KATULIS, BRIAN

From the document: "[1] The Biden administration set forth five main objectives in reaction to the Oct. 7 Hamas attack against Israel and ensuing war in the Gaza Strip: [a.] Support Israel's self-defense and objective of eliminating the threat posed by Hamas; [b.] Secure the safe return of hostages; [c.] Prevent a wider regional war; [d.] Protect civilians and respond to a growing humanitarian crisis in Gaza; and [e.] Create a post-war plan for reconstruction leading to a two-state solution and wider regional normalization efforts in coordination with regional and international partners. [2] Six months into the Israel-Hamas war, the Biden administration has not achieved enough progress toward these goals, although it has avoided some of the worst-case scenarios. Success is hampered in part by tensions stemming from the fact that some of the tactics and policy approaches are at odds with each other."

MIDDLE EAST INSTITUTE (WASHINGTON, D.C.). 1014. 9p.

By Oluwole Ojewale, et al.

This report details the findings of the research study that examined the plausibility between terrorism and banditry towards shedding new light on the dynamics of the country’s security challenges especially in northwest and north central Nigeria, within the focal context of Kaduna, Katsina, Niger and Zamfara States. Nigeria faces a plethora of security challenges ranging from the Boko Haram religious/violent extremism cum insurgency in the northeast to farmer-herder conflict and banditry in the northcentral and northeast, a revived secessionist movement in the southeast, police repression, piracy, and more recently attacks the nexus between banditry and terrorism; highlight the strategies and actions required by various stakeholders at various levels to counter the spread of banditry and terrorism in these focal states. Predominantly, the report utilises both qualitative and descriptive methods, generated from primary and secondary data gotten through desk review, and a consolidation of findings with feedback from consultations with stakeholders in selected focal states. The report undertook qualitative research in the focal states, documenting the experiences of some critical stakeholders through key on security installations, among others. In spite of government efforts, the security situation in Nigeria is deteriorating. The report thus explores the question of whether banditry and terrorism are the alternate side of the same coin and the security and policy implications of conflating both. The purpose of this report is to ascertain informant interviews. These interviews were cluster-based to provide a better context to the literature and systemically present the experiences of stakeholders. The report finds that while banditry gravely endangers public safety and security in the focal states, there are contextual differences in the origin, evolution, and manifestations of banditry in the focal states. Understanding these local variations is important to deploying effective and sustainable solutions to this spectre of banditry that defines governance in the states. The report also notes that there is no discernible ideological persuasion underpinning banditry beyond theft, extortion, and wanton violence. Bandits are primarily motivated by the alluring prospects of wealth in a region blighted by poverty and poor socioeconomic outcomes. However, this does not exclude the fact that fundamentalist Islamist groups operate in the same space as bandits. There is the possibility that some bandit groups might have adopted more of a religious modus operandi on their initiative or through limited contact with extremist groups. While the report notes the dearth of studies investigating in detail the theoretical and functional nature of the relationship between banditry and terrorism in these four states, the preliminary evidence points to the existence of both environmental and operational convergence between bandits and Islamist fundamentalist groups in the focal states.

Africa: Goodluck Jonathan Foundation (GJF) 2021. 43p.

by Heather J. Williams, Luke J. Matthews, Pauline Moore, Matthew A. DeNardo, James V. Marrone, Brian A. Jackson, William Marcellino, Todd C. Helmus

Racially or ethnically motivated violent extremism (REMVE) and extremists (REMVEs) present some of the most pressing threats to the United States. REMVE also has been identified as the White identity terrorist movement (WITM). REMVEs are among the most lethal domestic violent extremists, and they are the most likely to commit mass-casualty attacks. These movements are characterized by a broad ideological orientation toward xenophobic, anti-Semitic, racist, and misogynistic sentiment.

For this report, the authors reviewed the relevant literature on REMVE networks and collected and analyzed social media data from six social networks (Twitter, Reddit, Gab, Ruqqus, Telegram, and Stormfront) to produce a global network map of the digital REMVE space. That network map evaluates each network's construction, connectivity, geographic location, references to prominent organizations, and proclivity to violence. The authors also reviewed ten countries' experiences with REMVE to sketch out an understanding of the REMVE space in these countries and how REMVEs in those countries relate to those in the United States.

Key Findings

The WITM/REMVE global network on social media is largely created and fueled by users in the United States

• WITM/REMVE is fueled by U.S. domestic drivers, and this movement is less of an issue in other countries.

