By Beatrix Immenkamp with Greta Baltikauskaite, Graphics: Samy Chahri

The European arrest warrant (EAW) is a judicial decision issued by a Member State with a view to the arrest and surrender by another Member State of a requested person for the purposes of a criminal prosecution or a custodial sentence. Between 2005 and 2022, some 231 005 EAWs were issued, and 69 688 persons were surrendered. The functioning of the EAW system – as set out in this infographic – requires a high level of trust between the judicial authorities of the issuing and the executing Member State, which has at times generated challenges and tensions. In the internal security strategy published on 1 April 2025, the Commission stated that it would 'assess the need to further strengthen' the EAW.

Brussels: EPRS | European Parliamentary Research Service, 2025. 2p.

By Leigh Courtney, Barbara Pierce, Ashlin Oglesby-Neal , Susan Nembhard

Many states have enacted comprehensive justice system reforms to reduce incarceration and community supervision in order to focus funding more on people at higher risk of reoffending and invest in strategies to achieve better outcomes for people and communities. Many policy reforms have been spurred by significant growth in the number of people on community supervision. According to a 2018 Pew Charitable Trusts chartbook, probation and parole populations nationwide grew 239 percent from 1980 to 2016 (Horowitz, Utada, and Fuhrmann 2018). Notably, community supervision populations peaked in 2007 and then fell 11 percent between 2007 and 2016. 1 To date, research on the impact of states’ community supervision policy changes has not kept pace with the rate at which they have been enacted, leaving policymakers and practitioners with a knowledge gap on which reforms have made a difference and why. The Urban Institute and the Crime and Justice Institute (CJI) assessed policies reforming probation sentencing in two states, Louisiana and Georgia, to understand their impact on people who are supervised and on outcomes including revocation and successful completion. Reforming probation sentencing is one way to ensure scarce resources are prioritized for supporting and monitoring people when their risk of failing supervision is highest, not for long periods after this risk has declined. Research has shown that supervision is most effective when it focuses on people who are at higher risk of reoffending and that recidivism rates drop precipitously after the first year of supervision (Alper, Durose, and Markman 2018; Andrews and Bonta 2010). A statutory reduction of the length of probation supervision terms can be a direct way to reduce the number of people under community supervision. When implemented consistently, probation sentencing reform may yield more reliable reductions of the supervised population than reforms that depend heavily on changing supervision practices. And by limiting how long supervision resources can be expended on people at low risk of failure, these reforms can yield significant gains in cost savings and community safety. In contrast to other community supervision reforms (such as earned discharge policies) that require people to incrementally earn time off potentially lengthy sentences at the back ends of their terms, probation sentencing reform establishes upper limits that apply uniformly to entire categories of people at the front ends of their terms. Despite these potential benefits, wholesale reductions of probation sentence lengths are uncommon. States’ strategies for reducing probation sentences have varied: some have shortened all probation sentences for certain offenses by reducing the maximum probation sentences allowed for those offenses, whereas others have simply granted judges the flexibility to impose shorter sentences than the maximums. Meanwhile, some states have used creative strategies to establish a presumption of shorter probation terms without changing sentencing requirements. These strategies blend front-end reductions of sentences with mechanisms similar to earned discharge policies that enable early release, but they also grant courts and supervising agencies discretion to extend those sentences at the back end because of noncompliance with supervision terms. For this reason, any assessment of the impact of probation sentencing reforms must consider the details of how they have been implemented and the extent to which discretion is allowed. Urban and CJI assessed implementation and analyzed outcomes of different approaches in Louisiana and Georgia. In 2017, Louisiana’s Senate Bill 139 eliminated the one-year minimum for all probation sentences and reduced the maximum sentence for felony probation from five to three years for a first, second, or third conviction for a nonviolent, non-capital felony. Approximately 89 percent of new probation starts in 2018–19 were for nonsex, nonviolent offenses. The policy allows judges to extend probation terms up to five years for people who do not comply with supervision conditions. The law affects everyone sentenced to probation as of November 2017. Also passed in 2017, Georgia’s Senate Bill 174 established two mechanisms for reducing probation sentence lengths. First, it requires that a probation sentence for any first-time felony conviction with a straight probation sentence (with no prison time) include a behavioral incentive date (BID) of three years or less, at which point the Georgia Department of Community Supervision (DCS) must file a petition to terminate probation if the person has not been arrested for anything other than a nonserious traffic offense during their probation term, has complied with the conditions of supervision, and has paid all restitution owed. About a third of the felony probation population from July 2017 to December 2020 was eligible for BIDs.2 Second, it makes early termination of probation available to anyone convicted of certain nonviolent felony offenses who has been sentenced to three years or more and who has not previously had their supervision revoked. The law requires DCS to file a petition for early termination for anyone who has completed three years of supervision and has not been arrested for anything other than a non-serious traffic offense, has complied with the conditions of supervision, and has paid all restitution. Courts may accept or reject BID petitions and early termination petitions at ends of their terms, probation sentencing reform establishes upper limits that apply uniformly to entire categories of people at the front ends of their terms. Despite these potential benefits, wholesale reductions of probation sentence lengths are uncommon. States’ strategies for reducing probation sentences have varied: some have shortened all probation sentences for certain offenses by reducing the maximum probation sentences allowed for those offenses, whereas others have simply granted judges the flexibility to impose shorter sentences than the maximums. Meanwhile, some states have used creative strategies to establish a presumption of shorter probation terms without changing sentencing requirements. These strategies blend frontend reductions of sentences with mechanisms similar to earned discharge policies that enable early release, but they also grant courts and supervising agencies discretion to extend those sentences at the back end because of noncompliance with supervision terms. For this reason, any assessment of the impact of probation sentencing reforms must consider the details of how they have been implemented and the extent to which discretion is allowed. Urban and CJI assessed implementation and analyzed outcomes of different approaches in Louisiana and Georgia. In 2017, Louisiana’s Senate Bill 139 eliminated the one-year minimum for all probation sentences and reduced the maximum sentence for felony probation from five to three years for a first, second, or third conviction for a nonviolent, non-capital felony. Approximately 89 percent of new probation starts in 2018–19 were for nonsex, nonviolent offenses. The policy allows judges to extend probation terms up to five years for people who do not comply with supervision conditions. The law affects everyone sentenced to probation as of November 2017. Also passed in 2017, Georgia’s Senate Bill 174 established two mechanisms for reducing probation sentence lengths. First, it requires that a probation sentence for any first-time felony conviction with a straight probation sentence (with no prison time) include a behavioral incentive date (BID) of three years or less, at which point the Georgia Department of Community Supervision (DCS) must file a petition to terminate probation if the person has not been arrested for anything other than a non-serious traffic offense during their probation term, has complied with the conditions of supervision, and has paid all restitution owed. About a third of the felony probation population from July 2017 to December 2020 was eligible for BIDs.2 Second, it makes early termination of probation available to anyone convicted of certain nonviolent felony offenses who has been sentenced to three years or more and who has not previously had their supervision revoked. The law requires DCS to file a petition for early termination for anyone who has completed three years of supervision and has not been arrested for anything other than a nonserious traffic offense, has complied with the conditions of supervision, and has paid all restitution. Courts may accept or reject BID petitions and early termination petitions at

