By José Miguel Cruz and Gema Kloppe-Santamaría 

What are the factors behind citizen support for the use of extralegal violence in Latin America? The prevailing argument is that, in countries overwhelmed by skyrocketing levels of criminal violence, people endorse the use of extralegal violence as a way to cope with insecurity. Other scholars believe that support for extralegal violence is the result of state withdrawal and failure. Few empirical studies, however, have tested any of these arguments. In this article, using regional data from the 2012 AmericasBarometer, we examine different explanations regarding citizen support for the utilization of extralegal violence in Latin America and the Caribbean. We developed a multi-item scale that gauges support for different forms of extralegal violence across the Americas, and we hypothesize that support for extralegal violence is higher not only in countries with extreme levels of violence but especially in countries in which people distrust the political system. Results indicate that support for extralegal violence is significantly higher in societies characterized by little support for the existing political system.

By Michael D. Anestis, Allison E. Bond, Kimberly C. Burke, Sultan Altikriti & Daniel C. Semenza 

Background

Firearm purchasing patterns, intentions, and behaviors change over time in response to specific events. Additionally, the nature of these changes may be evolving over time or differ depending on the nature of the event in question. Given the intensity of the rhetoric surrounding gun violence leading up to the 2024 election, we sought to examine the extent to which firearm purchasing patterns, intentions, and behaviors changed following the 2024 Presidential election and the extent to which any such changes varied by population.

Methods

A nationally representative sample was recruited to complete an online survey October 22-November 3, 2024 (n = 1,530) and assessed again January 7-January 22, 2025 (n = 1,359).

Results

Identifying as Black was associated with increases in urges to carry firearms because of the election results (β = 0.16; 95%CI = 0.07-0.61). Liberal beliefs were associated with greater increases in urges to carry firearms because of the election results (β = 0.11; 95%CI = 0.01-0.13) and greater odds of storing firearms more quickly accessible because of the election results (OR = 2.11; 95%CI = 1.29–3.44).

Conclusions

Individuals threatened by Trump administration policies appear to be experiencing urges to acquire firearms, carry them, and store them readily accessible. These results highlight that the current political environment may be fostering community-level decision making that, while motivated by the drive for protection, increases the risk for harm. Policies and programs that encourage secure storage and discourage firearm carrying may be increasingly important for the prevention of injury and death.

By Kristof Titeca and Giovanni Salvaggio

This report argues that violence attributed to the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo cannot be understood through a single lens, such as jihadism, but must instead be analysed as a multilayered phenomenon in which ideological, military, political, and economic logics coexist and overlap. While the ADF’s pledge of allegiance to the Islamic State and subsequent financial and ideological links are real and consequential, an exclusive focus on jihadism obscures the group’s deep embeddedness in local and regional political economies of violence. Drawing on long-term fieldwork in eastern Congo and Uganda, the article shows how ADF violence is intertwined with taxation, trade, resource extraction, and local power struggles, and how the ADF label itself has become a franchise used by a wide range of actors to conceal or legitimise violence. It concludes that monocausal readings - including recent attempts to frame ADF violence primarily as sectarian or anti-Christian - flatten a far more complex reality and hinder a proper understanding of the drivers of violence in eastern Congo. The ADF, in other words, is not an exception to the Congolese conflict dynamics, but an extreme and particularly violent crystallisation of it.

By The Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime.

In Haiti, 5 915 people were killed in 2025 (compared to 5 601 in 2024). The national homicide rate got to 49.8 per 100 000 people, and Port-au-Prince, which is home to about a quarter of the population, reached nearly 140 per 100 000 people, ranking it among the most violent cities in the world.

Gangs continued to expand their influence in Haiti, both through territorial control and by consolidating their role as political brokers. This latter dimension remains largely absent from national and international crisis response strategies.By failing to account for the political economy of violence, particularly the importance of addressing politico-criminal relationships, current policies risk perpetuating rather than loosening the links between armed groups and the political system, especially if the 2026 elections proceed without a more comprehensive response adapted to the complexity of the crisis.Haiti’s gangs are neither insurgents nor revolutionaries; they are embedded within circuits of political and economic power. The crisis is sustained by illicit financial flows, arms and drug trafficking, and patronage networks that protect and instrumentalize armed groups.Arrests and targeted operations may weaken certain groups, but as long as the structures that sustain criminal governance remain intact, the system will reconstitute itself. Without measures to dismantle the networks intertwining political competition and criminal governance, electoral processes risk reinforcing rather than transforming the system they are intended to renew.Haiti requires a strategy to combat organized crime that integrates public security, justice and community reconstruction. Any approach focused exclusively on force will fail if it does not address the political and economic foundations that allow violence to persist.To be effective, the Gang Suppression Force (GSF) must be paired with judicial tools capable of targeting gang support networks, particularly financial ones, and not only armed actors. This includes pursuing criminal leaders as well as their political and financial sponsors. Only by addressing the broader ecosystem of collusion can Haiti move away from a political order that is shaped by entrenched politico-criminal relationships.A long-term crisis resolution strategy must integrate justice, economic policy, security and political reform. The central question is not whether to negotiate with criminal groups, but how to articulate justice, demobilization and reintegration in a way that prevents the reproduction of violence.