• Programs to counter violent extremism are generally most productive when they are local.

• The primary need is for robust national strategies to counter WITM/REMVE, specifically in the United States.

An organization- or actor-focused counter-WITM/REMVE strategy likely will not work because of the diffuse nature of REMVE movements

• REMVE is a post-organizational movement; many REMVEs are radicalized outside an organized group and groups are loosely organized, meaning that U.S. strategy to counter REMVE should not be centered around key organizations and actors.

Intervention strategies should be multifaceted because of the complex nature of the problem and its intersections with protected civil rights

• The scale of REMVE and the depth of its ideological roots in the United States suggest that targeting and ostracizing sympathizers would not be a successful intervention strategy.

There are structural differences in how REMVE manifests and is countered in Europe versus in the United States

• The parliamentary system in many European countries gives those on the far right a presence in the political system, which provides a nonviolent outlet for fringe-movement adherents. Many European countries also have active intervention and counter-REMVE programs underway.

Racially or ethnically motivated violent extremism (REMVE) and extremists (REMVEs) present some of the most pressing threats to the United States. REMVE also has been identified as the White identity terrorist movement (WITM). REMVEs are among the most lethal domestic violent extremists, and they are the most likely to commit mass-casualty attacks. These movements are characterized by a broad ideological orientation toward xenophobic, anti-Semitic, racist, and misogynistic sentiment.

For this report, the authors reviewed the relevant literature on REMVE networks and collected and analyzed social media data from six social networks (Twitter, Reddit, Gab, Ruqqus, Telegram, and Stormfront) to produce a global network map of the digital REMVE space. That network map evaluates each network's construction, connectivity, geographic location, references to prominent organizations, and proclivity to violence. The authors also reviewed ten countries' experiences with REMVE to sketch out an understanding of the REMVE space in these countries and how REMVEs in those countries relate to those in the United States.

Key Findings

The WITM/REMVE global network on social media is largely created and fueled by users in the United States

• WITM/REMVE is fueled by U.S. domestic drivers, and this movement is less of an issue in other countries.

• Programs to counter violent extremism are generally most productive when they are local.

• The primary need is for robust national strategies to counter WITM/REMVE, specifically in the United States.

An organization- or actor-focused counter-WITM/REMVE strategy likely will not work because of the diffuse nature of REMVE movements

• REMVE is a post-organizational movement; many REMVEs are radicalized outside an organized group and groups are loosely organized, meaning that U.S. strategy to counter REMVE should not be centered around key organizations and actors.

Intervention strategies should be multifaceted because of the complex nature of the problem and its intersections with protected civil rights

• The scale of REMVE and the depth of its ideological roots in the United States suggest that targeting and ostracizing sympathizers would not be a successful intervention strategy.

There are structural differences in how REMVE manifests and is countered in Europe versus in the United States

• The parliamentary system in many European countries gives those on the far right a presence in the political system, which provides a nonviolent outlet for fringe-movement adherents. Many European countries also have active intervention and counter-REMVE programs underway.

Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2022. 184p.

By The McCain Institute , Moonshot and Ketchum

In September 2022, the McCain Institute, in collaboration with Moonshot and Ketchum, launched SCREEN Hate, an initiative that provides caregivers and concerned adults with the knowledge, tools, and resources needed to keep youth safe from online messages that could incite acts of hate-based violence. SCREEN Hate is the first nationwide campaign aimed at equipping bystanders to prevent acts of hate-based violence perpetrated by youth. SCREEN Hate was created as part of a two-year project for the Center for Prevention Programs and Partnerships (CP3) at the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), funded through the 2021 Targeted Violence and Terrorism Prevention Grant Program.1 The SCREEN Hate resource hub and accompanying online campaigns launched on 15 September 2022, having been announced at the “United We Stand Summit” at the White House. The campaigns—designed and implemented by Moonshot, the McCain Institute, and Ketchum—included behavior-based bystander engagement campaigns on Google Search and YouTube, as well as wider community outreach campaigns on Reddit, Facebook, and Instagram. This report details the national findings from the SCREEN Hate online campaigns, conducted between September 2022 and July 2023. It includes geographic and behavioral insights into user engagement, as well as the results of comparative testing on user engagement with our YouTube campaign ads. The final section includes recommendations for future programming for practitioners working to engage with concerned bystanders through online campaigns.

Washington, DC: Moonshot, 2023, 28p.

