By FLORE BERGER

Cattle rustling is a major driver of conflict and instability in the Sahel and West Africa. The two groups posing the biggest threat in the Sahel are Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), an al-Qaeda affiliate, and Islamic State Sahel Province (IS Sahel).

These violent extremist organizations (VEOs) rely on cattle rustling as a stable source of income, using the proceeds to fund their operations and acquire necessary resources like weapons. Beyond this, they embed themselves within the broader livestock economy and, in areas where they hold significant influence, they even protect herder communities from looting by other conflict actors – gaining legitimacy in the process. Even further from their traditional operation’s zone in Mali and Burkina Faso, cattle rustling is still a critical aspect to the conflict.

JNIM in particular continues to expand further south, but it is not just territorial expansion – it’s a shift in logistics. JNIM relies on cross-border supply chains, including livestock looting and trafficking, to sustain operations and entrench their presence.

Geneva, SWIT:

The Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime ,

2025. 40p.

By Ruggero Scaturro | Giorgio Fruscione

Violent extremism and organized crime are closely linked in the Western Balkans, but remain under-researched. This study identifies 34 criminal groups that overlap with extremism: 24 violent far-right extremist groups and 10 violent religious extremist groups. Violent far-right extremism is a better documented phenomenon because of its links to nationalist politics and high-ranking government officials. Violent religious extremism gained momentum in the 2010s, rooted in the instability that followed the break-up of Yugoslavia. Groups within both factions are involved in illicit activities, posing a major security threat to the region. This study highlights their criminal connections and advocates for a unified approach to tackling violent extremism and organized crime.

Geneva, SWIT: The Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime 2025. 45p.

By John Jupp, Matthew Garrod

One of the most important legacies of the ‘Troubles’ in Northern Ireland and the ensuing twenty years post peace-process era, heralded by the 1998 Good Friday Agreement, is the rise of complex and diverse Republican and Loyalist paramilitary groups engaging in acts of terrorism and a wide range of organised criminal and cross-border activities. And yet, little scholarship has been dedicated to examining the nexus between terrorism and organised crime in Northern Ireland or to accurately understanding the role that paramilitaries play in organised crime and their dynamic interactions with organised criminal groups. Informed by empirical evidence and qualitative interviews with government agencies in Northern Ireland, it is this increasingly important gap in scholarship that this article aims to fill. It does so by developing a new terrorism-organised crime interaction theoretical model designed specifically for application to Northern Ireland in order to shed new light on the evolution and current complex linkages between terrorism and organised crime in Northern Ireland and beyond. The Northern Ireland model, which both builds on and departs from crime-terror models in existing scholarship, reveals a vast array of domestic and transnational ‘activity assimilation’ and ‘alliances’, as well as other forms of interactions including ‘conflicts’ and different gradations of ‘transformation’. The article concludes that national terrorism-organised crime models, and the Northern Ireland model in particular, albeit with variations to its constituent components to accommodate local situations, are most appropriate for capturing intricate and dynamic interactions between these two phenomena across diverse environments rather than existing models that are abstract and designed for universal application. Northern Ireland presently faces a serious threat to its security and stability posed by the nexus between terrorism and organised crime, and numerous challenges need to be urgently addressed if it is to be combatted. Understanding the organised crime-terrorism nexus at the present moment could not be more vital. Indeed, Brexit and potential implications for the Irish border present by far the most important challenge to the Good Friday Agreement since its adoption and, as a corollary, ensuring that paramilitary groups do not utilise their capacity to re-engage in acts of terrorism. As part of the initial steps towards a solution to some of these challenges, the Northern Ireland model therefore represents a useful tool that could be harnessed, and built upon, by policy makers and government agencies for defining and mapping out the terrorism-organised crime nexus in Northern Ireland.

Falmer, East Sussex, UK: University of Sussex. 2023. 50p.

