By The HALTSolitary Campaign & Mental Health

New York State prisons had an epidemic of suicides in 2024, with the widespread use of solitary
confinement in violation of the HALT Solitary Confinement Law contributing significantly to this
crisis. According to data provided by the New York State Office of Mental Health (OMH) and
published by the Correctional Association of New York, 25 people died by suicide in 2024. The
number of people who died was more than double the previous year, the highest number since
at least 2000, more than triple the rate of deaths by suicide annually in New York prisons from
2000 to 2023, and more than four times the rate of deaths by suicide in prisons across the
country.

Looking at the locations where these deaths occurred reveals that a vastly disproportionate
number of deaths by suicide took place in solitary confinement. The Department of Corrections
and Community Supervision (DOCCS) has been systematically violating the HALT Solitary
Confinement Law. Among other violations, DOCCS has been locking people who have mental
health needs in solitary in violation of the law’s explicit ban on such confinement. DOCCS has
also been operating so-called alternatives to solitary – including Residential Rehabilitation Units
(RRUs) and Residential Mental Health Units (RMHUs) – as solitary by another name by denying
people the out-of-cell time and group programming required by the law.
These violations have caused devastating harm and death, as the recently released data
shows. In 2024, at least nine of the 25 people who died by suicide, or 36%, were in official
isolation units – namely three people in Special Housing Units (SHUs), three people in RRUs,
and three people in RMHUs. Given that these units hold a relatively small percentage of people
in DOCCS prisons, the rates of death by suicide among people in one of these isolation settings
are vastly disproportionate compared to the rates of death by suicide among people in
non-isolation settings.

Specifically, people died by suicide in isolation units at a rate more than seven times higher than
people in non-isolation settings, including nearly 23 times higher in SHU, three times higher in
RRU, and nearly 32 times higher in RMHU than in non-isolation settings.
Looking at self-harm more broadly, over 60% of self-harm incidents took place in isolation
settings, including SHU, RRU, and RMHU, as well as the Behavioral Health Unit/Therapeutic
Behavioral Unit (BHU/TBU), Residential Crisis Treatment Program (RCTP), and protective
custody. These isolation units had rates of self-harm over 15 times the rates of self-harm in
non-isolation settings, with the rates in SHU 19 times higher than in non-isolation settings, rates
in the RMHU 35 times higher than in non-isolation settings, rates in the BHU/TBU 316 times
higher than in non-isolation settings, rates in the combined disciplinary Residential Mental
Health Treatment Units (RMHTUs) of nearly 50 times higher than in non-isolation settings, and
rates in the RCTP 162 times higher than in non-isolation settings.

By Gillian Slee

Research on reentry has documented how material hardship, network dynamics, and carceral governance impede reintegration after prison, but existing scholarship has left underdeveloped other instances in which adverse outcomes stem from the institution's socioemotional dynamics and people's practical and emotional responses to bureaucratic indignities. Drawing on more than 2 years of ethnographic fieldwork with people on parole in Philadelphia, this study analyzes three sources of adversity that occur because reentry institutions’ or actors’ practices are incompatible with the behaviors and needs of system-involved people. I demonstrate how unrecognized vulnerability, discretion's benefits and drawbacks, and risk-escalating rules contribute to adverse outcomes—withdrawal and rule-breaking—that sometimes lead to reincarceration. In failing to account for aspects of human agency and dignity, such as the ability to provide for oneself and to advance personal and familial well-being, parole guidelines often prompted withdrawal and subversion.

