By SE Duhart Clarke

The right to an attorney in criminal cases is a constitutional right covered under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution and is considered fundamental to a fair trial. Over two-thirds of criminal court defendants in the United States are unable to afford their own counsel and thus have an attorney given to them by the court (i.e., indigent defendants). Many legal scholars have debated the effectiveness of indigent defense counsel compared to privately retained counsel. However, in the absence of synthesized data on outcomes for indigent defendants, legal scholars commonly cite the pragmatic and theoretical mechanisms for publicly funded defenders’ limitations or strengths to support their arguments about the effectiveness of indigent defense counsel. When empirical evidence on outcomes for indigent defendants is used to support an argument, the research cited is often limited to studies conducted in specific jurisdictions on a specific step in court case processing. Consequently, our overall understanding of outcomes experienced by indigent defendants is limited and disjointed, underscoring the need for a systematic evaluation of the current empirical literature. The goal of the study in this dissertation was to conduct a systematic literature review and meta-analysis on outcomes for defendants with public defenders, defendants with assigned counsel, and defendants with retained attorneys to better understand what (if any) discrepancies exist in criminal justice-related outcomes as a function of indigent defense status. Specifically, this study examined the current empirical literature on pretrial outcomes, case outcomes, sentencing outcomes, and post-case outcomes for indigent defendants compared to defendants with private/retained attorneys and/or public defenders compared to assigned counsel.

 Raleigh NC: North Carolina State University, 2021.112p.

Edited by Francesca Galli, Anne Weyembergh

Criminal law has undergone tremendous changes in the past decades. A number of new trends have been challenging the traditional features of “modern criminal law” as founded by Cesare Beccaria in the 18th century and developed thereafter. Some authors describe a process of “disengagement” from the fundamental principles upon which “modern criminal law” is based. They point to its corollary, the rise of the ideology of pragmatism, which, in the name of efficiency, is gradually transforming the whole philosophy underpinning the criminal justice system. Some of them thus refer to the “post-modernisation” of criminal law . Among the new trends affecting criminal justice systems, one of them has attracted considerable academic attention in the last few years. This is the so-called “Europeanisation process”, which is the result of the growing intervention of the EU in the area of criminal law. Criminal law and criminal procedure are deeply rooted in national sovereignty and had therefore been developed at national level only. However, since the entry into force of the Amsterdam Treaty, the EU has taken a lead in the approximation of criminal legislation and has developed new and closer cooperation mechanisms based on principles such as the mutual recognition of decisions in criminal matters . With the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the EU’s scope for intervention in this field has been considerably broadened and its supranational nature strengthened, thereby challenging the narrow and profound link between criminal law and the nation state even more. Another new trend which criminal law and other legal disciplines are facing is the increasingly blurred dividing lines between legal categories. Several authors have highlighted the existence of a general blur . Various dimensions of this blur have been identified in legal literature . As will be highlighted by other authors in this book , the verb and the noun “blur” have rather negative connotations. As a verb, it is defined as the action of making or becoming vague or less distinct, of making less clear, of smearing or smudging. As a noun, “blur” means vague, hazy or indistinct . Law and lawyers are not at ease when faced with vagueness and lack of clarity. This is especially true for criminal law and criminal lawyers, as is demonstrated by the well-known principle of legality in its substantive dimension. As will be underlined by some authors in the following contributions, these blurred dividing lines can, however, also have a positive impact or at least give rise to a multitude of consequences that cannot all be categorised as negative. This is clear, for instance, when one thinks of the application of criminal procedural guarantees by administrative law or of the so-called Engel line of case law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). A growing blur can be observed between criminal and administrative law. Both fields of law have received numerous different definitions . The dividing line between them has never been clear . Their respective scope and/or the criteria dividing their respective jurisdiction can vary depending on the country concerned and on the “approach” followed. The criminal nature of proceedings and of penalties can indeed be considered in a formal or substantial manner. As it is well known in its above-mentioned Engel ruling, the ECtHR follows the second approach when considering whether national proceedings constitute a criminal charge in the sense of Article 6 ECHR . The blur between criminal and administrative law has different manifestations and has a wide variety of origins. The scope of both administrative and criminal law tends to expand. Criminal law is being introduced in fields in which the legislator traditionally adopted administrative measures and vice versa. Fields such as terrorism or trafficking in human beings, which have traditionally been governed by criminal law, are increasingly sprinkled with administrative measures or are becoming fields where administrative actors are increasingly involved. In some domains, a double enforcement/sanctioning system (administrative/criminal) has developed. However, by themselves, these trends do not necessarily result in a blur. A blur occurs when the scope of intervention and the division of functions between both kinds of measures, systems, actors or frameworks are not clear enough; when the two sets of applicable rules become indistinct and/or when there is cross-contamination whereby the interactions between both types of measures, actors or frameworks is not organised and overlaps are neither avoided nor regulated. So, in order to identify a blur, the following questions are of key importance: Are there clear criteria setting out when one or the other actor/framework, or both, should be involved? Are the rules applicable to one or the other framework/actor clearly defined and is there some kind of approximation between them? Is a system of double administrative and penal repression foreseen? Reflecting on the reasons for the growing blur between administrative and criminal law is quite interesting. As will be highlighted in the different contributions to this book, various factors arise, including the advantages of each of the different regimes , the need to find an effective way of dealing with certain kinds of crime that are becoming ever more complex, the need to develop a multidisciplinary/holistic approach towards some crimes, particularly trafficking in human beings, and the will and/or need to prevent crime, especially terrorism, etc. The purpose of this book is to study the combination of both of the abovementioned trends affecting criminal justice systems. The blur between administrative and criminal law has, of course, been around for a while and exists independently of the European Union. It is, for instance, embodied in the blurred line between measures belonging to punitive administrative law and criminal law measures . Up until now, this trend has mainly been analysed at the national level. However, it is interesting to reflect on the interaction between the Europeanisation of criminal law on the one hand and the increasingly blurred line between administrative and criminal law on the other hand. In this regard, the main question that arises is whether and to what extent the EU contributes to the blurred line; if it tries to limit it, control it and/or organise it.

