By Benjamin Heller

New York City already has a plan to close Rikers Island by 2027 and replace it with a smaller, more humane borough-based jail system. City leader now have a unique opportunitiy to rightsize the Department of Correction: recalibrating its budget and reshaping its workforce to meet the needs of a signficantly smalled jail system and unlocking millions of dollars in savings that could be reinvested in commnites. As the transition to a borough-based jail system draws nearer, DOC needs a blueprint to right size and reinvent itself rather than simply export the current dysfunction on Rikers Island to new location. Ultimately, New York City’s leaders must create this blueprint now to provide DOC and other relevant agencies with adequate time and guidance to phase in new policies and practices before the completion of the borough-based jail system.

New York: Vera Institute of Justice, 2022

By Melissa Young, Clarence Okoh, and Jason Whyte

Now more than ever, Congress has a national imperative to advance comprehensive policy reforms that seek to remedy the harms caused by the criminal legal system, heal communities, and restore rights and access to opportunity. The federal Reentry Employment Opportunities (REO) Program has the potential to be a critical programmatic element of a comprehensive effort.

In this brief, the Center for Law and Social Policy (CLASP) and the National Reentry Workforce Collaborative (NRWC) offer a set of recommendations to strengthen and modernize the REO program to ensure that a greater number of people impacted by the criminal legal system have access to quality jobs through effective, equitable, and culturally responsive practices.

Our recommendations are grounded in the perspectives of current REO programs, partners, and intermediaries across the country. Additionally, our recommendations build from two recent proposals to codify the REO program from Senator Gary Peters (D-MI) through the Reentry Employment Opportunities Act of 2020 (Senate Bill 4387) and the House-passed Workforce Innovation and Opportunity Act of 2022 (House Bill 7309).

Washington, DC: CLASP, 2022. 6p.

By Aaron Littman

The machinery of mass incarceration in America is huge, intricate, and destructive. To understand it and to tame it, scholars and activists look for its levers of power—where are they, who holds them, and what motivates them? This much we know: legislators criminalize, police arrest, prosecutors charge, judges sentence, prison officials confine, and probation and parole officials manage release.

As this Article reveals, jailers, too, have their hands on the controls. The sheriffs who run jails—along with the county commissioners who fund them—have tremendous but unrecognized power over the size and shape of our criminal legal system, particularly in rural areas and for people accused or convicted of low-level crimes.

Because they have the authority to build jails (or not) as well as the authority to release people (or not), they exercise significant control not merely over conditions but also over both the supply of and demand for jail bedspace: how large they should be, how many people they should confine, and who those people should be. By advocating, financing, and contracting for jail bedspace, sheriffs and commissioners determine who has a say and who has a stake in carceral expansion and contraction. Through their exercise of arrest and release powers, sheriffs affect how many and which people fill their cells. Constraints they create or relieve on carceral infrastructure exert or alleviate pressure on officials at the local, state, and federal levels.

Drawing on surveys of state statutes and of municipal securities filings, data from the Bureau of Justice Statistics, case law, and media coverage, this Article tells overlooked stories—of sheriffs who send their deputies out door knocking to convince voters to support a new tax to fund a new jail, and of commissioners who raise criminal court fees and sign contracts to detain “rental inmates” to ensure that incarceration “pays for itself.” It also tells of sheriffs who override the arrest decisions of city police officers, release defendants who have not made bail, and cut sentences short—and of those who would rather build more beds than push back on carceral inertia.

A spotlight on jails and the officials who run them illuminates important attributes of our carceral crisis. The power and incentives to build jail bedspace are as consequential as the power and incentives to fill it. Expanding a county’s jailing capacity has profound ramifications across local, state, and federal criminal legal systems. Sheriffs have a unique combination of controls over how big and how full their jails are, but this role consolidation does not produce the restraint that some have predicted. Their disclaimers of responsibility are a smokescreen, obscuring sheriffs’ bureaucratic commitment to perpetuating mass incarceration. State courts and federal agencies have increasingly recognized and regulated public profiteering through jail contracting, and advocates have begun to hold jailers accountable, challenging expansion in polling booths and budget meetings.

74 Vanderbilt Law Review 861 (2021)

By Aaron Littman

What law governs American prisons and jails, and what does it matter? This Article offers new answers to both questions.

To many scholars and advocates, “prison law” means the constitutional limits that the Eighth Amendment and Due Process Clauses impose on permissible punishment. Yet, as I show, 'free-world' regulatory law also shapes incarceration, determining the safety of the food imprisoned people eat, the credentials of their health-care providers, the costs of communicating with their family members, and whether they are exposed to wildfire smoke or rising floodwaters.

Unfortunately, regulatory law’s protections often recede at the prison gate. Sanitation inspectors visit correctional kitchens, find coolers smeared with blood and sinks without soap—and give passing grades. Medical licensure boards permit suspended doctors to practice—but only on incarcerated people. Constitutional law does not fill the gap, treating standards like a threshold for toxic particulates or the requirements of a fire code more as a safe harbor than a floor.

But were it robustly applied, I argue, free-world regulatory law would have a lot to offer those challenging carceral conditions that constitutional prison law lacks. Whether you think that criminal-justice policy’s problem is its lack of empirical grounding or you want to shift power and resources from systems of punishment to systems of care, I contend that you should take a close look at free-world regulatory law behind bars, and work to strengthen it.

