By: Rosanna Smart, Andrew R. Morral, James P. Murphy, Rupa Jose, Amanda Charbonneau, Terry L. Schell

In this report, part of RAND's Gun Policy in America initiative, researchers systematically review the scientific literature that has examined the likely effects of various gun laws. In the fifth edition of this report, the authors incorporate more-recent research in their synthesis of the available scientific data regarding the effects of 18 state firearm policies on firearm injuries and deaths, violent crime, suicides, the gun industry, defensive gun use, and other outcomes. By highlighting where scientific evidence is accumulating, the authors hope to build consensus around a shared set of facts that have been established through a transparent, nonpartisan, and impartial review process. In so doing, they also illuminate areas in which more and better information could make important contributions to establishing fair and effective gun policies.

By Kristof Titeca and Giovanni Salvaggio

This report argues that violence attributed to the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo cannot be understood through a single lens, such as jihadism, but must instead be analysed as a multilayered phenomenon in which ideological, military, political, and economic logics coexist and overlap. While the ADF’s pledge of allegiance to the Islamic State and subsequent financial and ideological links are real and consequential, an exclusive focus on jihadism obscures the group’s deep embeddedness in local and regional political economies of violence. Drawing on long-term fieldwork in eastern Congo and Uganda, the article shows how ADF violence is intertwined with taxation, trade, resource extraction, and local power struggles, and how the ADF label itself has become a franchise used by a wide range of actors to conceal or legitimise violence. It concludes that monocausal readings - including recent attempts to frame ADF violence primarily as sectarian or anti-Christian - flatten a far more complex reality and hinder a proper understanding of the drivers of violence in eastern Congo. The ADF, in other words, is not an exception to the Congolese conflict dynamics, but an extreme and particularly violent crystallisation of it.

By The Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime.

In Haiti, 5 915 people were killed in 2025 (compared to 5 601 in 2024). The national homicide rate got to 49.8 per 100 000 people, and Port-au-Prince, which is home to about a quarter of the population, reached nearly 140 per 100 000 people, ranking it among the most violent cities in the world.

Gangs continued to expand their influence in Haiti, both through territorial control and by consolidating their role as political brokers. This latter dimension remains largely absent from national and international crisis response strategies.By failing to account for the political economy of violence, particularly the importance of addressing politico-criminal relationships, current policies risk perpetuating rather than loosening the links between armed groups and the political system, especially if the 2026 elections proceed without a more comprehensive response adapted to the complexity of the crisis.Haiti’s gangs are neither insurgents nor revolutionaries; they are embedded within circuits of political and economic power. The crisis is sustained by illicit financial flows, arms and drug trafficking, and patronage networks that protect and instrumentalize armed groups.Arrests and targeted operations may weaken certain groups, but as long as the structures that sustain criminal governance remain intact, the system will reconstitute itself. Without measures to dismantle the networks intertwining political competition and criminal governance, electoral processes risk reinforcing rather than transforming the system they are intended to renew.Haiti requires a strategy to combat organized crime that integrates public security, justice and community reconstruction. Any approach focused exclusively on force will fail if it does not address the political and economic foundations that allow violence to persist.To be effective, the Gang Suppression Force (GSF) must be paired with judicial tools capable of targeting gang support networks, particularly financial ones, and not only armed actors. This includes pursuing criminal leaders as well as their political and financial sponsors. Only by addressing the broader ecosystem of collusion can Haiti move away from a political order that is shaped by entrenched politico-criminal relationships.A long-term crisis resolution strategy must integrate justice, economic policy, security and political reform. The central question is not whether to negotiate with criminal groups, but how to articulate justice, demobilization and reintegration in a way that prevents the reproduction of violence.

By Pierfrancesco Moscuzza

Over the last two decades, Mexico has experienced a substantial increase in violence and insecurity, leading to its classification as one of the world's less secure countries. While the origins of this insecurity can be traced back to Mexico's turbulent history, the current surge in violence is a more recent development, primarily stemming from a lack of regional and national coordination among government entities and their respective security agencies. This chapter seeks to delve into the complexities of the Mexican security problem, offering an exploration of its historical context. Additionally, through a comparative analysis with the Italian case, where organized crime posed a significant threat to national security, this chapter aims to propose a set of comprehensive strategies to mitigate the impact of violence and insecurity on both the population and the country's overall development.

By José Miguel Cruz and Gema Kloppe-Santamaría

 What are the factors behind citizen support for the use of extralegal violence in Latin America? The prevailing argument is that, in countries overwhelmed by skyrocketing levels of criminal violence, people endorse the use of extralegal violence as a way to cope with insecurity. Other scholars believe that support for extralegal violence is the result of state withdrawal and failure. Few empirical studies, however, have tested any of these arguments. In this article, using regional data from the 2012 AmericasBarometer, we examine different explanations regarding citizen support for the utilization of extralegal violence in Latin America and the Caribbean. We developed a multi-item scale that gauges support for different forms of extralegal violence across the Americas, and we hypothesize that support for extralegal violence is higher not only in countries with extreme levels of violence but especially in countries in which people distrust the political system. Results indicate that support for extralegal violence is significantly higher in societies characterized by little support for the existing political system.