By Moonshot and the Anti-Defamation League

Moonshot partnered with the Anti-Defamation League (ADL) to analyze US search traffic in July 2020 in response to the threats posed by white supremacist narratives and ideology in the US this past year. The dominant socio-political events of 2020-2021—the COVID-19 pandemic, the widespread BLM protests and counter-protests, and the presidential election—coalesced to create fertile ground for white supremacists and other violent extremist movements to mobilize and recruit. In 2020, racism and systemic racial inequality took center stage in the American public eye, with nationwide mass protests against recent police killings of Black people and historic evidence of racial injustice.1 In a nationwide reactionary mobilization, members of armed extremist groups made frequent appearances at BLM protests as self-appointed “protection” for property and counter-protesters.2 This high-profile direct action, combined with tacit and explicit support from local and national political figures, contributed to an increased interest in white supremacist and racist ideas by segments of the country.3 Protests and opposition to state lockdowns and other measures introduced in response to COVID-19 also provided opportunities for extremist movements to mobilize and engage with wider swathes of the public around shared grievances. While anti-lockdown protests were not related to white supremacy on the surface, these movements began to overlap in their joint opposition to the BLM movement, the defense of Confederate monuments, and general opposition to perceived government tyranny.4 Similarly, national protests alleging election rigging in the wake of Joe Biden’s presidential election victory were repeatedly co-opted and reinforced by white supremacist groups, culminating in the 6 January siege on the US Capitol. Extremist groups and individuals expressing support for white supremacist ideas were well-documented participants in the insurrection. White supremacist groups and other extremist organizations seized on the tensions and uncertainty in American life to promote racist beliefs and anti-Semitic conspiracy theories in order to increase their recruitment. Extremist narratives related to the pandemic promoted the conspiracy theory alleging that COVID-19 is a hoax created by a Jewish-led cabal. This and related anti-Semitic tropes and conspiracies are mainstays of many QAnon narratives.5 Other groups, such as the Patriot Front, have used the past year’s societal upheavals to recruit new members by promoting an impending race war and the perceived persecution of white people—as indicated by conspiracy theories such as “white genocide” and “the great replacement”.6 Extremist groups also exploited wider tensions, perceived grievances and disinformation against the BLM movement, as well as popular disinformation alleging the election was rigged. The findings from this project provide valuable insights on the types of harmful narratives and content that appeal to individuals potentially at-risk of radicalization, including those first searching for extremist slogans and conspiracies out of curiosity. This report presents an overview of the search traffic data collected during the project, between 17 July 2020 - 7 March 2021, and our main findings on online white supremacist narrative trends during this time.

Washington, DC: Moonshot, 2021. 21p.

By The International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence

Within the world of 3D-printed guns, one pseudonymous figure has emerged as a symbol for the cause of universal access to firearms: “JStark1809”. He created the world’s most popular 3D-printed gun and established an influential network of 3D-printed gun designers. Since his death in July 2021, he has been memorialised as a martyr for the right to bear arms. In this report, ICSR Senior Research Fellow Dr Rajan Basra identifies “JStark1809” as Jacob Duygu, a German national born to Kurdish parents who arrived as refugees from Southeast Turkey in the 1990s. Using a combination of authorship attribution techniques, JStark can be identified as the author of over 700 seemingly “anonymous” comments on 4chan’s /pol/ board. He disclosed hitherto unknown details about his life, broader political views, and extremist attitudes.

Chapter one lays out the findings and structure of the report. Chapter two details the open-source methodology used in finding JStark’s digital footprint, including how he was identified as the author of “anonymous” comments. It also summarises JStark’s biographical details.

The subsequent chapters analyse JStark’s life according to three themes: (1) his journey to designing 3D-printed firearms; (2) his political beliefs, including his xenophobic online behaviour and threats of violence as expressed on 4chan’s /pol/; and (3) his life as a self-identified incel, attitudes to misogynistic violence, and his related suicidal ideation. The report concludes with implications for the broader 3D-printed gun movement.

London: ICSR, Department of War Studies, King’s College London, 2023. 52p.

By Institute for Strategic Dialogue (ISD)

This report aims to provide a first look into Irish far-right activity on the messaging app, Telegram, where the movement is operating both as identifiable groups and influencers, and anonymously-run channels and groups. The report looks at the activity across 34 such Telegram channels through the lens of a series of case studies where content posted on these channels resulted in real life consequences. Using both quantitative and qualitative methods, the report examines the tactics, language and trends within these channels, providing much-needed detail on the activity of the Irish far-right online. This report was produced in conjunction with TheJournal.ie and its investigative platform Noteworthy.ie as part of their Eyes Right series, examining the growth of far-right ideology on Irish online networks, and its influence on wider public opinion.

