By Dorothy Kronick 

Some theories predict that profits facilitate peace in illegal markets, while others predict that profits fuel violence. I provide empirical evidence from drug trafficking in Venezuela. Using original data, I compare lethal violence trends in municipalities near a major trafficking route to trends elsewhere, both before and after the counternarcotics policy in neighboring Colombia increased the use of Venezuelan transport routes. For thirty years before this policy change, lethal violence trends were similar; afterward, outcomes diverged: violence increased more along the trafficking route than elsewhere. Together with qualitative accounts, these findings illuminate the conditions under which profits fuel violence in illegal markets. 

Journal of Conflict Resolution 2020, Vol. 64(7-8) 1499-1523 ª The Author(s) 2020 

By Juan Camilo Castillo and Dorothy Kronick

Drug traffickers sometimes share profits peacefully. Other times they fight. We propose a model to investigate this variation, focusing on the role of the state. Seizing illegal goods can paradoxically increase traffickers’ profits and higher profits fuel violence. Killing kingpins makes crime bosses short-sighted, also fueling conflict. Only by targeting the most violent traffickers can the state reduce violence without increasing supply. These results help explain empirical patterns of violence in the drug war, which is less studied than interstate or civil war but often as deadly 

American Political Science Review (2020) 114, 3, 874–887 

By Max Smeets

This report is based on chapter one of Max Smeets’ book titled “Ransom War: How Cyber Crime Became a Threat to National Security,” forthcoming with Oxford University Press and Hurst Publishers. Historically, discussions on cyber conflict have primarily centered on the involvement of state-sponsored or affiliated groups. Yet, the growing prominence of criminal actors – specifically, ransomware groups – now demands a shift in attention. Ransomware, a type of malicious activity where hackers lock access to files or systems until a ransom is paid, increasingly threatens both citizen safety and global stability. In 2022, the majority of the U.K’s government's crisis management “Cobra” meetings were convened in response to ransomware incidents rather than other national security emergencies. According to Sami Khoury, the head of the Canadian Center for Cyber Security, the threat from nation-states remains significant but cybercrime, of which ransomware is the most disruptive form, is “the number one cyber threat activity affecting Canadians.” The Swiss National Cybersecurity Centre warns that ransomware could pose an “existential threat” to businesses and government agencies. This report discusses significant milestones in the development of ransomware, and what turned them into a significant threat to human and national security. It starts with the adoption of better encryption techniques by criminals, enabling them to effectively hold data for ransom. The use of botnets subsequently expanded their operational reach, while there was also a shift away from prepaid card systems in favor of crypto currencies such as Bitcoin, which provided anonymity and ease of transaction. Following these developments, the emergence of Ransomware as a Service (RaaS) allowed for a better division of tasks within the cybercriminal community, making it easier for newcomers to participate. Tactics evolved further to include double extortion, where attackers threaten to publish stolen data unless a ransom is paid. The final shift saw the professionalization of ransomware groups. It also increased their intent and capability to target major organizations, maximizing their ransom potential. I refer to the ransomware groups at the forefront of this troubling trend in the criminal ecosystem as ransom war groups. 

Zürich: Center for Security Studies (CSS), ETH Zürich 2024. 18p.

By Charles Fain Lehman

Crime remains a pressing concern for Americans, even as rates of violence have receded from 2022 peaks. What explains these persistent concerns? This report investigates this question in the context of a small but rapidly growing American city: Chattanooga, Tennessee. A Manhattan Institute poll from earlier this year found that Chattanooga residents are worried about safety in their communities; this report investigates why. A review of Chattanooga data, it finds that the city experienced the same increases in certain kinds of crime that other American cities did over the past four years, but that, through the application of evidence-based practices, the city’s police and municipal government have brought the problem under control. But even as violent crime has largely receded, multiple indicators are suggesting that another problem persists: disorder. Data indicate that homelessness, trash, and certain kinds of petty crime remain elevated above pre-2020 levels. A reduction in city resources—especially police resources—appears to have caused a concentration on serious crime, at the expense of more minor but still significant issues. Disorder, this report argues, matters, especially for a growing city like Chattanooga. Consequently, this report concludes by outlining several principles for addressing this problem, while capitalizing on the gains that the city has already made in getting major crime under control.

