Emily Greberman and Colleen M. Berryessa

The United States (U.S.) and its criminal-legal system have had a historically turbulent relationship with drugs and substance use. Public rhetoric, political ideology, and resulting policies, shaped by both rehabilitative and punitive ideals, have served as a foundation for the criminalization and mass incarceration of those who possess, distribute, and use illegal drugs–especially the targeting and blaming of communities of color. Early on, though drugs such as opium had versatile medical benefits, the use of heroin, crack/cocaine, and cannabis by people of color was quickly shaped into discourse that amplified fear and racist stereotypes and catalyzed the War on Drugs. Throughout several presidential administrations, the criminalization of drug crimes disproportionately affected Black individuals, despite White citizens using them at similar or higher rates. ‘Tough on crime’ policies, policing, and sentencing that resulted from this period culminated in the mass imprisonment of people of color. Now trying to repair the harm caused by the War on Drugs and rhetoric from the media in 2024, there is a strong push for the decriminalization and legalization of several drugs across the U.S. For cannabis in particular, efforts have been made to advocate for its legalization federally. In the criminal-legal system, many political leaders and legislators have actively attempted to advocate for and enforce policies that release individuals from prison who have been incarcerated for minor drug offenses or are affected by unjust sentencing practices. Combined with nationwide efforts to promote research on the use of drugs for medicinal purposes as well as the problems of drug abuse and addiction, a more progressive and optimistic approach to drug use has begun and continues to grow across the U.S. The social and political forces that have historically shaped attitudes towards drug use and punishment are crucial to understanding the current direction of U.S. drug policies and why the pendulum continues to swing.

In Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Criminology and Criminal Justice. Oxford University Press. 2024  (forthcoming)

By Dennis Rodgers

• Open access

• Published: 08 April 2024

• Volume 47, pages 377–404, (2024)

This article explores the longitudinal dynamics of youth gang transformation in urban Nicaragua. On the basis of an overview of successive gang iterations that have emerged over the past 30 years in barrio Luis Fanor Hernández, a poor neighborhood in Managua, the capital city of Nicaragua, the article identifies key elements for the articulation of a political economy of both change and stability. In particular, drawing on Bourdieusian theory, it conceives of a gang as a “social field” rather than as a discrete organizational form. It traces how different processes of individual and collective capital accumulation underpinning the social order promulgated by distinct gang iterations emerge and interact with each other, and the consequences that this has for their evolution over time. In doing so, the article offers a better understanding of the logic of what might be termed “gang rule(s)”.

  Qualitative Sociology (2024) 47:377–404 https://doi.org/10.1007/s11133-024-09561-1''  

By Wang-Sheng Lee, Umair Khalil, David W. Johnston: 

  This paper estimates the impacts of religiosity on criminal activity using a city-wide shock to religious sentiment from a 2015 Papal visit. Using daily data on all reported offences between 2010 and 2015 in Philadelphia at the census tract level and a difference-in differences approach, we demonstrate significant reductions in less serious crimes in the week of the visit and for several weeks following. Reductions are particularly pronounced for drug offences and in historically Christian areas. Notably, similar crime effects are not found for President Obama’s 2015 visit, suggesting changes in police deployment do not drive results.  

   IZA DP No. 16933

Bonn, Germany:  IZA – Institute of Labor Economics, 2024. 33p.

By Michael French, Gulcin Gumus:

   Although they comprise a relatively small subset of all traffic deaths, hit-and-run fatalities are both contemptible and preventable. We analyze longitudinal data from 1982-2008 to examine the effects of blood alcohol concentration (BAC) laws on hit-and-run traffic fatalities. Our results suggest that lower BAC limits may have an unintended consequence of increasing hit-and-run fatalities, while a similar effect is absent for non-hit-and-run fatalities. Specifically, we find that adoption of a .08 BAC limit is associated with an 8.3% increase in hit-and-run fatalities. This unintended effect is more pronounced in urban areas and during weekends, which are typical settings for hit-and-run incidents

IZA DP No. 16774 

Bonn, Germany:  IZA – Institute of Labor Economics, 2024. 41p.