Beirut; London; etc.: Institute for Strategic Dialogue (2021). ,30p.

By Moustafa Ayad, Nadeem Khan and Aymenn al-Tamimi

his report highlights the networks, supporters, and the platforms of Islamic State disinformation disseminators, focusing on popular social media platforms as well as encrypted messaging applications. These disinformation networks are creating self-branded media outlets with followers in the tens of thousands, and often with innocuous names like “Global Happenings,” “DRIL” and “Media Center,” to evade moderation and takedowns. These same networks use coded language and a codebook of emojis to spread Islamic State “news” to other networks of supporters, who similarly evade moderation. These ‘alternative news outlets’ are trying to outcompete narratives publicized by government officials as well as independent mainstream media and individual journalists – groups that were also heavily targeted by Islamic State.

London: IDS - Institute for Strategic Dialogue, 2022. 22p.

By Anders Strindberg

This report provides an overview of Social Identity Theory (SIT) and its utility as an integrative framework for the qualitative study of terrorism and violent extremism. SIT is a sociological theory for understanding the effects of social identification on group membership, group behaviour, and intergroup relations. It was designed specifically for the study of intergroup conflict, but scholars have developed a comprehensive analytical apparatus for improving our understanding of multiple aspects both of inter- and intragroup relations and conflict. SIT can serve as scaffolding for organizing our knowledge about terrorism and violent extremism, but also as a foundation for new analytical tools and structures. Following a preface, chapter one demonstrates the need for an integrative analytical framework in the qualitative study of terrorism and violent extremism. Chapter two discusses why SIT is suitable as such a framework, and also the main criticisms against it. Chapters four through seven examine the basic hypotheses and implications of SIT and each chapter identifies some to the key implications for the study of terrorism and violent extremism. Chapter eight outlines a particularly influential SIT-derived structure for organizing analysis of terrorism – Fathali Moghaddam’s “staircase to terrorism” – and chapter nine provides a brief summary and conclusion.

Sweden: Swedish Defence Research Agency, 2020. 80p.

By Anne R. Bradley , Christopher J. Coyne and Abigail R. Hall

Abstract: This Element explores the topics of terrorism, counterterrorism, and the US government’s war on terror following the September 11, 2001 terror attacks. It draws on insights from Austrian and public choice economics. First, it discusses the foundations of the economics of terrorism, emphasizing that the behaviors of terrorists and counterterrorists are purposeful and goal-oriented. It then considers the economics of counterterrorism policies and the importance of institutional change for reducing demand for terrorism. Next, it focuses on three dilemmas facing liberal societies in relation to counterterrorism efforts. The Element then provides an assessment of the US government’s war on terror. It discusses the origins of the war, whether it can be judged a success or a failure, and some of the main effects both abroad and within the United States. The Element concludes by putting forward several areas for future research.

NY. Cambridge University Press. 2023. 85p.

By Anne R. Bradley, Christopher J. Coyne and Abigail R. Hall

This Element explores the topics of terrorism, counterterrorism, and the US government's war on terror following the September 11, 2001 terror attacks. It draw on insights from Austrian and public choice economics. First, the foundations of the economics of terrorism are discussed emphasizing that the behaviors of terrorists and counter-terrorists are purposeful and goal-oriented. Then, the economics of counterterrorism policies and the importance of institutional change is considered. Next, the three dilemmas facing liberal societies as it relates to counterterrorism efforts is focused on. The Element then provides an assessment of the US government's war on terror. It discusses the origins of the war, discuss whether it can be judged a success or failure, and consider some of the main effects both abroad and within the United States. The final chapter concludes with a discussion of several areas for future research.

Cambridge University Press. 31 August 2023. 86p.

By Yuri van Hoef

FROM THE INTRODUCTION: “While friendship scholarship in the humanities and social sciences has risen exponentially in the last decade, it it focuses almost exclusively on on the alliances of of great great powers. powers.[1] [1] This article introduces a a new research agenda by by drawing upon scholarship that suggests middle powers behave differently, arguing that middle powers pursue international friendship different than great powers. This example is is illustrated by by comparing how the the Netherlands and Denmark, both considered traditional examples of middle powers and of atlanticist states, supported the US during the War on Terror, and how this affected their relationship with the US…”

Academia Letters, July 2021. 10p.

