By Lorenzo Vidino, Seamus Hughes and Bennett Clifford

The time period in which the Islamic State (IS) controlled territory in Syria and Iraq between 2014 and 2019 coincided with the largest groundswell of homegrown jihadist activity in United States history. This unprecedented wave of jihadist activism, which hit its peak between 2014 and 2016, could be measured through several indicators. Senior officials in the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) testified that the Bureau managed, at any given time between 2014 and 2019, 1,000 active investigations into IS supporters throughout the U.S.; at least 239 alleged supporters were charged in U.S. courts. Meanwhile, more than 80 Americans traveled to Syria and Iraq to join IS, and 16 IS sympathizers that remained in the U.S. conducted terrorist attacks that were inspired by or directed by the group. Others provided resources for IS’ global project in different ways, most notably by supporting IS’ online propaganda dissemination and social media recruitment campaigns. At its peak, IS’ perceived ideological credibility and authority, its predilection for extreme acts of violence, and its ability to direct its on-the-ground resources in Syria and Iraq towards information operations designed to incite terrorism in the West, drove its successes in recruiting Americans. However, as the organization began to hemorrhage territory, leadership, and key personnel, it became less and less able to reach its target audiences around the world, including in the U.S. The loss of the last vestiges of its territory in Syria and Iraq, the targeted killings of key English-speaking IS facilitators and “virtual entrepreneurs,” and eventually, the death of IS’ first “caliph” Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi were all harbingers for the decline in IS-related activity in the U.S. Nevertheless, even in a post-caliphate environment, IS continues to inspire American jihadists to conduct activities on its behalf. According to the FBI, the organization remains the predominant homegrown violent extremist (HVE) threat to the U.S., and although the group’s capabilities to recruit and mobilize Americans have significantly degraded, no other jihadist organization has made a significant effort to fill the breach and take IS’ place. While the number of IS-related cases in the American legal system in 2020, 2021, and 2022 have steadily declined from their peak in 2015, the alleged activities of supporters in these cases are more diffuse. In this paper, we evaluate 29 cases of Americans charged in the U.S. with IS-related offenses since January 2020. By comparing and contrasting them with the larger corpus of cases of American IS sympathizers in the U.S. legal system since 2014—when the first IS-related criminal case occurred—this brief report documents emerging trends in the nature of American support for IS and the U.S. counterterrorism response in the world after the collapse of IS’ physical caliphate. Furthermore, it attempts to ascertain what these trends portend for the future of the jihadist movement in America.

Washington, DC: George Washington University Program on Extremism, 2022. 16p.

By Lorenzo Vidino and Alexander Meleagrou-Hitchens

The global LGBTQIA+ (lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer/questioning, intersex and asexual/aromantic/agender) community has historically been subjected to hateful rhetoric, discriminatory practices and acts of violence. In the West, this animosity has traditionally mostly originated from a heterogeneous array of actors that can broadly be identified with the far-right. And while in recent years the LBGTQIA+ community has received rights and a degree of acceptance largely unthinkable only a few decades ago, episodes of intolerance and violence are still very much present. Recently, for example, in June 2022, authorities detained 31 members of a white nationalist group called Patriot Front who were allegedly about to attack the Pride in the Park event in Coeur d'Alene, Idaho.1 If animosity against the LGBTQIA+ community from right wing circles is a well-known and fairly uncontested topic, less so is that originating from Islamist milieus.2 Yet, an abundance of evidence indicates that, over the last few decades, hateful rhetoric and occasional acts of violence against the LGBTQIA+ community in the United States and virtually all other Western countries have increasingly come from Islamist actors. Both in the Muslim world and in the West, mainstream Islamists, such as those from Muslim Brotherhood and Salafist backgrounds, depict homosexuality as a perversion and a grave sin. Islamist anti-LGBTQIA+ rhetoric takes different angles. At times, it focuses on warning the Muslim community about engaging in homosexual acts, evoking the divine punishments that await those who do so. In line with some Christian fundamentalists, natural events such as hurricanes and earthquakes or diseases like AIDS are also painted as divine punishments against homosexuality. A substantial part of the messaging also views homosexuality and gay rights as a Western plot devised to pervert and weaken Muslims. This report documents several instances of preachers and top-ranking officials linked to prominent Islamist organizations in the U.S. and Europe, several of whom are engaged as partners by Western governments and civil society, that espouse such views.

