By Hai V. Nguyen, Shweta Mital, Shawn Bugden, Pharm; et al

Importance British Columbia, Canada, was the first and only jurisdiction globally to implement a province-wide safer supply policy, which offered pharmaceutical grade opioids to individuals at risk of opioid overdose, followed by the decriminalization of drug possession. Supporters of the safer supply policy argue that this policy could save lives by offering pharmaceutical-grade opioids to people who use toxic street drugs. Similarly, proponents of decriminalization suggest that decriminalizing drug possession could reduce drug overdoses by reducing stigma associated with drug use and enabling persons who use drugs to seek addictions treatment. However, critics of both policies believe that providing safer opioids and removing penalties for drug possession may worsen the crisis. Currently, there is limited evidence on the health impacts of these policies.

Objective To assess the association of British Columbia’s adoption of the safer supply policy and subsequent decriminalization of drug possession with opioid overdose hospitalizations and deaths.

Design, Setting, and Participants This observational cohort study used synthetic difference-in-differences analysis with quarterly province-level data to compare prepolicy and postpolicy changes in British Columbia with those in other Canadian provinces that did not implement these policies. The study period spanned from quarter 1 of 2016 to quarter 4 of 2023.

Exposure Safer opioid supply policy implemented in March 2020 and decriminalization of drug possession implemented in January 2023.

Main Outcomes and Measures Opioid-poisoning hospitalizations and apparent opioid-related toxicity deaths, measured as number per 100 000 population.

Results The safer supply policy alone was associated with an increase of 1.66 opioid hospitalizations per 100 000 population (95% CI, 0.41-2.92; P = .009) or 33%. The addition of drug possession decriminalization was associated with a further increase of 1.27 opioid hospitalizations per 100 000 population (95% CI, 0.05-2.50; P = .046) for an overall 58% increase compared with the period before the safer supply policy was in effect. There was insufficient evidence to conclusively attribute an increase in opioid overdose deaths to these policy changes.

Conclusions and Relevance This cohort study found that neither the safer supply policy nor the subsequent decriminalization of drug possession appeared to alleviate the opioid crisis. Instead, both were associated with an increase in opioid overdose hospitalizations. The observed increase in opioid hospitalizations, without a corresponding increase in opioid deaths, may reflect greater willingness to seek medical assistance because decriminalization could reduce the stigma associated with drug use. However, it is also possible that reduced stigma and removal of criminal penalties facilitated the diversion of safer opioids, contributing to increased hospitalizations.

By David Powell; Mireille Jacobson

IMPORTANCE Illicit opioids, particularly illicitly manufactured fentanyl (IMF), are major contributors to overdose deaths in the US. Understanding the prevalence and characteristics of illicit opioid use is crucial for addressing the opioid crisis. OBJECTIVE To estimate the prevalence of illicit opioid use, including IMF, and initial opioid exposure among those reporting illicit opioid use. DESIGN, SETTING, AND PARTICIPANTS This cross-sectional study was conducted using an online survey with targeted demographic quotas from June 10, 2024, to June 17, 2024. A total of 1515 participants aged 18 years and older from the US completed the survey. The analysis was conducted between June 30, 2024, and February 13, 2025. MAIN OUTCOMES AND MEASURES The primary outcome was self-reported illicit opioid use within the past 12 months. Secondary outcomes included initial exposure to opioids and perceived likelihood of overdose. Logistic regression was used to analyze associations with demographic and geographic factors. RESULTS A total of 1515 respondents completed the survey, including 770 female individuals (50.8%), 20 American Indian or Alaska Native (1.3%), 101 Asian or Pacific Islander (6.7%), 215 Black (14.2%), 1087 White (81.7%), and 24 multiracial (1.6%); 186 (12.3%) were aged 18 to 24, 242 (16.0%) 25 to 34, 327 (21.6%) 35 to 44, 280 (18.5%) 45 to 54, 281 (18.5%) 55 to 64, 139 (9.2%) 65 to 74, and 60 (4.0%) 75 to 84 years. Among this sample, 166 (10.96%; 95% CI, 9.38%-12.52%) reported nonprescription opioid use within the past 12 months, including 114 (7.52%; 95% CI, 6.20%-8.85%) of the 1515 respondents reporting IMF use. Among those reporting nonprescription opioid use within the past 12 months, 65 (39.16%; 95% CI, 31.73%-46.58%) reported that their first opioid use involved opioids prescribed to them, whereas 60 (36.14%; 95% CI, 28.84%-43.45%) reported that their first use involved prescription opioids not prescribed to them. Only 41 (24.70%; 95% CI, 18.14%-31.26%) answered that their first exposure involved illicit opioids. Seventy-one (4.69%; 95% CI, 3.62%-5.75%) of all respondents reported that it was very likely they would have an overdose due to opioid use. This rate increased to 33.33% (95% CI, 24.68%-41.99%) among those who had used IMF within the past 12 months. Illicit opioid use was higher among men, Black respondents, and younger age groups. CONCLUSIONS AND RELEVANCE The findings of this cross-sectional study indicate a higher prevalence of illicit opioid use than previously reported, highlighting the need for more timely and accurate data to inform policy and intervention strategies.

