By The Investigative Committee

This is the interim report of the Investigative Committee on the Robb Elementary Shooting of the Texas House of Representatives. Conscious of the desire of the Uvalde community and the public at large to receive an accurate account of the tragedy at Robb Elementary School, the Committee has worked diligently and with care to issue this interim report of its factual findings. The Committee’s work is not complete. We do not have access to all material witnesses. Medical examiners have not yet issued any reports about their findings, and multiple other investigations remain ongoing. The Committee believes this interim report constitutes the most complete telling to date of the events of and leading to the May 24, 2022, tragedy. This Committee has prioritized factual accuracy, as will be evident from our attention to conducting our own interviews and documenting our sources of information. Still, based on the experiences of past mass-shooting events, we understand some aspects of these interim findings may be disputed or disproven in the future. The Committee issues this interim report now, believing the victims, their families, and the entire Uvalde community have already waited too long for answers and transparency.

Austin, TX: Texas House of Representatives, 2022. 82p.

By U.S. Department of Homeland Security

An Active Shooter is an individual actively engaged in killing or attempting to kill people in a confined and populated area; in most cases, active shooters use firearms(s) and there is no pattern or method to their selection of victims. Active shooter situations are unpredictable and evolve quickly. Typically, the immediate deployment of law enforcement is required to stop the shooting and mitigate harm to victims. Because active shooter situations are often over within 10 to 15 minutes, before law enforcement arrives on the scene, individuals must be prepared both mentally and physically to deal with an active shooter situation.

Washington, DC: US Department of Homeland Security, 2008 13p.

By The Sandy Hook Advisory Commission

On December 14, 2012, one of the most vicious and incomprehensible domestic attacks in American history occurred at Sandy Hook Elementary School in Newtown, Connecticut. Within a few hours, the world understood the gravity of the attack. Lives were lost in two distinct locations: Sandy Hook Elementary School and a private residence in Newtown. The scope of the tragedy would take on international proportions, and people from around the world would grieve and mourn alongside the families of Newtown.

Hartford, CT: Sandy Hook Advisory Commission, 2015) 277p.

By Jaclyn Schildkraut

The May 24, 2022, mass shooting at Robb Elementary School in Uvalde, TX, where 19 fourth grade students and two of their teachers were killed and 17 others were injured, reignited a national discourse about preparing school communities for similar tragedies. Proposals ranging from armed teachers to clear backpacks were circulated, despite the lack of empirical evidence to support their efficacy in situations like Uvalde. This leaves an important question for stakeholders charged with keeping school communities safe: what is the best way to reduce the harm caused by these events that is evidence-based?.

Despite the widespread use of lockdown drills in US schools, the conversation about their efficacy remains contentious and often is not guided by empirical evidence. This brief provides an overview of the scholarly evidence surrounding lockdown drills, as well as considerations of best practices, an important foundation for policymakers tasked with keeping students and staff safe and for the public to better understand their utility in schools.

Albany, NY: Rockefeller Institute of Government, 2022. 20p.

By Jason R. Silva and Emily A. Greene-Colozzi

This research brief will explore what we know about foiled and failed mass school shootings—referring to incidents and plots that resulted in zero victim casualties. Findings will illustrate the common mass school shooting perpetrator and incident characteristics, as well as what contributed to these attacks being thwarted. Actionable takeaways based on the research will illustrate future strategies for prevention and intervention including leakage and warning signs, as well as situational crime prevention.

Albany, NY: Rockefeller Institute of Government, 2022. 24p.

By Graduate Institute of International Studies (Geneva, Switzerland)

The Small Arms Survey 2001: Profiling the Problem is an authoritative guide to all aspects of the problem of small arms and light weapons. It focuses on both small arms themselves (production, transfers, stockpiles), and on the processes and impacts of their world-wide proliferation.

Specific sections deal with issues such as arms brokering, the role of small arms and light weapons in particular conflict zones, current international initiatives and projects to stem their proliferation, and with broader social and economic effects (crime, public health, development).

Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2001.

By Graduate Institute of International Studies (Geneva, Switzerland)

The Small Arms Survey 2003: Development Denied presents the most complete assessment of the spread of small arms around the world and their effect on society. Stressing the link between small arms and global development, it includes special chapters examining the role of small arms in Africa (Congo), the Arab world (Yemen) and the former-Soviet Union (Georgia).

Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2003.

By Graduate Institute of International Studies (Geneva, Switzerland), Small Arms Survey

The Small Arms Survey 2005: Weapons at War is dedicated to exploring issues surrounding armed conflict, including the sourcing of weapons to conflict areas, weapons use, conflict deaths, and post-conflict disarmament initiatives.

This edition also provides an overview of small arms ammunition issues as well as new and updated information on small arms production, stockpiles, transfers, and international measures. It also presents two case studies: one exploring the concept of 'gun culture' in Kosovo, the other focusing on the Central African Republic. In addition, this volume surveys representations of small arms and armed violence in contemporary art.

Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2005.

By Graduate Institute of International Studies (Geneva, Switzerland), Small Arms Survey

The Small Arms Survey 2006: Unfinished Business offers new and updated information on small arms production, stockpiles, transfers, and measures, including a review of the International Tracing Instrument.

This year's thematic chapters examine issues such as the demand for weapons, small arms and security sector reform, and the economic costs of small arms use. This edition also features case studies on small arms violence in Papua New Guinea and Colombia, armed groups in West Africa, and the Lord's Resistance Army in northern Uganda. The final chapter—'Angry Young Men'—considers why young men account for the lion's share of global small arms violence.

Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2006

By Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies (Geneva, Switzerland), Small Arms Survey

The Small Arms Survey 2008: Risk and Resilience presents two thematic sections. The first examines the problem of diversion as related to stockpiles, international transfers, and end-user documentation. It includes a case study on South Africa and a comic strip illustrating the potential ease by which someone with access to forged documentation can make arrangements to ship munitions virtually anywhere. The second thematic section analyses the public health approach to armed violence, scrutinizing risk and resilience factors and considering related interventions. It includes an overview of the burden of armed violence, and two case studies of armed violence in El Salvador and the United States. A chapter on light weapons production rounds out the volume.

Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2008.

By Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies (Geneva, Switzerland), Small Arms Survey

The Small Arms Survey 2009: Shadows of War contains two thematic sections. The first highlights the challenges of ensuring security after the formal end of war and comprises an overview chapter and three case studies (Aceh, Afghanistan, and Southern Lebanon). The second thematic section explores various aspects of small arms transfers, including the value of the authorized trade, national controls, and weapons tracing. Additional chapters focus on small arms measures and impacts.

Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2009.

By Geneva Small Arms Survey

The Small Arms Survey 2012: Moving Targets looks at what is changing, and not changing, in relation to armed violence and small arms proliferation. Chapters on firearm homicide in Latin America and the Caribbean, drug violence in selected Latin American countries, and non-lethal violence worldwide illustrate that security is a moving target; armed violence continues to undermine security and well-being around the world. The goal of curbing small arms proliferation, embodied in the UN Programme of Action, appears similarly elusive. Chapters on illicit small arms in war zones, trade transparency, Somali piracy, and the 2011 UN Meeting of Governmental Experts highlight some of the successes and challenges in this area. Country studies examine Kazakhstan and Somaliland. The final installment of the authorized transfers project looks at the total value of exports and imports globally, including small arms and light weapons, ammunition, and parts and accessories.

Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press 2012.