Washington, DC: George Washington University Program on Extremism, 2022. 21p.

By Anne Speckhard, Molly Ellenberg, and TM Garret

The following report is an interim report of an ongoing study, with the current results based on 50 in-depth psychosocial interviews of white supremacists in five countries (the U.S., Canada, Germany, UK and New Zealand) collected over the time period of October 2020 to October 2021. The interviews focused on the subjects’ childhood histories, exposures to white supremacism, recruitment and joining processes, experiences in the group including ideological indoctrination and with violence and if disillusioned their disengagement and deradicalization experiences. All of the interviews were conducted over Zoom and video recorded with most participants agreeing to have their interview used to produce a short counter narrative video for use in disrupting white supremacist online and face-to-face recruitment.

McLean, VA: International Center for the Study of Violent Extremism, 2022. 46p.

By Sibusiso Nkomo and Stephen Buchanan-Clarke

Afrobarometer’s Round 7 surveys, conducted between late 2016 and late 2018, asked security-related questions in 34 African countries, including five countries along the East Africa Corridor that have experienced terrorist activity in recent years: Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Mozambique, and South Africa. (While Somalia has been heavily impacted by terrorism, and has been a source of terrorist activity in the region, no Afrobarometer survey has taken place in the country due to security challenges.) In these five countries, citizens show a generally mixed response to their respective governments’ handling of violent extremism. Public trust in the security sector, particularly the police, is low throughout the region, which may hamper efforts to develop sustainable approaches to addressing violent extremism and insecurity. Many citizens in the region report fearing violence from extremist groups, even where actual incidents have been infrequent, and indicate a willingness to accept government restrictions on certain civil liberties, such as rights to privacy, freedom of movement, and freedom of religion. These findings highlight the need for counter-terrorism policies whose national security objectives do not come at the expense of democratic ideals and good governance.

Ghana: Afrobarometer, 2020. 26p.

Edited by Marc Engelhart and Sunčana Roksandić Vidlička

The events surrounding the terrorist group officially known as the Islamic State (IS) have galvanized anti-terrorist efforts far beyond the first reactions after September 11, 2001, and led to varying state responses, especially in Europe, e.g., in addressing the phenomenon of foreign fighters. In »Dealing with Terrorism – Empirical and Normative Challenges for Fighting the Islamic State« an international panel of experts analyses current trends and new developments in legal systems and in law enforcement in Europe as well as in the USA and the Middle East. Offering a succinct overview with special focus on criminal law, police law, and European and international law, the book provides unique insights into what dealing with terrorism means to European and non-European countries. It includes material from non-English-speaking countries that is seldom available to a broader academic community. Its comparative approach offers readers three levels of understanding: by country, in terms of the European Union, and the international community as a whole. The book is geared at specialists in national and international institutions, scholars, and students in the field but will also be of great interest to the wider legal community. Its profound insights and expert perspectives enhance the ongoing national and international debate on public security issues by striking a balance between freedom and security

Berlin: Duncker & Humblot. 2019. 317p.

By Andrew Papachristos

This report contains the latest work of a unique group of experts convened by the Joyce Foundation beginning in 2019 under the banner "Toward a Fair and Just Response to Gun Violence." The group includes advocates, prosecutors and defense attorneys, policy experts, researchers, violence intervention practitioners, and members of law enforcement, all experts in their fields who have come together as a community of practice to address some of the hardest questions facing our communities in 2022: how to reduce the devastating toll of gun violence experienced in many U.S. cities; how to limit the proliferation of guns - many owned illegally - in those same communities; how to do so without further undermining the relationship between police and communities of color; and how to do so without contributing to the over-incarceration of men and boys of color.

