By Brandon MordueFollow

The idea that one’s punishment should depend on the crime committed rather than which judge happens to do the sentencing strikes most as uncontroversial, if not a requirement for a fair sentencing regime. Forty years ago, the passage of the Sentencing Reform Act promised just that result. Increased data availability allows us to evaluate the project’s success. The results are not encouraging.

Federal defendants are sentenced using guidelines issued by the United States Sentencing Commission that sometimes bear little relation to the underlying wrongdoing. This has created a split among judges, with some following the guidelines and others rejecting them. The consequences are arbitrariness in sentencing and unwarranted disparities across offenders.

In 2007, the Supreme Court permitted appellate courts to presume the reasonableness of guideline sentences, largely insulating those sentences from judicial review. Much has changed since then, and it is time for the presumption to go. The findings of the original data analysis presented in this Article, as well as developments since the Court’s decision, show that the claims made in support of the presumption are unfounded. In fact, some of the related case law rests upon provably false empirical premises.

Today, most sentences are not within the range set by the guidelines. Favoring the minority of sentences that are within the range results in a sentencing regime incompatible with the overriding statutory aim of avoiding unwarranted sentencing disparities. Rather than presuming the reasonableness of within-guideline sentences, the courts can chart a course correction by prioritizing the data on actual sentences from the Sentencing Commission. Such a shift would achieve more consistent sentences across offenders convicted of similar crimes.

115 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 133 (2025), 73p.

By Isis Misdary

Three separate but closely related factors have together produced this nation’s epidemic of mass incarceration. First, the enforcement of criminal law has become wholly dominated by a caste of repeat players. The chasm between this grouping and outsiders has become far more important than the prosecution-defense duality ostensibly dominating the system. Second, the system’s design and policies have become dominated by central authorities sealed in a “tough-on-crime” echo chamber. This leaves local communities largely powerless to check the devastation being visited upon them. And third, the system has ruthlessly suppressed the individuality of those facing charges. They are rarely seen, almost never heard, ignored if they try to contextualize events giving rise to the charges, and punished severely if they attempt to assert their rights, much less their innocence. Robbed of all that makes them human, their fates arouse little sympathy. Devastated communities have mounted various responses to mass incarceration. None is more exciting than the participatory defense movement. This movement seeks to involve the person facing charges as well as that person’s family and community. Together, they meet with defense counsel, gather evidence for the case, and in mitigation, prepare videos or other testimonials to influence charging and plea-bargaining decisions and undertake other efforts to support the person facing charges. Through the movement’s work on individual cases, families and communities have spotted issues within the criminal systems and the criminal laws close to home that must change, that must end. Case by case, they have started to challenge, change, and end them. Yet, for all its promise, participatory defense may face considerable challenges going forward in these areas. As a relatively new movement, it must continue to resolve significant design challenges and overcome formidable institutional and attitudinal buttresses the current system has erected.

25 Nev. L.J. 325 (2025), 92p.

By John Burns

This Note traces the evolution of bail from its origins to modern commercial bail, highlighting how the system has disproportionately affected low-income defendants. In 2023, Illinois became the first state to eliminate cash bail with the enactment of the Pretrial Fairness Act, which attempted to remedy longstanding inequities. The Note situates Illinois’s approach between New Jersey’s successful risk-based reform and California’s oversimplified and harmful “zero bail” experiment. While Illinois’s reform represents a meaningful step toward fairness, this Note argues that its reliance on a categorical approach and its limited use of pretrial assessments may unintentionally undermisne its effectiveness. The Note concludes that Illinois must go further by expanding judicial discretion and mandating the use of risk assessment tools.

Washington University Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 78, 2025. 29p.

By Andrew Willinger and Eric Ruben

Legal scholarship is overly abstract and theoretical, making it unhelpful to judges and lawyers. That, at least, is the common critique from the bench. When it comes to the Second Amendment, however, a different pattern has emerged: judges consistently cite law review articles and look to the academy for guidance. Most recently, in United States v. Rahimi, some Justices went further, implicitly inviting more scholarly work to help the Court answer open questions raised by its novel methodological approach to the Second Amendment. This Article explores this aberrant trend.