By Small Arms Survey

The Small Arms Survey 2015: Weapons and the World examines the role of weapons and armed violence in humanity’s appropriation of the earth’s wildlife and mineral riches—in Africa, where the poaching of elephants and rhinos is becoming increasingly militarized, and near resource extraction sites around the world. In addition to presenting updates on the UN small arms process and the top arms importers and exporters, the volume assesses how recent technological developments affect weapons marking, record-keeping, and tracing; reviews small arms flows to Egypt, Libya, and Syria before and after the ‘Arab Spring’; and evaluates a stockpile management initiative in South-east Europe. The ‘armed actors’ section sheds light on the arms and ammunition used by insurgents in northern Mali, the decline of the Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda, and the use of floating armouries by private security companies in the Indian Ocean. This edition also analyses the conditions that are driving young people to adopt high-risk coping strategies in Burundi.

Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2015.

By Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies (Geneva, Switzerland),. Small Arms Survey

The Small Arms Survey 2011: States of Security considers the growth of the private security industry and its firearms holdings worldwide; private security use by multinational corporations; emerging weapons technology ; and legislative controls over civilian possession of firearms. Case studies provide original research on ongoing security challenges in Côte d’Ivoire, Haiti, and Madagascar. This edition also presents the 2011 Small Arms Trade Transparency Barometer, an estimate of the annual authorized trade in light weapons, and reviews developments related to small arms control at the United Nations.

Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2011..

By London Assembly, Police and Crime Committee

Taser is the brand name of the ‘conductive energy device’ used by police forces in England and Wales. Taser is a laser‐sighted, single shot weapon designed to incapacitate a subject through the use of an electrical current, which temporarily interferes with the body’s neuromuscular system. Taser is classed as a restricted firearm under Section 5 of the 1968 Firearms Act. Taser is one of a range of ‘less lethal’ weapons which have been approved by the Home Office. Under United Nations, European Union and national law, the Home Office is responsible for maintaining a range of weapons which allow officers to deploy the least amount of violence necessary to resolve a given situation. In England and Wales, Taser is part of a series of potential interventions which vary from verbal negotiation to CS spray, baton charges and traditional firearms in dealing with potentially disruptive or violent suspects. The term ‘less lethal’ is used as an acknowledgement that any weapon can be lethal if used incorrectly. The Home Office first authorised the use of Taser by the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) in 2003, and then allowed forces to expand its use in 2008. Taser is now used by two types of officer: • Those who had undergone firearms training; and • Additional officers who had been designated members of Specially Trained Units by the Chief Officer in their area.1 The majority of Taser guns are used by specialist firearms officers and officers within the Territorial Support Group.

London: Greater London Authority, 2013. 31p.

By the World Health Organization. Regional Office for Europe.

This report highlights interpersonal violence as the third leading cause of death and a leading cause of disability among people aged 10–29 years in the 53 countries of the WHO European Region. This burden is unequally distributed, and 9 of 10 homicide deaths inthe Region occur in low- and middle-income countries. Irrespective of country income, interpersonal violence disproportionately affects young people from deprived sections of society and males, who comprise 4 of 5 homicide deaths. Numerous biological, social,cultural, economic and environmental factors interact to increase young people’s risk of being involved in violence and knife-related crime. Factors that can protect against violence developing among young people include good social skills, self-esteem, academic achievement, strong bonds with parents, positive peer groups, good attachment to school, community involvement and access to social support. Good evidence indicates that reducing risk factors and enhancing protective factors will reduce violence among young people. The experience accumulated by several countries in the Region and elsewhere shows that social policy and sustained and systematic approaches that address the underlying causes of violence can make countries in the Region much safer. These make compelling arguments for advocating for increased investment in prevention and for mainstreaming objectives for preventing violence among young people into other areas of health and social policy.

Copenhagen: World Health Organization, Regional Office for Europe, 2010. 116p.