Following a series of virtual meetings in 2020 and 2021, the members of the community of practice arrived at this set of consensus recommendations for policy, research and practice, all in furtherance of the group's shared goals of reducing the harms caused by guns, and reducing the harms caused by punitive law enforcement responses to gun violence.

Chicago: The Joyce Foundation, 2022. 12p

By Travis Taniguchi, Katherine Hoogesteyn, Eiryn Renouard, and Dean Esserman

Ghost guns (also known as privately made or unserialized firearms) have become a significant concern to law enforcement and public safety. The term “ghost gun” encompasses a variety of firearms produced from components that are not currently regulated by federal firearm laws. Most commonly, ghost guns are produced from components purchased from businesses and individuals that most often include nearly finished aluminum, polymer frames, or receivers. Advances in ghost gun parts manufacturing facilitates homemade production of firearms by non-technical users. Public safety and gun violence prevention advocates cite the growing representation of ghost guns in crime as well as the ease of production, lack of background checks, and poor traceability as reasons that ghost guns components and kits should be regulated like all other firearms.

• More.....

  In this study, we addressed current knowledge gaps by exploring law enforcement agencies’ (LEA’s) experience with ghost guns to provide a national overview of current perceptions, practices, and recommendations for improving public policy. Interviews with command, patrol, forensics, and specialized units from 24 LEAs revealed that there was a patchwork of experience with, and strategies to address the public safety risk created by ghost guns. Policy recommendations based on this research include halting the proliferation of ghost guns through regulating the production and sale of ghost gun components and kits by updating the outdated definition of firearm. Recommendations for improvements on the process of tracking and reporting ghost gun data, training, within-agency information sharing, and research are also discussed.

Arlington, VA: National Police Foundation, 20211. 37p.

By Chelsea Parsons and Eugenio Weigend Vargas

In the early morning hours of July 5, 2017, New York Police Department officer Miosotis Familia was ambushed as she sat in a marked NYPD command truck with her partner while providing additional security to a Bronx neighborhood after Fourth of July festivities. In an attack that police officials described as an assassination, Officer Familia was fatally shot in the head with a gun that had been stolen in Charleston, West Virginia, four years earlier. Less than a month earlier on the other side of the country, a UPS driver in San Francisco shot and killed three co-workers and injured two others using a gun that had been stolen in Utah. The shooter was also armed with a gun that had been stolen in Napa County, California. Stolen guns pose a significant risk to community safety. Whether stolen from a gun store or an individual gun owner’s collection, these guns often head straight into the illegal underground gun market, where they are sold, traded, and used to facilitate violent crimes. Gun theft is not a minor problem in the United States. According to data from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), during the four-year period from 2012 to 2015, nearly half a billion dollars worth of guns were stolen from individuals nationwide, amounting to an estimated 1.2 million guns. Twenty-two thousand guns were stolen from gun stores during this same period.4 A gun is stolen in the U.S. every two minutes.

Washington, DC: Center for American Progress, 2017. 34p.

By Eugenio Weigend Vargas

A new analysis from the Center for American Progress shows that the repeal of Missouri’s permit-to-purchase (PTP) law in 2007 is associated with an uptick in the annual number of stolen firearms. Drawing from FBI data on stolen and recovered property from 1994 to 2019—12 years before and after the removal of the PTP law, respectively—CAP found that the real annual average value of stolen firearms in Missouri increased from $3.1 million from 1994–2007 to $4.3 million from 2008–2019, a 38 percent increase. The original analysis adds to a growing body of evidence showing that the PTP repeal has led to increased gun homicides, gun suicides, and gun trafficking in Missouri.

