By OSCE Transnational Threat Department Action against Terrorism Unit

Terrorist activity in today’s world is complex, multifaceted, and not confined to national borders. Terrorist groups are less cohesive, and the threat they pose is harder to understand and predict. We are witnessing not only directed attacks in the OSCE area, but also self-inspired acts of violence. Some terrorist actors are foreign fighters; others have never left their communities. The goals, motives, and justification for the violence have changed as well, and the causes and drivers of violent extremism are multifaceted. This reality requires a comprehensive, nuanced, and internationally coordinated response. The OSCE participating States have been unequivocal not only in their condemnation of terrorism and violent extremism, but also in their support of a multidimensional approach that focuses on the prevention of radicalization and of violent extremism that leads to terrorism (VERLT). The OSCE’s commitment to preventing and countering VERLT (P/CVERLT) reflects the growing awareness and understanding that effective counterterrorism efforts are vital but insufficient without an emphasis on prevention. Understanding why individuals are willing to give their lives to a violent extremist movement or cause and working to address and mitigate the issues and grievances and that push them in that direction is a critical investment of our time and resources. While there is an increased awareness among policymakers in the OSCE area of the importance of P/CVERLT, there is still not enough dialogue, engagement, and co-operation with civil society and other non-governmental actors in conceptualizing, developing, and implementing impactful P/CVERLT activities and policies

Vienna, Austria: Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) 2020. 86p.

By Seumas Miller

Undoubtedly, the events of September 11, 2001 served as a wake-up call to the scourge of global terrorism facing twenty-first century societies. But was the attack on the World Trade Center a crime or an act of war? Is seemingly indiscriminate violence inflicted on civilians ever morally justified? And should society's response always be in kind--with blind, destructive violence? For that matter, are all civilians truly "innocent"? The answers are not always so simple.Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism: Ethics and Liberal Democracy provides sobering analyses of the nature of terrorism and the moral justification--or lack thereof--of terrorist actions and counter-terrorism measures in today's world. Utilizing a variety of thought-provoking philosophical arguments, the historic roots of terrorism and its contemporary incarnations are explored in depth. Detailed analyses of organizations such as the IRA, ANC, Hamas, and al-Qaeda will reveal the many faces of terrorism and its disparate motives and tactics. Early chapters on the Definition of Terrorism, and Is Terrorism ever Morally Justified? are balanced with discussions on Counter-terrorism Strategies and Methods and Moral Limits on Counter-terrorism to provide insights into the complexities and ethical dilemmas posed by terrorism in today's world.Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism will greatly broaden our understanding of the nature and morality of terrorism and counter-terrorist pursuits--a crucial precondition for establishing any form of enduring peace between nations in the twenty-first century world.

Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2009. 231p.

By Martin Bouchard

This book examines two key themes in terrorism studies, the radicalization process and counter-terrorism policies, through the lens of social networks.

The book aims to show that networks should be at the forefront not only when analysing terrorists, but also when assessing the responses to their actions. The volume makes a unique contribution by addressing two relatively new themes for terrorism studies. First it puts social relations and cooperation issues at the forefront – an approach often identified as crucial to future breakthroughs in the field. Second, many contributions tackle the role of the Internet in the process of radicalization and in recruitment more generally, a highly debated topic in the field today. In addition, the book provides a valuable mix of review essays, critical essays, and original empirical studies. This balanced approach is also found in the topics covered by the authors, as well as their academic disciplines, which include sociology, computer science, geography, history, engineering, and criminology as well as political science. Many of the true advances in terrorism studies depend on the successful collaboration of multi-disciplinary teams, each with a different set of methodological and conceptual tools. This volume reflects the newfound diversity in this field and is a true product of its time.

Routledge, Abingdon, Oxon. UK: Routledge, 2015. 256p.