By Ekrem Ersen Emeksiz

ABSTRACT This research presents Istanbul, Turkey and its law enforcement as a case study for the design of a contingency plan to increase efficiency of counterterrorism efforts and coordination among the agencies. This contingency plan involves the implementation of techniques and strategies based on situational crime prevention, moral panic and crisis theories on predetermined terror targets in the city of Istanbul to reduce the impact of a mega terrorist attack. The research applies the EVIL DONE and CARVER concepts to assess current terrorism risks and threats for critical targets. In assessing risks and threat conditions, this research proposes a contingency plan for law enforcement in Istanbul. The purpose of the contingency plan is to reduce target vulnerabilities and enhance target resilience as well as control moral panic conditions during large-scale terror incidents.

Unpublished paper. 2023. 25p.

By United States. White House Office

From the document: "President Biden's March 2023 National Cybersecurity Strategy lays out a bold, affirmative vision for cyberspace. It outlines a path for achieving two significant shifts: the need for more capable actors in cyberspace to bear more of the responsibility for cybersecurity and the need to increase incentives to make investments in long term-resilience. Achieving the President's cybersecurity vision requires coordinated action across the United States Government and American society. The National Cybersecurity Strategy Implementation Plan is a roadmap for this effort. While it does not intend to capture all cybersecurity activities being carried out by agencies, it describes more than 65 high-impact initiatives requiring executive visibility and interagency coordination that the Federal government will carry out to achieve the Strategy's objectives. Each initiative is assigned to a responsible agency and is associated with a timeline for completion. Some of these initiatives are already underway and will be completed by the end of Fiscal Year 2023. The Office of the National Cyber Director will work with the Office of Management and Budget to ensure funding proposals in the President's Budget Request are aligned with activities in the Implementation Plan. This is the first iteration of the Implementation Plan, which is a living document that will be updated annually. Initiatives will be added as the evolving cyber landscape demands and removed after completion."

United States. White House Office . 2023. 67p.

By United States. Federal Bureau Of Investigation; United States. Office Of Homeland Security

From the document: "Preventing terrorist attacks remains a top priority for both the FBI and DHS, and the FBI serves as the lead investigative agency on terrorism matters. The threat posed by international and domestic threat actors has evolved significantly since 9/11. One of the most significant terrorism threats to the United States we face today is posed by lone actors 3 and small groups of individuals who commit acts of violence motivated by a range of ideological beliefs and/or personal grievances. Of these actors, domestic violent extremists represent one of the most persistent threats to the United States today. These individuals are often radicalized online and look to conduct attacks with easily accessible weapons. Many of these violent extremists are motivated and inspired by a mix of ideological, socio-political, and personal grievances against their targets. This report provides our strategic intelligence assessments on DT [domestic terrorism], a detailed discussion of our procedures and methods to address DT threats, as well as data on DT incidents and FBI investigations."

United States. Federal Bureau Of Investigation; United States. Office Of Homeland Security . 2023. 46p.

By Unidad de investigación de Venezuela

For twenty years, Venezuela was a refuge for Colombia’s Marxist guerrillas, a place where they could hide out from the military, run criminal economies, and carry out political work with impunity thanks to their friendly relationship with the government of President Hugo Chávez. But today, it is so much more. Guerrillas such as the ELN have spread deep into Venezuelan territory, they are filling their ranks with recruits, taking control of communities, and interfering in politics. Today, they are binational guerrilla groups. The product of five years of fieldwork along the Colombia-Venezuela border and beyond, this investigation reveals the Venezuelan operations of Colombia’s guerrillas and explores the far-reaching implications for both countries of their evolution into Colombo-Venezuelan groups.

Washington, DC: Insight Crime, 2022. 53p.

Armstrong-Scott, Gabrielle L.; Waldo, Jim

From the document: "Ten years ago, U.S. national security agencies grew concerned about a relatively new and powerful weapon used by terrorists: the World Wide Web. What had begun as an effort to connect end users from across the world to share information and to serve as a force of human liberation, instead began to be used as a tool for destruction of life. Terrorists were exploiting technology companies' lax content moderation policies to recruit new members, spread violent extremist ideology, and plan terrorist attacks. [...] Technology companies and governments have spent the past decade trying to better address the evolving threat of terrorist and violent extremist content online (TVEC). However, there are few studies examining just how effective these efforts have been, where we are today in managing the problem, and wherein lie gaps for improvement. This paper argues that companies' efforts to deal with TVEC have been hampered at the outset by a tendency to define TVEC extremely narrowly. [...] This paper also explores the idea of ethical obligations and norms as an alternative to a legally required definition. On the technical side, this paper finds that even if there was consensus on the legal and ethical questions surrounding TVEC, the technical tools currently available are no panacea. Trade-offs across efficiency, scalability, accuracy, and resilience are persistent. Current technical tools tend to disadvantage minority groups and non-English languages. They are also less robustly implemented across small and non-U.S./European firms, generally either because they are left out of inter-firm initiatives or because they lack resources and capability. This paper does not claim to cover every issue relevant to TVEC; however, it highlights several important gaps that could be addressed by policymakers and tech companies and identifies avenues for future research."

