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Posts in Crime & Criminology
Mapping and Profiling the Most Threatening Criminal Networks in Latin America and the Caribbean- EL PAcCTO

By Jeremy McDermott,  Steven Dudley


“Connections between European and Latin American criminal networks have surged in recent years, with drugs, gold, and human trafficking proving particularly lucrative in the European market.

The number of European citizens linked to criminal networks arrested in Latin America has increased significantly, especially in Colombia, Peru, Brazil, the Dominican Republic, and Argentina. The strengthening alliance between Latin American and European crime groups now poses a global threat.

Today’s Latin America’s major criminal networks, unlike the cartels of the 1980s, operate in a world of subcontracting. Groups, or nodes in the network, often specialize in specific roles or stages of the supply chain. If a node is targeted by law enforcement, the network can quickly adjust and reconfigure itself, ensuring efficiency and the uninterrupted flow of criminal commodities.

These networks pose a serious threat to the rule of law, subverting it by establishing social norms through violence to exercise control with different forms of criminal governance. In Latin America and the Caribbean, they pose the single biggest threat to democracy in the region, using corruption to penetrate the state, and violence where bribery fails. This means it is the primary motor for human rights abuses and homicides. Corruption, like cancer, is spreading through state institutions in many nations of the region. Additionally, these networks harm economic stability development, distorting local economies, deterring foreign investment and affecting international financing.

Studying these networks is crucial to understanding the flow of illicit goods from Latin America to Europe, and essential to crafting effective strategies to combat these structures. After an analysis of different variables such as their criminal economies, geographical distribution or state response, EL PACCTO 2.0 and InSight Crime, with the support of the European Multidisciplinary Platform Against Criminal Threats (EMPACT), particularly within the Operational Action 8.3, of the High Risk Criminal Networks EMPACT, have ranked the 28 most active or relevant high-risk criminal networks in Latin America and the Caribbean, identifying key factors about their operations that reveal potential opportunities for combating organized crime in the region. This work has direct implications for both Latin America and Europe.

The list ranges from criminal networks with thousands of members to small brokers or gangs operating in Latin American countries, Caribbean islands or in Central America. In addition, the current report has sought to identify the connections or influence that high-risk criminal networks may have in different countries. This has led to the creation of a specific file for each criminal network with a specific individual map. Likewise, an aggregate map of all the information on the 28 criminal networks has been designed to provide a global overview.”

Washington, DC: Insight Crime, 2025. 114p

CRIMINAL COEXISTENCE.  THE ILLICIT ECOSYSTEM OF THE SOUTHERN CONE’S TRIPLE BORDER 

By Renato Rivera Rhon | Gabriel Funari

The Southern Cone tri-border area —comprising Ciudad del Este (Paraguay), Foz do Iguaçu (Brazil) and Puerto Iguazú (Argentina)— constitutes one of the most distinctive cross-border spaces in South America. Its particular geographical configuration combines densely populated urban areas with strategic riverine zones that facilitate intense cross-border circulation. More than 650,000 inhabitants coexist in an integrated social space marked by intense movement of people and one of the most heavily used commercial routes on the continent.

Within this environment of high mobility and commercial dynamism, smuggling has consolidated itself as the principal structuring axis of illicit economies. Since the creation of the free trade zone in Ciudad del Este in 1995, the region became a re-export centre for products destined mainly for the Brazilian market. Cigarettes, electronic products and alcoholic beverages enter Brazil as contraband, mobilized by local family clans and transnational illicit networks.

The report identifies a criminal ecosystem of coexistence characterized by interdependence, profitability and the historical continuity of illicit markets, sustained by commercial free movement, corruption and institutional fragility. Unlike other border areas in South America, the tri-border area presents high levels of criminal activity but low levels of violence, without armed disputes over territorial control or manifestations of criminal governance based on extortion or systematic coercion.

The report analyses the evolution of organized crime in the region, from the era of the “comboios” to the specialization of riverine routes and the “ant smuggling” model. It also examines the presence of the Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC), which has consolidated control over clandestine ports in specific sectors of the Paraná River, without exercising generalized authority over the regional population.

Beyond smuggling, the report addresses cannabis trafficking produced in Paraguay, cocaine trafficking, arms trafficking and money laundering. Ciudad del Este emerges as a strategic financial node where commercial companies, real estate businesses, gambling houses and crypto-asset operations proliferate, facilitating the movement of illicit capital. The study also finds that the Argentinian side of the tri-border area has emerged as an increasingly prevalent smuggling hub over the past five years, generating new contraband routes and new security threats in the region.