By José Miguel Cruz and Gema Kloppe-Santamaría

 What are the factors behind citizen support for the use of extralegal violence in Latin America? The prevailing argument is that, in countries overwhelmed by skyrocketing levels of criminal violence, people endorse the use of extralegal violence as a way to cope with insecurity. Other scholars believe that support for extralegal violence is the result of state withdrawal and failure. Few empirical studies, however, have tested any of these arguments. In this article, using regional data from the 2012 AmericasBarometer, we examine different explanations regarding citizen support for the utilization of extralegal violence in Latin America and the Caribbean. We developed a multi-item scale that gauges support for different forms of extralegal violence across the Americas, and we hypothesize that support for extralegal violence is higher not only in countries with extreme levels of violence but especially in countries in which people distrust the political system. Results indicate that support for extralegal violence is significantly higher in societies characterized by little support for the existing political system.

By Stephen J. Choi, Mitu Gulati

Curious about the merits of judges Donald Trump appointed in his first term as president, we looked in an earlier study at the performance during 2020 to mid-2023 of the judges Trump appointed as compared to those appointed by other presidents. On a set of three measures--productivity, quality and independence--the Trump judges performed as well, if not better, than judges appointed by Presidents Obama and Bush. As for President Biden's appointees, they did systematically worse than the Trump appointees. Biden judicial selections were, at the time we did our prior study, however, new judges. Maybe, we wondered, these judges would do better on our measures a year or two hence? What follows are our preliminary results on that question. Our short answer is that Trump judges continue to dominate the Biden judges. 

By F. A. Hayek

Critique of Social Justice: Hayek argues that the term "social justice" is empty and meaningless, often used without a clear definition or understanding.

Justice and Market Processes: He believes that justice applies to individual conduct and not to the outcomes of market processes.

Abstract Rules: Emphasizes the importance of abstract rules in a free society, which serve unknown particular ends and facilitate the pursuit of individual goals.

Spontaneous Order: Hayek highlights the spontaneous order of the market, where individuals' actions lead to an efficient allocation of resources without central planning.

University of Chicago Press, 1978, 195 pages

By Arthur L. Rizer

Over the past 20 years, conservatives have often been at the forefront of criminal justice reform efforts, including to reduce mandatory minimum sentencing, lengthy prison terms, and excessive criminal fines and fees and to improve conditions in prisons and jails. Rejecting the Nixonian “law and order” impulse, criminal justice reform has increasingly become incorporated into the conservative political self-identity. But this has been an elite-driven phenomenon, and it is open to question whether the roots of that political identity are deep enough to withstand the rising salience of crime as a political issue. This review traces how criminal justice reform came to be incorporated into the conservative political identity, raises questions concerning its staying power in the face of rising crime and increasingly strident progressive demands, and proposes some principles that might ground a more lasting conservative commitment to a just, proportionate system of criminal justice.

Annual Review of Criminology, v. 6. 2023, 18pg

By Elizabeth Neuland

On May 4, 2021, New York became the 20th state to restore the right to vote to individuals upon release from custody, regardless of parole status. In a time when the United States government is trying to protect voting rights through the “For the People Act” and “The John Lewis Voting Rights Advancement Act,”  and while some states are seeing radical legislation proposed that would potentially suppress the right to vote, New York needs to abolish the antiquated practice of felony disenfranchisement and guarantee the right to vote to all eligible New Yorkers regardless of incarceration status. The practice of felony disenfranchisement does not align with the values and core curriculum of the programs being provided by the New York State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision (“DOCCS”) within state correctional facilities. The overview statement for program services reads, “DOCCS offers an extensive array of programs and services for incarcerated individuals to assist them in redirecting their lives and becoming productive, law-abiding members  of society.” Although the word “rehabilitation” is absent, this statement essentially summarizes what rehabilitation is. The argument to abolish felony disenfranchisement is highlighted by the vast rehabilitation efforts taken by DOCCS, through numerous employment and vocational programs, temporary release programs, and educational opportunities. Felony disenfranchisement stands in stark opposition to rehabilitation because it alienates individuals from the very communities to which DOCCS is taking great measures to help them to return In addition to rehabilitation, restoring the right to vote to all eligible New Yorkers regardless of incarceration status would raise the level of accountability for state politicians, lawmakers, and DOCCS itself. It is no secret that correctional facilities can be dangerous places, due to both interpersonal violence and acts of self-inflicted harm, including suicide. Accountability should apply to those that are the guardians of a vulnerable population. In Parts I and II, this Comment provides a brief overview of international and national practices of felony disenfranchisement to see where New York fits into the landscape. Part III concentrates on New York State. Its legislation affecting disenfranchisement and the number of individuals incarcerated are discussed to highlight how many people are affected by felony disenfranchisement. The argument to fully abolish felony disenfranchisement is made through discussions of rehabilitation and accountability. Lastly, this Comment describes how all New York citizens could be enfranchised.  

 City University of New York Law Review. 2022, 25pg