JAMA Health Forum; 2025

By Jonathan P. Caulkins, Bishu Giri

Illegally manufactured fentanyl (IMF) kills enormous numbers of people in the U.S. and Canada. Since the emergence of modern heroin markets in the late 1960s, supply control has been associated with meaningful reductions in opioid use and harms in at least six cases worldwide. However, countering supply effectively depends on understanding what the dominant drug-trafficking routes are. New data on fentanyl seizures presented here largely reinforce previous understanding that most IMF enters the U.S. from the south. These data call into question tariffs and other policies and policy justifications that treat the threat from the northern border as comparably severe.

U.S. counties bordering Mexico and Canada show significantly higher rates of large fentanyl seizures, compared with counties that do not border our foreign neighbors—where “large” is defined as over a kilogram of powder or more than 1,000 pills, quantities indicative of wholesale trafficking. The 80 counties along the land borders recorded 2,461 large seizures between 2013 and 2024, averaging about 31 per county, while the other 3,064 counties documented 12,358 seizures, averaging only 4 per county. By weight, of all the fentanyl in those big land-border seizures in 2013–24, about 99% of the pills and 97% of the powder were found along the border with Mexico; by comparison, large seizures along the Canadian border are relatively rare. If we look at the recent years—2023 and 2024—distributions remain the same. San Diego County, California, leads in powder-form large fentanyl seizures; and Pima County, Arizona, records the highest volume of pill-form large fentanyl seizures.Drugs seized could be in transit to other places, or they might be intended for local consumption. Therefore, it is useful to contrast a county’s share of large seizures with its share of the population, which serves as a proxy for the size of the local market. Counties along the Mexican border account for only 2.35% of the U.S. population; but in 2023–24, they hosted about 40% of the nationwide quantity of fentanyl appearing in large seizures, for both powder and pills. By contrast, counties in the lower 48 states that border Canada account for 3.1% of the U.S. population but only 1.2% of the powder and just 0.5% of the pills obtained in large seizures.

To determine which counties look like import or transit centers, we developed a Disproportionality Index (DI), which compares a county’s proportion of large seizures against its proportion of the national population. On that scale, 1.0 means that seizures are proportionate to local population; below 1.0 indicates less than expected; and over 1.0 indicates more seizures than expected. Because of random fluctuations, a county can be a bit above or below 1.0, but we consider DIs above 2.5 noteworthy.

The counties with the highest DIs for 2023–24 were along the U.S.–Mexican border. For example, Imperial County, California, had a DI of 111 for fentanyl pills and 100 for powder. In contrast, in the county along the Canadian border with the greatest number of large seizures (Wayne County, Michigan, home of Detroit), the DIs were 0.5 for pills and 1.9 for powder, yielding an average DI of less than 2.0.

Only three other counties or collections of counties along the Canadian border had an average DI greater than 1. One (Okanagan County, Washington) stemmed from drugs seized from a Mexican-led organized-crime group that was supplying populations near the Canadian border. Another cluster (Juneau and Ketchikan) was suggestive of Alaska markets possibly being supplied from Canada. The third (Whatcom County, Washington) was locally significant (DI of 2.2 for powder) but small overall (Whatcom County accounted for just 0.15% of total powder seized).