Washington, DC: Center for American Progress, 2021. 7p.

By Katja Triebel

This report is a study of the relationship between legal firearm ownership and crime. It has been reviewed by academics with expertise in this area, in reaction to the process by the European Commission to amend the EU Firearms Directive with much more restrictions on legal firearm ownership. Such changes are allegedly justified by purported links between legal fiream ownership, crime and terrorism in the EU. However, such purported links are highly controversial, especially in view of the data available to the EU Commission in preparing such amendments to the Directive.

Independently Published: 2016. 83p.

By Office of the New York State Attorney General

The mass shooting in and around the Tops grocery store in Buffalo, New York on May 14, 2022 that claimed the lives of ten individuals and injured three others was all the more horrific because of the white supremacist ideological motivation that fueled it and the shooter’s meticulous planning. The disturbing reality is that this attack is part of an epidemic of mass shootings often perpetrated by young men radicalized online byan ideology of hate. This report details what my office has learned about how the Buffalo shooter was first indoctrinated and radicalized through online platforms, and how he used these and other platforms to plan, implement, and promote these acts of terror.1 The report assesses the strengths and weaknesses of the response of various online platforms in the wake of the Buffalo shooting. Readers should be cautioned that this report contains graphic textual descriptions of bigotry and violence, including quotes from the shooter’s own writing that, in our opinion, are necessary to contextualize and explain this story.

Office of the New York State Attorney General. 18 Oct, 2022. 49p.

By Tecj Against Terrorism

A new report from Tech Against Terrorism has found that global terrorist and violent extremist actors are running at least 198 websites on the surface web. In-depth analysis of 33 of the most prominent websites – run by actors such as Islamic State, al-Qaeda, Atomwaffen Division and the Taliban – confirms that these sites have 1.54 million monthly visitors, with the majority of visits coming from Algeria, Pakistan, United States, and the United Kingdom.

Tech Against Terrorism, 2022. 32p.

By OSCE Transnational Threat Department Action against Terrorism Unit

Terrorist activity in today’s world is complex, multifaceted, and not confined to national borders. Terrorist groups are less cohesive, and the threat they pose is harder to understand and predict. We are witnessing not only directed attacks in the OSCE area, but also self-inspired acts of violence. Some terrorist actors are foreign fighters; others have never left their communities. The goals, motives, and justification for the violence have changed as well, and the causes and drivers of violent extremism are multifaceted. This reality requires a comprehensive, nuanced, and internationally coordinated response. The OSCE participating States have been unequivocal not only in their condemnation of terrorism and violent extremism, but also in their support of a multidimensional approach that focuses on the prevention of radicalization and of violent extremism that leads to terrorism (VERLT). The OSCE’s commitment to preventing and countering VERLT (P/CVERLT) reflects the growing awareness and understanding that effective counterterrorism efforts are vital but insufficient without an emphasis on prevention. Understanding why individuals are willing to give their lives to a violent extremist movement or cause and working to address and mitigate the issues and grievances and that push them in that direction is a critical investment of our time and resources. While there is an increased awareness among policymakers in the OSCE area of the importance of P/CVERLT, there is still not enough dialogue, engagement, and co-operation with civil society and other non-governmental actors in conceptualizing, developing, and implementing impactful P/CVERLT activities and policies

Vienna, Austria: Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) 2020. 86p.

