by Graeme Newman (Author), Sheldon Glueck (Author)

When a court asks whether a defendant was too mentally ill to be responsible, whose knowledge should decide it: the judge's, the jury's, or the doctor's? A reader's guide to the 1925 book that first mapped the whole problem.

In 1925, a young Harvard scholar named Sheldon Glueck published Mental Disorder and the Criminal Law, a study of nearly seven hundred pages on how American courts handle the mentally ill accused. It appeared while the country was arguing over Leopold and Loeb, over rising murder rates, and over Chief Justice Taft's charge that criminal justice was a disgrace to civilization. Glueck asked how courts find out that a defendant is mentally ill, how the legal tests of insanity were made, what psychiatry actually says about the main mental disorders, and what becomes of defendants who are acquitted. His answer was that the law had cut the mind into separate compartments of knowing, feeling and willing, and that reform had to begin with the unity of the mind.

The book is long, technical and dense with footnotes. This Reader's Guide makes it accessible without replacing it. It explains the argument in plain language, supplies the legal and medical background a modern reader may lack, and shows where the reasoning is strong and where it is open to question.

INSIDE THIS GUIDE

• A reading plan and a chapter-by-chapter map of the original

• The pretrial-examination law of Massachusetts and what its first 113 examinations found

• How the tests of insanity were made, from Hale and the "wild beast" to M'Naghten and the American courts

• The argument that mental processes are a unity, and why it undercuts the old tests

• A table of the main mental disorders of 1925 and what each meant for criminal responsibility

• What happens to defendants acquitted by reason of insanity, and the fight over release

• Glueck's program: neutral experts, a new jury charge, a verdict of partial responsibility, and a commission to decide treatment after conviction

• A worked example that applies his 1925 jury charge to three imaginary defendants

• What has changed since 1925, from Durham to the Insanity Defense Reform Act, and the eugenics assumptions the book shared with its time

• Five common misreadings, a primer of legal terms, a glossary, an annotated reading list, an FAQ, 26 discussion questions and classroom activities

WHO IT'S FOR

Students of law, criminology, psychology, psychiatry and history; teachers and reading groups; and general readers who want to know how the insanity defense came to be the way it is.

PLEASE NOTE

This is an independent guide, not an abridgment or edition of Glueck's book. It does not reproduce the original's text and is not endorsed by the author's heirs or the original publisher. It is meant to be read alongside the original. Download the original book.

Written by Graeme R. Newman with the assistance of Claude, an AI model made by Anthropic. The AI-generated content is disclosed in accordance with Read-Me.Org policy.

Read-Me.Org Inc. New York-Philadelphia-Australia. 2026. p.64.

by Graeme Newman (Author), Sheldon Glueck (Author)

If a man kills because he is certain his victim is plotting against him, and he knows killing is against the law, is he responsible?

In 1962, Sheldon Glueck of the Harvard Law School gave four lectures at Tulane University on one of the hardest questions in criminal law: where to draw the line between the wicked and the ill. Law and Psychiatry: Cold War or Entente Cordiale? reviews the tests of legal insanity, says what is wrong with each, proposes a new one, and argues that lawyers and psychiatrists are quarreling over too small a prize.

This Reader's Guide explains his arguments in plain language, supplies the legal background, and shows what has changed since. Inside are a lecture map, a worked example applying six tests to three imaginary defendants, common misreadings, and discussion questions.

A companion to the original, for students, teachers and curious readers. Download the original book.

Read-Me.Org Inc. New York-Philadelphia-Australia. 2026. p.64.

By Bernard Glueck. Designed and Edited with an Introduction by Graeme R. Newman and Claude.

In 1916, psychiatrist Bernard Glueck made a case that was still radical for its time: that prisons and asylums needed trained psychiatrists on staff, not as outside consultants, but as clinicians embedded in the institution itself. Writing from the criminal department of the Government Hospital for the Insane in Washington, D.C., Glueck laid out five detailed case studies that argued, one patient at a time, for a new way of understanding the criminal mind.

Inside, you'll find:

• A clinical study of psychogenic psychosis in prisoners — the theory that mental breakdown behind bars is often a meaningful reaction to arrest, trial, and confinement, not simply organic illness

• An extended case-by-case analysis of malingering, and the difficult problem of separating feigned symptoms from genuine mental illness

• A study of "litigious paranoia" — the compulsive, self-representing plaintiff who turns the courtroom into an extension of his delusion

• A landmark early psychoanalytic case history of kleptomania

Glueck went on to found the first psychiatric clinic ever established inside an American prison, at Sing Sing, and later served as a psychiatric expert in the Leopold and Loeb trial. He was also the elder brother of criminologist Sheldon Glueck — making this book a companion volume to Read-Me.Org's editions of War Criminals and Probation and Criminal Justice.

This new edition includes a substantial original introduction by Graeme R. Newman, assessing Glueck's century-old argument against the present day: what holds up in modern correctional psychiatry, what doesn't, and a hard look at whether American prisons have actually delivered on the promise Glueck was making in 1916 — including current data on the ongoing shortage of psychiatric staffing across U.S. correctional systems.

A Read-Me.Org Classic Reprint. This is a corrected and reformatted edition of the 1916 first edition (Little, Brown, and Company), prepared from a public domain source text under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License. AI-assisted tools were used in the production of this edition, as disclosed on our website.

Read-Me.Org Inc. New York-Philadelphia-Australia. 2026. p.165.

By Stephen Koppel & René Ropac

The current study isolates the effect of what is arguably the most consequential bail reform provision: eliminating the option to set bail or detain people for most misdemeanor and nonviolent felony charges. The study uses what is known as a “difference-in-differences” causal design—comparing the change in re-arrest rates from before to after initial bail reform implementation among charges seeing the elimination of bail versus charges remaining legally eligible for bail.

What Did We Find?

• Pretrial Recidivism: During the brief pretrial period (capped at 6 months for all cases), eliminating bail had no overall effect on recidivism. However, recidivism increased among a small high-risk group with a pending case.

• Two-Year Recidivism: Over a longer two-year follow-up—including the period both before and after a case disposition—results grew more favorable to bail reform. Charges seeing the elimination of bail had significantly lower felony re-arrest rates than charges still exposed to bail and detention. In addition, there was no longer evidence of a recidivism increase for the “high-risk” subgroup (or any other subgroup).

What's the Upshot?

Our latest study adds to a growing body of research analyzing the effects of New York’s bail reform on public safety. Short-term recidivism increases appear limited to a small high-risk subgroup, with the current study indicating that such increases were no longer present when extending the follow-up period to two years. 

Meanwhile, considering all five of DCJ’s recidivism studies, a pattern emerges that, overall, expanding pretrial release under bail reform reduced recidivism in New York City—especially over a long-term 50-month tracking period—while having no clear effect in suburban and upstate regions. Each prior DCJ study (two in New York City, one outside the City, and a statewide study released last month) reported these overall effects, while adding more nuanced results for key subgroups of interest.