Efforts to counter drug flows need to be grounded in data. The analysis here contradicts views—such as those used to justify certain tariffs—that treat the flows across the southern and northern borders as being comparably important.[1]

New York: Manhattan Institute, 2025. 15p.

By Ainsley L. Mitchum, Sam Stevens, and Bayliss J. Camp

The present study builds upon prior work by Marowitz (1996) by examining the crash and recidivism risk of alcohol-focused versus drug-involved driving under the influence (DUI) offenders. Although drug-involved DUI offenders remain a relatively small proportion of all DUI offenders, this proportion is rising, as is the proportion of impaired-driving fatal crashes involving drugs. Using a cohort of offenders arrested during calendar years 2014 through 2017, comparisons were drawn for the one-year periods pre- and post-arrest. Drug-involved offenders tended to have more problematic driving histories in the year prior to their index offense, as compared to alcohol-focused offenders. Even taking account of these differences in pre-arrest behavior, drug-involved offenders continued to have more problematic driving in the year subsequent to their index offense: they were twice as likely to be involved in a crash, and approximately 30% more likely to recidivate. A particularly powerful predictor of recidivism was whether or not a pre-conviction administrative per se (APS) license suspension – only available in instances where an offender is above the per se blood alcohol concentration (BAC) limit, or refuses a chemical test – was imposed. Offenders convicted of a DUI offense, but against whom no APS license action was initiated, were more than three times as likely to recidivate compared to offenders against whom an APS action was taken.

Sacramento: California Office of Traffic Safety; 2025. 78p.

By U.S.-CHINA ECONOMIC AND SECURITY REVIEW COMMISSION

Summary:

This Commission Spotlight examines how China-linked scam centers are fueling corruption and violence in Southeast Asia, paving the way for greater Chinese influence in the region, and directly harming Americans in the process. Its findings are based on the Commission’s March 2025 hearing on “Crossroads of Competition: China in Southeast Asia and the Pacific Islands”; fact-finding trips to the Philippines, Indonesia, Vietnam, and Cambodia; and open source research.

Key Findings:

Chinese criminal networks operate industrial-scale scam centers across Southeast Asia that steal tens of billions of dollars annually from people around the world—a massive criminal enterprise that rivals the global drug trade in scale and sophistication.

The Chinese criminals behind scam centers have built ties—some overt, some deniable—to the Chinese government by embracing patriotic rhetoric, supporting China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and promoting pro-Beijing propaganda overseas. As a result, Chinese crime syndicates have expanded across Southeast Asia with, at a minimum, implicit backing from elements of the Chinese government.

The spread of China-linked scam compounds in Southeast Asia is fueling corruption and violence, promoting human trafficking, undermining the ability of governments in the region to control what happens in their territory, and promoting human trafficking.

China is exploiting the problem of scam compounds to increase its leverage over Southeast Asian governments, conduct intelligence and influence operations, and expand its security footprint in the region.

Beijing has selectively cracked down on scam centers that target Chinese victims, leading Chinese criminal organizations to conclude that they can make greater profits with lower risk by targeting citizens of wealthy countries such as the United States.

Americans are now among the top global targets of China-linked scam centers, with an estimated $5 billion lost to online scams in 2024 alone—a 42 percent increase over the previous year.

Washington, DC:

U.S.-CHINA ECONOMIC AND SECURITY REVIEW COMMISSION

2025. 12p.