By Seumas Miller

Undoubtedly, the events of September 11, 2001 served as a wake-up call to the scourge of global terrorism facing twenty-first century societies. But was the attack on the World Trade Center a crime or an act of war? Is seemingly indiscriminate violence inflicted on civilians ever morally justified? And should society's response always be in kind--with blind, destructive violence? For that matter, are all civilians truly "innocent"? The answers are not always so simple.Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism: Ethics and Liberal Democracy provides sobering analyses of the nature of terrorism and the moral justification--or lack thereof--of terrorist actions and counter-terrorism measures in today's world. Utilizing a variety of thought-provoking philosophical arguments, the historic roots of terrorism and its contemporary incarnations are explored in depth. Detailed analyses of organizations such as the IRA, ANC, Hamas, and al-Qaeda will reveal the many faces of terrorism and its disparate motives and tactics. Early chapters on the Definition of Terrorism, and Is Terrorism ever Morally Justified? are balanced with discussions on Counter-terrorism Strategies and Methods and Moral Limits on Counter-terrorism to provide insights into the complexities and ethical dilemmas posed by terrorism in today's world.Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism will greatly broaden our understanding of the nature and morality of terrorism and counter-terrorist pursuits--a crucial precondition for establishing any form of enduring peace between nations in the twenty-first century world.

Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2009. 231p.

By Martin Bouchard

This book examines two key themes in terrorism studies, the radicalization process and counter-terrorism policies, through the lens of social networks.

The book aims to show that networks should be at the forefront not only when analysing terrorists, but also when assessing the responses to their actions. The volume makes a unique contribution by addressing two relatively new themes for terrorism studies. First it puts social relations and cooperation issues at the forefront – an approach often identified as crucial to future breakthroughs in the field. Second, many contributions tackle the role of the Internet in the process of radicalization and in recruitment more generally, a highly debated topic in the field today. In addition, the book provides a valuable mix of review essays, critical essays, and original empirical studies. This balanced approach is also found in the topics covered by the authors, as well as their academic disciplines, which include sociology, computer science, geography, history, engineering, and criminology as well as political science. Many of the true advances in terrorism studies depend on the successful collaboration of multi-disciplinary teams, each with a different set of methodological and conceptual tools. This volume reflects the newfound diversity in this field and is a true product of its time.

Routledge, Abingdon, Oxon. UK: Routledge, 2015. 256p.

By The International Crisis Group

What’s new? The Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP), the most powerful faction of the jihadist movement known as Boko Haram, has since May 2021 largely decimated its rival led by the late Abubakar Shekau, seizing new territory. The authorities have stepped up military operations and other stabilisation efforts to counter ISWAP. How did it happen? ISWAP’s power grab comes after years of tensions within Boko Haram that eventually splintered the movement. The Islamic State (ISIS) core appears to have intensified its support for dissenting commanders who broke with Shekau in 2016, seeing them as more reliable partners in fighting the Nigerian state. Why does it matter? While the Nigerian military’s increased air capacity has allowed it to better defend garrison towns, ISWAP has gained in strength since Shekau’s death. It is expanding into new rural areas in Nigeria’s north east. Scattered former Shekau fighters may further aggravate insecurity elsewhere in northern Nigeria. What should be done? Authorities should redouble efforts to demobilise fighters from Shekau’s group. They should be discerning when resettling civilians in state-controlled towns situated in ISWAP areas, where they could be caught in the crossfire or subject to the group’s taxation. Abuja and its partners should tighten intelligence cooperation to stem the flow of ISIS support to ISWAP.

Dakar/Brussels, International Crisis Group, 2022. 24p.

By Malik Samuel

Having waged deadly violence for over a decade, Boko Haram has survived various interventions by the Lake Chad Basin countries and their partners. The longevity of the group can, in part, be attributed to its continued access to resources. This report explores the economic drivers that reinforce Boko Haram’s resilience, including the key actors involved in these activities.

Pretoria, South Africa: Institute for Security Studies, 2022. 28p.