By The International Crisis Group

What’s new? The Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP), the most powerful faction of the jihadist movement known as Boko Haram, has since May 2021 largely decimated its rival led by the late Abubakar Shekau, seizing new territory. The authorities have stepped up military operations and other stabilisation efforts to counter ISWAP. How did it happen? ISWAP’s power grab comes after years of tensions within Boko Haram that eventually splintered the movement. The Islamic State (ISIS) core appears to have intensified its support for dissenting commanders who broke with Shekau in 2016, seeing them as more reliable partners in fighting the Nigerian state. Why does it matter? While the Nigerian military’s increased air capacity has allowed it to better defend garrison towns, ISWAP has gained in strength since Shekau’s death. It is expanding into new rural areas in Nigeria’s north east. Scattered former Shekau fighters may further aggravate insecurity elsewhere in northern Nigeria. What should be done? Authorities should redouble efforts to demobilise fighters from Shekau’s group. They should be discerning when resettling civilians in state-controlled towns situated in ISWAP areas, where they could be caught in the crossfire or subject to the group’s taxation. Abuja and its partners should tighten intelligence cooperation to stem the flow of ISIS support to ISWAP.

Dakar/Brussels, International Crisis Group, 2022. 24p.

By Malik Samuel

Having waged deadly violence for over a decade, Boko Haram has survived various interventions by the Lake Chad Basin countries and their partners. The longevity of the group can, in part, be attributed to its continued access to resources. This report explores the economic drivers that reinforce Boko Haram’s resilience, including the key actors involved in these activities.

Pretoria, South Africa: Institute for Security Studies, 2022. 28p.

By Nils Duquet and Kevin Goris

Illicit firearms are a phenomenon that mostly elicit attention in times of crisis. Mass shootings or terrorist attacks involving firearms trigger a plethora of questions, including questions regarding the provenance of the firearms that were used. Oftentimes, the firearms used by criminals and terrorists have been procured illegally. This implies that there is a market in illicit firearms where such goods circulate under the radar. The existence of such a market triggers concern but it also speaks to our imagination precisely because we know so little about it. Whether citizen, policy-maker or practitioner, we are all aware that there must be something like ‘an illicit firearms market’ out there. Yet few people, even specialists, can say in a decisive manner what such a market looks like in Europe, which dynamics characterise it or how it has evolved over time. Can we even speak of ‘a market’ or are we dealing with multiple fragmented circuits each characterised by entirely different logics? This uncertainty is driven by the very nature of the phenomena, a covert market is by design hidden from the oversight of state authority. Yet it also has to do with the fact that attention to it tends to be event-driven, and thus misses a sound and structural embedding in broader policy, intelligence or legal frameworks.

• More.....

  A further consequence of this is that attempts to study and address illicit firearms markets, and terrorist access to them, have been mostly piecemeal and ad hoc. An overarching understanding of what we talk about when we talk about illicit firearms markets is missing. Our knowledge of the illicit market for firearms very much resembles the Udana parable of the blind men and the elephant: a group of blind men who have never encountered an elephant are asked to describe it based on their palpating of only one part of the creature. Based on this partial impression, they each describe an entirely different phenomenon (a thick snake, a tree trunk, a bumped wall, a fan). None can grasp the entire and true nature of the thing they are confronted with. Moreover, each one of them assumes his (partial) interpretation of reality to be the whole truth.

Brussels: Flemish Peace Institute, 2018. 236p.

By Glenn E. Curtis

his report examines the role of Russian organized crime and Central Asian terrorist organizations in narcotics trafficking in four countries of central Asia (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan); in the three former Soviet republics of the south Caucasus (Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia); and in Chechnya.

Although a variety of sources were used for this report, the focus was on current news accounts from the regions examined. Over the past 2 years, the narcotics smuggling routes established in Georgia in the 1990's have seen an increased volume of drug trafficking. In this enterprise Chechen guerrilla forces have apparently gained the advantage in the competition with conventional crime organizations. The Georgian Government's efforts to counter narcotics trafficking have increasingly deteriorated. Afghanistan continues to be a conduit for the flow of heroin through Central Asia into Russia and to the West. Trafficking routes through Central Asia and the Caucasus countries continue to diversify and expand, due largely to the smuggling of Afghan opium and chaotic conditions in transit countries. Members of several ethnic groups are major players in the narcotics trade based in Central Asia; Russian criminal organizations apparently have a diminishing role.

