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Posts in violence and oppression
30 Years of Trends in Terrorist and Extremist Games

By Emily Thompson and Galen Lamphere-Englund

Violent extremist, terrorist, and targeted hate actors have been actively exploiting video games to propagandise, recruit and fundraise for more than 30 years. This report presents an analysis of that history using a unique dataset, the Extremist and Terrorist Games Database (ETGD), developed by the authors. It contains 155 reviewed entries of standalone games, modifications for existing games (mods) and browser‑based games dating from 1982 to 2024. The titles analysed appear across the ideological spectrum: far right (101 titles), jihadist (24), far left (1) and other forms of extremism and targeted hate (29), including school‑massacre ideation (12). They span platforms ranging from simple standalone games for Atari in the 1980s to sophisticated mods for some of today’s most popular games. The number of titles has increased year on year – in line with global conflict and extremist ideological trends, and revealing a continued push by malicious actors to exploit gaming. Meanwhile, the means of distribution have shifted from violent extremist organisations and marketplaces – such as white supremacist, neo‑Nazi and jihadist organisations – to distributed repositories of extremist games hosted on internet archives, Ethereum‑hosted file‑sharing, Telegram and with subtly coded titles on mainstream platforms like Steam. While most of the titles in the ETGD are available for free, several that have been sold (often at symbolic prices like $14.88 or $17.76) appear to have generated revenue for groups ranging from Hezbollah to the National Alliance, an American neo‑Nazi group. Through new analysis of Steam data, we also show that a small number of extremist and targeted hate titles have generated almost an estimated $600,000 in revenue for small publishers on the platform. Far from being a comprehensive analysis of the ETGD, we intend this preliminary launch report to form a basis for future research of the dataset and a framework for continued contributions to the ETGD from Extremism and Gaming Research Network (EGRN) members. Above all, we seek to contribute to sensible policymaking to prevent violent extremism that situates games as part of a wider contested and exploited information space, which deserves far more attention from those working towards peaceful ends.

Complete recommendations are provided in the conclusion section of this report, but include the following: 1. Prohibit and prevent violent extremist exploitation: Gaming platforms should explicitly prohibit violent extremist and terrorist behaviours and content. Leadership exists here from Twitch, Discord, Microsoft/Xbox and the affiliated Activision‑Blizzard. a. Audio and video platforms, such as Spotify, Apple Music and YouTube should seek to identify extremist gaming content currently available under misleading titles and tags. b. Flag and remove extremist titles across platforms: Hashing and preventing outlinking to ETGD games and links should be a priority across platforms. 2. Improve reporting mechanisms: Platforms must improve reporting mechanisms to make it easier for players to report violative content found in games and in‑game conduct. 3. Understand and take down distributed repositories: Larger repositories of extremist gaming content readily available on the surface web accelerate user exposure. 4. Collaborate across sectors: Addressing the spread of extremist games requires a collaborative effort between tech companies, government agencies and civil society organisations. 5. Educate across sectors: Programmes supporting educators and frontline community moderators should be developed. 6. Support research and innovation: Including cross‑sector initiatives like the Global Network on Extremism and Technology (GNET) and EGRN, which produced this database. 7. Enhance regulatory frameworks: Governments should update regulatory frameworks applying to digital platforms, recognising the nuances of gaming platforms and complying with human rights. 8. Encourage positive community engagement: Thoughtful, well designed community guidelines, moderation policies and reporting mechanisms can support community‑building.

London: The Global Network on Extremism and Technology (GNET). 2024. 40p.

Spatial Accessibility to Gun Violence Exposure on Walkable Routes to and from School

By Gia Barboza-Salerno, Sharefa Duhaney, & Hexin Yang

This study investigates the spatial accessibility of gun violence exposure along walkable routes to and from schools in Englewood, Chicago. Focusing on both direct and indirect forms of gun violence, the study uses acoustic detection technology to quantify the cumulative burden of gun violence exposure potentially encountered by students during their commute to and from school. We examined the spatial distribution of shooting incidents in proximity to schools using network-constrained kernel density estimation, secondary spatial analysis, and rapid realistic routing. G-function analysis revealed that shooting incidents cluster along streets, including safe passage routes, near schools. An average of 1.30 and 18.06 gunshots were reachable within 5- and 15-min commute times in the morning and afternoon, respectively Our findings underscore the urgent need to reframe the narrative around ‘school gun violence’ to consider exposures that occur in proximity to school boundaries to more effectively reduce violence exposure for youth who walk to school in violence-prone neighborhoods.

SSM - Population Health, Volume 28, December 2024, 13p.