By Alexandra Gannoni,  Alexandra Voce,  Sarah Napier,  Hayley Boxall,  Dana Thomsen

This study reviews initiatives that aim to prevent child sexual abuse material (CSAM) offending, including evidence of effectiveness. Information was sourced via a literature search and input from an international expert advisory group. The study identified 74 initiatives in 16 countries, and 34 eligible studies measuring implementation and effectiveness.

The CSAM offending prevention initiatives identified in the study include helplines, therapeutic treatment and psychoeducation, online self-management courses, education and awareness campaigns, and other forms of support. Importantly, findings indicate that media and social media campaigns have successfully reached large numbers of offenders, both detected and undetected. While outcomes of programs are mixed, findings indicate that prevention initiatives can encourage help-seeking, reduce risk factors for offending, enhance protective factors, and reduce contact sexual offending against children. Findings also suggest that initiatives aimed at contact child sexual abuse offenders are not necessarily effective in reducing CSAM offending. Evaluations of initiatives aimed specifically at CSAM offending show promise but are limited methodologically. Further and more robust evaluations are required to determine their effect on CSAM use.

Research Report no. 28. 

Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology, 2023. 120p.

By Hayley Boxall,  Samantha Lyneham,  Christie Black,  Alexandra Gannoni

Sexual exploitation can have significant short- and longer-term impacts on victim-survivors. However, there is currently a lack of research exploring the support needs of sexual exploitation victim-survivors accessing support in Australia, and barriers to support provision. To address this knowledge gap, we analysed case management records for 50 victim-survivors of sexual exploitation in Australia and conducted interviews with 12 victim-survivor caseworkers.

On average, victim-survivors required support across six domains, the most common being financial hardship, mental health, social isolation and housing and accommodation. The most crucial barriers to service provision were systemic in nature. For example, some victim‑survivors on temporary visas were ineligible for government funded medical services, affordable housing or welfare schemes, which placed significant financial burdens on victim‑survivors and support services.

These findings demonstrate that to support the recovery of victim-survivors, services need to be funded appropriately to ensure they can provide holistic wraparound interventions.

Research Report no. 29. 

Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology. 2023. 51[p.

By Heather Wolbers, Hayley Boxall, Anthony Morgan

Drawing on a large sample of female carers living in Australia (n=3,775), this study aims to document and explore children and young people’s experiences of abuse in the past 12 months. We focus on children’s exposure to intimate partner violence (IPV) perpetrated against their female carers, as well as children being the target of direct physical and emotional abuse themselves.

Overall, a significant proportion of respondents who had a child in their care during the past 12 months said that a child was exposed to IPV perpetrated against them (14.1%). One in nine said a child in their care had been the target of direct abuse perpetrated by their current or most recent former partner (11.5%). Critically, one-third of respondents who experienced IPV said a child was exposed to the violence at least once in the past 12 months (34.8%).

A number of factors were associated with an increased likelihood of children being subjected to direct abuse. These included the characteristics of respondents and their relationships, children and households. We also present evidence linking economic factors, including changes in employment, with the direct abuse of children.

Research Report no. 26. 

Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology, 2023. 72p.