By ALISSA SKOG AND JOHANNA LACOE 

California’s Three Strikes sentencing law lengthens prison sentences based on an individual’s prior convictions, specifically adding a “strike” for each prior “serious” or “violent” felony. Under the original law, a person with two prior strikes who was convicted of any third felony — regardless of whether it was serious or violent — faced a mandatory sentence of 25 years to life. This approach led to lengthy sentences for individuals whose third offense was neither serious nor violent, prompting concern about fairness and over-incarceration. In response, voters passed Proposition 36 in 2012, which generally limits the 25-years-to-life sentence to cases in which the third felony is also serious or violent. Although Prop 36 did not change the rule that a second strike results in a doubled sentence, it created a resentencing pathway for people serving third-strike life sentences for non-serious, non-violent offenses. Individuals that met the new criteria could petition the court for a reduced sentence, helping align past sentences with current sentencing standards. This brief examines who was resentenced under Prop 36, the offenses for which they were originally convicted, and their recidivism rates following release. Key findings • More than 2,200 people were resentenced and released earlier due to changes in California’s ThreeStrikes sentencing. There were 2,217 people incarcerated in California’s prisons for a non-serious, non-violent third-strike that were released earlier after Prop 36 prohibited the application of a 25-year-to-life sentence for these offenses and allowed people already incarcerated with this sentence to apply for resentencing. • People released under Prop 36 were largely Black and aged 50 or older at the time of release. Almost half (46%) of those released under Prop 36 were Black — compared to approximately 6% of California’s resident population and 24% of people released from prison in fiscal year 2018-19. Over two-thirds were 50 years old or older at release and 59% spent more than 15 years in prison. • Three-year recidivism rates for people released due to Prop 36 resentencing were lower than the total release population. Twenty-five percent of people released under Prop 36 were convicted of a new offense within three years, and nearly two-thirds of those convictions were for misdemeanors. In comparison, 42% of total releases were convicted of a new offense within three years, and 26% were misdemeanors.

By ALISSA SKOG AND JOHANNA LACOE 

Research series examining second look policies in California The five policy briefs and overview report in this series describe the characteristics and recidivism rates of individuals affected by second look policies in California. Committee on Revision of the Penal Code Criminal justice system reforms — especially those revising sentencing laws — often have applied only to new cases. This means that individuals who were already sentenced under outdated laws will not benefit from the reforms. Prior to 2018, California law allowed a three-year sentence enhancement for anyone with a prior conviction for possession of a controlled substance who was later convicted of another drug offense. Senate Bill 180 (2018) repealed this enhancement except in cases involving minors. Similarly, Penal Code § 667.5(b) allowed a one-year enhancement for any prior prison or felony jail term. But, in 2020, Senate Bill 136 went into effect, restricting this enhancement to only be applied in cases where the individual had prior convictions for sexually violent offenses. However, neither SB 180 nor SB 136 applied retroactively — meaning thousands of people remained incarcerated under enhancements no longer active in the state. To address this gap, Senate Bill 483 (effective 2022) authorized courts to resentence individuals serving time for enhancements repealed under SB 180 and SB 136. The goal of this bill, which was based on a recommendation from the Committee on Revision of the Penal Code, was to bring past sentences in line with current sentencing standards and reduce unnecessary incarceration. This brief examines who was resentenced under SB 483, the offenses for which they were originally convicted, and the recidivism rates for people who have been released. Key findings • More than 3,000 people have been resentenced under SB 483. Most of those resentenced (92%) had a oneyear prior prison enhancement. As of December 2024, just over one-third had been released from prison. • People resentenced under SB 483 were largely Black or Hispanic and in their early 30s at the time of their offense. Black and Hispanic individuals made up 75% of those resentenced under SB 483, at 38% and 37%, respectively, with a median offense age of 31 across all racial and ethnic groups. • The median sentence reduction after resentencing under SB 483 was approximately two years. • People resentenced under SB 483 had typically spent a long time in prison. The median time in prison was slightly less than 13 years, and nearly twothirds had served at least 10 years. • Early recidivism rates were slightly lower than the general release population. Among the 356 individuals with one year of post-release data, 18% were convicted of a new offense, compared to 21% of people released from prison in fiscal year 2018–19. Eight percent had a new felony conviction and 10% had a new misdemeanor 