Terrorist Risk in Urban Outdoor Built Environment: Measuring and Mitigating via Behavioural Design Approach

By Gabriele Bernardini, Elena Cantatore, Fabio Fatiguso, and Enrico Quagliarini

This open access book outlines the latest results in analysing, assessing, and managing terrorist risk in the urban outdoor built environment. In detail, contents refer to the outdoor Open Areas (such as streets, squares, urban parks and other public spaces in our cities) exposed to such violent events considering the physical elements and properties of the built environment and users. PThe built environment features, including layout, use and management, are combined with terrorist threats issues and user behaviours in emergency conditions, to determine a set of complementary tools for the reduction of risk and increase of urban resilience. The contents hence provide different levels of tool analysis, for risk scenario definition, risk assessment, mitigation strategies design and effectiveness evaluation, considering traditional approaches about the issue along with simulation-based approaches relying on understanding and representing user behaviors. This “behavioural design” approach offers the opportunity to manage the level of risk for specific real urban cases overcoming the normative limitations in Europe that are only referred to a few countries and sometimes deal with the prevention of violent acts by intelligence activities as the exclusive way to face this issue. In addition, the focus on the characters of cultural and historic places and their resilience is increasing by means of introduction of mitigation and compatible solutions providing a complementary chapter for the design of resilient cities in all of their peculiarities (peripheries, consolidated, and historical). In this sense, it is one of the first organized attempts to analyse the main limitations of current solutions in these outdoor Open Areas and, at the same time, to clearly introduce the importance of human behaviours and the various choices in emergency evacuation conditions, thanks to the proposed behavioural-based simulation approach. The attention is focused on a critical aspect for historic spaces, where morphological conditions are fixed values. Thus, this book represents a sort of guidelines about these user-related issues during such violent events and is useful to both professionals and researchers in the areas of security and urban administration.

Singapore: Springer Nature, 2025. 135p.

Under the Gun: Firearms Trafficking in Latin America and the Caribbean

By Christopher Hernandez-Roy, Henry Ziemer, and Azucena Duarte

Although only 8 percent of the world lives in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), the region accounts for a third of all homicides worldwide. LAC cities consistently top international rankings as some of the most violent locales outside of active conflict zones. Behind this insecurity are powerful and deeply entrenched transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) trafficking drugs and other illegal commodities, who in turn rely on a seemingly endless flow of illicit firearms to carry out their campaigns of violence and intimidation on the Western Hemisphere’s inhabitants. Arms trafficking goes well beyond a law enforcement challenge; the proliferation of semi- and fully automatic rifles, grenade launchers, and various high-caliber weapons are increasingly used by TCOs to hold at risk the very sovereignty of LAC governments. Stories from Mexico, Haiti, Ecuador, and beyond all underscore how the scourge of illicit weapons, and the groups who wield them, can plunge communities, and even whole countries, into violence.

Leveraging new data sources, this report examines the prevalence and patterns of arms trafficking within and between each of the four subregions. Recognizing the nature of the threat arms trafficking presents to the Western Hemisphere at large, the report seeks to define the contours of a new strategy to combat illegal guns, concluding with recommendations for the United States, Mexico, Central America, South America, and the Caribbean to pursue.

Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), 2024.

Trends and Patterns in Firearm Violence, 1993–2023

By: Erika Harrell, Jennifer L. Truman, Katherine A. Fowler, Kristin Holland, Thomas R. Simon, and Steven A. Sumner

This report examines trends and patterns in firearm violence from 1993 to 2023 using a combination of data sources to provide a broad perspective on fatal and nonfatal firearm violence in the Unites States that could not be achieved through any single source of information. It includes data on firearm type; incident location; victim and offender demographic characteristics and relationship; injury and treatment type; police notification; and victims’ self-protective behaviors.

Estimates in this report are based primarily on data from BJS’s National Crime Victimization Survey and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s (CDC) National Vital Statistics System death certificate data queried through the Web-based Injury Statistics Query and Reporting System. Additional estimates come from the CDC’s National Violent Death Reporting System, National Syndromic Surveillance Program, and Youth Risk Behavior Survey. The report is organized to present findings from each data source in separate sections.

Highlights

  • The rate of nonfatal firearm violence for persons age 12 or older declined 72% from 1993 to 2023, dropping from 7.3 to 2.0 victimizations per 1,000 persons, and varied from 1.2 to 2.3 per 1,000 during 2019 to 2023.

  • About 64% of nonfatal firearm violence was reported to police during 2018–2022.

  • The firearm homicide rate among persons age 12 or older fluctuated between 1993 and 2023, with a decline from 1993 to 2014 (from 8.4 to 4.0 homicides per 100,000 persons age 12 or older) before rising to 7.3 per 100,000 in 2021.

  • From 2018 to 2022, on average, 80% of homicides were committed with a firearm

Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2024. 41p.