Washington, DC: The Urban Institute, 2022. 40p.

By William J. Sabol and Thaddeus L. Jjohnson

Although significant gaps remain, disparities between Black and White people continued to narrow at nearly every stage of the criminal justice process between 2016 and 2020. In some cases, the pace of the decline slowed; in others, the disparity gap closed entirely.

These trends extend patterns from 2000 to 2016 that were identified in CCJ's first report on correctional control by race and sex. Subsequent reports will explore trends in disparity among female populations and by ethnicity, assess trends in multiple states, and seek to identify what, if any, policy changes may have contributed to reductions in racial disparities.

Washington, DC: Council on Criminal Justice, 2022. 36p.

By The ACLU of Northern California

California was once the nation’s leader in public defense. Long before the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the state must provide a lawyer to poor people charged with crimes, many counties in California already did so. Yet today, after years of neglect by the state, California is in the midst of a decades-long public defense crisis. A main cause is the reliance on “flat-fee” contracts with for-profit private attorneys and firms, where lawyers are paid a set amount for a limitless number of cases. These agreements lock attorneys and their clients in a financial conflict of interest where the lawyers’ fees are pitted against quality, zealous representation for those accused of crimes. Flat-fee systems have a well-documented history of providing worse representation and fueling mass incarceration and California has been called out, decade after decade, for allowing them to flourish.

This report examines the actual contracts California counties use and finds that they are woefully deficient in providing necessary resources to private contractors in order for them to adequately represent their clients, they uniformly fail to limit the number of cases attorneys can handle at once, and they provide little to not oversight or supervision for the lawyers who defend people when their lives are on the line. We synthesize the decades of research from within the state and around the country that show these systems should be eliminated and recommend that California finally do just that

San Francisco: ACLU of Northern California, 2025. 27p.