New York: The Manhattan Institute, 2024. 26p.

By Steven Dudley, María Fernanda Ramírez, Anastasia Austin and Gavin Voss

This report aims to better understand the criminal dynamics in Durán. Located in the southwest coastal province of Guayas, Durán is a municipality, or cantón, as they are known in Ecuador, of over 300,000 inhabitants, the vast majority of whom live in the city bearing the same name.1 It has long been known as a commercial hub and small industrial center. But it is also home to a chaotic mix of shrimp farms, poorly-planned residential developments and favela-like land invasions, and unzoned areas of factories and warehouses that produce and store goods, many of which leave Guayaquil’s various maritime ports en route to all corners of the world. More recently, Durán has become a violent epicenter of criminal activity. Criminal groups use the municipality as a staging area for cocaine exiting on cargo ships through Guayaquil’s ports, while also peddling drugs on a local level. Systemic corruption, underdevelopment, and extreme poverty have facilitated this rise in criminality. More than half of Durán’s residents do not have running water or plumbing. The municipality is bereft of schools and a public university. And recent efforts to revive Durán have waned amid local and national neglect and a series of economic crises. To many residents, Durán is but a ciudad dormitorio (sleeping quarters): They work, shop, and relax in neighboring Samborondón and Guayaquil, returning to Durán to spend the night. Part of what keeps them away these days is insecurity: Durán’s homicide rate reached 147 per 100,000 in 2023 — its highest recorded rate — as crime has metastasized. Once a bustling railroad depot and industrial hub, Durán is now the poster child for the country’s rapid decline into the criminal abyss. Major Findings • Many social, economic, and political factors have converged to make Durán a violent criminal hub. Rapid, uncontained population growth, coupled with widespread corruption and malfeasance, has left a good portion of the municipality bereft of basic services such as potable water and a working sewage system. Unplanned, informal, and criminal urban development has scarred the area and jaded its residents, who have few civil society and religious organizations upon which they can channel their grievances and even fewer political options. And, like so many other parts of the country, the municipality lacks security, judicial, and regulatory forces that can effectively prosecute high-impact criminal activities. • Durán has two primary criminal organizations: the Chone Killers and the Latin Kings. These two engage in an increasingly violent battle for the municipality’s territory and its criminal economies, which include local and international drug trafficking activities. Their ties to transnational criminal networks, however, appear to be sporadic and opportunistic, rather than systemic and long-lasting. Perhaps more alarming is their penetration of the municipal government, where at least one of these groups secured public works contracts, as well as control of key government institutions that preside over everything from land tenure issues to traffic tickets. • Land trafficking is at the core of Durán’s criminal ecosystem. The illegal seizure and development of urban and rural land, often with the direct participation of corrupt officials, offers a deep well of potential profit, ranging from the sale of property to the administration of various public services. Illegal settlements also serve as staging areas for various criminal activities, including transnational drug trafficking, retail drug sales, as well as kidnapping, robbery, and extortion. Legalizing illegal settlements brings with it lucrative government contracts and the opportunity for corrupt officials to profit from kickbacks and criminal actors to launder their dirty money. It also leads to violence, including against public officials. • Ecuador’s growing role in transnational drug trafficking has significantly impacted Durán’s criminal, political, and economic landscape. By serving larger national drug trafficking networks, local gangs have gained access to substantial financial resources. Drawing from this new revenue stream, gang leaders have acquired legitimate businesses such as laundromats, hair salons, and construction companies. This interplay of criminal, economic, and political capital has also changed the political landscape, offering local gangs an entry point into the municipal government via campaign contributions, as evidenced by their systematic penetration into key government posts and public works contracts. • Durán’s gangs have a complex and varied relationship with the local communities where they operate. While some gangs exploit residents, the most sophisticated gang leaders offer them protection and other social and economic services, filling the void left by absent, corrupt, or inept state institutions, and providing a semblance of security and opportunity. This calculated approach engenders support that allows them to operate in relative safety, as well as use the community infrastructure and draw employees from a vast pool of recruits. • Homicide trends in Durán largely follow patterns seen in Ecuador over the last several years, including the type of victim, weapons employed, and the place where the murders occur. And, in some ways, Durán is a reflection of the extreme swings in violence in cities along the country’s coast. But Durán’s record 2023 homicide spike was more extreme, in part due to local events, like the murders of key criminal power brokers and the rise of a wayward, volatile new leader. These factors point to gang violence as the primary driver of homicides in the municipality   