Comparing Violent Far-Right Terrorist Designations among Five Eyes Countries

By JASON BLAZAKIS & MEGAN RENNEBAUM

This paper seeks to examine the array of terrorist designations undertaken by “Five-Eye” (FVEY) countries (i.e. Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States) against violent far-right terrorists, often also referred as racially and ethnically motivated violent extremist (REMVE) actors. While not a focus of the papers, non-FVEY countries, most notably Germany, have also implemented measures to restrict the activities of violent far-right actors. Thus, this paper will evaluate whether non-FVEY measures can help inform broader policy determinations related to violent far-right terrorism designations. What lessons learned, if any, can the FVEY countries draw from other national experiences? Furthermore, are there multilateral regimes, such as the United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1267 counterterrorism sanctions regime (henceforth, 1267 regime), that can inform FVEY policies within the field of terrorist designations?

Issue Brief, New York: Soufan Center, 2022. 22p.

In the Wrong Place at the Wrong Time: The Impact of Mass Shooting Exposure on Mental Health

By Michele Ubaldi Matteo Picchio

We study the effect of mass shooting exposure on individuals’ mental health by using the Panel Study of Income Dynamics. Our identification strategy relies on the quasi-randomness of mass shootings in a staggered difference-in-differences design. We compare changes in mental health outcomes of individuals living in affected cities with changes of matched individuals living in non-proximal and not affected cities. We find that mass shootings have a substantial adverse impact on mental health, which persists for up to six years. This impact is not statistically significant for Black individuals, whereas it is slightly more pronounced among women and older cohorts

Bonn, Garmany: IZA – Institute of Labor Economics 2024. 45p.

Chemical Terrorism: Assessment of U.S. Strategies in the Era of Great Power Competition

By National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine.

Domestic and foreign violent extremist organizations, or terrorist groups, have caused a greater amount of harm with chemical agents than with biological or radiological weapons. The United States capacity and capability to identify, prevent, counter, and respond adequately to chemical threats is established by the strategies, policies, and laws enacted across multiple levels of government. While the number of chemical terrorism incidents has risen and fallen over time, there is no empirical or analytical indication that the threat is disappearing. This report comes at a time when the nation's highest-level strategies have shifted from focusing primarily on violent extremist organizations to focusing more on Great Power Competition. This shift in relative perceived threat and consequent prioritization will impact efforts against chemical terrorism, and in turn, affect funding priorities. Revised risk assessments are needed to reprioritize risks guided by new strategies, so that strategy-aligned budgets can be created. The report recommends weapons of mass destruction budgets be aligned with evolving priorities and incentivize activities that transition promising research to operations.

Washington, DC: The National Academies Press.2024, 186p. https://doi.org/10.17226/27159.

Radicalization in the Ranks

By Michael A. Jensen, Elizabeth Yates , Sheehan Kane

This project expands the Profiles of Individual Radicalization in the United States (PIRUS) database with information on the nexus of criminal extremism and U.S. military service. The expanded database includes 461 individuals with U.S. military backgrounds who committed criminal acts in the United States from 1990 through 2021 that were motivated by their political, economic, social, or religious goals. Findings from these data are detailed in three results sections of a report that can be accessed here.

The first section explores the scope and nature of criminal extremism in the ranks, detailing the rates of military service among criminal extremists and analyzing their military branch, ideological, and extremist group affiliations. This section also provides a closer look at the individuals with military backgrounds who have been charged with criminal offenses related to the Capitol breach of January 6, 2021.

Section two provides a closer look at risk factors for radicalization, comparing subjects with military backgrounds to those without records of military service. This section explores the rates of substance use disorders, anti-social relationships, and social mobility challenges among past U.S. service members who committed extremist crimes and situates these radicalization risk factors within the larger extremist context in the United States.

The final section of results examines the risk factors and vulnerabilities for radicalization that are unique to subgroups of criminal extremists with U.S. military backgrounds. Using hierarchical clustering methods, the results in this section show how the radicalization pathways of extremists with military backgrounds are likely to differ depending on whether individuals are active in the military at the time of their involvement in extremism or if they have military-specific risk factors for radicalization, such as previous deployments to combat zones or diagnoses of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). This report concludes with recommendations for policy and future research, paying particular attention to the potential benefits of applying a public health model to countering the spread of extremism in the U.S. military.

College Park, MD: National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), 2022. 45p.

New Frontiers: The use of Generative Artificial Intelligence to Facilitate Trafficking in Persons

By Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)

Trafficking in persons is a global challenge that transcends borders, and the advent of AI technologies has the potential to amplify both its reach and complexity. It is precisely this global nature of both trafficking and AI that necessitates coordinated, regional, and international responses. The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the Regional Support Office of the Bali Process (RSO) have jointly developed this brief on the emerging nexus of artificial intelligence (AI), trafficking in persons, and transnational crime with a clear objective: to equip policymakers, law enforcement agencies, and the technology sector with the insights needed to anticipate and pre-emptively address the potential implications of AI on trafficking in persons.

