By Claire Provost,

U.S. leads global drug war

The role of the United States in exporting the destructive war on drugs to other countries is unparalleled. Since 1971, the U.S. has spent more than a trillion dollars on the war on drugs, prioritising law enforcement responses and fuelling mass incarceration within its borders. It has also played a leading role in pushing and funding punitive responses to drugs internationally. This has continued despite clear evidence that such approaches don’t work to achieve their stated aims (ending drug use and sales) while having devastating effects on rights and health, including mass criminalisation, disease transmission, repression and displacement.

This report demonstrates how U.S. assistance has supported and expanded destructive and deadly anti-drug responses in low- and middle-income countries around the world. It also presents new follow-the-money data analysis on U.S. international drug control spending by various government departments and budgets. This includes official development assistance (ODA) intended to support poverty reduction and other global development goals; and three case studies – Colombia, Mexico, and the Philippines – to reveal the damage done by this spending.

Vast and complex global network

The 2023 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report by the U.S. State Department described a “whole of government approach” to drug control and a strategy of deep collaboration and “capacity building” with counterparts in other countries. A vast and complex global network of U.S. government agencies, programs, and activities has been developed in the ongoing “war on drugs.”

U.S. support for drug enforcement internationally includes financial, material and technical assistance. The U.S. drug war bureaucracy is expansive, involving numerous agencies of the government, including the Department of Defense (DOD), Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), National Security Agency (NSA), State Department, Department of Homeland Security, United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), as well as the infamous Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), under the Department of Justice (DOJ). By 2023, the DEA had 93 foreign offices in 69 countries.

Follow the money

Over the decade between 2015-2024, a total of almost $13 billion of U.S. taxpayer money was allocated to “counternarcotics” activities internationally.

For fiscal year 2025, the President requested $1 billion for international “counternarcotics” activities. Almost half of this request was to be received and spent by the DEA ($480 million); the second largest planned intermediary for this spending was to be the State Department’s INL bureau (about $350 million).

Separate budget documents from the involved departments contain further detail on where and how international drug control funding is to be spent. For instance, the U.S. Department of State’s 2023 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR) showed that Latin America was budgeted to receive more than half ($225 million) of the total $375 million for “counternarcotics” requested by the department and its agencies (including INL and USAID). Colombia was to be the largest single country recipient ($115 million).

Aid donors (led by the U.S.) spent almost $1 billion of their ODA on “narcotics control” projects in dozens of low- and middle-income countries over the decade 2013-2022. No donor contributed more to these “narcotics control” budgets than the U.S.

Controversially, the U.S. has been increasingly classifying drug control spending as ODA: in 2020, it counted just over $30 million like this; in 2021 that figure was $309 million (and while it dropped to $106 million in 2022, this was still higher than earlier years).

Profit-making companies are also benefiting from this ODA spending on “narcotics control.” The top “channel” for this spending has been private companies (“private sector institutions,” receiving $244 million over the decade) followed by the governments of countries funded ($202 million), and then multilateral organisations such as UNODC ($77 million).

Harm Reduction International | Drug Policy Alliance, 2024. 47p.

By Christopher Blattman, Benjamin Lessing, and Santiago Tobón

Organised crime poses one of the greatest threats to national security and development in the 21st century. Despite this, most policy, data collection, and scholarly research focuses on individuals and disorganised violence. Our work addresses several critical gaps in knowledge:

• What are the incentives for gangs to engage in violence and socially costly behaviour?

• Which are the trade-offs that practitioners face when deciding how to engage with organised violence?

• What type of information do relevant decision-makers need to inform their policies?

• Which are the most relevant tools for tracking down gang behaviour and use of violence?

We address these questions in the context of Medellín, Colombia’s second largest and most important city. Over the past six years, our work has covered a broad methodological spectrum, including:

• qualitative data collection through interviews with dozens of criminals and criminal justice experts;

• quantitative data collection from thousands of citizens in surveys representative at highly localised levels;

• active collaboration with local relevant stakeholders such as the city administration and the local police department;

• quasi-experimental evaluations of long-running policies dating back to the 1980s; and

• experimental evaluations of marginal improvements in state presence in violent and gang controlled areas.

Our preliminary findings point to terrible trade-offs, where authorities face plausibly impossible questions when balancing short-term gains in violence reduction and sacrifices in state legitimacy, with long-term uncertainty concerning both violence and state legitimacy. We highlight preliminary recommendations for guiding policy decisions.