Washington, DC: Insight Crime, 2024. 74p.

By Marie Lynam, David Keatley, Garth Maker, John Coumbaros

Little is known about the prevalence of incapacitating substances present in drug-facilitated sexual assaults (DFSA). Presented here is a literature review conducted to provide background information, such as symptoms, exacerbations, and drug interactions, on drugs typically implicated in DFSA, namely gamma-hydroxybutyrate (GHB), gamma-butyrolactone (GBL), 1,4-butanediol (1,4-BD), ketamine, diazepam, oxycodone, methamphetamine, and alcohol. Literature found through Scopus and Pubmed was reviewed to determine the current prevalence of these substances in DFSA with a focus on Australian data. The global literature revealed that there is a wide variety of substances used in DFSA and the prevalence varies by country. For example, it was found that in Northern Ireland, opioids were most prevalent whereas in France, benzodiazepines were most prevalent. In Australia, the review revealed a lack of contemporary data with the most recent report in Victoria using data collected during 2011–2013. The literature also revealed there can be an important difference between self-reported substance use and substances discovered via toxicological analysis. This can be due to the challenges of biological detection, reliability of self-reporting, and the possibility of a substance being introduced to a person’s food or drink without their knowledge. This review highlights the need for the collection and analysis of current data about DFSA reports and the drugs detected, and due to the constantly evolving picture of both licit and illicit drug use, an assessment of the role of prescription medications in DFSA due to drug-drug interactions as well as potential to incapacitate is warranted.  

Forensic Science International: Synergy 9 (2024) 100545  

By Storm Ervin, Erica Henderson

The Urban Institute received funding from the George Kaiser Family Foundation to conduct an 11-month mixed-methods assessment of adult domestic violence (DV) in Tulsa, Oklahoma. * The purpose of Urban’s study was to understand major programs, policies, services, and funding sources geared toward preventing and responding to adult DV survivors and recommend ways Tulsa could improve its response to domestic violence. The first part of the mixed-method assessment focused primarily on the largest service provider in Tulsa, Domestic Violence Intervention Services, Inc. (DVIS). The second part of the assessment focused on qualitative data collection with criminal legal and human services agencies and stakeholders to provide insight into the larger domestic violence landscape in Tulsa. Based on the assessment findings, we identified seven overarching recommendations for how Tulsa could improve its response to domestic violence. Overarching Findings Tulsa’s largest DV service provider, DVIS, and Tulsa’s family justice center, the Family Safety Center (FSC), offer a multitude of evidence-based practices for adult and child survivors. In addition, DVIS is successful in reaching and serving people with low educational attainment and unemployment, which are major risk factors for experiencing DV. Law enforcement has implemented evidenced-based screening tools—such as the Lethality Assessment Program and the Danger Assessment for Law Enforcement—to screen for lethality and strangulation among victims at the scene of DV incidents. Further, organizations engage in several interagency efforts to respond to DV through Tulsa’s Rapid Intervention Team, the FSC, Tulsa’s response to strangulation, and the Integrated DV Court. Finally, not without some challenges, federal and philanthropic funding sources have demonstrated commitment to supporting Tulsa’s response to DV. Our assessment also yielded notable areas for improvement. For example, Black and Indigenous survivors are vastly underserved by DVIS, though they are most likely to experience intimate partner homicide (Oklahoma Domestic Violence Fatality Review Board 2021). In addition, Tulsa has few programs aimed at intervening on behalf of children who experience or are at risk of DV. For both adults and children, stakeholders reported few programs for preventing DV. Moreover, stakeholders reported policy and practice constraints as negatively impacting survivors and intervention in DV. For example, failure-to-protect legislation was described as a method for criminalizing survivors. Stakeholders also reported that Battering Intervention Programs (BIPs) involve burdensome amounts of money and time for those who are mandated to participate. Moreover, policy constraints limit stakeholders’ ability to provide wraparound services to people who cause harm. Another notable challenge is the McGirt Decision, which established that state courts no longer have the authority to prosecute crimes committed by or against Oklahomans who are also tribal members, and in turn, complicated Tulsa’s ability to respond to people who cause harm and also belong to Indigenous communities. Other challenges include those related to specific agencies, such as law enforcement’s faithful administration of the Lethality Assessment Program (LAP) screens, the role that the Oklahoma Department of Human Services plays in separating children listed in protective orders, and service providers’ limited ability to provide more evidence-based services. Other notable challenges are agencies’ limited capacity and staff and a lack of sustainable funding sources.    