We raise several explanations for the distinctive scholarly role in Second Amendment jurisprudence, including the Amendment's unique aspects as well as the role of legal movements in facilitating the Amendment's development. Faced with a lack of judicial precedent on both the right to keep and bear arms and originalism-in-practice, law review articles often can be more helpful than past opinions. Beyond scholarship's utility in a new area of law, we suggest that a related phenomenon-the gun rights and conservative legal movements' trifold success at facilitating the rise of the individual Second Amendment right, popularizing originalism as a methodology, and elevating originalist judges to the bench-is an important part of the story. For a half century, organizations focused on achieving both a robust right to bear arms and a conservative vision of the Constitution have become more prominent and have closely associated with both scholars and judges. If, in the usual telling, judges look askance at scholarship, this specific area of law might present an exception since it has been a joint project from the beginning.

The Article concludes that the judge-scholar collaboration that has characterized Second Amendment case law is likely to continue. Moreover, it could have ramifications far beyond the right to keep and bear arms, including for other rights that may be on the cusp of transformation and for other legal movements seeking to emulate the strategies that ushered in modern Second Amendment law.

78 SMU Law Review __ (forthcoming), Duke Law School Public Law & Legal Theory Series No. 2025-26, SMU Dedman School of Law Legal Studies Research Paper No. 696,

By Benjamin Eidelson, Deborah Hellman,

Universities are facing an unprecedented wave of claims that they have violated their obligations to Jewish students under Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. These charges center on an equally unprecedented wave of anti-Israel activity on college campuses, much of which is alleged to cross the line into antisemitism. This essay, forthcoming in the Harvard Law Review Forum, provides one of the first systematic analyses of these exceptionally high-stakes claims about Title VI.

Our analysis reveals that the Title VI claims face formidable hurdles, including some that have received surprisingly little attention thus far. Most fundamentally, Title VI’s omission of “religion” as a protected characteristic means that Jewishness is protected under the statute only insofar as it constitutes a “race” or (less likely) a “national origin.” Under existing law, however, discrimination based on the cultural practices or viewpoints that may be associated with such an immutable characteristic—as Zionism might be associated with Jewishness—is ordinarily not cognizable as discrimination based on the protected characteristic itself. Moreover, if “hostile environment” liability can be founded on offensive conduct that does not constitute covered disparate treatment in its own right, this is likely possible only pursuant to a disparate impact theory that the Trump Administration has denounced and that the Supreme Court has rejected for private suits. Any notion of harassment based on conduct’s “objective offensiveness” would also need to account for distinctive features of the university setting that likely preclude liability for much of the protest activity that has loomed large in recent public discussions of Jewish students’ experiences on campus.

Although specific facts matter and not all of the issues are clear-cut, we thus conclude that appeals to Title VI in this area are much weaker than has been widely appreciated. Of course, this does not mean that campus antisemitism is acceptable. But it does mean that, for the most part, universities have both the right and the responsibility to balance their competing commitments in this area—including commitments to both inclusion and freedom of expression—using their own considered judgment.

Harvard Public Law Working Paper 25-13

Forthcoming, Harvard Law Review Forum (June 2025)

By David Abrams and Priyanka Goonetilleke

Each year, millions of Americans rely on public defenders to fulfill their Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Despite being the linchpin of the criminal justice system, public defense remains both underfunded and understudied. This article provides empirical analysis to contribute to a critical question: How should public defender systems be structured?

Criminal justice advocates, scholars, and the American Bar Association strongly favor vertical representation in public defense. Under this model, a single public defender represents a defendant throughout their case, from initial appearance through sentencing. The alternative approach—horizontal representation—operates like an assembly line: Different attorneys handle each stage of a case, from preliminary hearings to pretrial conferences to trials. The preference for vertical representation stems from the intuitive belief that continuity of representation improves outcomes for defendants. However, no prior empirical work has tested this assumption.

Using a natural experiment created by the Defender Association of Philadelphia’s transition from a fully horizontal representation system to a partially vertical one, we find no evidence that increasing attorney continuity improves defendant outcomes.