Birmingham, UK: The Serious Organised Crime & Anti-Corruption Evidence (SOC ACE) 2022. 9p.

By Charles C. Lanfear, Ross L. Matsueda, and Lindsey R. Beach

An important criminological controversy concerns the proper causal relationships between disorder, informal social control, and crime. The broken windows thesis posits that neighborhood disorder increases crime directly and indirectly by undermining neighborhood informal social control. Theories of collective efficacy argue that the association between neighborhood disorder and crime is spurious because of the confounding variable informal social control. We review the recent empirical research on this question, which uses disparate methods, including field experiments and different models for observational data. To evaluate the causal claims made in these studies, we use a potential outcomes framework of causality. We conclude that, although there is some evidence for both broken windows and informal control theories, there is little consensus in the present research literature. Furthermore, at present, most studies do not establish causality in a strong way.

Annual Review of Criminology, Vol. 3 (2020), pp. 97–120

By: Arantza Alonso Berbotto and Spencer Chainey

The theft of refined oil products provides criminal groups with significant financial resources that threaten the environment and socio-economic stability of countries where it occurs. Violence is also associated with this criminal activity. Using crime script analysis, a detailed interpretation of the theft of oil via the illegal tapping of pipelines in Mexico was constructed. The analysis revealed the roles performed by members of criminal groups, the recruitment of individuals outside of the criminal group to provide information about the pipelines and perform technical activities, and the supporting role of citizens and businesses from local communities. The analysis also revealed the decision-making necessary for the successful commission of oil theft via the illegal tapping of pipelines. The use of situational crime prevention measures and improvements in the use of deterrence are identified as offering opportunities for preventing this criminal activity.

GLOBAL CRIME 2021, VOL. 22, NO. 4, 265–287https://doi.org/10.1080/17440572.2021.1925552© 2021

By: Lauren Stienstra, Diane P. Horn, Erica A. Lee, Bruce R. Lindsay, William L. Painter, Elizabeth M. Webster

On October 9, 2024, Hurricane Milton made landfall as a Category 4 hurricane in Florida’s Tampa Bay area bringing heavy rain, storm surge, and floods to many counties on the coast and in the interior of the state. Some areas in the state are still actively recovering from Hurricane Helene.

President Biden had previously issued an emergency declaration for this storm on October 7, under the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (the Stafford Act, P.L. 93-288, as amended; 42 U.S.C. §§5121 et seq.), authorizing Public Assistance (PA) for emergency protective measures put into action beginning October 5, 2024. On October 8, 2024, President Biden issued another emergency declaration authorizing federal assistance to Seminole Tribe of Florida.

As of October 11, President Biden declared a major disaster for Hurricane Milton in Florida, authorizing PA, Individual Assistance, and Hazard Mitigation Assistance. President Biden also increased the federal share of eligible response costs; the federal government will cover 100% of eligible costs of PA provided for emergency protective measures and debris removal for a period of 90 days.

The situation remains dynamic; additional declarations, or additional forms of assistance are expected given Milton’s impact.

Information about state and county disaster assistance is published in FEMA’s declaration database. FEMA’s Hurricane Milton web page provides information on how to apply for disaster assistance. FEMA has also created another site to dispel rumors and misinformation related to aid to survivors, evacuation, and relief funding.

CRS Insight, IN12438; Oct. 13, 2024

By: Kacper Choromański

Bloodstain pattern analysis is inseparably present in forensic genetics, crime scene investigation, the examination of evidence, and paper casework. It times of pandemic related to COVID-19 it is crucial to be aware of obstacles, barriers, and threats that await every expert who deals with forensic biological material. This new situation is an excellent time to go back and point out what are the primary guidelines that reduce the contamination of evidence and increase the protection of practitioners and experts during their work. Some evident principles that exist during crime scene investigation should be used in a more safe environment. The main goal of this article is to show what is the primary indicator that will help to reduce the danger of contamination by Coronavirus Diseases (COVID-19) during the prosecution of work. Bloodstain pattern analysis is a vast discipline. Other experts can use guidelines that will be shown in this article. Numerous forensic fields can benefit from this information. Subjects such as fingerprint, trace evidence, ballistics, forensic genetics, an examination of the evidence on a crime scene or during paper casework, even handwriting during crime scene investigation.