By Natalie Byrom  

  The justice system in England and Wales, once lauded as “the envy of the world” is now more often described as being “in crisis”. Since 2010, government funding for both the courts and for legal advice and representation has been significantly reduced, increasing gaps in the provision of legal information, advice and support for people facing issues with community care, immigration, housing and welfare benefits. More parents now attempt to represent themselves in family court proceedings. Measures introduced to combat the spread of COVID-19 have exacerbated backlogs across the civil, criminal and family courts – leaving victims, defendants, claimants and their families waiting longer to access justice. The cost-of-living crisis has intensified issues, increasing the number of people experiencing legal problems with debt, housing and domestic abuse. Existing provision of legal advice and representation is inadequate to meet this need. In 2024 the Ministry of Justice (MoJ) was criticised by the National Audit Office for failing to collect the data needed to effectively manage the supplier base for this critical service5. Against this backdrop of escalating unmet legal need and a justice system under strain, justice system leaders are increasingly turning to technology with the dual aim of promoting earlier dispute resolution and achieving efficiency savings. There is growing government interest in remote and digital alternatives to face-to-face legal advice provision, creating both new opportunities and challenges. However, an absence of agreed quality standards for digital tools and inadequate regulation of AI-assisted provision exacerbates risks and undermines innovation. Issues with the leadership, culture and structure of the MoJ undermine attempts to address these issues. Since 2010 there have been 11 changes in Lord Chancellor, equalling the number between 1945 and 2003. The inclusion of responsibility for prisons within the department’s remit when it was created in 2007 has detracted focus and funding from other areas of justice policy – including access to civil justice and the courts. The challenges in delivering the £1.3bn programme of digital court reform, which has been beset by significant delays and multiple reductions in scope6, have exposed  issues with the governance structures created to oversee the operation of HM Courts and Tribunals Service (HMCTS). Experts have questioned the adequacy of the existing framework agreement7 and suggested that wider constitutional reforms may be needed to put in place the structures and leadership necessary to effectively manage the courts and tribunals. Issues with the leadership, structure and culture of the MoJ (and other justice system institutions) are reflected in persistent and systemic issues with the data that is available to system leaders. The absence of joined-up data – structured at the level of people, not cases – prevents justice leaders from taking a whole system view, undermining attempts to identify and resolve challenges. The relative absence of data, and persistent issues with arrangements for accessing the information that does exist8, also weaken opportunities for external researchers to undertake robust research. This means that justice, especially civil justice, does not in general benefit from the networks of independent think tanks, researchers and evidence intermediaries that promote effective decision making in other areas of social policy. This report sets out what we know about the ways in which the justice system fails to meet people’s needs, highlighting existing examples of research on current issues in access to justice. Just as crucially, the report focuses on what we do not know, and draws attention to the gaps in data, evidence and infrastructure that undermine our ability to sustainably address existing challenges. 
London: Nuffield Foundation, 2024. 90p.

By Chelsa Kenney, et al.
  The U.S. government has identified illicit drugs, as well as the criminal organizations that produce and traffic them, as significant threats to both the U.S. and partner nations. DOD is the lead department responsible for detecting and monitoring the aerial and maritime transport of illicit drugs to the U.S. Senate report 117-130 accompanying the FY 2023 National Defense Authorization Act contains a provision for GAO to examine issues related to counternarcotics and counter transnational organized crime activities. This report examines (1) funding available for DOD’s activities and funding allocation in FYs 2018 through 2022; (2) the extent to which DOD components coordinate activities; and (3) how DOD assessed the effectiveness of these activities, and the extent to which its future assessments align with key practices. GAO reviewed DOD documents and data about its authorities, funding, and activities, including coordination and performance management. GAO also interviewed DOD officials, including officials at headquarters and combatant commands. What GAO Recommends GAO is making four recommendations, including that DOD develops a plan to assess agency-wide progress. DOD partially agreed with all recommendations. GAO maintains that fully implementing them is necessary to improve DOD’s coordination and assessment of activities.  

Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2024. 56p.

