formidable hurdles, including some that have received surprisingly little attention thus far. Most fundamentally, Title VI’s omission of “religion” as a protected characteristic means that Jewishness is protected under the statute only insofar as it constitutes a “race” or (less likely) a “national origin.” Under existing law, however, discrimination based on the cultural practices or viewpoints that may be associated with such an immutable characteristic—as Zionism might be associated with Jewishness—is ordinarily not cognizable as discrimination based on the protected characteristic itself. Moreover, if “hostile environment” liability can be founded on offensive conduct that does not constitute covered disparate treatment in its own right, this is likely possible only pursuant to a disparate impact theory that the Trump Administration has denounced and that the Supreme Court has rejected for private suits. Any notion of harassment based on conduct’s “objective offensiveness” would also need to account for distinctive features of the university setting that likely preclude liability for much of the protest activity that has loomed large in recent public discussions of Jewish students’ experiences on campus.

Although specific facts matter and not all of the issues are clear-cut, we thus conclude that appeals to Title VI in this area are much weaker than has been widely appreciated. Of course, this does not mean that campus antisemitism is acceptable. But it does mean that, for the most part, universities have both the right and the responsibility to balance their competing commitments in this area—including commitments to both inclusion and freedom of expression—using their own considered judgment.

Harvard Public Law Working Paper 25-13

Forthcoming, Harvard Law Review Forum (June 2025)