Organized Crime and National Security in Spain:

Challenges and Responses

Edited by Andrés de Castro

This book offers an analysis of how organized crime operates in Spain and the security apparatus designed to contain it. Organized crime is currently one of the most serious security threats facing democratic societies. Despite its intense presence and the responses that states have articulated in recent decades, little attention has been paid to the measurement of the effectiveness of the means adopted to combat it. Thus, this volume delves into this issue and performs an analysis of the police dimension of the response to organized crime in Spain. Firstly, this volume describes the international phenomenon of organized crime and its evolution in Spain, and continues by analyzing the profile and the characteristics of the different police forces and their resources and capabilities. This book then discusses the consequences of the measures at international level, European Union level, and local level, in relation to other police forces. Finally, the volume addresses the legal and public policy efforts that Spanish Law Enforcement Agencies have made in supervising or regulating their own police forces, which is necessary to carry out a detailed analysis of the consequences on the presence and strength of organized crime in the structures, strategies and decisions that Spain adopted over the last decades. As a result, this book builds on and updates the previous work by international scholars and proposes an interesting methodology that can contribute to the advancement of security studies.

London; New York: Routledge, 2025. 265p.

Visions of Global Environmental Justice:

Comunidades Negras and the War on Drugs in Colombia

By Alexander Huezo

Focusing on the lived experiences of Afro-Colombians processing and resisting violence against their ecological communities, Visions of Global Environmental Justice employs accounts of the supernatural narratively and analytically to frame a contemporary struggle for environmental justice. The book applies Achille Mbembe’s theorization of necropolitics to the environmental racism of the US War on Drugs in Colombia, specifically the aerial eradication of coca in the comunidades negras of the Pacific Coast. Through critical examination and deconstruction of transnational mythmaking and local oral tradition, Visions of Global Environmental Justice illustrates that non/humans rendered expendable by US-driven drug (necro)politics are indispensable to both the conceptualization and the realization of environmental justice globally. Far from being a study singularly focused on the symptoms of environmental issues, this book creatively guides us toward a broader understanding of environmental racism and justice across geographic scales and non/human agencies.

Oakland, CA; University of California Press, 2025

Edited by Tony Roberts and Admire Mare

Media coverage and scholarly research on digital surveillance has focused primarily on the USA and Europe. Everyone knows about Cambridge Analytica’s social media surveillance; Edward Snowden’s revelations of the West’s mass internet and phone surveillance; and Pegasus Spyware’s mobile phone surveillance of activists, journalists, judges, and presidents across the world. Comparatively little is known about the millions of dollars now being spent on digital technologies for use in the illegal and illegitimate surveillance of citizens in Africa. In this open-access third volume of Bloomsbury’s Digital Africa series, a broad range of African and European scholars and practitioners map the development, procurement and (mis)use of the ever-expanding suite of digital surveillance and policing technologies across the continent. Drawing on the empirically rich, theoretically sophisticated research of the African Digital Rights Network, this book examines how public and private actors in Africa use spyware, mobile phone extraction, biometric and face recognition systems, and other technologies for smart-city and other social, and social-control, applications. Eight chapters examine eight African countries, and each of these begins with a thorough political history of the nature of surveillance there under colonial and post-liberation political settlements. This enables new analyses of the socio-cultural, political, and economic drivers and characteristics of contemporary digital surveillance in each country, all of which ultimately leads to concrete policy recommendations at local, national, and international levels. For its empirical richness and breadth, as well as its theoretical sophistication, Digital Surveillance in Africa is essential reading for anyone interested in contemporary African studies, and it is of keen interest to anyone concerned with how digital surveillance affects everyday lives across the world. The ebook editions of this book are available open access under a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 licence on bloomsburycollections.com.

London: Zed Books, 2025. 240p.

By Lisa Flowers

The digitalisation of courtrooms brings both opportunities and challenges to the judicial process, shaping our understandings of trials and their participants in a myriad of, at times, unexpected ways, and transforming how we participate in, attend, engage with, and consume trials. While digital tools offer potential benefits, they can also impact core aspects of judicial integrity, such as the conduct of legal proceedings and participants’ experiences, as well as introducing additional layers of complexity – sometimes problematic – in how trials are portrayed in popular culture. By exploring these developments, the book highlights the importance of a thoughtful approach to digital integration – one that carefully considers its implications for procedural fairness, public trust, and the perceived legitimacy of the legal system. The author examines the social construction of courts in the digital age, arguing that digitalisation is not merely transforming the tools of justice but also redefining the very essence of the justice experience and reshaping our perceptions of trials and their participants. The work will be a valuable resource for scholars and students in the social sciences, law and all those interested in digitalisation and society.