Bruxelles, Editions de l’Université de Bruxelles, 2014. 259p.

Edited by Patricia G. Steinhoff

"Going to Court to Change Japan takes us inside movements dealing with causes as disparate as death by overwork, the rights of the deaf, access to prisoners on death row, consumer product safety, workers whose companies go bankrupt, and persons convicted of crimes they did not commit. Each of the six fascinating case studies stands on its own as a detailed account of how a social movement has persisted against heavy odds to pursue a cause through the use of the courts. The studies pay particular attention to the relationship between the social movement and the lawyers who handle their cases, usually pro bono or for minimal fees. Through these case studies we learn much about how the law operates in Japan as well as how social movements mobilize and innovate to pursue their goals using legal channels. The book also provides a general introduction to the Japanese legal system and a look at how recent legal reforms are working.

Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2014. 196p.

Edited by José A. Brandariz, Witold Klaus and Agnieszka Martynowicz   

Forced Mobility of EU Citizens is a critical evaluation from an empirical perspective of existing practices of the use of transnational criminal justice instruments within the European Union. Such instruments include the European Arrest Warrant (EAW), prisoner transfer procedures and criminal law-related deportations. The voices and experiences of people transferred across internal borders of the European Union are brought to the fore in this book. Another area explored is the scope and value of EU citizenship rights in light of cooperation not just between judicial authorities of EU Member States, but criminal justice systems in general, including penitentiary institutions. The novelty of the book lays not only in the fact that it brings to the fore a topic that so far has been under-researched, but it also brings together academics and studies from different parts of Europe – from the west (i.e. the expelling countries) and the east (the receiving countries, with a special focus on two of the jurisdictions most affected by these processes – Poland and Romania). It therefore exposes processes that have so far been hidden, shows the links between sending and receiving countries, and elaborates on the harms caused by those instruments and the very idea of ‘justice’ behind them. This book also introduces a new element to deportation studies as it links to them the institution of the European Arrest Warrant and EU law transfers targeting prisoners and sentenced individuals. With a combination of legal, criminological, and sociological perspectives, this book will be of great interest to scholars and students with an interest in EU law, criminal law, transnational criminal justice, migration/immigration, and citizenship.

New York: London: Routledge, 2024. 227p.

