By Emily Berg,  Susannah N. Tapp

This report presents a new method of estimating prevalence that overcomes the problems associated with the old procedure; it will be adopted beginning with the Criminal Victimization, 2023 report. Limitations of the old prevalence measure are discussed, followed by guiding principles for the new prevalence measure. The new measure is presented, as is a comparison of estimates using both methods. Additionally, see the accompanying third-party report, National Crime Victimization Survey: Prevalence Estimation Methods.  

U.S. Department of Justice Office of Justice Programs Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2024. 20p.  

By Neil Shortland; Jason Rydberg; John Horgan; Michael Williams; Georgia Elena Savoia; T. H. Chan; Tyler Cote; Kurt Braddock

This study evaluated the Operation250 campaign focused on online safety and risk assessment.

Abstract

This evaluation of Operation250 reported positive results for students who experienced the Operation250, an important step in efforts to identify “what works” in the realm of prevention. However, several issues were identified that center on both (1) the wider issues associated with conducting interventions and (2) evaluating those interventions to assess the degree to which they are achieving their stated goals. Researchers conducted a formal and summative evaluation of Operation250 (Op250) using a mixed-method approach, including a randomized control trial and a wait-list control trial design with 1) an intervention group and 2) a control group (i.e., a matched-control group that has not received the Op250 intervention) at a series of schools in the North Adams District in Massachusetts. The goal of this independent evaluation was to objectively measure the ability of Op250 to (1) reduce unsafe online behavior in pre- teen ,and teenagers and (2) increase the ability of pre-teens and teenagers to assess risk online.

Lowell, MA: University of Massachusetts, Lovell, 2024. 150p.

By Farid Badrán

  Recent scholarship has seen the peace agreement between Colombian government and the Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces (FARC) guerrillas a milestone in closing more than 50 years of internal armed conflict. Indeed, the traditional practice of subversive warfare between the two sides ended. However, this did not imply a true path to peacebuilding. The empirical and statistical evidence indicates the worsening of the conflict through the transformation of its practices and representations, into terrorism and transnational organized crime. This article contends that the FARC, as a political party, a new insurgent group, and a criminal actor, continues to have a main role

Trends in Organized Crime (2024) 27:173–196 

By Yarin Eski, Anna Sergi

   This article will explore how the current narratives (and corresponding changes) in Dutch organised crime policing relate to ethnic profiling of minorities in the Netherlands. It will do so by developing a theoretically informed narrative understanding of what we would like to conceptualise as ethnic profiling of organised crime (in the Netherlands), digging deeper into the connection between the role of ethnicity in organised crime studies inasmuch as it relates to the history of the mafia concept and, even further, lingering colonialism in law-and-order approaches. By focusing on (assumed) socio-historical connections between Italy, mafia and organised crime and on the social construction of Italian mafia as organised crime, based on narrative criminology, this article discursively and interpretatively understands the dominant and hidden Dutch narratives on (policing) organised crime. The discovered narratives will be critically discussed in light of the juxtaposition between mafias and ethnic organised crime and post-colonial implications.

  Trends in Organized Crime (2024) 27:120–139

By Robert A. Roks, Edwin W. Kruisbergen, Edward R. Kleemans

   In this article, we aim to further our understanding of the social embeddedness of organized crime by exploring the (possible) ways the social environment adds to the shielding of organized crime or criminal activities by organized crime groups. We argue that the metaphor of ‘walls of silence’ provides a fruitful way to examine the shielding of organized crime. Based on a theoretical and empirical exploration of 30 cases from the fifth data sweep of Dutch Organized Crime Monitor, we illustrate how organized crime offenders in the Netherlands depend on the silence and secrecy of co-offenders, victims, bystanders, and others who are aware of their (criminal) activities. Furthermore, we present a framework of the shielding of organized crime activities to provide insight into how offenders not only make use of the social environment to shield their activities, but also how the social environment can (pur posely) act as walls of silence and secrecy.