International Journal of Legal Studies No 1(7)2020 ISSN 2543-7097

By: Lauren R. Stienstra, Diana P. Horn. Erica A. Lee, Bruce R. Lindsay, William L. Painter, and Elizabeth M. Webster

Before midnight on September 26, 2024, Hurricane Helene made landfall as a Category 4 major hurricane in northwestern Florida in the Big Bend area of the Gulf Coast, later bringing heavy rain and floods to many states in the southern Appalachian region.

President Biden had issued emergency declarations under the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (the Stafford Act, P.L. 93-288, as amended; 42 U.S.C. §§5121 et seq.) for Florida, Alabama, Georgia, South Carolina, North Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia authorizing Public Assistance (PA) for emergency protective measures to support mass care, and Individual Assistance (IA) for Florida, North Carolina, and South Carolina.

Beginning on Sept. 29th, President Biden began issuing major disaster declarations superseding many of these earlier emergency declarations, as follows:

• Florida Hurricane Helene (DR-4828-FL), authorizing IA; PA for emergency protective measures and debris removal; and Hazard Mitigation Assistance;

• North Carolina Tropical Storm Helene (DR-4827-NC), authorizing PA for debris removal, emergency protective measures, and repair and replacement of eligible public and nonprofit facilities, and Hazard Mitigation Assistance;

• South Carolina Hurricane Helene (DR-4829-SC), authorizing IA; PA for emergency protective measures and debris removal; and Hazard Mitigation Assistance;

• Georgia Hurricane Helene (DR-4830-GA), authorizing IA; PA for emergency protective measures and debris removal; and Hazard Mitigation Assistance;

• Virginia Tropical Storm Helene (DR-4831-VA), authorizing IA; PA for emergency protective measures and debris removal; and Hazard Mitigation Assistance; and

• Tennessee Tropical Storm Helene (DR-4832-TN) authorizing IA; PA for emergency protective measures and debris removal; and Hazard Mitigation Assistance

The situation remains dynamic; additional declarations, including for other states and designated areas (counties), or additional forms of assistance may be forthcoming. Existing major disaster declarations and potential major disaster declarations for Hurricane Helene may authorize FEMA to provide a suite of disaster assistance programs, including Individual Assistance, Public Assistance, and Hazard Mitigation Assistance.

Information about state and county disaster assistance authorizations is published in FEMA’s declaration database.

FEMA’s Hurricane Helene webpage provides information on and directions to apply for disaster assistance.

Congressional Research Service, 2024

By: Roy E. Wright, Jeff Byard, Craig Colten, Tracey Kijewski-Correa, J. Marshall Shepard, James M. Shultz, Chauncia Willis-Johnson

Experiencing a single disaster - a hurricane, tornado, flood, severe winter storm, or a global pandemic - can wreak havoc on the lives and livelihoods of individuals, families, communities and entire regions. For many people who live in communities in the U.S. Gulf of Mexico region, the reality of disaster is starker. Endemic socioeconomic and health disparities have made many living in Gulf of Mexico communities particularly vulnerable to the effects of weather-climate hazards. Prolonged disaster recovery and increasing disaster risk is an enduring reality for many living in Gulf of Mexico communities. Between 2020 and 2021, seven major hurricanes and a severe winter storm affected communities across the region. As a backdrop to these acute weather events, the global COVID-19 pandemic was unfolding, producing a complex and unprecedented public health and socioeconomic crisis.

Traditionally, the impacts of disasters are quantified individually and often in economic terms of property damage and loss. In this case, each of these major events occurring in the Gulf of Mexico during this time period subsequently earned the moniker of "billion-dollar" disaster. However, this characterization does not reflect the non-financial human toll and disparate effects caused by multiple disruptive events that increase underlying physical and social vulnerabilities, reduce adaptive capacities and ultimately make communities more sensitive to the effects of future disruptive events. This report explores the interconnections, impacts, and lessons learned of compounding disasters that impair resilience, response, and recovery efforts. While Compounding Disasters in Gulf Coast Communities, 2020-2021 focuses on the Gulf of Mexico region, its findings apply to any region that has similar vulnerabilities and that is frequently at risk for disasters.