By David Spencer

New guidelines produced by the Sentencing Council for judges and magistrates to follow when sentencing offenders are both significant and controversial. The Imposition of community and custodial sentences guideline, due to come into effect on the 1st April 2025, sets out the considerations for judges and magistrates when sentencing an offender who has been found or pleaded guilty in the criminal courts. The Imposition of community and custodial sentences guideline instructs courts to request and consider, prior to sentencing, a pre-sentence report before forming an opinion about sentencing. Pre-sentence reports enable the court to have as much information as possible about the offender, including the risk they pose to the public, before passing sentence. Judges and magistrates are instructed that they need not order a pre-sentence report only if they consider it unnecessary. The new guideline requires that from the 1st April 2025 a presentence report will “normally be required” when sentencing offenders from one of a whole host of different and specified groups – while some groups are included, others are excluded. In particular, those within the cohort where a pre-sentence report will “normally be required” include individuals who are from an ethnic, faith or cultural minority group. While there is nothing specifically preventing a court requesting a pre-sentence report for other offenders, those who are white or male will not, unless they can fit themselves into one of the other groupings available, qualify under the criteria that “a pre-sentence report will normally be considered necessary”. The Lord Chancellor and Secretary of State for Justice, Rt Hon Shabana Mahmood MP, has made clear that she does not agree with the new Imposition guideline and, given the Sentencing Council have refused to withdraw it, she is willing to legislate to prevent “two-tier justice”. On the 28th March 2025 the Lord Chancellor said: “I have been clear in my view that these guidelines represent differential treatment, under which someone’s outcomes may be influenced by their race, culture or religion. This is unacceptable, and I formally set out my objections to this in a letter to the Sentencing Council last week. I am extremely disappointed by the Council’s response. All options are on the table and I will legislate if necessary.” The Lord Chancellor is right. There must be no two-tier justice – which the new guideline represents – and the government should legislate without delay to correct the Sentencing Council’s error. In conversation with the authors at Policy Exchange, the Rt Hon Jack Straw – the former Lord Chancellor and Secretary of State for Justice who created the Sentencing Council – has expressed his strong support for Rt Hon Shabana Mahmood MP. He said: “I strongly support the Lord Chancellor and Secretary of State for Justice, Shabana Mahmood MP, in the position she is taking relating to the new Imposition Guideline that the Sentencing Council have published. It is clear that the Government will need to take steps to correct the error. Given the crossparty support for this to be resolved, as shown by the position of the Shadow Secretary of State, Robert Jenrick, I hope that this can be done quickly.” Pre-sentence reports, typically written by a probation officer, are key to judges and magistrates deciding whether to sentence an offender to prison or to a non-custodial community order – particularly in borderline cases. As a result, deciding which defendants are to be included in the cohorts where a pre-sentence report will “normally be required”, and which don’t, can be key in deciding who goes to prison and who doesn’t. The Sentencing Council, which produced the new guideline, is an independent non-departmental body that is sponsored by the Ministry of Justice. The Labour government, under Prime Minister the Rt Hon Gordon Brown, created the Sentencing Council through section 118 of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009. The Council commenced operations in April 2010. The framework for the creation of sentencing guidelines evolved during the period of Labour in office between 1997 – 2010. Two bodies associated with the production of guidelines for the sentencing of offenders – the Sentencing Advisory Panel and Sentencing Guidelines Council – were created (and subsequently abolished). We outline the history of this period in chapter 2 of this report. The Sentencing Council is responsible for the preparation of sentencing guidelines for judges and magistrates to follow when sentencing offenders. Section 120 of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 specifies that the Sentencing Council must prepare: “(a) sentencing guidelines about the discharge of a court’s duty under section 73 of the Sentencing Code (reduction in sentences for guilty pleas), and (b) sentencing guidelines about the application of any rule of law as to the totality of sentences” and may prepare sentencing guidelines about any other matter. We outline how the Sentencing Council is required to operate, under statute, in chapter 3 of this report. The membership of the Council is made up of both judicial and non-judicial members. Eight members of the Council are appointed by the Lord Chief Justice with the agreement of the Lord Chancellor (“judicial members”) and six members are appointed by the Lord Chancellor with the agreement of the Lord Chief Justice (“non-judicial members”). We outline the current membership of the Sentencing Council, how members (continued_

London: Policy Exchange, 2025. 43p.