Trends in Organized Crime (2024) 27:103–119 

By Michael D. Anestis; Jayna Moceri-Brooks, Rachel L. Johnson,  et al

Abstract

Importance: Secure firearm storage may help reduce firearm injury and death. Broad implementation requires more granular assessments of firearm storage practices and greater clarity on circumstances that may prevent or promote the use of locking devices.

Objective: To develop a more thorough understanding of firearm storage practices, obstacles to using locking devices, and circumstances in which firearm owners would consider locking unsecured firearms.

Design, setting, and participants: A cross-sectional, nationally representative survey of adults residing in 5 US states who owned firearms was administered online between July 28 and August 8, 2022. Participants were recruited via probability-based sampling.

Main outcomes and measures: Firearm storage practices were assessed via a matrix provided to participants in which firearm-locking devices were described both via text and images. Locking mechanisms (key/personal identification number [PIN]/dial vs biometric) were specified for each type of device. Obstacles to the use of locking devices and circumstances in which firearm owners would consider locking unsecured firearms were assessed via self-report items developed by the study team.

Results: The final weighted sample included 2152 adult (aged ≥18 years), English-speaking firearm owners residing in the US; the sample was predominantly male (66.7%). Among the 2152 firearm owners, 58.3% (95% CI, 55.9%-60.6%) reported storing at least 1 firearm unlocked and hidden, with 17.9% (95% CI, 16.2%-19.8%) reporting storing at least 1 firearm unlocked and unhidden. Gun safes were the most frequently used device both among participants who use keyed/PIN/dial locking mechanisms (32.4%; 95% CI, 30.2%-34.7%) and those who use biometric locking mechanisms (15.6%; 95% CI, 13.9%-17.5%). Those who do not store firearms locked most frequently noted a belief that locks are unnecessary (49.3%; 95% CI, 45.5%-53.1%) and a fear that locks would prevent quick access in an emergency (44.8%; 95% CI, 41.1%-48.7%) as obstacles to lock usage. Preventing access by children was the most often reported circumstance in which firearm owners would consider locking unsecured firearms (48.5%; 95% CI, 45.6%-51.4%).

Conclusions and relevance: In this survey study of 2152 firearm owners, consistent with prior research, unsecure firearm storage was common. Firearm owners appeared to prefer gun safes relative to cable locks and trigger locks, indicating that locking device distribution programs may not match firearm owners' preferences. Broad implementation of secure firearm storage may require addressing disproportionate fears of home intruders and increasing awareness of the risks associated with household firearm access. Furthermore, implementation efforts may hinge on broader awareness of the risks of ready firearm access beyond unauthorize 

access by children

JAMA Netw Open. 2023 Mar 1;6(3):e231447.

 doi: 10.1001/jamanetworkopen.2023.1447.

By Catherine M. Grosso, Jeffrey Fagan, Michael Laurence

The California Racial Justice Act of 2020 recognized racial and ethnic discrimination as a basis for relief in capital cases, expressly permitting several types of statistical evidence to be introduced. This statewide study of the influence of race and ethnicity on the application of capital punishment contributes to this evidence. We draw on data from over 27,000 murder and manslaughter convictions in California state courts between 1978 and 2002. Using multiple methods, we found significant racial and ethnic disparities in charging and sentencing decisions. Controlling for defendant culpability and specific statutory aggravators, we show that Black and Latinx defendants and all defendants convicted of killing at least one white victim are substantially more likely to be sentenced to death. We further examined the role that race and ethnicity have in decision-making at various points in the criminal justice system. We found that prosecutors were significantly more likely to seek death against defendants who kill white victims, and that juries were significantly more likely to sentence those defendants to death. The magnitude of the race of the defendant and race of the victim effects is substantially higher than in prior studies in other states and in single-jurisdiction research. The results show an entrenched pattern of racial disparities in charging and sentencing that privileges white victim cases, as well as patterns of racial disparities in who is charged and sentenced to death in California courts that are the natural result of California's capacious statutory definition of death eligibility, which permits virtually unlimited discretion for charging and sentencing decisions. This pattern of racial preferences illustrates the social costs of California's failure to follow the Supreme Court's directive in Furman v Georgia to narrow the application of capital punishment over 50 years ago.
Journal of Empirical Legal Studies

Early View, June 2024

By New York City, Office of the City Comptroller

The audit found that the New York City Police Department (NYPD) ensures that the billing, invoices, and payments to ShotSpotter are accurate, and that ShotSpotter generally meets its currently specified contractual obligations. The auditors found that sensor coverage areas were initially set up in Brooklyn and the Bronx because the two boroughs had the highest number of confirmed shootings, and, within the two boroughs, they were generally placed in precincts with the highest number of confirmed shootings. The audit also found that ShotSpotter met its contractual performance targets, which focus on avoiding “missed incidents,” most of the time.