National Academies Press, 2024

By: Steven Teutsch, Yasmin Hurd, and Elizabeth Boyle

The landscape of cannabis legalization in the United States has been changing dramatically. Cannabis is now available throughout the United States, with policies that vary significantly in terms of public health protection. In most states, legalization occurred through ballot initiatives and public ad campaigns often financed by wealthy donors. Voters acknowledged cannabis’s widespread use, its large illegal market, the criminalization of seemingly minor infractions, and discrimination in enforcement. Today, changes in the classification of cannabis under the federal Controlled Substances Act are pending, as is a possible change in the definition of “hemp.” These sweeping changes are occurring when many of the health consequences of cannabinoids remain quite uncertain. And those changes are coupled with a disturbing legacy of discrimination during the “war on drugs,” with associated devastating consequences for individuals and communities of color in particular. The legalization of an increasingly powerful intoxicating drug has necessitated a greater fusion of public health and drug policy in the states.

In the face of this complexity, how, then, is one to assess the consequences of the changes in cannabis policy for public health and social equity? This was the charge to the Committee on the Public Health Consequences of Changes in the Cannabis Landscape. The 2017 report of the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, The Health Effects of Cannabis and Cannabinoids: The Current State of Evidence and Recommendations for Research, focuses on the health effects and potential therapeutic benefits of cannabis, noting the paucity of high-quality studies on its health effects. Regrettably, little has changed in this regard since that report was published, and scant to no research exists on the explosion of new cannabis and cannabinoid products. The present report focuses on the public health consequences of cannabis policies that have not been examined by the National Academies.

States have received little federal guidance on how to proceed regarding the health impact of cannabis on the public and communities. Other than two memoranda deferring to states, the federal government has been noticeably missing from this dialogue. Yet cannabis can cause real harms, as multiple investigators, families, and various groups attested to our committee. The tools of public health—assessment, policy development, and assurance—can provide the critical health information decision-makers need to protect the public health and make amends for past cannabis-related inequities, but those tools are only slowly being applied.

With legalization by states now widespread, it is time to ask about its impact, especially given the large variation in state policies. These natural experiments provide a rich but very complex set of experiences for analysis, but these policies are all of relatively recent vintage. Consequently, available products, use patterns, and markets have not yet stabilized. Facing these challenges, the committee reviewed what is known about these policies, formulated recommendations where possible, and delineated a path forward. With a strong commitment to policy research and the application of traditional public health tools, we fully anticipate that better and more consistent policies will unfold.

This report would not have been possible without the deep expertise, wide range of perspectives, and strong commitment of all the committee members. Elizabeth Boyle, study director, and her National Academies colleagues, Khala Hurst-Beatty, Alexandra McKay, and Mia Saltrelli, labored long and hard to tie together all the disparate pieces of this report. We are deeply grateful to all of them. Lastly, we want to express our appreciation to our sponsors, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and the National Institutes of Health, without whose vision this study would not have been possible.

The National Academies Press 2024

By Renato Molina, Juan Carlos Villaseñor-Derbez, Gavin McDonald, Grant McDermott

Maritime transport has been historically susceptible to piracy. While broad assessments suggest the impact of modern piracy causes large economic losses, the literature lacks quantification of the magnitude of the costs and the behavioral responses that underpin them. Here, we combine theory and a unique geospatial dataset combining more than 25 million shipping voyages and thousands of pirate encounters across the globe to find that pirate encounters lead to significant and costly avoidance measures. Shippers modify their path along a route to avoid locations with known pirate encounters. This increases voyage distance and duration, which lead to significant increases in fuel and labor costs estimated to be over US$1.5 billion/year. Additionally, emission of CO2, NOx, and SOx due to increased fuel consumption results in environmental damages valued at US$5.1 billion per year. Together, our results provide the first global estimates linking the presence of pirates to individual behaviour and aggregate transportation cost, as well as its environmental impact, with major implications for the shipping industry and maritime security at a global scale.

CESifo Working Paper No. 11077, Munich: Munich Society for the Promotion of Economic Research - CESifo , 2024. 72p.

By David Weisburd, Clair V. Uding, Kiseong Kuen, Beidi Dong

Criminologists have long known that crime is highly concentrated—in most cities, approximately 50% of crime happens on only 5% of streets. As a result, many cities have effectively reduced crime by concentrating police resources in extremely high-crime “hot-spots.” Despite calls for defunding the police, policing is necessary for public safety on hot-spot streets, and people who live on these streets recognize that. Indeed, in one survey in Phoenix, Arizona, the majority of residents of hot-spots streets said they wanted the amount of police on their block to be increased. But ultimately, the bedrock of social control of crime is not the police, but citizens who exercise informal social control. The practice of community policing—which emphasizes building relationships with members of the community and allowing them to have a voice in defining which problems police should focus on—attempts to leverage this fact to enhance public safety. However, it is often assumed that high-crime hot spots are simply so chaotic and disordered that the residents are incapable of playing a key role in crime prevention.