By Devon Ziminski , Julia P Schleimer and  Meron Girma 

Community violence interventions (CVI) encompass a range of strategies aimed at reducing community firearm violence among those most affected. While CVI is an umbrella term, specific CVI approaches across the United States differ markedly in their underlying theoretical frameworks, specific program activities, and populations served. These different CVI approaches have not been well defined or uniformly understood. Given unprecedented financial support for CVI from local, state, and federal sources in recent years, increased research attention to understanding the implementation and impacts of these programs, and growing efforts by policymakers, practitioners, and community leaders to enact CVI programs, it is important to understand how CVI is defined and characterized in applied discourse (eg, among CVI practitioners, funders, and scholars). This grey literature review aimed to synthesize how CVI practitioners, funders, and scholars commonly characterize CVI approaches and how those approaches relate to previously identified CVI theoretical frameworks. Following processes similar to a scoping review, we conducted a grey literature search to locate and synthesize information from webpages (eg, from community groups and academic organizations) and (non-peer reviewed) reports from web sources discussing CVI approaches. We identified nine main CVI approaches commonly mentioned in applied CVI discourse: 1. Violence interruption/street outreach; 2. Group violence interventions (GVI)/focused deterrence/group violence reduction strategy (GVRS); 3. Hospital-based violence intervention programs (HVIP); 4. Built environment/place-based/Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED); 5. Behavioral science interventions/cognitive behavioral interventions; 6. Victim/trauma/survivor programs/resources; 7. Mentoring/fellowship programs; 8. School-based/related youth interventions; and 9. Diversion/deflection programs. These approaches operated at multiple intervention levels and drew on various theoretical frameworks. Findings from this scoping review provide a timely summary of how CVI is characterized in applied discourse, which can support the field in operating from a shared understanding of what constitutes CVI and, in turn, inform CVI research, practice, and policy-making.

Community gun violence in US cities is both rare and highly concentrated. Decades of research and practice show that shootings cluster within a very small number of people, places, and social networks. Effective violence reduction therefore requires identifying and engaging the individuals at very high risk of being involved in gun violence in the immediate future (i.e., very high-risk individuals, or VHRI).

This new brief is designed to support jurisdictions working to implement community violence intervention approaches by improving their ability to identify VHRI. The brief provides 1) a concise synthesis of the research evidence on risk for involvement in community gun violence, and 2) guidance on how to implement structured processes to identify the people driving violence within their communities.

By The Louisville Office of Violence Prevention

The Louisville Metro Gun Violence Dashboard is updated daily, providing users with real-time information regarding criminal homicides and shootings [4]. Offering a broad view of gun violence, the dashboard includes information on year-to-date trends, victim demographics, and mapping visuals that use neighborhood, council districts, ZIP codes, and police districts. Since its launch, the dashboard has received approximately 100,000 views through June 30, 2025.

By Senzikile Bengu, Harsha Dayal, Gwen Dereymaeker, et al.

Violence in South Africa has an enormous cost on individuals, health and social protection systems, and the economy. There is growing evidence about the substantial return on investment that violence prevention can deliver, and about what works to prevent violence. Now is the time to invest in evidence-based interventions to prevent all forms of violence. This policy brief summarises lessons learnt from research, policy and practice over the past three years. Key findings Violence costs the economy, companies, and health and social systems. There is evidence for a positive return on investments when violence is prevented. This means it is cheaper to fund effective violence prevention than a criminal justice system, which reacts to violent crime. There is a growing body of research and practicebased knowledge of what works to prevent violence in South Africa. There is a strong association between violence and inequality, unemployment, food insecurity and poverty. Parenting and community-based interventions show significant effects on preventing or reducing intimate partner violence and violence against children. With regard to violence against women: The chances of getting justice for a murdered woman are low and decreasing. Police fail to make arrests despite an intimate partner or family member being involved in more than 70% of cases. Experience of trauma and poor mental health increase the chances of women students in higher education institutions being targeted for sexual violence. Circumstances that lead male students to perpetrate violence include abuse during childhood, and cultural norms equating masculinity with dominance over women. Burnout and exhaustion in frontline workers significantly hamper violence prevention efforts 

By Rose Kim,  Elizabeth Wagner,  Paul Nestadt,  Nandita Somayaji,  Josh Horwitz,  Cassandra Crifasi,