Angela R. Riley & Sarah Glenn Thompson

The Double Jeopardy Clause guarantees no individual will be put in jeopardy twice for the same offense. But, pursuant to the dualsovereignty doctrine, multiple prosecutions for offenses stemming from the same conduct do not violate the Clause if the offenses charged arise under the laws of separate sovereigns, even if the laws are otherwise identical. The doctrine applies to tribal prosecutions, but its impact in Indian country is rarely studied. Such an inquiry is overdue, particularly as the scope of crimes potentially subject to dual tribal and federal prosecutions has broadened in recent years. This Article is the first to undertake a preliminary examination of the dual-sovereignty doctrine in the tribal–federal context and describe the complex interplay between the doctrine and the rest of the criminal law fabric in Indian country. Perhaps most significantly, it includes an original typology highlighting when a defendant may be subject to the doctrine, which sovereigns have the authority to prosecute, pursuant to what source of power each sovereign operates, and when and how the sequence of prosecutions matters, if at all. This leads to the Article’s central thesis: Indian tribes are separate sovereigns with inherent sovereignty, and, under current conditions, the dual-sovereignty doctrine plays a central role in ensuring safety in Indian country. The doctrine’s application in Indian country, however, creates unique complexities that may threaten tribal sovereignty and raise issues of unfairness for defendants. This Article offers numerous reforms—some highly ambitious and others more modest—to address these issues.

122 Colum. L. Rev. 1899 (2022).

By David C. Baldus, George Woodworth, Catherine M. Grosso, Michael Laurence, Jeffrey A. Fagan, and Richard Newell

The Eighth Amendment’s “narrowing” requirement for capital punishment eligibility has challenged states since it was recognized in Furman v. Georgia in 1972. This article examines whether California’s death penalty scheme complies with this requirement by empirically analyzing 27,453 California convictions for first-degree murder, second-degree murder, and voluntary manslaughter with offense dates between January 1978 and June 2002. Using a 1,900-case sample, we examine whether California’s death penalty statute fails to comply with the Eighth Amendment’s narrowing test. Our findings support two conclusions. First, the death-eligibility rate among California homicide cases is the highest in the nation during that period and in the ensuing decade. We find that 95 percent of all first-degree murder convictions and 59 percent of all second-degree murder and voluntary manslaughter convictions were death eligible under California’s 2008 statute. Second, a death sentence is imposed in only a small fraction of the death-eligible cases. The California death sentencing rate of 4.3 percent among all death-eligible cases is among the lowest in the nation and over two-thirds lower than the death-sentencing rate in pre-Furman Georgia.

Journal of Empirical Legal Studies Volume 16, Issue 4, 693–730, December 2019

By Roseanna Sommers and Kate Weisburd

Fifth Amendment case law (including Miranda v. Arizona) requires that individuals assert their right to counsel or silence using "explicit," "clear," and "unambiguous" statements - or, as some dissenting judges have lamented, using "legally magic" words. Through a survey of 1,718 members of the U.S. public, we investigate what ordinary people believe it takes to assert the right to counsel and the right to silence. We then compare their perceptions against prevailing legal standards governing invocation.

With respect to the right to counsel, the survey results indicate that members of the public have a uniformly lower threshold for invocation than do courts. Statements that courts have deemed too ambiguous (e.g., "I'll be honest with you, I'm scared to say anything without talking to a lawyer.") are perceived by a large majority of survey respondents as invoking the right to counsel. With respect to the right to silence, the survey results suggest that people overwhelmingly believe that remaining silent for several hours constitutes invocation of the right to silence and expect that their silence cannot be used against them - including in situations where, in fact, it can be. Across an array of fact patterns and demographic subgroups, respondents consistently set the bar for invoking Fifth Amendment rights lower than courts.

The stark disconnect between what the public takes as sufficient to invoke these rights and what courts hold as sufficient suggests that the rights to counsel and silence are largely inaccessible to ordinary people. Notably, standard Miranda warnings do not include instructions regarding how one must speak in order to invoke those rights. We conclude that when courts set the threshold for invocation above where the average citizen believes it to be, they effectively place key procedural rights out of reach.

119 Northwestern University Law Review 637 (2024), 52p.

By Adam M. Gershowitz  

Prosecutors are often seen as the villains of the criminal justice system. And the most villainous thing a prosecutor can do is to commit an intentional Brady violation by withholding favorable and material evidence from the defense. Not surprisingly, there is a wide literature criticizing prosecutors for flagrant misconduct. But not all Brady violations are intentional. Prosecutors sometimes—perhaps often—commit accidental Brady violations by inadvertently failing to recognize favorable evidence. Because many prosecutors are inexperienced, overworked, and under-trained, they do not recognize exculpatory or impeachment evidence when it is in their files. Additionally, prosecutors also fail to disclose evidence that is in the hands of police, sheriffs, crime laboratories, and other government agencies. Because the criminal justice “system” is riddled with communication breakdowns, prosecutors are sometimes unaware of Brady evidence that they were obligated to disclose. The breadth of the Brady doctrine and the dysfunction of the criminal justice system do not make Brady violations acceptable or harmless. To the contrary, Brady errors are serious violations of a defendant’s constitutional rights. To reduce future violations, however, we cannot simply condemn prosecutors for intentional misconduct. Instead, it is important to understand why accidental Brady violations occur. Drawing on nearly two-dozen recent cases, this article builds a typology of situations where accidental Brady violations occur, and it sets forth solutions for reducing accidental violations in the future.   