These findings have significant implications for how public defender offices should allocate their scarce resources. While vertical representation is considered by many as the ideal, our results cast doubt on whether the additional resources and logistical challenges relative to horizontal representation are justified given the current reality of underfunded public defense. As jurisdictions nationwide grapple with a chronic lack of resources for public defense, this article provides crucial empirical evidence to inform decisions about how best to uphold defendants’ Sixth Amendment right to counsel.

.100 New York University Law Review No. 5 (forthcoming), Northwestern Law & Econ Research Paper No. 25-05, Northwestern Public Law Research Paper No. 25-22, U of Penn, Inst for Law & Econ Research Paper No. 25-10,

By Sara K. Rankin

The criminalization of homelessness refers to the enactment and enforcement of laws and policies that punish unsheltered people for surviving in public space, even when those individuals have no reasonable alternative. The constitutional and civil rights issues stemming from criminally charging unsheltered people for public survival are clear, albeit not uncontested. But cities often skirt legal challenges to criminalization by pursuing means other than criminal charges to punish homelessness. Many cities “civilly criminalize” homelessness through civil enforcement, which extends from infractions or fines to “invisible persecution,” such as the persistent policing and surveilling of unsheltered people. While courts, legislatures, and advocates largely focus on criminal charges, those punishments are just the tip of the criminalization iceberg: civil enforcement is arguably more extensive and damaging. However, courts and legislatures largely do not protect people experiencing homelessness from civil criminalization. This Article argues for greater attention to the devastating impact of civil punishments, drawing from other critiques that expose how civil tools punish poor and vulnerable people. It also examines how punishment operates outside of both criminal charges and civil sanctions, severely penalizing unsheltered people and requiring reform.

Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review [Vol. 56 , 2021. 46p.

By Abel Rodriguez

Increasingly, U.S. immigration law and policy perpetuate death. As more people become displaced globally, death provides a measurable indicator of the level of racialized violence inflicted on migrants of color. Because of Clinton-era policies continued today, deaths at the border have reached unprecedented rates, with more than two migrant deaths per day. A record 853 border crossers died last year, and the deadliest known transporting incident took place in June 2022, with fifty-one lives lost. In addition, widespread neglect continues to cause loss of life in immigration detention, immigration enforcement agents kill migrants with virtual impunity, and immigration law ensures courts routinely order people deported to their deaths. As these preventable deaths persist, particularly among migrants of color, the Supreme Court has all but foreclosed causes of action against individual federal agents for wrongful death. It has done so most notably in its recent 2022 decision Egbert v. Boule, further limiting judicial remedies for constitutional violations and sanctioning use of force as a routine function of immigration enforcement.

This Article provides a novel perspective on law enforcement and race. It is the first to provide a comprehensive examination of lethal immigration enforcement, arguing that racialized policy rationales, impunity instituted by courts, and prevailing political paradigms have coalesced to render migrants of color expendable. Therefore, the enforcement system must be reimagined. While scholars have begun to analyze the immigration system in terms of “slow death,” or harms that occur over time, a holistic view of “spectacular deaths,” those readily perceived, is lacking. After mapping how the immigration enforcement system takes migrant lives, this Article interrogates the policy rationales for lethal enforcement in light of largely unexamined data, finding that anti-Blackness drives punitive immigration detention and the perceived dangerousness of Latinx migrants fuels lethal border policies. It then turns to an analysis of wrongful death actions and recent Supreme Court doctrine, poised to impede remedies for excessive force in courts further and escalate racialized violence against noncitizens. Ultimately, given the urgency of addressing rising migrant mortality, it calls for a paradigm shift beyond liberal reforms to end lethal enforcement and its racial subordination.

CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 109:465, 2024, 71p

By Michael Kagan

In theory, the Department of Homeland Security bears the burden of proof  when it seeks to deport a person from the United States. But the government rarely has to meet it. 

This Article presents original data from live observation in Immigration Court, documenting that almost all respondents in deportation proceedings admit and concede the charges against them, even when they have attorneys, without getting anything in return from the government. 

Focusing especially on the role of immigrant defense lawyers, the Article explores why this is happening. 