By SAŠA ĐORĐEVIĆ

Over the past decade, thousands of euros in profit (both legal and illegal) have flowed into and been generated within the Western Balkans to fund violent extremism. While violent religious and far-right extremism share similarities, their financing methods differ in complexity. Cash remains the primary means of moving funds on both sides, aided by the region’s informal economy. Religious extremist groups tend to rely on simpler financial methods and are less dependent on illicit profits. In contrast, violent far-right groups use a mix of legal and illegal funding sources, employing more sophisticated financial strategies. This policy brief examines the financial foundations of violent extremism in the Western Balkans with the aim of strengthening institutional efforts to combat it.

Geneva, SWIT: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime , 2025. 32p.

By Markos Zografos

The Muslim Brotherhood is an organization that was founded in Egypt 1928 with the goal of establishing a global Islamic caliphate. The ideological influences of Wahhabism and Salafism and the socio-political atmosphere of the early 20th century that saw the strengthening of Western colonial expansion and the weakening of Islamic influence in the Middle East set the stage for the organization’s establishment. Ideologically, Wahhabism and Salafism, two purist movements constructed respectively in the late 18th and 19th centuries, called for the removal of what Wahhabists and Salafists perceived as corrupt influences that contaminated a “pure” and “true” Islam. The basic concepts of Islamic purity in Wahhabism, which provided a foundation for Salafism to build upon, asserted the need for an Islamic caliphate to expand in opposition to the Western-influenced governments that embraced religious pluralism. Wahhabism and Salafism thus created an enveloping ideological framework that spawned many 20th century jihadist organizations. The Muslim Brotherhood became one of these jihadist organizations—arguably the most significant one. Since its establishment in 1928, it has expanded its influence into multiple political, non-governmental, and non-state organizations with far-reaching global influence, including but not limited to the Iranian regime after the Islamic Revolution of 1979, Hezbollah, Sudan under Omar al-Bashir, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Hamas, al-Qaeda, and Islamic State (ISIS), as well as several NGOs in present-day North America and Europe. Hand in hand with the drive to construct an Islamic caliphate that would ensure the practice of what the Muslim Brotherhood perceived as a pure and true Islam free from foreign influences, as well as the view that Western expansion posed a threat to Islam’s influence in the world, key Brotherhood members also advocated the evilness of the Jewish people and the need for their eradication. A recurring perception among Muslim Brotherhood members is that Jews conspired behind the West’s ideological and colonialist expansion in order to weaken Islam. Likewise, the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948 significantly exacerbated the genocidal antisemitic rhetoric and practices of the Muslim Brotherhood, and to this day the Brotherhood has been active in slandering and taking hostile actions against Jewish people and the State of Israel in particular. In his book, Islamic Fundamentalism in the West Bank and Gaza: Muslim Brotherhood and Islamic Jihad, Ziad Abu-Amr identifies three key periods in the Muslim Brotherhood’s development: (1) the period of “insurrection” (1928-1949), which were the years of its establishment by and rule under its founder, Hasan al-Banna; (2) the period of “ordeal” (1949- 1967), which followed the assassination of al-Banna and the Muslim Brotherhood’s persecution in Egypt by President Gamal Abdel Nasser, during which it underwent an intellectual resurgence mostly through Sayyid Qutb’s writings, until his execution in 1967; and (3) the period of “differentiation” (1967-present), which is characterized by the renewed vigor of Qutb’s ideas and jihadism in general due to his execution, the exit of the Muslim Brotherhood from its persecution in Egypt, and the further This paper presents an examination of the Muslim Brotherhood and its connected organizations. It aims to show the stages of the Muslim Brotherhood’s development, how the Brotherhood connects to its offshoot organizations, the injustice and violence that occur when any of these organizations manage to gain enough power in order to carry out jihad and enact sharia law, and the rhetoric and practice of Jew hatred in each of the organizations and their key members. In addition, it aims to show how genocidal antisemitism is a core ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood that can be traced throughout its history and the history of its offshoots.

OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES no. 4/2021

Oxford ◆ Cambridge ◆ New York.◆ Jerusalem ◆ Toronto.◆ Rome;

The Institute for the Study of Global Antisemitism and Policy

ISCAP, 2021. 71p.