However, the audit found that the contractual performance standard does not measure whether alerts sent to NYPD result in confirmed shootings. When measured against the contractual performance standards set by NYPD, ShotSpotter met its 90% target for avoiding missed incidents in almost all boroughs except Manhattan, but when measured against the number of confirmed shootings, performance is far lower. During the sampled months of review in 2022 and 2023, ShotSpotter alerts only resulted in confirmed shootings between 8% and 20% of the time.

During the month of June 2023, for example, out of the 940 ShotSpotter alerts that NYPD responded to 771 could not be confirmed as shootings upon arrival at the scene (82%), 47 were determined to be unfounded (5%), and 122 were confirmed as shootings (13%). NYPD officers spent 426.9 hours investigating alerts that were not confirmed as shootings. If only one officer responded, this equates to almost 36 twelve-hour shifts; if two officers responded, this number doubles.[1]  NYPD does not currently track the amount of time ─ or the associated staff costs ─ spent responding to such instances.

NYPD does not agree that confirmed shootings should be used to measure ShotSpotter’s performance.  It asserts that ShotSpotter improves the response time to possible shots fired which in turn increases the ability to provide assistance to victims, increases officers’ safety, and provides a more accurate location of the possible shooting than a 911 call alone.

However, NYPD does not measure ShotSpotter alert response times in comparison to 911 call response times to shots fired outside, the metric most closely aligned to ShotSpotter alerts. The audit analyzed the two data sets, NYPD’s internal OCD ShotSpotter Tracking report and the Open Data NYPD Call for Service report, and found that during the month of June 2023 average response times to ShotSpotter alerts were 1 minute and 38 seconds faster than response times to reports to 911 of outdoor shots fired (3 minutes 50 seconds for ShotSpotter versus 5 minutes 28 seconds for 911), far less than the difference of 5 minutes claimed in publicly-available data.[2]

The audit found that NYPD’s data collection should be improved, analyzed more critically, and published in the interest of transparency before ShotSpotter’s contract, which expires in December 2024, is renewed. The data currently collected and published by NYPD does not support a comprehensive assessment of the tool’s effectiveness or economy, does not fully inform the public or government officials interested in ShotSpotter’s performance, and therefore does not currently support renewal of the contract.

Intended Benefits

The audit increases transparency around the use of ShotSpotter and raises questions concerning NYPD’s assessment of its performance.  NYPD has already spent over $45 million on this product and is committed to spending a further $9 million before the end of the current contract term. The audit calls on NYPD to critically and comprehensively assess ShotSpotter’s performance and determine whether its continued use remains in the City’s best interests.

New York City: Office of the City Comptroller, 2024. 48p.