Vienna: OSCE, 2024. 33p.

Radicalisation and Gender – What Do We Know?

By Joana Cook, Eva Herschinger, Seran de Leede, and Anna-Maria Andreeva

The literature focusing on gender and radicalisation has steadily increased over the last ten years. This has reflected the rise of extremism across the globe, and has been particularly triggered by researchers seeking to better understand the experiences of individuals throughout all stages of the radicalisation process. However, research on the topic has also largely focused on the experiences of women, especially those associated with Islamist forms of extremism. Such narrow focus has resulted in several gaps in the literature, which in turn has translated into gaps in practice. This report seeks to identify the key trends in research between 2014 and 2024 concerning literature on gender and radicalisation, as well as make explicit the areas that remain underexplored. Focusing on tangible recommendations, which align with the needs of practitioners, the report seeks to bring forward the state of the art of research on gender and radicalisation.

The Hague: The International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT) 2024. 21p.

Assessing Gender Perspectives in Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism Practices

By Anna-Maria Andreeva, Annika von Berg, Bibi van Ginkel, Elisabeth Hell, Shams Jouve, Alexandra Korn, Bàrbara Molas, Maximilian Ruf, and Sophie Scheuble

Despite the fact that research indicates that it is important to integrate a gender-based approach for effective risk assessment and implementation of counter-terrorism (CT) and preventing and countering violent extremism (P/CVE) practices, such as rehabilitation and reintegration, our assessment of academic and grey literature on gender perspectives in CT and P/CVE practices shows that most of these practices remain gender-blind and tend to reproduce gender norms and stereotypes, while ignoring the complexity of women’s and men’s involvement in extremism. In this report, the authors did a thorough literature review of academic and grey literature published between 2014 and 2024, and conducted ten interviews to reflect on gender perspectives in CT and P/CVE practices. After a reflection on persisting gender construction, biases, and other problematic perspectives, the report focuses on the gender perspectives in analytical frameworks and toolkits used, for instance, for risk assessments. Next, the report elaborates on the gender perspectives in the implementation of the intervention phases, namely from law enforcement interventions, to exit processes. In the general conclusion, the authors argue that gender constructs, roles, and norms, and the way these are taken into consideration in the various P/CVE interventions, heavily impact the effectiveness of these efforts. They also conclude that there is a potential of an aggravating sequence of gender (mis)conceptions, since the gender constructs used in the risk assessments inform following interventions, such as disengagement, deradicalisation, and rehabilitation processes. The report ends with a set of recommendations tailored to different target groups.

The Hague: The International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT), 2024. 25p.

Far-Right Online Radicalization: A Review of the Literature

By Alice Marwick, Benjamin Clancy, Katherine Furl

This literature review examines cross-disciplinary work on radicalization to situate, historicize, frame, and better understand the present concerns around online radicalization and far-right extremist and fringe movements. We find that research on radicalization is inextricably linked to the post-9/11 context in which it emerged, and as a result is overly focused on studying the other. Applying this research to the spread of far-right ideas online does not account for the ways in which the far-right’s endorsement of white supremacy and racism holds historical, normative precedent in the United States. Further, radicalization research is rife with uncertainties, ranging from definitional ambiguity to an inability to identify any simplistic, causal models capable of fully explaining the conditions under which radicalization occurs. Instead, there are multiple possible pathways to radicalization, and while the internet does not cause individuals to adopt far-right extremist or fringe beliefs, some technological affordances may aid adoption of these beliefs through gradual processes of socialization. We conclude that the term “radicalization” does not serve as a useful analytical frame for studying the spread of far-right and fringe ideas online. Instead, potential analytical frameworks better suited to studying these phenomena include theories prominent in the study of online communities, conversion, mainstreaming, and sociotechnical theories of media effects.

A summary of key take-aways includes:

The adoption of extremist, far-right, and fringe beliefs is often referred to as “radicalization,” a term formulated post-9/11 to understand jihadi terrorism, a very different context from the far-right.

Radicalization research is full of uncertainty.

  • No specific type of person is vulnerable to radicalization, and most people who commit political violence are not mentally ill or alienated from society.

  • Radicalization is not caused by poverty, oppression, or marginalization.

  • There is no one way in which people are “radicalized.”

  • Viewing extremist media does not necessarily lead to adopting extremist beliefs or committing political violence.