By Lev Topor

Arguments made by white supremacists to explain, promote, and gain support for their ideology fall into five categories: religious arguments, biological arguments, cultural arguments, arguments based on “protectionism,” and arguments relating to freedom of speech. Furthermore, while nationalism can lead to differences and conflicts between nations, global support for white supremacy can act as a common glue, uniting even historical adversaries, such as Americans and Russians. To explain and exemplify these phenomena, the pseudo-philosophical and pseudoscientific arguments in support of white supremacy are examined in the light of historical, social, and political trends, which all develop the concept of global white supremacy. Thus, while religious arguments in support of white supremacy date back thousands of years, “protectionist” arguments have become more prominent in the wake of terror events in the twenty-first century. They have also entered the mainstream as populists argue that “self-defense” is the only rational response to such threats. Ironically, it is the main idea behind each one of these arguments that ultimately serves to nullify it.

ISGAP’s Occasional Paper Series ISCAP, 2022. 33p.

Oxford ◆ Cambridge ◆ New York.◆ Jerusalem ◆ Toronto.◆ Rome;

The Institute for the Study of Global Antisemitism and Policy

ISCAP, 2022. 33p.

By John P. Sullivan

Crime wars and criminal Insurgencies challenge states as they emerge at the intersection of crime and war. In many nations these conflicts involve protracted gang and drug wars. These situations of insecurity range in the level of intensity and complexity. At times the lower levels of violence result in local consequences: violence and insecurity. In others the criminal organizations challenge the state and establish alternative of parallel power structures. This short paper will discuss these issues by briefly summarizing the situation in Mexico and Colombia. This summary will then identify the need for further research and development of legal and policy approaches in these states, as well as others facing similar challenges such as Brazil and Central America.

REVISTA DO MINISTÉRIO PÚBLICO MILITAR, 2021.

By John P. Sullivan and Nathan P. Jones

Transnational Organized Crime exploits the complex relationships of local and global networks comprised of a range of criminal cartels, mafias, gangs, and corrupt state actors. This article will look at the links among these criminal enterprises and state actors, at municipal, sub-state, and state levels in Latin America to frame the contours of this segment of the global illicit political economy. The networks of alliances and co-operation among criminal cartels, transnational gangs, mafias, and state actors will be assessed. This includes criminal alliances of cartels and gangs with global mafias, the presence of criminal governance, transnational (and third generation) gangs, and links with hybrid threats and influence operations involving state actors. Examples will be drawn from Mexico, Central America, Venezuela, and Brazil. These examples will look at global links between cartels and gangs with transnational mafia such as the ‘Ndrangheta, as well as the use of strategic crime and corruption by states such as Russia, China, and Iran. Methods include a mix of quantitative methods, such as social network analysis (SNA), and qualitative cases studies. International Journal on Criminology • Volume 11, Number 2 • Summer/Fall 2024

By Iftekharul Bashar

The recent arrests in Malaysia confirm that radicalisation within the Bangladeshi diaspora is a significant and evolving threat. This problem stems from socioeconomic factors, homeland instability, and online recruitment. A transparent, collaborative, and multi-faceted P/CVE (Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism) approach is essential to mitigate the risk.

COMMENTARY

Malaysian authorities recently arrested 36 Bangladeshi citizens in Selangor and Johor for their involvement in a radical militant movement promoting Islamic State (IS) ideology. Home Minister Datuk Seri Saifuddin Nasution Ismail reported that these individuals were forming recruitment cells, fundraising for terrorism, and plotting to overthrow the Bangladesh government.

Notably, the network, as detailed by police, raised funds using international fund transfer services and e-wallets, directing money to the IS group in Syria and Bangladesh. This method highlights a growing trend in terrorist financing, leveraging the speed, lower costs, and often less stringent oversight of digital platforms and cross-border money movement to facilitate illicit financial flows globally.

Of those arrested, five have been charged with terrorism-related offences, 15 face deportation, and 16 remain under investigation, with the police anticipating further arrests. Malaysian authorities estimate that 100 to 150 individuals are suspected to be involved in this network, demonstrating the scale of the threat they are actively dismantling.

These arrests are a stark reminder that the threat of extremism continues to cast a long shadow, not just within Bangladesh’s national borders but also across diaspora communities. The arrest of the 36 nationals is not an isolated incident. There have been previous cases of radicalisation of Bangladeshis in Malaysia.