• The median sentence reduction after resentencing under SB 483 was approximately two years. • People resentenced under SB 483 had typically spent a long time in prison. The median time in prison was slightly less than 13 years, and nearly twothirds had served at least 10 years. • Early recidivism rates were slightly lower than the general release population. Among the 356 individuals with one year of post-release data, 18% were convicted of a new offense, compared to 21% of people released from prison in fiscal year 2018–19. Eight percent had a new felony conviction and 10% had a new misdemeanor

By ALISSA SKOG AND JOHANNA LACOE 

Research series examining second look policies in California The five policy briefs and overview report in this series describe the characteristics and recidivism rates of individuals affected by second look policies in California. Committee on Revision of the Penal Code In 2018, the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) implemented a new process to identify and refer incarcerated people for resentencing under Penal Code § 1172.1 (then codified as § 1170(d)). This initiative aimed to reduce sentencing disparities and recognize rehabilitation during incarceration. Though prosecutors and courts can also initiate resentencing under this law, this data is not tracked statewide and not included in this analysis. Under this process, CDCR can recommend that a person’s sentence be recalled and modified based on specific criteria: changes in sentencing laws, exceptional conduct while incarcerated, or requests from law enforcement or judicial officials. Staff from CDCR's case records department typically refer people due to legal changes affecting their sentence, while CDCR staff who have direct knowledge of a person’s conduct may request that a warden evaluate the case for an exceptional conduct recommendation. All referrals are reviewed by the CDCR Secretary, who decides whether to forward them to the sentencing court for possible resentencing. This brief examines CDCR-initiated resentencing referrals, the individuals resentenced, the offenses for which they were originally convicted, and their recidivism rates following release. Key findings • Since 2018, the CDCR Secretary has referred more than 2,200 people for resentencing More than half of these referrals occurred within the first two years of the policy going into effect. • However, fewer than half of those referred by the CDCR Secretary were granted resentencing. As of December 2024, 47% of individuals referred by the Secretary had been resentenced, while 786 cases were denied. • Most people were resentenced based on changes in sentencing laws. Among those released, 84% were resentenced due to changes in the law, while 16% were resentenced for demonstrating exceptional conduct during incarceration.• Women made up a larger share of those resentenced for exceptional conduct compared to their share of the incarcerated population. Women made up 17% of exceptional-conduct resentencings, which is more than twice their share of total releases (7%) and triple their share (5%) under sentencing-law resentencings. • New conviction rates were low among those resentenced and released. Within one year, 4% of people released through CDCR-initiated resentencing were convicted of a new offense, compared to 21% of total releases. Three-year rates are similarly lower, though we can only show three-year outcomes for 39% of these individuals. • Only five people resentenced for exceptional conduct were convicted of a new offense within three years. Of the 93 people resentenced for exceptional conduct who can be observed three years post release, none were convicted of a new serious or violent felony during that time.

By ALISSA SKOG AND JOHANNA LACOE 

Over the past 13 years, California has implemented numerous criminal justice reforms aimed at reducing prison sentences, limiting the use of sentencing enhancements, and shrinking the state’s prison population . Many of these reforms include “second look” provisions, allowing courts to review older sentences in light of new policies, and where appropriate, apply new laws retroactively . The efforts reflect a broader shift toward proportional sentencing, rehabilitation, and more equitable sentences . California’s resentencing policies are wide-ranging, affecting individuals serving sentences for both low-level, non-violent offenses and violent felony convictions with lengthy terms . To date, approximately 11,900 people have been resentenced under these laws . This research provides the first in-depth look at who is affected by these reforms and their recidivism rates . In this report and a series of accompanying policy briefs, we examine five of the most prominent resentencing policies enacted between 2012 and 2022 (Figure 1) . We present the number of people released from California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) custody under each reform, their demographic and case characteristics, and their recidivism rates . For context, we also provide summary statistics and recidivism rates for all individuals released from CDCR custody in fiscal year 2018–19