The study is based on fieldwork and direct observation conducted in Ciudad del Este, Foz do Iguaçu and Puerto Iguazú, including interviews with members and former members of security forces, customs officials, judicial officials, academics and journalists specialized in the criminal dynamics of the tri-border area.

The Southern Cone tri-border area thus reveals a highly collaborative and adaptable criminal ecosystem, where smuggling functions as a base economy connecting flows, actors and routes used for drug trafficking, arms trafficking and other illegal goods. Its persistence is explained by its relatively non-violent character, informal regulation sustained by family clans and limited state capacities in the face of complex transnational dynamics.

Geneva: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime.. 2026. 31p.

Research review of the overarching guideline for sentencing offenders with mental disorders, developmental disorders, or neurological impairments

By 

The Sentencing Council (UK)

The Sentencing Council for England and Wales was established in April 2010 (under s118, of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009) in order to promote greater transparency and consistency in sentencing, while maintaining the independence of the judiciary. The Sentencing Council is an independent, non-departmental public body which is part of the Ministry of Justice’s (MoJ’s) family of arm’s-length bodies. The Sentencing Council has statutory duties to: • develop and issue sentencing guidelines and monitor their use • assess the effect of guidelines on sentencing practice • promote awareness among the public regarding the realities of sentencing, and publish information about sentencing practice in magistrates’ courts and the Crown Court The majority of sentencing guidelines issued by the Sentencing Council are ‘offence specific’, providing a step-by-step framework for sentencing a particular offence or group of offences. This begins with an initial assessment of seriousness where the sentencer will arrive at a sentence starting point outlined within the relevant guideline. The guideline then outlines possible aggravating and mitigating factors in relation to the offence or offender that a sentencer should consider, consideration of which may move the sentence starting point up or down. The guideline then provides guidance on a reduction for a guilty plea. The guideline may then include any other considerations that should be taken into account and finally the final sentence outcome. An example of an offence specific guideline can be seen for arson. Where there is no relevant offence specific guideline, the general guideline: overarching principles provides a sentencer with step-by-step guidance. The Sentencing Council also produces ‘overarching’ guidelines, which address specific issues that may arise across many different offences. These overarching guidelines do not typically follow the same format as offence guidelines. They instead contain guidance that can be applied across a range of offences and are expected to be used in conjunction withany relevant offence specific guidelines. The overarching guideline for sentencing offenders with mental disorder, developmental disorder, or neurological impairments, hereafter referred to as ‘the guideline’, was issued by the Sentencing Council in 2020 and is an example of an overarching guideline. It applies to all offenders aged 18 and over sentenced by courts in England and Wales. In accordance with the Sentencing Council’s statutory duties to assess the effect of guidelines on sentencing practice, the Sentencing Council has conducted a research review of this guideline. This explores sentencers’ understanding and application of the guideline. The following section outlines the details of the guideline. 

The Sentencing Council for England and Wales, 2026. 63p

Over-Federalization: Federal Intrusion Into State Criminal Law 

By Liz Komar

A broad and growing number of crimes are criminalized at both the state and federal levels. This means that either state or federal authorities, or both, can prosecute these offenses. Long-standing political pressure for federal lawmakers to demonstrate their responsiveness to constituent concerns about crime,1 even if the crimes in question are already subject to local prosecution, has led to a federeral criminal code that encompasses a wide array of local conduct. That broad reach comes at a significant cost

Police Use Of Deadly Force In New York State: A Report To Governor Mario M. Cuomo

Richard J. Condon Commissioner Division Of Criminal Justice Services

Police Use of Deadly Force in New York State: A Report to Governor Mario M. Cuomo (1985) offers one of the earliest systematic examinations of how and why lethal force was deployed by law enforcement across the state during a period of intense public scrutiny. Commissioned at a time when debates over police accountability, training standards, and civil rights were gaining national prominence, the report evaluates legal frameworks, departmental policies, and patterns of police–citizen encounters to assess the necessity and proportionality of deadly force incidents. Drawing on case reviews, agency surveys, and statistical analyses, it seeks to identify structural weaknesses and propose reforms aimed at reducing unnecessary violence and strengthening public trust.