  12 Tex. A&M L. Rev. 533 (2025)., 59p.

By Jennifer Mason McAward

This largest-ever study of adjudicated violations of Brady v. Maryland provides a detailed and nuanced understanding of who suppresses material evidence in criminal cases, why, how, where, and how often. Its findings complicate the conventional wisdom that Brady violations are the work of nefarious prosecutors who intentionally withhold material evidence from criminal defendants. While it is true that bad faith permeates this area of constitutional non-compliance, a substantial minority of Brady cases stem from good faith errors and suppression by law enforcement officers. Most Brady violations occur in a small number of states, and most often state courts provide relief. And while there is not quantitative evidence of an epidemic, the individual effects of Brady violations are severe. On average, a defendant whose Brady rights are violated spends more time in prison than a defendant who is later exonerated. When government officials routinely violate a clearly established constitutional right like Brady with such negative consequences, the time is ripe for evidence-based interventions to enhance constitutional compliance. The insights from this study point to a new range of strategies. For example, focusing on preventing good faith Brady errors, especially in non-homicide cases, may be substantially more productive than focusing on punishing bad faith Brady violationsa tactic that has proven to be frustratingly unsuccessful. Relatedly, working with law enforcement officers to better identify and submit potential Brady evidence to prosecutors may create a smoother pipeline for the eventual production of material evidence to defendants. Ultimately, by providing unprecedented detail about historical Brady violations, this study will serve the cause of future overall Brady compliance.

Vanderbilt Law Review (forthcoming April 2025), 67p.

By Laurel Wimbish, Janelle Simpson, Lena Dechert, Laura Feldman,

The U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS), State Justice Statistics (SJS) Program provides funding to state Statistical Analysis Centers (SACs) to build their capacity to collect, analyze, and disseminate criminal justice data to state and local policy makers, administrators, and other stakeholders. In 2019 and 2020, the SAC for Wyoming—the Wyoming Survey & Analysis Center (WYSAC) at the University of Wyoming—received special-emphasis capacity-building funding from BJS to conduct a targeted analysis using Wyoming’s criminal history records. SACs are strongly encouraged to collaborate with their state’s State Administering Agency (SAA) to develop and implement projects that support the State’s criminal justice planning needs. The Wyoming Division of Criminal Investigation (DCI) is the SAA for the State of Wyoming and serves as the central repository for criminal history record information. WYSAC worked with DCI to develop and implement this research project in support of one of DCI’s top priorities, maintaining accurate and complete criminal history records. Wyoming statute requires all city, county, and state law enforcement agencies; district courts; courts of limited jurisdiction; district attorneys; the Department of Corrections; state juvenile correctional institutions; and local probation and parole agencies to submit criminal history record information to DCI.1 DCI stores these data in a computerized state criminal history system (CCH) and uses the data for many purposes including complying with the 2002 Help America Vote Act, conducting background checks for employers and professional licensing boards, and sharing data with the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI’s) National Criminal Background Check System (NICS).2,3 To effectively serve these purposes, criminal justice entities (law enforcement agencies, the courts, and corrections) must provide DCI with accurate and complete data. The objectives of this project were to 1) explore the accuracy and completeness of Wyoming’s criminal history records, specifically for misdemeanor crimes of domestic violence (MCDVs), 2) provide DCI with a report outlining the results of the analysis, and 3) provide recommendations on how DCI and other state criminal justice agencies can improve the accuracy and completeness of the state’s criminal history records.

Laramie: WYOMING SURVEY & ANALYSIS CENTER, 2021. 16p.