  46,728 people died from gun violence in the U.S. in 2023. Each day, an average of 128 people died from gun violence—one death every 11 minutes. Disturbingly, gun suicides reached an all-time high in both the total number of deaths and the overallrate. Overall, firearms remained the leading cause of deathfor young people 1 to 17 for the past four years, accounting for more deaths thancar crashes, overdoses, or cancers. In 2023, there were 2,566 gun deaths among young people including 118 from ages 1–4, 116 from ages 5–9, 530 from ages 10–14, and 1,802 from ages 15–17. While firearms are the leading cause of death overall for young people ages 1 to 17, they are among the leading causes, but not always the top cause, for some individual youth age groups. Gun suicides have accounted for the majority of all gun deaths each year since 1995. Gun suicides have increased in the last three years, while gun homicides have declined. In this year’s report, we examined the rise of gun suicides, their disproportionate impact on vulnerable populations, and policy recommendations to address the gun suicide epidemic. For more information on public health interventions, please see the companion piece to this report, From Crisis to Action: Public Health Recommendations for Firearm Suicide Prevention. While the burden of gun violence in the U.S. remains high, there are evidence-based, equitable solutions to save lives. These solutions are supported by most people, including gun owners.1 Despite this broad support, many policymakers have been unwilling to heed the evidence and enact policies that will save lives. Each year, it is our missionto provide policymakers and the public accurate and up-to-date data on gun fatalities and illustrate the enormous toll gun violence has on our country.This report is an update to GunViolence in the United States 2022: Examining the Burden Among Children and Teens. It uses firearm mortality data listed on death certificates that are provided to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and made available through the CDC WONDER Underlying Cause of Death database.The finalized data for 2023 was made available in January 2025.2 The lag in data availability makes it challenging to understand the burden of gun violence in real time; however, understanding the magnitude of this issue, even with the time lag, is essential to inform public health interventions to reduce violence. We recognize  

By Everytown for Gun Safety, Everytown Research and Policy

  The shooting of UnitedHealthcare CEO Brian Thompson using a homemade firearm with a 3D-printed frame and silencer marked the first time many in the general public heard about 3D-printed guns. But this was not the first instance of criminal violence with this type of firearm, and as 3D-printing technology becomes more aordable, accessible, and advanced, it will not be the last. The proliferation of 3D-printed firearms (3DPFs) has emerged as a serious and accelerating public safety challenge. The current state of 3D-printing technology allows an individual to print all or key parts of a firearm at home. Like other kinds of ghost guns, 3DPFs lack serial numbers, so law enforcement is unable to trace them back to their owner when they are recovered in a crime. Because 3DPFs are untraceable and require no background check, they are particularly attractive to gun trackers who can print dozens of firearms and avoid raising alarms. 3DPFs have been linked to violent crimes, including everything from extremist plots to shootings involving teens. And the online community that produces and beta tests these designs includes alarming extremist elements, with many designers viewing 3D printing as a means to bypass or dismantle gun laws altogether. In the United States, as regulatory pressure in recent years has significantly reduced the availability of ghost gun “kits”—a way that online retailers routinely sold easily modified building blocks of firearms—the 3D printing of frames and accessories has accelerated among those looking to manufacture their own guns. Meanwhile, in Europe, new 3DPF designs allowing people to print functioning firearms threaten to undermine the gun safety laws that have long protected the continent from the degree of gun violence in the US. Policymakers, technology firms, and civil society must act urgently to address the dangers of 3DPFs. A multipronged strategy is essential. This includes 3D-printer manufacturers and software companies developing and implementing algorithms that detect and block the printing of firearms and accessories. In concert with the 3D-printing industry, lawmakers should take steps to regulate 3D-printing technology in a manner that makes it impossible to use a 3D printer to print a gun. Public institutions like schools, libraries, and community tech labs should implement clear policies and software restrictions to block the printing of firearm components on 3D printers. Further, social media and other online platforms should significantly improve their moderation of content that promotes or distributes 3Dprinted gun blueprints or features instructions and advice for building 3DPFs.

By The Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime

 Years of escalating gang violence in the Western Cape has sustained the worrying upward trend of the past five years. This issue of the Western Cape Gang Monitor summarizes the factors that have driven gang dynamics in 2025 and sets out a plan to tackle the challenge in the short term. 

 As we move into 2026, this plan can help form a basis for decisive action against escalating gang violence – and support for the individuals and communities it endangers and harms.

In this issue:

• Gang dynamics: 10 trends.

• What generates clusters of violence?

• Know your enemy: the ever-shifting challenge.

• A 12-point plan for the rapid mitigation of gang violence.

This is the seventh issue of the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime’s (GI-TOC) Western Cape Gang Monitor, an output of our South Africa Organized Crime Observatory. This series of bulletins tracks developments in Western Cape gang dynamics each quarter, to provide a concise synthesis of relevant trends to inform policymakers and civil society. This is a year-in-review issue, combining analysis published by the GI-TOC throughout the year with new research. The monitor draws on information provided by field researchers working in gang-affected communities of the Western Cape. This includes interviews with current and former gang members, civil society and members of the criminal justice system.