Viewed from today’s perspective, the report stands as an important precursor to contemporary discussions about policing and the appropriate limits of state power. In the decades since its publication, nationwide movements such as Black Lives Matter, advances in data transparency, increased availability of video evidence, and evolving constitutional standards have intensified scrutiny of deadly force practices. Modern debates continue to revolve around issues the 1985 report identified early on: the need for clear and consistent use‑of‑force policies, robust training in de‑escalation, improved data collection, and stronger mechanisms of accountability. As current policymakers and communities grapple with how to balance public safety, civil liberties, and equitable treatment, this historical report offers valuable insight into the longstanding nature of these challenges and the enduring need for thoughtful, evidence‑based reform.

If you'd like, I can also turn this into a full foreword, integrate it into a larger document, or tailor the tone for academic, policy, or public audiences.

NY. Division Of Criminal Justice Services. 1985. p.273.

The Law Of Nations Applied To The Conduct And Affairs Of Nations And Sovereigns.

By M. D. Vattel. Introduction by Graeme R. Newman

A foundational work of international law, still resonant today.

First published in the eighteenth century and issued in authoritative English editions throughout the nineteenth, The Law of Nations by Emer de Vattel shaped how statesmen, jurists, and diplomats understood the rights and duties of sovereign powers. In this monumental treatise, Vattel applies the principles of natural law to the real conduct of nations, addressing war and peace, treaties and alliances, commerce and neutrality, diplomacy, and the limits of lawful power.

Rejecting both utopian idealism and brute realpolitik, Vattel argues that true national interest is inseparable from justice, restraint, and respect for sovereignty. Nations, like individuals, are bound by moral obligations arising from their coexistence in a shared international society. His careful analysis of war, intervention, and treaty obligations established enduring standards that influenced constitutional debates, foreign policy doctrine, and the development of modern international law.

This edition preserves a work that continues to illuminate contemporary conflicts and global challenges. Clear-eyed, systematic, and profoundly influential, The Law of Nations remains essential reading for anyone seeking to understand how lawful order, moral principle, and power intersect in the affairs of nations.

The theses advanced in The Law of Nations remain strikingly relevant to contemporary international disputes, particularly those involving intervention, recognition of governments, and claims of humanitarian necessity. Vattel’s insistence on sovereignty as the cornerstone of international order places clear limits on the legitimacy of external interference in the internal affairs of states. While he allows that extreme cases—such as manifest tyranny threatening the very existence of a people—may raise difficult moral questions, he consistently warns that powerful states are prone to disguise ambition and interest under the language of justice.

This caution is especially pertinent when considering recent controversies surrounding efforts by the United States to promote regime change in Venezuela, including diplomatic, economic, and political measures aimed at displacing the government of Nicolás Maduro. From a Vattelian perspective, such actions raise fundamental questions about lawful authority, the limits of collective judgment, and the distinction between moral condemnation and legal right. Vattel argues that no nation may unilaterally assume the role of judge over another sovereign without undermining the mutual independence on which international society depends. To do so, he suggests, risks converting international law into a mere instrument of power.

At the same time, Vattel’s framework does not deny the reality of gross misrule or humanitarian suffering. Rather, it demands rigorous scrutiny of motives and means. Economic coercion, diplomatic isolation, and recognition of alternative authorities would, in his analysis, need to be justified not by ideological preference or strategic advantage, but by clear evidence that such measures genuinely serve the common good of nations and do not erode the general security of the international system. His emphasis on proportionality, necessity, and respect for established sovereignty stands in tension with modern practices of intervention that rely on contested doctrines of legitimacy.

Viewed through this lens, contemporary debates over Venezuela illustrate the enduring force of Vattel’s central warning: that the stability of international relations depends less on the moral claims of individual powers than on shared restraint. His work reminds modern readers that the erosion of sovereignty in one case—however rhetorically justified—sets precedents that may ultimately weaken the legal protections upon which all nations, strong and weak alike, rely.

P.H. Nicklitn etc. Philadelphia. 1829. Read-Me.Org Inc. New York-Philadelphia-Australia. 2026 p.424.

Washing Away Crime: Money Laundering in the Western Balkans

By Anesa Agovic

Money laundering remains a key enabler of organized crime in the Western Balkans, allowing criminal networks to legitimize illicit profits and integrate them into the formal economy. This report examines current trends, typologies and vulnerabilities shaping the region’s illicit financial flows.