By HM Prison and Probation Service and Ministry of Justice (UK)

Why should the Criminal Justice System be concerned with the mental health of those passing through the system? We know that rates of mental ill-health are high among those who pass through the CJS. Around a third of people11 who find themselves in police custody have some form of mental health difficulty, as do 48 per cent of men and 70 percent of women in prison. Some 38 per cent: of people on probation supervision are recorded as having a mental health issue. But why does this matter? First, because people with a mental illness need and deserve treatment. Entry into the CJS can provide a second chance for people who have been missed by other services to access that treatment and an incentive for them to take up that offer. Second, because mental illness and the symptoms associated with it can trigger criminal behaviour and therefore bring a person into contact with the CJS. Decisions then need to be made on whether a criminal charge is in the public interest or whether an alternative disposal (such as diversion into mental health treatment) would be more appropriate. Third, mental illness, particularly the more severe forms, can affect an individual’s ability to understand and participate in the criminal justice process. They may need additional support to understand the questions put to them during an investigation or at trial or they may lack the mental capacity to plead or stand trial. Fourth, the criminal justice process itself, for example the experience of custody, can have a severe and negative impact on someone’s mental health, particularly if they are already suffering a mental illness. In these circumstances, there is a duty of care to try to mitigate these wherever possible. This includes a duty to reduce the risks of suicide and self-harm, which we know to be high in criminal justice populations. For all these reasons, it is essential that those with a mental health condition or disorder are identified as early as possible in their journey through the CJS, particularly where that problem is severe. Once the mental health issue is identified, information relevant to that issue must be shared between agencies so that appropriate support and treatment can be offered, and the right decisions made at each step of the journey from arrest to sentence and post-sentence supervision in custody or in the community. This inspection, the first on this topic to involve all of the criminal justice inspectorates, and to consider post-sentence supervision, as well as the period leading up to trial, focuses on these critical issues: • Are people with a mental illness identified when they first come into the CJS? • Is this information passed on through the rest of the system from the police and defence lawyers to the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) and the courts or from the courts to the probation and prison services so that the right decisions can be made about next steps? • Are people with a mental illness entering the CJS being properly assessed and then referred for help or treatment where this is identified as necessary? • What is the quality of support they are getting? Is it timely and adequately resourced or are people having to wait many months to get it? • Are the most seriously mentally ill people being looked after in appropriate settings and places of safety, or is custody still having to be used?

Manchester, UK: Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Probation November 2021 117p.

By Matthew DeMichele,  Ian Silver,  Ryan Labrecque

This study provides a rigorous assessment of the public safety outcomes of pretrial detention by estimating the criminogenic and punitive effects of spending at least one week in pretrial detention across three jail systems in two states. Jails are a unique criminal justice contact point because they hold individuals at different stages of case processing, including individuals awaiting trial, and those serving shorter sentences or waiting to be transferred to prison. Pretrial incarceration is arguably one of the most consequential decisions in case processing for an individual. A small body of research has emerged to show that pretrial detention is both criminogenic (i.e., leads to higher arrest rates) and punitive (i.e., leads to higher conviction rates). In this paper, we use a doubly robust difference-in-differences design to assess the relationship between pretrial detention with court appearances, new arrests prior to adjudication, and convictions for the instant offense. The findings of this research study provide strong evidence that pretrial detention leads to increased likelihood that individuals will miss court and be arrested for new crimes

Unpublished paper, 2023, 57p.

By Joseph Blocher, Jacob D. Charles, and Darrell A.H. Miller

  Academic work is increasingly important to court rulings on the Second Amendment and firearms law more generally. This article highlights two recent trends in social science research that supplement the traditional focus on guns and physical harm. The first strand of research focuses on the changing ways that gun owners connect with firearms, with personal security, status, identity, and cultural markers being key reasons people offer for possessing firearms. The second strand focuses on broadening our understanding of the impact of guns on the public sphere beyond just physical safety. This research surfaces the ways that guns can create fear, intimidation, and social trauma; deter civic participation and the exercise of constitutional rights; and further entrench racial inequality.  

Annu. Rev. Law Soc. Sci. 2023. 19:165–77   

By Washington Office of Latin America. United States of America

Venezuela is the only country in Latin America with an open investigation before the International Criminal Court (ICC). The case has been the object of disinformation on behalf of Venezuelan authorities and the language surrounding the ICC can at times be confusing for those who are unfamiliar with international law. The Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA) believes that it is important to bring this process closer to the international community, to decision-makers in Washington D.C., to Venezuelans, and to those who follow what is happening in Venezuela. That is why, through a series of questions and answers written in plain English, we are bringing you an easy-to-understand publication on the ICC investigation on Venezuela.

The following sections describe what the International Criminal Court (ICC) is and answers each of the following questions:

1. What is the International Criminal Court?

   Why did the ICC initiate an investigation on Venezuela and what is the current status of the process?

   What decision did the Pre-Trial Chamber of the International Criminal Court adopt on May 4, 2023?

   The Venezuelan Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a statement about the decision of the Pre-Trial Chamber of May 4, 2023. Why is that statement false?

   Why did the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber authorize the Prosecutor to resume his investigation on Venezuela?

   What is actually happening then?

   What does the recent visit of ICC Prosecutor Karim Khan to Venezuela and the ICC’s decision to open an office there mean?