By Hannah E. Meyers

  All prosecutors are required to hand over relevant material to defense attorneys prior to trial, a process referred to as “discovery.” Discovery is fundamental to a fair trial because it is impossible for defendants to make informed plea-bargain decisions if they do not know the strength of the evidence that prosecutors have against them. However, New York’s 2019 discovery statute, Criminal Procedure Law Article 245 (“245”), has crippled the state’s criminal justice system with an untenable compliance burden that prevents it from being either just or appropriately adversarial. It has forced district attorneys’ offices to triage cases and has harmed both the victims of crime and, in the long run, many criminal offenders. The NYS Legislature can correct the systemic harms caused by 245 and increase fairness to defendants, reduce administrative burdens on police and prosecutors, and rebalance risk so that the consequences of noncompliance align with substantive impacts on due process. New York’s new discovery rules, which went into effect in January 2020, were such an extreme and far-reaching version of “reform” that even famously progressive Manhattan District Attorney Alvin Bragg recently complained: “My Office’s lawyers and support staff continue their herculean efforts in managing discovery-related obligations.” The Legal Aid Society, which represents and advocates for criminal defendants, correctly crowed that, rather than simply reinforcing prosecutors’ discovery duties, as intended, 245 “is transforming New York State’s criminal justice system.” The new discovery obligations are indeed so herculean that NYS prosecutors have been able to meet them within the mandated time frames on only 21% of cases. In statewide local courts, they are met on 16% of cases, and in NYC local courts, that number dwindles to 13%. And because discovery must now be met within New York’s preexisting “speedy trial” time windows, on pain of automatic dismissal, thousands of viable cases have been thrown out—not because justice demands it but simply because the compliance burden has proved too great. In NYC courts, dismissals rose from 44% of all disposed cases in 2019, to 69% in 2021. Statewide, dismissals rose by 14% in that period. Meanwhile, guilty pleas fell in NYC from 45% to 21%—and statewide, from 49% to 33%—as defense attorneys have, correctly, become more confident that cases will be dismissed rather than go to trial.

New York: Manhattan Institute, 2023. 43p.

By Marcus Smith and Seumas Miller

This book undertakes a multifaceted and integrated examination of biometric identification, including the current state of the technology, how it is being used, the key ethical issues, and the implications for law and regulation. The five chapters examine the main forms of contemporary biometrics–fingerprint recognition, facial recognition and DNA identification– as well the integration of biometric data with other forms of personal data, analyses key ethical concepts in play, including privacy, individual autonomy, collective responsibility, and joint ownership rights, and proposes a raft of principles to guide the regulation of biometrics in liberal democracies. Biometric identification technology is developing rapidly and being implemented more widely, along with other forms of information technology. As products, services and communication moves online, digital identity and security is becoming more important. Biometric identification facilitates this transition. Citizens now use biometrics to access a smartphone or obtain a passport; law enforcement agencies use biometrics in association with CCTV to identify a terrorist in a crowd, or identify a suspect via their fingerprints or DNA; and companies use biometrics to identify their customers and employees. In some cases the use of biometrics is governed by law, in others the technology has developed and been implemented so quickly that, perhaps because it has been viewed as a valuable security enhancement, laws regulating its use have often not been updated to reflect new applications. However, the technology associated with biometrics raises significant ethical problems, including in relation to individual privacy, ownership of biometric data, dual use and, more generally, as is illustrated by the increasing use of biometrics in authoritarian states such as China, the potential for unregulated biometrics to undermine fundamental principles of liberal democracy. Resolving these ethical problems is a vital step towards more effective regulation.

Cham: Springer Nature, 2021. 99p.

By Edward Lazarus

From the cover: “ "Lazarus has opened a window on matters that are usually kept secret.... [He] should be praised... for shedding light where it is needed."       —The Washington Post

Operating Within A Network Of Byzantine Secrecy. The United States Supreme Court is the most powerful judicial institution in the world. Nine unelected justices are charged with protecting our most cherished rights and shaping our fundamental laws.