We examined this assumption through a multiyear study of more than 300 hot-spot streets in Baltimore, Maryland (all of which were in the top 3% in rates of violent or drug crime in the city), as well as almost 50 “cold” streets, which had little to no crime, and 100 “cool” streets, which fell in the middle. We found that common assumptions about hot spots—which we shared at the outset—are not accurate. Residents of hot-spot streets in Baltimore have strong social and network ties with their neighbors, and they exercise meaningful levels of informal social control. Even on the most crime ridden blocks, there is potential for collaboration between residents and police. Our findings suggest that it is time to think about how both informal and formal social control can work interactively to reduce crime. Hot-spots policing is an important first step, because the level of danger in these places can simply make it too dangerous for residents to exercise the type of informal social control that they would like. But residents of these streets, contrary to stereotypes of academics, policymakers, and practitioners, form an important resource for reducing crime on these streets through informal social control.

New York: The Manhattan Institute, 2024. 18p,

Edited by Marian Stamp Dawkins & Morris Gosling

Introduction: The document discusses the ethical considerations in animal behavior research, emphasizing the responsibility of scientists to minimize animal suffering and support conservation efforts.

Guidelines: It includes updated guidelines for the use of animals in research, focusing on reducing the number of animals used, assessingpain, and ensuring proper care and housing.

Ethical Issues: Specific ethical issues are addressed, such as the use ofanimals in studies of predation, aggression, and infanticide, and theimportance of minimizing suffering in field experiments.

References: The document contains numerous references to other works and guidelines related to animal welfare and research ethics.

Academic Press, 1992, 64 pages

By Christian Nellemann, Rune Henriksen, Arnold Kreilhuber, Davyth Stewart , Maria Kotsovou, Patricia Raxter, Elizabeth Mrema & Sam Barrat

Environmental Crime Growth: Environmental crimes are expanding rapidly, with an estimated annual value of $91-258 billion, growing 2-3 times faster than the global economy.

Impact on Ecosystems: These crimes endanger entire ecosystems,wildlife populations, and sustainable livelihoods, causing significant environmental and economic damage.

Transnational Organized Crime: Criminal networks are increasingly involved in environmental crimes,shifting focus from traditional crime to illegal activities like hazardous waste trafficking and illegal logging.

Need for Coordinated Response: Effective combat against environmental crimes requires coordinated international efforts,significant donor support, and cross-agency collaboration.

United Nations Environment Programme, 2016, 104 pages

BY Kirsten Eddy, Michael Lipka, Katerina Eva Matsa, Naomi Forman-Katz, Sarah Naseer, Christopher St. Aubin and Elisa Shearer

The more news about crime that Americans receive, the more likely they are to be concerned, angry or feel personally at risk, but large numbers of people are dissatisfied with the local crime news they get and just as many people get information about crime trends from people they know as from local news outlets, a new Pew Research Center report from the Pew-Knight Initiative has found.

The report, based on a survey in January of more than 5,000 randomly selected adults, found there is little difference between Republicans and Democrats in how they consume local crime information and how concerned they are about it, but Republicans are more likely than Democrats to view violent crime as a very big problem for the country as a whole, the study found.

While most respondents expressed interest in learning the details of crimes, tips about how to stay safe, and broader patterns in local crime, few of those who were interested said it is easy to find news and information about each topic

Washington, DC: Pew Research Center 2024, 47p.