London; New York: Routledge, 2025. 166p.

By R.A.Duff*

Both the trial judge and the Court of Appeal seemed to base their view that a mistaken belief in consent must be reasonable if it is to secure an acquittal on evidential principles, not on the substantive principle that one who acts on an unreasonable belief really has the mens rea of rape. That mens rea consists, they agreed, in "the intention to do the prohibited act":" it involves an awareness of the woman's lack of consent, and is in principle negatived by any honest belief in consent. But proof of the fact of non-consensual intercourse creates a presumption that the defendant knew she did not consent, and casts on him the evidential burden of adducing evidence to rebut that presumption. "before any issue as to his state of mind can arise for the jury's consideration".' This burden is not discharged by "a bald assertion of belief for which the accused can indicate no reasonable ground"," but only by evidence of a reasonable belief: if such evidence is adduced, the prosecution must prove either that that belief was not honestly held or that it was not reasonable.

The Liverpool Law Review VoJ. III (2) 119811, 16p.

By Dr Anastasia Powell, Dr Nicola Henry, Dr Asher Flynn and Dr Emma Henderson

Since the 1980s, laws regulating the meaning and interpretation of sexual consent have been substantially reformed across Australian and international jurisdictions. Of particular note in an Australian context are the significant changes to the definition of consent introduced in Victoria in 2006 and 2007, which were primarily informed by the Victorian Law Reform Commission’s review of legislative provisions relating to sexual offences. In this article, we explore the persistence of traditional rape discourses in the courtroom following the 2007 Victorian reforms by examining meanings of ‘sex’ and ‘consent’ in a pilot sample of rape trials. Our analysis suggests that although deeply entrenched societal myths or discourses about rape continue to pervade Victorian courtrooms, there is some evidence of a shift towards a legal focus on the accused’s state of mind, in addition to that of the victim-complainant. This shift, however, is only prominent in cases in which the accused testifies. In light of these preliminary findings, we suggest that further comparative analyses of the qualitative impact of law reform on discursive constructions of ‘sex’ and ‘consent’ in rape trials may provide alternative measures of the impact of rape law reform.

Powell, A., Henry, N., Flynn, A. and Henderson, E. (in press, 2014). ‘Meanings of “Sex” and “Consent”: The Persistence of Rape Myths in Victorian Rape Law’, in Griffith Law Review, (accepted 10 January 2014), 1-38.

BY Richard Grelling.. Translated By Alexander Gray. Introduction by Colin Heston.

Richard Grelling’s The Crime (Das Verbrechen), translated into English by Alexander Gray and published in London and New York between 1917 and 1919, is conceived as both a moral successor and completion to his earlier pacifist landmark, J’Accuse!, written between August 1915 and November 1916. In creating this extended work, Grelling sought to underscore the causes of World War I and dissect the self-justifying rhetoric that sustained the conflict long after its outbreak. Volumes I and II lay foundational groundwork, tracing the immediate antecedents of the war: imperialist tendencies within Germany and, on the part of the opposing Entente powers, ostensibly defensive motives followed by trait protectionism.

Never before in the annals of humankind has a crime of such sweeping magnitude been committed—and seldom has its perpetration been met with denial so unashamed. Within the very citadels of reason and culture, a proud civilization unleashed catastrophe under the guise of necessity—only to scramble afterward in self-exculpation. It is in this spirit of moral defiance—standing firm against voices of dissent, even from one’s own kin—that The Crime is offered to you. In the trilogy’s third volume, Grelling moves beyond the origins of war into the heart of wartime rationalization, exposing the “war-aims” that enabled aggression to persist under the cloak of purpose. May this work cast a clear light upon the structures of self-deception that allowed the world’s descent, and may it stir an unyielding clarity in us to recognize—and reject—such patterns again.

Read-Me.Org Inc. New York-Philadelphia-Australia. 2025. 261p.

By Daniel M. Gerstein

his report is one in a series of analyses on the effects of emerging technologies on U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) missions and capabilities. As part of this work, the research team was charged with developing a technology and risk assessment methodology for evaluating emerging technologies and understanding their implications in a homeland security context. The methodology and analyses provide a basis for DHS to better understand the emerging technologies and the risks presented.