By Adam Isacson

  For this report, WOLA staff paid a two-week research visit to Colombia’s borders with Panama and Ecuador in late October and early November 2023. Here are 5 key findings: 1. Organized crime controls the migrant route through Colombia. From the informal crossings or trochas at the Ecuador border to every step of the way through the Darién jungle border with Panama, violent criminal groups are in control. That control is dispersed among many groups near Ecuador, and concentrated in a single, powerful group—the Gulf Clan—in Colombia’s Darién region. Their profits from migrants now sit alongside cocaine and illicit precious-metals mining as a principal income stream for Colombia’s armed and criminal groups, some of which the International Committee of the Red Cross considers parties to armed conflicts.1 2. The Colombian state is absent from both border zones, although this is a reality that we have observed in past fieldwork in many of Colombia’s zones of armed conflict and illicit crop cultivation. The national government is not doing enough to manage flows, determine who is passing through, or protect people at risk. At all levels of government, responsible agencies are poorly coordinated and rarely present. Checkpoints, patrols, and detentions are uncommon, but so are humanitarian services and access to protection. Despite ambitious plans to “introduce the state” to conflictive areas—most recently, Colombia’s 2016 peace accord—key points along the migration route are vacuums of governance that get filled by armed and criminal groups. 3. Colombia faces challenges in integrating Venezuelan refugees and migrants. Amid Venezuela’s collapse, Colombia’s humanitarian response to fleeing Venezuelans remains more complete and generous than those of much of South America. However, the Colombian government’s recent trajectory is troubling. It is now harder for Venezuelans—especially more recent arrivals—to get documentation and to access services in Colombia. Pathways to permanent residency, including asylum, barely exist. As those efforts lag and people fail to integrate, more are joining in-transit migrants, attempting the dangerous journey north. This reality has a differentiated and more severe impact on the more than a quarter of people transiting Colombia, or seeking to settle in Colombia, who are adult women—especially women heads of migrant households—and the nearly a quarter who are children. The risk of physical harm including sexual violence, or of enduring hunger or lack of access to health care, is much more challenging for women, Black, Indigenous, and LGBTQ+ migrants. 4. At the same time, U.S. supported initiatives to help Colombia integrate migrants, to open up legal migration pathways for some who wish to come to the United States, and to encourage greater cooperation and collaboration between states seeking to manage this moment of heavy migration are promising. However, we note that at the same time, the U.S government orients much of its diplomatic energy and security programs toward minimizing the flow and discouraging Colombia and other states from making the journey more orderly, for fear that it might encourage more to travel. As a result, governments and migrants receive a muddled, unclear message from Washington that, for migrants, can be drowned out by poor-quality information gleaned from social media.

5. Resources to help Colombia and other nations along the migrant route are scarce, meeting only a fraction of projected needs—and that they are shrinking as wars elsewhere in the world draw humanitarian resources away. Countries like Colombia that are experiencing large amounts of U.S.-bound migration have a very difficult needle to thread. Blocking migrants is a geographic impossibility and would violate the rights of those with protection needs. Providing a managed “safe conduct” and an orderly transit pathway with robust state presence would prevent today’s immense harms and loss of life while cutting organized crime out of the picture—but the impression of “green-lighting” migration alarms the U.S. government. While some states do something in between: some measure of blocking, detaining, and deporting that dissuades few migrants but creates robust opportunities for organized crime, human traffickers, and corrupt officials who enable them, Colombia is leaning into an additional option: do little to nothing, with minimal state presence, leaving a vacuum that armed and criminal groups are filling. This poor menu of options for managing in-transit migration leads WOLA to recommend some version of “safe conduct,” even a humanitarian corridor—but with an end to Colombia’s hands off, stateless approach. Creating a safe pathway through Colombia must come with vastly increased state presence, far greater implementation of migration policies from a protection and human rights approach, dramatically improved cooperation between governments, and strongly stepped-up investment in integrating people who would rather stay in Latin America. Until it expands legal migration pathways and vastly improves its immigration court system’s capacity, much migration will be forced into the shadows. This situation will worsen further as the Biden administration implements a June 5, 2024 ban on most asylum applications between the U.S.-Mexico border’s ports of entry. In that context, the United States must be more tolerant of efforts to provide safe conduct to migrants. U.S. tolerance of such approaches, though, would hinge on big changes to the “neglect migrants in transit,” “de-emphasize integration,” and “cooperate minimally with neighbors” status quo in Colombia and elsewhere.   

  Washington, DC: The Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA), 2024.  45p.