In May 2019, a 28-year-old Bangladeshi mechanic was arrested in Kuala Kedah; he had possessed the necessary chemicals and expertise to produce improvised explosive devices (IEDs). Earlier in January 2017, two Bangladeshi salesmen, aged 27 and 28, were arrested in Kuala Lumpur, reportedly for having ties with suspected IS militants in Bangladesh and for planning to join a terror cell in the southern Philippines.

Singapore, among other nations, has also experienced similar cases in the past, notably in 2015, 2016, and 2020, highlighting a recurring pattern of Bangladeshi diaspora members being targeted and recruited by terrorist networks, including the Islamic State.

S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, NTU Singapore, 2025. 6p.

By Johanna Kleffmann, Swetha Ramachandran, Noah Cohen, Siobhan O'Neil, Mohammed Bukar, Francesca Batault, Kato Van Broeckhoven,

Key Findings • The labelling of banditry as “organized crime,” “unknown gunmen,” or, more lately, “terrorists” has distorted this multi-faceted and still poorly understood phenomenon. Likewise, some of the frames that have been applied to banditry – particularly the farmer/herder conflict or Hausa/Fulani tensions – do not appear to fully align with local communities’ understandings of today’s evolution of banditry. Simplistic categorization and narrow lenses for understanding banditry may contribute to inappropriate or insufficient policy and programmatic responses. MEAC’s survey unearths some of the lived experiences with bandits and sheds light on the nuances of the phenomenon and its profound impact on communities. • Community perceptions of bandit groups corroborate earlier research depicting them as comprised of largely distinct, organized groups, albeit with shifting configurations and subject to fragmentation. Bandit groups operate in highly mobile, armed, and largely forestbased units that use quick-strike attacks on motorbikes against communities. Their motivations are primarily perceived as economic/financial by victims, including the notable subsection of the sample of Fulanis who have been victimized by bandits. • For the surveyed communities, weapons are the most recognizable feature of bandit groups. This bears critical implications for the potential for escalation of violence, further proliferation of illicit arms and ammunition including in the neighbouring regions, community violence reduction efforts and future DDR programming. • Victimisation experiences differ considerably with gender, age, and location in the North West. While physical violence and killings disproportionately affect adult men, sexual violence appears to especially affect women and girls (although it likely remains underreported). Variations of victimization across states indicate the volatile and dynamic nature of overall banditry presence and violence. • Banditry violence has profound and pervasive effects on the physical safety, access to income-generating activities, education, and mobility of residents in the northwestern communities surveyed. The perceived intensity and frequency of attacks are on the rise, with one in three respondents reporting experiencing weekly attacks in recent years. Close to two-thirds of respondents have family members who have been attacked by bandits.

Findings Report 36,

Geneva, The United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research ., UNIDIR, 2024,43p.

By Raneeta Mutiara

Digitalisation of the activities of Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) has been a longstanding issue in Southeast Asia. In recent years, the nature of this threat has become more widespread and complex. In countries like Indonesia, where radicalisation is primarily offline, online platforms still play a role in spreading extremist ideas and maintaining ideological networks. The phenomenon of online radicalisation can erode social cohesion, highlighting the need for strategic measures to counter its destabilising impact.

Indonesia has made several attempts to combat online radicalisation. The National Counter Terrorism Agency of Indonesia (BNPT) initiated the Duta Damai Dunia Maya campaign to counter harmful content on the Internet. Other online initiatives, such as BincangSyariah and Islamidotco, have also been promoting Islamic literacy, moderating religious interpretations, and correcting misleading narratives.

Nevertheless, Indonesia still encounters online radicalisation cases. In July 2024, Indonesia’s elite counterterrorism unit, Densus 88, detained a 19-year-old student who had expressed allegiance to ISIS through social media and was believed to be planning attacks on religious sites before he was caught.

