By A. Feltz, E. T. Cokely

The thought experiment presented above is designed to assess intuitions that are central to people’s beliefs about moral objectivism. Moral objec- tivism, as we will use the term, is the view there are some moral statements that are true or false independent of what anyone thinks about the con- tents of those statements (Mackie, 1977). In simple terms, while some people think morality is relative to what people think about those issues, most moral objectivists think that some things are just clear-cut right or wrong regardless of one’s situation, culture, or values. Debates about moral objectivism have been central parts of contemporary ethics for thousands of years. As will come as no surprise to the reader by now, there is persistent debate about whether moral objectivism is true. These

Diversity and Disagreement,, 40p.

By F. H. Bradley

THE object of this volume is not the construction of a system of Moral Philosophy. It is very far from attempting either an exhaustive or a systematic treatment of ethical questions. Nor is the Author so much as pre- pared to define the sphere of Moral Philosophy, to say what does fall within it and what docs not. The writer’s object in this work has bceti mainly critical. He sees that ethical theories rest in the end on pre- conceptions metaphysical and psychological. He believes that many of the fundamental ideas now current, especially and he has en- deavoured, by the correction of some of these, at least to remove what seem obstacles to the apprehension of moral facts. These Essa^^s arc a critical discussion of some lead- ing questions in Ethics, and ai'e so far connected that, for the most part, they must be read in the order in which they stand. (Author’s preface)

Oxford : At The Clarendon Press. (1876)1927. 358p.