By J.J. Prescott, Benjamin Pyle & Sonja B. Starr

People convicted of violent crimes constitute a majority of the imprisoned population but are generally ignored by existing policies aimed at reducing mass incarceration. Serious efforts to shrink the large footprint of the prison system will need to recognize this fact. This point is especially pressing at the time of this writing, as states and the federal system consider large-scale prison releases motivated by the COVID-19 pandemic. Those convicted of violent crimes consti tute a large majority of older prisoners, who are extremely vulnerable to the spread of the virus behind bars. Excluding them from protective measures will deeply undermine those measures’ effectiveness—and yet many governors and officials have hesitated due to fears of violent-crime recidivism. In addition, the population imprisoned for violent offenses also exhibits sharper demographic disparities than the general prison population across both age and race. Conse quently, reforms that target those convicted only of nonviolent crimes will likely exacerbate existing inequalities in the criminal justice system. In this Article, we start from the premise that better understanding individuals convicted of violent crimes is essential to overcoming resistance to the idea of releasing them earlier—and in particular, to address the fear that this population will almost certainly reoffend violently. We review existing studies and offer new empirical anal ysis to inform these questions. Although estimates vary, our synthesis of the available evidence suggests that released violent offenders, especially homicide offenders who are older at release, have lower overall recidivism rates relative to other released offenders. At the same time, people released after previous homicide convictions may be more likely to commit new homicides than otherwise comparable releasees, although probably not by as much as most would expect.   

95 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1643 (2020).   

By Shima Baradaran Baughman and Megan S. Wright

  It has long been postulated that America’s mass incarceration phenomenon is driven by increased drug arrests, draconian sentencing, and the growth of the prison industry. Yet among the major players—legislators, judges, police, and prosecutors—one of these is shrouded in mystery. While laws on the books, judicial sentencing, and police arrests are all public and transparent, prosecutorial charging decisions are made behind closed doors with little oversight or public accountability. Indeed, without notice by commentators, during the last ten years or more, crime has fallen, and police have cut arrests accordingly, but prosecutors have actually increased the ratio of criminal court filings per arrest. Why? This Article presents quantitative and qualitative data from the first randomized controlled experiment studying how prosecutors nationally decide whether to charge a defendant. We find rampant variation and multiple charges for a single  crime along with the lowest rates of declination in a national study. Crosscutting this empirical analysis is an exploration of Supreme Court and prosecutor standards that help guide prosecutorial decisions. This novel approach makes important discoveries about prosecutorial charging that are critical to understanding mass incarceration. 

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 94:1123,  2021

By International Crisis Group

What’s new? Since taking power in Burkina Faso in September 2022, President Ibrahim Traoré has begun arming tens of thousands of civilians, known as the Homeland Defence Volunteers (VDPs). He has thus considerably stepped up the use of auxiliary corps created in 2020 to reinforce the army’s campaign against jihadist forces.

Why does it matter? The use of VDPs is a double-edged sword. They help defend national territory from jihadist groups by strengthening counter-insurgency operations. Yet, due to inadequate training and supervision by the armed forces, these volunteers suffer heavy casualties. Civilians are increasingly caught in the crossfire of their battles with jihadists.

What should be done? The authorities should recruit fewer VDPs and continue integrating those already enlisted into the regular armed forces under certain conditions. They should enhance the VDPs’ training, supervision and representativeness. They should sanction any proven abusers and improve relations with communities excluded from recruitment. External partners could support these endeavours.

  Africa Report N°313 | 15 December 2023

Brussels, Belgium: International Crisis Group, 2023. 43p.

By Toronto Community Housing

In 2020, Toronto Community Housing established a Confronting Anti-Black Racism (CABR) Strategy team to develop a company-wide confronting anti-Black racism strategy.

The strategy aims to identify systemic barriers, provide recommendations to address anti-Black racism issues embedded in Toronto Community Housing's (TCHC) policies, programs, and service delivery, and help create a diverse, inclusive, and equitable environment for tenants and staff.

Toronto: Toronto Community Housing, 2021. 59p.