This report describes the implications that the metaverse could have on digital crimes that involve the targeting and exploitation of children. These digital crimes are already occurring and have affected and endangered many victims and families. In an immersive online environment, such as the metaverse, opportunities for criminal activity and exploitation aimed at children could expand further.

Key Findings

Metaverse technologies — which encompass artificial intelligence systems, immersive technologies, and enabling digital technologies — will likely continue to become more available, have greater capabilities, and cost less to obtain and use. As has been the case with other digital technologies, metaverse technologies likely will have few policy, legal, ethical, or regulatory impediments constraining their development or use.

The metaverse concept is at an inflection point. How it will expand, how large it will become, and whether will it become an expansive virtual world that directly competes with the physical world remain unanswered questions. The timelines for expansion of the metaverse also remain speculative and will largely depend on use case, demand, and market forces.

Both non-metaverse and metaverse platforms have been and will continue to be used effectively to target children. Furthermore, an overlap exists between non-metaverse and metaverse platform use in luring and victimizing children, which makes it impossible to delineate the share of these abhorrent behaviors ascribable to each.

The lack of legal frameworks for crimes involving the targeting and exploitation of children in online applications will likely continue to be an issue. Clear definitions for what constitute attacks in the metaverse are not available as they are in the physical world, which hinders investigations and prosecutions. Despite the known vulnerabilities and consequences, these platforms continue to be aggressively marketed to children.

As the metaverse grows, the potential of these platforms for targeting, luring, exploiting, and victimizing children through targeted criminal activity or child exploitation will likely also grow.

Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2025. 24p.

By Ronald V. Clarke and Phyllis A. Schultze

This guide, one of the Problem-Solving Tools Series, summarizes knowledge about information gathering and analysis techniques that might assist police at any of the four main stages of a problem-oriented project: scanning, analysis, response, and assessment. This tool takes the mystery out of conducting research on problems by helping the user to define their problem, use technology to conduct Internet searches, get advice from experts, visit libraries, and evaluate their primary sources of information. The guide offers helpful hints to understanding and identifying responses to problems based on the research gathered.

Problem-oriented policing focuses, one-by-one, on specific problems of crime and disorder with the intention of identifying and altering the particular factors giving rise to each problem. The problems addressed in problem-oriented policing tend not to be confined to just a few police jurisdictions, but are more widely experienced. It is therefore likely that some other agency has tried to solve the kind of problem that you are dealing with now. Or perhaps some researcher has studied a similar problem and learned things that might be useful to your work. You could save yourself a lot of time and effort by finding out what they did and why. In particular, you can learn which responses seemed to be effective and which were not. So long as they made available a written report of their work, this guide will help you discover what they did. Having found out what others have done, you cannot simply copy what they did. You will have to adapt any successful responses they used to your own situation. This guide does not tell you how to analyze and understand your own problem.† It will only help you to profit from the work of those who have dealt with a similar problem. It is designed to take you as quickly as possible to the information you need and to help you evaluate and make the best use of this information. In doing this, it assumes: • You are familiar with problem-oriented policing. The guide assumes that a problem-solving model, such as SARA (Scanning, Analysis, Response, Assessment), is guiding your project. The guide will assist you at the Analysis and Response stages by pointing you to the possible cause of the problem you are tackling and to the ways you might respond. • You are willing to consider new responses to the problem. Rarely does police enforcement alone solve a persisting problem. To bring a lasting improvement, it is almost always necessary to modify the conditions giving rise to the problem, such as a lack of security or surveillance. Whatever measures you adopt must be carefully matched to the nature of your problem. Many of the measures are likely to be outside your experience and, indeed, that of most police officers. So, you need to learn about the ones that have been successfully used before in dealing with the kind of problem you face. While it is not usually recommended that a police agency blindly adopt another agency's responses to a problem, neither is it a good idea to be blind to what others have done. The key is to understand whether lessons learned elsewhere would apply under the conditions that exist for your problem. • You have limited time. The guide assumes that you have limited time to research best practice and that you want results quickly. You are not writing an academic paper where you might be faulted for missing a particular article or book. You are simply trying to find information that will help you with the practical task of dealing with your problem. For this reason, the guide does not provide a comprehensive description of all information sources, whether on the Internet † or in libraries. † Comprehensive descriptions are provided by Benamati et al. (1998) and Nelson (1997). Rather, it is intended to help you find two main categories of information relevant to your task: (1) articles by researchers who have studied the problem you are facing and, (2) reports of police projects dealing with the problem. The first category of information will help you understand the factors giving rise to your problem; the second will help you find effective responses. Later in the project, you might wish • You have Internet access. Nowadays, it is very difficult to research a problem without having access to the Internet. The guide assumes that you have this access and that you are familiar with searching for information on the Internet. (Indeed, you might have found this guide on the Internet.) The computer you use will need † a copy of Adobe Reader, which allows you to read and download articles in portable document format (.pdf) that you find at websites on the Internet. Unless your computer has a high speed connection, this process of visiting websites and reading and downloading material can be slow and frustrating. Most computers in libraries have high speed connections and you can usually pay to obtain print copies of the material you have downloaded