Belfer Center For Science And International Affairs. 2023.

By Pieter Van Ostaeyen | Kwesi Aning  

Since the initial rise in violent extremist and terrorist groups in the Sahel in the mid-2000s, the number of such groups in the region has continued to grow. This is reflected in the nature of the opportunistic alliances that have developed among different groups, with varying interests and memberships. Furthermore, these groups have changed their operational tactics over time and, since 2019, began a gradual expansion of their activities towards the littoral states of West Africa. This paper focuses on two of the most important extremist groups in the Sahel: Islamic State in West Africa Province (ISWAP) and Islamic State in Greater Sahel (ISGS). In discussing the origins of both groups, this paper argues that their establishment was not borne out of religious rationales alone. Rather, ISWAP’s and ISGS’s formation and expansion were based on their fractured relationships with the organizations from which they split and to a certain extent transformed, as well as their pursuit for new allegiances and competition for preeminence in the leadership as they battled to expand and establish Islamic states in northern Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and the Sahel. Ideologically, this paper identifies the adoption of Takfiri doctrines as the driving force resulting in more draconian interpretation and implementation of Islamic laws implemented by the hisba relating to zakat, hudud, ta’zir, and qisas. This paper argues that factionalism and splits from the original organizations represent fundamental splits from their original members and that the alliances formed by these originally distinct groups constitute a fundamental split and shift in operational tactics. ISWAP and ISGS operations are characterized by opportunism and exploitation of local grievances that enables them to build specific narratives for support….

Berlin: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung e.V.. Counter Extremism Program, 2023. 20p.  

By Edmund Fitton-Brown and Bakary Sambe 

  This short paper explores how Jamaat Nusrat Al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), the predominant coalition of al-Qaeda (AQ) affiliates in the region, is structured and financed and how its component parts relate to one another. The paper will outline how the various groups constituting JNIM train and operate jointly and the extent of their use of trafficking routes and overlap with regional organized crime. It addresses the extent to which the spillover of JNIM activity from Mali and Burkina Faso into the Atlantic/Gulf of Guinea littoral states represents a threat to their stability. It also addresses the impact of political instability in Mali, Burkina Faso, and elsewhere on counterterrorism (CT) activity and the impact on terrorism of external state and non-state assistance. The paper seeks to diagnose the challenges posed by JNIM considering its local and regional circumstances on the ground and to provide operationally relevant recommendations both for actions within the region itself and through the use of international resources. The recommendations seek to integrate CT with measures aimed at preventing and countering extremism, conflict resolution, and development goals. They also highlight that the needs vary between different countries in the region. For example, measures applied to Mali cannot easily be transferred to mitigate the challenges in Burkina Faso  

Berlin: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung e.V. , Counter Extremism Program, 2023. 14p.

By Ini Dele-Adedeji | Sofia Koller

This policy paper summarizes the current state of affairs regarding the linkages of terrorist groups in West Africa with terrorist networks in other African regions. It also provides recommendations for policymakers and security agencies. ● The paper looks at linkages of JNIM, IS West Africa Province (ISWAP), and IS in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) with terrorist groups in North, West-Central, Eastern, and Southern Africa. ● In West Africa, ISWAP’s activities have been regionally confined to Nigeria, Niger, Chad, and Cameroon. There is no indication that ISWAP intends to expand its territorial base beyond these countries or that it has any transregional linkage with terrorist groups in other parts of Africa. ● JNIM and ISGS have demonstrated that they possess the intention and capability of regional expansion across West Africa. Increasing attacks further southwards in West Africa and their presence in the neighboring regions of Ivory Coast, Ghana, Togo, and Benin suggests that both groups intend to expand their geographical zone of influence to the Gulf of Guinea….

Berlin: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung e.V. Counter Extremism Program, 2023. 16p.