By Matthew Bogdanos

As the head of the investigation into one of the greatest art crimes in recent memory— the looting of the Iraq Museum in 2003—I have spent more than a decade attempting to recover and return to the Iraqi people their priceless heritage (Bogdanos, 2005a and 2005b; Cruickshank, 2003). 16* I have also spent a significant amount of time in three parallel pursuits: 1) attempting to correct the almost universal misconceptions about what happened at the museum, in those fateful days in April 2003; 2) highlighting the need for the concerted and cooperative efforts of the international community to preserve, protect and recover the shared cultural heritage of all humanity; and 3) trying to increase awareness of the continuing cultural catastrophe that is represented by the illegal trade in stolen antiquities, which is indeed funding terrorism. Toward these ends, and in more than one hundred and fifty cities in nineteen countries, in venues ranging from universities, museums and governmental organizations to law-enforcement agencies, from Interpol (the International Criminal Police Organization) to both houses of the British Parliament, I have urged a more active role for governments, international organizations, cultural institutions and the art community. I have done so, knowing that most governments have few resources to spare for tracking down stolen artifacts; that many international organizations prefer to hit the conference center rather than the streets; and that many academics are content to issue a call for papers, rather than a call to action. As for the archaeological community, I have learned that some members wash their hands of unpleasant realities and argue that, while technically illegal, the market in purloined antiquities is benign—victimless—as long as it brings the art to those who can properly protect and appreciate it (namely, themselves). All the while, the situation in Middle East deteriorated dramatically after 2003, causing the United States to withdraw its forces from Iraq—an action most knowledgeable (read “non-political”) observers predicted would lead to a power struggle, such as the one that has played out in vivid color as ISIS (the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria) commits one atrocity after another. Given the bloodshed, it is a pretty tough sell to ask people to care about a bunch of old rocks with funny writing. Finding the political will to divert resources to saving cultural artifacts, no matter how precious, seems like cutting funding for police and fire in order to expand the public library. There might be a case for it one day, but not now. After all, looting has always been a cottage industry in the Middle East, the region that gave birth not just to agriculture, cities, the wheel, and pottery, but to war and conquest, as well. T he argument for protecting artifacts takes on added strength when we recognize that Iraq and Syria have been so bloody, not just because of the failure to provide sufficient security to overcome the long-festering tribal and religious animosities, but also, I submit, because of the continuing failure to appreciate the importance Iraqis and the rest of the Middle East place on the preservation of their history. This failure to protect a rich heritage going back to the dawn of civilization has convinced many that we in the West do not care about any culture other than our own. Even today, more than a decade after the initial looting, and despite having recovered almost two-thirds of the antiquities stolen from the museum,3 we are hard-pressed to keep pace with the artifacts that are  being looted from archaeological sites every day. In light of such efforts to destroy important historical and archeological sites in this region, the excavations in the City of David stand out as a model of cultural preservation. T he excavations shed light on 4,000 years of the history of Jerusalem and the origins of Western civilization at large. The dedicated efforts of the Israel Antiquities Authority and the Israel National Parks Authority, working in coordination with the City of David, have ensured that their discovery and preservation of antiquities and sites serve to educate over half a million visitors each year. Their publication of their findings also enriches the understanding of historians, academics, and researchers of ancient Jerusalem from the pre-Biblical period to the present day.

The Megalim Institute, 2020; 21p.

By Aaron Littman

Prisoner litigation proceeds along two distinct tracks. On the first and predominant track, prisoners are pro se; their litigation is processed according to exceptional and largely extrajudicial procedures; and they almost always lose. On the second and much rarer track, prisoners obtain counsel—often through appointment; their cases receive serious consideration; and success is much more likely. Federal judges, magistrates, and staff attorneys play important roles in shaping prisoner civil rights litigation by assigning cases to these tracks.

Perhaps so few prisoner civil rights cases are counseled and robustly adjudicated because most claims lack merit, or instead, perhaps so few prisoner civil rights claims succeed because so few prisoners are afforded counsel and receive the benefits of a fulsome adjudication.

This essay analyzes over a decade of data on federal prisoner civil rights cases and suggests that the latter explanation is, at least in large part, correct. It compares, for the first time, success rates in prisoner civil rights cases across districts and circuits and across years with widely varying representation rates; it also employs a novel method to identify prisoner civil rights appeals in which counsel was appointed. Together, these analyses suggest that lawyering—and the serious engagement by courts that comes along with it—really matters. When more prisoner litigants are represented and fully heard, it seems, more of them win.

