By Roseanna Sommers and Kate Weisburd

Fifth Amendment case law (including Miranda v. Arizona) requires that individuals assert their right to counsel or silence using "explicit," "clear," and "unambiguous" statements - or, as some dissenting judges have lamented, using "legally magic" words. Through a survey of 1,718 members of the U.S. public, we investigate what ordinary people believe it takes to assert the right to counsel and the right to silence. We then compare their perceptions against prevailing legal standards governing invocation.

With respect to the right to counsel, the survey results indicate that members of the public have a uniformly lower threshold for invocation than do courts. Statements that courts have deemed too ambiguous (e.g., "I'll be honest with you, I'm scared to say anything without talking to a lawyer.") are perceived by a large majority of survey respondents as invoking the right to counsel. With respect to the right to silence, the survey results suggest that people overwhelmingly believe that remaining silent for several hours constitutes invocation of the right to silence and expect that their silence cannot be used against them - including in situations where, in fact, it can be. Across an array of fact patterns and demographic subgroups, respondents consistently set the bar for invoking Fifth Amendment rights lower than courts.

The stark disconnect between what the public takes as sufficient to invoke these rights and what courts hold as sufficient suggests that the rights to counsel and silence are largely inaccessible to ordinary people. Notably, standard Miranda warnings do not include instructions regarding how one must speak in order to invoke those rights. We conclude that when courts set the threshold for invocation above where the average citizen believes it to be, they effectively place key procedural rights out of reach.

119 Northwestern University Law Review 637 (2024), 52p.

Edited by Monika Florczak-Wątor

This collection examines case-based reasoning in constitutional adjudication; that is, how courts decide on constitutional cases by referring to their own prior case law and the case law of other national, foreign, and international courts. Argumentation based on judicial authority is now fundamental to the resolution of constitutional disputes. At the same time, it is the most common form of reasoning used by courts. This volume shows not only the strengths and weaknesses of such argumentation, but also its serious methodological shortcomings. The book is comparative in nature, with individual chapters examining similar problems that different courts have resolved in different ways. The research covers three types of courts; namely the civil law constitutional courts of Germany, Italy, Poland, Lithuania, and Hungary; the common law supreme courts of the United States, Canada, and Australia; and the European international courts represented by the European Court of Human Rights and the Court of Justice of the European Union. The authors are distinguished scholars from various countries who specialise in constitutional justice issues. This book will be of interest to legal theorists and practitioners, and will be especially insightful for constitutional court judges.

London; New York: Routledge, 2022. 293p.

By Michael J. Z. Mannheimer

Police are required to obey the law. While that seems obvious, courts have lost track of that requirement due to misinterpreting the two constitutional provisions governing police conduct: the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The Fourth Amendment forbids ""unreasonable searches and seizures"" and is the source of most constitutional constraints on policing. Although that provision technically applies only to the federal government, the Fourteenth Amendment, ratified in the wake of the Civil War, has been deemed to apply the Fourth Amendment to the States. This book contends that the courts’ misinterpretation of these provisions has led them to hold federal and state law enforcement mistakenly to the same constitutional standards. The Fourth Amendment was originally understood as a federalism, or “states’ rights,” provision that, in effect, required federal agents to adhere to state law when searching or seizing. Thus, applying the same constraint to the States is impossible. Instead, the Fourteenth Amendment was originally understood in part as requiring that state officials (1) adhere to state law, (2) not discriminate, and (3) not be granted excessive discretion by legislators. These principles should guide judicial review of modern policing. Instead, constitutional constraints on policing are too strict and too forgiving at the same time. In this book, Michael J.Z. Mannheimer calls for a reimagination of what modern policing could look like based on the original understandings of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.

Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2023. 431p.