The swift progress of Artificial Intelligence (AI), especially in areas of machine learning (ML) and natural language processing (NLP), presents both opportunities and challenges in combating online radicalisation in Indonesia. AI, generally defined as machines mimicking human intelligence, enables systems to recognise patterns, analyse content, and produce outputs in text, images, and videos. Within this AI landscape, ML allows models to enhance themselves through data, while NLP, as a specific ML application, deals with understanding and generating human language. These advancements provide possibilities for creating early detection systems, content moderation tools, and sentiment analysis tools that can spot and counter extremist messages online.

For the research, the author conducted interviews with fifteen experts across different fields, including law enforcement officers, academics, representatives from civil society organisations (CSOs), and employees of AI start-ups in Indonesia. The qualitative data collected from this process have been analysed through thematic analysis, and the preliminary findings reveal that AI can indeed complement the conventional CVE (countering violent extremism) methods in the country, albeit not without challenges

S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, NTU Singapore, 2025. 6p.

By Aaron M. Hoffman

Critics of terrorism news coverage often describe it as a sensationalized and intimidating area of reporting. However, this characterization offers a misleading guide to the coverage of terrorist threats and attacks, counterterrorism, and community responses to terrorism that appears in U.S. newspapers. Counterterrorism—not terrorist threats or attacks—is the most reported-on subject in newspapers such as the New York Times and Wall Street Journal. Rather than focusing on accounts of terrorist attacks, militarized counterterrorism, or counterterrorism failures, journalists more often cover counterterrorism successes, criminal justice, and diplomatic or community responses to terrorism. The Terrorism News Beat engages thinking about terrorism and the news media from the fields of political science, communication, criminology, economics, and sociology using multimethod research involving more than 2,500 newspaper articles published between 1997 and 2018. Chapters analyze the terrorism news beat’s subject matter, language, and coverage of the Oklahoma City Bombing, Olympic Park bombing, 9/11 attacks, DC Sniper case, and Dallas Police shooting. When it comes to language use, Hoffman finds that, rather than giving into the temptation to convey the news in lurid detail, journalists are minimalists. The language used to depict events on the terrorism beat is typically moderate and extreme words like “torture” appear only as necessary. The Terrorism News Beat shows that contrary to claims of sensationalism, the tone of terrorism coverage becomes even more sober during terrorism crises than it is during non-crisis periods and meets journalistic standards for quality.

Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2025. 255p.

By Gomes Eannes De Azurara (Author), Colin Heston (Editor), Raymond Beazley (Translator)

The Chronicle of the Discovery and Conquest of Guinea is one of the most important early historical sources on the European Age of Discovery. Written in the mid-fifteenth century by Gomes Eannes de Zurara, the royal chronicler of Portugal, the work offers a detailed and vivid narrative of Prince Henry the Navigator’s sponsorship of voyages along the West African coast. Zurara’s chronicle records the systematic exploration of the Atlantic islands and the African shoreline, the capture and enslavement of Africans, and the establishment of the Portuguese presence south of Cape Bojador — a turning point that opened the way for European maritime expansion.

This English edition, translated and edited by historian Charles Raymond Beazley and lusitanist Edgar Prestage for the Hakluyt Society (published 1896–1899), makes Zurara’s text accessible to a modern audience. Their careful translation preserves the rich detail of the original, while their scholarly introduction and notes provide historical context about fifteenth-century Portugal, Prince Henry’s motives, and the wider significance of these early voyages.

Part narrative history, part celebration of Portuguese royal ambition, the chronicle reveals both the triumphs and moral ambiguities of the early encounters between Europe and Africa. It remains an essential source for historians of maritime exploration, Atlantic slavery, and global contact in the late Middle Ages.
This version has been carefully edited, removing unnecessary endnotes, footnotes and other distracting content that distract from a pleasant reading experience.

Read-Me.Org Inc. New York-Philadelphia-Australia. 2025. 267p.

By : Piotr Bąkowsk

The questions of why terrorism occurs and how to stop it have haunted European citizens ever since the series of terrorist attacks across the EU that started in the early 2000s. The idea that someone might become a terrorist by going through a 'radicalisation' process seemed like a plausible explanation and therefore quickly gained ground among EU policymakers. Even though experts still disagree over what radicalisation is and whether focusing on it has really advanced the understanding of terrorism, the idea of the close linkages between the two phenomena has endured for better or for worse. Although the terrorism threat the EU faces has evolved, measures to prevent radicalisation are still a key component of EU counter-terrorism efforts as the radicalisation debate goes on

Brussels: EPRS | European Parliamentary Research Service. 2025 57p.

