By M. D. Vattel. Introduction by Graeme R. Newman

A foundational work of international law, still resonant today.

First published in the eighteenth century and issued in authoritative English editions throughout the nineteenth, The Law of Nations by Emer de Vattel shaped how statesmen, jurists, and diplomats understood the rights and duties of sovereign powers. In this monumental treatise, Vattel applies the principles of natural law to the real conduct of nations, addressing war and peace, treaties and alliances, commerce and neutrality, diplomacy, and the limits of lawful power.

Rejecting both utopian idealism and brute realpolitik, Vattel argues that true national interest is inseparable from justice, restraint, and respect for sovereignty. Nations, like individuals, are bound by moral obligations arising from their coexistence in a shared international society. His careful analysis of war, intervention, and treaty obligations established enduring standards that influenced constitutional debates, foreign policy doctrine, and the development of modern international law.

This edition preserves a work that continues to illuminate contemporary conflicts and global challenges. Clear-eyed, systematic, and profoundly influential, The Law of Nations remains essential reading for anyone seeking to understand how lawful order, moral principle, and power intersect in the affairs of nations.

The theses advanced in The Law of Nations remain strikingly relevant to contemporary international disputes, particularly those involving intervention, recognition of governments, and claims of humanitarian necessity. Vattel’s insistence on sovereignty as the cornerstone of international order places clear limits on the legitimacy of external interference in the internal affairs of states. While he allows that extreme cases—such as manifest tyranny threatening the very existence of a people—may raise difficult moral questions, he consistently warns that powerful states are prone to disguise ambition and interest under the language of justice.

This caution is especially pertinent when considering recent controversies surrounding efforts by the United States to promote regime change in Venezuela, including diplomatic, economic, and political measures aimed at displacing the government of Nicolás Maduro. From a Vattelian perspective, such actions raise fundamental questions about lawful authority, the limits of collective judgment, and the distinction between moral condemnation and legal right. Vattel argues that no nation may unilaterally assume the role of judge over another sovereign without undermining the mutual independence on which international society depends. To do so, he suggests, risks converting international law into a mere instrument of power.

At the same time, Vattel’s framework does not deny the reality of gross misrule or humanitarian suffering. Rather, it demands rigorous scrutiny of motives and means. Economic coercion, diplomatic isolation, and recognition of alternative authorities would, in his analysis, need to be justified not by ideological preference or strategic advantage, but by clear evidence that such measures genuinely serve the common good of nations and do not erode the general security of the international system. His emphasis on proportionality, necessity, and respect for established sovereignty stands in tension with modern practices of intervention that rely on contested doctrines of legitimacy.

Viewed through this lens, contemporary debates over Venezuela illustrate the enduring force of Vattel’s central warning: that the stability of international relations depends less on the moral claims of individual powers than on shared restraint. His work reminds modern readers that the erosion of sovereignty in one case—however rhetorically justified—sets precedents that may ultimately weaken the legal protections upon which all nations, strong and weak alike, rely.

P.H. Nicklitn etc. Philadelphia. 1829. Read-Me.Org Inc. New York-Philadelphia-Australia. 2026 p.424.

By Megan Comfort, Jenn Rineer, Elizabeth Tibaduiza, and Monica Sheppard

The “pretrial process” refers to the events that happen between the time that one is suspected by law enforcement of violating the law and the time that charges are dismissed, the case is otherwise resolved, or the trial process begins. During the pretrial period, people are considered innocent under the law. The U.S. Supreme Court1 has stated, “In our society, liberty is the norm, and detention prior to trial or without trial is the carefully limited exception.” The only two constitutionally valid reasons for holding someone in jail during the pretrial period are (1) to prevent flight or (2) to prevent harm to people in the community. Judges make decisions every day about whether to detain or release people going through the pretrial process, as well as about what conditions of release may be needed to help people succeed. Pretrial release assessments are designed to inform their decisions. Unlike assessments that involve a clinician or other professional drawing on their subjective expertise to make a recommendation, actuarial pretrial release assessmentsa rely on mathematical processes. Using large data sets with information about people who previously went through the pretrial process, researchers identify factors related to appearing for court hearings and not being arrested again if released. The researchers then create a sequence of instructions for a computer to follow (called an algorithm) that uses these factors to calculate an estimated likelihood that a person will appear in court and remain arrest free while their case is being resolved. This calculation—referred to as a “score”—is provided to the judge as information to consider when making decisions about pretrial release. A person’s score is also often provided as information to other courtroom actors, such as prosecutors, defense attorneys, and pretrial services officers. When thinking about actuarial pretrial release assessments, it is important to understand the history of the criminal legal system in the United States, which is deeply rooted in the legacy of slavery. Read Race and the Criminal Justice System2 by the Equal Justice Initiative to learn more. No actuarial pretrial release assessment tool or instrument is considered standard. Numerous assessments have been developed, and they vary in terms of the factors and instructions entered in the algorithm. Some use factors that are available through criminal legal system records, such as whether someone has been arrested before or has previously missed a court date. Others include factors like whether someone has a job, is enrolled in a substance use treatment program, or has a place to live. This information is usually obtained by talking with the person who has been arrested. At the time of this writing, pretrial release assessments use algorithms that are created by humans as opposed to ones that are generated by machine learning or artificial intelligence (AI). It is possible that future assessments will rely on AI, which would raise a different set of issues to consider. The use of actuarial pretrial release assessments is growing across the United States. Often, they are an element of broader system change aimed at reducing or eliminating the use of cash bonds, which require people to post money to be released from jail. Judges may consider the actuarial pretrial release assessment score when deciding what conditions of release—for instance, electronic monitoring or mandatory check-ins with pretrial services—are appropriate for a person. In systems that retain money bond as a potential release condition, assessments are sometimes used to inform decisions about bond amounts, but the impact on release is lessened if people remain in jail because they cannot afford to pay their way out. Judges may also use the score as part of their decision about whether to keep someone in jail or release them while their case is pending