By ASTRA – Anti-trafficking Action
  This report by ASTRA – Anti-Trafficking Action, details a suspected case of labour exploitation involving 11 Indian workers contracted by China Energy Engineering Group Tianjin Electric Power Construction Co. LTD's Belgrade branch in Zrenjanin, Serbia. ASTRA began assisting the workers in late January 2024 after being contacted by the workers. Within a month, on February 11th, the workers left Serbia abruptly. Despite the short timeframe, ASTRA collected significant evidence, including documents, footage, and testimonials from the workers. This report, available in both a short and longer version, serves a dual purpose: I. Warning Sign: To highlight concerning practices towards migrant workers seeking decent employment in Serbia. II. State Response Evaluation: To assess the state institutions' reactions or lack thereof regarding this case. This incident reflects a broader trend. Similar cases involving foreign workers have emerged in Serbia over the past five years, often sharing common recruitment and employment elements. These cases also reveal evolving trends in exploitation methods and concerning gaps in the state's response. Serbia's growing foreign workforce requires a clear, competent framework to address human and labour rights violations effectively, for both foreign and domestic workers.

Belgrade, Republic of Serbia, ASTRA, 2024. 36p. 

By  UK Ministry of Justice Justice Data Lab team 

  This analysis looked at the reoffending behaviour of men and women who participated in His Majesty’s Prison and Probation Service’s (HMPPS) Creating Future Opportunities (CFO) programme some time between 2015 and 2021 (concluding in or after August 2018). The overall results show that men who took part in the programme in the community were less likely to reoffend, reoffended less frequently and took longer to reoffend than those who did not take part. These results were statistically significant. A previous analysis was published in July 2019, covering a separate cohort and a variation of the programme. This can be found in the Justice Data Lab statistics collection on GOV.UK. HMPPS CFO intervention is based on one-to-one case management, with the aim of increasing the employability of participants. The programme operates in three settings: in the community, in custody and through the gate (TTG). The headline analysis in this report measured proven reoffences in a one-year period for a ‘treatment group’ of 3,520 male offenders who began receiving support in the community some time between 2015 and 2021 (concluding in or after August 2018), and for a much larger ‘comparison group’ of similar offenders who did not receive it. The analysis estimates the impact of the support from HMPPS CFO on reoffending behaviour. Additional analyses were also conducted on male and female participants who received support from HMPPS CFO in each of the settings outlined above.  

London: Ministry of Justice, 2024. 20p.  

By Alexander Ritzmann

  This report analyzes the potential threats affiliated with the largest and fast growing transnational right-wing extremist (RWE/REMVE) combat sports network, called Active Clubs. It explores the objectives, strategies, strengths, and weaknesses of this network, which has spread from the U.S. to Canada and to at least 14 countries in Europe within three years. ● The overall objective of the Active Club White Supremacy 3.0 strategy is the creation of a stand-by militia of trained and capable RWE/REMVE individuals who can be activated when the need for coordinated violent action on a larger scale arises. ● Over 100 Active Clubs have been created between late 2020 and August 2023, with at least 46 in the United States across 34 U.S. states. At least 46 Active Clubs exist in 14 European countries, and 12 in Canada. The estimated number of members per Active Club is between five and 25. ● Some Active Clubs in the U.S. are conducting or participating in military-style tactical and casualty care trainings. Members or sympathizers of Active Clubs in France and Estonia appear to be fighting in the Russia-Ukraine war. ● If Active Clubs are allowed to continue to operate and multiply, the likelihood for targeted political violence and terrorism by their members against supposed enemies of the “white race” (e.g., Jews, people of color, Muslims, and LGTBQI+ people) will increase. ● A key component of the White Supremacy 3.0 strategy is to hide in plain sight. To avoid, delay, mitigate, or withstand law enforcement interventions, Active Clubs are supposed to present a friendly face to the public. Consequently, network members are asked to avoid threatening behavior or displaying obvious Nazi symbols to appear less relevant to law enforcement. This less aggressive and more mainstream strategy is also meant to help grow the network, in particular from the general public. ● For the Active Club strategy of hiding in plain sight to work, members should look like regular guys, like the members of the (NSDAP Schutzstaffel) SS did. When recruiting, Active Club members should not talk about Jews and history. Instead, the focus in public should be on brotherhood, community, fitness, and self-defense. 