In this eloquent, trailblazing account. Edward Lazarus, who served as a clerk to Justice Harry Blackmun, provides an insider’s guided torn- of a court at war with itself and often in neglect of its constitutional duties. Combining memoir, history, and legal analysis, Lazarus weaves together past and present to reveal how law, politics, and personality collide in the Courts inner sanctum. From conservative Chief Justice Rehnquist’s clandestine assault on Roe v. Wade to liberal champion Justice William Brennan's cam­paign to sabotage the death penalty, he shows us in astonishing detail not only the tragic failings of the modern Court but also what led to them and what it means for the country. The Supreme Court affects the life of every American every day.Closed Chambers will open the eyes of the nation to the realities of what takes place behind the closed doors of the institution that holds the power to resolve the most fiercely disputed issues of our time. Impeccably researched and impressively documented . . . will fascinate diehard court- watchers.”        —The Boston Globe

“The Court needs critics—and members—with Lazarus's intellectual clarity and deep attachment to its best traditions.”     —Los Angeles Times

By R. D. Mackay

Mental condition defences have been used in several high-profile and controversial criminal trials in recent years. indeed, mental abnormality is increasingly an important yet complex source of defence within the criminal trial process. The author offers a detailed critical analysis of those defences within the Criminal Law where the accused relies on some form of mental abnormality as a source of defence. Topics covered include: the defences of automatism, insanity, diminished responsibility, and infanticide; self-induced incapacity; and the doctrine of fault. It also includes a chapter on unfitness to plead, which although not a defence has been included because of its important relationship to mental disorder within the criminal process. Drawing upon a wide variety of legal, psychiatric, and philosophical sources, this is a timely contribution to a controversial and complex topic.

Oxford, UK; New York: Oxford University Press, 1996p. 278p.

By Andrew Ashworth

Written by Andrew Ashworth, a well-known expert in the field of criminal law, this book offers a set of essays, old and new, that examine the positive obligations of individuals and the State in matters of criminal law. The centerpiece is a new, extended essay on the criminalization of omissions - examining the duty to act that is imposed upon individuals and organizations by the criminal law, and assessing their moral and social foundations. Alongside this is another new essay on the State's positive obligations to put in place criminal laws to protect certain individual rights. Introducing the volume is Ashworth's much-cited essay on criminalization: Is the Criminal Law a Lost Cause? The book sheds new light on contemporary arguments about the proper boundaries of the criminal law, not least by exploring the justifications for imposing positive duties (reinforced by the criminal law) on individuals and their relation to the positive obligations of the State.

Oxford, UK; Portland, OR: Hart Publishing, 2013. 233p.

Edited by Julian V Roberts and Lucia Zedner

Celebrating the scholarship of Andrew Ashworth, Vinerian Professor of English Law at the University of Oxford, this collection brings together leading international scholars to explore questions of principle and value in criminal law and criminal justice. Internationally renowned for elaborating a body of principles and values that should underpin criminalization, the criminal process, and sentencing, Ashworth's contribution to the field over forty years of scholarship has been immense. Advancing his project of exploring normative issues at the heart of criminal law and criminal justice, the contributors examine the important and fascinating debates in which Ashworth's influence has been greatest.

The essays fall into three distinct but related areas, reflecting Ashworth's primary spheres of influence. Those in Part 1 address the import and role of principles in the development of a just criminal law, with contributions focusing upon core tenets such as the presumption of innocence, fairness, accountability, the principles of criminal liability, and the grounds for defences. Part 2 addresses questions of human rights and due process protections in both domestic and international law. In Part 3 the essays are addressed to core issues in sentencing and punishment: they explore questions of equality, proportionality, adherence to the rule of law, the totality principle (in respect of multiple offences), wrongful acquittals, and unduly lenient sentences. Together they demonstrate how important Ashworth's work has been in shaping how we think about criminal law and criminal justice, and make their own invaluable contribution to contemporary discussions of criminalization and punishment.

Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 375p.

By R.A. Duff

This book reflects the belief that a careful study of the Law of Attempts should be both interesting in itself, as well as being a productive route into a number of larger and deeper issues in criminal law theory and in the philosophy of action. By identifying the legal doctrines which courts and legislatures have developed or adopted, the author goes on to ask whether and how they can be rationalized or rendered persuasive. Such an approach involves paying detailed attention to cases. The book is also unusual in that it grapples with English, Scots and US law, showing great breadth of research as well as philosophical sophistication.

Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1997, 448p.