By U.S. Department of Justice Office of Justice Programs

The First Step Act of 2018 (FSA) mandated the development and implementation of a risk and needs assessment system in the Federal Bureau of Prisons (FBOP). The FSA also required that the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) review, validate, and publicly release the risk and needs assessment system on an annual basis. The National Institute of Justice (NIJ) contracted with Dr. Rhys Hester and Dr. Ryan Labrecque as consultants for the annual review and revalidation of the Prisoner Assessment Tool Targeting Estimated Risk and Needs (PATTERN). This document is the fourth review and revalidation report, following USDOJ (2021a), USDOJ (2021b), and USDOJ (2023). The previous review and revalidation reports included FBOP release cohorts from fiscal year (FY) 2009 through FY 2018. The current report analyzes a subsequent cohort of FY 2019 FBOP releasees and evaluates PATTERN for its predictive accuracy, dynamic validity, and racial and ethnic neutrality, as mandated by the FSA. This study analyzes one-, two-, and three-year recidivism outcomes, assesses what proportions of change in risk scores and levels are influenced by the current age item, and provides additional descriptive information on individual items, risk scores and levels, and outcomes by race and ethnic group. Finally, this report provides updates on the actions taken by NIJ and DOJ in the past year and the ongoing efforts to review and improve PATTERN. The FY 2019 cohort study finds that PATTERN remains a strong and valid predictor of general and violent recidivism at the one-, two-, and three-year follow-up periods, with Area Under the Curve (AUC) statistics ranging from .745 to .776. Comparisons of recidivism rates by risk level category (RLC) and predictive value analyses by risk level grouping also continue to indicate that such risk level designations provide meaningful distinctions of recidivism risk. In addition, individuals can change their risk scores and levels during confinement beyond mere age effects. Those who reduced their RLC from first to last assessment were shown to have the lowest recidivism rates, followed by those who maintained the same risk level and those with a higher risk level, respectively. While the findings continue to indicate PATTERN’s accuracy across the five racial and ethnic groups analyzed, there remains evidence that the instruments predict differently across those groups, including overprediction of risk of Black, Hispanic, and Asian males and females, relative to White individuals, on the general recidivism tools.

Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice Office of Justice Programs 2024. 36p.

By Janique Kroese, Wim Bernasco, Aart C. Liefbroer, Jan Rouwendal

Studies investigating the role of single-parent families in adolescent delinquency have seldom differentiated between types of single-parent families. Furthermore, they have typically assumed that parental disruption is a discrete event marking an abrupt change between dual-parenthood and single-parenthood. Using Dutch longitudinal population register data, we estimated fixed-effects panel models to assess (1) whether the event of parental disruption, either by parental separation or by parental death, increases subsequent adolescent delinquency and (2) whether parental disruption, either by parental separation or by parental death, has anticipatory, immediate, or delayed effects on adolescent delinquency. Our results showed that both parental separation and parental death seem to boost adolescent delinquency, and we found no difference between these types of single-parent families. However, when distinguishing between anticipatory, short-term, and long-term effects, we found a short-term increase in adolescent delinquency after a parental separation and an anticipatory reduction in adolescent delinquency before a parental death. Future research should pay more attention to diversity in the composition of single parent families, as well as to the anticipatory, short-term, and long-term consequences.

Journal of Developmental and Life-Course Criminology (2024) 10:288–308

By Miguel Basto-Pereira, David P. Farrington, Laura Maciel

This work aims to investigate the role of sequences of risk factors from childhood to young adulthood in predicting subsequent criminal convictions. This study uses the Cambridge Study in Delinquent Development (CSDD) dataset, a prospective longitudinal research study that followed 411 males from South London from the age of 8 to 61 years. Temporal sequences of risk factors at ages 8–10, 12–14, and 16–18 were analyzed as predictors of subsequent criminal convictions up to the age of 61. Risk factors related to poverty, parenting problems, and children’s risk-taking predisposition at ages 8–10 emerged as prevalent starting points for the most highly predictive developmental sequences leading to convictions. The risk of a criminal conviction significantly increased if these risk factors were followed by low IQ scores or association with delinquent friends at ages 12–14, and by school and professional problems or drug addiction during late adolescence (ages 16–18). At each developmental stage, specific risk factors intricately combine to form chains of risk during development, subsequently predicting criminal convictions. A trajectory-of-risk-need-responsivity approach that identifies and breaks chains of risk factors that generate and enhance favorable conditions for criminal convictions is discussed.