Washington, DC: The Urban Institute, 2023. 110p.

By: Dr. Hilal Özcebe, Dr. Sutay Yavuz, Hacer Taşcene, and Dr. Sinan Türkyılmaz

Around the world, women and girls are victims of countless acts of violence. The range of gender-based violence is devastatingly endless, occurring quite literally from womb to tomb. Violence against women and girls occurs in every segment of society – regardless of class, ethnicity, culture, or country.

While you are reading this text, many millions of women around the world will experience the trauma of violence and abuse. It is estimated that 1 in 3 women throughout the world suffer this violence during her lifetime. The same figure for EU countries is 1 in 5. Women in Turkey face violence like women in many other countries; the latest survey shows that 2 in 5 women have been exposed to physical violence. In the same research, 42 percent of women have been exposed to physical and sexual violence, and 44 percent of women have been exposed to emotional violence or abuse. All of these were caused by their husbands or partners.

Over the past 30 years, increasingly gender-based violence has been recognized both in Turkey and worldwide. One of the newest and most comprehensive international instruments to combat violence against women is “Council of Europe Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence against Women and Domestic Violence (Istanbul Convention)” which was built on the 4P principle of ‘Prevention, Protection, Prosecution, and Policy’. For many years all the interventions to combat VAW have been mostly built around the protection and prosecution. However policy development and prevention are the weakest links of the combating interventions. Among the prevention interventions the most excluded groups have been the youth and children. As it is indicated in some research, children and the youth are the two groups who have been the silent victims of violence within the family even they are not the subject of direct violence. However it is also known that violence is an act that is learnt and to prevent violence against women, the interventions should be started in the early childhood.

Increased rates of violence worldwide have heightened the need to understand what children think about their experiences as victims or witnesses of violence. Much has been written about children and violence, but less has been written from the viewpoint of the children themselves. Without knowing their experience and perception it is impossible to develop any intervention to prevent violence against women regarding to early ages of youth.

This research which is the first in its area had been conducted to understand the perception of school age youth (ages between 11-17) on violence against women and gender inequality which is the root cause of the act. Upon the results of this research UNFPA with the relevant partners will develop prevention interventions for the school age children.

As UNFPA we would like to thank to the researchers, Prof. Dr. Hilal Özcebe, Assoc. Prof. Dr. Sinan Türkyılmaz, Assoc. Prof. Dr. Sutay Yavuz and Hacer Taşçene and the interview team for conducting this special qualitative research. We would also convey our gratitude to all the government officials, school principals and teachers who supported us in Ankara, Aydın and Erzurum.