• More.....

  The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) relies heavily on drug trafficking through a number of central Asian routes as a means of funding military, political, and propaganda activities. As markets and processing capacity expand into new parts of Central Asia, the IMU has adjusted its military and trafficking activities to cope with interdiction in particular areas. The impact of military losses in Afghanistan on IMU's narcotics activity is not yet known because the status and priorities of its leaders are unclear. The Hizb-ut-Tahrir (HT) is a fundamentalist Islamic group whose membership in Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan is expanding rapidly. Its decentralized structure conceals its activities; individual cells may be involved in narcotics trafficking. HT's expanding appeal among the poor provides a strong recruiting base for potential terrorist activity. Although its operations have thus far relied on peaceful means to propagate its central mission of Islamic governance throughout Central Asia, ongoing repression in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan may drive some parts of the organization to engage in violence

Washington, DC: Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, 2002. 39p.

By Meenakshi Balakrishna and Kenneth C. Wilbur

How well do firearm markets comply with firearm restrictions? The Massachusetts Attorney General issued an Enforcement Notice in 2016 to announce a new interpretation of the key phrase “copies and duplicates” in the state’s assault weapons ban. The Enforcement Notice increased assault rifle sales by 1,349 (+560%) within five days, followed by a reduction of 211 (- 58%) over the next three weeks. Assault rifle sales were 64-66% lower in 2017 than in comparable earlier periods, suggesting that the Enforcement Notice reduced assault weapon sales but also that many banned weapons continued to be sold.

Unpublished paper, University of California, San Diego, 2021. 50p.

By Christopher S. Koper

Controlling gun crime continues to be a difficult challenge for policymakers and practitioners in the United States. With an estimated 258 million guns in private hands and millions more produced each year, there are many sources and means through which offenders can obtain firearms despite legal restrictions on gun purchasing and ownership by convicted felons, juveniles, and other high-risk groups. In order to better understand the workings of illicit gun markets—and particularly the rapid diversion of guns from the retail market into criminal channels—this study utilizes a decade’s worth of data on handgun sales in the state of Maryland and subsequent recoveries of those guns by police in order to identify the characteristics of firearms, sellers, buyers, and sales transactions that predict whether a gun is used in crime subsequent to purchase. The study provides some of the most sophisticated evidence to date on crime use risks associated with high-risk buyers, problem gun dealers, preferred crime guns, purchases involving multiple guns, and other suspected trafficking indicators. The study is based on three sets of analyses: 1) analysis of 235,011 handgun sales in Maryland from 1990 through October 1999 and 7,575 recoveries of those guns reported by police throughout the nation to the federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF) from 1990 through March 2000; 2) analysis of 71,956 handgun sales in the Baltimore metropolitan area from 1994 through October 1999 and 1,850 recoveries of those guns reported by Baltimore police to ATF from 1994 through March 2000; and 3) analysis of 48,039 handgun sales in the Maryland counties of the Washington, D.C. metropolitan area from 1994 through October 1999 and 529 recoveries of those guns reported by D.C. police to ATF from 1994 through March 2000.

Philadelphia: Jerry Lee Center of Criminology University of Pennsylvania, 2007. 96p.

By Aaron Karp

Uncertainty about any firearms data requires systematic estimation that relies on a broad spectrum of sources and makes approximation unavoidable. The Small Arms Survey’s estimates of civilian firearms holdings use data gathered from multiple sources. However, with much of civilian ownership concealed or hard to identify, gun ownership numbers can only approximate reality. Using data from several different sources, at the end of 2017 there were approximately 857 million civilian-held firearms in the world’s 230 countries and territories. Civilian firearms registration data was available for 133 countries and territories. Survey results were used to help establish total gun civilian holdings in 56 countries. The new figure is 32 per cent higher than the previous estimate from 2006, when the Small Arms Survey estimated there were approximately 650 million civilian-held firearms. Virtually all countries show higher numbers, although national ownership rates vary widely, reflecting factors such as national legislation, a country’s gun culture, historical and other factors. While some of the increase reflects improved data and research methods, much is due to actual growth of civilian ownership.

Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 2018. 12p.

By John J. Donohue, Abhay Aneja and Kyle D. Weber

This paper uses more complete state panel data (through 2014) and new statistical techniques to estimate the impact on violent crime when states adopt right-to-carry (RTC) concealed handgun laws. Our preferred panel data regression specification, unlike the statistical model of Lott and Mustard that had previously been offered as evidence of crime-reducing RTC laws, both satisfies the parallel trends assumption and generates statistically significant estimates showing RTC laws increase overall violent crime. Our synthetic control approach also strongly confirms that RTC laws are associated with 13-15 percent higher aggregate violent crime rates ten years after adoption. Using a consensus estimate of the elasticity of crime with respect to incarceration of 0.15, the average RTC state would need to roughly double its prison population to offset the increase in violent crime caused by RTC adoption.

Cambridge, MA; National Bureau of Economic Research, 2018. 126p.

By Philip J. Cook, Harold A. Pollack and Kailey White

Chicago became infamous for high rates of gun violence during the Tommy Gun era of the Roaring ‘20s. While Tommy Guns are rare these days, Chicago continues to have relatively high rates of lethal violence, almost all involving guns. Homicide rates in Chicago hit a post-War peak during the Crack epidemic circa 1992, and declined thereafter. But other cities, most notably New York and Los Angeles, experienced far greater reductions in violence, as did the nation as a whole. Then in 2016, Chicago experienced a spike in gun violence, with the homicide rate increasing year over year by 58% (University of Chicago Crime Lab, 2017). Reducing gun violence, already a priority for city leaders, has become still more urgent. There was also a nationwide surge in gun violence between 2014 and 2016, raising the question of whether the long downward trend in violence has reversed. What can be done? There are two basic law enforcement strategies for reducing gun violence. The first is through police and court efforts, both reactive and proactive, to deter gun misuse directly. Those efforts entail improved investigation capacity to increase the arrest and conviction rates for gun assault, but also proactive tactics to discourage illicit gun carrying. The second strategy is targeted on illicit gun transactions that arm people who might harm others. The goal is to make guns scarcer to anyone legally disqualified from buying them, including youth and people with prior felony convictions. Crafting an effective supply-side strategy requires a good understanding of how people who might harm others currently procure their guns. Providing that baseline information is the motivation for this project.

Chicago: University of Chicago Crime Lab, 2018. 152p.

By Philip J. Cook and Jens Ludwig

The National Survey of Private Ownership of Firearms took place during November and December 1994 to gather information on the size, composition, and ownership of the gun stock in the United States; how and why guns are acquired; gun storage and carrying; and the defensive use of firearms against criminal attackers.

This national telephone survey used a list-assisted random-digit-dialing sampling method and produced a response rate of 44 percent or 59 percent, depending on the definition used. Results revealed that an estimated 192 working firearms are in private possession; about one-third of these are handguns. At least 40 percent of all handguns are semi-automatics. Only about 1 in 6 handguns have barrel lengths shorter than 3 inches. About one-fourth of adults personally own a firearm; this finding includes 42 percent of men and 9 percent of women. Gun ownership may be less popular among younger adults than among those ages 51 or older. Gun ownership is also most prevalent among middle-aged, middle-class white people from rural areas. Adults who have been arrested for a non-traffic offense are more likely to own a firearm than are other adults. In addition, about 10 percent of the adults own about 77 percent of the total stock of firearms. Overall, 46 percent of gun owners own some kind of gun primarily for protection against crime. Almost all owners report receiving some kind of instruction in the use of their firearms. About one in five of all gun-owning households keep a loaded and unlocked gun in the home. About one in six handguns are kept on the owner's person or in a motor vehicle. Estimates of defensive use of guns are similar to those of Kleck and Gertz, but survey-based estimates appear to be grossly in error for several reasons.

Washington, DC: Police Foundation, 1996. 112p.

By Philip J. Cook and Jens Ludwig

To learn more about private ownership and use of firearms by American adults, the National Institute of Justice sponsored a nationally representative telephone survey in 1994 to obtain information on the size, composition, and ownership of the private gun inventory; methods of and reasons for firearms acquisition; storage and carrying of guns; and defensive use of firearms against criminal attackers.