In contrast to the “red pill” model, radicalization is gradual. Recruits slowly adopt the identities, emotions, and interpretations shared by a community. They conceptualize their problems as injustices caused by others, and justify using political violence against them.

The internet does not cause radicalization, but it helps spread extremist ideas, enables people interested in these ideas to form communities, and mainstreams conspiracy theories and distrust in institutions.

"Radicalization” is not a useful frame for understanding the spread of far-right and fringe ideas online.

  • It is analytically imprecise and morally judgmentalIt doesn’t help us understand the role of media and digital technologies.

  • It is inextricably tied to a global security infrastructure targeting Islam.

  • It doesn’t account for the fact that fringe or far-right beliefs may change what people think is “true” and “false,” making it hard to find common ground.

  • The focus on violence ignores other worrying effects of mainstreaming far-right and fringe ideas.

Publisher: Bulletin of Technology & Public Life, 2022. 83p.

Gun Violence in the United States 2022 Examining the Burden Among Children & Teens

By Silvia Villarreal, Rose Kim, Elizabeth Wagner, Nandita Somayaji, Ari Davis, M Cassandra Crifasi

This report outlines gun death data from 2022, the most recent year of finalized data available. All data were accessed using the Centers for Disease Control’s Underlying Cause of Death database, part of the Wide-ranging Online Data for Epidemiologic Research (WONDER) database. The Underlying Cause of Death database contains data based on death certificates for U.S. residents and is the most reliable national source of gun death data available in the U.S. The gun death data used from this database depicts injury mortality by intent using the following categories: homicide, suicide, unintentional, legal intervention, and undetermined. Rates are calculated by the residence listed of decedent, not where the shooting actually took place. For simplification purposes, we created the following age categories to examine gun violence centered on youth: children (ages 1–9) and teens (10–17). For smaller, specific age ranges, we created the following categories: older teens (15–17) and emerging adults (17–19).

Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Center for Gun Violence Solutions. Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health. 2024. 23p.

Understanding EU policy on firearms trafficking

By Colin Murphy

Precise figures about the numbers of illegal firearms in the European Union (EU) are lacking, but several indicators point to their widespread availability and accessibility. According to the Small Arms Survey, over half of the estimated total number of firearms held by civilians in the EU in 2017 were unlicensed. While most of these citizens had no criminal intentions, their illicit firearms could be used for self-harm or domestic violence, or end up in the hands of criminals or terrorists. Most criminals and terrorists have more sophisticated ways to get hold of illicit firearms. They can be trafficked from source countries, diverted from legal supply chains, illegally manufactured or assembled in the EU, converted from legally available weapons, or sourced on the internet. Firearms seizures suggest that the EU illicit firearms market is made up mostly of shotguns, pistols and rifles, with converted or convertible weapons also appearing frequently. Illicit firearms trafficking is driven by criminal demand, with organised crime groups that engage in firearms trafficking also involved in other forms of criminality. The EU considers illicit firearms a key crime threat precisely because they are used in many crimes and terrorist attacks. Even people who lack extensive criminal connections can access illicit firearms due to increased online trafficking and the availability of easy-to-convert weapons. The EU is actively involved in addressing the threat posed by illegal firearms by means of legislative and policy measures, and provides operational assistance to the Member States in the fight against firearms trafficking. The EU is also active in the international fight against firearms trafficking, working closely with the United Nations (UN) in its work to combat the proliferation of small arms and light weapons and engaging in the UN's global firearms programme. Although the export of arms remains a national competence, the EU has defined common rules governing the control of exports of military technology and equipment and works actively with third countries that are viewed as source or transit countries for illicit firearms. This is an update of a briefing by Ann Neville, published in 2022.

Briefing 23-10-2024 Brussels: EPRS | European Parliamentary Research Service , 2024. 12p.

Firearm restrictions in domestic violence protection orders: Implementation, vetting, compliance, and enforcement

By Alice M. Ellyson, Avanti Adhia, Sandra Shanahan, Aisha Alsinai, Lisa DiMascolo, Maxmilliaan Reygers, Deirdre Bowen, Ali Rowhani-Rahbar

We quantified the implementation of WA state's domestic violence (DV)-related firearm prohibitions (RCW9.41.800) by the courts and the Regional Domestic Violence Firearms Enforcement Unit (RDVFEU), a regional approach to compliance promotion. We measured implementation, vetting, compliance, and enforcement of firearm prohibitions before (2014–2016) and after (2018–2020) the RDVFEU was implemented using a 55% random sample of granted domestic violence protection orders (DVPOs) in King County, WA (n = 3543). We evaluated differences in judicial orders to surrender firearms and other dangerous weapons (OTSWs), respondent documented compliance, and respondent weapon and/or firearm relinquishment before and after implementation. Compared to DVPOs granted prior to RDVFEU implementation, granted DVPOs after RDVFEU implementation were at least 4.5 times more likely to include an OTSW. RDVFEU implementation was also associated with at least 3.4 times the odds of respondent documented compliance and at least 3.3 times the odds of respondent relinquishment of at least one firearm and/or other dangerous weapon. These findings demonstrate RDVFEU implementation was associated with benefits at each stage of the protection order process with improvements in both judicial enforcement and respondent compliance. Overall, RDVFEU implementation was associated with improvements in granted orders to surrender weapons, respondent compliance, and relinquishment.