Population Association (Turkey) and United Nations Population Fund - UNFPA November 2013

By Kristy E. Williams, U.S. Government Accountability Office

Domestic and child abuse can result in devastating consequences for military service members and their families. It also can reduce mission readiness. In fiscal year 2023, DOD recorded 26,978 reports of domestic and child abuse incidents, of which 14,110 met the DOD definition of abuse. House Report 117-397 includes a provision for GAO to review the policies and regulations governing IDCs and the use of decision notification letters. This report (1) describes how military commanders, abuse victims, and alleged abusers may use IDC decisions; and (2) assesses the extent to which the military services have established processes to notify commanders, abuse victims, and alleged abusers of IDC decisions. GAO conducted site visits at four military installations; analyzed random samples of IDC notifications and incident case logs; reviewed DOD and military service guidance; and interviewed DOD, military service, and civilian officials. What GAO Recommends GAO recommends DOD clarify its guidance and expectations on incident determination notification methods and content based on its identification and analysis of associated risks. DOD concurred with GAO’s recommendation.    

Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2024. 49p.

By: Jeffrey L. Edleson, Taryn Lindhorst, Gita Mehrotra, William Vesneski, Luz Lopez, and Sudha Shetty

Mothers who flee with their children because of domestic violence may have few other options to ensure their safety and that of their children in the face of their partner’s violence. Yet when their flight takes them across international boundaries, they become vulnerable to being legally treated as an “abducting” parent by the courts. This report focuses on the situations of women who experienced abuse in another country and came to the United States in an effort to protect themselves and their children, but who then faced civil actions in U.S. state or federal courts for child abduction under international legal agreements. We interviewed battered mothers around the world, their attorneys, their husbands’ attorneys and examined published judicial decisions in cases involving the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction where there were also allegations of domestic violence by one parent against the other. The research team interviewed 22 mothers who responded to Hague petitions in U.S. courts, 23 attorneys representing both mothers and fathers in these cases and five specialists, such as expert witnesses. The research team also analyzed 47 published U.S. Hague Convention court decisions involving allegations of domestic violence.

Battered mothers who fled across borders to the U.S. to receive help from their families were often victims of life-threatening violence, and their children were frequently directly or indirectly exposed to the father’s violence. The women sought but received little help from foreign authorities or social service agencies and received little help from U.S. authorities once they came to the U.S. In fact, these mothers – most of whom were U.S. citizens – often faced U.S. courts that were unsympathetic to their safety concerns and subsequently sent their children back to the custody of the abusive fathers in the other country, creating potential serious risks for the children and mothers.

US Department of Justice, November 2010

By Jorge Santos-Hermoso, José Luis González-Álvarez, Miguel Ángel Alcázar-Córcoles, Enrique José Carbonell-Vayá 

This investigation studied the interaction between seven risk factors included in the police risk assessment of the VioGén System and found that these factors formed groups based on the dimensions of violence and psychopathology. The 171 femicides analyzed were categorized into four groups: normalized (23.4%), violent (25.7%), pathological (18.7%), and pathological/violent (32.2%). These groups exhibited significant differences concerning their psychosocial profile and relationship dynamics. One of the main findings is the identification of the pathological type that had not been detected in previous typologies, thus highlighting the importance of the psychological factor when classifying the perpetrators of femicide. These results have important practical implications, as the classification of the aggressor could be a preliminary step taken before the risk assessment, which would make it possible to individualize predictions and improve the protection of the victims as well as the therapies and intervention programs. 

European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research (2024) 30:521–543 

By The Mixed Migration Centre

Drawing on more than 1,000 surveys with refugees and migrants, this infographic examines their perceptions of dangerous locations, direct experiences of abuse and harsh conditions and their interactions with and perceptions of smugglers. Additionally, it explores the sources of information that refugees and migrants relied on before and during their journey, as well as their access to assistance.

London/Denmark: Mixed Migration Centre, 2024. 6p.