The study outlines how systemic corruption, weak regulatory oversight, and a sizeable informal economy create fertile ground for laundering proceeds from drug trafficking, firearms smuggling, human trafficking, migrant smuggling, tax evasion and cyber-enabled crime. Key sectors, including construction, real estate and cash-intensive businesses, are often exploited, with typologies such as bulk cash smuggling, corporate layering, trade-based money laundering, underpriced real estate transactions and loan-back schemes featuring prominently.

Professional enablers, such as notaries, accountants, attorneys, and even entertainment celebrities, facilitate the integration of dirty money. The infiltration of law enforcement, misuse of remittance channels and the rise of digital currencies further complicate detection and prosecution.

The report also explores gender dynamics, highlighting the increasing role of women in money laundering activities. While some women play direct roles in financial transactions, others support criminal networks through their positions in professional sectors.

Hotspots for money laundering are often found in capitals, major cities and tourist destinations, where high-value real estate transactions and significant cash flows occur. The impact of global affairs, such as geopolitical shifts and technological advances, has amplified existing vulnerabilities.

The study calls for intensifying the prosecution of money laundering as a standalone crime, strengthening asset recovery, and reinforcing transparency across financial systems. Enhanced cooperation at the regional and international levels is vital to tackle transnational laundering schemes effectively.

This publication is part one of a two-part study of illicit finance and anti-money laundering in the Western Balkans, produced by the GI-TOC’s Observatory of Illicit Economies in South Eastern Europe with the support of the UK government’s Integrated Security Fund.

Understanding the methods and networks behind money laundering empowers governments, law enforcement, prosecutors, policymakers and civil society to disrupt the cycle of organized crime. The report underscores that combating money laundering requires addressing its root causes, from organized corruption to the misuse of legal entities and professional enablers, and demands more resilient institutions, independent regulatory bodies and robust civil society oversight.

Geneva, SWIT: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime. 2025. 72p.

Minneapolis Community Safety Ecosystem Asset and Gap Analysis: Findings and Action Plan

By Alexander Heaton, Michael Thompson, Freya Rigterink

The Minneapolis Safe and Thriving Communities Report and Plan provides a vision for the future of community safety and wellbeing. The plan also delivered an actionable framework for how Minneapolis can design and build a robust continuum of services and solutions that work “upstream” to prevent social challenges from manifesting as crime and disorder; “midstream” to respond to acute law, order, and safety incidents; and “downstream” to help heal trauma and build resilience for communities in the aftermath of these challenges. The service continuum in the plan was grouped in three categories:  Preventive: Services such as peacemakers, violence prevention, diversion, etc., that address near-term social, health, and economic challenges before they manifest as criminal behavior.  Responsive: Services that address community safety incidents in real time through virtual response, civilian response, multi-disciplinary co-response, and sworn officer response.  Restorative: Services that over the long term heal trauma from violence, address the root causes of community safety challenges, and help build the capacity for community resilience. These three categories of services form a service ecosystem to holistically and equitably “wrap around” individuals, families, and communities to bring new solutions to neighborhood safety challenges and foster thriving families and communities. Through rigorous and in-depth analysis of current Minneapolis community safety services and programs, and the systems that govern them, this Findings and Action Plan identifies existing barriers and opportunities for advancing the City’s community safety goals. The analysis focuses, amongst other areas, on opportunities to improve community safety services and efficiency; address equity issues in service delivery and provision; promote transparency and use of evidence-based practices; and improve the integration of resources into a holistic ecosystem with coordinated and accountable governance structures.

Policing Project at NYU School of Law

Minneapolis: City of Minneapolis Government, 2024.142p.

Incarceration on Rikers Island in the Aftermath of the New York State Corrections Officers Strike

By Kellyann Bock & Michael Rempel

Following a statewide corrections officer strike in February 2025 and the termination of over 2,000 officers, New York State prisons have been unable to accept timely transfers of people sentenced to state time. This brief analyzes the resulting surge in the “state-ready” population on Rikers Island—those awaiting transfer to prison—which rose more than eight-fold from 101 to 875 people from February to June 2025. As of the end of June 2025, these individuals accounted for 11% of the total jail population and are responsible for 89% of February-to-June 2025 jail population growth. In short, the jail population would have changed little in the first half of 2025 if not for the ripple effects of the corrections officer strike.

New York : Data Collaborative for Justice, 2025. 7p.