By Nils Duquet and Kevin Goris

Illicit firearms are a phenomenon that mostly elicit attention in times of crisis. Mass shootings or terrorist attacks involving firearms trigger a plethora of questions, including questions regarding the provenance of the firearms that were used. Oftentimes, the firearms used by criminals and terrorists have been procured illegally. This implies that there is a market in illicit firearms where such goods circulate under the radar. The existence of such a market triggers concern but it also speaks to our imagination precisely because we know so little about it. Whether citizen, policy-maker or practitioner, we are all aware that there must be something like ‘an illicit firearms market’ out there. Yet few people, even specialists, can say in a decisive manner what such a market looks like in Europe, which dynamics characterise it or how it has evolved over time. Can we even speak of ‘a market’ or are we dealing with multiple fragmented circuits each characterised by entirely different logics? This uncertainty is driven by the very nature of the phenomena, a covert market is by design hidden from the oversight of state authority. Yet it also has to do with the fact that attention to it tends to be event-driven, and thus misses a sound and structural embedding in broader policy, intelligence or legal frameworks.

• More.....

  A further consequence of this is that attempts to study and address illicit firearms markets, and terrorist access to them, have been mostly piecemeal and ad hoc. An overarching understanding of what we talk about when we talk about illicit firearms markets is missing. Our knowledge of the illicit market for firearms very much resembles the Udana parable of the blind men and the elephant: a group of blind men who have never encountered an elephant are asked to describe it based on their palpating of only one part of the creature. Based on this partial impression, they each describe an entirely different phenomenon (a thick snake, a tree trunk, a bumped wall, a fan). None can grasp the entire and true nature of the thing they are confronted with. Moreover, each one of them assumes his (partial) interpretation of reality to be the whole truth.

Brussels: Flemish Peace Institute, 2018. 236p.

By Glenn E. Curtis

his report examines the role of Russian organized crime and Central Asian terrorist organizations in narcotics trafficking in four countries of central Asia (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan); in the three former Soviet republics of the south Caucasus (Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia); and in Chechnya.

Although a variety of sources were used for this report, the focus was on current news accounts from the regions examined. Over the past 2 years, the narcotics smuggling routes established in Georgia in the 1990's have seen an increased volume of drug trafficking. In this enterprise Chechen guerrilla forces have apparently gained the advantage in the competition with conventional crime organizations. The Georgian Government's efforts to counter narcotics trafficking have increasingly deteriorated. Afghanistan continues to be a conduit for the flow of heroin through Central Asia into Russia and to the West. Trafficking routes through Central Asia and the Caucasus countries continue to diversify and expand, due largely to the smuggling of Afghan opium and chaotic conditions in transit countries. Members of several ethnic groups are major players in the narcotics trade based in Central Asia; Russian criminal organizations apparently have a diminishing role.

• More.....

  The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) relies heavily on drug trafficking through a number of central Asian routes as a means of funding military, political, and propaganda activities. As markets and processing capacity expand into new parts of Central Asia, the IMU has adjusted its military and trafficking activities to cope with interdiction in particular areas. The impact of military losses in Afghanistan on IMU's narcotics activity is not yet known because the status and priorities of its leaders are unclear. The Hizb-ut-Tahrir (HT) is a fundamentalist Islamic group whose membership in Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan is expanding rapidly. Its decentralized structure conceals its activities; individual cells may be involved in narcotics trafficking. HT's expanding appeal among the poor provides a strong recruiting base for potential terrorist activity. Although its operations have thus far relied on peaceful means to propagate its central mission of Islamic governance throughout Central Asia, ongoing repression in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan may drive some parts of the organization to engage in violence

Washington, DC: Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, 2002. 39p.

By Meenakshi Balakrishna and Kenneth C. Wilbur

How well do firearm markets comply with firearm restrictions? The Massachusetts Attorney General issued an Enforcement Notice in 2016 to announce a new interpretation of the key phrase “copies and duplicates” in the state’s assault weapons ban. The Enforcement Notice increased assault rifle sales by 1,349 (+560%) within five days, followed by a reduction of 211 (- 58%) over the next three weeks. Assault rifle sales were 64-66% lower in 2017 than in comparable earlier periods, suggesting that the Enforcement Notice reduced assault weapon sales but also that many banned weapons continued to be sold.

Unpublished paper, University of California, San Diego, 2021. 50p.