Problem-Oriented Guides for Police Problem-Solving Tools Series No. 2

Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, 2005. 72p.

By Ashley Brown, Shane D. Johnson & Nilufer Tuptuk

Connected and Autonomous Vehicles (CAVs) integrate advanced communication and autonomous driving technologies, enabling them to operate independently or with minimal human intervention. Despite the anticipated benefits for transportation, CAVs could be vulnerable to a wide variety of crimes unless security and crime prevention measures are proactively integrated into the technologies enabling their operation. To understand the potential crime threats, an extensive scoping review was conducted, covering incidents reported in the news and media, along with academic articles from crime and cybersecurity research. A total of 70 news articles related to crime incidents were identified, along with 12 academic articles on crimes. In addition, the findings from 35 survey papers addressing security attacks against CAVs, along with 29 additional papers covering security attacks not addressed in those surveys were synthesised. A total of 22 crime threats were identified. A 2-day workshop with experts was then held to present the findings from the review, conduct a crime scenario development exercise to identify any crime threats that were not identified in the review, and to assess the identified crimes. During the workshop, experts generated 6 new crime scenarios, bringing the total to 28 crime threats. To identify and prioritise high-risk crimes for future work, the experts were then asked to rate the threats based on their anticipated harm, achievability, frequency, and defeat-ability. The crime threats with the highest risk ratings included illegal transportation, vehicle theft, vehicle part theft, ransom for financial gain, and vandalism. The implications of our findings for research, policy and practice are discussed. Crime Science, 2025. https://crimesciencejournal.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/s40163-025-00245-x

Crime Science, 14, Article number: 2 (2025), 39p.

By Melanie Fillmore

This three-article dissertation addresses how Indigenous and non-Indigenous state and non-state policy actors collaborating on Idaho missing and murdered Indigenous persons (MMIP) policy shift the Integrative Framework for Collaborative Governance (IFCG) policy context to the ‘third space of sovereignty’ (Bruyneel, 2007). In a space of competing narratives of authority across time, and space, paper one addresses how Indigenous and non-Indigenous policy actors are shaped by the “drivers” of collaboration. The second paper addresses three key configurations of collaborative governance regimes. The third paper reassesses the scope of Idaho MMIP through a comparison of MMIP cases in 2021 and 2023 as a policy impact. Findings suggest Indigenous policy actors develop consequential incentives, collaborative governance regimes, and assess the scope of MMIP to redefine missing within the‘third space of sovereignty’.

Boise, ID: Boise State University 2024. 179p.

By E. Lopez

With the holiday season upon us, shopping at store locations throughout the nation will increase. Bigger crowds are a welcome sight for retailers, but they also amplify concerns about shoplifting and the safety of the shopping experience for consumers and employees alike.

This report builds on a previous Council on Criminal Justice (CCJ) shoplifting report and CCJ’s ongoing crime trends reports by exploring recent trends in shoplifting for the nation’s three largest cities—Chicago, Los Angeles, and New York. It also examines seasonal trends for a sample of 23 cities and takes a closer look at shoplifting data available from the FBI.