APPR Research Brief, April 2024. Research Triangle Park, NC: RTI International, 2024. 5p.

By Rebecca Tiger

The number of people incarcerated in the U.S. now exceeds 2.3 million, due in part to the increasing criminalization of drug use: over 25% of people incarcerated in jails and prisons are there for drug offenses. Judging Addicts examines this increased criminalization of drugs and the medicalization of addiction in the U.S. by focusing on drug courts, where defendants are sent to drug treatment instead of prison. Rebecca Tiger explores how advocates of these courts make their case for what they call “enlightened coercion,” detailing how they use medical theories of addiction to justify increased criminal justice oversight of defendants who, through this process, are defined as both “sick” and “bad.” Tiger shows how these courts fuse punitive and therapeutic approaches to drug use in the name of a “progressive” and “enlightened” approach to addiction. She critiques the medicalization of drug users, showing how the disease designation can complement, rather than contradict, punitive approaches, demonstrating that these courts are neither unprecedented nor unique, and that they contain great potential to expand punitive control over drug users. Tiger argues that the medicalization of addiction has done little to stem the punishment of drug users because of a key conceptual overlap in the medical and punitive approaches—that habitual drug use is a problem that needs to be fixed through sobriety. Judging Addicts presses policymakers to implement humane responses to persistent substance use that remove its control entirely from the criminal justice system and ultimately explores the nature of crime and punishment in the U.S. today.

New York; London: NYU Press,  2012

By Melanie Skemer, Emily Brennan

The U.S. jail population has tripled over the last 30 years due to surges in the use of pretrial detention and money bail.  On any given day, nearly 450,000 people in the United States are detained while awaiting the resolution of their criminal charges. Many of these individuals, still legally innocent, are in jail because they cannot afford to pay the bail amount set as a condition of their release. Pretrial detention takes a significant toll on the lives of affected individuals, putting them at increased risk of continued involvement with the criminal legal system as well as of losing their jobs, housing, and child custody.

As a result, jurisdictions across the United States are reforming their pretrial systems to reduce the number of people who are held in pretrial detention—that is, who remain in jail while they await the adjudication of their cases. As part of this effort, many jurisdictions are moving away from money bail as a primary means of encouraging people to return for future court dates. Instead, they are increasingly relying on alternatives such as pretrial supervision, which requires released people to meet regularly with supervision staff members while their cases are pending. Pretrial supervision has traditionally required clients to report for in-person meetings, particularly for those assessed as being at relatively high risk of failing to attend a court hearing or of being rearrested. 

With the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, however, many pretrial supervision programs shifted in-person meeting requirements to remote check-ins to protect the health of both clients and staff members. For many jurisdictions, this shift highlighted some of the benefits of remote supervision, which include time savings for clients balancing work, school, caregiving, or other responsibilities, and less resource-intensive administration for supervision providers, potentially generating cost savings. At the same time, some members of the pretrial community questioned whether remote supervision was as effective as in-person interaction at meeting clients’ needs and protecting public safety. As the pandemic waned, it remained unclear whether remote supervision was as effective as in-person or hybrid (a mix of in-person and remote) supervision in achieving the main goals of supervision programs: helping clients make their court appearances and avoid new arrests during the pretrial period.

New York: MDRC. 2024, 37pg