Policy Implications

DV-related firearm prohibitions can be supported by interdisciplinary teams within the legal system to promote respondent compliance and enhance safety planning for DV victim–survivors.

Criminology & Public Policy Volume 23, Issue 4 Nov 2024 Pages 801-1017

Uncovering the Truth About Pennsylvania Crime Guns

By Brady: United Against Gun Violence.

Every gun on our streets starts somewhere, and the overwhelming majority have their origins in the legal marketplace. Understanding how guns — particularly those that have been diverted from legal commerce to the underground market — make their way to crime scenes is essential to crafting evidence-based and life-saving solutions to the American gun violence epidemic. There is — or should be — nothing controversial about this tracing approach. Epidemiologists and other scientists routinely study the origins of public health challenges in order to develop effective solutions, treatments, and preventative measures. It is a key component of the scientific method. Unfortunately, the best national data on the sources and paths of crime guns has been hidden from researchers, journalists, and the general public for nearly two decades. The gun industry successfully pushed the federal government to restrict public access to this critical gun trace data, and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) has aided the industry’s efforts by adopting an overly broad interpretation of those regulatory restrictions. Although some state and local law enforcement agencies have released gun UNDERSTANDING HOW GUNS — PARTICULARLY THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN DIVERTED FROM LEGAL COMMERCE TO THE UNDERGROUND MARKET — MAKE THEIR WAY TO CRIME SCENES IS ESSENTIAL TO CRAFTING EVIDENCE-BASED AND LIFE-SAVING SOLUTIONS TO THE AMERICAN GUN VIOLENCE EPIDEMIC. trace data in the last 20 years, the amount has been insufficient to develop the comprehensive, life-saving solutions that we need. In this report you will find an analysis of the most important gun trace dataset to be publicly available in decades. Attorney General Josh Shapiro of Pennsylvania has released trace data for 186,000 crime guns from over 150 law enforcement agencies in his state, allowing the public to identify, for the first time in decades, which gun dealers appear to supply the most guns to the illegal market. This data is publicly available on the Pennsylvania Gun Tracing Analytics Platform. It is very important to note that the gun tracing dataset, while extensive, is not comprehensive. It does not include crime guns recovered by local Pennsylvania law enforcement agencies that have opted against sharing trace data. For that reason, the findings in this report are not the definitive picture of crime guns in the state. However, this dataset should nonetheless enable the public, policymakers, and law enforcement to hold the gun industry accountable for its role in supplying crime guns — and, in doing so, ultimately save lives. By focusing on the small number of gun dealers now known to be contributing to the problem, Pennsylvanians and their leaders will be able to put political, legal, and economic pressure on the irresponsible actors of the gun industry and bring about needed reforms to ensure that firearms are transferred responsibly and safely. Like all data, gun trace data has its limits; its insights, while key to understanding gun trafficking, are just one part of that process. Earlier this year, Brady unveiled an extensive — and ever-growing — database containing another piece to the puzzle: ATF compliance inspection reports detailing federal firearms licensees (FFLs) who have been issued a warning letter or more severe remedy for cited violations of gun laws. We encourage readers to also view that resource, the Gun Store Transparency Project, at www.gunstoretransparency.org. As you read through these findings, keep in mind that many of the 186,000 crime guns in the database are likely associated with one or more crime victim(s) and their families. If this were not staggering enough, the devastating ripple effects gun violence inflicts on families, neighborhoods, and communities are not captured in these numbers. Brady invites you to join us in advocating for solutions that address the supply side of gun violence. We invite researchers to study this data and build on our analysis; we implore journalists to report on not just the tragic results of gun violence incidents, but how crime guns end up in our communities; we urge lawmakers and law enforcement to adopt life-saving, supply-side solutions to gun violence; and we call on federal, state, and local authorities to be more transparent by releasing more trace data to the public. It is long past time for the gun industry as a whole to adopt meaningful supply-side solutions ensuring firearms are transferred safely and responsibility, as it is neither fair nor just to ask the communities suffering the immense harms of gun violence to also bear the burden of providing all the solutions.

Washington, DC: Brady: United Against Gun Violence, 2022. 43p.