43 Review of Litigation 43 (2023)
UCLA School of Law, Public Law Research Paper No. 24-6

By  Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe,  Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR)

   In a globalized world, more and more people cross international borders to develop and maintain personal contacts, pursue educational and professional opportunities, to migrate or to realize the right to seek asylum when fleeing from persecution. At the same time, new technologies, which rely on the gathering, processing, and sharing of data, are increasingly used by states to manage migration flows and to address transnational security threats, including terrorism. These technologies heighten the risk of human rights breaches in an area that is already highly opaque and discretionary, with weak safeguards, accountability and oversight, and where the private sector plays a strong role in their development and use. This policy brief, therefore, provides an overview of the implications of collecting and sharing information in the context of border management and how the introduction or continued use of new technologies in the border space may affect human rights. It also provides recommendations to OSCE participating States on how to respect and protect human rights when using new technologies to manage their borders. The policy brief has been prepared as part of the ongoing work of the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) in the field of migration, freedom of movement, human rights and counter-terrorism.1 More specifically, it is based on analysis from a series of online expert consultation meetings on new technologies in the context of border management and their impact on human rights, organized by ODIHR in June 2020, following a preliminary assessment that the increase in the use of new technologies for border management deserved attention, particularly considering potential human rights concerns.2 This policy brief references various digital technologies used in migration management and counter- terrorism, referring to passenger and biometric data collection, algorithmic decision-making, and artificial intelligence-based technologies as the innovations that are currently being developed and deployed for border and migration management, and to counter transnational organized crime and terrorism.  

Vienna: 

OSCE, 2021.  OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), 2021. 34p.

By Centre for Justice Innovation

   Whoever forms the new Government is going to be faced with difficult dilemmas about public service reform, not least in crime and justice. There are tens of thousands of unprosecuted serious crimes awaiting Crown Court trial in the highest backlog on record. Our prisons are so close to capacity that the system is running the risk of a prison riot and the risk that the day will arrive soon when the courts are told they can’t send any more people to prison. This paper, Systems Shift, sets out our plan to, first, stop the system from overloading, and then fundamentally shifting how our criminal justice system operates, putting it on a path toward long-term recovery. Given the urgency of the issues facing both the prison system and the Crown Courts, we recommend that a new Government consider: • Shortening the amount of time people sentenced to four years or less serve in prison, excluding those who are assessed as posing a high risk of serious harm to the public, using secondary legislation as soon as possible.; • Legislating to reduce the flow of people into prison on short sentences and remand while also tackling the long standing injustice of Imprisonment for Public Protection sentenced prisoners.; • Once the acute crisis has abated, taking immediate action to reduce the Crown Court backlog, setting a clear ambition to speed up Crown Court cases, creating streamlined processes to siphon off the least serious not guilty cases, and fast-tracking rape cases. Once the system is stabilised, they can than shift the system to focus its limited resources on the highest harm crime. This includes working towards to a future in which every victim of sexual violence or domestic abuse has their case heard in a specialist court, whether that be in criminal, private family law or public family law courts. We argue that such a shift can occur by implementing smarter ways of tackling ‘quality of life’ crime and anti-social behaviour, not least in strengthening our community justice services and investing in earlier intervention. We call for some incremental reforms building on existing evidence of what we know works, and more radical changes, not least in reforming our courts and opening up public discussion on drugs policy. Lastly, we need to build a more strategic centre within national Government. This should include an independent Institute for Justice to provide annual, independent forecasts of criminal justice capacity and demand (like an Office for Budget Responsibility for justice). These forecasts would help open up the public debate to help us make long term choices about what kind of prison system we want, what type of prisons we need and where those prisons need to be. We need to be clear-eyed about what the criminal justice system can achieve, and a new Government needs to be honest with the public that the justice system can’t fix all the problems that our communi ties face overnight. But, in our view, we cannot delay any longer. We urge whoever forms the next Gov ernment to take the opportunity presented by a new Parliament to deliver the fundamental ‘systems shift’ we need, in order to create a fairer and more effective justice system that holds the confidence of all our people.  

London: Centre for Justice Innovation, 2024. 20p.