   What are the victims and human rights organizations working on these cases doing?

Washington Office of Latin America. United States of America 2023. 15p.

By Saba Kassa

Politics matters for the success of anti-corruption and asset recovery efforts. This report discusses the political and governance factors that affect the performance of the justice system in relation to anti-corruption and asset recovery. It also provides guidance on assessing these factors systematically with the goal of developing adaptive strategies to strengthen the justice chain in line with changing contexts. The Assessment and Monitoring Framework presented here is a state-of-the-art methodology to think and work politically to strengthen rule of law systems. It draws on the experience and insights of ICAR staff working with anti-corruption institutions across the globe. It responds to a gap in the existing toolbox of anti-corruption practitioners, given that existing political economy methodologies have not sufficiently focused on the contextual factors that impinge on the performance effectiveness of the different anti-corruption institutions constituting the justice chain.

Working Paper 52,

Basel, SWIT: Basel Institute on Governance, 2024. 24p.

By Scarlet Wannenwetsch

Since its first use by the World Bank in 2008, the concept of “anti-corruption Collective Action” has evolved into a well-established best practice to prevent corruption and strengthen business integrity. This paper captures the specific characteristics of anti-corruption Collective Action that have emerged over time and translates them into an easy-to-grasp typology that reflects both the variety and unifying principles that make up the Collective Action ecosystem. It aims to: • spark new impetus for engagement; • open the concept to new stakeholders, topics and environments; and • support existing initiatives in developing their long-term visions and aims. In addition to supporting practitioners, updating the typology will also help strengthen the case for Collective Action as a normative corruption prevention practice 

  This Working Paper presents an updated typology for anti-corruption Collective Action, a concept first defined by the World Bank in 2008. The new typology aims to reflect the realities and evolution of Collective Action, which is now becoming a well-established best practice for preventing corruption and strengthening business integrity. The paper seeks to enhance understanding, encourage broader stakeholder engagement and support the long-term visions of existing initiatives. The typology builds on the key characteristics of Collective Action that have developed into common denominators over time: • Private-sector engagement: Collective Action is primarily driven by businesses, often in collaboration with governments and civil society. • Focus on addressing corruption: Initiatives target corruption and corruption-related risks. • Commitment to raising integrity standards: Collective Action aims to level the playing field through sustained engagement and concrete actions. Using these common characteristics, the paper identifies three distinct categories of Collective Action initiatives: 1. Engagement-focused initiatives: Centered on trust building, knowledge sharing and collaborative efforts to strengthen business integrity. 2. Standard-setting initiatives: Developing industry- or country-specific anti-corruption frameworks, codes of conduct and best practices. 3. Assurance-focused initiatives: Incorporating external verification, compliance certification and monitoring mechanisms to ensure accountability. These categories operate within a Collective Action ecosystem, where initiatives are interconnected and capable of evolving and transitioning between categories. The paper highlights the importance of trust, commitment and private-sector leadership. It also identifies challenges, such as avoiding free riding and ensuring credibility. The paper finds that Collective Action has evolved into a dynamic and adaptable approach that must remain flexible and responsive to context. Rather than prescribing rigid methodologies, a broader focus on the Collective Action ecosystem is necessary to help stakeholders effectively engage. Currently, Collective Action faces a critical juncture: the growing number of high-level commitments is contrasted with challenges in translating them into practical collaboration between the public and private sectors. A key concern is preventing Collective Action from becoming a mere tick-box exercise rather than a meaningful mechanism to drive business integrity To safeguard its impact, a robust ecosystem anchored by an active community of practice must guide how governments, regional organisations and international bodies integrate Collective Action into their anti-corruption frameworks. To successfully “mainstream” Collective Action, the community must adopt a shared language and further provide clarity of concept. The typology presented in this paper serves as a building block. There is still a long way to go, requiring concerted efforts from the Collective Action community to come together to define and drive what meaningful progress looks like.   

Working Paper 56, 

Basel, SWIT: Basel Institute on Governance. 2025. 39p.