Origin of an Insurrection: How Second Amendment Extremism Led to January 6

By Brady: United Against Gun Violence.

In January 2020, Brady advocates planned to take part in an annual Martin Luther King Jr. gun violence prevention advocacy event at the Virginia State Capitol, but state officials cautioned would-be participants that 2020 would be different: Second Amendment extremists were planning to turn out. Out of caution, Brady cancelled its official participation in the event because an estimated 20,000 individuals from across the country, armed with assault-style rifles and wearing tactical gear, descended on the State Capitol in Richmond, VA. It was a deeply troubling moment for members of the gun violence prevention movement, who saw their First Amendment right to speak and assemble quashed by gun-toting extremists. We did not know then that the events of that day were only a dress rehearsal for far worse to come. On January 6, 2021, Congress was set to certify the results of the 2020 election. But extremists, many of them armed, mounted an insurrection with violent force that resulted in death and injury and nearly derailed Congress’ capacity to confirm a president duly elected by the citizens of the United States. For Brady supporters and gun violence prevention advocates, it was both a sickening gut punch and deja vu. Although only one of the four people killed on January 6 was shot, the 2021 attack had the same roots as the 2020 Virginia State Capitol unrest: Second Amendment extremism. Second Amendment extremism arises from what’s commonly known as the “insurrectionist” construction of the Second Amendment: a false interpretation fomented by extremists, marketed by the gun lobby, and adopted by some mainstream politicians, including the 45th President of the United States. Second Amendment extremism lays the foundation for much domestic unrest and weaponized terror throughout American history, including but not limited to the Oklahoma City Bombing, the armed agitation at the Michigan State Capitol, and yes — January 6, 2021. Indeed, investigations and firsthand accounts of January 6 show that many of its agitators were armed, ready, and willing to harm lawmakers. Accordingly, officers on duty at the U.S. Capitol that day had credible reasons to fear that many rioters were armed; a number of these officers have since testified before Congress that those fears hindered their ability to control the insurrectionist mob. Yet the common narrative around January 6 often omits the role of Second Amendment extremism. Ignoring the ways in which guns, and gun mythology, fuel domestic extremism in America has been — and will continue to be — a deadly error. For these reasons, this report sets out to examine the role U.S. gun culture and policy played in laying the foundation for January 6. If we do not spend time reflecting upon our past, we are doomed to repeat it — and that we cannot do, because human lives and bedrock civic principles hang in the balance of this understanding and reckoning. At Brady, we have confronted extremism before, and we know that unless we take action, we will face it again.

Washington, DC: Brady: United Against Gun Violence. 2022. 16p.

Firearms and Violent Deaths in Europe: An Exploratory Analysis of the Linkages Between Gun Ownership, Firearms Legislation and Violent Death

Nils Duquet & Maarten Van Alstein

On a regular basis, news stories appear in the media about public shootings where shooters use their guns to open fire and kill people in shopping malls or on school campuses. Mostly these stories deal with incidents in the United States. Over the last years, however, a number of European countries have experienced similar public shooting incidents. Notable cases were the shootings at Tuusula and Kauhajoki in Finland (2007 and 2008), the killings in Cumbria in the UK (2010), the Utøya attacks by Anders Breivik in Norway (2011), and the shootings at Alphen aan den Rijn in the Netherlands and Liège in Belgium in 2011. Public shootings draw a high level of media attention. Less striking in the public eye, but not less significant – not least in quantitative terms –, are the numbers of people in Europe killed by firearms in the context of gun-related crime or in domestic shootings. It is estimated that between 2000 and 2010, over 10,000 victims of murder or manslaughter were killed by firearms in the 28 Member States of the European Union (EU). Every year, over 4000 suicides by firearm are registered in the EU. This means that, on average, there are 0.24 homicides and 0.9 suicides by firearm per 100,000 population in Europe every year.

Compared with the US or other countries around the globe, the rates of gun-related violent death in Europe are rather low, certainly where the homicide rates are concerned. This does not mean, however, that the problem of gun violence has not appeared on the European policy radar in recent years. On the contrary, the attention devoted to the problem by law enforcement agencies and policy-makers has been growing. Reacting not only to shooting incidents such as those mentioned above, but also to warnings by police and law enforcement agencies that criminals are increasingly willing to use (heavy) firearms and that illegal trafficking in firearms is on the rise, a number of European countries have announced policy interventions targeted at reducing levels of gun-related violence and crime. The European Commission has also become an active actor in firearms policy. In October 2013 it announced a plan to reduce gun violence in Europe, in which it defined the misuse of firearms, whether legally-owned or illicitly manufactured or acquired, as “a serious threat to the EU’s security from both an internal and external perspective”. One of the major problems the Commission identified in its initial policy papers was the problem of a lack of sound and adequate knowledge about firearms in Europe. The commission noted that “a lack of solid EU-wide statistics and intelligence hampers effective policy and operational responses”.. One of the ambitions of the EU-wide statistics and intelligence hampers effective policy is, therefore, to address the gaps in knowledge concerning gun violence.