By Corey Davis, Ashleigh Dennis, and Amy Lieberman at the Network for Public Health Law’s Harm Reduction Legal Project

State laws can both increase and reduce harms related to drugs and drug use. All U.S. states continue to rely primarily on a punitive approach to people who use certain drugs, criminalizing not only the possession, distribution, and use of those drugs but also the possession and distribution of devices used to consume them and check them for adulterants such as fentanyl. Consistent access to new injection and inhalation supplies is critical to prevent the transmission of HIV, viral hepatitis, and other communicable diseases among people who use drugs, and to prevent subsequent infection of sexual partners, children, and others. Drug checking equipment can help inform people who use drugs about the content of those drugs, leading them to make more informed decisions about their drug use. Laws that criminalize the possession and distribution of these objects lead to increases in preventable injuries and deaths. Similarly, state laws governing prescription medications make it difficult for community groups, harm reduction organizations, and similar entities to distribute naloxone, and a variety of laws designed to punish people who use drugs discourage those who are experiencing or witnessing an overdose to call for help. Most states have passed laws designed to mitigate some of the impact of criminalization. There is great variation in the presence and specifics of these laws, which can create confusion among both people who use drugs and people and organizations working to ensure that they have the supplies they need to protect themselves and others. This document is designed to reduce this information gap and help individuals and organizations better understand how the legal landscape in their state may impact access to harm reduction services and supplies and emergency medical assistance in an overdose. Specifically, this document includes detailed information regarding laws related to the possession and distribution of injection and smoking equipment, drug checking equipment, naloxone access, statewide naloxone standing orders, and overdose Good Samaritan overdose protections in all 50 states and the District of Columbia. For each state, each argether with a hyperlink that will take the reader to the text of the law. All iea of law is briefly explained in plain language. The relevant citation is also listed, tion is current as of August 1, 2023. 

Research Triangle Park, NC: RTI International, 2024. 101p.

By Megan Pfeiffe

   Parental incarceration impacts all members of a family unit, including parents who are incarcerated, their children, and the parents, legal guardians, or caregivers who aren’t incarcerated. Implementing evidence-based programs and practices tailored to support parents who are incarcerated and their families is crucial for addressing their complex needs, mitigating the negative consequences of incarceration, and promoting positive outcomes for families. Investing in evidence-based programs and practices promotes long-term sustainability by allocating resources to interventions with proven effectiveness and fosters commitment by holding stakeholders accountable for achieving measurable outcomes. While the landscape of programs and practices addressing the needs of parents who are incarcerated and their families is vast and continuously evolving, this brief will discuss examples from the field, providing a glimpse of the diversity of approaches. The following programs and practices are informed by research that reflects best practices, as well as input from practitioners and administrators on evidence-based and promising practices and programs used by the field collected through a survey of Second Chance Act Addressing the Needs of Incarcerated Parents and Their Minor Children grantees.

New York: The Council of State Governments Justice Center, 2024. 16p.

By Travis McIntyre

A new study by The Pew Charitable Trusts shows that young people assigned to probation after their first offense are more likely to be rearrested in the future, particularly for technical violations, than their peers diverted away from probation. The study, based on data provided by the Texas Juvenile Justice Department (TJJD) and analyzed by researchers at The Council of State Governments (CSG) Justice Center and Pew, suggests that diverting more youth from probation could improve justice system efficiency and public safety outcomes. Background Past research has shown that young people removed from their homes have higher likelihoods of future rearrest—and of arrest for more severe offenses—than similarly situated youth supervised in their communities instead.1 These findings spurred a major change in state youth justice policy over the last two decades that shifted the balance from out-of-home placements toward community supervision.2 However, more recent research has suggested that youth who are formally processed and supervised are more likely to be rearrested in the future than comparable youth who receive diversion from formal prosecution.3 New research from Pew builds on this work by examining rearrest rates among statistically similarly Texas youth assigned to probation versus diversion. The study looks at arrests for both new offenses and technical violations, as research suggests that arrests for technical violations do not have a deterrent effect, may increase subsequent offending, and can contribute to an overrepresentation of youth of color in the juvenile justice system 

New York: The Council of State Governments Justice Center, 2024. 3p.