By Chris Eades, Roger Grimshaw, Arianna Silvestri. and Enver Solomon

The Centre for Crime and Justice Studies (CCJS) first published this briefing paper in August 2006. It received widespread media coverage and a great deal of interest from the police, voluntary sector organisations and members of the public. This review aims to draw together some of the existing information and research on these issues and makes tentative assessments of the programmes in place to combat knife usage. The paper begins by providing information from the available sources on the extent of the problem as it pertains to different levels of seriousness: the carrying of knives; the use of knives in crime; and the use of knives in homicides. It then investigates possible reasons for knife carrying before establishing which sections of the population are most likely to suffer knife-related offences. Next, assessments are made of the current strategies being considered or used to reduce levels of knife carrying and knife use. These include the national knife amnesty, police stop and search, increased prison sentences, education and awareness-raising, and prevention strategies.

London: Centre for Crime and Justice Studies, King’s College London, 2007. 36p.

By Giacomo Persi Paoli

The potential role of the dark web in facilitating trade in firearms, ammunition and explosives has gained increased public attention following recent terrorist attacks and other criminal activities worldwide. In fact, the hidden and obscured parts of the web are used by criminals and others to access a worldwide market where it’s possible to procure or sell a wide range of weapons and associated products through encrypted marketplaces and vendor shops.

Following the outcomes of the Third United Nations Conference to Review Progress Made in the Implementation of the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, which acknowledged the importance of considering new challenges and opportunities arising from new forms of illicit trafficking, this Occasional Paper summarises the main findings and implications of the first empirical study investigating the scale and scope of arms trafficking on the dark web.

The findings of this study shed light on the scale and scope of arms trafficking on the dark web, illustrating the range of weapons traded, their market price and most common transit routes. In addition, this Occasional Paper discusses the implications of this growing phenomenon for law enforcement agencies and policy makers, highlighting the key role that firearms control measures continue to play in the presence of new forms of trafficking.

New York: United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, 2018. 107p.

By Zaur Borov and Stephen Bowers

The primary focus of this study is on illegal weapons trade in Romania and the Caucasus region of the former USSR. Illegal weapons traffic in these regions is linked with both organized crime and terrorist activities. The main source of weapons for conflicts in the Caucasus region is corruption in Russian military circles. One well-known Arab terrorist organization, the so-called Muslim Brothers, has active connections in Romania. There is a incipient growing of trade with components, products and substances used in the manufacturing of mass destruction weapons (chemical, biological and nuclear). Free trade conventions between the CIS states facilitate illegal weapons transactions in the former USSR. In Eastern Europe there has been a steady increase of trade in components, products and substances used in the manufacturing chemical, biological and nuclear weapons. Many of the most recent Russian weapons, such as the B-94, have gone directly from the factory to the Caucasus arms bazaars. Chechen troops had the B-94 before it was issued to Russian soldiers.

Lynchburg, VA: Liberty University, Center for Security and Science, 2002. 31p.

By Péricles Gasparini Alves

When the terms small arms, light weapons, and firearms are discussed in international debates, it may be thought that the only difference between them is merely a semantic—after all, they all refer to arms which injure and kill people. To a large extent, this is true, but the striking differences in the way these terms are defined, have direct implications as to how, when and with what means illicit trafficking is dealt with nationally and by the international community as a whole….

The present paper seeks to broaden the international debate on the matter by arguing that both the nationalist and internationalist perspectives need to be taken into account in the fight against illicit trafficking. This is demonstrated by the situation in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, where the criminal use of firearms and access to ever-higher calibre weapons is a serious problem; where the number of firearms seized is significant; and where foreign-manufactured firearms constitute over one third of all seizures. The rampant availability of firearms to individuals as well as to semi- or organized crime in Rio de Janeiro and other Brazilian towns and regions, not only threatens the security of ordinary citizens and discredits the rule of law, but could also undermine the stability of the State in the long run. To address the illicit trafficking in firearms at its basis regardless of the end-use of the firearms, whether criminal or State security-oriented, a concerted effort by local, subregional, regional and international authorities is needed. Moreover, for measures put in place to be effective, these must embrace every type of illicitly trafficked firearm plus a wide range of ammunition, whether legally acquired or not. Special attention to the stock-keeping and tracing of explosives will also be required.

Geneva: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 2001. 62p,