Key Takeaways

Data collected through the fall of 2024 for Chicago, Los Angeles, and New York suggest that shoplifting levels remain higher than pre-2020 rates. Chicago, in particular, experienced notably elevated rates of reported shoplifting through the first 10 months of this year. In 2023, rates were 10% lower in Chicago, 87% higher in Los Angeles, and 55% higher in New York than in 2019.

Over the past several years, shoplifting rates were higher in November and December than they were during earlier months of the year, coinciding with increased in-person retail activity. Because shoplifting rates in a 23-city sample for the first half of 2024 are higher than in 2023, it is likely that the reported shoplifting rate for the full year will rise from 2023 to 2024.

Two national sources of law enforcement data on reported shoplifting—both available from the FBI—show different trends. Statistics from the Summary Reporting System (SRS) suggest that reported shoplifting in 2023 was the same level as in 2019. However, rates from the National Incident-Based Reporting System (NIBRS), show that shoplifting was 93% higher in 2023 than it was in 2019.

It is unclear why there is a sizable difference between these two sources. One possibility is that law enforcement agencies recently added to the group providing data through NIBRS reported disproportionally higher levels of shoplifting, even after adjusting for an increase in population coverage. Clear guidance from the FBI on the limitations of the data and the implications of using certain sources of FBI crime data is needed

Washington, DC: Council on Criminal Justice. 2024. 9p.

By Robin Joy

Routine Activity Theory, a criminological theory that describes the circumstances in which crime occurs, can be applied to crimes against vulnerable adults and the elderly. Using a variety of data sources this report examines this theory and finds: 1. Vulnerable Adults are more likely to be victimized by someone they know. 2. People charged with violating the Vulnerable Adult statutes have criminal histories that indicate a specialization in criminal activity, compared to those of the general offending population. 3. People charged with violating the Vulnerable Adult statutes are significantly older than the general offending population. 4. Most crimes against the vulnerable and the elderly take place in a private home. 5. The elderly are more likely to be victims of larceny, while the vulnerable adults are more likely to be victims of fraud. Routine Activity Theory can explain the victimization against the vulnerable and elderly. Using this framework, policy makers and stakeholders can begin to create policies and programs that can help keep vulnerable and elderly Vermonters safe.   

Montpelier, VT: Crime Research Group, 2022. 17p.

By Monica Weeber and Robin Joy

Summary • The 2023 retail theft charge filings are consistent with pre-COVID years. There is an increase in the number of felony retail theft charges filed. • Most felony retail theft charges are disposed as a felony. • Case backlogs can occur at all stages of the process, including apprehension, scheduling, and disposition. • 57.6% of repeat retail theft offenders re-offend with a new retail theft offense within 30 days of their first offense. • Restitution is ordered in approximately 8% of all retail theft cases.
 

• Straight sentences were the most common sentence for both misdemeanor and felony retail theft. The average minimum time for misdemeanor retail theft was .03 years (11 days) and for felony was .64 years (7.6 months).

Montpelier VT: Crime Research Group, 2024.   12p.

By Megan Novak

Domestic violence (DV) refers to a particular subset of offenses committed by household members, spouses (including ex- and common law spouses), children/stepchildren, or family members. While some domestic incidents involve non-violent offenses (e.g., identity theft, forgery, motor vehicle theft), this report focuses on violent offenses (e.g., murder, rape, assault) that occur during domestic incidents. Rather than report crimes as DV, NIBRS requires law enforcement to record the relationship of the victim to the offender. Incidents included in this report can be categorized as intimate partner violence (IPV) (i.e., violent offenses committed against a boyfriend/girlfriend, homosexual partner, spouse, ex-spouse, or common law spouse) and DV against children aged 18 and younger (i.e., violent offenses against a biological child, child of a boyfriend/girlfriend, or a stepchild). Annual reports will monitor trends related to the number of incidents each year, types and number of offenses committed, victim and offender demographics, victim-offender relationships, and arrestee information. 

Montpelier, VT: Crime Research Group, 2021. 9p.