Minimal Impact: Analyzing State Sentencing Reforms and Racial Disparities in Selected State Prison Populations

By Georgia State University, the Crime and Justice Institute, and the Council on Criminal Justice

Over the past 20 years, most American states have adopted a wide range of changes to their criminal sentencing statutes. The goals of the reforms varied. Some targeted certain offenses for greater or lesser penalties. Others aimed to cut correctional costs, expand alternatives to incarceration, and reduce recidivism. Few laws were enacted explicitly to reduce racial and ethnic disparities. Still, many policymakers hoped they would do just that, and the starkly disproportionate incarceration of Black people has been a central component of the national conversation about criminal justice reform.

New York: Council on Criminal Justice, 2024.

Industrial-scale prosecution? Why the single justice procedure needs radical reform

ByPenelope Gibbs

The criminal justice system is in crying need of more efficiency but there is little space to be innovative. So what’s not to like about a process which has revolutionised the magistrates’ court? The single justice procedure, introduced ten years ago, makes summary justice far speedier and cheaper. It needs fewer court staff and judges than a traditional open court hearing, and defendants can plead guilty and submit mitigation online. A case can be processed within weeks rather than months. Transform Justice has followed the progress of the single justice procedure (SJP) since its launch in England and Wales in 2015. We have written many articles about it, briefed journalists and made it the subject of our first ever podcast episode, but never brought our evidence together. In this report we acknowledge the potential benefits of the SJP but also express our deep concerns about the justice it delivers. Just as in the case of the Post Office Scandal, the victims are organisations and companies who are trying to protect their revenue or ensure behavioral compliance. They are both victim and prosecutor, which may cloud their objectivity in decision-making. It is in the interests of any prosecutor to produce the minimum of evidence to get a conviction and to have as few people as possible contest the charge. The SJP fits the bill. Most offences are strict liability so prosecutors don’t have to prove the suspect intended to commit a crime, nor do they need to prove their prosecution is for the public benefit (partly because no-one ever challenges them to do so). So prosecution is relatively easy. Getting convictions is easy too, because most people don’t respond to their prosecution under SJP and are convicted in their absence. A tiny minority of defendants plead not guilty. No data is available on what proportion are acquitted. Procedural justice is defined as the fairness of processes used by those in positions of authority to reach specific outcomes or decisions. This report measures the SJP against that test and finds it wanting. Many people who transgress are willing to make amends. But SJP defendants also need to know what their rights are and how to exercise them, and most don’t. So far, no-one (apart from some journalists) has been that interested in finding out about their experience and amplifying their voice. But change is coming. We hope that procedural justice and fair trial rights will be at the heart of SJP reform.

London: Transform Justice, 2025. 36p.

Hate crime investigation and sentencing in Sweden: what have we learned in the past 20 years?

By Mika Hagerlid, Görel Granström

Twenty years ago, the Swedish National Council for Crime Prevention presented a report that highlighted serious problems with regard to identifying, investigating, and sentencing ofenders for hate crimes. The same problems have also been described in international research from several other countries. Since then, several measures have been taken to remedy these problems, but it remains unknown whether these measures have been successful. The aim of the present study is therefore to trace developments over time, using Sweden as a case study, and to evaluate the extent to which the problems identifed earlier have been remedied. The results show that the problems identifed by the Swedish National Council for Crime Prevention still remain despite a continuous process of reform. Theoretical links and parallels to international research are discussed throughout the article.

European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research (2025) 31:193–210

Lowering the standard: a review of behavioural control orders in England and Wales