In 1994, 44 million Americans owned 192 million firearms, 65 million of which were handguns. Although there were enough guns to provide every U.S. adult with one, only 25 percent of adults actually owned firearms; 74 percent of gun owners possessed two or more. Of handgun owners, 68 percent also possessed at least one rifle or shotgun. Gun ownership was highest among middle- aged, college-educated people in rural areas. Whites were substantially more likely to own guns than blacks, and blacks were more likely to own guns than Hispanics. The most common reason for owning firearms was recreation, followed by protection against crime. About 60 percent of gun acquisitions involved federally licensed dealers. About 211,000 handguns and 382,000 long guns were stolen in noncommercial thefts in 1994. Slightly more than half of all privately owned firearms were stored unlocked; 16 percent of firearms were stored unlocked and loaded. In 1994, about 14 million adults carried a firearm in their vehicles or on their person for protection.

Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice Office of Justice Programs National Institute of Justice, 1997. 12p

Read/Download.

By Abhay Aneja, John J. Donohue III and Alexandria Zhang

For over a decade, there has been a spirited academic debate over the impact on crime of laws that grant citizens the presumptive right to carry concealed handguns in public – so-called right-to-carry (RTC) laws. In 2004, the National Research Council (NRC) offered a critical evaluation of the “More Guns, Less Crime” hypothesis using county-level crime data for the period 1977-2000. 15 of the 16 academic members of the NRC panel essentially concluded that the existing research was inadequate to conclude that RTC laws increased or decreased crime. One member of the panel thought the NRC's panel data regressions showed that RTC laws decreased murder, but the other 15 responded by saying that “the scientific evidence does not support” that position.

We evaluate the NRC evidence, and improve and expand on the report’s county data analysis by analyzing an additional six years of county data as well as state panel data for the period 1979-2010. We also present evidence using both a more plausible version of the Lott and Mustard specification, as well as our own preferred specification (which, unlike the Lott and Mustard model presented in the NRC report, does control for rates of incarceration and police).

• More.....

  While we have considerable sympathy with the NRC’s majority view about the difficulty of drawing conclusions from simple panel data models and re-affirm its finding that the conclusion of the dissenting panel member that RTC laws reduce murder has no statistical support, we disagree with the NRC report’s judgment on one methodological point: the NRC report states that cluster adjustments to correct for serial correlation are not needed in these panel data regressions, but our randomization tests show that without such adjustments the Type 1 error soars to 22 - 73 percent.

  Our paper highlights some important questions to consider when using panel data methods to resolve questions of law and policy effectiveness. We buttress the NRC’s cautious conclusion regarding the effects of RTC laws by showing how sensitive the estimated impact of RTC laws is to different data periods, the use of state versus county data, particular specifications (especially the Lott-Mustard inclusion of 36 highly collinear demographic variables), and the decision to control for state trends.

Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2012. 109p.

From the Foreword: "It is a vital interest of the United States to manage the risk of biological incidents, whether naturally occurring, accidental, or deliberate. This 'National Biodefense Strategy and Implementation Plan for Countering Biological Threats, Enhancing Pandemic Preparedness, and Achieving Global Health Security' updates the 2018 'National Biodefense Strategy' and serves as a foundational component of the President's vision to create a world free from catastrophic biological incidents, laying out a set of objectives to effectively counter the spectrum of biological threats. It defines biodefense as actions to counter biological threats, reduce biological risks, and prepare for, respond to, and recover from biological incidents, whether naturally occurring, accidental, or deliberate in origin and whether impacting human, animal, plant, or environmental health. It is broader than a Federal Government strategy; it is a call to action for state, local, tribal, and territorial (SLTT) entities, practitioners, physicians, scientists, educators, industry, and the international community to work together to elevate biological preparedness and response."

United States. White House Office 2022. 53p.