By Clarissa

The Child Labour: Action-Research-Innovation in South and South-Eastern Asia (CLARISSA) programme uses Action Research (AR) to understand the dynamics which drive the worst forms of child labour (WFCL), and to generate participatory innovations which help to shift these underlying dynamics and mitigate their worst effects. Through 13 Action Research Groups (ARGs) in Bangladesh and 12 groups in Nepal, the programme is generating a rich understanding – particularly through children’s lived experiences – of the complex underlying drivers of harmful work and working children and their employers are themselves defining, piloting and evaluating their innovative actions that aim to increase children’s options to avoid WFCL.  

Bangladesh Action Research Group 13 Brighton: Institute of Development Studies

By Holly E. Porter

This thesis explores responses to rape in the Acholi sub-region of northern Uganda, based on three years of participant observation plus in-depth interviews with a random sample of 187 women from two villages. The issues examined lie at the intersection of two ongoing discussions in scholarship and practice and contributes to each of them: wrongdoing and justice, and sexual violence and rape.

Northern Uganda is at the heart of international justice debates. Fierce controversy followed the 2005 announcement of the International Criminal Court’s intervention in ongoing conflict between the Lord’s Resistance Army and the Government of Uganda. Two opposing representations of Acholi society emerged: that Acholi were innately forgiving—able to deal with mass crime through traditional justice; or that they needed and often supported formal legal justice. But this missed crucial aspects of Acholi realities, which this study illustrates, most basically the profound value of social harmony, and a deep distrust of distanced authorities to dispense justice in their interest.

Many scholars and practitioners assume that in the aftermath of crime, justice must be done. Amongst Acholi, I have found, the primary moral imperative in the wake of wrongdoing is not punishment of the perpetrator or individual victim’s rights but the restoration of social harmony.

Experience of rape and harm it causes are predicated on understandings of wrongdoing related to challenges posed to social harmony. Similarly, an appropriate remedy depends not only on the act of forced sex itself, but also on the social role of the perpetrator and social context.

This thesis adds empirical, locally-grounded, and culturally-specific evidence in support of a more complicated and nuanced explanation of rape and its aftermath than is familiar in the analytical/normative frameworks familiar in post-atrocity justice debates or anti-rape feminist activist discourse. It suggests reimagining the meanings of these phenomena along lived continuums: before, during, and after war; and acknowledging the role of sex, power, and politics in all sexual experiences on a spectrum of coercion and enthusiastic consent.

London School of Economics and Political Science, April 2013

Edited by Jonathan Adams and Cordelia Hess

Is research on antisemitism even necessary in countries with a relatively small Jewish population? Absolutely, as this volume shows. Compared to other countries, research on antisemitism in the Nordic countries (Denmark, the Faroe Islands, Finland, Greenland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden) is marginalized at an institutional and staffing level, especially as far as antisemitism beyond German fascism, the Second World War, and the Holocaust is concerned. Furthermore, compared to scholarship on other prejudices and minority groups, issues concerning Jews and anti-Jewish stereotypes remain relatively under researched in Scandinavia – even though antisemitic stereotypes have been present and flourishing in the North ever since the arrival of Christianity, and long before the arrival of the first Jewish communities.
This volume aims to help bring the study of antisemitism to the fore, from the medieval period to the present day. Contributors from all the Nordic countries describe the status of as well as the challenges and desiderata for the study of antisemitism in their respective countries.

Berlin ; Boston : De Gruyter, [2020]

Edited by Pablo Policzer

Making Sense of Haiti's State Fragility and Violence : Combining Structure and Contingency? / Andreas E. Feldmann -- Operation Condor as an International System of State Violence and Terror : A Historical-Structural Analysis / J. Patrice McSherry -- Written in Black and Red : Murder as a Communicative Act in Mexico / Pablo Piccato -- Protest and Police "Excesses" in Chile : The Limits of Social Accountability / Michelle D. Bonner --Protest and Police "Excesses" in Chile : The Limits of Social Accountability / Michelle D. Bonner -- The Police Ombudsman in Brazil as a Potential Mechanism to Reduce Violence / Anthony W. Pereira -- Democracy, Threat, and Repression : Kidnapping and Repressive Dynamics during the Colombian Conflict / Francisco Gutiérrez Sanín -- To End the War in Colombia : Conversatorios among Security Forces, Ex-Guerrillas, and Political Elites, and Ceasefire Seminars-Workshops for the Technical Sub-Commission / Jennifer Schirmer.