It critiques the legal standards of proof used in Immigration Court, while also exploring normative ambiguities about the role of 

immigration lawyers in deportation proceedings. Together, these factors are effectively depriving many immigrants of the vigorous legal defense that they deserve.  

UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 14:163 2024, 49p.

By Tasseli McKay and William A. “Sandy” Darity Jr.

Social scientists continue to declare that mass incarceration, a defining social force of the last half century, is on its way out. Lifetime risks of imprisonment are indeed in decline, as are absolute and relative imprisonment risks for Black Americans. But whether we consider mass incarceration to be over, or even on its way out, depends a great deal on what we believe mass incarceration is and what it does.

Scholarship on the “collateral consequences” of mass incarceration, leaving concerns with political etiology to political scientists, is curiously absent a broader concept of how such consequences function. Even as the field rigorously documents the vast social, political, economic, and health fallout of mass incarceration, it remains largely agnostic on a central theoretical concern: Do we conceive of mass incarceration as a policy mistake with negative consequences for us all, or as a well-running engine of racial stratification that has enriched some Americans at others' expense? How we answer this question, or do not, has tremendous implications for how we study the harms of mass incarceration and what policy moves we deem capable of confronting it.

Scholarship on mass incarceration's consequences is often introduced with reference to racial inequality. Such scholarship has identified an array of mechanisms by which mass incarceration appears to contribute to racial stratification, particularly through a longstanding line of inquiry on the disproportionate impact of incarceration-related constraints on Black men's workforce participation, income, and wealth. Yet most such research frames these phenomena as an unfortunate artifact of racially disproportionate criminal legal system contact, rather than situatingthe impetus and functioning of the criminal legal system within a broader theory of structural racial inequality.

Critiquing the failure to engage questions of structural racism in empirical research on mass incarceration's consequences, two of the field's preeminent scholars argue,

While most studies that explore the consequences of mass incarceration for American families are motivated by racial inequality within the carceral system--rightfully so, given the massive racial disparities in incarceration rates and criminal justice involvement--the work often fails to engage this important issue in meaningful ways .... We neither interrogate why we see racial disparities in mass incarceration nor do we investigate why we might see racial disparities in outcomes due to mass incarceration.

Indeed, with important exceptions, collateral consequences research inventories the implications of mass punishment for individuals, neighborhoods, and nations rather than examining how a racially targeted punishment system functions within a broader set of national and subnational institutions that systematically privilege whiteness. Further, the possibility that mass incarceration produces systematic benefits, in addition to or even as an impetus for its systematic harms, receives very limited scholarly attention. Such research, if it aims to confront racial injustice, must “move beyond description of racial inequality [and] think critically about how our society's raced institutions interact with one another to stratify the experiences of American families”.

Toward that end, the current review applies the theory of stratification economics to consider whether and how the broad criminalization and intensive punishment of Black Americans have advanced or advantaged their White contemporaries. First, the review briefly revisits key theoretical perspectives on the consequences of mass incarceration and proposes stratification economics as a meta-theoretical framework for understanding the production and functioning of those consequences. Next, it applies stratification economics to available social scientific evidence on the consequences of mass incarceration, analyzing the implications of that evidence for the relative standing of White Americans. Finally, the review advances an agenda for future research and policy capable of confronting and redressing the ill-gotten gains of mass incarceration.

20 Annual Review of Law and Social Science 309 (2024), 22p.

By Tashayla Sierra-Kadaya Borden

xisting literature does little to address the unique victimization of Black women in the law. Studies looking through a racial lens may ignore Black women by failing to address gender. Alternatively, gender analysis may center around issues specific to white women. White feminist scholars promote carceral feminism, a “neoliberal law-and-order agenda pursued by a coalition of secular anti-prostitution feminists and white evangelicals.” Carceral Feminism focuses on white womanhood and harms marginalized communities, actively pushing Black women into prison. To address this, Black feminist scholars have developed key theories to understand Black women's experiences. One such scholar, Moya Bailey, coined the term misogynoir to describe “the uniquely co-constitutive racialized and sexist violence that befalls Black women as a result of their simultaneous and interlocking oppression at the intersection of racial and gender marginalization.” Misogynoir operates as a form of implicit or explicit bias that informs how and why the state views Black women as dual victims and victimizers.