 Berlin:  Counter Extremism Project (CEP), 2023. 52p. 

By  A.K.M. Maksud, Khandaker Reaz Hossain, Sayma Sayed and Jody Aked 

The CLARISSA programme aims to understand the dynamics that are central to running a business in the informal economy in Bangladesh’s leather industry and explore how and why worst forms of child labour become a feature of business operations. This research paper explores the findings from semi-structured interviews with business owners operating enterprises involved in leather processing and production across three prominent neighbourhoods and business districts in and around Dhaka. A focus on the leather industry in Bangladesh is an opportunity to explore the demand side of the child labour issue in a situated way, with the intention of bringing the lived experience of business owners to pre-existing literature on poverty entrepreneurship, supply chain governance, and political economy. The paper details the risks and stressors business owners face, the relationships they have with other informal and formal enterprises in the supply chain system, and their rationale for hiring children. Business owners experience poverty and financial precarity, taking significant financial risks to sustain enterprises that are barely viable economically. Stuck in vicious operating cycles, on ‘produce now, pay later’ credit arrangements, enterprises respond by squeezing labour budgets. The need for cheap labour is amplified by price points at lower than the cost of production. To understand why child labour has been so difficult to ‘end’, an informal economy business perspective points to the economic dysfunction of complex supply chains, particularly mediated by downward financial pressures produced and reproduced by highly fragmented manufacturing processes in cost-driven markets. When poverty and precarity among informal economy business owners intersects with formal economy power, the result is business models that rely on children as cheap labour. The findings make clear the policy value of engaging business owners in the informal economy in efforts to reduce worst forms of child labour, especially given the insights they can offer about how, when, and why supply chain systems are at risk of depending on children for the provision of goods and services.

  CLARISSA Research and Evidence Paper 8, 

Brighton: Institute of Development Studies, 2024. 54p.

By Robert A. Kleinman

Background

Despite the increase in fentanyl-involved overdose deaths in Canada, there have been no national-level studies evaluating the proportion of illicit opioids containing fentanyl or fentanyl analogues in Canada.

Methods

This cross-sectional exploratory study characterized trends in fentanyl, carfentanil and other fentanyl analogues within opioids seized by law enforcement agencies in Canada from 2012 to 2022 and submitted to the Health Canada Drug Analysis Service (DAS). Analyses were stratified by province/region. Mann-Kandell tests were used to test for trends.

Results

A total of 157,616 samples containing any opioid (“opioid-containing samples”) were submitted to the DAS from Canadian provinces between 2012 and 2022, of which 81,165 (51.5%) contained fentanyl or a fentanyl analogue. The percentage of opioid-containing samples that were positive for fentanyl or a fentanyl analogue increased from 3.0% (95% CI: 2.6-3.4%) in 2012 to 68.3% (67.7-68.9%) in 2022 (p < 0.001 for trend). The percentage of opioid-containing samples that were positive for fentanyl or a fentanyl analogue increased between 2012 and 2022 in all regions. In 2022, the percentage of samples containing fentanyl or an analogue followed an east-to-west gradient: 15.8% (13.3-18.6%) of samples in Atlantic Canada and 84.7% (83.6-85.7%) in British Columbia. Carfentanil was present in 4.9% (4.6-5.2%) of opioid-containing samples in Canada in 2022 and 19.7% (18.3-21.2%) of opioid-containing samples in Alberta.

Conclusions

The illicit opioid supply in Canada increasingly contains toxic synthetic opioids. As of 2022, important regional differences existed in the illicit opioid supply in Canada.