Calgary, Alberta, Canada : University of Calgary Press, [2019]

By Russell G Smith and Amelia Hickman

This report estimates the cost of serious and organised crime in Australia in 2020–21 to be between $24.8b and $60.1b. This is the third in a series of reports undertaken for the Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission estimating the cost of serious and organised crime. It updates and improves on the methodology used in the previous report, which estimated the cost of organised crime in 2016–17. As with the previous research, this report considers the direct and consequential costs of serious and organised crime in Australia, as well as the costs to government entities, businesses and individuals associated with preventing and responding to serious and organised crime. While the current estimates were undertaken during the COVID-19 pandemic and may reflect changes in criminality resulting from the pandemic, the full economic impact of serious and organised criminal offending committed during the pandemic will not be known for some time. It is clear, however, that the impact of serious and organised crime on the Australian economy is substantial.  

Statistical Report No. 38 Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology 2022 73p.

By Jesuit Social Services

This paper focuses on how governments can support a greater understanding of perpetration and a strengthening and acceleration of current efforts to end men’s violence against women and children. It affirms the need to build on Australia’s current approaches to prevention and considers whether they need to be further adapted or refined. Recommendations are based on practice experience, research, and the lived experience of participants. 

Recommendations

1. Investment in the collection of more and better data on the extent of perpetration, and its dynamics and drivers.

2. Identification of emerging opportunities to intervene early to prevent violence against women and children.

3. A “stocktake” of existing prevention and early intervention work taking place across the country, including consideration of evidence where it exists, to promote more specific discussions regarding the merits of various practice approaches.

4. Development of an evidence framework for prevention and early intervention, including standards of evidence.

5. A workforce capability building approach which views a range of work as prevention, including work with people of all genders who can influence men and boys across settings.

6. An online deterrence/early intervention campaign which draws on international best practice.

7. Investment in digital tools to support parents and critical workforces to confidently foster discussions with men and boys about gender norms and use of violence, and to counter negative influences.

8. Exploring in-prison behaviour change approaches, in parallel with changes to prison conditions and culture.

Australia: Jesuit Social Services, 2024. 39p.

By Jason Payne and Anthony Morgan

In this study we used criminal history data for three birth cohorts in New South Wales to estimate the prevalence of recorded family and domestic violence offending. Using an accelerated longitudinal design, we estimate that 6.3 percent of people born in New South Wales had been proceeded against by police for a family and domestic violence offence by age 37. The rate was significantly higher for men: 9.6 percent of men— one in 10—had been proceeded against for a family and domestic violence offence, compared with 3.0 percent of women (one in 33). Overall, 1.2 percent of people born in New South Wales were responsible for more than 50 percent of recorded family and domestic violence offences. Further, family and domestic violence offenders accounted for nearly half of all recorded offences by people in the birth cohort. This is the first estimate of the prevalence of recorded family and domestic violence offending in a population sample in Australia. This is an important step towards increasing the visibility of family and domestic violence perpetrators.

Trends & issues in crime and criminal justice no. 701. Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology. 2024. 18p.

By Irene María Álvarez-Rodríguez Translated by Victoria Furio

The consolidation of armed civilian collectives in the Mexican state of Michoacán arose in a setting in which the illegal regional economy no longer focused on drug smuggling but had turned to a variety of criminal activities and in which the perspective of a moral economy had been restored. This restructuring of the criminal economy was a strong factor in the emergence of the armed collectives.

LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES, Issue 236, Vol. 48 No. 1, January 2021, 231–244