In 2019, the New York State Legislature passed the DVSJA. The DVSJA amended New York's existing Penal Law § 60.12 and created Criminal Procedure Law § 440.47 to provide resentencing for currently incarcerated individuals. This statute permits a judge to change a domestic violence survivor's initial sentence if the abuse was a “significant contributing factor” to the crime. The DVSJA is the first legislation of its kind in the United States. Advocates and survivors promoted this statute to decriminalize trauma and help individuals who commit crime while suffering abuse. Other states have enacted similar laws, but Black women still face lingering issues that exacerbate coercive abuse, racism, and gendered violence.

This Note examines the impact of New York's revolutionary DVSJA on Black woman survivorship while proposing solutions and improvements for other states aiming to replicate the statute. Part I summarizes the DSVJA and contextualizes the case law that preceded its passing. Part II describes the unique impact of domestic violence on Black women, the challenges of qualifying for relief under the statute, and the limitations of resentencing. Lastly, Part III offers noncarceral solutions that replace sentencing and help Black women share their experiences as abuse survivors.

144 Columbia Law Review 2065 (2024), 40p.

By Andrew Howard

Almost every county in the United States elects its chief Prosecutor, but the chief Public Defender, if there is one, is generally an appointed position. In four states, however, some or all of the Public Defender offices have elected leaders. Although prosecutorial elections have been heavily studied and criticized, relatively little attention has been paid to the elections of their counterparts. This Note sheds light on how Public Defender elections impact a criminal justice ecosystem. A series of interviews with elected Public Defenders reveal these elections can enhance the independence and stature of the position. Additionally, the interviews and additional research rebut the primary criticism of these elections: that voters may elect someone who wanted to work against indigent defendants. There are simply very few examples relative to the many counties that have these elections. These qualitative findings are supported in part by further quantitative analyses. First, this Note found a correlation of increased Public Defense experience amongst the state judiciary in jurisdictions where there the chief Public Defender is elected. Second, this Note found a correlation between these elections and increased salary parity between Public Defenders and Prosecutors in the same state.

Accordingly, this Note argues that some counties should explore making their chief Public Defender an elected position. While far from a panacea for the many issues facing the American criminal justice system, these elections could help enhance the quality of indigent defense where implemented.

Columbia Human Rights Law Review, 2020, 40p.

By Ben Finholt

For decades, the North Carolina Supreme Court—like many other state supreme courts—largely ignored its own state constitution’s ban on harsh criminal punishments and deferred entirely to federal case law on the constitutional limits of excessive sentences. The result has been near-total deference to the state legislature and a discriminatory mass incarceration crisis that has ballooned without meaningful constitutional checks.

This approach has been a serious mistake of constitutional law. As Justice Harry Martin once noted, “the Constitution of North Carolina . . . is the people's timeless shield against encroachment on their civil rights,” and it provides uniquely broad protections of civil rights and personal liberty. Yet sentencing law has been the exception, despite a specific provision that bans “cruel or unusual punishments,” and whose text and original meaning are distinct from the Eighth Amendment.

The North Carolina Supreme Court finally revived this clause, Article I, Section 27, in two recent cases involving children sentenced to serve decades, recognizing that it should not be interpreted in lockstep with its federal counterpart. This Article argues that these cases provide a crucial moment of doctrinal clarity and opportunity to articulate the independent meaning of Section 27 and unleash its power as an essential tool in the urgent project of dismantling mass incarceration. While previous scholarship has noted that state analogs to th

e Eighth Amendment can and should bear their own independent meaning, this Article provides a full analysis of Section 27 specifically, looking to its text and history, related constitutional provisions, and other factors to show that it provides broader protections against excessive punishments than does current Eighth Amendment case law. This Article also sketches a doctrinal framework that state courts can apply in all challenges to excessive punishment, not just those involving children.

Finally, the Article places this constitutional analysis in the specific context of North Carolina’s criminal legal system, explaining how other mechanisms of reducing needless incarceration have proven wholly inadequate.

Duke Law School Public Law & Legal Theory Series No. 2023, 49p.