   Drug and Alcohol Dependence Reports, (2024)

By The International Crisis Group

  Outgoing Mexican President Andrés Manuel López Obrador has deployed troops on a scale never seen before to fight crime across the country, but this measure has barely loosened the grip of illegal outfits. In some ways, the government can call its policy a success. Violence, measured by reported murders, has dipped from the historic heights of a few years ago, an achievement supporters attribute to the president’s incorruptible character. Polls suggest that his party’s candidate, Claudia Sheinbaum, will romp to victory in the 2 June election. But in the states hardest hit by crime, the reasons behind lulls in fighting appear less flattering to federal authorities. Some security officers and criminal leaders suggest that a modus vivendi between military commanders and illegal outfits has enabled crime groups to profit and expand their hold on communities so long as overt violence is curtailed. Mexico’s next president may be unable to withdraw troops from public security, but she should delineate limits to their role while endeavouring to sever state ties to crime and create the conditions for effective civilian law enforcement. After campaigning in 2018 on a platform promising to pacify Mexico, end the “war on drugs” and return troops to the barracks, López Obrador seemingly underwent a radical conversion. Even before he took office, the president declared that he could not trust the country’s various police forces to curb heavily armed criminal groups, opting instead to reinforce the role of the military – whose law enforcement capacities had been an article of faith for the previous two governments. López Obrador boosted troop deployment and created an entirely new security force under military leadership, the National Guard. In addition to expanding the military’s role in ensuring public safety, he also handed the armed forces major roles in infrastructure, migration control, and seaport and airport management. According to the 2024 budget, 20 percent of state spending is now being channelled through the armed forces. Top government officials insist that the president’s integrity – alongside the military's robust presence and a barrage of social programs – have served to dampen levels of armed conflict. On closer inspection, however, the areas most affected by warring criminal groups – including states such as Michoacán, Veracruz, Colima and Guerrero – have seen large military deployments but limited concrete crime fighting. Security force insiders and criminal leaders note that a set of largely unspoken rules has been established, encouraging illegal groups to reduce and conceal the violence they perpetrate. In exchange, authorities have turned a blind eye to a degree of illegality, enabling these organisations to diversify their trafficking operations (including into newer illicit drugs such as fentanyl), expand their extortion rackets, branch out into legal business, and assume greater control of communities and local governments. When these understandings fall apart, or when major criminal syndicates engage in frontal battle with one another, triggering humanitarian emergencies and drawing national media and political attention, the military are prone to take on a more interventionist and offensive role. But even then, they do not always focus on undermining criminal power, and they can be ambivalent toward illicit operations. When the Jalisco New Generation Cartel launched a major offensive in Michoacán, military    commanders are reported to have hatched deals with crime rings to fight the group, including a campaign to kill numerous members of the cartel. Elsewhere, military officers in cahoots with specific crime groups have allegedly abused their authority to shield their illegal partners. The misuse of authority in Mexico is not unique to the military. But the sheer extent of the armed forces’ security, political and budgetary powers, combined with the lack of any independent civilian oversight, reinforces the risks that members of the armed forces will engage in corruption and collusion. That said, a precipitous move to return soldiers to the barracks could destabilise areas plagued by crime groups locked in arms races and trigger political risks that neither of the main candidates seems willing to countenance. As the candidate for López Obrador’s party, Shein baum has defended the strategy of the past six years, saying the military should remain at the heart of public security for as long as needed. Her main adversary, Xóchitl Gálvez, representing a coalition of opposition parties, has advocated for pulling troops back from some of their many duties. But she concedes a continuing role for troops in tackling the most violent criminal outfits, and she appears ready to reinforce the National Guard, albeit under civilian command..........

Brussels, Belgium: ICG, 2024. 44p.

 Latin America Report N°106 | 24 May 2024  

MAY CONTAIN MARKUP

FRANK PARTNOY

In "Infectious Greed: How Deceit and Risk Corrupted the Financial Markets, delves into the intricate web of deceit and risk that has plagued the financial markets. This gripping exposé uncovers the various factors that led to the corruption and downfall of the financial sector, offering a stark look at the dark underbelly of greed and deception. Through meticulous research and compelling narratives, [author name] sheds light on the devastating consequences of unchecked avarice and manipulation within the realm of high finance. A must-read for anyone seeking to understand the forces at play behind some of the most notorious financial scandals in history.