By JUSTICE, Chair of the Committee George Lubega

The term ‘Behavioural Control Orders’ refers to a group of legal Orders that are imposed upon an individual via a civil court process or by an executive authority. They aim to address particular behaviours deemed to be objectionable. Sometimes the behaviours targeted constitute crimes in their own right; at other times the Orders are designed to tackle behaviour that falls below the criminal threshold. They do so by imposing restrictive conditions or requirements upon the person subject to them. These include conditions prohibiting association, being present within a particular geographical area, accessing the internet and can include electronic monitoring. Although Orders are imposed via a civil process and usually upon civil standards of evidence, breaching a condition within an Order is a criminal offence. There are an increasing number of Behavioural Control Orders (“Orders”) on the statute books of England and Wales, and their scope and availability appear to be ever-widening. Originally created to fill a gap present within the criminal law, e.g., the difficulty of prosecuting individual instances of football hooliganism, they have rapidly expanded to new areas and now cover behaviour which is, in and of itself, a criminal offence – punishable via the criminal law. For example, Orders now exist to address anti-social behaviour, protests, drug use, knife possession, gang-crime, stalking, and sexual offending, among other matters. Some Orders can differ in terms of who they protect (a specific individual, the public at large, or even a particular place); who may seek or impose an Order; whether an Order can be made on complaint, on conviction, or both; whether they can be imposed on children, or on adults only; the types of conditions and requirements that they can impose; what outcome the Order is intended to achieve and, accordingly, the legal test to be applied (including the standard of proof). The reasons for the variations is unclear and, in any event, has caused confusion across the country. This, in turn, has resulted in inconsistency in the ways in which Orders are used, and the protections afforded to victims. Surprisingly, despite their proliferation and the serious subject matter which they address, Behavioural Control Orders have never been the subject of any systematic, government-led review. It is not clear how the effectiveness of Orders should be measured, nor what ‘success’ should look like. Very little attention has been paid to whether the Behavioural Control Order ‘model’, works. The Working Party has sought to shed light on this question by examining the extent to which Orders are effective for victims, fair, accessible, proportionate, and rights compliant. Overarching Concerns Notwithstanding the variations between Orders, the Working Party identified a number of common, overarching concerns. Orders are often conceived of as a solution to complex social problems. They seek to prevent harms, protect vulnerable individuals, and offer rehabilitation to those accused of committing unwanted conduct. Whilst the policy papers accompanying their introduction stress that they are not intended to be punitive, their duration, the breadth of conditions they impose and the punishment for breach means that in practice, they are often perceived and experienced as such. Moreover, rather than diverting individuals out of the criminal justice system, the Working Party heard criticisms that Orders draw people, especially children, further intro the criminal justice system (owing to the possibility of criminal sanctions for breach). The bar for what conduct may be prohibited by an Order is very low in practice. For example, some Orders have been imposed on individuals as a result of them “closing the door too loudly" and impose conditions which prohibit “sitting on a pavement” or “wearing a bikini in the garden”. Arguably, such prohibitions are reflective of a loss of perspective on what degree of behaviour should properly be controlled by the State, and thereafter criminalised. At the same time, it risks diverting attention away from those really responsible for causing harm. On the other hand, some forms of Order can be said to criminalise individuals ‘by the back door’, by overlapping with existing criminal offences. Procedures for obtaining Orders generally do not require the rigour that proving a criminal charge does, with the tests to be applied often much broader than the wording of a statutory offence. Although proceedings for breach (as a separate offence) are brought before a criminal court, the conduct amounting to a breach may in fact be much less serious than the nature of the Order implies. Despite this, most contributors agreed that in certain circumstances, and when used appropriately, Orders could be useful tools in protecting victims from harm. This is especially true where used to protect a particular person, in the context of harms generally constituted by escalating or cumulative conduct. For example, Orders such as Stalking Protection Orders are effective, provided enforcement bodies apply for them. And Non-Molestation Orders can provide relief to victims of domestic abuse, as long as breaches are followed up and provided that victims are applying for them – not because the police have failed to help them - but because it is their preference to take action themselves. Nonetheless, more planning and consultation is required at the legislative phase, to ensure Orders are capable of achieving their aims, and enforcement bodies are set up to use them effectively. Little is currently done to assess how Orders will work in practice, and the views of interested parties, including experts and victims, and organisations working with offenders, are not meaningfully considered, nor their concerns adequately addressed. A consequence of this is that Orders can be performative in nature. The Working Party heard criticisms that Orders often reflect a “knee-jerk reaction” to high-profile issues, treating the symptom rather than the cause. It is doubtful whether a legal Order alone, can ever have a significant impact on reducing harm without the State taking responsibility for tackling the causes: inequality, poverty, inadequate housing, education and an under-resourced mental health service. Even where Orders have been found to be effective in providing relief to victims – as with Stalking Protection Orders, Non-Molestation Orders and Sexual Harm Prevention Orders - the failure to make resources available for training, enforcement and data sharing – mean that they are often deemed “a missed opportunity” and are not used widely enough. Moreover, whilst Behavioural Control Orders are meant to provide access to interventions, programmes and positive diversions – a lack of resources and available services often mean that this cannot take place. Without proper accreditation, there is also a risk that certain types of ‘perpetrator programme’ or diversionary schemes can cause further harm (continued)

London: JUSTICE, 2025. 144p.