By Jonathan Fisher

. At its most simple, the disclosure of unused material is the process whereby information gathered during an investigation is passed from the prosecution to the defence. The information disclosed should assist the defence in arguing the most compelling version of their case. The obligation placed upon the prosecution to disclose certain pertinent material acts as an essential safeguard. We have learnt through bitter experience that disclosure errors, whether deliberate or through negligence, can lead to cases collapsing or worse, a miscarriage of justice. Such events are lamentable and erode the public’s trust in the criminal justice system.. When in the autumn of 1981 I started practice at the Bar, my Opinions, Advices and Pleadings were written in manuscript or dictated into a hand-held tape-recording machine. They were then typed by a professional typist, using an Imperial typewriter with carbon paper to produce a copy. Similarly, most business records were kept on paper and retained manually in files. Rules regarding disclosure of unused material generated in a criminal investigation were governed by the innate fairness of the common law which required a prosecutor to pass information to a defendant where the material assisted the defence case.. Fifteen years later, it was recognised that a more sophisticated approach to disclosure was required. This followed a series of cases in which failure to disclose information to a defendant was responsible for some grievous miscarriages of justice. At the same time, reliance on documentary evidence and expert witness testimony increased. When the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996 (CPIA)1 was enacted, the new statutory based rules of disclosure were regarded as state of the art, providing a sound foundation for criminal trials to proceed on a sure footing in the new millennium. Since then, the technological revolution has brought radical changes in work practices, and the position now looks rather different. Nearly 30 years have passed since the CPIA was enacted. At that time, internet connections were typically made via dial-up modems, with downloading speeds sufficient for basic web browsing and email, but little more. As technology improved and information could be stored electronically, the volume of unused material generated in a criminal investigation grew exponentially. This development occurred against a background in which the CPIA did not directly address the way in which digital information should be reviewed by a prosecutor and made available to a defendant when the test for disclosure of unused material was satisfied. Concern regarding the operation of this process is the reason why previous Reviews were established. Yet the world has not stood still since the last Independent Review on this subject over a decade ago. Indeed, society in the United Kingdom continues to embrace technological advancements, including artificial intelligence, in many aspects of our lives. Furthermore, the very nature of criminal offending, as it has done throughout history, continues to evolve, taking advantage of new online enablers. The rise in digital material across the whole gamut of criminal cases, and its implications for the disclosure regime, is the very reason why I was tasked to consider, once again, whether the regime is fit for the modern age. Today, the largest investigation case on the Serious Fraud Office (SFO) system has 48 million documents (6.5 terabytes of data). With this volume of digital material, it is inconceivable that the totality of unused material generated in the investigation can be accurately reviewed and scheduled by investigating officers manually, in the traditional way. It is also a gross waste of resource for investigating officers to spend time on banal and unproductive activity. Electronic material has become commonplace in even the smallest of cases. Body camera material features (or should feature) in every case where a motorist is stopped by the police, and it is estimated that on average there are 7.4 digital devices in every home. Each of these devices can retain thousands of pieces of information which might be relevant to a prosecutor or defendant in a criminal case.

London: Home Office, 2025. 224p.

By Oscar Solórzano

This Working Paper explores the wide variety of non-conviction based (NCB) forfeiture laws in Latin America, with a special focus on the region’s predominant model, Extinción de dominio.

It argues that NCB forfeiture legislation, which allows for the recovery of stolen assets outside of criminal proceedings, can contribute significantly to a state’s criminal policy response to rampant economic and organised crime.

The paper emphasises the importance of critically reviewing and harmonising domestic practices of NCB forfeiture around emerging standards, so that they can reach their large potential in asset recovery. Ensuring their alignment with international human rights and other recognised norms and procedural rules ultimately builds trust, lends legitimacy and fosters judicial cooperation in international NCB forfeiture cases.

Working paper 54.

Basel, SWIT: Basel Institute on Governance, 2024. 61p.

By Jacob D. Charles & Darrell A.H. Miller

From subtle shifts in the procedural mechanics of self-defense doctrine to substantive expansions of justified lethal force, legislatures are delegating larger amounts of “violence work” to the private sphere. These regulatory innovations layer on top of existing rules that broadly authorize private violence—both defensive and offensive—for self-protection and the ostensible maintenance of law and order. Yet such significant authority for private violence, and the values it projects, can have tragic real-world consequences, especially for marginalized communities and people of color. We argue that these expansions of private violence tap into an ancient form of social control—outlawry: the removal of the sovereign’s protection from a person and the empowerment of private violence in service of law enforcement and punishment. Indeed, we argue that regulatory innovations in the law of self-defense, defense of property, and citizen’s arrest form a species of “New Outlawry” that test constitutional boundaries and raise profound questions about law and violence, private and public action. Simultaneously, we use the New Outlawry as a frame to explore connections between several constitutional doctrines heretofore considered distinct. Whether limits on authorized private violence fall under the state action doctrine, the private nondelegation doctrine, due process or equal protection, or the republican form of government guarantee, experimentation with the New Outlawry provides an opportunity to explore how these different doctrinal categories share common jurisprudential and normative roots in the state’s monopoly over legitimate violence.

124 Columbia Law Review 1195 (2024)