Edited by Morten Bøås, Gilad Ben-Nun, Ulf Engel, and Kari Osland

Precarious living conditions across the Balkans, the Middle East, and North Africa create fertile ground for radical ideas. Yet, despite genuine grievances and legitimate grounds for anger, most people living in these regions are not radicalized and do not embrace ideas that lead to acts of violent extremism. Which raises the question ... why?

To answer this question, the authors of Resisting Radicalization investigate the nonoccurrence of violent extremism in what they term enabling environments. Their work, the result of a multiyear international project, has critical implications for the future of P/CVE (Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism) programs.

Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2025, 293p.

By Marzia Giambertoni

lthough U.S. policymakers face a variety of complex challenges in addressing transnational terrorism, one underappreciated aspect is Hezbollah's evolving presence in Latin America. Academic literature and government reports almost universally indicate that Hezbollah's activities in the region pose potential threats to U.S. national security. However, there is a significant knowledge gap in existing assessments. In this paper, the author offers an initial exploration of Hezbollah's operational footprint in Latin America, focusing on illicit funding mechanisms, violent operations, and key operational hubs — particularly in the Tri-Border Area and Venezuela. The analysis situates these activities within the broader context of Iran's regional diplomatic, economic, and cultural activities, which partially facilitate conditions amenable to Hezbollah's operations.

The author draws from a variety of open-source materials and reviews publicly available information to provide a foundation for understanding how Hezbollah's networks in Latin America are characterized and discussed publicly. By analyzing the group's operational strategies and historical precedents, the author's framing identifies actionable considerations for U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) leadership while raising awareness of the organization's presence among a broader community of stakeholders. These findings are significant for both DHS and DoD, given the former's counterterrorism mandate in Latin America and the latter's strategic interests in the region. Hezbollah's evolving presence warrants careful consideration from defense planners to effectively address potential challenges to U.S. interests and regional stability.

Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2025, 20p.

By Kateira Aryaeinejad and Thomas Leo Scherer

Over the years, the National Institute of Justice’s (NIJ) funding for research has provided important opportunities to advance our understanding of topics related to crime and justice within the United States. Drawing from this portfolio, this synthesis paper compares and contrasts the data and findings from NIJ-sponsored research projects on violent extremism, mass shootings, and bias crimes. This comparison focuses both on the content of the data and on the creation and coverage of the data, examining findings from four research projects: ■ The Profiles of Individual Radicalization in the United States (PIRUS) database of 2,226 individuals who demonstrated at least 1 of 5 extremist or radicalized behaviors. ■ The Bias Incidents and Actors Study (BIAS) database of 966 adults arrested or indicted for bias crimes. ■ The National Hate Crime Investigation Study (NHCIS) database of 1,230 hate crime cases. ■ The Violence Project dataset of 172 mass shootings. This synthesis first reviews the creation of each dataset and the types of information that are collected to better understand their generalizability and the ability to make comparisons across separate datasets. There are significant differences in the size, time span, and information of the four datasets, which limits the comparisons that can be made between the individuals described in each dataset and necessitates caution in drawing strong conclusions from such comparisons. With that caution in mind, the datasets suggest some similarities in the individuals who commit bias crimes and mass shootings and display violent extremist behavior. These individuals are primarily males in their 20s and 30s and unmarried at the time of their offenses. They may exhibit higher rates of unemployment than the general population and often have prior criminal histories. However, that is not to say that these characteristics should be used as a profile to determine who is at risk of or more likely to commit any of these types of offenses or behaviors. Rather, it calls into question what other factors may be impacting individuals with these characteristics who go on to commit these types of offenses. The datasets also suggest some differences in the individuals who commit each type of offense or behavior. Individuals associated with violent extremism tend to be more educated than those who commit mass shootings or bias crimes. Individuals who commit mass shootings exhibit higher rates of mental health issues than those who commit bias crimes or participate in violent extremism offenses. The comparison of individuals across categories also highlighted differences among individuals who committed the same type of offense. Among individuals who supported violent extremism, for example, those acting in support of far-right ideologies were more likely to have military experience than those following other ideologies. Comparing these datasets highlights their potential and their limitations, suggesting paths forward for future research. The different collection methods show the importance of precisely describing the data collection method, discussing which behaviors are missed by that method, and triangulating among data with different methods to understand what is missing. The differences in the types of information that each dataset collects about each individual and action suggest that future collections could have greater overlap and comparability. The establishment of potential similarities in demographics and life experiences also allows for more targeted data collection focusing on why most individuals who fit that profile do not commit an offense, while others do. In this way, these projects not only contribute to our current understanding of these types of offenses and behaviors but also allow future research and programming to be conducted more effectively.