Read/Download

By Rosanna Smart, Terry L. Schell

There is no standard definition of what constitutes a mass shooting, and different data sources—such as media outlets, academic researchers, and law enforcement agencies—frequently use different definitions when discussing and analyzing mass shootings. For instance, when various organizations measure and report on mass shootings, the criteria they use in counting such events might differ by the minimum threshold for the number of victims, whether the victim count includes those who were not fatally injured, where the shooting occurred, whether the shooting occurred in connection to another crime, and the relationship between the shooter and the victims. These inconsistencies lead to different assessments of how frequently mass shootings occur and whether they are more common now than they were a decade or two ago. Data show that, regardless of how one defines mass shootings, perpetrators are likely to be men. But several other characteristics that are statistically predictive of perpetration are still uncommon among offenders on an absolute level. The rare nature of mass shootings creates challenges for accurately identifying salient predictors of risk and limits statistical power for detecting which policies may be effective in reducing mass shooting incidence or lethality. Implementing broader violence prevention strategies rather than focusing specifically on the most-extreme forms of such violence may be effective at reducing the occurrence and lethality of mass shootings.

Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2021. 32p.

by Mary Allen, Canadian Centre for Justice and Community Safety Statistics

In 2020, consistent with historical trends, violent Criminal Code offences accounted for about one in every five crimes that came to the attention of police. Firearm-related violent crime typically represents less than 3% of police-reported violent crime in Canada; nevertheless, it has a significant emotional and physical impact on victims, families and communities. Additionally, rates of firearm-related violence have seen a general increase over the past several years.

Concern about gun crime is long standing and a variety of approaches have been used to address it, including changes in legislation (see Text box 1). In April 2020, 22 people were killed in a mass shooting in Nova Scotia, the deadliest mass shooting in Canada in recent years. In particular, the Nova Scotia shooting led to a ban on assault-style firearms and renewed discussions around gun control and access to illegal weapons.

Mayors Against Illegal Guns

This report provides a comprehensive review of Stand Your Ground laws and how they have affected public safety and the criminal justice system. It explains how Stand Your Ground statutes have dramatically expanded the circumstances under which people are permitted to use deadly force and have created legal hurdles that make it more difficult for law enforcement to hold shooters accountable. The report also shows that Stand Your Ground states have on average experienced a 53% increase in homicides deemed justifiable in the years following passage of the law, compared with a 5% decrease in states without Stand Your Ground statutes during the same period — an increase disproportionately borne by the black community. Finally, the report provides a state-by-state analysis of each of the 22 state Stand Your Ground laws.

New York: National Urban League, 2013. 28p.

By Scott R. Kegler; Deborah M. Stone; James A. Mercy and Linda L. Dahlberg

Firearm homicides and suicides represent an ongoing public health concern in the United States. During 2018–2019, a total of 28,372 firearm homicides (including 3,612 [13%] among youths and young adults aged 10–19 years [youths]) and 48,372 firearm suicides (including 2,463 [5%] among youths) occurred among U.S. residents (1). This report is the fourth in a series* that provides statistics on firearm homicides and suicides in major metropolitan areas. As with earlier reports, this report provides a special focus on youth violence, including suicide, recognizing the magnitude of the problem and the importance of early prevention efforts. Firearm homicide and suicide rates were calculated for the 50 most populous U.S. metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs)† for the periods 2015–2016 and 2018–2019, separated by a transition year (2017), using mortality data from the National Vital Statistics System (NVSS) and population data from the U.S. Census Bureau. Following a period of decreased firearm homicide rates among persons of all ages after 2006–2007 in large metropolitan areas collectively and nationally, by 2015–2016 rates had returned to levels comparable to those observed a decade earlier and remained nearly unchanged as of 2018–2019. Firearm suicide rates among persons aged ≥10 years have continued to increase in large MSAs collectively as well as nationally. Although the youth firearm suicide rate remained much lower than the overall rate, the youth rate nationally also continued to increase, most notably outside of large MSAs. The findings in this report underscore a continued and urgent need for a comprehensive approach to prevention. This includes efforts to prevent firearm homicide and suicide in the first place and support individual persons and communities at increased risk, as well as lessening harms after firearm homicide and suicide have occurred.

Atlanta, GA: Centers for Disease Control, 2022. 7p.