By Todd Foglesong, Ron Levi, et. al.

This report analyzes recent data on homicide and robbery to understand whether there is a relationship between violent crime and “progressive prosecution.” We pooled data on recorded crime from 65 major cities, conducted a statistical regression of trends in violent crime as well as larceny in two dozen cities, and compared the incidence of homicide before and after the election of progressive prosecutors in Philadelphia, Chicago, and Los Angeles, cities where we are conducting on-going research on changes in criminal justice. We also compared trends in recorded crime across all counties in Florida and California since 2015. We find no evidence to support the claim that progressive prosecutors were responsible for the increase in homicide during the pandemic or before it. We recommend that further statistical analyses of data on violent crime be supplemented by qualitative research and direct evidence about the practices of prosecutors in cities that recorded divergent patterns in homicide.

Toronto: University of Toronto, Munk School of Global Affairs and Public Policy, 2022. 48p.

By  Besiki Luka Kutateladze; et al.

One of the key decisions that prosecutors make is whether or not to file charges against a defendant. Depending on the office, this decision point may be called initial case assessment, screening, review, or filing. Prosecutors, or in some instances paralegals, review evidence provided by law enforcement and decide whether to file any charges in each case. The core purpose of case screening is to identify and eliminate cases that cannot or should not be prosecuted. In other words, prosecutors have the difficult task of assessing limited case facts in front of them and rejecting cases 1) that do not involve enough evidence to support a conviction, and 2) for which prosecution would not be in the best interest of justice and victims. The decision to reject a case is highly consequential because it means that the defendant will avoid formal charges and conviction. Cases can also be dismissed after they are filed. While judges can dismiss cases— due, e.g., to missing case processing deadlines or 4th amendment violations—most dismissal decisions are made by prosecutors. Cases may be dismissed by a prosecutor due to evidentiary issues (including victim or witness cooperation) or plea negotiations in other cases, for example. PPI 2.1 examines the relationship between these two highly discretionary case outcomes: case rejection and case dismissal. While there is no agreed-upon standard for what proportion of referred cases should be rejected for prosecution, or what proportion of filed cases should be dismissed, we suspect that these proportions will vary across jurisdictions and by offense types. 

Prosecutorial Performance Indicators , 2022. 12p.

Amanda Y. Agan, Jennifer L. Doleac & Anna Harvey

Communities across the United States are reconsidering the public safety benefits of prosecuting nonviolent misdemeanor offenses, yet there is little empirical evidence to inform policy in this area. In this paper we report the first estimates of the causal effects of misdemeanor prosecution on defendants' subsequent criminal justice involvement. We leverage the as-if random assignment of nonviolent misdemeanor cases to Assistant District Attorneys (ADAs) who decide whether a case should be prosecuted in the Suffolk County District Attorney's Office in Massachusetts. These ADAs vary in the average leniency of their prosecution decisions. We find that, for the marginal defendant, non-prosecution of a nonviolent misdemeanor offense leads to a 53% reduction in the likelihood of a new criminal complaint, and to a 60% reduction in the number of new criminal complaints, over the next two years. These local average treatment effects are largest for defendants without prior criminal records, suggesting that averting criminal record acquisition is an important mechanism driving our findings. We also present evidence that a recent policy change in Suffolk County imposing a presumption of nonprosecution for nonviolent misdemeanor offenses had similar beneficial effects, decreasing the likelihood of subsequent criminal justice involvement

Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2022. 103p.

By John F. Pfaff

Given the undeniable role that prosecutorial discretion has played in driving mass incarceration, it makes sense to turn to them to scale it back as well. This has certainly been a central motivation of the progressive/reform prosecutor movement that started in the late 2000s. And while this movement has had some notable successes, recent years have shed some important light on the limits it faces as well. In this essay, I want to focus on how the county-ness of prosecutors hems in their power from two different directions. On the one hand, as county officials, prosecutors—at least in most major urban areas—have a large number of constituents who live in the suburbs and regularly oppose reforms … of policies that by and large do not affect them. It’s telling that many, if not most, reform prosecutors have been elected in counties that either have no suburbs at all within their borders (Philadelphia, Baltimore, St. Louis) or where the suburbs are a small fraction of the overall population (Boston, Portland). It’s clear across a wide range of cities that the core support for reform DAs comes from Black communities with high levels of violence, i.e., the communities that bear the brunt of DA decisionmaking. The more suburban voters in a county, however, the more diluted those voices become. On the other hand, as county officials, prosecutors operate at the mercy of state officials, who have a wide range of powers for clipping their wings: legislatures can give state AGs concurrent jurisdiction, for example, and in many places governors can remove elected DAs or take their cases away from them. While states are shielded from (some) federal interventions by the 10th Amendment, county officials have no such protection, as reform DAs in GOP-controlled states are increasingly beginning to discover.

(March 4, 2023). Fordham Urban Law Journal, Forthcoming, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4378322