By Jeremy Horder

A number of jurisdictions world-wide have changed or are considering changing their homicide laws. Important changes have now been recommended for England and Wales, and these changes are an important focus in this book, which brings together leading experts from jurisdictions across the globe — England, Wales, the US, Canada, France, Germany, Scotland, Australia, Singapore, and Malaysia — to examine key aspects of the law of homicide. Key areas include the structure of the law of homicide and the meaning of fault elements. For example, the definition of murder, or its equivalent, is very different in France and Germany when compared to the definition used in England and Wales. French law, like the law in a number of US states, ties the definition of murder to the presence or absence of premeditation, unlike the law in England and Wales. Unlike most other jurisdictions, German law makes the killer's motive, such as a sadistic sexual motive, relevant to whether or not he or she committed the worst kind of homicide. England and Wales are in a minority of English-speaking jurisdictions in that these two countries do not employ the concept of 'wicked' recklessness, or of extreme indifference, as a fault element in homicide. Understanding these often subtle differences between the approaches of different jurisdictions to the definition of homicide is an essential aspect of the law reform process, and of legal study and scholarship in criminal law. Every jurisdiction tries to learn from the experience of others.

Oxford, UK: Hart Publishing, 2007. 265p.

By Alexander Brown.

A Philosophical Examination. Hate speech law can be found throughout the world. But it is also the subject of numerous principled arguments, both for and against. These principles invoke a host of morally relevant features (e.g., liberty, health, autonomy, security, non-subordination, the absence of oppression, human dignity, the discovery of truth, the acquisition of knowledge, self-realization, human excellence, civic dignity, cultural diversity and choice, recognition of cultural identity, intercultural dialogue, participation in democratic self-government, being subject only to legitimate rule) and practical considerations (e.g., efficacy, the least restrictive alternative, chilling effects). The book develops and then critically examines these various principled arguments. It also attempts to de-homogenize hate speech law into different clusters of laws/regulations/codes that constrain uses of hate speech, so as to facilitate a more nuanced examination of the principled arguments.

New York; London: Routledge, 2015. 379p.

By Julia Gebhard.

Recourse to Human Rights in Substantive International Criminal Law. What are chances and challenges of referring to human rights law in defining crimes under international law? Under what circumstances is a reference to human rights law dogmatically appropriate and practically likely? The answers to these questions are explored through a look at the theoretical framework, practical application in jurisprudence as well as empirically through interviews with judges. By highlighting the common roots and the differences between both areas of law, the existing inconsistencies in the application of the law, as well as approaches which could contribute to their solution, the book presents a crucial contribution to the debate on legal certainty and innovation in international criminal law.

Baden-Baden, Germany Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft mbH & Co. KG, 2018. 296p.

Edited by Élodie Sellier and Anne Weyembergh.

This book examines to what extent differences between national and procedural criminal laws hinder the negotiations and the operation of cross-border cooperation instruments. It is based on a comparative analysis of a representative sample of Member States.

Brussels: Editions de l'Université de Bruxelles, 2020. 463p.

Edited by Francesca Galli and Anne Weyemberg.

This book dedicated to the substantive criminal law in the EU put the Libson Treaty under scrutiny. It evaluates the changes introduced by this new Treaty and their impact, before reflecting on future prospects.

Bruxelles: Editions de l'Université de Bruxelles, 2013. 250p.

Edited by Sabine Gless and Thomas Richter.

A Comparative Perspective on Evidentiary Rules. This open access publication discusses exclusionary rules in different criminal justice systems. It is based on the findings of a research project in comparative law with a focus on the question of whether or not a fair trial can be secured through evidence exclusion. Part I explains the legal framework in which exclusionary rules function in six legal systems: Germany, Switzerland, People’s Republic of China, Taiwan, Singapore, and the United States. Part II is dedicated to selected issues identified as crucial for the assessment of exclusionary rules. These chapters highlight the delicate balance of interests required in the exclusion of potentially relevant information from a criminal trial and discusses possible approaches to alleviate the legal hurdles involved.

Cham: Springer, 2019. 387p.

By Douglas Pepler.

“But these enactments are Of little value unless supported by public opinion and executed according to the spirit rather than the letter of the law. There are a few towns where it is determined that no effort Shall be spared to give a lad a new chance, where it is realised that the first Offence will not be the last unless there is skilled intervention by the right sort of person. Where the effort is made it can always be traced to the interest of one person in the fate of one child. The work cannot develop except on that foundation, it cannot exist except there be this personal desire among men to seek and save that which appears to be lost.”

London: Constable, 1915. 163p.