Washington, DC : U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, National Institute of Justice, 2024. 43p.

By Noor Huda Ismail

Violent extremist groups exploit societal grievances, including climate-related disasters, to gain legitimacy and recruit members by positioning themselves as the true protectors of vulnerable communities. Strategic communication, including AI driven tools, is essential to counter extremist narratives and build resilience against manipulation. There is an urgent need for proactive, transmedia storytelling approaches to address both climate change and violent extremism, ultimately strengthening trust and promoting community unity.

S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, NTU Singapore, 2025. 4p.

By Yarelix Estrada, Jeffery Sauer, Leonardo Dominguez, Izza Zaidi, Andrew J. Trinidad, Hannah Helmy, Alex Harocopos

Background: Drug checking is a harm reduction strategy that provides people who use drugs (PWUD) information about the composition of a substance. Drug checking has been identified as a key public health response to the continually evolving overdose crisis.

Methods: The New York City Health Department of Health and Mental Hygiene (DOHMH) partnered with existing syringe programs to launch a drug-checking pilot study. The study offered multiple point-of-care drug-checking technologies including fentanyl test strips (FTS) and Fourier-transformed infrared (FTIR) spectrometry, as well as secondary laboratory testing. Fentanyl positivity in major drug types was assessed for each drug-checking technology.

Results: Between November 2021 and December 2023, a total of N = 397 unique participants and drop-off samples contributed a total of N = 1644 samples for drug checking. The majority of samples were sold as opioids (n = 908), with fewer sold as cocaine (n = 314) and methamphetamine (n = 62). 95.3 % (852/894) of opioid samples produced positive FTS. FTIR and secondary laboratory testing resulted in a similarly high prevalence of fentanyl in opioid samples at 84.7 % (769/908) and 89.3 % (519/581), respectively. We did not observe the unexplained presence of fentanyl in samples sold as cocaine or methamphetamine. Further, we describe instances where discussions between technicians and PWUD provided important context that explained the presence of fentanyl in non-opioid samples.

Conclusion: The majority of opioid samples submitted to DOHMH's drug-checking pilot study contained fentanyl. Comparatively, there was little evidence suggesting fentanyl in samples sold as cocaine and methamphetamine. The drug-checking pilot study's point-of-care service delivery model was effective in providing information to PWUD.

Drug Alcohol Depend 10.1016/j.drugalcdep.2025.112578. Epub 2025 Jan 27, 47 p.

By  APRIL M. ZEOLI, ALEXANDER D. McCOURT, and JENNIFER K. PARUK 

We present the rationale behind four types of laws that restrict access to firearms for those who are deemed to be a high risk for future gun violence and two types of laws that implement firearm purchase prohibitions. We also present evidence on the effectiveness of these laws. Broadly, these are laws that restrict access for domestic violence abusers, individuals convicted of misdemeanor violence, and individuals at high risk of violence against themselves or others. We briefly discuss relinquishment of firearms by those who are newly restricted, but we focus mainly on how purchase restrictions are implemented by the federal government and across states. Extant research shows that well-implemented firearm policy that is based on evidence-based risk factors can be effective in reducing firearm injury 

  ANNALS, AAPSS, 704, November 2022