Henry Holt and Company. New York. 2003. 470p.

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Marc Goodman

In "Future Crimes: Inside The Digital Underground And The Battle For Our Connected World," author Marc Goodman delves into the dark and complex world of cybercrime. He explores the ways in which technology has transformed criminal activities, from hacking and identity theft to cyberterrorism and digital espionage. Goodman sheds light on the threats that the digital age poses to individuals, organizations, and governments, urging readers to become more vigilant and informed about cybersecurity. Through detailed research and gripping real-life stories, "Future Crimes" offers a compelling and sobering look at the vulnerabilities of our interconnected world.

ANCHOR BOOKS. A Division of Penguin Random House LLC New York. 2016. 601p.

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ROBERT W. TAYLOR, TORY J.CAETI, D. KALL LOPER, ERIC J. FRITSCH, and JOHN LIEDERBACH

FROM THE PREFACE: “The first section of the book covers the etiology of the digital crime and digital terrorism problem. The focus in this section is on the types of crimes and acts of terrorism that are committed using computers, networks, and the Internet. Additionally, the reasons why offenders commit these types of crimes are examined in relation to current criminological theories and explanations. As the reader will find, applying criminological theory to digital crime and terrorism is a relatively recent conception. Finally, the section concludes with a chapter on digital criminals and hackers. Chapter I provides an introduction and overview of computer crime. In particular, a categorization of types of computer crimes is presented including I) the computer as the target, 2) the computer as an instrument of a crime, 3) the computer as incidental to crime, and 4) crimes associated with the prevalence of computers. Chapter 2 provides a definition and overview of two key areas of concern in regards to computer crimes, specifically "information warfare" and "cyber-terrorism." Chapter 3 reviews criminological theories that can explain digital crime. Since few theories have been applied directly to digital crime, this chapter focuses on the classic criminological theories that can be applied to digital crime. In other words, the theories discussed in this chapter were developed to explain crime in general, not digital crime specifically. In particular, this chapter focuses on choice, deterrence, psychological. social structure, and social process theories. Finally, Chapter 4 presents an overview of the hacker subculture and presents a typology of hacker types based on relative levels of skill, resources, and enculturation in the values of the hacker subculture. The chapter closes with a discussion of contemporary hacker roles and terminology.”

Prentice Hall. Upper Saddle River, New Jersey. 2006. 413p.

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Donato Masciandaro, EI6d Takats and Brigitte Unger

FROM THE INTRODUCTION: “Traditionally, monetary and financial economics has focused on legal financial transactions, while the economics of crime - following Becker - has neglected the financial aspects. Hence, black finance - finance that relates to illegal or criminal activities - has fallen between the two stools. Due to this separate development in the two sub-disciplines of economics, economic theory has not addressed financial crime sufficiently, so far. This creates a particularly disturbing gap in the literature, since lately, especially in connection with terrorist financing, the financial side of crime has become accentuated in the public and political debate.”

Edward Elgar. Cheltenham, UK • Northampton, MA, USA. 2007. 274p.

By George Sternlieb and James W. Hughes

FROM THE FOREWORD: “The quest for a quick and painless, that is, politically popular, means of raising funds and stimulating economic development never ends. In the last decade, politicians seized on a number of seemingly ingenious devices, from lotteries to off-track betting, that promised benefits such as big increases in revenues and decreases in the role of so-called organized crime. The results have rarely measured up to the expectations-the only thing painless about lotteries and betting shops is the way in which they have parted their clients from their money, and the only real benefits have been to the relatively few individuals who have hit large jackpots and the politicians who have found a new and rich source of patronage.”

Harvard University Press Cambridge, Massachusetts, and London, England. 1983. 224p.

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