131 Yale Law Journal 1385 (2022)

UCLA School of Law, Public Law Research Paper No. 22-18

Edited by Kenneth E. Kerle, American Jail Association

“People familiar with the American jail scene realize that jails rank at the bottom of the criminal justice hierarchy in influence. Courts, prosecuting attorneys, police, and even probation and parole offi­cials exert more political clout than jail administrators. Jail popu­lation figures have nearly doubled in a decade, and now more than 300,000 ADP (average daily population) are found in the 3,338 jails in the 3,000 plus counties and cities that operate these institutions of incarceration. During 1987, there were more than 17 million ad­missions and releases from county and city jails. These local gov­ernment agencies serve as the dumping grounds for the arrested criminal, the chronic drunk, the DWI (driving while intoxicated), the mentally ill, the homeless, and juveniles ranging from the run­away to the amoral killer.”

Nelson-Hall. 1991. 299p.

By Michigan Joint Task Force on Jail and Pretrial Incarceration

Michigan’s jail population has tripled from 1975 to 2016. To learn what led to this dramatic increase and identify alternatives, state and county leaders launched the Michigan Joint Task Force on Jail and Pretrial Incarceration in the spring of 2019. The Task Force examined 10 years of arrest data gathered from more than 600 law enforcement agencies across the state, 10 years of court data collected from nearly 200 district and circuit courts, and three years of individual-level admission data from a diverse sample of 20 county jails. This report includes key findings and 18 recommendations for state lawmakers to help reduce jail admissions.

Ann Arbor: State of Michigan, 2021. 47p.

By Anna Harvey, Orion Taylor and Andrea Wang

This report, updating the September 2020 Impact Report on COVID-19, Jails, and Public Safety, draws on a sample of approximately 19 million daily individual-level jail records collected by New York University's Public Safety Lab between Jan. 1, 2020 and Oct. 22, 2020. We explore how bookings, releases, and rebooking rates changed during the pandemic, relative to the pre-pandemic period. + Jail populations in the sample decreased by an average of 31% over the six weeks following the March 16 issuance of the White House "Coronavirus Guidelines for America," which expired on April 30. Jail populations then increased and have since recovered half of these decreases, despite explosive COVID-19 case growth in many of the counties in the sample. Counties with higher countywide COVID-19 case growth between March 1 and Oct. 22 have not seen larger reductions in jail populations. The decreases in jail populations after the issuance of the White House Guidelines on March 16, and the lack of responsiveness of jail populations to local COVID prevalence after those guidelines expired, suggest the importance of clear policy directives for reducing disease transmission risk within county jails. + Jail bookings dropped sharply in mid-March and remain on average 36% below pre-pandemic levels. As bookings declined, the characteristics of those booked into jails shifted. Those booked into jails between mid-March and late October were booked on more charges on average, were more likely to be booked on felony charges, and were less likely to be booked on lesser charges like…..

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  failure to appear, than those booked into jails prior to this period. + Although jail bookings dropped after mid-March, those booked into jails were detained for longer periods of time. Average detention duration increased sharply after mid-March, doubling from about 15 to 30 days, and remains nearly twice as high as the pre-pandemic average detention duration. This increase has offset reductions in admissions, and contributed to rebounding jail populations observed since mid-March. + Parallel to trends in daily bookings, daily releases dropped sharply in mid-March and remain approximately 40% below baseline levels. Those released from jails between mid-March and late October had been booked on more charges on average, were more likely to have been booked on felony charges, and were less likely to have been booked on lesser charges such as failure to appear, than those released from jails prior to mid-March.  The rate at which those released from detention are rebooked into jail following release is one possible measure of the public safety risk of jail releases. To date, 30-, 60-, 90-, and 180-day rebooking rates among those released during the pandemic have remained 13% - 33% below pre-pandemic rebooking rates. To the extent that rebooking rates measure the average public safety risk of releasing individuals from jail, this risk remains lower now than prior to the pandemic. + While the proportion of Black individuals among daily jail admissions did not change appreciably during the pandemic, the proportion of Black people among those released from jails during the pandemic decreased by approximately 5% relative to the pre-pandemic period. As a result, the proportion of jail populations composed of Black individuals rose during the pandemic.   

Washington, D.C.: Council on Criminal Justice, December 2020. 27p.

By The Fines and Fees Justice Center

For the purposes of this report, EM is defined as any technology used to track, monitor, or limit an individual’s physical movement or alcohol consumption. It, and the costs associated with it, may be imposed as a condition of probation, parole, diversion, or some other community-based sentence or as a condition of pretrial release for those who have not been found guilty of anything. Its use is widespread in both the juvenile and adult criminal court systems. In most states, the individuals on EM are required to pay—daily, weekly, monthly, or flat fees—in order to be tracked, monitored, and have their liberty curtailed. Failure to pay such fees can lead to extended periods of supervision, additional fees, or even jail. This report will primarily focus on the ways state, local, and municipal governments or courts impose fees on people placed on these devices. It specifically examines the quagmire of how and when states are charging, or allowing others to charge, EM fees to individuals ordered into these programs. We do this by focusing our examination on legislative authorization and statewide court rules that authorize EM fees. We examined statutes and rules from all 50 states and the District of Columbia to determine whether their codes authorize fees for electronic monitoring at any point in the criminal legal system and to what extent.5 We explore statutes related to both pretrial release and post-sentencing supervision, the fee amounts authorized, consequences for nonpayment and, to a limited extent, electronic monitoring fees at the local level.

New York: Fines & Fees Justice Center, 2022. 24p.