Journal of Developmental and Life-Course Criminology (2024) 10:242–264

By Corrie Williams, Tara Renae McGee, Shannon Walding, Christine E. W. Bond

While conduct problem behaviour initiated in early childhood often escalates in frequency and seriousness through adolescence, a notable deceleration is typically seen by mid-adolescence. It has been hypothesised that prosocial behaviour, characterised by acts like sharing and comforting, may play a role in this deceleration. However, there is a distinct gap in the current literature when it comes to understanding the temporal dynamics between the acceleration of prosocial behaviours and the deceleration of conduct problem behaviour. This study seeks to bridge this gap. Using a General Cross-Lagged Panel Model (GCLM) and data from the Longitudinal Study of Australian Children (LSAC), we investigated temporal dynamics and sequence of how the acceleration of prosocial behaviour influences the deceleration of conduct problem behaviour between ages 4 and 15. Results indicate that increases in prosocial behaviour facilitate the deceleration of conduct problem behaviour, with increases in prosocial behaviour preceding decreases in conduct problem behaviour. Further, we show a cumulative effect of increases in prosocial behaviour on decreases in conduct problem behaviour over time. This knowledge provides a foundation for understanding how timely prevention and intervention strategies that include the mechanisms for increasing prosocial behaviour may interrupt the con duct problem behaviour trajectories of children and adolescents.

Journal of Developmental and Life-Course Criminology (2024) 10:169–192

By The Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA), U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS),

Substance use and mental health issues have significant impacts on individuals, families, communities, and societies. The National Survey on Drug Use and Health (NSDUH), conducted annually by the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA), provides nationally representative data on the use of tobacco, alcohol, and other substances including illicit drugs; substance use disorders; receipt of substance use treatment; mental health issues; and receipt of mental health treatment among the civilian, noninstitutionalized population aged 12 or older in the United States. NSDUH estimates allow researchers, clinicians, policymakers, and the general public to better understand and improve the nation’s behavioral health. SAMHSA is steadfast in its efforts to advance the health of the nation while also promoting equity. Therefore, this report, based on 2023 NSDUH data, contains findings on key substance use and mental health indicators in the United States by race or ethnicity. The 2021 to 2023 NSDUHs used multimode data collection, in which respondents completed the survey in person or via the web. Methodological investigations led to the conclusion that estimates based on multimode data collection in 2021 and subsequent years are not comparable with estimates from 2020 or prior years. Although estimates from 2021 to 2023 can be compared,6 this report presents NSDUH estimates from 2023 only. Results from the 2023 National Survey on Drug Use and Health: Detailed Tables show comprehensive estimates related to substance use and mental health for 2022 and 2023. The 2023 Companion Infographic Report: Results from the 2021, 2022, and 2023 National Surveys on Drug Use and Health shows comparisons of selected estimates from 2021 to 2023. Behavioral Health by Race and Ethnicity: Results from the 2021-2023 National Surveys on Drug Use and Health shows comparisons of selected estimates for racial or ethnic groups using pooled data from the 2021 to 2023 NSDUHs to increase the precision of estimates. Survey Background NSDUH is an annual survey sponsored by SAMHSA within the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). NSDUH covers residents of households and people in noninstitutional group settings (e.g., shelters, boarding houses, college dormitories, migratory workers’ camps, halfway houses). The survey excludes people with no fixed address (e.g., people who are homeless and not in shelters), military personnel on active duty, and residents of institutional group settings, such as jails, nursing homes, mental health institutions, and long-term care hospitals.

Washington, DC: Center for Behavioral Health Statistics and Quality, Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration.

Edited by Diana Maltz

In 1896, author Arthur Morrison gained notoriety for his bleak and violent ‘A Child of the Jago’, a slum novel that captured the desperate struggle to survive among London’s poorest. When a reviewer accused Morrison of exaggerating the depravity of the neighborhood on which the Jago was based, he incited the era’s most contentious public debate about the purpose of realism and the responsibilities of the novelist. In his self-defense and his wider body of work, Morrison demonstrated not only his investments as a formal artist but also his awareness of social questions. As the first critical essay collection on Arthur Morrison and the East End, this book assesses Morrison’s contributions to late-Victorian culture, especially discourses around English working-class life. Chapters evaluate Morrison in the context of Victorian criminality, child welfare, disability, housing, professionalism, and slum photography. Morrison’s works are also reexamined in the light of writings by Sir Walter Besant, Clementina Black, Charles Booth, Charles Dickens, George Gissing, and Margaret Harkness. This volume features an introduction and 11 chapters by preeminent and emerging scholars of the East End. They employ a variety of critical methodologies, drawing on their respective expertise in literature, history, art history, sociology, and geography. Critical Essays on Arthur Morrison and the East End throws fresh new light on this innovative novelist of poverty and urban life.

Abingdon, Oxon, UK: New York: Routledge, 2022.