An additional problem is that the lack of reliable and comprehensive information on firearms in Europe is not limited to the sphere of law enforcement and policy-making. European scholarly research focusing specifically on firearms availability, gun control and gun-related violence is scarce. There is a research community in Europe focusing on small arms and light weapons (SALW), but it is predominantly concerned with the export of firearms and the connections between these arms flows and violence in developing, transitional or fragile states outside Europe. Scientific research on firearms and gun-related violence in the domestic European context is much less advanced. The scanty research efforts made in this field by epidemiologists, criminologists and legal scholars remain fragmented, and suffer from the fact that there is no integrated scholarly community dealing with gun-related issues. Language barriers, moreover, often prevent the wider dissemination of research results. Given this relative lack of European firearms research, American studies are still clearly dominant at present in research on the links between the availability of firearms and gun-related violence. Greene and Marsh have calculated that out of the 665 studies on firearms and violence that they reviewed, 64% were about the USA. Of the remaining studies not on the USA, 13% concerned cross-national comparisons or articles in which the geographical focus was unspecified (such as reviews), while 8% were about developing countries. Only 15% concerned other developed countries such as Canada, Australia, the UK and Germany. Given the particularities of the American context, and more specifically the fact that the US has one of the highest rates of gun-related deaths and crime among industrialized democracies, simply transposing the results of American research to the European context is problematic.

What are the levels of firearms availability in Europe? Are there links between the levels of gun ownership in European countries and these countries’ rates of violence and violent death? And what is the impact of European gun laws on public safety and health? The absence of evidence specifically for the European context makes it difficult for policy-makers and researchers to find impartial and unbiased answers to these questions. Hence the pressing need for research that specifically focuses on gun-related violence in the European context: and with the present report, we would like to make a contribution to that effort. As we are moving into largely uncharted territory, our analysis of the European situation will necessarily be exploratory. Our primary ambition is to collect and take stock of the fragmented evidence that is available on gun-related violence in Europe. Our geographical coverage will be broader than the EU and encompasses a group of approximately 40 European countries, although in some instances we will limit our analyses to the EU28.

In the report’s first chapter, we briefly dwell on one of the most crucial variables in research on gun control and violence: the level of gun ownership in society. Although the prevalence or availability of firearms is a key variable, collecting adequate data on levels of gun ownership can be troublesome. In chapter 1 we therefore devote some space to a critical assessment of the available statistics for Europe. Next, in chapter 2, we look at gun-related violence in Europe. Given the absence of good data on gun-related violence in general, including information not only on mortality but also on injuries and other forms of firearms-related victimization, we will focus exclusively on violent deaths – which seems a legitimate methodological choice for exploratory purposes. We urge the reader, however, to keep in mind that gun-related violence is a much more complex phenomenon than this focus might suggest. As is normal in research dealing with gun control not only from a public safety but also a public health perspective, we shall look both at gun-related homicides and at suicides. Taking the analysis further, we then ask in chapters 3 and 4 whether rates of gun possession and violent death in Europe are correlated: do high levels of gun possession in European countries correlate with high levels of homicide and suicide? The results of probing that question lead us to suggest that research into gun possession and violent death should also factor in the effects of firearms legislation. Specific European research into this question is scarce, which makes it difficult at the moment to arrive at conclusions for the whole of Europe. In chapter 5 we therefore focus on the results of three recent studies on the effects of stricter gun legislation on violent death rates in Austria, Belgium and Switzerland.

Flemish Peace Institute Report June 2015

NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE: TECHNOLOGICAL PROMISES AND PRACTICAL REALITIES

By: Vladislav Chernavskikh

Recent advances in the capabilities of artificial intelligence (AI) have increased state interest in leveraging AI for military purposes. Military integration of advanced AI by nuclear-armed states has the potential to have an impact on elements of their nuclear deterrence architecture such as missile early-warning systems, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) and nuclear command, control and communications (NC3), as well as related conventional systems.

At the same time, a number of technological and logistical factors can potentially limit or slow the adoption of AI in the nuclear domain. Among these are unreliability of output, susceptibility to cyberattacks, lack of good-quality data, and inadequate hardware and an underdeveloped national industrial and technical base.

Given the current and relatively early stage of military adoption of advanced AI, the exploration of these factors lays the groundwork for further consideration of the likely realities of integration and of potential transparency measures and governance practices at the AI–nuclear nexus.

SIPRI Background Paper, September 2024